YEAR 9 • Nº 192 OCTOBER 19th, 2023

JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS AND OCEANPOLITICS

BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTEISSN 2446-7014

Underwater sovereignty in the

South China Sea
and a further 13 articles in this edition
BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE
No 192 • october 19th, 2023
Boletim Geocorrente is a biweekly publication from EDITORIAL BOARD
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
.
Carolina Vasconcelos de Oliveira Silva (PUC-Rio)
Franco Napoleão A. de Alencastro Guimarães (PUC-Rio)
Isadora Jacques de Jesus (UFRJ)
João Victor Marques Cardoso (UNIRIO)
José Ricardo de Oliveira Araujo (UFRJ)
Luísa Barbosa Azevedo (UFRJ)
Nicole Eduarte Silva Chifunga (UFF)
Vanessa Passos Bandeira de Sousa (ESG)
SOUTH AMERICA
Bruna da Silveira Eloy (UFRJ)
Fernanda Carvalho Calado Coutinho (UFF)
Gabriel Augusto Almeida da Silva (UFRJ)
Luciano Veneu Terra (UFF)
Matheus Ribeiro de Paula (UERJ)
Pedro Emiliano Kilson Ferreira (Univ. de Santiago)
Rafael Henrique de Almeida Bandeira Araujo (UFRJ)
NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
Isabela Süssekind Rocha Torres (PUC-Rio)
Taynah Pires Ferreira (UFRJ)
Victor Cabral Ribeiro (PUC-Rio)
Victor Eduardo Kalil Gaspar Filho (EGN)
ARCTIC & ANTARCTIC
Gabriela Paulucci da Hora Viana (UFRJ)
Gabriele Marina Molina Hernandez (UFF)
Jayanne Balbino Soares (UFF)
EUROPE
Guilherme Francisco Pagliares de Carvalho (UFF)
Gustavo da Hora Azevedo Osuna Bittencourt (UFRJ)
Maria Victoria R. Scarlatelli de Menezes (PUC-Rio)
Marina Autran Caldas Bonny (UFRJ)
Millene Sousa dos Santos (UFRJ)
Rafaela Caporazzo de Faria (UFRJ)
EAST ASIA
João Pedro Ribeiro Grilo Cuquejo (Kobe University)
Luís Filipe de Souza Porto (UFABC)
Marcelle Torres Alves Okuno (EGN)
Maria Eduarda Araújo Castanho Parracho (UERJ)
Philipe Alexandre Junqueira (UERJ)
Rodrigo Abreu de Barcellos Ribeiro (UFF)
Thomas Dias Placido (UFSC)
3
RESEARCHERS OF THE
CONJUNCTURE ASSESSMENT GROUP
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
Amanda Neves Leal Marini (ECEME)
João Gabriel Fischer Morais Rego (ECEME)
Maria Clara Vieira Schneider Vianna (UFRJ)
Melissa Rossi (Suffolk University)
Pedro Nobre Vecchia (UFRJ)
Vitória de França Fernandes (UFRJ)
RUSSIA & FORMER USSR
José Gabriel de Melo Pires (UFRJ)
Gabriel Willian Duarte Constantino (UFRJ)
Luiza Gomes Guitarrari (UFRJ)
Pedro Mendes Martins (ECEME)
Pérsio Glória de Paula (Saint Petersburg University)
Rafael Esteves Gomes (UFRJ)
SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
Guilherme de Oliveira Carneiro (UFRJ)
Maria Gabriela Veloso Camelo (PUC-Rio)
Matheus Bruno Ferreira Alves Pereira (UFRJ)
Thayná Fernandes Alves Ribeiro (UFF)
SOUTH ASIA
Eduardo Araújo Mangueira (UFRJ)
Gabriela Siqueira Duarte dos Santos (UFRJ)
Lucas Mitidieri (UFRJ)
Maria Fernanda Császár Lima Ferreira (UFRJ)
Rebeca Vitória Alves Leite (EGN)
Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira (PUC-Rio)
SPECIAL TOPICS
Raquel Torrecilha Spiri (UNESP)
Victor Magalhães Longo de Carvalho Motta (UFRJ)
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
 INDEX
SOUTH AMERICA EAST ASIA

Migration changes and strategic challenges at the Chile-Peru border....................5
NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
Haiti and the Dominican Republic: impacts of the current border crisis .................6
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The fall of Ali Bongo and the future of Françafrique..............................................7
Piracy control and maritime security in Somalia: a success?..................................8
EUROPE
Emphasis on North-Korean submarine capabilities...............................................12
Japan and cyber defense: challenges and opportunities......................................13
SOUTH ASIA
Diplomatic crossroads: Bangladesh’s entry to the BRICS.....................................13
SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
Underwater sovereignty in the South China Sea...................................................14
ARCTIC & ANTARCTIC

Protection and competition the EU’s investigation on Chinese electric vehicles ����8 The Chinese search for Arctic governance: science as a tool for geopolitics........15

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA SPECIAL TOPICS

The Dilemma of Investment in Libya: the main cause of the floods........................9
Hamas x Israel conflict: the roles of Iran and Saudi Arabia...................................10
RUSSIA & FORMER USSR
Testing of the 9M730 Burevestnik and the rise of nuclear tensions..................... 11
Times of change in the international energy market..............................................16
Selected Articles & Defense News........................... 17
Geocorrente Calendar.............................................. 17
References............................................................... 18
Risk Map.................................................................. 19

RISK MAP
By: Luísa Barbosa

For more information on the criteria used, see page 19.

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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
 SOUTH AMERICA
Migration changes and strategic challenges at the Chile-Peru border
T he year of 2023 has seen transformations at the borders
between Chile and Peru, with the reconfiguration
of Venezuelan people’s migration flows. Data from
the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
reveals that, for the first time since the beginning of the
Venezuelan exodus in 2014, the number of Venezuelans
that decided to leave Chile has surpassed that of those
who decided to leave the country by land. In that sense,
one must question the impact of the changes in the
displacement of peoples considering regional security
and other political players involved.
According to the IOM, four out of five displacements
registered in the border between Chile and Peru represent
the leaving of Venezuelans from Chilean territory.
It represents a shift in a stable migration tendency,
as the Andean country has been the final destination
for half a million Venezuelan citizens in the last three
years, according to the Departamento de Extranjería e
Inmigración. Migration analysts from the University of
Santiago de Chile have reached the conclusion that the
new scenario happens due to a lack of adaptation by the
migrants to an often hostile territory. The Venezuelans
face difficulties of insertion into the formal job market,
professional non-recognition, issues in housing rental,
and xenophobic speech and practices.
Source: Diario Financiero
5
Pedro Kilson
Two other factors are crucial to the reversal of
migration fluxes: the shift in Chilean migration policy
after 2018 and the beginning of what could be a process of
militarization of the country’s northern region, initiated
throughout the first semester of 2023. The Sebastián
Piñera administration has introduced more restrictive
visa measures, which ended up hindering legal entry and
establishment of Venezuelan, Haitian and Dominican
nationals in Chilean territory. In February, effectives of
the Chilean army stationed in the border with the aim
of controlling the three regions of the North macro-
zone: Arica y Parinacota, Tarapacá, and Antofagasta y
Atacama. In turn, Peruvian authorities have adopted
a similar policy in April, one that indeed leads to the
reversal of migration flows. However, there has been no
efficient and lasting communication strategy between
Chilean and Peruvian authorities.
The changes in the Venezuelan migration flows do
not represent a solution to the migration crisis, as the
framework of regional security stays the same. The
borders remain weak and open to organized crime,
without the development of strategic communication
for administrative, military, or political coordination
between the region’s governments.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p05.
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 NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
Haiti and the Dominican Republic: impacts of the current border crisis
O n September 15, 2023, the Dominican government
announced the closure of all borders with Haiti, with
which it shares the island of Hispaniola.The measure
was demanded after resumption of the construction of a
canal in Dajabón River (also known as Massacre River)
by Haitian private companies, given the structural risks
of the project for the course of the river, potentially
causing damage to Dominican economy and agriculture.
The decision contributed to worsening diplomatic
tensions between the two countries, already shaken due
to political, security and migration issues (Boletim 180).
Thus, one must question what are the potential economic
implications of the canal's construction and further border
closure for the Dominican Republic (DR).
The Dajabón River is 55km long and makes up a
natural border between Haiti and the DR. As agreed upon
in the 1929 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Arbitration,
both countries agreed to share the river waters under the
sole condition of not altering its natural course. However,
in last April, the construction of a canal — in development
since 2018 — in the Haitian part of the river, aiming to
divert waters for commercial use, was resumed. If it
indeed happens, modifications in the river course will
6
Taynah Pires Ferreira
bring consequences for local ecosystems, and agriculture
can also be gravely affected in both countries. For the
DR, losses can be significant, as 5.8% of the country’s
GDP comes from agriculture.
However, the decision by Dominican President
Luis Abinader has sparked economic and humanitarian
losses. One of the immediate results of the measure
was a halt in trade with Haiti through air, land and
water. For the Dominican economy, the implications are
enormous, as the Caribbean country is one of its main
commercial partners. According to the UN, exports to
Haiti reached USD 1.02 billion in 2022. Considering
those socioeconomic implications, the DR has reopened
limited commerce between the two countries in October,
easing some of the cross-border tension. Despite that,
territorial limits remain closed for migration.
Even with this small border opening, no agreement
was reached, which elevates tensions in the region. The
issue will then continue to negatively affect the DR
given the socioeconomic losses. Furthermore, UN efforts
stand out in the search for a satisfactory agreement that
allows for both nations to mitigate the crisis’ effects on
Hispaniola.
Source: The New York Times
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p06.
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 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The fall of Ali Bongo and the future of Françafrique
O n August 30, 2023, a group of military personnel
overthrew Gabon’s President Ali Bongo. The taking
of power — the eighth in French Africa in the last three
years — shares similarities with movements observed in
Mali, Niger and other Sahel countries but also has some
distinguishing aspects which can point to a scenario of
larger instability in the region.
The coup d’État organized by General Brice Oligui
and the high sectors of the Gabonese military effectively
ended the rule of the Bongo family over Gabon, which
started with Omar Bongo’s rise to power in 1967. The
Bongo dynasty became known for both its fortune,
revealed after continuous corruption scandals, and
its privileged connection with France. In 2003, an
investigation revealed that Paris had guaranteed its
support to the Bongo family in exchange for exploration
contracts to French company Elf Aquitaine for access to
Gabon’s oil reserves, estimated in 2.5 billion barrels.
Omar Bongo ruled until his death in 2009, when
he was replaced by his son, Ali Bongo, elected in that
same year and re-elected in 2016. In August 2023, the
Source: International IDEA
Coup d'etat in Sub-saharan Africa in the last 3 years
7
Franco Alencastro
Gabonese parliament approved a change in electoral
law, which demanded voters to only cast a vote on a
representative of the same party as their presidential
candidate. The rule hurt the opposition, which gathered
in a coalition in which most parties, by definition, don’t
have a presidential candidate. The announcement of
Bongo’s victory — by a 64% margin — came on August
30th, four days after the election, and was the final trigger
for the coup.
Until that moment, the fall of regimes in Francophone
Africa was restricted to the Sahel region, where political
crisis happened due to the failure of security policies
supported by the French armed forces. However, Gabon
is not subject to the same pressures, which can indicate a
domino effect throughout the rest of francophone Africa.
The rule of the Bongo family over Gabon is one of the
most emblematic examples of Françafrique, the intricate
web of political and corporate relations between Paris
and the African leaders of former French colonies. Its end
can indicate, in turn, a symptom of crisis in this model.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p07.
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Piracy control and maritime security in Somalia: a success?
S ince 2012, piracy and armed robbery indexes off
the Somali coast have reduced dramatically, and,
according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB),
no attack was registered in the last three years. Such
mark was possible due to joint efforts aimed at ensuring
maritime security in the region bathed by the Red Sea,
which were endorsed and aided by continuous decisions
by the United Nations Security Council. Implemented
and annually renewed since Resolution 1814 of 2008,
such resolutions have prompted cooperation by both
the region’s States and foreign powers, as well as the
development and strengthening of monitoring and
combat capacities in Somalia. However, can one expect
that stability in those indexes accounts for maritime
security off the Somali coast?
Despite contributing to greater attention to maritime
security with incentives to the development of ocean
governance and policies, the initiatives to mitigate piracy
and armed robbery did not cover other types of maritime
crime. Somalia has made significant progress, gradually
assuming responsibility for its maritime security.
However, after more than a decade of control over piracy
and armed robbery attacks, the Somali coast is currently
still threatened by smuggling, trafficking in general —
EUROPE
Protection and competition the EU’s investigation on Chinese electric vehicles
I n October of 2023, the European Commission officially
began investigating Chinese electric vehicles. This
measure comes from pressure by the French government
to protect the European industry, reflecting concerns
that China could jeopardize the bloc's competitiveness
through subsidizing practices. Considering that scenario,
how do the European Union's (EU) investigations bring
forth the urgency of industrial protectionism and the
potential start of a trade war between the players?
The beginning of anti-subsidy analysis regarding
battery-run electric vehicles results from various
complaints, that automobiles coming from China have
been the target of advantageous loans and tax reductions.
It also was alledged that other practices have allowed
china to increase its presence in European imports,
causing losses to the EU’s industries. The sudden increase
in cheaper imports comes at a time when the European
market is undergoing a change towards electrification,
allowing China to conquer a substantial portion of a
rapidly-growing market, which demands continuous and
8
Vanessa Bandeira
especially of people and guns —, terrorism, and illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, for instance.
Considering the interconnection among multiple
types of maritime crime, especially between piracy and
IUU fishing, maritime security cannot be measured by
analyzing only the rates of one type of crime. Due to the
risk of criminals migrating to other less surveilled and
more profitable types of crime, the numbers presented do
not reflect the full reality in terms of maritime security.
Thus, one must approach the issue of maritime
insecurity holistically, treating the roots of the problem
in order to make sure that a reduction in numbers is not
just migration to other types of crime. With other crimes
affecting the region, and considering Somalia’s political,
economic and social frailty, the cycle of violence and
impoverishment continues to threaten the population’s
economic and food security and keep concerns high
over the return of crimes declared resolved until the
present moment. One concludes, thus, that the control
of the number of piracy and armed robbery attacks off
the Somali coast does not mean that there is maritime
security in the region, as other types of crime are seen in
Somali waters.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p08.
Millene Santos
substantial investment. This scenario could thus result
in significant losses for European industries, quickly
creating an unsustainable situation.
In tandem, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce has
manifested its strong dissatisfaction towards the EU’s
investigation. The country states that it has not received
proper evidence of the case, and that the investigation
does not conform to the rules of the World Trade
Organization. Chinese reaction might indicate that the
conflict is enlarging into more grave proportions. China
has also prompted the EU to protect the stability of global
supply chains as well as domestic strategic partnership.
That is because Beijing considers that this “obvious act
of protectionism” damages the growth of the global
electric vehicle industry at a time when electrification
is becoming a central strategy for energy transition on a
global scale.
With that, there is the risk that, alongside the heating
of discussions, Europe experiences potential Chinese
retaliation that further leads to a trade war. That is
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
because some countries have a high exposure to Chinese
investment, as the German automotive industry's case,
which would result in higher costs for companies and
consumers and negatively affect the economy.
Therefore, one can observe that, at the same time
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
The Dilemma of Investment in Libya: the main cause of the floods
S eptember 13th was marked by news from Libya
regarding floods in the northeastern part of the country.
Over 15.000 people have lost their lives according to
Libyan authorities. As reported by the Middle East
Monitor, other two dams are in critical condition and
may burst at any moment, causing new floods. But why
is Libya, a large petroleum and natural gas exporter, not
prepared to deal with catastrophes of this magnitude?
The main possible analysisis about the vacuum of
central power in the North African country, in which, due
topersistent civil war since 2011, in the middle of the Spring
Arabic, there is no single authority capable ofgovern
the country and managing calamities. Furthermore,
the government has apparently been investing more to
combat rebel troops than in the existing infrastructure
equipment in the national territory. The region most
affected by the dam bursts is predominantly under the
control of paramilitary and jihadist groups against the
government. In the past, the cities of Derna - the most
affected by the floods - and Benghazi were targets of
bombings by the government and its international allies,
precisely to "eliminate" the influence of groups opposite
to the central administration. This fact can help explain
9
that the EU tries to protect its own industries, diplomatic
relations with China become unstable, which can impact
some nations of the bloc as well as the recent efforts for
broader cooperation in environmental protection goals
aiming at energy transition.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n191.p08-09.
Pedro Nobre Vecchia
the abandonment of investments in the region.
In this context, negligence regarding equipment
and infrastructure is highlighted. According to Libyan
researcher Moin Kikhia, from the "Libyan Democratic
Institute" think-tank, the "endemic corruption in the
government" and the "lack of administration" were
important factors that resulted in little investment in
public equipment, such as dams, leaving them vulnerable,
without the maintenance necessary to avoid such tragedy.
Additionally, the population living in the cities near these
dams does not seem to receive any form of emergency
evacuation instructions, which could at least attenuate
the impacts of a catastrophe like this.
The situation remains very critical: as stated by
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, there is the risk that new dams
may burst. As maintained by Libyan authorities, they are
in good operating conditions, yet the UN office points to
"contradictory reports" in this regard.
It is observed, therefore, that Libya lives a complex
situation: it invests a lot in its military power to combat
internal rival groups and, apparently, it invests little in its
national infrastructure.
Source: Reuters
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n191.p09.
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Hamas x Israel conflict: the roles of Iran and Saudi Arabia
O n October 7th, Hamas — a Palestinian paramilitary
group which controls Gaza since 2007 — launched
an offensive towards Israel. In addition to the action, the
group has penetrated Israeli territory through the south
of the country, violating the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Jewish State. In response, the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) has launched operation “Iron
Sword”, which culminated in nation-wide deployment
and a declaration of war on Hamas. Considering that
scenario, how can one observe the conflict through the
lenses of Iranian and Saudi interests and differences?
Firstly, it is worth noting that Hamas is a group
supported by Iran, through contributions spanning
technology, arms, military training and ideological
support. Thus, despite having its own agenda, this non-
state actor functions as an important proxy for Iranian
military strategy against Israel, on which it wages a
shadow war (Boletim 169). In that context, through social
media and press releases, Iranian authorities saluted the
group for its achievements, reinforcing its support and
criticizing the Israeli counteroffensive and its actions in
Gaza. Thus, besides intensifying a reality that polarizes
regional balance, one can observe how Iran has also been
Source: CNN
10
Amanda Marini
acting as a notorious player, with the actions and stance
of a regional power in the local geopolitical scenario.
Saudi Arabia, in turn, had been greatly approaching
both Israel, following the Abraham Accords, and
Palestine, through the Palestinian Authority, with the
recent assignment of its first-ever ambassador to the
territory. Riyadh’s efforts to establish diplomatic ties
with Tel Aviv represent an attempt by the Kingdom to
mitigate regional instability caused by tensions between
Israel and the Palestinian groups, thus generating benefits
for the Arab population in Gaza and the West Bank.
However, this scenario has been shaken since the start of
the Hamas operation, as the group, which supports Iran,
is not happy with the Saudi approach to Israel or the
Kingdom’s interests regarding the territory’s population.
Finally, the present reality profoundly hinders the
process of dialogue towards peaceful coexistence of
the two States of Israel and Palestine, in which both are
respected and have their sovereignty preserved. One shall
indeed highlight how challenging it is to reach a common
denominator for the resolution of a historic conflict
once more torn open, and how it has been observed and
managed by the interests of regional powers.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p10.
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 RUSSIA & FORMER USSR
Testing of the 9M730 Burevestnik and the rise of nuclear tensions
T he weakening of the strategic arms control framework
and the increase in nuclear tensions are developments
of the contemporary dispute between Russia and the
United States (US). Thus, how can the development of the
Burevestnik missile be analyzed in the current context of
international crisis?
On October 5, Russia’s Vladimir Putin announced the
success in testing for the 9M730 Burevestnik (SSC-X-9
Skyfall, in NATO’s designation), a nuclear-powered
cruise missile with unlimited maneuverability and range.
In addition, Putin highlighted the possibility of Russia’s
retreat from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT). This measure would serve both to test new
nuclear warhead technologies and to respond to the US,
which signed, but never ratified, the CTBT.
The Burevestnik is part of a new set of disruptive
strategic weapons presented by the Russian government,
such as the Poseidon underwater nuclear-powered drone
(Boletim 117), the Sarmat super-heavy intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) (Boletim 160) and the Kinzhal
and Zircon hypersonic missiles (Boletim 163). According
to Russian authorities, the Burevestnik will increase the
second-strike capabilities of the Russian strategic forces
if the country happens to be struck by nuclear weapons.”
Furthermore, the unlimited range would be a disruptive
11
Pérsio Glória de Paula
factor, which would allow the Burevestnik to bypass the
densest areas of Western anti-missile systems and enter
blind spots or zones with less interception capacity.
This highlights Skyfall's possible ability to continue
flying until it acquires new targets, unlike conventional
intercontinental ballistic missiles, which would make it
similar to a loitering munition with nuclear capabilities
and global reach.
Despite uncertainty regarding the impact of this
weapon on the nuclear balance, the potential exit of
Russia from the CTBT has been appointed as another
negative development to the already weak strategic arms
control framework (Boletim 178). Russia and the United
States have not yet reestablished forms of dialogue for
the reconstruction of this framework. The erosion of
strategic arms control substantially increases the risks of
a new arms race and potential nuclear confrontation.
In that sense, although in test phases, the development
of the Burevestnik highlights the central role of strategic
capabilities in the rise of tensions between Russia and
Western nuclear powers. Furthermore, one shall point
out the continuous and dangerous erosion of the strategic
arms control framework, which was built during the
Cold War and is essential for diminishing the risks of
nuclear warfare.
Source: VK
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p11.
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 DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n191.p12.
EAST ASIA
Emphasis on North-Korean submarine capabilities
R egarding naval power, Geoffrey Till (2006) claims
that the level of development of nations can be
reflected on their naval capabilities; while a developing
country has a “pre-modern” navy in order to safeguard its
survival, a more developed State is able to have a modern
Force, capable of adapting classic concepts of naval
deployment to modernity. Till highlights that countries
in the Asia-Pacific region tend to be wary of the moves
and modernization of their neighbors, and so is the case
with North Korea. The country proves that it also is in
the geopolitical game, and indeed seeks modernization
of its naval power.
Through the Todd-Lindberg approximate Naval
Strength classification system (1966), it is possible to
identify that Pyongyang possesses a green-water navy,
with operational capacity in coastal waters. The Korean
People’s Navy is split into a fleet in the Yellow Sea and
another one in the East Sea, made up of approximately
two frigates as surface combatants and 372 coast and
patrol combatants, spanning over five corvettes, 72
submarines — one Sinpo-C and one Sinpo-B, both
with ballistic missiles, 20 Romeo-class conventional
submarines, 10 Sang-O-class coastal submarines and 10
midget submarines, as well as other vessels.
With the qualitative inferiority of its conventional
forces — obsolete Soviet-era equipment, old Chinese
acquisitions and national updated vessels —. Pyongyang
Source: Naval news
12
Marcelle Torres
seeks to develop asymetric capabilities, such as ballistic
missile launch systems. While the Kim Jong Il regime
(1994-2011) concentrated on midget submarines, one of
them even being involved in the sinking of South Korean
corvette Cheonan in 2010, the Kim Jong Un regime
(2011 - current day) emphasizes ballistic missile
submarines.
For instance, one can observe the Gorae-class
Sinpo-B submarine, which transports one missile and
has signaled the DPRK’s vision for the development of a
strategic force. Also, there is the program for submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), with the production
of Pukguksong missiles; the Romeo-Mod-class Sinpo-C
housing three Pukguksong-3 missiles; and, in September
2023, Pyongyang has launched the Kim Kun Ok
submarine, equipped with 10 vertical tubes for SLBM
launch. The new submarine is highlighted by Kim Jong
Un as one of the main future offensive underwater means
of North-Korean naval power.
The search for the country’s nuclear capabilities
marks a new era for the reinforcement and modernization
of the North-Korean navy. Despite remaining limited
and not at the same level of modern navies, Pyongyang
seeks to re-adapt its old submarines and modernize its
naval power into a force for both sea denial and strategic
deployment.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p12.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
Japan and cyber defense: challenges and opportunities
W ith the consolidation of the Internet and the
expansion of digital services that span from the
new technologies of the 4.0 industry to the gradual
digitalization of State apparatus, the virtual world gains
ever more political relevance. It is in that scenario that
multiple countries, through state-affiliated hacker groups,
promote coordinated attacks to government institutions
of rival countries, whether for accessing sensitive
information or destabilizing essential services as a form
of retaliation. Considering the use of these strategies by
countries that have delicate relations with Japan, such
as China and Russia, it is vital that Tokyo invests in a
cohesive and coordinated national strategy for cybernetic
defense so as to contain current and future digital threats.
Considering that scenario, this article seeks to analyze
the limitations in Japanese cybernetic defense strategy,
and how potential breaches can be approached.
In August of 2023, the Pentagon made a statement
reinforcing its trust in sharing sensitive information with
Japan after the Washington Post reported that Chinese
hackers infiltrated Tokyo’s defense network and accessed
classified information related to plans and military
deficiency evaluation from 2020 to 2021. The news brings
forth the vulnerabilities of the Japanese cyber defense
SOUTH ASIA
Diplomatic crossroads: Bangladesh’s entry to the BRICS
A request to join the BRICS, made in June of 2023
by Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina,
revisits the diplomatic crossroads in which the country
is situated amongst strong foreign pressure. Although
the request failed, its objective was to diversify exports,
boost economic development and, above all, reduce
dependency on the dollar. However, this potential
adhesion triggers a complex geopolitical dispute which
involves China, India and the United States, raising
significant matters about the potential impacts for the
Indo-Pacific region.
During the latest BRICS Summit, China’s Xi Jinping
expressed his support to Bangladesh’s inclusion into
the Bloc, also compromising to aid the South Asian
country in its search for development and prosperity. The
possibility of adhesion would bring forth opportunities
for Bangladesh to strengthen its ties with China and
India, its main trade partners and growing sources of
foreign funding. But, the decision could be interpreted
as a sign of disagreement towards US strategy for the
13
João Pedro Grilo
system, despite the country’s growing concerns since the
2014 Basic Act On Cybersecurity — which established
the legal definition of the term “cybersecurity” —, and
the release of its two Cybersecurity Strategies, in 2015
and 2018.
This frailty can be explained by organizational matters,
as each State organization internally treats its matters of
cybersecurity, hidering the production of a unified and
human policy due to a gap of qualified professionals in
the matter within the government. The lack of an active
cybersecurity policy, which would allow for interception
and prevention of attacks as well as counteroffensives, is
another weakness in the Japanese system.
Vis-à-vis these two limitations, one noticed that Japan
urgently needs not only a holistic cyberdefense plan that
covers all agencies and ministries, but also a way to qualify
defense agents. Fortunately, ever more frequent bilateral
cybernetic exercises with allied countries — which allow
for the exchange of expertise — and the recent mention
of the importance of an active cybersecurity policy in the
country’s latest National Security Strategy (NSS) may
indicate qualitative improvement and doctrine changes
to the Japanese defense system.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p13.
Lucas Mitidieri
Indo-Pacific.
According to Michael Kugelman, director of the South
Asia Institute at the Wilson Center, Bangladesh faces one
of the most delicate situations in its history due to being
the stage for disputes of influence between Beijing, New
Delhi and Washington. Currently, the Indo-Pacific region
has played a crucial role in president Joe Biden’s foreign
policy, especially for the strengthening of bilateral
relations for the contention of Chinese expansion in the
region. India, for instance, is already part of that strategy,
being a member of Quad (Australia, United States, India
and Japan), aiming to become a regional leadership and
thus contain the expansion of Chinese influence in the
region. However, if on one hand the United States wish
to gather Bangladesh and India in its strategy for Chinese
contention, China wishes to strengthen its commercial
relations with the nation.
In summary, the country’s traditional policy of
neutrality and maintenance of good relations puts the
country in a delicate position regarding its commercial
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
partners. This complex network of interests puts geopolitical advantages, but, at the same time, it raises a
Bangladesh in strong diplomatic crossroads, in which its crucial matter: the preservation of its neutral stance vis-
potential adhesion to the BRICS could foster substantial à-vis complex geopolitical dynamics.

DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p15-14.

SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA

Underwater sovereignty in the South China Sea
Gabriela Veloso

O n Aufust of 2023, the Chinese Ministry of Natural

Resources launched a map referring to territorial
division on the South China Sea (SCS). The new standard
map established a ten-dash line, expanding China’s
maritime claims and invading Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZs) of many countries, such as Brunei, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. This
unilateral action did not please the neighboring countries,
and the Indonesian government was one of the first
to speak up. A few days after the release of the paper,
Indonesia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi
highlighted the necessity for border representations
and maritime claims to respect the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), so as
to say that China’s unilateral actions go directly against
International law.
The paper exposes Chinese determination to maintain its
claims in the SCS, strengthening its influence and control
over vital resources and strategic trade routes. This fact
highlights the need for neighbors to reinforce their maritime
security and sovereignty, and the Indonesian response
reflects the country’s sense of urgency regarding the matter.
This perspective on the defense of sovereignty and respect
to International law was reinforced in the Indonesian speech
at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Special
Boletim on the 78th UNGA). For Jakarta, which in recent
years has sought to modernize its defense capacities —
especially at sea —, the central concern at the moment is
regarding the potential illegal and unsurveilled entry of
Chinese submarines in its territory, so as to challenge its
underwater sovereignty. Advanced military technology,
alongside the potential use of unmanned underwater vehicles
(UUV), amplifies that threat. The discovery of UUV similar
to the Chinese in Indonesian waters in 2020 highlights that
concern.
Considering that scenario, the Indonesian Navy has
been more specific on the capabilities that it wishes for its
future submarine fleet, including operations within their
EEZs and offshore, missile and UUV-launching capabilities
and improvements in underwater detection capabilities as a
whole. However, the country faces political and economic
challenges which limit the progress of its naval programs.
In that scenario, underwater defense and security emerge
as crucial aspects of current Indo-Pacific geopolitics,
especially considering the growing strategic importance
of maritime waters and the need to safeguard national
interests in the domains. Thus, it is imperative that Indonesia
accelerates its efforts to improve capabilities as both a vital
part of the protection of maritime sovereignty and dissuasion
of criminal activity.

Source: The Strategist

New detailed map, front and back, showing China's ten-dash line
in the South China Sea
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p14.
14
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
 ARCTIC & ANTARCTIC
The Chinese search for Arctic governance: science as a tool for geopolitics
I n recent years, China has been strengthening its
presence in the Arctic through scientific research,
bringing forth its commitment to the Arctic. Since the
country became an observer at the Arctic Council, it has
actively sought to participate in debate and strengthen its
acting in the region through scientific expeditions. For
that reason, this article aims to analyze Chinese scientific
activities in contrast with the geopolitical objectives of
the North.
Since proclaiming itself a “Near-Arctic-State”, China
has intensified its presence in scientific trips to the region.
In July of 2023, on board the Xuelong-2 polar icebreaker,
the 13th Chinese scientific expedition on the Arctic
began, setting a significant milestone by successfully
conducting a marine optical survey in the Arctic Ocean.
The mission installed an underwater monitoring device,
expected to give the Chinese access to sounds emmitted
by animals, vessels or acoustic activity in the region.
Beijing demonstrates substantial interest in the North
Pole due to the need to research implications of climate
change and understand how air currents from the Arctic
can impact China, which faces great climate challenges.
In contrast, its presence in the region also reflects the
15
Jayanne Balbino
country’s aim for larger governance in the area.
On matters geopolitical, this presence is also aligned
with the Chinese strategy for expanding the Silk Route to
the North. For China, this investment possesses strategic
relevance in terms both energetic and commercial,
bearing in mind the supply of Russian hydrocarbons
and the diversification of its maritime route options. In
addition, one must note that part of the Pacific Ocean
is under the influence of the United States and its allies,
which can restrict Chinese navigation so as to affect
a vital route for the transportation of its products to
Africa and Europe through the Malacca Strait. Thus, the
Arctic is seen as a more efficient and strategic option in
comparison to traditional routes.
Even amongst growing geopolitical tensions, Beijing
maintains its commitment to a view of the region as a
central priority. Understanding the area is the key to its
administration; however, the search for broader control
of the Arctic Ocean can trigger tensions in the area. From
a geopolitical point of view, energetic diversification
and the establishment of new maritime routes have a
crucial role for China’s transformation into an economic
leadership, overcoming the United States.
Source: Atlas report
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p15.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
 SPECIAL TOPICS
Times of change in the international energy market
B y analyzing documents from the energy sector
published in the last decade, one can infer the
increasing emphasis on non-fuel minerals. Although
essential for the manufacture of generating equipment
of low-carbon energy, these resources still have low
production concerning what is necessary to meet the
energy transition goals outlined in regimes such as the
Paris Agreement. Insufficient production added to the
concentration of mineral enterprises brings the topic to
the agenda of agencies previously focused strictly on the
oil and gas sector.
In last September, the International Energy Agency
(IEA) organized its first high-level event to debate the
material basis of the energy transition material. The
almost 50 countries represented were subsidized by the
“Critical Minerals Market Review 2023”, the Agency’s
first report mapping the mining sector. The document
deals with phenomena such as the acceleration of demand
for minerals such as lithium, nickel, and copper and how
it is caused by the record implementation of technologies
such as solar and wind.
To support climate and energy ambitions, the IEA
stipulated that it would be necessary to significantly
encourage access to many minerals, also highlighting
the importance of taking advantage of technology and
recycling as a way of maintaining an uninterrupted
supply. To this end, it will be necessary to invest in
Source: Critical Minerals Market Review 2023
16
Victor Gaspar Filho
research into the life cycle of products, with a special
focus on electronic and industrial waste, batteries, wind
turbines, and permanent magnets.
The Agency also highlighted the role of transparency
in the markets, providing predictability and lower
volatility to price levels. For this purpose, it is committed
to monitor the market, something foreseen in the G7
Five-Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security. It also
highlighted the importance of encouraging measures
following environmental, social, and governance
principles (ESG). Furthermore, it highlighted the role
of international cooperation to increase production and
alleviate concentration in the sector.
At the meeting, the IEA announced the creation of
the Division of Energy Security and Critical Minerals,
as well as the reporting of annual events dedicated to the
sector. The first edition will be broadcast in 2024, on the
50th anniversary of the agency, which was first created
as a response to the first oil shock. The phenomena that
culminated in the shock and creation of the IEA indeed
have important parallels observable in recent geopolitical
events in the Middle East. Incorporating the minerals'
agenda into an agency created half a century ago is
indicative not only of a paradigm shift that highlights the
urgency of a successful decarbonizing energy transition,
but also the importance of these resources in the search
for energy security.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n192.p16.
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
 SELECTED ARTICLES & DEFENSE NEWS
By: Captain (Retd) Leonardo F. de Mattos
► The Geopolitics of EU Enlargement
PROJECT SYNDICATE, Mark Leonard
► Judy Asks: Does Anyone Benefit From the Israel-Hamas War?
CARNEGIE EUROPE, Judy Dempsey
► China Accelerates Construction of ‘Ro-Ro’ Vessels, with Potential Military Implications
CHINA POWER, Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Jaehyun Han e Jennifer Jun
► Southeast Asia’s Security Landscape: Lessons for the ADF
AUSTRALIAN ARMY RESEARCH CENTRE, Dr Abdul Rahman Yaacob, Dr Gatra Priyandita e Dr Sylvia Laksmi
► Plus ça change: A French Approach to Naval Warfare in the 21st Century
WAR ON THE ROCKS, Michael Shurkin

GEOCORRENTE CALENDAR
Click on the boxes to acess the references: By: Maria Fernanda Császár e Taynah Pires

OCTOBER
Main events on October 19 - 31

22 22 25 28-29
30

ARGENTINA SWITZERLAND USA JAPAN

GENERAL ELECTIONS PARLIAMENTARY MEETING OF AUSTRALIA G7 TRADE MINISTERS'
ELECTIONS AND US LEADERS MEETING

NOVEMBER
Main events on November 01 - 09

02-04 11-21
06-10 07-09 07-09
30-05

SOUTH AFRICA COOK ISLANDS AUSTRALIA URUGUAY

FORUM FOR US-SUB-SAHARAN 52nd PACIFIC ISLANDS INDO PACIFIC 2023 LATIN AMERICA ENERGY
AFRICA COMMERCIAL AND FORUM LEADERS MEETING INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRANSITION INVESTMENT
ECONOMIC COOPERATION EXPOSITION FORUM

17
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
 REFERENCES

• Migration changes and strategic challenges at the • Emphasis on North-Korean submarine capabilities
Chile-Peru border JY, Da-gyum. N. Korea unveils first ‘tactical nuclear attack submarine’. The
DIAZ, Rhaymar. Cambio significativo en la dinámica migratoria de Korea Herald, Sep. 08 2023. Access on: Oct. 09 2023.
venezolanos en Chile. Meridiano, Sep. 07 2023. Access on: Sep. 19 2023. IISS. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance
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Chile para impedir el paso de inmigrantes indocumentados al Perú. Infobae,
Sep. 12 2023. Access on: Sep. 19 2023. • Japan and cyber defense: challenges and opportunities
STEFAN,S. Japan’s National Cybersecurity and Defense Posture: Policy and
• Haiti and the Dominican Republic: impacts of the
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Dominican president threatens to close border with Haiti over canal dispute.
Al Jazeera, Sep. 12 2023. Access on: Sep. 20 2023 JOHNSON, Jesse. U.S. ‘confident’ in Japan intel sharing, but Taiwan con-
UN Urges Re-opening Of Dominican Republic Border With Haiti. Barron’s, cerns linger. The Japan Times, Aug. 09 2023. Access on: Sep. 05 2023.
Sep. 18 2023. Access on: Sep. 20 2023.
• Diplomatic crossroads: Bangladesh’s entry to the
• The fall of Ali Bongo and the future of Françafrique BRICS
Gabon: Presidential term reduced from seven to five years. Africanews, Apr. THE DAILY STAR. Demystifying BRICS and the stakes for Bangladesh. The
07 2023. Access on: Sep. 22 Sep 2023. Daily Star, Sep. 04 2023. Access on: Sep. 09 2023
HENLEY, Jon. Gigantic sleaze scandal winds up as former Elf oil chiefs are RAIHAN, Selim. Bangladesh’s Geopolitical Balancing Act. The Australian
jailed. The Guardian, Nov. 13 2003. Access on: Sep. 22 2023. Strategic Policy Institute, Aug. 07 2023. Access on: Sep. 09 2023.

• Piracy control and maritime security in Somalia: a • Underwater sovereignty in the South China Sea
success?
Malufti, Muhammad Fauzan; Alfiansyah, Iqbal Bagus. Challenges to
JAKOBSEN, Peter Viggo. Somali piracy, once an unsolvable security threat,
Underwater Sovereignty and Indonesia’s Naval Modernization. The
has almost completely stopped. Here’s why. The Conversation, Sep. 27
Diplomat, Oct. 03 2023. Access on: Oct. 10 2023.
2023. Access on: Oct. 13 2023.
NAÇÕES UNIDAS. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United
WELDEMICHAEL, Awet Tewelde. Conclusion: IUU Fishing Is Back! Will
Nations, 1982.
Piracy Return? In: Piracy in Somalia: Violence and Development in the Horn
of Africa. Cambridge University Press, pp. 196–204, 2019, Access on Oct.
13 2023. • The Chinese search for Arctic governance: science as
a tool for geopolitics
• Protection and competition the EU’s investigation on XINHUA. Chinese scientists embark on 13th Arctic Ocean scientific
Chinese electric vehicles expedition. Global Times, Jul. 13 2023. Access on: Sep. 19 2023.
GIJS, Camille. Brussels officially starts probe into Chinese electric vehicles. CHEN, Stephen. China plans massive listening programme at the North Pole
Politico, Oct. 04 2023. Access on: Oct. 05 203. after declaring success in Arctic test of underwater device. South China
AIZHU, Chen; BLENKINSOUP, Philip. China rebukes EU’s rushed request Morning Post, Jul. 09 2023. Access on: Sep. 19 2023.
for consultations over EV subsidy probe. Reuters, Oct. 04 2023. Access on:
Oct. 09 2023. • Times of change in the international energy market
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY. IEA Critical Minerals and Clean
• The Dilemma of Investment in Libya - the main cause Energy Summit delivers six key actions for secure, sustainable and
of the floods responsible supply chains. Agência Internacional de Energia, Sep. 28
UN warns 2 other dams in Libya may burst. Middle East Monitor, Sep. 18 2023. Accesso on: Sep. 14 2023.
2023. Access on: Sep. 18 2023. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY. Critical Minerals Market Review
WINTOUR, Patrick; HARDING, Luke. ‘Sea is constantly dumping bodies’: 2023. Agência Internacional de Energia, Jul. 28 2023.
fears Libya flood death toll may hit 20,000. The Guardian, Sep. 13 2023.
Access on: Oct. 10 2023.

• Hamas x Israel conflict: the roles of Iran and Saudi The initial map on page 04 of this Boletim was made in MapChart and follows the
Arabia guidelines by Creative Commons.
NAJDI, Youhanna; RESTLE, Benjamin. Israel-Hamas war: What is Iran’s
role? DW, Oct. 12 2023. Access on: Oct. 12 2023.
Iran’s Raisi, Saudi Arabia’s MBS discuss Israel-Hamas war. Al-Jazeera, Oct.
12 2023. Access on: Oct. 12 2023.

• Testing of the 9M730 Burevestnik and the rise of

nuclear tensions
Россия провела успешное испытание межконтинентальной ракеты
“Буревестник”;[Rossiya provela uspeshnoye ispytaniye mezhkontinental’noy
rakety “Burevestnik”]. Ria Novosti, Oct. 05 2023. Access on: Oct. 14 2023.
WRIGHT, Timothy. Russia claims to have tested nuclear-powered cruise
missile. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oct. 13 2023. Access
on: Oct. 14 2023.
18
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
 RISK MAP

T he map titled “Main Global Risks”, showcased

on page 04 of this Boletim, was elaborated by
members of the Conjuncture Assessment Group
(NAC, in Portuguese) from the Brazilian Naval War
College. The criteria used for analyzing international
phenomena and determining which should be on
the Map is based on the relevance of said topics for
Brazil, being: the presence of Brazilian residents in
the region, its influence over the Brazilian economy
and its impact on Brazil’s Strategic Environment.
The parameters for risk categorization follow the
interests of the permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council, the relevance of involved
players, international repercussions, regional impact
and the possibility for conflict escalation. After the
► HIGH RISK:
selection of the phenomena, those can be categorized
into high risk (red) — when great social, political,
military or economic instability can be observed —
and moderate risk (orange) —for situations of main
observed risk aggravation. The countries represented
in gray present monitored conflicts; in the case of risk
aggravation, they can turn orange or red.
The analyses are reformulated in every new
edition of the Boletim, with the aim of re-evaluating
and updating the highlighted regions, as well as
the color used in each of them. This way, the main
phenomena are always observed and sorted between
high and moderate risk. Below, there are links about
the risks indicated in the map:
By: Luísa Barbosa

• ARMENIA & AZERBAIJAN - crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan May Invade Armenia in Coming Weeks, Blinken
Warns Members of Congress. Asbarez, Oct. 13 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• BURKINA FASO - Sociopolitical crisis: In Burkina Faso, Special Representative Simão stresses the importance of mobilizing
to strengthen peace and stability. Relief Web, Oct. 14 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• ECUADOR - Sociopolitical crisis: Daniel Noboa, banana empire heir to Ecuador's youngest president. France 24, Oct. 16
2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• GABON - Coup d’État: Gabon junta head reaches out to DRC for re-integration after coup. The East African, Oct. 12 2023.
Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• HAITI - Internal conflict: 1100 Kenyans Will Not Save Haiti. Council on Foreign Relations, Oct. 12 2023. Access on: Oct.
16 2023.

• YEMEN - Structural Regional crisis: Houthi drone attack kills 3 Yemeni gov't soldiers-Xinhua. Xinhua, Oct. 13 2023. Access
on: Oct. 16 2023.

• ISRAEL - Regional crisis: Hamas denies temporary ceasefire with Israel in Gaza-Xinhua. Xinhua, Oct. 16 2023. Access on:
Oct. 16 2023.

• LEBANON - Structural crisis: Lebanon border fighting stokes fears of regional spillover of Israel-Hamas war. France24, Oct.
16 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• MALI - Sociopolitical crisis: Mali's junta says departure of UN troops will not be delayed, sends soldiers to northern region.
France24, Oct. 15 2023. Access on: Oct. 15 2023.

• MYANMAR - Internal conflict: Three Myanmar Ceasefire Signatories Vow to Topple Junta. The Irrawaddy, Oct. 13 2023.
Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• NIGER - Coup d’État: Niger: Uncertain future for deposed president Bazoum after 80 days in detention. Africanews, Oct.
13 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• RUSSIA & UKRAINE - Armed conflict: Russia’s Avdiivka offensive is failing, says top Ukrainian officer. The Guardian,
Oct. 15 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• SYRIA - Regional crisis: Israel strikes back after Syria rockets set off sirens, military says. Reuters, Oct. 14 2023. Access
on: Oct. 16 2023.

• SOMALIA - Structural crisis: Is Somalia ready to shoulder security burden after African Union exit? Anadolu Agency, Oct.
12 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• SUDAN - Internal conflict: UN relief chief urges end to ‘humanitarian nightmare’ in Sudan. UN News, Oct. 15 2023. Access
on: Oct. 16 2023.

19
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023
 ► MEDIUM RISK:
• BELARUS - Regional crisis: Migration via Belarus: “Hybrid attack on Latvia”. Globe Echo, Oct. 14 2023 Access: Oct. 16
2023.

• ETHIOPIA - Internal crises: Ethiopia: Victims ‘left in limbo’ as rights probe mandate ends. UN News, Oct. 13 2023. Access
on: Oct. 16 2023.

• IRAN - Regional Instability: Iran warns Israel of regional escalation if Gaza ground offensive launched. Al Jazeera, Oct. 15
2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• PERU - Sociopolitical crisis: Peru Economy Shrinks Again, Pointing to Negative Growth in 2023. Bloomberg, Oct. 15 2023.
Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO - Regional crisis: Democratic Republic of the Congo: Adoption of a
Presidential Statement. Security Council Report, Oct. 13 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• VENEZUELA - Structural crisis: Cautious Hopes for a Breakthrough in Venezuela. Americas Quarterly, Oct. 13 2023.
Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

► UNDER MONITORING:
• AFGHANISTAN - Social instability: Another powerful earthquake shakes quake-devastated region in western Afghanistan.
Associated Press, Oct. 16 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• NORTH KOREA - Regional crisis: N. Korea slams Japan's plan to move up U.S. missile purchase as 'arrogant choice'.
Yonhap News Agency, Oct. 16 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• EL SALVADOR - Sociopolitical instability: Corte busca modificar Cámaras Contra el Crimen Organizado para casos de
menores. ElSalvador.com, Oct. 15 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• GUATEMALA - Political instability: Guatemala: bloquean 17 carreteras en rechazo a fiscal Porras. DW, Oct. 16 2023. Access
on: Oct. 16 2023.

• INDIA - Social instability: In Mizoram, Rahul Gandhi rakes up Manipur issue: 'Women molested, babies killed'. The
Hindustan Times, Oct. 16 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• LIBYA- Sociopolitical instability: Al-Lafi reiterates need to secure border with Sudan. The Libya Observer, Oct. 16 2023.
Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• SOUTH CHINA SEA - Regional dispute: Global Impact: South China Sea tensions roll on as China, Philippines clash over
Scarborough Shoal. South China Morning Post, Oct. 16 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• MOZAMBIQUE - Unrest between government and insurgent forces: Mozambique Police Crack Down on Opposition Before
Election Results. Human Rights Watch, Oct. 13 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• NICARAGUA - Political crisis: Ortega endurece represión y translada a ocho sacerdotes al nuevo Chipote. La Prensa, Oct.
15 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• NIGERIA - Internal crises: Ex-Niger Delta militant leaders meet in Rivers over oil theft. The Guardian Nigeria, Sep. 16
2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• PAKISTAN - Sociopolitical crisis:World Bank warns Pakistan of looming poverty crisis ahead of elections.The Times of
India, Oct. 14 Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC - Social instability: Central African Republic Emergency Response: Situation Report
#1027. Relief Web, Oct. 13 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• DARIÉN GAP - Migration crisis: El Paso del Darién: incremento de personas que atraviesan esta peligrosa selva. RFI, Oct.
12 2023. Access on: Oct. 16 2023.

• TAIWAN - China-USA tensions: A spooked and lonely Taiwan looks for new friends. BBC News, Oct. 15 2023. Access on:
Oct. 16 2023.

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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 192 • October | 2023