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Psychology of Women Quarterly, 1989,13,459-475. Printed in the United States of America

FEMl NlST POSTSTRUCTURALISM

A N D DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

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Confribufions fo Feminist Psychology

Nicola Gavey
University of Auckland, New Zealand

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In this article I suggest that feminist poststructuralism (Weedon, 1987) is
of great potential value to feminist psychologists seeking more satisfacto-
ry ways of theorizing gender and subjectivity. Some key elements of this
theoretical perspective are discussed, including an understanding of
knowledge as socially produced and inherently unstable, an emphasis
on the importance of language and discourse, and a decentering of the
subject. Discourse analysis is discussed as one way of working that is

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consistent with feminist poststructuralist theory. To illustrate this ap-
proach, an example is presented from my work on the sexual coercion of
women within heterosexual relationships.

In this article I will discuss feminist poststructuralism (Weedon, 1987),

which, I believe, is of great potential value to feminist psychologists. The
theoretical underpinnings of feminist poststructuralism are transdisci-
plinary in origin and are radically different from much of psychology. It is,
however, closely aligned with some poststructuralist enterprises within psy-
chology and recent moves toward a postmodern psychology (e.g., Antaki,
1988; Gergen, 1985, 1988; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988; Henriques,
Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984; Sampson, 1985; Shotter &
Gergen, 1989; Walkerdine, 1986).1While I am specifically addressing this
discussion to psychologists, poststructuralist approaches are not discipli-

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I would like to thank Sylvia Blood and Kathryn McPhillips for discussions that were helpful in
the preparation of this article; Jeanne Marecek and two reviewers for helpful comments and
editing; and Patti Lather for an inspiring seminar (unfortunately only days before the final
draft of this article had to be finished). The research reported in this article was partially
funded by a grant from the University of Auckland Research Fund.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Nicola Gavey, Department of Psychology, University
of Auckland, Private Bag, Auckland, New Zealand.

Published by Cambridge University Press 0361-6843/89 $5.00 + .OO 459

460 zyxwvu
z
nary-bound. Therefore any apparent “containment” of this discussion
within “psychology” is artificial.
CAVEY

Discourse analysis is an approach compatible with feminist poststruc-

turalist theory. This “method will be discussed, along with an example of
discourse analysis from my research on the sexual coercion of women with-
in heterosexual relationships.

FEMINIST POSTSTRUCTURALISM

Poststructuralism refers to a loose collection of theoretical positions influ-

enced by, for example, post-Saussurean linguistics, Marxism (particularly
Althusser’s theory of ideology), psychoanalysis (especially Lacan’s rework-
ings), feminism, the “new French feminists” (Kristeva, Cixous, Irigaray),
and the work of Derrida, Barthes, and Foucault. Weedon (1987) claimed
that poststructuralism offers a useful conceptual foundation for feminist
practice. She described feminist poststructuralism as “a mode of knowl-
edge production which uses poststructuralist theories of language, subjec-
tivity, social processes and institutions to understand existing power rela-
tions and to identify areas and strategies for change” (pp. 40-41).
In the sections that follow, I will discuss feminist poststructuralism in
relation to feminist psychologies and briefly outline what I regard as some
of its key concepts. Work such as this, which attempts to identify and
describe some of the “key features” of poststructuralism (in this case as they
relate to psychology at least), is on somewhat shaky ground. It is in danger
of fixing and oversimplifying the ideas, thus presenting them in a poten-

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tially stagnant and deradicalized form in which they may be adopted as a
new orthodoxy. Some people working along poststructuralist lines would
be reluctant to label their approaches as “poststructuralist.” An important
part of poststructuralism is its resistance to definition or even identifica-
tion, presumably because such practices represent an attempt to pin down
an essence that does not exist.

Relationship to Feminist Psychologies

Feminist initiatives within psychology have tended to fall within the domi-
nant positivist, empiricist research tradition of mainstream psychology
(e.g., Lykes & Stewart, 1986; Wallston & Grady, 1985). Yet feminist criti-
cisms of positivist social science research question some of the underlying
assumptions of these approaches. For example, the possibility and virtues
of “value-free” research and objectivity, the validity of laboratory research,
the relationship between the researcher and the researched (and the power
imbalance between the two), the mystification of scientific “expertise,”
and so on are all questioned by these critiques (e,g., Bograd, 1988; Hoff,
1988; Kitzinger, 1987; Wallston, 1985; Wallston & Grady, 1985; Wilkin-
son, 1986; Yllo, 1988).
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Mainstream psychology can be understood to fall within the liberal
46 1

humanist tradition, which is so pervasive in contemporary Western society

that it is a rarely recognized and rarely questioned “fundamental faith”
(Kitzinger, 1987, p. 192). This lack of recognition is not surprising given
that liberal humanism is, more often than not, the theoretical basis of
“common sense” (Belsey, 1980; Weedon, 1987). It assumes that individuals
share a unique essence of human nature (Weedon, 1987). It also involves an
emphasis on rationality and “the dignity of the individual and his or her
inalienable rights to justice, liberty, privacy, freedom of thought, and the
pursuit of happiness irrespective of colour, class, creed, or gender” (Kit-
zinger, 1987, p. 191). Through the “individualistic focus of contemporary

zy
liberal psychology,” Kitzinger (1987) argued, “the personalization of the
political is achieved” (p. 37). Thus, for instance, although liberal humanist
values are not unworthy, the absence of metatheoretical concerns about
power render them insufficient.
Even initiatives within feminist psychology that are related only tenu-
ously to mainstream psychology (e.g., Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, &

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Tarule, 1986) share its humanist assumptions. For example, within these
and other feminist analyses, there is considerable emphasis on, and privi-
leging of, women’s experience, which is often at least implicitly regarded
as universal and transhistorical - an entity that is pure and essential. Wom-
en’s language is regarded as transparently reflecting women’s unique expe-
rience. As such, to speak “from experience” has almost unquestionable
authority in much feminist discourse. The importance of language as a
constitutive process remains largely unrecognized.
A poststructuralist approach to experience is radically different. It as-
sumes that “experience has no inherent essential meaning” (Weedon 1987,
p. 34), and “in so far as it is meaningful experience is constituted in lan-
guage” (Weedon, 1987, p. 85; see also Belsey, 1980; Wetherell, 1986). This
does not mean that experience does not exist or that it is not important, but
rather that the ways in which we understand and express it are never
independent of language.
Feminist emphasis on women’s experience is important as a political
strategy that has given voice to women’s oppression by, and resistance to,
patriarchal prescriptions. Many feminists are highly committed to privi-
leging women’s experience in a positively redefined form. According to
Derrida (quoted in Culler, 1982), this attempt to reverse the hierarchical
relationship between men and women is an important phase in the decon-
struction of this hierarchy. However, feminist theories that maintain this
stance ultimately offer a less radical challenge to patriarchal discourse and
power because they move “parallel to hegemonic discourse” (Weedon,
1987, p. 110) and adhere to the existent terms of the debate. As Lather
(1988) noted, we “need to wrestle with the postmodern questioning of the
lust for authoritative accounts if we are not to remain as much a part of the
462 z
problem as of the solution ourselves” (p. 577). Feminist theorizing that
GAVEY

posits essential, fixed qualities for women and men (even if women’s quali-
ties are positively valued) can end up supporting the status quo. Subversion
requires a challenge to, rather than uncritical preservation of, the practices
and forms of subjectivity (that is, ways of being, identities, desires, ways of
behaving, and so on) required by existing social institutions (Weedon,

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1987).
Feminist poststructuralism is not necessarily inconsistent with other
forms of feminism. For example in its insistence on social and historical
specificity it shares common concerns with some socialist feminist theories.
Also, the feminist recognition of the need for consciousness raising, or
“subjective transformation” (Henriques et al. , 1984, p. 7), as necessary for
significant social change, is a point with which feminist poststructuralism
concurs. In fact, some feminist writers explicitly locate feminism within
postmodernism generally (e.g., Flax, 1987). Others (e.g., Bowles, 1984)
believe that poststructuralists are merely reiterating what feminists have
been saying all along. This certainly highlights the perception that there is
important shared ground between feminism and poststructuralism in gen-
eral, clarifying the futility of dichotomizing the two movements.

Approaches to Knowledge

Poststructuralist theory rejects the possibility of absolute truth and objec-

tivity. As feminists have observed, dominant conceptions of reality and
truth in patriarchal Western society have tended to be male constructions
which reflect and perpetuate male power interests. Feminists’ explorations
of our own realities, as women, have tended to produce different truths,
thus casting suspicion on the idea of one reality and one truth. Similarly,
from a poststructuralist perspective, knowledge is considered to be socially
constructed, through “a specific kind of production with definite relations
to the social and material world” (Venn, 1984, p. 150). Knowledge is
transient and inherently unstable - there are few, if any, universal truths.
Furthermore, knowledge is understood to be not neutral - it is closely
associated with power. Those who have the power to regulate what counts
as truth are able to maintain their access to material advantages and
power.
Within poststructuralism a plurality of meanings is welcomed. Tradi-
tional science is considered to be just one discourse among many, no more
or less valid as a means to truth and knowledge than other discursive forms
such as literature. Although traditional scientific method may be utilized
because of its rhetorical power or its utility in addressing technological
problems, it is not thought to have any superior access to knowledge and
truth. It is not privileged, as it is within mainstream psychology, as the best
or only approach.
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zyxw 463
The structure of reality assumed for most scientific investigation is dif-
ferent from what is assumed within poststructuralism. For example, Culler
(1982) noted, “Structuralists are convinced that systematic knowledge is

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possible; poststructuralists claim to know only the impossibility of this
knowledge” (p. 22). If one’s world view does not presume a pre-existent,
fixed, universal structure of reality (human nature or development, for
example) available to be discovered, then one may question what is the
purpose of research and scholarship. Some feminists imply that it is the
political ends of women’s liberation (Acker, Barry, & Esseveld, 1983; Jag-
gar, 1983). Similarly, for constructionism (which is part of the developing
postmodern movement within psychology), moral criteria are being reas-
serted as relevant to scientific practice (Gergen, 1985). For feminist post-
structuralism, goals of scholarship would include developing understand-
ings or theories that are historically, socially, and culturally specific, and
that are explicitly related to changing oppressive gender relations. Rather
than “discovering” reality, “revealing” truth, or “uncovering” the facts,
feminist poststructuralism would, instead, be concerned with disrupting
and displacing dominant (oppressive)knowledges.

Language

These approaches to knowledge are connected to the poststructuralist as-

sertion that all meaning and knowledge is discursively constituted through

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language and other signifying practices (Belsey, 1980; Weedon, 1987; see
also Black & Coward, 1981). Any interpretation or understanding of an
object or event is made available through a particular discourse concerning
or relating to that object or event.
Feminist poststructuralism is underpinned with the understanding that
language (and discourse) constitutes subjectivity. Meaning is actively con-
stituted through language and therefore is neither fixed nor essential.
Meanings arise out of difference and distinctions, not out of direct and
immediate essences and substances (Sampson, 1985, 1989). Futhermore,
“common language is not innocent and neutral,” but “riddled with the
presuppositions of Western metaphysics” (Coward & Ellis, 1977, p. 123).
This view of language is in marked contrast to the liberal humanist view of
language as transparent and expressive, merely reflecting and describing
(pre-existing) subjectivity and human experience of the world.

Discourse

Weedon’s feminist poststructuralism is particularly influenced by the

Foucauldian idea that language is always located in discourse. Discourse
refers to an interrelated “system of statements which cohere around com-
464 zyxwvuz
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mon meanings and values. . . . [that] are a product of social factors, of
powers and practices, rather than an individual’s set of ideas” (Hollway,
1983, p. 231). It is a broad concept referring to a way of constituting
meaning which is specific to particular groups, cultures, and historical
periods and is always changing. For Weedon (1987), discourse is a struc-
turing principle of society that constitutes and is reproduced in social
institutions, modes of thought, and individual subjectivity. So, for exam-
ple, the discursive production of the desire to be a “good mother” (which
has particular material and political implications for women), would in-
volve such things as “the child-care books, the hospital visits, the routine
check-ups, the normalizing techniques which define satisfactory maternal
health or development, and so on” (Henriques et al., 1984, p. 219). It is
through discourse that material power is exercised and that power relations
are established and perpetuated. And, at the same time, every discourse is
“the result of a practice of production which is at once material, discursive
and complex, always inscribed in relation to other practices of production
of discourse” (Henriques et al., 1984, p. 106). Feminist poststructuralism
maintains an emphasis on the material bases of power (for example, social,
economic, and cultural arrangements) and the need for change at this level
of discourse. This emphasis and insistence distinguishes it from some post-
structuralist approaches that are highly abstract and apparently “apoliti-
cal” (Weedon, 1987).
Discourses are multiple, and they offer competing, potentially contra-
dictory ways of giving meaning to the world. They offer “subject positions”
for individuals to take up (Hollway, 1984; Weedon, 1987). These positions,
or “possibilities” for constituting subjectivity (identities, behaviors, under-
standings of the world) vary in terms of the power they offer individuals.
Discourses vary in their authority. The dominant discourses appear
“natural,” denying their own partiality and gaining their authority by
appealing to common sense. These discourses, which support and perpetu-
ate existing power relations, tend to constitute the subjectivity of most
people most of the time (in a given place and time). So, for example,
systems of meaning such as feminism are currently limited in their power
because they are marginalized and unavailable as yet as subject positions to
many women.
Individuals are not passive, however. Rather they are active and have
“choice” when positioning themselves in relation to various discourses. For
example, women can identify with and conform to traditional discursive
constructions of femininity or they can resist, reject, and challenge them
(to a greater or lesser extent). This is not a simple matter of rational choice
however. Weedon suggested that consciousness, as fragmented and contra-
dictory, is the product of a discursive battle for the subjectivity of the
individual. For example, some women have chosen feminism as a system of
meaning that is preferable for understanding their lives in this society at
this time. Yet despite this choice some aspects of a feminist woman’s subjec-
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Feminist Poststructuralism and Discourse Analysis

tivity may still be gendered in traditionally feminine ways, and she may
retain desires and behaviors incompatible with the goals of feminism (e.g.,
see Coward, 1984).
465

Subjectivity

Subjectivity is constituted or constructed through language and discourse.

Subjectivity refers to “the conscious and unconscious thoughts and emo-

z
tions of the individual, her sense of herself and her ways of understanding
her relation to the world” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32).

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Western psychology usually assumes that the individual has on essential,
coherent, and unique nature and subjectivity. Poststructuralism does not. It
seeks to “decentre the subject”- to shift emphasis away from the individual as
the origin and guarantor of meaning, and as a “fully aware and self-present”
agent (Sampson, 1989, p. 14). In direct contrast to the humanist assumptions
of a unified, rational self, poststructuralism proposes a subject that is fragmen-
tary, inconsistent, and contradictory. Poststructuralism thus denies authentici-
ty to individual experience. It also denies the existence of an essential female
nature - an important concept within some feminist discourses. It offers in-
stead a “contextualizationof experience and an analysis of its constitution and
ideological power” (Weedon, 1987, p. 125). It is, therefore, able to contend
with contradictions in experience, such as, the presence of desires and behav-
ior inconsistent with women’s liberation in women who see themselves as
feminists. As Weedon suggested, an advantage of poststructuralism is its recog-
nition of a “consciousawareness of the contradictory nature of subjectivity can
introduce the possibility of political choice between modes of femininity in
different situations and between the discourses in which they have their mean-
ing” (p. 87). It is possible, therefore, not to deny desires which may be incom-
patible with Iiberation, “but rather to understand desires as produced and
therefore, potentially at least, as changeable” (Henriqueset al., 1984, p. 219).

Experience as Text

Poststructuralist theory has probably been most developed within the field
of literary criticism (e.g., Belsey, 1980; Culler, 1982). A poststructuralist
approach to a fictive text regards it as an embodiment of various discourses
available in the social, cultural, and historical context of the author. The
traditional notion of authorship is challenged (Barthes, 1987; Foucault,
1979), as the author is seen more as a reproducer of discourse than a
creator of new thought. Literary texts provide important examples of vari-
ous discourses in circulation at a given time and in a given culture, but they
are not regarded as providing great original insights into “basic” human
nature or social processes. Emphasis is placed on the practice of reading,
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recognizing that there are numerous different readings of a text possible.
There is no essential “true” meaning that resides within the text; rather,
different meanings are constructed on every reading.
Parallels can be drawn between the processes of analyzing and under-
standing literature and the processes of analyzing and understanding indi-
viduals’ behavior or their accounts of their experience (Potter, Stringer, &
Wetherell, 1984). As language constitutes subjectivity, both fiction and
individuals’ self-reports are examples of this constitution. At least two
points are important here with regard to psychology. First, the notion of
experience (or behavior, self-reports, etc.) as text implies that we should
approach the reports and accounts of those we research as discursive pro-

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ductions and not as reflections (accurate, distorted, or otherwise) of their
“true” experience. Second, the poststructuralist emphasis on reading and
the multiple meanings of texts reminds us that our understanding (reading)

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of our research data is really the constitution of such data, insofar as they
are meaningful, and it is controlled by our own location in various discours-
es- for example, scientific, humanist, therapeutic, feminist, and so on.

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

As one develops new theoretical understandings, one’s ways of working

shift. A way of working that is consistent with a feminist poststructuralist
perspective is discourse analysis. This article presents discourse analysis as
one tool for critical analysis, but by no means prescribes it as “the” new
method.
Discourse analysis refers to a set of methods that have been used by
workers with different theories of language in a variety of ways (e.g., van
Dijk 1985). The particular form of discourse analysis that I present in-
volves identifying the social discourses available to women and men in a
given culture and society at a given time. These discourses provide subject
positions, constituting our subjectivities, and reproducing or challenging
existing gender relations (e.g., Hollway, 1984; Walkerdine, 1986). Close
attention is paid to the social context of language and to its function in or
relation to structures of power. One of the aims is to provide detailed,
historically specific analyses which will enable us “to explain the working
of power on behalf of specific interests and to analyze the opportunities for
resistance to it” (Weedon, 1987, p. 41).
Potter and Wetherell (1987) note that one feature common to all forms
of discourse analysis is that:

Participants’ discourse or social texts are approached in their own right and
not as a secondary route to things “beyond” the text like attitudes, events or
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Feminist Poststructuralism and Discourse Analysis 467
cognitive processes. Discourse is treated as a potent, action-oriented medi-
um, not a transparent information channel. (p. 160, emphasis in original)

Discourse analysis involves the careful reading of texts (e.g. , transcripts

of conversations or interviews, or existent documents or records, or even
more general social practices), with a view to discerning discursive pat-
terns of meaning, contradictions, and inconsistencies. It is an approach
that identifies and names language processes people use to constitute their
own and others’ understanding of personal and social phenomena. These
processes are related to the reproduction of or challenge to the distribution
of power between social groups and within institutions. Discourse analysis
proceeds on the assumption that these processes are not static, fixed, and
orderly but rather fragmented, inconsistent, and contradictory.
If this discussion of discourse analysis seems vague, it is perhaps because

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there are no recipes or formulae. It is a form of analysis that is attentive
both to detail in language and to the wider social picture. From the per-
spective of social psychologists, Potter and Wetherell (1987) emphasized:

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there is no method to discourse analysis in the way we traditionally think of
an experimental method or content analysis method. What we have is broad
theoretical framework concerning the nature of discourse and its role in
social life, along with a set of suggestions about how discourse can best be
studied and how others can be convinced findings are genuine. (p. 175,
emphasis in original)

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Just as there is no method in the usual sense for psychology, similarly the
criteria for evaluating poststructuralist forms of discourse analysis bear
little resemblance to traditional evaluative practices in mainstream psy-
chology. (For a discussion on evaluating discourse analyses, see Potter &
Wetherell, 1987.)

A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS APPROACH TO WOMEN’S EXPERIENCES

OF SEXUAL COERCION WITHIN HETEROSEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS

In this section, I present an example of a discourse analysis from my

ongoing research on women’s experiences of sexual coercion within hetero-
sexual relationships. One view of sexual victimization holds that it exists on
a continuum of normative heterosexual practices which are socially con-
structed as involving an active, initiating male and a passive, responsive
female (e.g., Gavey, 1988; Jackson, 1978; MacKinnon, 1983). From this
perspective it makes limited sense to arbitrarily separate “rape” from “not
rape,” and “sexual coercion” from “noncoercive heterosexual sex.” The ma-
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jority of identified cases of rape and sexual abuse occur within what have
been called “legitimate heterosexual relationships” (Gavey, 1988) or “po-
tentially appropriate relationships” (Estrich, 1987) (e.g., Russell, 1982,

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1984). Thus it is important to look at the full range of sexual coercion that
occurs within such relationships. This range includes little discussed phe-
nomena such as social coercion (e.g., engaging in sex only to avoid, for
example, appearing “frigid” or old-fashioned) and interpersonal coercion
(e.g., engaging in sex because it is the only way to stop a man’s continual
pleading) (Finkelhor & Yllo, 1983). These more normative forms of coer-
cion include situations where the woman appears to consent to take part in
an interaction despite not wanting to. Some of these forms of coercion,
particularly social coercion, are rarely discussed in the literature on sexual
victimization. I suggest this is because within the dominant discourses on
heterosexuality, such behavior appears natural.
My research seeks to locate women’s accounts of their experiences of
heterosexual coercion in relation to specific discourses concerning sexuality

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and sexual violence in particular, and interpersonal relationships and gen-
der relations more generally.
Presented on page 469 is a collection of extracts from the transcript of an
interview with a woman about her experiences of heterosexual coercion.
Sue Davis (a pseudonym) is a Pakehaz woman who was 35 years old at the
time of the interview. The conversation concerns an incident that was
recalled in response to the question, “Have you ever had any sexual experi-
ences that, looking back on, you feel uncomfortable about or regret in
some way?” The incident happened 14 years before the interview, when
she was 21 years old. Because Sue Davis describes herself as having “con-
sented” to have sexual intercourse (“he certainly didn’t force me”), it would
not be regarded as an instance of sexual victimization by, for example,
researchers taking a literal and de-contextualized reading of her account.
Because the reading process is constructive and not neutral, it is impor-
tant to identify one’s positions as a reader in relation to this text (even
though such identification is unlikely to capture the nuances and complexi-
ty of these positions). My positions are currently, at least, feminist and
poststructuralist in terms of theoretical perspectives, and female, hetero-
sexual, Pakeha and educated in terms of my social location.
The main focus of the analysis is on the content of the text - that is,
what was actually said. But, because language is a material and social
process, the social and historical contexts of the account are also impor-
tant. I examine this text for the presence of discourses relevant to women’s
experiences of social and interpersonal heterosexual coercion and for sub-
ject positions offered to women by these various discourses.
I will briefly discuss two related discursive themes in this text. These are
the “permissive sexuality” discourse and the “male sexual needs” discourse
(cf. Hollway, 1984). These discourses provide the respective possible sub-
ject positions of a “sexually liberated’ woman for whom sex is “no big
Feminist Poststructuralism and Discourse Analysis

1
EXCERPTS FROM THE TRANSCRIPT OF A N
INTERVIEW W I T H SUE DAVIS
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Sue Daois: I just had no idea that he felt sexually attracted to me at all. I thought we were just good
469

2 friends, because we got on really well. And there was a New Year’s party where he made it quite clear that,
3 you know, his manhood was going to be dashed if he didn’t go to bed with me. And I got myself into the

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4 situation where I knew that he was very vulnerable, and it didn’t really mean a lot to me, and it seemed to
5 mean such a hell of a lot to him that I said yes. And it was not the greatest sexual experience I’ve ever had

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6 anyway. I don’t think it probably did much for him, because he realized that there wasn’t much to it, and
7 so I don’t think I did him any favors anyway, really. I would have been better to have found the right
8 words to say no.
9 (Gap of two pages)
10 Sue Dovis: Um (pause) he just came and said he wanted to talk to me I think, “Come outside, come
11 outside.” Something along that line, fairly insistently, because I was busy talking to someone else
12 and didn’t really want to go and I remember I sort of went because be was so insistent. Um
13 (pause) and I didn’t think I was naive in those days, but I certainly wasn‘t expecting him to be
14 (pause) you know he made it (pause) he said “Oh, come t o Bruce’s room” and I think then I figured

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15 out what he wanted, but I figured if 1 went with him 1would be able to sort of sit down and talk to
16 him and sort of say my line which I’d said quite a few times in the past by then, you know, “You’re
17 a very attractive person, hut (pause) urn” And he was just so frantic that um (pause)
18 (Gap of half a page)
19 Interviewer: And then once you were out there he was quite frantic and (pause)
20 Sue Dauis: Well he was sort of desperate to have sex and (pause)
21 Interviewer: How was he communicating that?
22 Sue Davis: Urn, words, things like “Please Sue, please,” you know, and physically. I can’t
23 remember exactly how, but, you know, sort of, um (pause) he certainly didn’t force me. Um I
24 somehow through the words got the feeling- although he never said it-that he’d never had sex
25 before. Um and I remember feeling the doomed “Oh shit!” you know. Urn, as I said before it didn’t
26 mean that much to me and it seemed to mean so much to him, so basically I lay down on the bed
27 and let him have sex, but it was not a mutually enjoyable sex. Basically he masturbated inside me
28 as far as I am concerned, and you know it was an inappropriate time (pause) it was all wrong
29 because, you know, if I had gone to bed with someone like that in another situation where we’d
30 cared about each other and we were going to he continuing that relationship I could have taught
31 him, um, but he WIL) going off the next day, anyway. So as a first sexual experience it was lousy
32 for him - well I mean he came, but so what, you know, that was all. Urn, and, you know 1 felt flat.
33 I didn’t want to go and have sex with him in the first place. I had no idea that he felt that way
34 towards me.
35 (Gap of half a page)
36 Interviewer: What, if any, were some of the initial consequences of this event? (Gap of half a line)
37 Sue Dmis: Um (pause) Well, he must have gone away with a fairly disillusioned attitude towards sex as far
3R as his first encounter had gone. I um felt just depressed about the whole incident. I didn’t like it. I hadn’t
39 wanted it, and I’d simply done it because I didn’t want (pause) 1 seemed to have sex a lot at the time
40 because I didn’t want to hurt someone’s feelings. As though I was strong and they were not. Um, and I
41 know my feeling in those days was that sexual activity by itself isn’t important, it was how I felt about
42 someone that made it important or not important. I still feel that way a bit. You know, it’s (pause)
43 although I’ve been stuck with one person for many years it’s (pause) sex without the love is just (pause) it’s
44 no different from wiping your bottom after you’ve gone to the toilet, or brushing your hair. It’s a physical
45 activity. It’s an enjoyable one, um, well it can be an enjoyable one.
46 (Gap of one third of a page)
47 Interviewer: What feelings and thoughts do you have about this experience when you look back on
48 it?
49 Sue Davis: It makes me squirm a bit. Um, it’s not one that I look back with any enthusiasm on,
50 whereas there are a lot of things I do look back with enthusiasm on, and, yeah, it was the motives,
51 the things that caused the hehaviour were all wrong, and I thing that’s the thing that makes me
52 not like it.
470
deal,” and a woman who is responsive to and takes responsibility for male
“needs.” Sue Davis appears to have taken up these two positions. These
discourses and subject positions can be understood in terms of their histori-
z
CAVEY

cal location, in a period from the early 1970s to the present, a time in the

zy
wake of the so-called sexual revolution for women.
Examples in the text of the “permissive sexuality” discourse include “it
didn’t mean that much to me” (lines 25-26) and “I seemed to have sex a lot
at the time” (line 39; others appear in lines 41, 43-45). Examples of the
positioning of taking responsibility for male sexuality include “his man-
hood was going to be dashed if he didn’t go to bed with me” (line 3), and
“he was sort of desperate to have sex” (line 20; others are found in lines 4,
4-5,7, 12, 14-15, 15-16, 17,26,30-31,31-32,37,39-40,40).
These two discourses in conjunction, can render a woman almost “un-
rapeable” (Russell, 1982, p. 58) from the point of view of dominant dis-
courses on sexuality and rape (except in a “classic” rape in which a stranger
uses extreme violence). As Cherry (1983) noted, “in some instances, rapes
literally ‘don’t exist’ because the victim sees the coercive sexual experiences
as natural and legitimate in the context of a structured power relationship
between a man and a woman” (p. 252). Commenting on the sexual revolu-
tion, Hite (1977) addressed aspects of both the “permissive sexuality” and
“male sexual needs” discourses:

This glorification of the male “sex drive” and male orgasm “needs” amounts
to justifying men in whatever they have to do to get intercourse-even
rape- and defines the “normal” male as one who is “hungry” for intercourse.
On the other hand, the definition of female sexuality as passive and receptive
(but, since the sexual revolution, also necessary for a healthy woman)
amounts to telling women to submit to this aggressive male “sex drive”. (p.
465)

Given the subject positions adopted by Sue Davis, nonconsent in the

situation she encountered would have been almost inconceivable. Thus the
whole notion of consent and the meaning of choice in such contexts are
rendered problematic. What is important here is that these subject posi-
tions reproduce a form of heterosexual gender relations in which women
lack power.
One value of a poststructuralist approach is its assertion that subjectivity
is produced through discourses that are multiple, possibly contradictory,
and unstable. Sue Davis, for example, does not escape from any ill effects
of this unwanted sexual experience. It left her feeling “flat” (line 32) and
“depressed” (line 38) (see also, lines 7-8, and 49). This suggests that her
experience was not constituted solely by her positionings in the permissive
sexuality discourse and the male sexual needs discourse. The inconsistency
and contradictions in her language (for example, at one stage she refers to
Feminist Poststructuralism and Discourse Analysis zy
zyxw 471
feeling “the doomed ‘Oh shit!”’ [line 251, and the very next sentence, says
“it didn’t mean that much to me” [lines 25-26]) can be understood as the
effect of a discursive battle between a positioning in the “permissive sexual-
ity” discourse and another position within this or some other discourse and
not articulated explicitly. This discourse might involve women’s rights to
“mutually enjoyable sex” (line 27) (which could be part of the “permissive
sexuality” discourse) or some form of feminist discourse about the exploita-
tion of women within heterosexual relationships. It is tempting to interpret
this contradiction as indicating that her positioning in the permissive sexu-
ality and male sexual needs discourses amounts to a false consciousness,
and her negative feelings represent her true, authentic, real response. But
such an interpretation is problematic because of its oversimplification and
essentialism as well as its elitism an arrogance (Condor, 1986; Kitzinger,

ADVANTAGES A N D DISADVANTAGES OF
FEMlNIST POSTSTRUCTURALISM
zyx
1986; Marshall, 1986). Poststructuralists would suggest that some conflict
of this kind is almost inevitable and is a potential source of change.

There are some potential problems with a feminist poststructuralist ap-

zyx
proach for feminist psychologists. First, its anti-humanism and decen-
tering of the individual is so inimical to many feminists and psychologists
alike that they may reject it outright. Wilkinson (1986) found among the
accounts of feminist research that she reviewed “a broad consensus regard-
ing both the necessity of giving priority to female experience and of devel-
oping theory which is firmly situated in this experience” (p. 13). Feminist
poststructuralism, of course, holds that female experience is never indepen-
dent of social and linguistic processes and, in fact, is constituted by them.
Hence it problematizes this approach to feminist research.
A second disadvantage is that poststructuralist theory is conceptually
complicated, and often discussed in unfamiliar and therefore difficult lan-
guage. This renders it to some extent inaccessible to people without certain
sorts of backgrounds and the time to devote to indepth study of unfamiliar
material. Belsey (1980) commented that this difficulty does not arise from
“a perverse desire to be obscure” (p. 4), but rather: “to challenge familiar
assumptions and familiar values in a discourse which, in order to be easily
readable, is compelled to reproduce these assumptions and values, is an
impossibility. New concepts, new theories, necessitate new, unfamiliar and
therefore initially difficult discourses” (pp. 4-5). Thus, there may be no
simple solution to this problem. This is of concern to feminists, especially
those who give priority to combating elitism and sharing information out-
side formal education channels.
A third potential objection to poststructuralism is its relativism. As Flax
(1987) noted:
472 zyxwvu
zyxwvuz GAVEY

zy
It is also appealing, for those who have been excluded, to believe that reason
will triumph - that those who proclaim such ideas as objectivity will re-
spond to rational arguments. If there is no objective basis for distinguishing
between true and false beliefs, then it seems that power alone will determine
the outcome of competing truth claims. This is a frightening prospect to
those who lack (or are oppressed by) the power of others. (p. 625)

zyxw
In a useful discussion of relativism in relation to postmodernism and femi-
nism, Lather (in press) contends that relativism is only a problem if a
foundational approach to knowledge is accepted: “All this hand-wringing
about relativism can be framed primarily as a liberal response to the crisis
of absolutism” (emphasis in original). My response to feminists’ fears about
relativism is to emphasize that it does not mean that we have to abandon
our knowledges and values. Rather we must be aware that there is no sure
way of guaranteeing or fixing them or of convincing others of their truth.
Theory and research should be assessed in terms of their utility in achieving
politically defined goals rather than their “truth value” (Kitzinger, 1986, p.
153).
What feminist poststructuralism offers us is a theoretical basis for ana-
lyzing the subjectivities of women and men in relation to language, other
cultural practices, and the material conditions of our lives. It embraces
complexity and contradiction and, I would suggest, surpasses theories
that offer single-cause deterministic explanations of patriarchy and gender
relations. It not only gives credence to women’s active resistance to patri-
archal power (as well as our oppression by it), but it also offers promis-
ing ways of theorising about change - all of which are important to femi-
nism.
Feminist poststructuralism and other postmodern initiatives open up
new ways of working for feminist psychologists. These include analysis of
the socially constructed nature of human behavior, deconstruction of the
assumptions within language and the processes of producing subjectivities,
and discourse analysis of existing discursive fields and related subject
positions. I hope this article will generate interest in poststructuralism
among feminist psychologists. As that occurs, we will be able to develop
our own more detailed and critical feminist poststructuralist understand-
ings.
NOTES

1 . Although the distinction between poststructuralism and postmodernism is not clear, and
the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, I tend to assume that postmodernism refers
to times and practices, and poststructuralism to theories which parallel and are part of
these practices.
2. Pakeha refers to New Zealanders of European descent.
 zy
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zyxwvuts
Feminist Poststructuralism and Discourse Analysis 473
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First draft received: March 2, 1989

Final draft received: August 17, 1989