Gender and Subjectivity - Simone de Beauvoir and Contemporary Feminism

Gender and Subjectivity: Simone de Beauvoir and Contemporary Feminism
Author(s): Sonia Kruks

Source: Signs, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 89-110
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Genderand Subjectivity:
Simonede Beauvoirand
Feminism
Contemporary
Sonia Kruks
-T-:H inEthe
O RE T I CA L D E BATE amongNorthAmerican
lastdecadehas beenwidelyinfluenced
feminists
bypostmodern-
ism.Indeed,somehavegoneso faras to claimthatfeminist
theoryis inherently postmodern, its veryprojectnecessarily
such
challenging "Enlightenment myths" as the existenceofa stableself
or subjectandthepossibility ofattaining objectivetruthabout theworld
through the use of reason. Theyargue thatfeminist theory, withits
deconstruction of whatappearsnaturalin our society, itsfocuson dif-
ference, and itssubversion ofthestablephallocentric normsofWestern
thought, "properly belongs in the terrain
of postmodern philosophy" and
that"feminist notionsof theself,knowledge, and truthare too contra-
dictory to thoseoftheEnlightenment to be contained withinitscatego-
ries"(Flax 1987,625).
I am notconvinced, however, thatsuchclaimscan be substantiated.
Foronething, a
theypresuppose binary opposition,Enlightenment/post-
modern, thatis itself
bothhistorically andconceptually questionable.For
another, we do not havea sufficientlyclearconsensus on what we might
meanby"feminist" notionsof"theself,knowledge, andtruth" topermit
ustobe abletoclaimthatthey"properly" belonganywhere inparticular.
Mostimportant, feminism is muchmorethana fieldofscholarship, and
itis whenwe cometo theterrain offeminist that
politics postmodernism
arguably presents thegreatest difficulties.
In a spateof recentarticles, authorssuchas WendyBrown(1987),
Nancy Hartsock (1987), and Linda Alcoff(1988) claimthatpostmod-
Thanks go to Eleanore Holveck,PatriciaJagentowiczMills, Marion Smiley,and

ChristineDi Stefanoforcommentson earlierversionsof thisarticle.Thanks also to De-
bra Bergoffen,HesterEisenstein,Joan Tronto,and Linda Zerilliforconversationsthat
helpedme to formmyideas.
[Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society1992, vol. 18, no. 1]

of Chicago.All rightsreserved.
?1992 byThe University 0097-9740/93/1801-0002$01.00
Autumn 1992 SIGNS 89

Kruks BEAUVOIR, GENDER, AND SUBJECTIVITY
ernismdepoliticizesfeminismand urge feministsto have virtuallyno

truckwithit.1Such authorsarguethattheproblemsthatpostmodernism
presentsforfeministpractice,its radical nominalismor constructivism
(includinga constructivistaccount of the body) and its discourse-
boundedness,precludea grasp of the objectiveconditionsof women's
lives.Most significantly,
theyhold,thepostmodernrefusalto conceiveof
the selfor subjectas a knowingand volitionalagent-a conceptionof
agency that has underpinnedmost prior feministvisions of political
action-implies an unacceptablepassivity:women are reduced to no
more than the effectsof discursivepractices,productsof the play of
signifiers,victimsof a "discoursedeterminism."2 No place, theycharge,
is leftin thepostmodernaccountof social changefortheorganizedand
consciousstruggleof groupsor individuals.For postmodernists errone-
ously claim thatchangetakes place througha suprahumanplay of dis-
coursesoverwhichwe can have littleor no influence.
Though such writersportraypostmodernismas irremediably flawed
and inimicalto effectivefeministpolitics,otherswho sharesome of their
concernsalso believethatit is stillworthattempting to work toward a
rapprochement withpostmodernism. Sandra Harding,forexample,has
recently arguedthatfeminist epistemology needsbothEnlightenment and
postmodernagendas and thatneitheragenda can be constructedto the
totalexclusionof theother(1990). Mary Pooveyhas neatlysummedup
theproblemthisway: "The challengeforthoseof us who are convinced
both that real historicalwomen do exist and share certainexperiences
and that deconstruction'sdemystifying of presencemakes theoretical
senseis to workout some way to thinkbothwomenand 'woman.'It isn't
an easy task" (1988, 52-53).3
My own view,while criticalof the moregrandioseclaimssometimes
made in thename of postmodernism-including thoseforthe"death of
thesubject,"fortheimpossibility of anytotalizingor continuousaccount
of history,and for the irrelevanceof biology to sexuality(let alone
1 The
followingpassage fromWendyBrown'sarticlewell sums up the generalcon-
cernsand sentiments of theseauthors:"What woman needs to be deconstructed, to
know herselfas a fieldof discourse,a 'fiction,'a 'text,'a play of 'free-floating
signifiers'?
These are the verythingswoman has been; indeedtheyconstitutea marvelous,ifparo-
died, shorthandforthe historyof women'soppression.Deconstructive politicsmay in-
deed be a remedyfora disease afflicting men-an inflatedsense of selfas sui generis
individuals,as inventors,as systematizers,and as capable of godlikeomnipotence....
But womenwill deconstructonly at the perilof sustainingtheirexclusionfromhistory,
losingthe 'narrative'thatis essentialto theiremergenceinto visiblehistory, shyingfrom
power and the discoveryof theirown voices.Womencan only emergeinto the world as
subjectsand as claimantsof power" (1987, 15).
2 The
phraseis WendyHolloway's, citedby Teresade Lauretis(1987, 15).
3 Two recentanthologiesthatencapsulatemuchof the debate about feminismand
postmodernism are editedby IreneDiamond and Lee Quinby (1988) and Linda J.
Nicholson (1990).
90 SIGNS Autumn 1992

BEAUVOIR, GENDER, AND SUBJECTIVITY Kruks
gender)-is that,at a moremodesttheoreticalaltitudethanthatto which

its adherentsusually aspire, postmodernismoffersvaluable tools and
techniquesto feminism.The best of what postmodernfeminismhas de-
velopedso faris not "hightheory"so muchas a seriesof radicalglosses
on thenow classic startingpointproposed by Simonede Beauvoir:"one
is not born a woman, one becomes one." Postmoderndeconstructive
techniquesand genealogicalmethods,like the work of Beauvoir,may
help us to de-essentializeand de-naturalizethe conceptof "woman."
What we have learned (or perhapsre-learned)frompostmodernthe-
ories is theveryreal power of discourseand the lack of transparency of
language:thereis no returning to a simplerealismtoday.YetI sharewith
Poovey a concern that we remain able to talk about "real historical
women" and thatwe do not embracea kind of postmodernhypercon-
structivism4 in whichthe verycategoryof "women" can disappear (as,
e.g., in Riley [1988]).
Similarly, what we have learnedfromthe postmoderncritiqueof the
Enlightenment subjectis that we should not attributeto consciousness
the absolute power to constituteits own world: subjectivityis never
"pure" or fullyautonomous but inheresin selves that are shaped by
culturaldiscoursesand that are always embodied-selves thatthus are
also gendered.Yet to acknowledgeall of thisdoes not mean thatwe are
obligedto proclaimdefinitively "the deathof thesubject."It is important
forfeministpolitics (as Alcoffand othershave argued) thatwe remain
able to granta role to individualconsciousnessand agency,to insisteven
on a notionof individualresponsibility forour actions.But we mustdo
so whilealso acknowledgingthewaysin whichsubjectivity is discursively
and sociallyconstructed.In particular,we need to be able to accountfor
genderas an aspectof subjectivity, but to do so withouteitheressential-
izingor dehistoricizing it.
As a contributionto such an attemptto re-construct the subject,this
articlesets out to re-examinethe work of an earlierthinker:Simone de
Beauvoir.For it is not thecase thatbeforepostmodernism therewas only
the Enlightenment or modernity. Indeed, if evertherewas a binaryop-
4 I have in mindherewhat Donna Haraway (1988) has critically referred to also as
"strongconstructivism." Alcoff(1988) refersto thispositionas "nominalism."However,
thisdoes not seem to me the appropriatetermto use as it is quite possible to be at one
and the same timea realist(in the sense of claimingthatthingshave a substantialexist-
ence independenceof our consciousness)and a nominalist(in the sense of denyingthat
universalor generalconceptsdescribeanythingmore than a collectionof discreteenti-
ties). Hume, e.g., subscribesto such a positionand can be describedas both a realist
and a nominalist.Postmodernthinkersgenerallyrejectthe claim thatthingshave an ex-
istenceindependentof the humandiscourses(ifnot consciousnesses)thatconstruct
them.They do not, however,necessarilyrejectthe claim thatgeneralconceptsreferto
somethingmore than a collectionof discreteentities.They are, in otherwords,antireal-
istswho are not necessarilycommittedto nominalismin its classical sense.

position that needs deconstructing, it is that betweenmodernityand

postmodernity. Fortunately, we do not have to choose betweenthe un-
happy alternativesof an Enlightenment subject(i.e., an autonomousor
self-constitutingconsciousness)on the one hand and the attempt,as
Michel Foucault pithilyput it, "to get rid of the subjectitself"on the
other([1977] 1980, 117).5 In theworkof Beauvoir,I want to argue,we
finda nuancedconceptionof thesubjectthatcannotbe characterizedas
eitherEnlightenment or postmodern:rather,it is a conceptionof the
subjectas situated.
In heraccountof womenas subjects"in situation,"Beauvoircan both
acknowledgethe weightof social construction, includinggender,in the
formationof the selfand yetrefuseto reducethe selfto an "effect."She
can granta degreeof autonomyto the self-as is necessaryin orderto
retainsuchkeynotionsas politicalaction,responsibility, and theoppres-
sion of the self-while also acknowledgingthe real constraintson au-
tonomous subjectivity produced by oppressivesituations.As I suggest
later,Beauvoir's account of situatedsubjectivity is one fromwhich we
could beginto develop an account of the genderingof subjectivity that
can avoid both essentialismand hyperconstructivism.
Itwillperhapsbe helpfulto returnto Beauvoirthrougha briefoverview
of recentintellectualhistory,recallingthat,like the main proponentsof
postmodernism, Beauvoirwrotein a distinctly Frenchintellectualmilieu.
Postmodernismand the existentialphenomenologythat shaped Beau-
voir's thoughtform(to writeold-fashionednarrative)part of the same
history.Althoughthe postmoderncritiqueof modernitycan be traced
back to Nietzscheor to the laterworkof Heidegger,what has been im-
portedintoAmericanfeminist theoryin thelast decade undertherubric
ofpostmodernism is a clusterofideas formulated primarily in Francefrom
thelate 1960s onward.6I would argue,however,thattheseideas do not
constitutetheprofoundepistemicor epistemologicalbreaktheirauthors
frequently claim forthembut,rather,are both absorptionsof and reac-
tionsagainstthe work of earliergenerationsof Frenchthinkers.
Postmodernism emergedin Franceabove all as a radicalizingcritique
of 1960s structuralism, as "poststructuralism." In spiteof its objectivist
stance and claims to scientificity,structuralism easilypassed into post-
structuralism throughtheirsharedhostilityto theclassical notionof the
subject.What linksstructuralism and poststructuralism in Franceis what
s In another
essayFoucaultwritesthatifwe areto talkof"thesubject"at all,it
"mustbe stripped role-thus analyzedas an effect
ofitscreative only"([1969]1977a,
138). See also,fora "feminist"version,JuliaKristeva's "The subjectnever
formulation:
is. The subjectis onlythesignifying
processandhe appearsonlyas a signifying
practice,
thatis,onlywhenhe is absentwithin thepositionoutofwhichsocial,historical
and
signifying activityunfolds"(1984,215).
6
See Poovey(1988) foran excellent ofthisprocessofimportation.
briefoverview

maybe summed up as theirantihumanism. Fromtheinsistence ofClaude

Levi-Straussthattheaimofthehumansciencesis "to dissolveman"and
theclaimsofJacquesLacan and LouisAlthusser that"thesubject"is a
mere"effect," to JacquesDerrida'sattackson themetaphysics of"pres-
ence"andFoucault'sarguments thatsubjects are"constituted" as a func-
tionof discourse, whathas beenunderattackare thosenotionsof au-
tonomoussubjectivity and agencythathave indeedbeen centralto
philosophy sincetheEnlightenment.
Although thisattackcan,ifone so chooses,be locatedin thebroad
historicalsweepfrommodernity to postmodernity, the emergence of
Frenchantihumanism was in itsoriginsalso a farmoreparochialphe-
nomenon:a Parisian-based reactionagainstthehegemony exercised by
humanistic existentialphenomenology andMarxisminpostwarFrance.
It was, above all, againstJean-Paul Sartrethatthe battlewas waged.
Indeed,the"dissolution ofman"was first proclaimed byLevi-Straussin
1962 in thecontextof a chapter-length attackon Sartre'sCritiqueof
DialecticalReason([1962] 1968, chap.9, esp. 247). In thelate 1970s,
Foucaultstillbluntly statedhisagendaas theattempt to usegenealogy to
displacenotonlyMarxismbutalso thephenomenology of his student
days:thephenomenological subject,inanyform, hadto be destroyed, he
insisted.Long afterwe mighthave thoughtphenomenology dead in
France,Foucaultfeltit necessary to insiston killingityetagain:
I don't believetheproblemcan be resolvedby historicizing the

subject,as positedbythephenomenologists, a
fabricatingsubject
thatevolvesthrough thecourseofhistory. One hasto dispense with
theconstituent subject,to getridofthesubjectitself,that'sto say,
toarriveatan analysiswhichcanaccountfortheconstitution ofthe
subjectwithin a historicalframework ... [Genealogy] is a formof
historywhich can account forthe constitutionof knowledges, dis-
courses,domainsofobjectsetc.,without havingto makereference
to a subjectwhichis eithertranscendental inrelation
to thefieldof
eventsor runsin itsemptysamenessthroughout thecourseofhis-
tory.[(1977) 1980, 117]
This statement opposes as starkalternatives a conceptionof the
subjectas "constituent"(or and
constituting) as "transcendental"
to
on theone hand,and a conception
history, ofthesubjectas constituted
and to be analyzedas an "effect"of itshistorical framework,on the
other.In it we findposedthoseoversimple choicesbetweenhumanism
and antihumanism, betweenEnlightenment or modernity and postmo-
dernitythatpostmodernists frequentlytendto presentus withbecause
of the dichotomizing lensesthroughwhichtheyview the historyof

philosophy.In order to account for the weight of social structures,

discourses,and practicesin the shapingof subjectivityand yet still to
acknowledgethatan elementof freedomis intrinsicto subjectivity-an
elementthatallows us to talk,as I thinkwe must,of individualhuman
agencyand responsibility-weneed a farmore complex,indeed dialec-
tical, account of the subject than Foucault's work would grant us.7
Ironically,such an account is be foundin the work of some of the very
FrenchphenomenologistsFoucault dismissed,includingBeauvoir and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty.8 It is also to be foundin Sartre'slaterworks,
such as Critiqueof Dialectical Reason ([1960] 1976) and his monumen-
tal studyof Flaubert([1971] 1981, [1971] 1987, and [1971] 1989). As I
have arguedelsewhere(1990a, 1990b), however,it was not yetpresent
in his 1940s "existentialism," of which Being and Nothingness(1943)
was the fullestformulation:a work that stillasserted(albeit paradoxi-
cally) a versionof the classic Enlightenment subject.9
Simonede Beauvoir,the "Mother" of second wave feminism(Ascher
1987), was, of course, closely associated with Sartrepersonallyand
philosophically. When The Second Sex (1949) was adopted byAmerican
feminists in the late 1960s, its insightthatone is not born but becomes
a woman,thatfemininity is a social constructand not an unchangeable
essence or a biological destiny,seemed a revelation.But althoughthis
insightremainscentralto postmodernfeminism, by the late 1970s The
Second Sex began to seem ratherpasse. It was not onlythatBeauvoir's
descriptions of women'sexperiencesincreasingly appliedto a bygoneage
and to women of a narrow social stratum.Her solutions-the book
ended witha call fora "fraternal"collaborationof men and women in
establishing"the reign of libertyin the midst of the world of the
given"10-seemedto denythefemaledifference thatmanyfeminists now
valorized.Her notionof liberationarguablyimpliedmakingwomencon-
formto a male ideal. Her persistentuse of sexistlanguage (theSartrean
7 Thisis thecaseat leastuntilFoucault's verylastyears.Therearesomeintriguing

indicationsin oneofhislastinterviews, e.g.,thathe was beginning to shift
hisground
on thequestionofthesubject(seeFoucault1984,381-90).
8 It was aboveall (1908-61) whodeveloped sucha dialecticalac-
Merleau-Ponty
countofthesubject.Merleau-Ponty workedcloselywithBeauvoir andSartreon the
journalLes TempsModernes in thelate1940sandearly1950s,andBeauvoir hada
deepfamiliaritywithhiswork.I havearguedelsewhere thatin manywaysherconcep-
tionofsubjectivityis closerto histhanto Sartre's(seeKruks1991,285-300).
9 There of
are, course,seriousdisagreements amongSartrescholarsoverwhatSar-
tre'searlyconception ofsubjectivitywas andwhether he altereditsignificantly
in his
laterworks.I havearguedforthisreading, thatSartreshifted hisconception ofsubjec-
tivityovertime,in Kruks(1990a,esp.chap.5, 146-79).
10Beauvoir([1949]1974,814). Unlessotherwise all subsequent
indicated, pageref-
erences citingBeauvoir areto TheSecondSex.

languageof "man" and "his" world)demonstrated how insensitive she

had beento maledominance in herownintellectual milieu.
Moreover, sinceBeauvoirwas said to sharewithSartrenot onlya
misogynist dislikeof thefemalebodybuttheentirephilosophical bag-
gageof"existentialism," including theSartrean conceptionofthesubject,
postmodern feminism has cometo dismissheras methodologically na-
ive.11TodayBeauvoiris generally treatedas a venerable
ancestor,butshe
is no longerregarded as havinganything ofsignificanceto contributeto
theon-going development offeministtheory. Ratherthanconsigning her
to ancestorworship,however, I wantto arguethatBeauvoirremains
highlyrelevantto current theoreticalconcerns.In particular she still
speaksto theproblemofdeveloping an adequatefeminist theoryofthe
gendering of subjectivity.
Both in her ethicalessaysof the 1940s and in The SecondSex,
Beauvoirdevelopeda somewhatsubmergedaccount of "being-in-
situation," or situatedsubjectivity, thatwas radicallydifferent from
Sartre's.12To claimthatBeauvoirdepartssignificantly fromthenotion
of theautonomoussubjectis also, of course,to say thatBeauvoirwas
farmorephilosophically independent fromSartrethanhas generally
beenrecognized. I will beginfromthislastpoint,to showthatBeau-
voir'sworkis notas consistently rootedin Sartreanphilosophy as has
beencommonly supposedandthatitdepartsfromSartre'sidentification
ofsubjectivity withan inviolable,autonomous I willthen
consciousness.
suggest, in thefinalsection,whatit is aboutBeauvoir'sconception of
the subjectthatmakesit of enduringsignificance forthe projectof
reconstructing ouraccountofthegendering ofsubjectivity.
ItwasBeauvoirherself whoinsisted
thatherworkwasphilosophically
of Sartre's.Repeatedly,
derivative and untilthe last yearsof herlife,
11Forcriticisms ofherattitude to thefemalebodysee,e.g.,McCall(1979,209-23);

Evans(1980,395-404). Fora discussion ofSartre's
horrorofthefemalesexin Being
and Nothingness, see CollinsandPierce(1976,112-27). Forcritiques ofBeauvoir's
adherence to existentialism
andallegations ofherensuing philosophical see
naivete,
McCall(1979); Le Doeuff(1980,277-89); Elshtain(1981,306-10); O'Brien(1981,
65-76); Evans(1985); and Okely(1986). Fora discussion ofsomeofthesecriticisms in
theiroriginalFrenchcontext, see Kaufmann (1986,121-31).
12 ForSartre thesubjectalwaysconstitutes themeaning ofa situation,evenifits
facticities
arebeyondchoice.See,esp.,Beingand Nothingness ([1943]1956,esp.pt.4,
chap.1, sec.2, "FreedomandFacticity: The Situation,"
481-553). ForBeauvoir, how-
ever,situationscan becomeconditions thatimposetheirmeaning on thesubjectand
that,as we willsee,mayevenpermeate to thepointwhereself-reflection
subjectivity and
thusfreedom ceaseto be possible.

Beauvoirsaid thatshe lacked originality and was merelySartre'sdisciple

in mattersphilosophical.She was willingto claim originality forherself
in thefieldof literature, but in themorehallowedfieldof philosophyshe
could not compete but only follow. "On the philosophicallevel," she
insisted,"I adhered completelyto Being and Nothingnessand later to
Critiqueof DialecticalReason."13Too manyscholarsand commentators
have taken Beauvoirat her word. Most assume that,as one authorre-
centlyput it, she simplyuses Sartre'sconcepts as "coat-hangers"on
whichto hang her own material,even to the point whereit can be said
that "Sartre's intellectualhistorybecomes her own" (Okely 1986,
122).14 Yet such a view,even thoughembracedby Beauvoirherself,is
misleading.For althoughBeauvoirdoubtlesstriedto workwithina Sar-
treanframework (i.e., theframework of Beingand Nothingness),she did
not whollysucceed. Many of the leaps and inconsistencies one can find
in herworkreflect, I believe,a tensionbetweenher formaladherenceto
Sartreancategoriesand thefactthatthephilosophicalimplicationsofher
work are in large measureincompatiblewithSartreanism.
For Sartre,subjectivityor "being-for-itself" is wholly autonomous
and, because unconditioned,free.Man is an "absolute subject." Each
subject,althoughexisting"in situation"and thusencountering the fac-
ticityof the world of things(or "being-in-itself"), always freelyand
autonomouslyconstitutesthe meaningof its own situationthroughthe
capacityfor transcendence.Moreover,in relationsbetweenhuman be-
ings,whichSartrecharacterizesas thefundamentally conflictualrelation
of Selfand Other,thisabsoluteautonomyof thesubjectalwaysremains
intact.Thus, forSartre,relationsof unequal power have no bearingon
theautonomyof thesubject."The slavein chainsis as freeas his master,"
Sartretellsus ([1943] 1956, 550), because each is equallyfreeto choose
13
Beauvoirmakes thisstatementin an interviewwithSicard (1979, 325). In
Schwarzer(1984), Beauvoirmakes a similarpoint: "In philosophicalterms,he was cre-
ativeand I am not... I always recognizedhis superiority in thatarea. So whereSartre's
philosophyis concerned,it is fairto say thatI took mycue fromhim because I also em-
braced existentialismmyself"(109). The account of Beauvoir'sintellectualrelationship
to SartrethatemergesfromBair's recentbiography(1990) also paintsheras deferential
to Sartreon philosophicmatters.
14 This standardview of the relationof Sartreand Beauvoirhas begunto be chal-
lenged,most systematically by MargaretA. Simons (1981, 25-42; and 1986, 165-79).

See also Butler(1986, 35-49, esp. 48) forthe suggestionthatBeauvoirsoughtto "exor-
cise" Sartre'sCartesianismlong beforehe triedto do so himself.Tong (1989) has also
brieflyremarkedthatBeauvoirshould be read as philosophicallyindependentof Sartre
(196). Le Doeuff([1989] 1991) is also extensivelyconcernedwiththe Beauvoir-Sartre
philosophicrelationship.Even so, muchmoreworkremainsto be done on thisquestion.
While I cannot developthe argumenthere,it seemsto me thatmanythemesin Sartre's
Cahierspour une morale,writtenin the late 1940s and posthumouslypublishedin
1983, draw frominsightsin Beauvoir'searliestethicalwritings.A case could also be
made thatthe conceptof "destiny"in the Critiqueof Dialectical Reason has it roots in
Beauvoir'saccount of "woman's destiny"in pt. 1 of The Second Sex.

the meaninghe giveshis own situation.The questionof materialor

politicalinequalitybetween masterandslaveis simply to their
irrelevant
relationas two freedoms, as two absolutesubjects.In thesamevein,
Sartreis able to write-in themiddleof WorldWarII!--thattheJew
remains freeinthefaceoftheanti-Semite becausehecanchoosehisown
attitude towardhispersecutor.
In hisdelineationoftheabsolutesubject,Sartreremains withinwhat
manyfeminists have suggestedis a typically male conceptionof the
subject.He presents a versionof whatNancyHartsockhas character-
izedas the"walledcity"viewoftheself,whichconceives oftheselfas
notonlyradicallyseparatefromothersbut also as alwayspotentially
hostile.As Hartsockhas observed, Hegel'saccountoftheemergence of
self-consciousnessin the"master-slave thestruggle
dialectic," in which
each consciousness "seeks the deathof the other"-an accountthat
Sartreappropriates as the relationof self and otherin Being and
Nothingness-restates a commonmasculine experience:"The construc-
tionof a selfin oppositionto anotherwho threatens one's verybeing
reverberates throughout theconstruction of bothclasssocietyand the
masculinist worldview and resultsin a deep-going and hierarchical
dualism"(Hartsock1985, 241).15 Moreover,Sartre'snotionof the
subjectsharesthe abstractuniversalism that othershave suggested
comeswitha specifically malenotionofreason(see,e.g.,Lloyd[1984]
and Harding[1986]). To be masteror slave,anti-Semite or Jew-or
male or female-has, for Sartre,no bearingon the absoluteand
inviolable ofwhicheachofus is thebearer.
subjectivity
Giventhesearguablymasculinist elements of theSartrean notionof
the subject,his philosophy would not seemto providea hospitable
framework withinwhichto developfeminist theory.Insofaras Beauvoir
triesto remainwithinit,shedoesappealto a predominantly malenotion
of abstract,universal freedom as thegoal fortheliberated woman.Ex-
istingin unhappyantagonism withtheSartrean framework, however,is
a significantlydifferentnotionoftheselffromwhichBeauvoiroperates.
This is a less dualisticand morerelationalnotionof theself,suchas
Hartsockand othershavearguedoftenemerges fromtheparticularities
15Hartsockis carefulto
point out thatshe is elaboratingwhat Webercalled an
"ideal type."This point needs to be emphasized,forit is importantto avoid essentializ-
conceptionsof "abstractmasculinity"or the walled citysubject.
ing or dehistoricizing
There is a dangerof oversimplisticallyopposingthemto conceptionsof the "feminine"
as concreteand relational.Few individualscorrespondexactlyto ideal types,and the
Westernphilosophictraditionitselfis farmore untidythan some feministreadingsof it
mightsuggest.There is, e.g., an ethicalsocialisttradition,exemplifiedin the work of
WilliamMorris,thatcuts across the abstract/relational dichotomy.Or, fora blistering
attackon the abstractself,but one thatfunctionsas an unapologeticdefenseof patriar-
chalism,one need look no further than EdmundBurke.

of women'slifeexperience(Hartsock1985, 242 ff.).16It involves,contra

the earlySartre,a tacitrejectionof thenotionof the "absolute subject"
for a situatedsubject: a subject that is intrinsically and
intersubjective
embodied, thus always "interdependent"and permeable ratherthan
walled.17
Beauvoirhad alreadybegunto developa notionof the subjectdiffer-
entfromSartre'swell beforeshe wroteThe Second Sex. This is apparent
in thesummaryin her autobiographicalvolume,The Primeof Life,of a
seriesof conversationsshe had withSartrein thespringof 1940. In these
conversations,Sartreset out forher the main lines of the argumentof
whatwas to becomeBeingand Nothingness.Theirdiscussions,Beauvoir
recalledin 1960, centeredabove all on the problemof "the relationof
situationto freedom."On thispoint theydisagreed:
I maintainedthat, fromthe point of view of freedom,as Sartre

definedit-not as a stoical resignationbut as an activetranscen-
dence of the given-not everysituationis equal: what transcen-
dence is possible fora woman locked up in a harem?Even such a
cloisteredexistencecould be livedin severaldifferent
ways, Sartre
said. I clungto myopinion fora long timeand thenmade only a
token submission.BasicallyI was right.But to have been able to
defendmy position,I would have had to abandon the terrainof
wherewe stood. [(1960) 1962,
thusidealist,morality,
individualist,
34]
Beauvoirwas rightthather "submission"was no morethan"token."

Althoughshe was neverwillingto challengehead-onSartre'sconception
of freedom,or thenotionof the impermeable"walled citysubject" that
it implied,she quietlysubvertedthem.This becomesclearerin two essays
16
The argumentthatwomen experiencethe selfas relationalhas now been made on
a numberof different grounds.It has been arguedfroma psychoanalytic viewpointby
Nancy Chodorow (1978) and othersand fromthe evidenceof social psychologyby
Carol Gilligan(1982). It has also been arguedfromthe specificities of women's daily
practicallifeby,among others,Sara Ruddick (1989). There now seems to be a clear,if
minimal,consensuson what we mightcall the phenomenologicalevidence:mostwomen
in the Westtoday do experiencethemselvesmore relationallythanmost men do. But it
is importantnot to transform such phenomenologicalevidenceinto strongerclaims for
an essentiallydifferent femaleself.
17 It is one of the
paradoxes of Sartre'sworkin the immediatepostwarperiod that
he defendssuch a radicallyindividualistic and detotalizedaccount of subjectivity
while
tryingalso to argue the case forsocialistsolidarityand a collectiverevolutionaryproject.
His inabilityto bringthesetwo dimensionsof his thoughtinto adequate relationwith
each otherarguablyaccountsforhis failureto completethe ethicsthathe attemptedto
writeas a sequel to Being and Nothingness.I have arguedthismore fullyin Kruks
(1990b).

on ethicsshe wrotepriorto The Second Sex: Pyrrhuset Cineas (1944)

([1947]1967).InPyrrhus
andTheEthicsofAmbiguity etCineas,written
while Being and Nothingnesswas in press, Beauvoir begins fromthe
Sartreanautonomoussubjectbut ends by puttingin questionthe theory
of fundamentally conflictualsocial relationsthatSartredevelopsfromit.
AlthoughBeauvoirpresentsfreedomsas separate,she arguesthat,par-
adoxically,they are also intrinsically interdependent.18 If one triesto
imaginea worldin whichone is theonlyperson,theimageis horrifying,
she insists.For everything one does would be pointlessunlesstherewere
othersubjectsto valorize it: "A man [sic] alone in the world would be
paralysedby theself-evident vanityof all his goals; he could not bear to
live" (1944, 65).19
Moreover,forothersto valorize one's project,Beauvoirargues,it is
not enoughthattheyare freemerelyin Sartre'ssense; it is not sufficient
forthemto be subjectseach of whomconstitutes, likethemasterand the
slave, the meaningof his or her own discretesituation.Freedom for
Beauvoir,farmore than forSartre,involvesa practicalsubjectivity: the
abilityof each ofus to act in theworldso thatwe can takeup each other's
projectsand givethema futuremeaning.20And forthisto be possible,we
also requirean equal degreeof practicalfreedom:
The other'sfreedomcan do nothingforme unless my own goals

can serveas his point of departure;it is by usingthe tool whichI
have inventedthattheotherprolongsits existence;the scholarcan
onlytalkwithmenwho havearrivedat thesame levelof knowledge
as himself... I musttherefore endeavourto createforall men sit-
uationswhichwill enable themto accompanyand surpassmytran-
scendence.I need theirfreedomto be available to use me, to pre-
serveme in surpassingme. I requirefor men health,knowledge,
well being,leisure,so thattheirfreedomdoes not consumeitselfin
fightingsickness,ignorance,misery.[1944, 113-14]
18
Sartredoes,ofcourse,discusswhathe calls"being-for-others" in Beingand Noth-
ingness.However, forSartre, unlikeBeauvoir, cannotbe an ontological
being-for-others
structure ofthefor-itself
(seeSartre[1943]1956,282).
19In all herworks,The SecondSex included,Beauvoir uses"man"to re-
repeatedly
ferto all humanbeingsand lapsesintomasculine forms foranydiscussion thatdoesnot
positivelyrequirefeminine ones.I havedecidedto keepsuchmale-oriented languagein
mytextwhereI either citeor paraphraseher.Pyrrhuset Cineas(as wellas manyof
Beauvoir's earlypoliticalessays)remains in English.
unavailable However, a fewextracts
havebeentranslated (Miskowiec1987,135-42).
20 Sartrealso emphasizes inhislaterattempt to synthesize
practical
subjectivity
Marxismandexistentialism, intheCritiqueofDialecticalReason([1960]1976); yet
againthequestionoftheextentto whichSartrewas intellectually influenced byBeau-
voiris raised.

Already,then,Beauvoiris aware of the interdependence of subjectiv-

itiesand, in waysthatSartreis not,of thepermeability of thesubject.She
arguablytakes the firststep here toward adequatelylinkingSartre'sin-
dividualisticexistentialismwiththeirsharedcommitment to the solidar-
isticand communalvalues of socialism.In The Ethicsof Ambiguity, she
went a step further. There she suggeststhat oppressioncan permeate
subjectivityto thepointwhereconsciousnessitselfbecomesno morethan
a productof theoppressivesituation.The freedomthatSartrehad asso-
ciated with subjectivitycan, in a situationof extremeoppression,be
whollysuppressed,even thoughit cannot be definitively eliminated.In
such a situation,theoppressedbecomeincapable of theprojectof resis-
tance,unable to maintainthe reflective distancenecessaryto be aware
thattheyare oppressed.In sucha situation,"livingis onlynot dying,and
humanexistenceis indistinguishable froman absurdvegetation"([1947]
1967, 82-83). The oppressed-and this is a point Beauvoirwill later
returnto in her analysis of woman's situation-live in an "infantile
world" of immediacy, withno senseof alternative futures.Freedomis no
longerthe capacityto choose how to live even the most constrainedof
situations,which Sartrehad claimed it to be. Freedomis here seen as
reducibleto no more than a suppressedpotentiality. It is made "imma-
nent,"unrealizable.Yet,forall this,freedom,is stillnot a "fiction"or an
"imaginary"forBeauvoir.For should oppressionstartto weaken,free-
dom can always reerupt.
In The SecondSex, Beauvoir'sbreakfromSartre'sversionofthewalled
citysubjectbecomeseven more marked.She beginsThe Second Sex on
whatappearsto be firmly Sartreanground."What is a woman?" sheasks,
and answersinitiallythatwoman is definedas thatwhichis not man-as
Other: "She is determinedand differentiated withreference to man and
not he withreference to her; she is the inessentialas opposed to the es-
sential.He is the subject,he is the Absolute: she is the Other" (xix).21
Somecommentators haveused thisand othersimilarpassagesto accuse
Beauvoirof takingon board the Sartrean(and Hegelian) notionof the
self-constructionofsubjectivity throughconflict.22Veryearlyin thebook,
however,Beauvoirrelativizesthe notion of othernessby introducinga
distinctionnot foundin Being and Nothingness,and whose originality
needs emphasizing.We can, she argues,distinguish two significantly dif-
ferentkinds of relationsof otherness:those betweensocial equals and
21
Translationaltered. Therearenumerous difficulties
withtheonlypublishedtrans-
lationofTheSecondSex,byH. M. Parshley. In whatfollowsI haveretranslated
many
passages,although I stillgivepagereferencesto hisstandard version.
English
22
See,e.g.,Lloyd(1984,esp.93-102); also Hartsock(1985,app. 2, 286-92).
O'Brien(1981) has an interestingdiscussionofthewaysinwhichshethinks Beauvoir
misappliesHegel's"master-slave dialectic"to women(69-72).

thosethatinvolvesocial inequality.Wheretherelationis one of equality,

she suggeststhat othernessis "relativized"by a kind of "reciprocity":
each, as she had said in Pyrrhuset Cineas,recognizesthattheOtheris an
equal freedom.Where,however,othernessexiststhroughrelationsof in-
equality,therereciprocityis to a greateror lesserextentabolished,re-
placed by relationsof oppressionand subjection.When one of the two
partiesin a conflictis privilegedby havingsome materialor physicalad-
vantage,then,"thisone prevailsovertheotherand undertakesto keep it
in subjection"(1944, 69). It is not,then,woman'sothernessperse buther
subjection-the nonreciprocalobjectificationof woman by man-that
Beauvoirsetsout to explain. It is not onlythatwoman is the Other; she
is theunequal Other.The questionis, ifthisinequalityis not inscribedin
nature,how does it occur?
The shortanswerforBeauvoiris, of course,that"being a woman" is
a sociallyconstructedexperience;it is to livea social situationthatmen
have, fortheirown advantage,attemptedto impose on women. Beau-
voir's discussionof the varyingdegreesto whichwomen choose or are
forced to accept this impositionsuggests a continuumof different
possible responses.Some-the "independent"women she describesin
the last part of the book-consistently,if unsuccessfully, attemptto
resistit. Some choose to accept it in what Sartretermed"bad faith"(a
strategyto evade the pain and responsibility that come with freedom)
because of the securityand privilege it brings. Others, unable to
conceiveof real alternatives, acceptit whileengagingin formsof passive
resistanceand resentment.For yet others,as for the oppressedwhom
Beauvoir had describedin The Ethics of Ambiguity,freedomis sup-
pressed to the point where they cease to be capable of choice or
resistance.What is of interesthere is that in describingthe most
oppressed end of the continuumBeauvoir departs even more sharply
fromthe Sartreannotionof the subjectthan in her earlieressays. In so
doing,she also breaks freeof any kind of Enlightenment notionof the
subject,although(as we will see) she certainlydoes not therebyintend
to "get rid of the subjectitself."23
Once again BeauvoirrelativizesSartre'sideas in waysthatsignificantly
transform them.She beginsby appearingto agreewithSartrethatthere
23
JudithButler(1986) has arguedthatforBeauvoir genderis alwaysactivelychosen.
ForBeauvoir, to "becomea woman"is,according to Butler, "a purposiveandappro-
setofacts,theacquisition
priative ofa skill,a 'project',to use Sartrian to
[sic]terms,
assumea certain corporealstyleandsignificance" (36). Butlerdrawsfromthisreading
theclaimthatthereis "an absolutedifference" between genderandsex andthatgender
couldthusbe completely remade.Certainly sucha liberatory messagecouldbe drawn
fromBeauvoir's text,butonlybyignoring theotherendofthecontinuum: thepoint
whereBeauvoirbreakswithSartrein arguing that,fortheoppressed, a "project"can
ceaseto be possible.

is a radical disjuncturebetweenthehumanand thenaturalrealms,with

freedomand subjectivity thehuman.Indeed,thisclaim is
characterizing
the basis forherrejectionof deterministic biologicalexplanationsof the
femalecondition.However,yetagain, Sartre'sdualisticontologyrapidly
becomestransmutedin her hands. While biologyis not itself"destiny,"
theoppressivesituationthatmenacrosstheages haveimposedon women
and justifiedin largeparton thegroundsof real biologicaldifferencecan
functionanalogouslyto a naturalforce.Women can have a man-made
destiny;indeed,she saysat one point,"the whole of feminine historyhas
been man made" (144). If a woman is oppressedto thepointwhereher
subjectivity is suppressed,thenhersituationis de factoher"destiny"and
she ceases to be an effective or morallyresponsibleagent. "Everysub-
ject,"she writes,
continuallyaffirmshimselfthroughhisprojectsas a transcendence;
he realizeshis freedomonly throughhis continualtranscendence
toward otherfreedoms;thereis no otherjustification forpresent
existencethanitsexpansiontowardsan endlesslyopen future.Each
timethattranscendencefallsback into immanencethereis a deg-
of freedominto facticity;
radationof existenceinto the 'in-itself,'
thisfallis a moralfaultifthesubjectagreesto it; it takestheform
and an oppressionifitis inflicted
of a frustration upon him.[xxxiii]
Woman, then,is locked in immanenceby the situationman inflicts

upon her-and she is not necessarilyresponsibleforthatcondition.Al-
thoughthe language in the passage is Sartrean,the argumentis not. A
consistentSartreanpositionwould make woman responsibleforherself,
no matterhow constrainedher situation.But forBeauvoir,women are
not the primarysource of the problemeven thoughsome complywith
theiroppressorsin "bad faith."Formany,thereis no moralfaultbecause
theresimplyis no possibilityof choice. In the notionthatfreedomcan
" thatthe"for-itself"
"fall back intothe'in-itself,' can be turnedthrough
the action of other(i.e., male) freedomsinto its veryopposite,Beauvoir
has radicallydepartedfromthe Sartreannotionof the absolutesubject.
For Sartre,therecan be no middleground.Eitherthe for-itself, the un-
caused upsurgeof freedom,the "absolute subject," exists whatever the
or
of itssituation, else
facticities it does not existat all. In thelattercase,
one is dealingwiththe realmof natureor inertbeing.Insofaras Beau-
voir's account of woman's situationas one of immanenceinvolvesthe
claim thatfreedom,thefor-itself, can be penetratedand modifiedby the
it
in-itself, implies another notion of thesubjectthanSartre's.Beauvoiris
trying to describe human existence as a synthesisof freedomand con-

straint,of consciousnessand materialitythat, finally,is incompatible

withSartre'sversionof the walled citysubject.
Indeed,so farhas Beauvoirmovedthatone mightevenbe temptedto
formulateherposition,albeitonlyat thisextremeend of thespectrum,in
Foucault'sterms:woman is a historically constituted,not a constituting,
subject. For not only does woman fail freelyto choose her situation,
accordingto Beauvoir,she is in the most extremesituationits product:
"When ... a groupof individualsis keptin a situationof inferiority, the
factis theyare inferior... yes,womenon thewhole are todayinferior to
men, which is to say that theirsituationgives themless possibilities"
(xxviii).
Yet unlikeSartre'spostmoderncritics,Beauvoirneverwhollydiscards
a notion of free subjectivity. Even when it is suppressed,reduced to
immanence,subjectivity remainsa distinctlyhuman potentiality. Thus,
forexample,while muchof herpainstakingand detailedaccountof the
younggirl'sformation24 could be retoldin theFoucauldianmode of "the
political technologyof the body" and of "discipline,"Beauvoirwould
neverhave agreed to abandon the notion of a repressionof freedom.
However suppressed, however disciplined,it is still freedom-made-
immanentthat distinguisheseven the most constitutedhuman subject
froma trainedanimal. For Beauvoir,a real repressionor oppressionof
thissubjectis also alwayspossible,unlikeforFoucault.Howeversocially
constructedits identitiesmay be, forBeauvoirthe subjectis stillsome-
thingotherthanthe"effect"of itsconditionings. Althoughshe avoidsthe
essentialismof the subjectas, forexample,a Cartesiancogito,she also
rejectsthe hyperconstructivism of the Foucauldian account,whichpre-
sentsthe subjectas discursively produced,to be "strippedof its creative
role and analysed as a complex and variable functionof discourse"
(Foucault [1969] 1977a, 138).
How thendoes Beauvoirdevelopthisaccountof a situatedsubjectthat

can be characterizedneitheras an autonomous walled city nor as
uniquelya constructof discursivepractices?Two fundamentalinsights
orientthedevelopmentof heraccountof situatedsubjectivity. The firstis
herrecognitionof what I will call theintersubjectivityof the subject.By
this is meant somethingmore than the interconnectedness of subjects.
What is meantis theimpossibility of a subjectiveself-constitution
thatis
not always sociallyand culturallypermeated.If all that took place be-
24 Amongnumerousotherproblemsof translation,ParshleyrendersBeauvoir'schap-
terheadingFormationas "The FormativeYears,"thusweakeningthe notionof an active
productionof the selfimpliedby the Frenchterm.

tweenan individual manand womanwas a struggle ofconsciousnesses

between twohumanbeings,oneofwhomhappenedto be maleandone
female,thenwe couldnotanticipate in advancewhichof themwould
objectify theother.If,however, we examinetherelations of a husband
anda wife,thenitis verydifferent. Forthesocialinstitution ofmarriage
in all itsaspects-legal,economic, sexual,cultural, etc.-has formed in
advancefortheprotagonists theirownrelation ofinequality.AsBeauvoir
pointsoutin a strikingly unSartrean passage,"It is notas singleindivid-
uals thathumanbeingsare to be definedin thefirstplace; menand
womenhaveneverstoodopposedto each otherin singlecombat;the
coupleis an originalMitsein;and as suchit alwaysappearsas a perma-
nentelement in a largercollectivity" (39, emphasisadded).
Although subjectivity is individually lived,itis never,then,simplyan
individual constitution of existence. Rather, according to Beauvoir, it is
bothconstituting andconstituted. It is,to use Sartre'slaterterminology,
"singularuniversal"(Sartre[1972] 1983, 141-69). Thusit follows(as
Beauvoirhad alreadymadeclearinherethicalessays)thatoppression of
anykindaffects morethanits immediate victimsand thatliberatory
struggles cannotbe otherthancollective. ThatBeauvoirherself did not
apparently see at thetimeshe wroteThe SecondSex thatshe should
explicitly applytheseconclusions to women(as shewas alreadydoingin
thelate 1940s to colonialpeoples)is an indication of theisolationin
whichshewroteherbook and ofthelimitsto herownpoliticalimagi-
nation.25 Butthisfailureshouldnotblindus to theimplications of her
argument.
Beauvoir'slaterassessment of TheSecondSex was thatit was nota
"militant" book(1972,623). Insofar as itpresents no callfora concerted
resistance bywomento theiroppression, shewas justified in thisjudg-
ment.But if not militant,the book is in its implications deeply
political-anditis herethatmuchofitscontinuing relevancelies.Forin
herinsistence thatfreedoms areinterdependent and thatfreedom, how-
eversuppressed, however immanent, is an enduring Beauvoir
potentiality,
affirms thatwomen'soppressionis real and thatpoliticalstruggle is
indeedpossible.Whileeschewing thenaiveassumptions of individual
freeagencyandresponsibility thatarecentral to theEnlightenment con-
ceptionof subjectivity, she also insiststhatsubjectivity cannotbe ac-
countedforsolelyin termsof theeffect of theapparently autonomous
powerofstructures, technologies, or discourses.
25 It should be
noted,however,thatit would have called forremarkablepowersof
imaginationto envisionan activewomen's movementin postwarFrance.Francewas still
a primarilyagrarian,Catholic country,in whichwomenhad onlyjust obtainedthe vote.
The earlydefeatand occupationof Franceby the Germansmeantthat,unlikein the
UnitedStatesor Britain,fewwomenwerepushed out of theirtraditionaldomesticroles
by the war.

I turnnowtoBeauvoir's secondinsight. Thisconcerns theinherence of

subjectivityin the body:the idea, whichshe borrowsfromMerleau-
Ponty, thatthesubjectis alwaysproperly calleda "body-subject."26 It is
towardthespecificities of embodiedsubjectivities thatBeauvoirorients
us to grasptheoppression ofwomen.Ifthecoupleis an "originalMit-
sein"(Heidegger's term,meaning a fundamental "beingwith"),27 thisis
becauseof its reproductive significance.By stressingthatreproduction
and sexuality are sociallyand culturally constitutedphenomena, Beau-
voir avoidsthe essentialism of biologicalreductionism. But she also
avoidshyperconstructivism byarguing thatreproduction is ontologically
fundamental. If(as shehad arguedinPyrrhus et Cineas)we needothers
to takeup ourprojectsand overcome ourfinitude, theneachindividual
freedom requires"theperpetuation of thespecies."Thus,she now ar-
gues,"we can regardthephenomenon ofreproduction as ontologically
founded"(8).28In an argument thatis neither realistnorconstructivist
butdialectical,Beauvoirinsiststhatalthough biological"facts"haveno
significanceoutsidethevaluesthathumanbeingsgivethem,theydo still
havean objective reality:therearereallimitsto thesignifications we can
choose.It is helpful to contrast BeauvoirwithFoucaulthere.According
to Foucault,"nothing in man-not evenhisbody-is sufficiently stable
to serveas the basis for ... self-recognition"
([1971] 1977b, 153). For
Beauvoir,however, althoughthebodyis not a stableessence,it stillis
encountered by the selfas an objectivegiven.And whetheror not a
womandecidesto procreate, it is an inescapablefactthatof thetwo
biologicalsexesherphysiology is gearedtothemoreextended andphys-
demanding
iologically roleinperpetuating thespecies.
Although a wom-
an's body"is notitselfsufficient
to define
heras woman,"itis,Beauvoir
argues,"an essential
element ofthesituation sheoccupiesintheworld"
(41).29
"Woman,likeman,is herbody,"shewrites, andthencitesMerleau-Ponty in a

26
note:"So I am mybody,in so far,at least,as myexperience goes,and conversely my

bodyis as a lifemodel,or as a preliminary sketchformytotalbeing"(33).
7
In Beingand Nothingness Sartrehadexplicitly rejectedtheconcept, arguing
againstHeidegger thattherecan be no fundamental groundofsharedbeingandthatall
humanrelations areintrinsically
conflictual([1943] 1956,300 ff.).Beauvoir's useof
Heidegger's concepthererepresents a startling
departurefromSartre's thinking.
28 Thereis a certain ofheterosexual relations in thisclaiminsofar
privileging implicit
as theyaretheonlysexualrelations thatpermit thecontinuance ofthehumanspecies.
However, givenBeauvoir'sinsistencethatbiologyis notdestiny,that"thefactsofbiol-
ogytakeon thevaluestheexistent bestowsuponthem"(41), thisprivileging is in no
waydefinitive. In herchapteron lesbianismBeauvoir suggests that,although notguaran-
teed,greater mayin factbe morepossiblein lesbianrelations
reciprocity thanin hetero-
sexualones:"Between women... thereis no struggle, no victory,
no defeat;inexact
reciprocity eachis at oncesubjectandobject,sovereign and slave;duality becomesmu-
tuality"(465).
29ThusI do notthinkthatBeauvoir wouldhaveacceptedtheargument forthepos-
sibility oftotally sexandgenderthatJudith
delinking Butlerclaimsto findimpliedin

Beauvoirhas been criticized,with considerablejustification, forher

horrorof the female body and its functions.There are indeed many
passages in The Second Sex wherewomen's bodilyfunctionsare identi-
fiedwith animality,passivity,and lack of freedomand are denigrated
fromthe masculiniststandpointof an apparentlydisembodiedreason
and freedom.Thereis, however,anotherreadingof woman's body to be
foundin Beauvoir'stextas well. This reading,whichI intendto pursue
hereas themorefruitful one forfeminism, tellsus thatit is as body that
human subjectivityboth encountersand gives meaning to its own
inescapable rootedness in objective reality. In Beauvoir's account,
womenencounterthisin a particularly intenseform,one whose alienat-
ing aspects she most emphasizes:"Woman, like man, is her body,"she
says, but immediatelyadds, "but her body is somethingother than
herself"(33).
The importantpoint that is lodged here against Enlightenment or
walled cityconceptionsof the subjectis thatsubjectivity is not givenin
closed contradistinctionto a realmof objectiveentitiesthatit overseesor
contemplatesin detachment.Rather,it is throughthebody thatwe each
inherein one and thesame world.Moreover,thiscommoninherencemay
formthe basis foran overlappingor foran even fullersharingof expe-
rienceon which common action may be based.30Beauvoir'swoman is
not, then,a Sartreanfor-itself forwhom the body is merelya facticity.
But neither,contraFoucault,is she merelya "soul . . . producedperma-
nentlyaround,on, the body,by the functioning of a power thatis exer-
cised on ... those one supervises,trains,corrects"([1975] 1977c, 30).
Rather,for Beauvoir,we need to explore what she calls "the strange
ambiguityofexistencemade body" (810). For "to be presentin theworld
herwork (see Butler1986, esp. 45-46; and 1987). Althoughanatomyis not destinyfor
Beauvoir,its connectionto gendercannot be viewedas whollycontingent, either.If,as
Monique Wittigobserved(citedin Butler1987, 135), we do not ask about the shape of
the earlobes of a newbornbaby whereaswe do ask about its sex, thisis surelybecause
sex is, as Beauvoirargues,ontologicallysignificant in a way thatearlobesare not. To be
bornof a particularsex is to be bornwithor withoutthe capacityto bear and to nour-
ish the nextgenerationof our species: i.e., to be bornwithor withoutsignificantly dif-
ferentoptions (howeverwe may choose, or be forced,to use them)withregardto an
activitythatis intrinsicto human existenceas we know it.
to note thatin "SituatedKnowledges"(1988) Donna Haraway also
30 It is intriguing
stressesthe connectionbetweenthe existenceof embodiedselvesand thepossibilityof
an objective(or sharable)knowledge.Calling for"a doctrineof embodiedobjectivity,"
she observesthat"objectivityturnsout to be about particularand specificembodiment
and definitely not about falsevisionpromisingtranscendence of all limitsand responsi-
bilities.The moral is simple:onlypartialperspectivepromisesobjectivevision" (582-
83). While I doubt whetherHaraway would want to identify herown workwiththe
phenomenologicaltradition,thereare strikingresonancesbetweenwhat she is saying
and the views of both Beauvoirand, above all, Merleau-Ponty, on whose critiqueof
"high-altitude thinking"Beauvoirdrew.

impliesstrictlythatthereexistsa bodywhichis at thesame timea thing

in the world and a point of view on thisworld" (7, emphasisadded).
For Beauvoir,subjectivityis corporallyconstituted;it is coextensive
with the body,while being simultaneously"a point of view." This ac-
count is significantly differentfromSartre's,forwhom "my body for-
me" and "my body for-others"-thatis, the body as object-are on
"different and incommunicablelevelsof being" ([1943] 1956, 374). She
holds thatbiologicaldifference itself,as well as the sociallyconstructed
significationsthatadhereto thatdifference, permeatessubjectivity, but it
is not reducibleto theireffect.Thus, ratherthan acceptingeithera real-
ismof thekindthatpositsan inevitablefeminine essencegroundedin the
body and in motheringor the positionof much postmoderntheoryin
whichthebodyitselfbecomesno morethana discursiveconstruct, Beau-
voirsuggestsa less dichotomizedaccountof subjectivity. Such an account
allows us to acknowledgethe samenessof women as biologicallysexed
and sociallyconstructedfemaleswithoutpinningan immutableessence
of womanhood onto "real historicalwomen" whose lives may also be
radicallydivergent, shaped also by class, race, ethnicity,age, sexual ori-
entation,and manyotherfactors.Biological sex is always presentas a
givenin the"lived experience"of thebody.31Yet our livedexperienceof
thebody is never"natural."It is, forBeauvoir,one of thealwayssocially
mediatedexperienceswe have of the objectivegivensof our lives.Thus
Beauvoir would, I think,approve of postmodernfeministprojectsto
contestthe discursiveconstructionsof gender,even thoughshe would
rejectthe hyperconstructivist epistemologyupon which theygenerally
rest.
Thus, againstthehyperconstructivism incipientin postmodernism, in
whichsubjectivity itselfcan become but a fictionand everything, includ-
ing the categoryof woman, can cease to be real, Beauvoirsketchesan
accountof thegenderingof subjectivity thatcan bestbe characterizedas
a dialecticalrealism.By thisI mean an account in which not only dis-
course but also a discursivelymediated "beyond" of discourse is ac-
knowledged.This "beyond" of discourseincludes,on theone hand, the
existenceof objectiveparametersto human life,such as sex, birth,dis-
ease, malnutrition, and death and, on theotherhand, an always-present
potentialityforthatmarginof autonomousthoughtand action in situ-
ation thatBeauvoircalls "freedom."For unlesswe grantthatreal histor-
ical womenliveand die, thattheydo decideand act, and thattheycan in
varyingdegreesbe oppressedor free,we risk becomingour own grave
diggers.If we need to seek a way betweenhyperconstructivism and es-
31
L'experiencevecue is the titleBeauvoirgave to the second volumeof The Second
Sex. It is unfortunately
renderedin the Englishtranslationas "Woman's LifeToday,"
whichfailsto captureBeauvoir'sphenomenologicalintent.

sentialism,Beauvoir'sworkremainsrichlysuggestive
as to how we might
set about it.
Departmentof Politics
Oberlin College
References
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Gender and Subjectivity - Simone de Beauvoir and Contemporary Feminism

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Gender and Subjectivity: Simone de Beauvoir and Contemporary Feminism

Author(s): Sonia Kruks

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.60 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 10:11:17 AM

Thanks go to Eleanore Holveck,PatriciaJagentowiczMills, Marion Smiley,and

[Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society1992, vol. 18, no. 1]

Autumn 1992 SIGNS 89

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ernismdepoliticizesfeminismand urge feministsto have virtuallyno

90 SIGNS Autumn 1992

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gender)-is that,at a moremodesttheoreticalaltitudethanthatto which

Autumn 1992 SIGNS 91

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position that needs deconstructing, it is that betweenmodernityand

92 SIGNS Autumn 1992

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maybe summed up as theirantihumanism. Fromtheinsistence ofClaude

I don't believetheproblemcan be resolvedby historicizing the

Autumn 1992 SIGNS 93

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philosophy.In order to account for the weight of social structures,

7 Thisis thecaseat leastuntilFoucault's verylastyears.Therearesomeintriguing

94 SIGNS Autumn 1992

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languageof "man" and "his" world)demonstrated how insensitive she

11Forcriticisms ofherattitude to thefemalebodysee,e.g.,McCall(1979,209-23);

Autumn 1992 SIGNS 95

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Beauvoirsaid thatshe lacked originality and was merelySartre'sdisciple

lenged,most systematically by MargaretA. Simons (1981, 25-42; and 1986, 165-79).

96 SIGNS Autumn 1992

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the meaninghe giveshis own situation.The questionof materialor

Autumn 1992 SIGNS 97

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of women'slifeexperience(Hartsock1985, 242 ff.).16It involves,contra

I maintainedthat, fromthe point of view of freedom,as Sartre

Beauvoirwas rightthather "submission"was no morethan"token."

98 SIGNS Autumn 1992

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on ethicsshe wrotepriorto The Second Sex: Pyrrhuset Cineas (1944)

The other'sfreedomcan do nothingforme unless my own goals

Autumn 1992 SIGNS 99

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Already,then,Beauvoiris aware of the interdependence of subjectiv-

100 SIGNS Autumn 1992

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thosethatinvolvesocial inequality.Wheretherelationis one of equality,

Autumn 1992 SIGNS 101

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is a radical disjuncturebetweenthehumanand thenaturalrealms,with

Woman, then,is locked in immanenceby the situationman inflicts

102 SIGNS Autumn 1992

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straint,of consciousnessand materialitythat, finally,is incompatible

How thendoes Beauvoirdevelopthisaccountof a situatedsubjectthat

Autumn 1992 SIGNS 103

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tweenan individual manand womanwas a struggle ofconsciousnesses

104 SIGNS Autumn 1992

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I turnnowtoBeauvoir's secondinsight. Thisconcerns theinherence of

"Woman,likeman,is herbody,"shewrites, andthencitesMerleau-Ponty in a