The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No.

3, July–September 2020

Government Communications, Political Trust

and Compliant Social Behaviour: The Politics of
Covid-19 in Britain
KENNETH NEWTON

Abstract
It is commonly said that the lockdowns and social distancing necessary to control coron-
avirus pandemics will only work if the general population trusts its government, believes the
information it provides, and has confidence in its policies. This article traces the British gov-
ernment’s record in providing information about its policies and performance, and compares
this with the public’s use of the mainstream news media. It then considers how these two
sources of information affected trust in government and public compliance with social dis-
tancing and lockdown rules. Lastly, it compares Covid-19 with Brexit and draws conclusions
about how beliefs and behaviour are formed when individuals are personally faced with a
serious threat.
Keywords: Covid-19, government information, mainstream news, trust, social compliance

IT IS REASONABLE to assume that social com-
pliance with the difficult and stressful beha-
viour required to stop the spread of diseases
such as Covid-19 are dependent on the pop-
ulation’s trust and confidence in the govern-
ment that is imposing lockdown and social
distancing rules. Based on its massive
knowledge of public opinion and behaviour,
this is what the Gallup Poll, for example, has
to say about the matter.
People’s trust in the medical advice and
information they get from their government
will be crucial in the coming days and weeks
as the countries on the frontlines of COVID-
19 outbreaks in Western Europe and the U.S.
step up their mitigation strategies.
Somewhat fortunately, before the arrival of
the COVID-19 pandemic, substantial majori-
ties of residents in Italy, the United King-
dom, Germany, France, Spain and the United
States said they trust the medical advice and
information they receive from their govern-
ments.
Gallup reports that 81 percent of the pop-
ulation in the UK in 2018 said they had a lot
or some trust in the government’s medical
and health advice, and 18 per cent said they
had not much or none. The comparable fig-
ures in Germany, the highest trust country,
were 83 and 13 per cent, and in Italy, the
lowest, 63 and 36 per cent.1
How the British government has commu-
nicated with the public and what it has com-
municated have played a major part in
determining how citizens have come to view
their government and how they have
behaved during the Covid-19 pandemic. But
the evidence does not confirm the claim that
trust in government is crucial or that compli-
ance with lockdown behaviour is dependent
upon this trust.
The evidence for these conclusions is pre-
sented in three main parts. The first considers
the content of government communications,
including the background context of a long
tradition of secrecy in British government, the
example the government set in its own beha-
viour, and its frequent claims that its policies
were following the science. The second part
turns to the role of the mainstream media in
informing the public about the pandemic and
the attention paid to the news by the public.
The third part considers how the combination
of government behaviour and media informa-
tion caused opinion to swing from trust in the

502 © 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use
and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations
are made.
 1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
government to distrust, and how this led their expert views were confidential, so the
many to make up their own minds about how wider world was unable to tell whether the
best to protect themselves and others from the government was actually following the
disease. science, as it claimed. Under pressure, it
revealed SAGE membership and the group
itself released records showing that there was
Government information, lack of sometimes disagreement about alternative
information, misinformation, and courses of action, some heeded by the govern-
disinformation ment, some not. Concern was expressed about
the proper functioning of the committee when
Secrecy it was discovered that the Prime Minister’s
policy advisor, Dominic Cummings, and
A background factor in the official Covid-19
another political appointee of Number Ten,
information campaign is a long-established
had attended its meetings.4 When lockdown
tradition of secrecy in British government.
was delayed on the grounds that research
This caused problems years before the onset
showed the need to avoid lockdown fatigue,
of the pandemic. Experts informed us that flu
there was speculation about the nature and
and virus pandemics had occurred with
reliability of research used to justify inaction
increasing frequency since the Asian flu of
when earlier action would save lives.
1957 and that we should expect another one
Secrecy was also built into the emergency
sooner or later, probably sooner. As a result,
powers of the government to award con-
three simulations were run to test the coun-
tracts to companies without open tendering,
try’s ability to deal with such a crisis and to
sometimes with confidential commercial
make recommendations: Winter Willow
clauses, sometimes not divulged until after
(2007), Exercise Cygnus (2016), and, in Scot-
the event, and sometimes awarded to com-
land, Exercise Iris (2018). All found serious
panies without the resources or experience
failings, and among their recommendations
to deliver services quickly and efficiently.5
they picked out: the need to stockpile equip-
As John Denham puts it, ‘Commercial confi-
ment; the need for close coordination between
dentiality ensures minimal scrutiny’.6 Mini-
levels of government; the need to shield those
mal scrutiny has many possible
most at risk in care homes; and the heavy
consequences ranging from inefficiency to
demands of testing, tracking and isolating.
corruption and public distrust.
Little was known about Exercise Cygnus
One of the most prominent features of the
until it was leaked in 2020, but it seems that
daily press briefings during the pandemic
its publication was suppressed because it was
was the official announcement of daily Covid-
‘too terrifying’ for the public, partly because
19 deaths. Initially, these included care home
the chief medical officer at the time concluded
figures, but these were then then omitted
that the NHS had clearly failed the Cygnus
from the total. When it became clear from
test.2 In any case, care homes were not
other sources that care home deaths were high
informed of its recommendations, so could
and increasing, the government included the
not implement them in 2020. It seems that the
figures in the total once again, increasing
government’s Scientific Advisory Group for
them by a substantial amount. Not releasing
Emergencies (SAGE) did not know about, or
the figures aroused suspicion and had a big-
did not discuss the report in January or Febru-
ger impact on public opinion when it was rea-
ary.3 Publication of reports like Cygnus might
lised how large they were. More distrust was
put pressure on governments to take action
aroused by government ministers failing to
on their recommendations and provide infor-
answer directly questions from the press and
mation for those who need to know. Besides,
public during these press briefings.
lack of PPE and the high care home death rate
both came back to bite the government and
publication would have saved them trouble in Vagueness
the longer run.
Government secrecy had other conse- Some of the most important information
quences. Initially, the members SAGE and broadcast by the government was confusing

GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS, POLITICAL TRUST AND COMPLIANT SOCIAL

B E H A V I O U R 503

© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)

and contradictory.7 In the first daily press
meetings the government repeated that a pri-
mary objective was ‘flattening the curve’, a
phrase that PR experts found unappealing
and ineffective. On 16 March the Prime Min-
ister announced that it would not be neces-
sary to shut schools, yet on 20 March
schools were shut until further notice. When
the government started easing the lockdown,
most people thought the new slogan, ‘Stay
alert’, was meaningless and the regional gov-
ernments of Wales and Scotland rejected it.
When schools were partially re-opened, the
government issued vague and confusing
directives, and repeated the same mistake
when shops followed suit and airport immi-
gration officers had to enforce new quaran-
tine rules. There were days of conflicting
messages about the need to wear face masks
in shops and public places. Lack of clarity
frequently caused distraction from the main
business of managing the crisis, and sug-
gested a lack of thought and planning as
well as a failure to master the basics of com-
munication with the public. This added to a
general feeling that the government was not
handling things well.
Setting an example
The government broke its own rules. On the 3
March 2020 the government asked people not
to shake hands, yet on the same day the Prime
Minister stated that he was shaking hands
with everyone. The first televised daily meet-
ings with the press showed him flanked by
medical advisors clearly breaking their two
metre social distancing rule. When officials in
England, Scotland, and abroad broke the lock-
down rules, they resigned their official posts,
but those close to Number Ten did not.
Dominic Cummings’ trip to Barnard Castle
and Durham had a big impact (discussed
below) on public opinion. Among Western
political leaders the Prime Minister was one
of the last to appear in public wearing a face
mask (and only two days before Trump).
Following the science
The government has made a point of empha-
sising that its policies followed the lead of
science, backing its claim by flanking the PM
504 KENNETH NEWTON
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3 © 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
and Cabinet ministers with scientific advi-
sors at daily press meetings over the follow-
ing weeks. Since Covid-19 was new, there
was almost no science to follow about this
specific form of the disease, but, and it is a
big but, there was ample science in general
about how to deal with coronavirus out-
breaks—science that was well understood
and widely available. That science said that
early, decisive action was essential to pre-
vent the disease spreading; a large stockpile
of medical supplies and equipment was nec-
essary; a clear plan of action was needed,
preferably laid down in advance when there
was calm and time to think carefully, as
Winter Will, Cygnus and Iris had done; close
coordination between key players; testing,
tracing, and isolating the infected; a lock-
down of the population; international coop-
eration; and a ban on travellers from
hotspots abroad. Above all, the science
emphasised that rapid, decisive, and early
action was essential.
The government did not so much follow
this science as ignore most of it. In spite of
increasingly urgent warnings coming from
the Chinese government, the World Health
Organization (WHO), SAGE, and The Lancet,
the weeks from February to mid-March were
a period of indecision and inaction. Boris
Johnson missed five consecutive emergency
meetings of SAGE, earning him the nick-
name of the ‘part-time Prime Minister’ and
being reported as ‘missing in action’. Some
18 million people arrived in Britain by air in
the three months before lockdown, and tour-
ists disembarked from cruise ships from
virus hotspots (and which were themselves
virus hotspots), the great majority without
testing and free to travel home and mix at
will. All this was reported prominently in
the press. Not generally known at the time,
but exactly what the pandemic simulations
had warned against, large numbers of older
people were transferred out of hospitals—in
order to clear beds for coronavirus patients
—to care homes where they spread the dis-
ease among those most at risk.
As days, then weeks, passed, scientists
and experts continued to repeat the urgent
need for action, repeating the mantra of test,
trace, isolate, and lockdown, all of which
soon became common knowledge. The
media reported the stark news coming out
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)

of Italy and Spain, and what the Germans
were doing to control the spread of the
virus. In early March the Prime Minister
announced his main weapons against this
contagious and deadly disease: hand wash-
ing while singing ‘Happy Birthday’ and not
touching your face.
The government did not come out publicly
with a plan of action until mid-March, but it
was really a plan of inaction that failed to
comply with the science: tracking and tracing
was not to be attempted; testing was limited
to those admitted to hospital; there was little
attempt to build a stock of PPE; no evidence
of a plan of action for the next weeks and
months; no lockdown; schools were not
closed; large gatherings were not banned; few
travellers from abroad were tested and quar-
antined. Even though the risk was raised from
moderate to high the Prime Minister gave
vague, soft advice to stay at home for those
with symptoms (though people without
symptoms can be infectious), avoid unneces-
sary travel and contact with others, and avoid
cruise ships if over seventy.
Expert scientific reaction was loud and
widespread. Professor William Hanage, an
epidemiologist at Harvard, wrote that he
thought the Prime Minister’s outline policy
was satire when he first read it, an example
of strange British humour.8 Those who
started social distancing and semi-isolation
in the first week of March watched the daily
press briefings with disbelief as the govern-
ment continued to delay the inevitable.
When the national lockdown was
announced on 23 March, the virus had more
or less free rein for fifty-two days after the
first infection was recorded on 1 February
2020. The UK was one of the last European
countries to go into general lockdown,
although by that time it had one of the high-
est daily rates of death and infection. Mem-
bers of SAGE have calculated that the failure
to lockdown earlier cost lives—perhaps as
many as 20,000. A model devised for Chan-
nel 4’s Dispatches programme estimated that
a lockdown on 16 March in the UK might
have saved 8,000 lives; four days earlier it
might have saved 13,000. On 16 July the
government’s chief scientific advisor, Sir
Patrick Vallance, told the science and tech-
nology committee of the House of Commons
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS, POLITICAL TRUST
© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
that SAGE had advised the government to
start lockdown a week before it did.
A report of the National Audit Office
states that the only central stockpile of PPE
was designed for a flu epidemic, not the
gowns and visors an official committee had
recommended in 2019. Consequently, the
volume of required PPE available fell far
short of requirements listed by the commit-
tee of experts.9 Of the 33 million respirator
masks in the 2009 procurement, only 12 mil-
lion were distributed. The government failed
to explain what happened to the rest, except
to say that limited demand for masks meant
they were not handed out; another puzzle,
given that demands for masks and other
PPE were repeated loudly and often.
The three pandemic simulations discussed
above were clear about the need to shield
vulnerable staff and residents in care homes.
On 25 February the government released its
guidance notes for community care and resi-
dential care homes. Face masks were not
needed, visiting not banned, and there was
no need to do anything different because ‘It
remains very unlikely that people receiving
care in a care home . . . will become
infected.’10 The document was withdrawn
on 13 March but around 25,000 people were
discharged from hospitals into care homes
between 17 March and 15 April and it is not
known how many were tested for Covid-19.
Until late April neither staff nor residents
were tested routinely unless they had symp-
toms, but when tested later, it was found
that 42 per cent of staff and residents with-
out symptoms were positive. Furthermore,
many staff move between care homes carry-
ing infection with them and the general
underfunding of care homes has left them
especially vulnerable to infectious disease.11
Moving the scientific goalposts
When the stocks of PPE were first dis-
tributed, some equipment with a use-by date
of 2016 had a sticker placed over this infor-
mation with a new date of 2020.12 Similarly,
care workers were informed that masks from
the government stockpile that were past
their use-by date were deemed fit for use by
official sources.13 Medical staff reacted
strongly against the government telling them
AND COMPLIANT SOCIAL
B E H A V I O U R 505
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3

that they should use the PPE more than once
and that full length medical gowns were not
necessary, both contrary to the accepted
safety practices.14
The timing and sequencing of lifting the
lockdown was another problem, starting
with the first efforts to open schools when
the government broke its own rules for start-
ing the process.15 The SAGE assessment said
it ‘cannot be clear’ that opening up schools
would not lead to an increase in infections’.16
Independent SAGE put it more bluntly:
schools should not re-open on June 1,
because there is no clear evidence that it was
safe.17 In any case, lifting lockdown and
keeping the rate of infection low depends on
rigorous and effective testing, tracking, and
isolating, but tracking and isolating were still
experiencing teething problems. Further-
more, the absence of a mobile app limited
the ability to track extensively. The chief sci-
entific advisor urged caution: the country
did not meet the WHO’s six criteria for lift-
ing lockdown measures, and the UK was
placed 163 on a list of 168 countries in terms
of its readiness to exit lockdown.18
It is rightly said that when you cross poli-
tics with science, what you get is politics.19
However, it is not clear what exactly hap-
pened during the Covid pandemic and
research will probably reveal an inevitably
complicated and muddled process. Did
politicians try to follow a science that was
wrong, or did they pick the most convenient
recommendations from conflicting advice?
Was groupthink involved, or maybe the sci-
entists provided what the politicians wanted
to hear? Or, more likely, that scientists rec-
ommended options that were practicable,
given the parlous state of the NHS, the pub-
lic health system, and the mindset of their
political masters?20 There are bound to be
delays in making decisions and then again
in implementing them. Any and all of these
are possible and must remain open for any
enquiry into the handling of the pandemic.
What is clear now is that in spite of its fre-
quent claims, government policy did not, for
whatever reason, follow the general science
of pandemic control so far as testing, track-
ing, isolating, lockdown, protecting the
elderly and others most at risk, and those
frontline workers who depended on a reli-
able supply of PPE. And, as discussed
506 KENNETH NEWTON
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3 © 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
below, many members of the public knew
this.
Government information,
misinformation, and
disinformation
Secrecy, lack of information, unclear and
ineffective messaging, setting a bad example,
and ignoring the science all played their part
in the course of the pandemic, but more
important for the political attitudes and
behaviour of the population was official mis-
information. In an era of fake news, conspir-
acy theories, alternative facts, and
propaganda, a distinction must be drawn
between information, misinformation, and
disinformation. By information is meant fac-
tual statements that are consistent with the
best available evidence at the time; disinfor-
mation is incorrect but provided in good
faith without intent to deceive; misinforma-
tion is incorrect and intended to deceive.
Government misinformation was a frequent
occurrence during the British pandemic.
It started on 31 January when the EU
began planning for the bulk purchasing of
PPE. Britain could have joined this effort but
declined, saying it was making its own
arrangements. It then changed its story say-
ing that it had not received EU emails invit-
ing Britain to participate, although British
officials had attended EU meetings. A senior
Whitehall official then said that the decision
had been political, but retracted the state-
ment the next day.
In the early days, several government offi-
cials went on record, stating that one aim of
their policy was to create herd immunity.
When it was realised that this would might
entail millions of infections and up to half a
million deaths, it was officially denied that
herd immunity was ever part of the policy.
If there is any truth in this denial, it rests on
a hair-splitting distinction between policy
and an inevitable consequence of policy.21
The widespread criticism of the govern-
ment for its failure to deliver adequate sup-
plies of PPE provoked it into making false
claims about the amount distributed and the
imminence of fresh supplies. One large ship-
ment of equipment was said to be arriving,
but seemed not have been distributed three
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)

weeks later. Another consignment was
claimed to be arriving on a Monday, when it
was actually going to be ordered on that
day. When part of it arrived a few days later
some items were found unfit for use. On
another occasion, the Health Secretary, Matt
Hancock, announced that that a massive
effort had resulted in over a billion items of
PPE being delivered. It later transpired that
the billion included many items not usually
thought of as PPE (such as body bags, clini-
cal waste containers and cleaning equip-
ment) and surgical gloves were counted
singly, not in pairs. The figure of a billion
was an overestimation by many millions.
Covid testing produced another batch of
misinformation. Under intense pressure, the
number of daily tests increased a little, until
on 29 March the Health Secretary announced
that a 10,000 target had been met. The fact
check organisation Full Fact finds no data to
support the claim and the figure confuses
the number of tests and the number of peo-
ple tested.22 Since testing is a difficult job,
the same person may be tested two or three
times to get it done properly. A goal of
100,000 tests a day by the end of April was
then announced and repeated frequently,
although it provoked much scepticism.
When the day arrived, it was claimed that
the target had been exceeded by a substan-
tial margin, but it turned out that the figure
included tests that had been put in the post,
though whether they had actually been car-
ried out, returned, or processed was
unknown. The next day recorded 85,000
actual tests. The nature of testing figures
caused the head of the UK Statistics Author-
ity to write letters to the Health Secretary on
11 May and 2 June, the second saying that
the government’s aim ‘seems to be to show
the largest possible number of tests, even at
the expense of understanding’.23
The official daily figures for Covid deaths
released in the government’s press briefings
are also a matter of doubt and dispute.
There are different ways of counting Covid
mortality, but the government’s highest daily
figure was 980, recorded on 8 April 2020.
The Office of National Statistics reports that
the real figure that day was 1,445 and for
twenty-two consecutive days between 2 and
23 April it never dipped below 1,000.24 Some
of the discrepancy is explained by the
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS, POLITICAL TRUST
© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
difference between deaths with Covid on the
death certificate (the government’s way of
counting) and the larger, but more realistic
figure of excess deaths. Even so, the figures
were not the whole truth for some weeks.
(Initially, the daily count had included care
home deaths, but that practice was dropped,
until it became clear that the figures were
high and increasing. When they incorporated
again into the figures the totals rose substan-
tially.)
One of the more puzzling events occurred
when Boris Johnson caught the virus, went
into intensive care, but while there was
announced to be in an optimistic mood and
still in charge of government. Being in inten-
sive care and still in charge of government
seemed unlikely, the more so when Dominic
Raab, the de facto deputy, admitted that he
had barely been in touch with the Prime
Minister. Shortly after, a press release said
the PM had recovered enough to be able to
sit up in bed. It is not clear how someone
can be in good spirits and running the gov-
ernment one day, and the next day,
improved enough to sit up in bed. The epi-
sode is of little importance in itself, which
makes it even more difficult to understand
why it required confusing and apparently
contradictory PR treatment. Perhaps the staff
at Number Ten thought that news about the
Prime Minister flat on his back and totally
incapacitated was bad publicity.
Doubt ranging from scepticism to disbelief
of government communications was further
encouraged by pronouncements made by the
Prime Minister. He claimed early on that the
NHS could cope well with the pandemic,
even when the service itself had warned that
it would struggle with a normal bout of win-
ter flu and stated ‘we’ve got a fantastic
NHS, we will give them all the support that
they need, we will make sure that they have
all preparations, all the kit that they need for
us to get through it.’25 At the daily Downing
Street press conference on 19 March, he
repeated that ‘We’re guided very much by
the science’ and ‘the next twelve weeks
could turn the tide of this disease’, adding
that he was absolutely confident it was pos-
sible to ‘send the virus packing in this coun-
try’, when the evidence of other countries
further advanced than Britain said otherwise.
Exactly twelve weeks later, a further 1,266
AND COMPLIANT SOCIAL
B E H A V I O U R 507
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3

people tested positive and the official death
rate for that day was 151.26 Johnson had
claimed that the UK would have a world
beating tracking and tracing programme, but
the app was delayed and then abandoned.
On 2 June he announced that ‘This country
is now testing more than virtually any other
country in Europe’, but Full Fact finds that
‘The UK appears to be testing fewer people
than in Russia. But there isn’t enough data
on this to determine for sure where the UK
places, and the UK’s data isn’t particularly
comparable with other countries.’27
Mainstream media information
The British public took close interest in Covid-
19 from the start. The first few deaths in Eur-
ope and the USA provoked a jump in interest
in news about the pandemic that spread to
about half the population by 31 January. Four
Populus surveys from 20 March to 10 April
recorded a record breaking 98 per cent of the
population noticing stories about the virus.28
Most were paying much more attention to
trustworthy sources of news and drawing
their own conclusions from it. Typically in
times of crisis, the British people turn to BBC
News because it is the most trusted source of
information in the country, with a rating far
higher than the government or politicians. The
Guardian was the most trusted newspaper, but
even the Conservative-leaning national press
often took the government to task for its short-
comings, so the public was far from depen-
dent on official government press releases.
The mainstream media covered the pan-
demic in Britain and abroad extensively, and
in some detail. Covid-19 was headline or
front page news for many weeks, with the
press reporting government successes and
failures, and investigating and correcting
government misinformation. Consequently,
the public was well informed in general
about the pandemic and how the govern-
ment was dealing with it. A YouGov Covid
tracker poll compares how well people in
twenty-two countries thought their govern-
ment was handling coronavirus: by 29 May
the UK sample ranked their country bottom
of the international table.29 Another YouGov
poll shows that the British believed that that
no other country in the study, America
508 KENNETH NEWTON
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3 © 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
excepted, had performed worse than Bri-
tain.30 The population is often accused of
being politically ignorant; these survey
results suggest otherwise.
The evidence is that people make up their
own minds about subjects that are of per-
sonal relevance and about which they have
personal experience and knowledge.31 It also
shows that people know what news sources
they trust and distrust, that they know when
they are being misled about issues of first-
hand experience and relevance. They can
spot the politicians who do not answer ques-
tions put to them, especially when they do it
daily over months of press meetings. This is
not to say that they necessarily make the
right, logical, or sensible decisions, or that
they master the details of political issues,
only that they have a general understanding
of matters of first-hand experience and
importance to them and make up their own
minds accordingly.
The combination of unreliable government
information, counter-balanced by different
information from the mainstream news
media, plus the readiness of the population
to make up its own mind about issues of
personal, first-hand relevance, had a decisive
influence on trust in the government and
compliance with social distancing and lock-
down rules.
Political attitudes and social
behaviour
Attitudes
Times of national crisis are often accompa-
nied by an initial rally-round-the flag effect
on public mood, followed by a gradual
decline of political trust and confidence as
the crisis develops and its costs emerge. Pub-
lic opinion in the USA about the Korean and
Vietnam wars, for example, followed this
pattern, in both cases disillusionment grow-
ing in direct proportion to the increase in
military casualties and deaths. The same
occurred in the UK when support for the
government and trust in political leaders
was widespread at first, but declined as the
pandemic developed.
From the end of January 2020, government
approval climbed steadily from 30 per cent
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)

to a peak of 52 per cent on 23–23 March,
when it fell steeply to 32 per cent by the first
week of June. On 11 March 2020, 72 per cent
thought the government was handling the
crisis very or somewhat well; by 5 June it
was 39 per cent. In mid-January, 42 per cent
thought Johnson was doing well as Prime
Minister. This climbed steeply in the last two
weeks of March to 66 per cent and then fell
more steeply over the next three weeks to 43
per cent.32 By the end of April two-thirds of
the population thought that the government
had acted too late in imposing stricter lock-
down measures.33
Similarly, trust in the government to pro-
vide accurate pandemic information fell from
67 to 48 per cent between 10 April and 21
May, while the percentages for news organi-
sations rose from 38 to 48 per cent, and
those for scientists, doctors, and experts rose
from 83 to 88 per cent.34 By the end of May,
the Conservatives were, in the words of a
YouGov poll, taking a hammering.35 More
people were reporting that they thought the
government weak, incompetent, untrustwor-
thy, and cared only about a select few. By
the end of June, more people thought Keir
Starmer would make a better Prime Minister
than Johnson; 51 per cent said the govern-
ment had under-responded to the pandemic
and its net approval rating for handling the
crisis fell further to minus 10 per cent. The
general feeling was that too little had been
done and too late, and then by July the view
of almost two-thirds of the population was
that lockdown was being eased too
quickly.36 By the beginning of July, Johnson’s
net approval rating had fallen to minus 6
per cent, after reaching a high of plus 40 per
cent in the second week of May.37
Public opinion often takes some time to
adjust to new circumstances, with small fluc-
tuations around an accumulation of inci-
dents, followed by a major swing of opinion
precipitated by one or two controversial
ones. In the case of the Vietnam War, Ameri-
can support fell slowly in line with the rise
in body bags, but fell sharply and perma-
nently immediately after the Tet Offensive,
mainly because the public came to realise
that it had been deceived about the power of
the Viet Cong by their government.38 Simi-
larly, in the UK trust in the government
began to slip away in late March as the
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS, POLITICAL TRUST
© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
death toll from coronavirus rose, but the
announcement of 40,000 deaths and Dominic
Cummings’ trips to Durham and Barnard
Castle tipped the decline into a steep slide.
Conservative voters were most likely to
break ranks over the Cummings scandal.
After a week of news headlines and calls for
Cummings to resign, the Prime Minister said
that the country should ‘move on’ from the
controversy, but almost a fifth of Tory voters
disagreed. Two-thirds of the country
believed that the PM was wrong to support
Cummings, including 45 per cent of Conser-
vative voters, and almost half the country
said they had lost respect for the govern-
ment for supporting him.39
In other countries, the politicians with rep-
utations intact or enhanced are notable for
their plain and honest speaking and frank
discussion of the difficulties of policy mak-
ing, for facing problems squarely, and treat-
ing the public as adults. They are
disproportionately women, including Jacinda
Ardern, Angela Merkel, Sanna Marin, Mette
Frederiksen, and Nicola Sturgeon, but also
Anthony Fauci, a leading member of the
White House Coronavirus Task Force, and
New York State Governor, Andrew Cuomo,
among others. By comparison, British minis-
ters—almost exclusively men—have lacked
their qualities and failed to engage the trust
of the general public. The government
seemed to believe that it was necessary to
give out optimistic and upbeat messages; the
public wanted honest speaking that con-
fronted reality.
Large shifts in political opinion during the
Covid pandemic were not unexpected, but
their consequences for social behaviour were
unanticipated.
Social behaviour
Most predictions about social behaviour dur-
ing lockdowns assumed that widespread
compliance with the rules would require
high levels of trust in government and confi-
dence in its policies and ability to deliver
them, especially when patience ran out and
lockdown fatigue set in. None of this applies
to the UK. As ever, there were those who
did not comply: some thought that the pan-
demic was fake or a conspiracy; some older
citizens were unable or unwilling to change
AND COMPLIANT SOCIAL
B E H A V I O U R 509
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3

their settled social patterns; and many
younger adults took no notice. The 18–24
age group was found to have the highest
levels of infection, but the lowest likelihood
and willingness of isolate, if told to.40 The
great majority of people, however, complied
with social distancing, shielding, and lock-
down rules; some took the decision days or
even weeks before the government acted.
When it came to easing lockdown restric-
tions, as mentioned above, the majority of
the population thought the government was
moving too quickly.
Why do we find a low trust and sceptical
population socially isolating and distancing
itself, sometimes before the government told
them to and often continuing to do so after
the rules were eased? Because, as argued
above, they used different sources of infor-
mation and made up their own minds about
how to protect themselves and those around
them. Three-quarters of the population
believed that they could personally influence
whether they were infected, and that not fol-
lowing the rules was the most important fac-
tor in spreading the disease.41 Most gave
more priority to health than the economy.
Trust in the government and confidence in
its policies is sometimes not essential, it
seems, for public compliance with rules to
protect personal and public interests. If the
crisis concerns the personal interests of an
individual, or their personal safety and that
of their friends and family, they are likely to
weigh up the risks and take what action they
think is appropriate, irrespective of what
they think of the media or the government,
or both.
In this respect, government information
about Covid-19 and Brexit was treated in a
different way by the public. Brexit is an
abstract and remote issue involving complex
matters of national identity, international
affairs, and trading relations in the future.
Covid is literally an in-your-face matter of
illness and death in the here and now. Views
about Brexit were ruled by the heart; Covid
was a matter for calculating personal risk
using the head. As Samuel Johnson might
have said: ‘Depend on it, sir, when a person
knows they are threatened by a deadly dis-
ease, it sharpens the mind wonderfully’.
Another way of putting this is to say trust is
what we resort to when we have little or no
510 KENNETH NEWTON
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3 © 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
control over our affairs or little or no infor-
mation to help us make up our minds. Then
we must rely on others. Little is known even
now about Covid-19—except that it is a
deadly virus that anyone can catch. The risk
of infection might be small, but the price to
pay for any given individual might be final.
The calculation requires balancing the proba-
bilities against the risk, and if the risk is seri-
ous illness or death, the calculation is
heavily weighted on the side of caution, the
more so if friends, family and, perhaps,
unknown others are involved. No one
knows what the probabilities and costs of
Brexit will be for any given individual in Bri-
tain, so we must, in the last analysis, trust or
distrust the judgment of others or follow our
own gut feelings. Being told that we will
have an extra £350 million a week for the
NHS by leaving the EU, is one thing, but
being told that it is safe to send your chil-
dren back to school when this involves risk
of serious disease is another.
Conclusion
It is widely assumed that compliance with
social distancing and lockdown rules require
a trust in government, confidence in its poli-
cies and its ability to deliver them, plus a
belief that its information can be relied upon.
However, the British public generally
observed the rules, despite a major decline
of trust, confidence, and belief, in the space
of just a few weeks. It did so because it had
alternative and more trusted sources of infor-
mation in the mainstream news media, as
well as the non-government expert opinion
that the media reported. The public paid
close attention to the sources of information
it trusted, especially the BBC, and conse-
quently, it was quite well informed about
how the British government was performing
compared with other countries. Its initial
rally-round-the flag attitudes gradually chan-
ged to become less trusting of government
information, and less confident about its per-
formance. News of 40,000 deaths and
Dominic Cummings’ trips to Durham and
Barnard Castle precipitated a steep slide in
government approval.
Perhaps most important, there is evidence
that public opinion is less susceptible to
influence by the government or the media,
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)

or other sources of information, on matters
of personal importance and impact. Covid-
19 posed a real, immediate, and personal
threat to health and life, and hence people
generally formed their own opinions about
it, how the government had handled it, and
what action they should take to protect
themselves. This makes the pandemic a dif-
ferent sort of political matter compared with
Brexit, for example, which is a more remote
and abstract issue for the future. If Brexit
has a strong positive or negative impact on
the bread-and-butter issues of daily life, we
may see the public shift from its ideological
approaches to the referendum campaign to a
more Covid-19 mode of response.
Kenneth Newton is Professor Emeritus,
University of Southampton
Notes
1 K. Archer and I. Ron-Levey, ‘Trust in govern-
ment lacking on COVID-19’s frontlines’, Gallup
blog, 20 March 2020; https://news.gallup.c
om/opinion/gallup/296594/trust-government-
lacking-frontlines-covid.aspx (accessed 20 July
2020).
2 C. Smyth, ‘NHS fails to cope with bodies in flu
pandemic test’, Times, 27 December 2020;
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/nhs-fails-
to-cope-with-bodies-in-flu-pandemic-test-8pn
mdpdfx (accessed 30 June 2020).
3 N. Titheradge and F. Kirkland, ‘Coronavirus:
outbreak exercise showed “clear gap” in readi-
ness’, BBC News, 5 June 2020; https://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-52927462 (accessed 30 June
2020).
4 See, L. Friedman, ‘Scientific advice at a time of
emergency. SAGE and Covid-19’, in this issue
of The Political Quarterly.
5 On the contracts see P. Geoghegan and D.
Conn , ‘Revealed: key Cummings and Gove
ally given COVID-19 contract without open
tender’, OpenDemocracy, 10 July 2020; https://
www.opendemocracy.net/en/dark-money-inves
tigations/revealed-key-cummings-ally-given-840
000-covid-contract-without-competition/ (ac-
cessed 16 July 2020); G. Monbiot, ‘ When
secret coronavirus contracts are awarded with-
out competition, it’s deadly serious’, The Guar-
dian, 15 July 2020; https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2020/jul/15/coronavirus-
contracts-government-transparency-pandemic
(accessed 15 July 2020).
6 J. Denham, ‘Covid-19 exposes the nonsensical
structure of English governance’, Prospect, 2
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS, POLITICAL TRUST
© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
May 2020; https://www.prospectmagazine.co.
uk/politics/covid-19-exposes-the-nonsensical-
structure-of-english-governance-devolution (ac-
cessed 27 June 2020).
7 See, for example, D. Demianyk, ‘5 confusing
messages from Boris Johnson’s coronavirus
press conference’, Huffington Post, 19 March
2020; https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/
boris-johnson-press-conference-coronavirus_uk_
5e73b6cfc5b6f5b7c540665c? (accessed 17 July
2020).
8 W. Hanage, ‘I’m an epidemiologist. When I
heard about Britain’s “herd immunity” coron-
avirus plan, I thought it was satire’, The Guar-
dian, 15 March 2020; https://www.theguardia
n.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/15/epidemiol
ogist-britain-herd-immunity-coronavirus-covid-
19 (accessed 15/03/2020).
9 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor Gen-
eral, Department of Health and Social Care,
Readying the NHS and Adult Social Care in Eng-
land for COVID-19, London, National Audit
Office, 12 June, 2020; https://www.nao.org.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Readying-the-
NHS-and-adult-social-care-in-England-for-COVID-
19-Summary.pdf; BBC News, ‘Coronavirus: UK
failed to stockpile crucial PPE’, 28 April 2020;
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-
52440641 (both accessed 30 June 2020).
10 Public Health England, ‘COVID-19: guidance
for social or community care and residential
settings’, 25 February 2020; https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications/guidance-for-soc
ial-or-community-care-and-residential-settings-
on-covid-19 (accessed 30 June 2020).
11 K. Razzall, ‘Asymptomatic care workers
unknowingly spread coronavirus’, BBC News,
3 June, 2020; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
health-52912538 (accessed 30 June 2020).
12 R. Gilroy, ‘Nurses raise alarm after practices
sent PPE with altered expiry date’, Nursing
Times, 7 March, 2020; https://www.nursing
times.net/news/coronavirus/nurses-raise-alarm-
after-practices-sent-ppe-with-altered-expiry-date-
17-03-2020 (accessed 30 June 2020).
13 National Care Association, ‘Faulty masks’, 2
July 2020; https://nationalcareassociation.org.
uk/news-events (accessed 2 July 2020)
14 A. Rimmer, ‘Covid-19: experts question guid-
ance to reuse PPE’, British Medical Journal, 20
April 2020; https://www.bmj.com/content/
369/bmj.m1577 (accessed 30 June 2020).
15 Independent Sage Committee, ‘Government
failing to follow own school advice’, press con-
ference, 28 May 2020; https://www.independe
ntsage.org/government-failing-to-follow-own-sc
hool-advice-review-by-independent-sage/ (ac-
cessed 30 June 2020).
AND COMPLIANT SOCIAL
B E H A V I O U R 511
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3

16 J. Gallagher, ‘Coronavirus: key evidence on
opening schools revealed’, BBC News, 22 May
2020; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
52770355 (accessed 30 June 2020).
17 Independent Sage Committee, ‘June 1 too early
to re-open schools’, draft consultation report,
22 May 2020; https://www.independentsage.
org/too-early-to-re-open-schools-on-june-1-says-
independent-sage/ (accessed 20 June 2020).
18 J. Gallagher, ‘Coronavirus: how dangerous is
lifting lockdown?’, BBC News, 2 June 2020;
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
52878816; T. Hale, et al., ‘Lockdown rollback
checklist: do countries meet WHO recommen-
dations for rolling back lockdown?’, research
note, Blavatnik School of Government, Univer-
sity of Oxford, 29 May 2020; https://www.
bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-06/Lock
down%20Rollback%20Checklist%20v3.0.pdf (ac-
cessed 2 June 2020).
19 See, for example, ‘“Politicised nature” of lock-
down debate delays Imperial report’, Financial
Times, 23 May 2020; https://www.ft.com/con
tent/41e98ccb-a39c-4f88-b444-74d50a76c383
(accessed 6 August 2020).
20 At a meeting of the House of Commons
Health and Social Care Committee on 21 July
2020, chief medical officer, Chris Whitty,
defended the government’s ‘entirely practical’
decision to drop its initial tracking and tracing
programme in March, blaming the limited test-
ing and tracing capacity on the failure to build
up the healthcare infrastructure. He also said
that had been no ‘huge delay’ in the response
to the pandemic in England; https://commit
tees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/747/html/ (ac-
cessed 8 August 2020)..
21 E. Yong, ‘The UK’s coronavirus “herd immu-
nity” debacle’, The Atlantic, 16 March 2020;
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/
2020/03/coronavirus-pandemic-herd-immunity-
uk-boris-johnson/608065/ (accessed 30 June
2020).
22 Full Fact, ‘Government misses one of its
Covid-19 test targets’, 6 April 2020; https://
fullfact.org/health/coronavirus-test-targets/ (ac-
cessed 5 July 2020).
23 UK Statistics Authority, ‘Sir David Norgrove
response to Matt Hancock regarding the
Government’s COVID-19 testing data’, 2 June
2020; https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/
correspondence/sir-david-norgrove-response-to-
matt-hancock-regarding-the-governments-covid-
19-testing-data/ (accessed 30 June 2020).
24 Office for National Statistics, ‘Deaths registered
weekly in England and Wales, provisional’,
London, HMSO, week ending 12 June 2020;
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationand
community/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/
512 KENNETH NEWTON
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3 © 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
datasets/weeklyprovisionalfiguresondeathsregis
teredinenglandandwales (accessed 8 August
2020).
25 Full Fact, ‘Here is the transcript of what Boris
Johnson said on this morning about the new
coronavirus’, 10 March 2020; https://fullfact.
org/health/boris-johnson-coronavirus-this-morn
ing/ (accessed 17 July 2020).
26 S. Berman, ‘12 weeks ago, Boris Johnson said
that coronavirus would have already “been
sent packing”’, MSN News, 12 June 2020;
https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/uknews/
12-weeks-ago-boris-johnson-said-that-coronavir
us-would-have-already-been-sent-packing/ar-BB15
nzEX (accessed 17 July 2020)
27 Full Fact, ‘We still don’t know if the UK does
the most Covid-19 tests in Europe’, 2 June
2020; https://fullfact.org/health/coronavirus-
testing-europe/ (accessed 17 July 2020).
28 Populus, ‘Pandemic news continues to domi-
nate’, undated; https://www.populus.co.uk/in
sights/2020/05/pandemic-news-continues-to-
dominate/ (accessed 26 July 2020). See also
Ofcom, ‘Early effects of Covid-19 on online
consumption’, April 2020; https://www.ofc
om.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0030/195069/
covid-19-news-consumption-week-five-comscore.
pdf (accessed 6 August 2020).
29 YouGov, ‘COVID-19: government handling
and confidence in health authorities’, 17 March
2020; https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/
articles-reports/2020/03/17/perception-govern
ment-handling-covid-19 (accessed 30 June
2020).
30 M. Smith, ‘Europeans think UK has managed
COVID-19 poorly . . . and Britons agree, You-
Gov, 2 June 2020; https://yougov.co.uk/topics/
international/articles-reports/2020/06/02/euro
peans-think-uk-has-managed-covid-19-poorly-and
(accessed 30 June 2020).
31 An array of evidence to support this statement is
provided in K. Newton, Surprising News: How the
Media Affect—And Do Not Affect Politics’, Boulder
CO., Lynne Rienner, 2019, pp. 145–160, 210–211.
32 The figures in this paragraph are taken from
YouGov polling reports in https://yougov.co.
uk/topics/politics/trackers/government-approva
l; https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/arti
cles-reports/2020/03/17/perception-government-
handling-covid-19; https://yougov.co.uk/topics/
politics/trackers/boris-johnson-approval-rating
(all accessed 30 June 2020)
33 Ipsos MORI, ‘Spike in Britons thinking govern-
ment acted “too late” to address virus but con-
fidence in the NHS continues to grow’, 30
April 2020; https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/
en-uk/spike-britons-thinking-government-acted-
too-late-address-coronavirus-confidence-nhs-con
tinues-grow (accessed 21 July 2020).
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)

34 University of Oxford, Reuters Institute and
YouGov, ‘Less than half of Britons now trust
the government to provide accurate informa-
tion on the pandemic’, 1 June 2020; https://in
teractive.guim.co.uk/charts/embed/jun/2020-06-
01T13:57:54/embed.html (accessed 18 July 2020).
35 YouGov, ‘Voting intention: Con 45%, Lab
35%’, 1 June 2020; https://yougov.co.uk/topic
s/politics/articles-reports/2020/06/01/voting-
intention-con-45-lab-35-29-30-may (accessed 30
June 2020).
36 Ipsos MORI, ‘Perceptions of lockdown timings
—too fast, too slow, or about right?’, 8 July
2020; https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-
uk/perceptions-lockdown-timings-too-fast-too-
slow-or-about-right (accessed 21 July 2020).
37 YouGov, ‘Boris Johnson approval rating’, 4–6
July 2020; https://www.opinium.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/Opinium-Political-
Report-25th-June-2020 (accessed 30 July 2020).
38 M. Schudson, The Power of the News, Cam-
bridge MA., Harvard University Press, 1995, p.
147; D. C. Hallin, The Uncensored War, New
York, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 12.
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS, POLITICAL TRUST
© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
1467923x, 2020, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.12901 by Nat Prov Indonesia, Wiley Online Library on [11/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
39 Opinium polls, ‘Public Opinion on coronavirus
28 May’, 30 May 2020; https://www.opinium.
co.uk/public-opinion-on-coronavirus-28th-may/
(accessed 15 July 2020).
40 Telegraph Reporters, ‘England’s coronavirus
infection rate significantly reduced before lock-
down was eased, study finds’, The Telegraph,
15 July, 2020; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ne
ws/2020/07/15/englands-coronavirus-infection-
significantly-reduced-lockdown/ (accessed 18
July 2020); YouGov, ‘Elderly people and res
ponses to Covid-19 in 27 countries’; https://you
gov.co.uk/topics/health/articles-reports/2020/07/
17/elderly-people-and-responses-covid-19-27-
countries (accessed 19 July 2020).
41 J. Connolly, ‘Public attitudes and the manage-
ment of the COVID-19 crisis: the importance of
personal responsibility’, LSE British and Irish
Politics and Policy blog, 1 May 2020; Public
attitudes and the management of the COVID-
19 crisis: the importance of personal responsi-
bility (accessed 30 June 2020).
AND COMPLIANT SOCIAL
B E H A V I O U R 513
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3