Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Hendrik Bessembinder*
W.P. Carey School of Business
Arizona State University
* Email: hb@asu.edu. The author is also a consultant to Baillie Gifford and Co.
Abstract
Investments in publicly-listed U.S. stocks enhanced shareholder wealth by more than $55.1
trillion in aggregate during the 1926 to 2022 period, even while investments in the majority
(58.6%) of the 28,114 individual stocks led to reduced rather than increased shareholder wealth.
The degree to which wealth enhancement is concentrated in relatively few stocks has increased
over time: for example, the number of high-performing firms that explain half of the net wealth
creation since 1926 decreased from ninety as of 2016 to eight-three as of 2019 and to seventy-
two as of 2022. I identify the firms with both the largest enhancements and largest reductions in
shareholder wealth since 1926 and during more recent intervals.
1. Introduction
Many studies have quantified shareholder returns on equity investments, but most focus on
averages of monthly or other short-horizon returns.1 I report here on long-run outcomes to shareholders,
measured as the dollar amount of shareholder wealth created (or dissipated) by investments in each of the
28,114 firms that issued common stock appearing in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database from 1926 to 2022. This paper is in part an update to earlier studies that assessed wealth
enhancement outcomes through 2016 and 2019, respectively.2 I also document how the concentration in
market-wide wealth enhancement among relatively few firms has increased in recent years. In addition to
identifying the firms with the largest enhancement to shareholder wealth, I identify those firms with the
largest reductions in shareholder wealth, both for the full post-1926 sample and in recent years.
The term “shareholder wealth creation” (henceforth SWC) as used here is the improvement (or
decline) in the wealth of a company’s shareholders in aggregate over the period that the company’s shares
were listed on the public stock markets. The benchmark is the wealth that would have been attained had
the invested capital earned one-month Treasury bill returns instead. SWC considers net distributions
(dividends, spinoffs, share repurchases, new share issuances, etc.) as well as share price changes for each
stock during each month from 1926 to 2022, but is measured as of the end of the sample period.
Delisting returns compiled by CRSP, which include any proceeds received as a result of mergers or
acquisitions as well as estimates of any remaining value after delistings for negative reasons, are included
for those firms that exit the database prior to the end of the period evaluated. The SWC measure for each
firm captures the dollar amount by which the firms’ shareholders in aggregate were rewarded for taking
1
Studies that report on arithmetic means of short horizon returns include those that compile outcomes for
characteristic-sorted portfolios, those reporting Sharpe Ratios (which rely on mean returns in the numerator) and
those reporting “alpha” (conditional arithmetic mean) estimates from factor model regressions.
2
See Bessembinder (2018) and (2021).
that SWC is not a direct measure of the efficiency or quality of firms’ management or strategies. In
particular, since it relies both on realized cash flows and on stock market valuations, SWC is potentially
pessimism.
When aggregated across companies, SWC is similar to a value-weighted market return in the
sense that large companies are more important than small in the calculation. However, SWC outcomes
differ from value-weighted market returns not only because they are expressed in dollar terms rather than
as percentages, but also because they explicitly account for share issuances and repurchases, and the fact
that dividends are not (in aggregate) reinvested in the stock market. SWC is also distinguished from a
simple examination of firms’ market capitalization by the fact that it considers all lifetime cash flows to
or from shareholders.3 Spinoffs, share repurchases, and dividends, for example, reduce a firm’s market
capitalization as assets are separated from the ongoing firm, but do not similarly decrease calculated
I measure shareholder wealth creation (SWC) using the method specified by Bessembinder
(2018). The algebraic formulation is reproduced in the appendix to this paper. Conceptually, SWC
focuses on cash flows to (in the case of dividends, share repurchases, or spinoffs) or from (in the case of
share issuances) a firm’s shareholders in aggregate.4 The first market capitalization observation (in 1926
or the first month the firm appears in the CRSP database) is viewed as an initial investment, i.e. a cash
flow from shareholders, and the final market capitalization observation (at the end of the sample period or
3
Nevertheless, I compile and describe in Section 5 data on concentration in firms’ market capitalization, for
comparison.
4
It is an important point of perspective that dividends and share repurchases are not (and cannot) be reinvested in
the firm through secondary market transactions, since each secondary market trade involves both a purchase and a
sale by shareholders.
calculation is the wealth that would have been obtained if investors earned one-month Treasury bill
returns instead. In particular, SWC is the increase (or decrease) in shareholder wealth, measured as of the
end of the sample period, attributable to investors’ taking on the risk of holding equity shares rather than
Treasury bills.
Although the SWC measure is defined based on monthly cash flows to or from shareholders in
aggregate, it can also be computed by focusing on excess rates of return and market capitalization each
period. In particular, SWC can be computed by (i) multiplying the firm’s excess (over the one-month
Treasury bill rate) return for each month by its beginning-of-month market capitalization to obtain an
excess dollar return, (ii) compounding each monthly dollar amount forward to end-of-sample (based on
I obtain data on returns and shares outstanding for all common stocks (share codes 10, 11, and
12) in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly stock database. As of December 2022,
CRSP reported returns for common stock issued by 28,114 firms.6 I measure shareholder wealth creation
as of December 31, 2022 for each of these firms. I also compute aggregate wealth creation by summing
outcomes across stocks. Aggregate net wealth creation is defined as the sum of firm-level wealth
creation across all stocks, while aggregate gross wealth creation is the sum of firm-level wealth creation
5
The cash flows realized in each calendar month are restated as end-of-sample equivalents by compounding forward
at the Treasury-bill interest rate, because the Treasury rate is the opportunity cost of capital for purposes of the SWC
measure. Since Treasury rates reflect anticipated inflation (and on average are slightly higher than inflation rates)
there is no need for a separate inflation adjustment – each outcome is measured at a single (end-of-sample) point in
time. Bessembinder, Chen, Choi, and Wei (2019) show that the wealth creation measure can also be interpreted as
the “Net Future Value” of all cash flow to or from shareholders in aggregate. The internal rate of return of the same
series of cash flows is sometimes referred to (e.g. Dichev, 2007 and Dichev and Yu, 2011) as the dollar-weighted
return to investors.
6
I identify firms based on the CRSP permco variable. Some firms (e.g. Alphabet) issued multiple classes of
common stock, identified by the CRSP permno variable. For these firms I compute SWC for each class of common
stock, and then sum the resulting SWC figures across share classes within the firm.
In addition to measuring wealth creation outcomes from 1926 to 2022, I measure corresponding
outcomes from 1926 to 2016 and from 1926 to 2019, periods that correspond to those considered in
Bessembinder (2018) and Bessembinder (2021), respectively.8 Comparing outcomes across these time
frames provides insights as to the degree to which the concentration of historical wealth creation has
I implement the SWC measure for each of the 28,114 firms using the CRSP monthly stock
database from 1926 to 2022.9 Summing the outcomes across firms indicates that net SWC totaled $55.11
trillion as of the end of 2022.10 Of the sample firms, 11,633 (41.38% of the total) created positive wealth
for their shareholders over their full lifetimes. Summing across those firms with positive outcomes
indicates gross SWC in the amount of $64.23 trillion. In contrast, shareholders in 16,481 firms (58.62%
7
https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library.
8
For each of these periods, I rely on CRSP stock data and Fama-French Treasury rate data downloaded as of April
2023. Outcomes reported here for the periods ending in 2016 and 2019 differ very slightly from those reported by
Bessembinder (2018) and Bessembinder (2021) for the corresponding periods. These minor differences reflect (i)
small (never more than one basis point in a month) changes in the Treasury Bill interest rate data recently reported
on Kenneth French’s website as compared to earlier versions of the data, and (ii) changes in the CRSP shrcd
variable in the recent CRSP data as compared to earlier vintages, such that a few securities previously identified as
common stocks are no longer so designated, and vice versa. It might also be noted that firms such as General
Motors and AT&T Corporation which exited the database prior to 2016 nevertheless showed an increase in wealth
creation outcomes from 2016 to 2022. This reflects that fact that shareholder wealth is assessed as of the indicated
end-of-sample date. In particular, wealth creation for these firms increased by the compound Treasury bill interest
rate between the indicated dates.
9
Delisting returns are included for stocks that delist for either negative (e.g. low share price) or positive (e.g.
acquisition) reasons, to avoid the bias described by Shumway (1997). The SWC measure is constructed from
sample “lifetimes,” that is, the period during which each stock was included in the CRSP monthly database. The
portion of any firm’s life that preceded 1926 is not captured. Further, even for firms that entered the database after
1926, the database does not capture pre-IPO outcomes, or outcomes from the IPO price to the end of the month that
includes the IPO. SWC as measured therefore captures investors’ experience beginning at the end of the month that
the stock is first included in the CRSP database.
10
Wealth creation outcomes for all 28,114 firms are available for download, as is the SAS computer program that
generates the outcomes, at https://wpcarey.asu.edu/department-finance/faculty-research/do-stocks-outperform-
treasury-bills. To replicate the outcomes requires access to the CRSP monthly common stock database.
of $9.11 trillion.11
I next report on the individual firms with the largest positive and most negative SWC outcomes.
Since SWC is measured in dollars as of a single point in time, large outcomes (either positive or negative)
reflect a combination of unusually high or low rates of return and relatively large market capitalizations,
and are accentuated if the unusual returns are earned over longer time periods.
Table 1A reports on SWC outcomes for the fifty firms with the largest lifetime SWC measured as
of December 2022. The Table also reports for each firm the first and last month for which the CRSP
monthly database contains return observations for the firm. The top five firms are Apple (lifetime SWC
of $2.68 trillion), Microsoft (lifetime SWC of $2.09 trillion), Exxon Mobil (lifetime SWC of $1.22
trillion), Alphabet (lifetime SWC of $1.00 trillion) and Amazon (lifetime SWC of $764 billion). Among
these, only Exxon Mobile has been present in the CRSP database since 1926. By comparison, Apple and
Microsoft entered in 1981 and 1986 respectively, Amazon entered in 1997, and Alphabet entered in 2004.
The firm that was listed at the most recent date among those listed on Table 1A is Abbvie Inc., which is
ranked 33rd with $263.0 billion in SWC subsequent to its January 2013 spinoff from Abbott Laboratories
Table 1B reports outcomes for the twenty-five firms with the worst lifetime wealth creation
outcomes, measured as of December 2022. The largest negative outcome is -$102.0 billion in SWC for
11
The fact that overall stock market wealth creation is strongly positive even while most individual firms had
negative wealth creation is attributable to positive skewness in the distribution of compound stock returns (see, for
example, Albuquerque (2012), Fama and French (2018), Farago and Hjalmarsson (2023), Heaton, Polson and Witte
(2017), and Simkowitz and Beedles (1978)), in combination with differences in firm size and lives.
12
Most of the ex-post successful firms identified on Table 1A were still listed on public stock markets at the end of
2022 (though General Motors, which filed for bankruptcy in 2009 is a notable exception that demonstrates the
importance of the fact that the SWC measure includes not just cumulative share price changes, but also prior
dividends and share repurchases). The dominance of firms still listed reflects a number of factors, including (i) the
real economy is larger in recent as compared to earlier decades, (ii) industry concentration as reflected for example
in sales has increased in recent years (see, for example, Figure IV in Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenan
(2020), who refer to the emergence of “superstar firms”), and (iii) that firms with longer lives will have greater SWC
outcomes, other things equal, as long as returns to their shares exceed Treasury interest rates.
firms contained in Table 1B are for firms that remain publicly traded as of the end of the 2022 sample
period, including Rivian Automotive (SWC of -$91.6 billion), Deutsche Bank (SWC of -$47.3 billion),
Coinbase (SWC of -44.6 billion), Doordash (SWC of -$31.9 billion), and Airbnb (SWC of -$27.5 billion).
The outcome for Rivian is noteworthy because the $91.6 billion in wealth reduction is the second worst
lifetime SWC outcome among the 28,114 firms in this study, even though the outcome accrued over just
Table 1A also reports on the percentage of the $55.11 trillion in net SWC from 1926 to 2022
accounted for by each of the firms listed. Apple alone accounts for 4.86% of the net SWC. Microsoft
and Exxon Mobile account for another 3.80% and 2.21%, respectively, implying that the Top 3 firms
together account for 10.87% of the net SWC since 1926. The Top eleven firms collectively account for
slightly over 20% of net SWC, the top twenty-three firms account for slightly more than 30%, and the
Top forty-two firms account for just over 40%. The fifty firms listed on Table 1A account for 43.13% of
the $55.11 trillion in net SWC attributable to all 28,114 firms publicly listed in the U.S. markets since
1926.
Bessembinder (2018 and 2021) previously documented a high degree of concentration in SWC,
for samples that spanned from 1926 to 2016 and 2019, respectively. Table 2 provides data regarding the
degree of concentration in SWC since 1926 for samples that measure SWC as of the end of 2016, 2019,
and 2022. Outcomes are reported both when explaining the concentration of net SWC and when
13
Rivian’s IPO was completed on November 10, 2021. Since the methods employed here require data on market
capitalization at the end of the prior month, this study measures Rivian’s wealth creation outcomes for the months
from December 2021 to December 2022.
14
Ellenberg (2014) articulates how the use of percentages to explain a figure that is the net of both positive and
negative outcomes can be misleading. This concern is most acute in those situations where the net outcome
explained is close to zero, as could be the case if SWC were measured over short time horizons. Of course, stock
since 1926 is concentrated in relatively few firms has increased in recent years. Outcomes obtained when
focusing on net SWC are reported in Panel A. The number of firms required to explain ten percent of net
SWC decreased from five as of 2016 to four as of 2019 and three as of 2022. The number of firms that
explain fifty percent of net SWC decreased from ninety as of 2016 to eighty-three as of 2019 and to
seventy-two as of 2022. The number of firms required to explain all of the $34.8 trillion in net SWC as of
2016 was 1,094, increased to 1,173 when explaining the $47.39 trillion in net SWC as of 2019, but
decreased again to 966 firms required to explain all of the $55.1 trillion in SWC as of the end of 2022.15
Since the number of firms in the database increases as the sample window is widened, the percentage of
firms required to explain each of these thresholds decreased relatively more than the number of firms
required.
Bessembinder (2021) noted that the $12.57 trillion increase in net SWC from $34.82 trillion at
the end of 2016 to $47.39 trillion at the end of 2019 was highly concentrated, in that only five firms,
Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, and Facebook (now known as Meta Platforms) accounted for
22.1% of the increase. By comparison, the $7.27 trillion increase in net SWC from $47.39 trillion at the
end of 2019 to $55.11 trillion at the end of 2022 is even more concentrated. Five firms, Apple, Microsoft,
Alphabet, United Health Group, and Eli Lilly, accounted for 32.1% of this increase.16 This increased
market investing involves outcomes that for a given firm are the net of many individual price increases and
decreases and for a portfolio are the net of winning and losing positions, implying that net outcomes are the natural
object of study. I also compute and evaluated gross wealth creation, which is the sum of wealth creation across only
those firms with positive outcomes. Note that the percentage of firms that accounts for 100% of gross wealth
creation is also the percentage of all firms with positive wealth creation outcomes.
15
The number of firms with positive SWC is substantially larger than the number that explains 100% of net SWC.
Focusing for example on outcomes measured as of 2022, 966 firms are sufficient to explain 100% of net SWC. An
additional 10,667 firms generated positive SWC. However, the positive SWC for these firms was just sufficient to
offset the negative SWC of the remaining 16,481 firms (Panel C of Table 2), such that SWC for the 27,148 firms not
included among the Top 966 sums to zero. The total number of firms with positive SWC can be identified on Table
2 based on the percentage of firms required to explain 100% of gross SWC.
16
As an additional point of comparison, the ten firms with the greatest increase in firm-level SWC from 2016 to
2019 explain 29.52% of the increase in net SWC during that interval, while during the subsequent 2019 to 2022
period the ten firms with the greatest increase in firm-level SWC explained 45.10% of the increase in net SWC.
Parker (2005) that the internet-based economy has contributed to more “winner take all” outcomes.
Focusing on gross SWC (Panel B of Table 2) instead of net SWC also supports the conclusion
that the degree of concentration in wealth creation has increased since 2016. The number of firms
required to explain ten percent of gross SWC decreased from seven as of 2016 to five as of 2019 and four
as of 2022. The number of firms that explain fifty percent of gross SWC decreased from 138 as of 2016
to 121 as of 2019 and to 110 as of 2022. The number of firms required to explain all of the gross SWC
(equivalently, the number of firms with positive SWC outcomes) increased from 10,669 as of 2016 to
11,633 as of 2022, but the percentage of firms with positive SWC outcomes decreased from 42.07% as of
It should not be surprising that SWC as measured here is concentrated in relatively few stocks to
some degree. Bessembinder (2018) and Farago and Hjalmarsson (2023) show that the compounding of
purely random short-horizon percentage returns induces positive skewness in compound long-horizon
percentage returns. Further, differences in firm sizes and in the number of months that firms are included
in the database contribute.17 Still, the degree of concentration is notable, as is the fact that concentration
I next report as a basis for comparison, the degree of concentration in market capitalizations of
publicly-listed U.S. common stocks over time. As noted, the SWC measure used here differs from firms’
market capitalizations because SWC captures prior cash flows to shareholders, including dividends, as
well as seasoned equity offerings or share repurchases (which alter market capitalization by increasing
17
Note, though, that firm size (as measured by market capitalization) and return performance are intertwined. Firm
size depends partly on market capitalization at the time of its IPO or creation as a spinoff, partly on subsequent
equity offerings or share repurchases, and partly on its compound long-run return per share. Apple, as a case in
point, was not a uniquely large firm at the time of its IPO, and its rise to become the largest stock by market
capitalization reflects high compound returns in the decades since its listing (offset only in part by over $500 billion
in share repurchases in recent years).
informative.
I compute the market capitalization of every common stock included in the CRSP monthly stock
database as of the end of each calendar year from 1974 to 2022, as the product of price per share and
shares of common stock outstanding.18 I then sum market capitalizations across the five largest firms, the
fifteen largest firms, and across all firms, and compute the percentage of the total market capitalization
accounted for by the largest five and fifteen firms. Also, to ensure that outcomes are not affected by
changes in the numbers of firms listed on the public U.S. markets over time, I compute the sum of market
capitalizations for the 1500 largest stocks, and compare the market capitalization of the top five and
Outcomes are displayed on Figure 1. The data indicate that the concentration of market
capitalization as of the end of 2022 is generally similar to that at the end of 1974. In particular, the five
largest firms accounted for 15.4% of total market capitalization and 16.0% of the largest 1500 firms’
market capitalization at the end of 2022, compared to 15.1% and 15.8%, respectively, at the end of 1974.
However, the degree of concentration in market capitalization has varied substantially in the intervening
years. For example, the market capitalization of the largest five firms relative to the largest 1500 firms
reached a minimum of 7.9% at the end of1993 and a maximum of 19.3% at the end of 2021 (indeed, each
Understanding the determinants of the variation in the degree to which stock market
capitalization is concentrated in a relatively few firms comprises an interesting avenue for future research.
The variation in market capitalization in recent years is most relevant in terms of gaining perspective
regarding the finding documented here that SWC is not only highly concentrated, but has become more so
18
I begin the calculation at 1974 to avoid any potential distortion from the fact that the CRSP database excludes
Nasdaq-listed stocks in earlier years. For those firms with multiple share classes I compute market capitalization
for each class (CRSP permno) and sum across classes to obtain firm (CRSP permco) market capitalization
substantially from 2016 to 2022. In particular, the market capitalization of the largest five firms relative
to that of the largest 1500 firms rose from 9.5% at the end of 2016 to 16.0% at the end of 2022. That is,
while dividends and net share repurchases are also relevant, the increased concentration of SWC since
The fact that wealth creation in the U.S. public stock markets is concentrated in relatively few
firms naturally focuses attention on the identity and characteristics of the firms that created the most
wealth for their shareholders. Of course, the fact that a given firm performed very well up to a given
point in time is no guarantee that it will continue to outperform thereafter. I next report on comparisons
of outcomes across those measured at the end of 2016, 2019, and 2022, respectively, identifying both
firms that continued to improve shareholder wealth in recent years, and those that stumbled.
Table 3, like Table 1, reports lifetime SWC for the fifty firms with the largest outcomes measured
as of the end of 2022. In addition, it reports SWC outcomes for the same firms as of the end of 2016 and
2019, and changes in SWC outcomes across these dates. Apple displayed the greatest increase in
lifetime SWC, from $746 billion (rank #2) as of 2016 to $2.68 trillion (rank #1) as of 2022, an increase of
$1.94 trillion. Microsoft followed closely, as SWC increased by $1.46 trillion from $630 billion (rank
#3) as of 2016 to $2.09 trillion (rank #2) as of 2022. Alphabet moved up from a ranking of 11 in 2016
(SWC of $365 billion) to rank #4 in 2022 (SWC of $1.00 trillion), while Amazon moved up from #14 in
Several firms moved into the Top 50 in terms of SWC as of the end of 2022 from positions far
outside the Top 50 as of 2016. The largest climb in terms of rankings was Tesla, which moved from #334
19
The data in Figure 1 show that increases in the concentration of market capitalization actually began in 2013, and
continued until the end of 2021. The market downturn of 2022 disproportionately affected the largest capitalization
stocks, leading the notable decline in market capitalization concentration as of the end of year that can be observed
in Figure 1.
rankings from 2016 to 2022 include Thermo Fisher Scientific (from #194 to #46), Broadcom (from #148
to #38), Abbvie (from #135 to #33) and Nvidia (from #128 to #26).20
Of course, some firms that ranked highly in terms of lifetime SWC at a given point in time
subsequently underperform. Among the firms that remained in the top 50 as of 2022, two (General
Electric and Wells Fargo) had decreases in lifetime SWC between 2016 and 2022. General Electric’s
decline from $608 billion in SWC as of 2016 to $463 billion as of 2022 and from a ranking of #4 to a
ranking of #17 was notable. Three of the firms listed on Table 3 displayed large declines in SWC
between 2019 and 2022 even though their SWC figures increased on balance between 2016 and 2022.
These included Amazon (decrease in lifetime SWC from $865 billion at the end of 2019 to $764 billion at
the end of 2022), Intel (decrease in lifetime SWC from $387 billion to $269 billion) and Meta Platforms
The previously-described results focused on Table 3, which lists firms that comprised the Top 50
in terms of lifetime SWC as of the end of 2022. Of course, there were also firms that ranked among the
Top 50 at earlier dates, but did not so rank at the end of 2022. Table 4 reports SWC outcomes for firms
that were among the Top 50 as of the end of 2016, but were not among the top 50 as of the end of 2022.
Among these, the largest declines in SWC from 2016 to 2022 were observed for AT&T Inc. (from $169.5
billion to $124.1 billion), Schlumberger (from $134.1 billion to $105.3 billion) and Disney (from $191.9
billion to $166.9 billion). Disney experienced an improvement in SWC from 2016 to 2019 of $80.1
billion, which was then more than offset by a decrease in SWC of $105.2 billion from 2019 to 2022.
Table 5 reports on the twenty-five firms with the largest decline in SWC from 2016 to 2022, as
well as from 2019 to 2022, including for firms that did not rank among the Top 50 at any point in time.
The list of largest SWC declines from 2016 to 2022 includes General Electric and AT&T Inc., as
20
However, it is also noteworthy that both Tesla and Nvidia were briefly ranked much higher. SWC measured as of
the end of 2021 amounted to $991 billion and $718 billion (rank #5 and #6) for Tesla and Nvidia, respectively.
-$35.2 billion) and Walgreens Boots Alliance (decrease of $30.8 billion, from $94.7 billion to $63.9
billion). It also includes thirteen firms that were initially listed after the end of 2016. These include,
Dupont De Nemours, Coupang, Coinbase Global, Uber, Doordash, Snowflake, Airbnb, Uipath,
Quantumscape, Zoom Video, and three electric vehicle firms: Rivian Automotive, Lucid Group, and
Nikola Corp.21
The list of the largest declines in SWC from 2019 to 2022 includes, among other firms,
Salesforce (decrease of $38.4 billion, from 102.7 billion), Verizon (decrease of $60.6 billion, from 226.1
billion), and Boeing (decrease of $73.8 billion, from $257.8 billion). It also includes Meta Platforms
(decrease of $183.6 billion, from 390.8 billion), Intel (decrease of $118.1 billion, from 387.4 billion), and
Disney (decrease of $105.2 billion, from 272.1 billion). The decreases in lifetime SWC during the three-
year period 2019 to 2022 for these three firms are noteworthy, as they exceed in absolute magnitude the
7. Conclusions
It is inevitable that SWC measured over long horizons will be concentrated in few firms to an
extent because of differences in initial size, the number of months the firm has been listed, as well as
purely random return outcomes that are only observable ex post. This study documents that the degree to
which SWC is concentrated in relatively few firms is not only striking, but continues to increase in recent
years. These outcomes are worthy of further study. In particular, to what extent are the results
attributable to the mathematical observation (Bessembinder, 2018 and Farago and Hjalmarsson, 2023)
that the compounding of purely random short-horizon returns will lead to positive skewness in compound
long-horizon returns? Alternatively, to what extent are the outcomes attributable to more fundamental
21
The firm listed on Table 5 is that created by the 2017 merger of Dow Chemical and E. I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company (the latter of which is listed on Table 1). This firm was initially named DowDuPont and subsequently
renamed Dupont de Nemours after a pair of spinoffs during 2019. See
https://www.investors.dupont.com/investors/dupont-investors/faq/default.aspx.
The SWC employed here takes account not only of the time series of cash flows to investors, but
also end-of-period valuations that are based on the market’s forward-looking assessments, and will
therefore change as unforeseen events arise. This study identifies the best-performing firms in terms of
lifetime SWC measured as of 2016, 2019, and 2022, but also highlights how some firms listed as top
performers at certain dates subsequently stumbled. The list of firms that turn out to have delivered the
best shareholder outcomes over upcoming decades is likely to differ substantively from the lists contained
herein. However, it can be anticipated that SWC is likely to be concentrated in a relatively few firms
Albuquerque, R., 2012, Skewness in stock returns: reconciling the evidence on firm versus aggregate
returns, Review of Financial Studies 25, 1630–1673.
Autor, David, David Dorn, Lawrence Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen, 2020, The fall of
labor share and the rise of superstar firms, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135, 645-709.
Bessembinder, Hendrik, 2018, “Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?” Journal of Financial Economics,
129, 440-457. The pre-publication document can be downloaded at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2900447.
Bessembinder, Hendrik, 2021, “Wealth Creation in the U.S. Public Stock Markets 1926-2019”, Journal of
Investing, 30, 47-61. The pre-publication document can be downloaded at https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3537838.
Bessembinder, Hendrik, Te-Feng Chen, Goeun Choi, and K.C. John Wei, 2019, “Do Global Stocks
Outperform US Treasury Bills?” Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3415739.
Dichev, I.D., 2007, What are stock investors’ actual historical returns? Evidence from dollar-weighted
returns, American Economic Review 97, 386–401.
Dichev, I.D., Yu, G., 2011, Higher risk, lower returns: What hedge fund investors really earn, Journal of
Financial Economics 100, 248-263.
Ellenberg, J., 2014, How Not to be Wrong, The Power of Mathematical Thinking, Penguin Books, New
York, New York.
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 2018, Long horizon returns, Review of Asset Pricing Studies, forthcoming.
Farago, A., Hjalmarsson, E., 2023, Long-horizon stock returns are positively skewed. Review of Finance,
27, 495-538.
Heaton, J.B., Polson, N.G., Witte, J.H., 2017, Why indexing works, Applied Stochastic Models in
Business and Industry 33, 690–693.
Noe, T., and G. Parker, 2005. Winner take all: competition, strategy, and the structure of returns in the
internet economy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 14, 141–161.
Shumway, T., 1997, The delisting bias in CRSP returns, Journal of Finance 52, 327-340.
Simkowitz, M.A, Beedles W.L., 1978, Diversification in a three-moment world, Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 13, 927–94
Lifetime Wealth
Company Name First Last
Creation % of Total
(most recent) Month Month
($ Millions)
WORLDCOM INC GA NEW ‐$102,002.5 ‐0.19% Dec‐80 Jul‐02
RIVIAN AUTOMOTIVE INC ‐$91,631.6 ‐0.17% Dec‐21 Dec‐22
VIAVI SOLUTIONS INC ‐$86,779.8 ‐0.16% Dec‐93 Dec‐22
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC ‐$85,441.1 ‐0.16% May‐96 Nov‐06
WACHOVIA CORP 2ND NEW ‐$68,317.3 ‐0.12% Jan‐73 Dec‐08
DUPONT DE NEMOURS INC ‐$59,992.9 ‐0.11% Oct‐17 Dec‐22
DAIMLER A G ‐$59,679.8 ‐0.11% Dec‐98 Jun‐10
QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTL INC ‐$58,517.0 ‐0.11% Jul‐97 Mar‐11
COUPANG INC ‐$55,190.1 ‐0.10% Apr‐21 Dec‐22
NORTEL NETWORKS CORP NEW ‐$54,009.4 ‐0.10% Dec‐75 Jan‐09
DEUTSCHE BANK A G ‐$47,302.5 ‐0.09% Nov‐01 Dec‐22
COINBASE GLOBAL INC ‐$44,607.7 ‐0.08% May‐21 Dec‐22
SPRINT NEXTEL CORP ‐$39,754.6 ‐0.07% May‐63 Jul‐13
BROADWING CORP ‐$37,680.9 ‐0.07% Aug‐00 Jan‐07
TIME WARNER INC NEW ‐$37,331.8 ‐0.07% Apr‐92 Jun‐18
KRAFT HEINZ CO ‐$35,181.3 ‐0.06% Aug‐15 Dec‐22
ARCELORMITTAL S A LUXEMBOURG ‐$34,678.0 ‐0.06% Sep‐97 Dec‐22
PALM INC ‐$34,185.0 ‐0.06% Apr‐00 Jun‐10
UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC ‐$34,112.3 ‐0.06% Jun‐19 Dec‐22
GLOBAL CROSSING LTD ‐$33,438.7 ‐0.06% Sep‐98 Oct‐11
DOORDASH INC ‐$31,912.7 ‐0.06% Jan‐21 Dec‐22
PARAMOUNT GLOBAL ‐$30,056.0 ‐0.05% Jul‐87 Dec‐22
SNOWFLAKE INC ‐$30,050.2 ‐0.05% Oct‐20 Dec‐22
SYCAMORE NETWORKS INC ‐$28,848.8 ‐0.05% Nov‐99 Mar‐13
AIRBNB INC ‐$27,494.6 ‐0.05% Jan‐21 Dec‐22
20288 VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC 165,115 35 226,053 35 165,475 67 60,938 ‐60,578 360
21734 TEXACO INC 164,279 36 172,213 46 175,513 59 7,934 3,300 11,234
43613 COMCAST CORP NEW 146,872 38 203,502 40 172,656 62 56,630 ‐30,846 25,783
21886 WARNER LAMBERT CO 142,468 40 149,348 53 152,210 73 6,880 2,862 9,742
20315 BOEING CO 139,355 41 257,785 31 183,928 55 118,430 ‐73,857 44,574
21576 SCHLUMBERGER LTD 134,186 43 82,898 107 105,303 103 ‐51,288 22,405 ‐28,882
20908 H P INC 129,290 46 147,062 56 162,282 70 17,772 15,221 32,993
21592 SEARS ROEBUCK & CO 120,587 49 126,410 70 128,833 81 5,824 2,422 8,246
11300 GILEAD SCIENCES INC 118,600 50 120,412 74 158,203 71 1,812 37,791 39,603
Table 5: Shareholder Wealth Creation for Firms with the Greatest Decrease from 2016 to 2022 and from 2019 to 2022.
Wealth Creation ($ Millions) Measured at Wealth Creation ($ Millions) Measured at
PERMCO Company Name (Most Recent) End 2016 End 2022 Change PERMCO Company Name (Most Recent) End 2019 End 2022 Change
20792 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 608,115 463,380 ‐144,736 54084 META PLATFORMS INC 390,781 207,149 ‐183,631
58911 RIVIAN AUTOMOTIVE INC 0 ‐91,632 ‐91,632 2367 INTEL CORP 387,430 269,361 ‐118,069
56027 DUPONT DE NEMOURS INC 0 ‐59,993 ‐59,993 20587 DISNEY WALT CO 272,084 166,915 ‐105,169
58024 COUPANG INC 0 ‐55,190 ‐55,190 15473 AMAZON COM INC 865,293 763,966 ‐101,327
55296 KRAFT HEINZ CO 13,606 ‐35,181 ‐48,787 58911 RIVIAN AUTOMOTIVE INC 0 ‐91,632 ‐91,632
21645 A T & T INC 169,525 124,055 ‐45,470 20315 BOEING CO 257,785 183,928 ‐73,857
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4448099
58167 COINBASE GLOBAL INC 0 ‐44,608 ‐44,608 21645 A T & T INC 191,434 124,055 ‐67,379
56719 UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC 0 ‐34,112 ‐34,112 20288 VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC 226,053 165,475 ‐60,578
57587 DOORDASH INC 0 ‐31,913 ‐31,913 20483 CITIGROUP INC 79,560 19,203 ‐60,357
21881 WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE INC 94,651 63,870 ‐30,781 58024 COUPANG INC 0 ‐55,190 ‐55,190
57255 SNOWFLAKE INC 0 ‐30,050 ‐30,050 58167 COINBASE GLOBAL INC 0 ‐44,608 ‐44,608
21576 SCHLUMBERGER LTD 134,186 105,303 ‐28,882 55341 PAYPAL HOLDINGS INC 80,387 36,973 ‐43,415
57588 AIRBNB INC 0 ‐27,495 ‐27,495 41673 FIDELITY NATIONAL INFO SVCS INC 41,267 ‐159 ‐41,426
58186 UIPATH INC 0 ‐26,424 ‐26,424 45288 SALESFORCE INC 102,663 64,302 ‐38,361
57148 LUCID GROUP INC 0 ‐26,170 ‐26,170 2850 MEDTRONIC PLC 142,868 105,011 ‐37,857
20587 DISNEY WALT CO 191,954 166,915 ‐25,039 21305 WELLS FARGO & CO NEW 278,476 242,854 ‐35,622
57104 QUANTUMSCAPE CORP 0 ‐24,432 ‐24,432 57587 DOORDASH INC 0 ‐31,913 ‐31,913
21866 PARAMOUNT GLOBAL ‐5,908 ‐30,056 ‐24,148 43613 COMCAST CORP NEW 203,502 172,656 ‐30,846
56690 ZOOM VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS INC 0 ‐23,471 ‐23,471 57255 SNOWFLAKE INC 0 ‐30,050 ‐30,050
56382 NIKOLA CORP 0 ‐23,356 ‐23,356 21492 RAYTHEON CO 79,833 52,228 ‐27,605
Figure 1: Concentration of U.S. Stock Market Capitalization, 1974 to 2022, Top 5 and Top 15 Firms
30.0%
25.0%
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4448099
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022
Largest 5 (% of All) Largest 15 (% of All)
Largest 5 (% of Largest 1500) Largest 15 (% of Largest 1500)
This Figure displays the market capitalization of the five largest and fifteen largest firms relative to the combined market capitalization of all
publicly‐listed common stocks and relative to the combined market capitalization of the 1,500 largest stocks, as of the end of each indicated
year. The sample includes all common stocks (shrcd variable equal to 10, 11, or 12) in the CRSP monthly common stock database.
Appendix: Computing Shareholder Wealth Creation (SWC)
Let W0 denote investors’ initial wealth, and assume an investment horizon of T periods. Let Rft
denote the time t Treasury bill return, and Rt denote the time t return on a common stock, inclusive of
both dividends and capital gains. Further, let It denote investors’ time t equity investment in common
stock, measured by the market capitalization of equity. Finally, let FVt,T = (1+ Rft+1)*(1+ Rft+2)* (1+
Rft+3)*…. *(1+ RfT) denote an interest accumulation factor obtained by compounding forward from time t
to time T at the prevailing one-month Treasury interest rates. Bessembinder (2018) shows that the dollar
amount of shareholder wealth created, measured as of the end of sample period, can be computed as:
WT – W0*FV0, T =
I0*(R1 – Rf1) FV1,T + I1*(R2 – Rf2) FV2,T + … + IT-2*(RT-1 – RfT-1)*FVT-1,T + IT-1*(RT – RfT). (1)
The first line of expression (1) can be interpreted as the difference between investors’ actual final wealth
and the final wealth that would have been attained had the invested capital earned Treasury-bill rates.
The second line of expression (3) shows that this dollar amount can be computed by (i) multiplying the
firm’s excess (over Treasury bills) return by its beginning market capitalization in each period to obtain
an excess dollar return, (ii) compounding each resulting dollar amount forward to the end-of-sample,
Bessembinder, Chen, Choi, and Wei (2019) show that this wealth creation measure can also be
computed as the “Net Future Value” of all cash flow to or from shareholders in aggregate, including their
initial capital investments, dividends, share repurchases, secondary equity issuances and firms’ end-of-
sample market capitalizations. The internal rate of return of the same series of cash flows is sometimes
referred to (e.g. Dichev, 2007 and Dichev and Yu, 2011) as the dollar-weighted return to investors.