I. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS 4.
Because of this refusal by the respondent, petitioner came to
February 3, 1997 | GR No.122156
PETITIONERS: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
RESPONDENTS: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL
PONENTE: Bellosillo, J.
LINK :
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/feb1997/gr_122156_1997.htm
l The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative
DOCTRINE:
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent
of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
decided to auction 30% to 51% of shares in the Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC).
2. There are only two bidders participated in the sale, held on
September 18, 1995: a) petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation which offered P41.58 per
share for 51%; and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm that
offered to purchase the same amount for P44.00 per share.
3. The winning pending bidder was Renong Berhad, petitioner
who matched the former's bid in a letter to the GSIS dated
October 28, 1995. In a subsequent letter, petitioner sent a
P33-M check as bid security, which the GSIS refused.
the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus. The SC
issued a TRO enjoining respondents from consummating and
perfecting the said sale.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article
XII Section 10, are self-executing (YES)
HELD:
While the Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) may be couched in such a way as
not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing, the legislature is
not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as it is consistent with the
Constitution. The SC remarked that Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement.
The SC added further that there is a presumption that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing and minor details may be left to
the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
1

II. Bayan Muna, v. Alberto Romulo
February 1, 2011 | G.R. No. 159618
PETITIONERS: BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep.
SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L.
MAZA
RESPONDENTS: ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr., J
LINK :
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb2011/gr_159618_2011.htm
l 1. Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack
DOCTRINE:
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines
a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between states in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation."
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group
established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this
case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his
capacity as then Executive Secretary.
2. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome
Statute establishing theInternational Criminal Court (ICC)
with "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for
the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions."
3. In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the
RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a
non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain
persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment
suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals.
4. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents
in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it
be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as
without force and effect.
ISSUE/S:
or excess of jurisdiction in concluding the RP-US Non
Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome
Statute?
2. Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the
concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the
Senate?
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ
from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one
complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of
complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to
Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory
states].” the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary
jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed
within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the
2
ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or
unable to prosecute.

Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference

between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged
to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and
not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is
only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines
to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. And even
assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still
recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into
between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to
the Rome Statute.

The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without

the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been
confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we
have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as
commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has
never been seriously questioned by our courts.

3

III. PITC, v. COA
November 21, 2017 | GR No. 205837
PETITIONERS: PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING
CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON AUDIT
PONENTE: Leonardo- De Castro, J.
LINK:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/nov2017/gr_205837_2017.ht
ml
DOCTRINE:
The court ruled that existing benefits being received by incumbent
government employees as of July 1, 1989, including the car plan
benefits, were not intended to be revoked by the passage of
Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758). The court also held that the car
plan benefits provided by PITC are supportive of the
implementation of the agency's objectives and mission and are
responsive to the exigencies of the service.
FACTS:
1. PITC is a government-owned and controlled corporation that
was created under then President Marcos.
2. Executive Order No. 756 was issued to authorize the
reorganization of PITC.
3. Section 6 of the said EO provides the grant of benefits for
employees who retire, resign or are separated from service
during or as a consequence of the reorganization.
4. Then, to further authorize the reorganization of PITC, E.O.
No. 877 was issued which states that the restructuring and
reorganization should be completed within 6 months from
the date of E.O. No. 877.
5. However, PITC continued to grant the special incentives
provided under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 to its
qualified employees even after the lapse of the six-month
period specified in EO No. 877.
6. The legality of such policy was put in issue and directly
resolved by the Supreme Court in the Decision dated June
22, 2010 (G.R. No. 183517). In the said case, PITC tried to
oppose the COA's disapproval of the claim of a retired PITC
employee for the payment of retirement differentials based
:
on Section 6 of EO No. 756 by filing a petition for certiorari.
7. The motion was dismissed, and ruled that the grant of the
retirement benefits under Section 6 of EO No. 756 was
temporary and limited in nature and the same should have
been restricted to tthe six-month period of the mandated
reorganization of PITC.
8. PITC moved for a reconsideration of the final on September
27, 2010.However, pending the resolution of the said
motion, PITC still allocated part of its retirement benefits
pursuant to Section 6 of EO No. 756.
9. PITC argued that it could continue to allocate part of its
budget for the aforesaid benefits while its motion for
reconsideration was still pending. Should the Court deny its
motion, PITC believed that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
should be applied prospectively.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COA is correct in its observation in the AAR.
(YES)
HELD:
4
Article 8 of the Civil Code declares that "judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines." Article 4 of the Civil Code, on the
other hand, enunciates the rule on non-retroactivity of laws, in that
"laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." Both COA and PITC invokes the case of Co vs. CA
which states the Art. 8 of the civil code and that "the interpretation
upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of
the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. tx" The court
also states the case of Columbia Pictures Inc., vs. CA where the case
of Senarillos vs. Hermosisima was expounded. In its ruling, the court
cited "It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a
part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject
only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is
a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively
and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and
acted in good faith." Applying the foregoing disquisition to the
present case, the Court disagrees with PITC's position that the
Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively.

5

IV. Francisco Chavez, v. JBC
July 17, 2012 | GR No.202242
PETITIONERS: FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
RESPONDENTS: JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR.
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.
LINK :
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_202242_2013.htm
l legislature. Francisco I. Chavez, (petitioner) questioned this
DOCTRINE:
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter "a"
preceding "representative of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves
no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the
members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC.
Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative
from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have,
in no uncertain terms, so provided. It is worthy to note that the
seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose,
that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single
vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members
of the JBC for that matter.
FACTS:
1. A body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process was conceived and called the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) and its composition, term and
functions are provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution which also indicates that the JBC shall be
composed of seven (7) members.
2. In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth
member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the ]BC - one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote.
3. In separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, the JBC En
Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At
present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the ]BC as representatives of the
practice in this petition.
4. The Supreme Court granted the petition.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in
this case; and
2. Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to
perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the
letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to
several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have “standing” to
6
 challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage
injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the
very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
co-equal branch of government is put in issue.The Court representation because no liaison between the two houses
disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be
stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is composed of seven (7) members only. Notwithstanding its
not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not They are not nullified.
at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in
the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over
the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More
importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations
to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is
illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just
for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have
the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal
blunders.
2. Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1)
of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to
sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC
serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution
should there be a stalemate in voting.It is evident that the

7

V. Romulo Macalintal, v. COMELEC
July 10,2003 | GR No. 157013
PETITIONERS: ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management,
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.
LINK :
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jul2003/gr_157013_2003.html
DOCTRINE:
Congress has no general supervision over the COMELEC which is
an independent body, functioning on its own and promulgating
rules and regulations of its own kind. Congress may however
review its orders, decisions, and rulings as specifically provided by
the Constitution.
FACTS:
1. Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the
validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A.
9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:
2. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an
immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee
voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote
for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
3. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is
Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Macalintal's arguments are correct. (NO)
HELD:
There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to
physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for
non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws,
domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a
resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus,
an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to
the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If
the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified
as an absentee voter.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the
intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the
proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential
race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed
COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of
the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in
Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue
of RA 9189.
8

VI. Aniceto Saludo, v. PNB,
August 20, 2018 | GR No.193138
PETITIONERS: ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR
RESPONDENTS: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
PONENTE: Jardeleza, J.
LINK :
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2018/aug2018/gr_193138_2018.ht
ml
DOCTRINE:
Article 1767 of the Civil Code provides that by a contract of
partnership, two or more persons bind themselves to contribute
money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention
of dividing the profits among themselves. Two or more persons
may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession. Under
Article 1771, a partnership may be constituted in any form, except
where immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto, in
which case a public instrument shall be necessary. Article 1784, on
the other hand, provides that a partnership begins from the
moment of the execution of the contract, unless it is otherwise
stipulated.
FACTS:
1. As stated in the Record, SAFA Law Office entered into a
contract of lease with Philippines National Bank on June 11,
1998. PNB agreed to lease 632 square meters of the second
floor of the their Financial Center Building in Quezon City
for three years and for a monthly rental fee of P189,600. The
rental fee is subject to a yearly escalation rate of 10%. SAFA
Law Office then occupied the leased premises and paid
advance rental fees and security deposit in the total amount
of P1,137,600.
2. However, SAFA Law office continued to occupied the lease
premises until February 2005 even if the contract has expired
on August 1, 2001 and discontinued paying its rental
obligation after December 2002. PNB sent a demand letter
for payment dated July 17, 2003 for SAFA Law Office in the
amount of P4,648,086.34. PNB sent another letter
demanding the payment of unpaid rents in the amount of
P5,856,803.53 which was received by SAFA Law Office on
November 10, 2003. SAFA Law office sent a letter dated
June 9, 2004 expressing its intention to negotiate with PNB.
3. PNB sent a demand letter dated July 7, 2005 requiring the
firm to pay its rental arrears in the total amount of
P10,951,948.32. In response, SAFA Law Office sent a letter
dated June 8, 2006, proposing a settlement. However, PNB
declined the settlement proposal in a letter dated July 17,
2006, stating that it was not amenable to the settlement's
term.
4. On September 1, 2006, Saludo, the managing partner of
SAFA Law Office, filed an amended complaint for
accounting and/or recomputation of unpaid rentals and
damages against PNB in relation to the Contract of Lease.
And on October 4, 2006, PNB filed a motion to include
SAFA Law office as Principal plaintiff. On October 23,
2006, Saludo filed his motion to dismiss counterclaims and
claiming that SAFA Law office is only a relationship or
association of lawyers in the practice of law and a single
proprietorship.
5.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Macalintal's arguments are correct. (NO)
9
HELD:
There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to
physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for
non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws,
domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a
resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus,
an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to
the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If
the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified
as an absentee voter.

The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the

intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the
proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential
race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed
COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of
the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in
Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue
of RA 9189.

10

VII. Jesus Nicardo Falcis III, v. Civil Registrar General
September.3, 2019 | GR No.217910
PETITIONERS: JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III
RESPONDENTS: CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
PONENTE: Leonen, J.
LINK :
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2019/sep2019/gr_217910_2019.htm
l
DOCTRINE:
Article 1767 of the Civil Code provides that by a contract of
partnership, two or more persons bind themselves to contribute
money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention
of dividing the profits among themselves. Two or more persons
may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession. Under
Article 1771, a partnership may be constituted in any form, except
where immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto, in
which case a public instrument shall be necessary. Article 1784, on
the other hand, provides that a partnership begins from the
moment of the execution of the contract, unless it is otherwise
stipulated.
FACTS:
1. On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed
pro se before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. His Petition sought to "declare article 1 and 2 of
the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence,
nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code."
2. Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing
Magallona v. Executive Secretary, Araullo v. Executive
Secretary, and the separate opinion of now-retired Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion (Associate Justice Brion) in Araullo.
3. Again citing Associate Justice Brion's separate opinion, he
claims that this Court should follow a "fresh' approach to this
Court's judicial power" and find that his Petition pertains to a
constitutional case attended by grave abuse of discretion.
4. He also asserts that the mere passage of the Family Code,
with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima facie case of grave
abuse of discretion, and that the issues he raised were of such
transcendental importance as to warrant the setting aside of
procedural niceties.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the right to marry and the right to
choose whom to marry are cognates of the right to life
and liberty. (YES)
2. Whether or not the self-identification of petitioner Jesus
Nicardo M. Falcis III as a member of the LGBTQI+
community gives him standing to challenge the Family
Code. (NO)
HELD:
1. YES. Accordingly, the task of devising an arrangement
where same-sex relations will earn state recognition is better
left to Congress. Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into
through a legal framework, and enforceable according to
legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent
"legalness" of marriage, the constitutional right to marry
cannot be secured simply by removing legal barriers to
something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the law itself
must create the "thing" to which one has a right. As a result,
the right to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative
11
 obligation on the state to establish this legal framework.
Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can
delay other more inclusive and egalitarian arrangements that
the State can acknowledge. Prematurely adjudicating issues
in a judicial forum despite a bare absence of facts is
presumptuous. It may unwittingly diminish the LGBTQI+
community's capacity to create a strong movement that
ensures lasting recognition, as well as public understanding,
of SOGIESC.
2. NO. The petitioner, despite being a member of the
LGBTQA+ community does not give him locus standi or
legal standing because the requisite of direct injury from the
outcome of the case is not met. His assertion of not being
able to enter into a same-sex relationship and to settle down
with a partner in the Philippines cannot be considered as a
direct injury or sufficient interest to warrant legal standing in
this case. His assertions of injury for the inability to find a
same-sex partner and to settle down in his country cannot be
directly linked to the existence of the Family Code as the
definitive cause and thus, non sequitur.

12

VIII. AM No.02-11-11-SC, RE: PROPOSED RULE ON
LEGAL SEPARATION
March 4, 2003
Title
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON LEGAL
SEPARATION
Date of Effectivity
The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003
following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation not later than March 7, 2003
Scope
This Rule shall govern petitions for legal separation
under the Family Code of the Philippines. (Section 1)
Link https://lawphil.net/courts/supreme/am/am_02-11-
11-sc_2003.html
Legal separation is a legal process by which a married couple may
legally separate from each other while still remaining married. This
proposed rule aims to provide guidelines and procedures for
individuals seeking legal separation.
The proposed rule on legal separation includes provisions such as
grounds for legal separation, filing requirements, and the process for
obtaining a legal separation decree. It also outlines the rights and
obligations of the spouses during the legal separation process,
including issues related to child custody, support, and the division of
properties. The Supreme Court of the Philippines has issued this
administrative matter to seek public comments and inputs on the
proposed rule. Interested parties, such as lawyers, stakeholders, and
the general public, are encouraged to submit their comments and
suggestions to the Supreme Court.
This proposed rule on legal separation aims to provide clear and
comprehensive guidelines for individuals seeking legal separation in
the Philippines. It seeks to ensure that the legal separation process is
fair, just, and in accordance with the law.
Key Points:
1. The proposed rule on legal separation aims to provide a clear
and standardized process for couples seeking legal
separation instead of divorce.
2. The proposed rule requires couples to meet certain eligibility
criteria, such as being married for a specific period of time or
having irreconcilable differences.
3. The rule outlines the process for filing a petition for legal
separation, including the required documentation and fees.
4. It establishes guidelines for property division, spousal
support, child custody, and visitation rights during legal
separation.
5. The proposed rule also emphasizes the importance of
mediation and alternative dispute resolution methods to
encourage amicable resolutions between the parties
involved.
6. It addresses the issue of financial responsibilities during
legal separation, including the division of debts and financial
support for children.
7. The rule also highlights the rights and responsibilities of
both parties during legal separation, including the obligation
to maintain confidentiality and not to interfere with each
other's lives.
8. It provides provisions for the termination of legal separation,
either by reconciliation or by converting it into a divorce.
13
 9. The proposed rule seeks to streamline the legal separation
process, ensuring fairness and consistency for all parties
involved.
IX. Sps. Maximo Espinosa and Winifreda De Vera, v.
Sps. Mayandoc
July 3, 2017 | GR. No. 211170
PETITIONERS: SPOUSES MAXIMO ESPINOZA AND
WINIFREDA DE VERA
RESPONDENTS: SPOUSES ANTONIO MAYANDOC AND
ERLINDA CAYABYAB MAYANDOC
PONENTE: Peralta, J.
LINK : 5. Respondents appealed, but the CA affirmed the
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63098
DOCTRINE:
Article 1767 of the Civil Code provides that by a contract of
partnership, two or more persons bind themselves to contribute
money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention
of dividing the profits among themselves. Two or more persons
may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession. Under
Article 1771, a partnership may be constituted in any form, except
where immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto, in
which case a public instrument shall be necessary. Article 1784, on
the other hand, provides that a partnership begins from the
moment of the execution of the contract, unless it is otherwise
stipulated.
FACTS:
1. A parcel of land originally owned by Eusebio Espinoza was
divided among his heirs: Pastora Espinoza, Domingo
Espinoza and Pablo Espinoza.
2. On May 25, 1972, a fictitious deed of sale was executed by
petitioner Maximo's father, Domingo Espinoza, conveying
the three-fourth (3/4) share in the estate in favor of
respondent Erlinda Cayabyab Mayandoc's parents under
TCT No. 28397.
3. On July 9, 1977, a fictitious deed of sale was executed by
Nemesio Cayabyab, Candida Cruz, petitioners-spouses
Maximo Espinoza and Winifreda De Vera and Leopoldo
Espinoza over the land in favor of respondents- spouses
Antonio and Erlinda Mayandoc under TCT No. 37403.
4. As a result of the foregoing, petitioners filed an action for
annulment of document with prayer for the nullification of
TCT No. 37403 before the RTC and a Decision was rendered
in favor of the petitioners.
RTC.Respondents filed a complaint for reimbursement for
useful expenses alleging that the house in question was built
on the disputed land in good faith. However, petitioners
argued that respondents can never be considered as builders
in good faith because the latter were aware that the deeds of
sale over the land in question were fictitious and, therefore,
null and void.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondents were builders in good faith. (
YES)
HELD:
Yes. To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person
asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e., that he be a possessor
in the concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in
his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Bad
faith should be established by clear and convincing evidence since
the law always presumes good faith. Anyone who claims that
someone is in bad faith has the duty to prove such. In this case,
14
petitioners were not able to prove that respondents were in bad faith
in constructing the house on the subject land.
Furthermore, Article 448 of the Civil Code must be applied when the
builder believes that he is the owner of the land or that by some title
he has the right to build thereon, or that, at least, he has a claim of
title thereto. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of
forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving
the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter
to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to
exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to
exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing
Thus, this case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings to
assess the current fair market of the land and to determine other
matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in
relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code.

15
 (Legaspi) with prayer for issuance of letters testamentary
before the RTC.
2. Petitioner is the de facto adopted daughter of Legaspi
3. Legaspi left a notarial will, instituting the petitioner, Orlando
Castro, Perpetua Sablan Guevarra, and Remigio Legaspi
X. Margie Santos Mitra, v. Perpetua S. Guevarra Sablan, as her heirs, legatees and devisees; that Legaspi left
April 18, 2018 | GR No.213994 real and personal properties
4. Perpetua L. Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio L. Sablan
(respondents), who claim to be Legaspi's legal heirs,
PETITIONERS: MARGIE SANTOS MITRA
opposed the petition. They aver that the will was not
RESPONDENTS: PERPETUA L. SABLAN-­GUEVARRA,
executed in accordance with the formalities required by law;
REMEGIO L. SABLAN, ET AL.
that since the last page of the will, which contained the
PONENTE: Reyes Jr., J.
Acknowledgement, was not signed by Legaspi and her
LINK :
instrumental witnesses, the will should be declared invalid;
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/6422
that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages
3
upon which the will was written; and that the will was
executed under undue and improper pressure, thus, Legaspi
DOCTRINE:
could not have intended the document to be her last will and
The last page of the will is but a mere continuation of the
testament.
Acknowledgement portion, which the testator and the witnesses
5. The RTC rendered a Decision[7] admitting Legaspi's will to
are not required to signWhat is imperative for the allowance of a
probate.
will despite the existence of omissions is that such omissions must
6. The CA reversed the judgment of the RTC, as the CA
be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need
adhered to the view of strictly complying with the
of resorting to extrinsic evidence.
requirement of stating the number of pages of the will in the
An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation attestation clause. Moreover, the CA detected another
clause indeed failed to state the number of pages comprising the supposed fatal defect in the will: the photocopy of the will
will. However, as was the situation in Taboada, this omission was submitted by the respondents on appeal did not contain the
supplied in the Acknowledgment. signatures of the instrumental witnesses on each and every
page thereof.

ISSUE/S:
FACTS:
1. Whether the failure to sign the last page of the will is
1. Margie Santos Mitra (petitioner) filed a petition for the fatal to the will’s validity. (NO)
probate of the notarial will of Remedios Legaspi y Reyes 2. Whether the failure to state the number of pages in the
attestation clause will invalidate the will. (NO)

16
HELD:

The Court REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the CA

and AFFIRMED the RTC.

1. No. It is a skewed stance in insisting that the testator Legaspi

and the instrumental witnesses should have signed on the last
page of the subject will. When Article 805 of the Civil Code
requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it
necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where
the last testamentary dispositionends. As the probate court
correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not
contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere
continuation of the Acknowledgment.
2. No. In Taboada vs. Hon. Rosal, the Court allowed the
probate of a will notwithstanding that the number of pages
was stated not in the attestation clause, but in the
Acknowledgment. In Azuela vs. CA, the Court ruled that
there is substantial compliance with the requirement, if it is
stated elsewhere in the will how many pages it is comprised
of.

17

XI. AM No.21-03-02-SC, Rules on Action for Support
and Petition for Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Decisions or Judgments on Support
March 23, 2021
Title
RULES ON ACTION FOR SUPPORT AND
PETITION FOR RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN DECISIONS
OR JUDGMENTS ON SUPPORT
Date of Effectivity
These Rules shall take effect on 31_ May 2021
following their publication in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation.
Scope
These Rules shall govern all actions for support filed by
those entitled to support under the Family Code of the
Philippines and other laws obliging an individual to
provide support to another person, including petitions
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
or decisions for support.
These Rules shall not preclude the filing of a verified
application for support pendente lite under Rule 61,
2019 Amendments to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, and spousal and child support under the
Rule on Provisional Orders, and shall apply to children
regardless of the marital status of their parents.( Section
1)
Link https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/202
2/11/21-03-02-SC.pdf
The Rules on Action for Support and Petition for Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Decisions or Judgments on Support provide
guidelines and procedures for individuals seeking support from
another person, as well as those seeking the recognition and
enforcement of foreign decisions or judgments on support in the
country.
These rules aim to ensure that individuals who are entitled to support
receive the necessary assistance, and that foreign decisions or
judgments on support are recognized and enforced in a fair and
efficient manner. It cover various aspects of support actions and
recognition/enforcement proceedings, including the jurisdiction of
the courts, venue, parties involved, pleadings and motions, evidence,
and the issuance of orders and judgments.
In support actions, the rules outline the requirements for filing a
petition, the determination of support obligations, the rights and
obligations of the parties, and the enforcement of support orders. For
recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions or judgments on
support, the rules provide procedures for filing a petition, the
requirements for recognition and enforcement, and the factors
considered by the court in deciding whether to grant recognition and
enforcement. The rules also address issues such as modification or
termination of support orders, remedies for non-compliance, and the
confidentiality and protection of personal information in support
cases.
Overall, the Rules on Action for Support and Petition for
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Decisions or Judgments on
Support aim to ensure that individuals entitled to support receive the
necessary assistance, and that foreign decisions or judgments on
support are given appropriate recognition and enforcement in the
Philippines.
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XII. Joseph Estrada, v. Desierto
December 9, 2004 | GR No. 156160
PETITIONERS: JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
RESPONDENTS: ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST
CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.
PONENTE: Puno, J.
LINK:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/mar2001/gr_146710_2001.ht
ml
DOCTRINE:
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written.
It can be expressed. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.
FACTS:
1. After the people's clamor in EDSA for him to resign from his
position, Petitioner Joseph Estrada issued a statement that he
will be leaving the Malacañang Palace in order to have a
peaceful transition of power and start the healing of the
nation warped by confusion due to his impeachment trial.
Nevertheless, he sent a letter to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House stating that he is temporarily unable to
perform the duties of the office of the President and let then
Vice-President Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
assume the position of Acting President.
2. Later, the Office of the Ombudsman filed plunder and
perjury charges against the Petitioner. A special panel of
prosecutors were assigned to investigate the charges against
the Petitioner. Thus, the Petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition before the Supreme Court. He alleged that he
cannot be criminally charged by the Ombudsman on the
ground of immunity from suit. He claimed that he is still the
President of the Philippines, and that Respondent is merely
holding the position in an acting capacity. Further, he
claimed that he cannot be considered as to have resigned
because he is prohibited by law from resigning since he was
under an investigation, i.e. an impeachment trial.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner resigned as
President.(YES)
2. Whether or not the Petitioner was temporarily incapable
of exercising the Presidency. (NO)
3. Whether or not the Petitioner is immune from suit, and if
so, up to what. (YES)
HELD:
1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in a resignation, there
must be an intent to resign, and that intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
government by any formal requirements as to form since it
can be oral or written, expressed or implied. So long as the
resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal effect.
In the present case, it was established the Petitioner resigned
from his position as President of the Philippines. According
to the Angara Diary, which serialized the final days of the
Petitioner in Malacañang Palace, the Petitioner made
pronouncements which was interpreted as intention of giving
up the position such as when he proposed a snap election
19
 where he would not be a candidate; non-defiance to the Further, the Petitioner cannot claim that he is immune from
request of a peaceful and orderly transfer of power; prior suit because he was not convicted by the Impeachment
agreement to the transfer of power with conditions as to the Court. To allow such situation will put a perpetual bar
state of the Petitioner and his family; and the issuance of a against his prosecution, which were criminal in nature.
statement wherein the Petitioner leaves the palace, the seat of Hence, the Petitioner is not immune from suit.
the Presidency, for the sake and peace and order. Hence, the
resignation of the Petitioner was implied by his actions to
leave the Presidency.
2. NO. The Court ruled that it is not within its jurisdiction to
review whether the Petitioner was temporarily incapable of
exercising the Presidency for being political in nature, and
addressed solely to Congress, as provided in the
Constitution. Even if the Petitioner can prove that he did not
resign, the Petitioner cannot successfully claim that he was
merely on leave because Congress recognized the
Respondent as the de jure president, which cannot be
reviewed by the Court without violating the principle of
separation of powers. In the present case, both Houses of
Congress recognized the Respondent as the President when
they issued Resolutions to the said effect. Further, both
Houses issued a Resolution approving the selection and
appoint of Sen. Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President.
Further, finally, both Houses started sending bills to be
signed into law by the Respondent. Hence, the Petitioner was
not temporarily incapable to exercise the Presidency because
he resigned as President, and Houses of Congress already
recognized the legitimacy of the Respondent.
3. NO. The Court held that presidential immunity was granted
only during the term of the President In order to prevent
delay in actions on important matters by the Chief Executive
due to litigations that may be lodged against him. The said
immunity does not apply beyond the term of the President.
In the present case, the Petitioner cannot claim that he cannot
be sued before the Ombudsman because he was immune
from suit. In fact, the Petitioner cannot cite any decision that
the President has post-tenure immunity from liability.

20