(4600 words)

Development of a Compatible Shared Corridor for a

Railroad and High-Voltage Power Transmission Line

Chris Brophy
Project Manager
Corr Comp Co.
870 E. Higgins Rd. STE 129
Schaumburg, IL 60173
1-877-300-2003
cbrophy@corrcomp.com

Richard P. Bowden
Assistant Director Signal
BNSF Railway Company
4515 Kansas Ave
Kansas City, KS 66106-1124
913-551-4602

Eddy Harrel, P.E.

Transmission Project Manager
ONCOR Electric Delivery
P.O. Box 970
115 West 7th Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76101
817-991-4827

David W. McCord, P.E.

McCord Engineering, Inc.
13616 “W” Street
Omaha, NE 68137-2948
402-895-1989

© AREMA 2009 ®
Abstract
Driven by increasing power demand, ONCOR Electric Delivery has increased

transmission system capacity, both real and projected, on a ROW shared with the BNSF

Railway since 1991.

Since then, Corr Comp Co. participated in several iterations of mitigation design,

modeling, installation, and testing that were completed in step with increasing power

requirements and evolving criteria targets. Verification of the mitigation effectiveness

was proven by onsite measurements after each installation. Ongoing testing of the

mitigation as a part of routine maintenance allows system maintainers to monitor the

integrity of the mitigation system and quickly address problems. Continuous monitoring

and ongoing testing also allowed for the use of unconventional mitigation system designs

where conventional techniques were inadequate.

The final result provided signal system compatibility and personnel safety designed by

computer modeling that was then proven by field verification measurements. Also

included were provisions for ongoing testing and maintenance to ensure long term

reliability and integrity. Ultimately, the installed mitigation measures reduced rail

voltages by approximately 90% thus allowing for the compatible operation of both

systems in the shared ROW for the foreseeable future.

© AREMA 2009 ®
Introduction

Electromagnetic compatibility issues between utilities that share a common corridor are

not unusual. Increasing load demand requires periodic upgrades to power systems and

mitigation measures. Thus, railroads sharing corridors with power transmission lines

undergoing planned power system upgrades require special attention. This was the case

with ONCOR Electric and BNSF railway in a shared right-of-way (ROW) in Texas.

Corr Comp evaluated the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and designed rail voltage

mitigation to address issues with the railroad signal system and with the safety of railroad

personnel working in the exposure. Several iterations in the mitigation design were

required, because of increasing load demands on the power system. Unique mitigation

was necessary to ensure compatibility for expected future loads. ONCOR Electric, BNSF

Railway, and Corr Comp agreed on mitigation measures at each stage in a progression of

upgrades over the course of the project.

This paper focuses on the unconventional aspects of the mitigation system that was

installed to enable safe and compatible operation of both utilities on the shared ROW.

Background

Driven by increasing power demand, ONCOR Electric Delivery has increased

transmission system capacity, both real and projected, on the shared ROW since 1991.

These power increases along with system changes have caused system compatibility

© AREMA 2009 ®
issues with railroad signal equipment and railroad personnel safety. These have required

substantial mitigation designs to adequately maintain compatibility. Through cooperation,

the shared corridor users agreed upon incremental installation of mitigation and evolving

criteria as system parameters changed over time. The design approach included a long-

term plan to check and maintain the integrity of the mitigation after initial installation and

into the future.

The timeline presented in the next section provides some history of the problem and some

insight into the evolution of the rail voltage mitigation system that was implemented.

Brief Timeline of Shared Corridor

Late 1980’s –

ONCOR realized the need for a 345kV circuit and the chosen route included a 10

mile shared ROW with UP Railroad (ROW now owned by BNSF Railway).

March 1991 –

Construction of single vertical circuit 345kV line completed.

Shortly after the line was energized, railroad equipment began malfunctioning.

Rail-to-ground voltages were measured at 68 Volts and 115 Volts was measured

across at least one IJ.

© AREMA 2009 ®
 A preliminary study of the problem by ONCOR and coordination with UP

Railroad resulted in the installation of high-power five ohm resistors in a “star”

arrangement at insulated joints as temporary voltage mitigation.

Shortly thereafter, a “split-phase” vertical double circuit arrangement was

designed and implemented by ONCOR as a longer-term solution. This involved

installing a second circuit on the transmission towers and hardwiring the phases

ABC on one circuit and CBA (top-to-bottom) on the opposite circuit. This

arrangement reduced magnetic fields and mitigated induced rail voltages to an

acceptable level for personnel safety.

Up to 2000 –

No steady-state rail equipment problems, but some infrequent fault-related

problems were reported by railroad personnel.

Since the last investigation, shared ROW section of track sold to BNSF Railway.

End of 2002 –

ONCOR requirements for continuous supply of critical loads for contingency

conditions forced consideration of independent operation of each circuit rather

than the hardwired split-phase arrangement. Corr Comp begins investigation into

Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) using 2007 load estimates (1700 Amps)

with estimated 3% residual (unbalance) current. The worst-case condition was

© AREMA 2009 ®
 identified as one circuit out-of-service, a contingency condition. Variations and

novel implementations of mitigation were investigated (series capacitors in shield

conductors and a semiconductor switch, among others).

Mid 2004 –

Through cooperation and compromise, a suitable rail voltage mitigation system

was agreed upon by BNSF and ONCOR.

Late 2004/Early 2005 –

Mitigation measures installed:

• Two buried mitigation conductors, one on each side of the track for some

regions of the exposure (total approximately 12.5 miles of buried 4/0

copper conductor),

• One under-built shield conductor (739.8 kcmil ACAR) on the transmission

towers that extended approximately ½ mile in each direction beyond the

length of the exposure,

• Several added insulated joints and associated signal equipment to reduce

the continuous length of track circuits,

• Several rail-to-rail 60 Hz filters at selected locations to help prevent

signal-system interference if/when a track insulated joint fails,

© AREMA 2009 ®
 • Several specially designed SCR-based switches to connect the rail-system

grounds to the buried mitigation conductor during the short duration of a

transmission line fault.

Spring of 2005 –

Construction of additional power substation near the middle of the exposure

completed. Double circuit extended to substations, but remains hardwired as split-

phase until mitigation study completed.

Spring/Summer of 2005 –

Steady-state testing completed to verify efficiency of mitigation. Transmission

line loads exceeded mitigation design targets (1700 Amps), resulting in some

locations exceeding rail voltage thresholds. BNSF insisted that the circuit remain

hardwired as split-phase until additional mitigation can be developed.

Summer of 2005 –

Corr Comp begins another phase of investigation into EMC issues with revised

increased power load limits (3400 Amps) and 5% residual (unbalance) current.

Additional novel approaches to mitigation studied (Electrified Electro Code and

impedance bonds, among others). The mitigation acceptability criteria (target) is

updated to consider personal safety associated with a stopped train in the exposure

spanning several track cuts thus affectively increasing the track circuit length to

over 8,000 feet.

© AREMA 2009 ®
 Some of the alternative mitigation approaches considered included:

• The use of shorter signal circuits to limit the induced voltage (rendered

problematic by the train presence requirement)

• The use of low-value resistors connected to earth at each side of each rail

insulated joint (as in 1991)

• The use of impedances bonds at the ends of existing Electro Code signal

circuits with a capacitor in series with the impedance bond at each rail

connection

• The use of a 60-Hz series tuned circuit:

o connected rail-to-ground at each side of each insulated joint

o connected across most IJs within the exposure

• The use of Electrified Electro Code track circuits with associated

impedance bonds

Late 2006/Early 2007 –

Additional mitigation installed to compensate for increased power load limit:

• Catenary shield conductor installed directly above track on separate tower

structures

• Additional buried shield conductor to provide a continuous shield on each

side of the track for the length of the exposure

© AREMA 2009 ®
 • Additional insulated joints, with associated repeater equipment, at several

locations

• Additional rail-to-rail series-tuned 60-Hz filters at selected locations

Onsite steady-state and simulated fault test measurements were completed to

verify efficiency of mitigation. Results were scaled to account for loads during

testing at less than designed capacity. Testing confirmed mitigation effectiveness

for all conditions and at all locations with one exception. Post test analysis

deduced that a lumped, low impedance rail-to-ground connection (possibly a

shorted arrester) may have caused the excessive voltage at that site.

Early 2009 –

No steady-state compatibility issues have been reported. Two power line faults

have occurred since last installation of mitigation (in 2007) with no railroad

equipment damage reported.

Distinctive Considerations to Rail Voltage Mitigation

Catenary Shield

In the final mitigation design, installed in 2007, a separate “aerial” shield was considered

in addition to the existing under-built shield installed in 2005. Computer modeling

showed the shielding conductor was effective when located close to the bottom phase,

nearest to the track. Mounting positions farther from the phase resulted in degraded

© AREMA 2009 ®
shielding performance. The final design resulted in a “catenary” shield conductor

supported by new structures located on the opposite side of the tracks.

Figure 1 shows a sketch of the cross section of the corridor. It depicts the four primary

shields for mitigation, including one under-built shield, two buried shields, and the

catenary shield, as red points. The dashed red box around the catenary shield shows the

acceptable mounting position of the shield to satisfy National Electrical Safety Code

(NESC) and railroad clearances and to satisfy the necessary mitigation shielding

performance.

Electro Code Repeater Bypass Filter

During the final mitigation design, the need for additional insulated joints (IJs) became

apparent. In order to minimize disruption to the existing signal system, IJs were added

outside of grade crossing approaches where possible. However, Electro Code (EC) was

present throughout the exposure, necessitating EC repeaters where additional IJs were

located. Corr Comp developed and tested a prototype 60 Hz filter (parallel LC) for the

purpose of potentially eliminating the need for EC repeaters at new IJ locations in the

future.

The passive filter was designed using heavy duty components to block 60 Hz and allow

other frequencies to pass, including Electro Code (pulsed DC). The filter components

included a custom-made industrial inductor manufactured by Power Engineering

Industries and an off-the-shelf power distribution capacitor made by Vishay.

© AREMA 2009 ®
At a new track IJ location, a pair of filters installed across the joints would allow EC

signals to pass with negligible attenuation. However, at 60 Hz the filter would be

relatively high impedance, thus maintaining low 60 Hz induced voltages at the installed

IJ location and adjacent IJ locations. This arrangement provides all of the benefits of an IJ

for rail voltage mitigation without the expense of an EC repeater, full-size bungalow, and

power feed at every new IJ location.

As a temporary test of the concept, BNSF disconnected the EC repeater and installed a

prototype filter at one new IJ location during field testing. Figure 2 shows the basic

wiring diagram of the filters for the test configuration. Note that the filter(s) had to be

installed in a crisscross configuration at the insulated joints to account for the EC polarity

difference on both sides and also provide detection of a shorted IJ.

The prototype 60 Hz filter arrangement remained installed at the new IJ location for

several months without any report of problems. In the end, the concept was considered

proven successful. A simple but robust 60 Hz filter installed at an IJ location for

mitigation could significantly reduce cost by eliminating the need for an EC repeater.

Rail Fault Protector (RFP)

During the relatively short duration of a power line fault (typically less than 6 cycles - 0.1

seconds or shorter), induced rail voltage to earth or across IJ’s in a shared ROW can

exceed recommended personnel safety guidelines, such as IEEE Std. 80, for typical

© AREMA 2009 ®
power line fault currents and exposure lengths. If the signal arresters fire during the fault

period, the rail voltage can become even higher at some locations, since the fired arresters

can result in a longer effective continuous length of track. This was the case for the

shared ROW between ONCOR and BNSF Railway.

Bare conductors are often buried near the rails to reduce induced rail voltage by

magnetic-field shielding for both the steady state and fault conditions of the power

system. If the track arresters fire as a result of fault current induction, the rails are

temporarily connected to the bungalow ground during the period of the fault. However, if

the bungalow ground is also connected to a parallel buried mitigation conductor

temporarily for the duration of the fault, significant reduction in the rail touch potential

relative to nearby soil can be achieved. The temporary connection between the bungalow

ground and the buried mitigation conductor can be accomplished by a suitable electronic

switch, which only “closes” during a power-line fault event. The use of a temporary

connection only during a power-system fault precludes any steady state influence of the

mitigation on the track signal system. The sketch of Figure 3 illustrates the concept.

The sketch shows two rails with insulated joints that separate track signal circuits. Rail-

to-ground lightning arresters connect to a local rail system ground on each side of each

insulated joint. These are only shown for one of the rails, arresters that connect from the

other rail to the same grounds and between the rails are not shown for simplicity. An

electronic switch is shown that connects between the buried mitigation conductor and a

railroad signal ground. The track and the buried bare conductor are forced to be at

© AREMA 2009 ®
approximately the same voltage, when both the track arresters and the “switch” conduct

because of fault-induced voltage. The bare conductor causes the soil near the track to be

at approximately the same potential as the track, thus helping to control the “touch

potential” of the track to a safe value.

A temporary connection between the buried mitigation conductor and the bungalow

grounds was provided for this project by a passive semiconductor switch, namely, the

Rail Fault Protector (RFP). The RFP was adapted for this application from related

industrial devices in the Dairyland Electrical Industries product line. These switches are

significantly more robust for both lightning and fault current than the track arresters.

The current through the RFP switch is continually monitored to ensure that the bungalow

ground and the buried mitigation conductor are only connected together during the brief

period of a power-line fault. The leakage current monitor is discussed under Current

Leakage Monitor later in this paper. The proper functioning of the RFP switch can be

tested with a specially designed mitigation test box that is also described in a later section

of this paper.

Mitigation Integrity

After installation of mitigation measures in 2005 and 2007, field test measurements were

made and compared to computer models to verify performance. This section describes

briefly the measurements used to gauge the efficiency of the mitigation after it was

installed.

© AREMA 2009 ®
As a part of the design, the integrity of the RFP switch is continuously monitored.

Specific components, including RFP devices, are periodically tested to ensure reliable

and compatible operation. The power utility company also agreed upon automatic

notification of the railroad in the event of a power system fault so railroad personnel

could verify that all systems are operating properly.

The sections following verification testing describe the mechanisms that facilitate

ongoing mitigation integrity testing, including mitigation test boxes, RFP current leakage

monitoring, and buried conductor testing.

Post-Installation Field Tests

Steady-State Mitigation Verification

Setup

After the mitigation measures were installed in 2005 and 2007, a verification test was

performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the mitigation. The verification field test was

designed to provide an assessment of the mitigation performance for important operating

conditions of both systems, within a reasonable testing period. Tests were made to

evaluate both the steady-state and faulted operating conditions of the transmission line.

The field test necessitated significant cooperation and support from both power company

and railroad personnel.

© AREMA 2009 ®
In the phase arrangement of these particular circuits, there is no canceling effect due to

current flowing in the second circuit when it is out of service. Therefore, the worst-case

steady-state condition for railroad compatibility that can occur with independent

operation of the two circuits is with one circuit out of service. This operating

arrangement, which will rarely occur, is the principal configuration studied during the

field mitigation verification testing. For most steady-state measurements the transmission

line was configured with only the west circuit energized to supply the load that existed

during the testing period.

Special equipment was installed in substations to measure both the amplitude and phase

of the current in each phase and also the residual current for use with post-test analysis of

voltages induced into the rail system. The transmission line current was logged at 5-

minute intervals so that the transmission line current values could be correlated to

induced voltages measured on the rail system.

Rail measurements

The steady-state rail-system mitigation verification testing included:

• Rail-to-ground

• Rail-to-rail voltages with:

o Normal IJ conditions

o A deliberate shorted IJ

• Bungalow ground resistance

• Bungalow voltage to remote ground

© AREMA 2009 ®
 • Impedance (resistance) of all insulated joints in the area of influence

• Ballast resistivity estimate calculated from Electro Code signals in each test block

• Induced current in mitigation shield conductors (at selected locations)

• Soil resistivity (at selected locations)

Scaling

Although the power company can schedule the arrangement of the transmission line, they

have little control over the level of current that may flow on the line. Therefore, the field

testing could not be conducted at the maximum current levels for which the mitigation

was designed. In addition, other conditions that existed during the field-testing period

were not what might be considered to be “worst-case” values. Therefore, it was necessary

to “scale” the field-measured voltage and currents to account for possible changes in

some parameters which may occur at other times and may be more ‘worst-case” than

during the measurement period.

Simulated Fault Mitigation Verification

Setup

After mitigation measures were installed in 2007, a method of testing the fault condition

performance was devised. Corr Comp used a novel approach to simulate induction from a

single phase-to-ground fault in a power transmission system. Since a thousand or more

amp actual power system fault is generally not advisable, a much lower current signal

© AREMA 2009 ®
was used. During the simulated fault test, both circuits of the double circuit transmission

line remained out of service.

A single phase wire was used to allow current to flow between substations at both ends of

the exposure. The worst-case phase, which is closest to the track, was grounded at one

substation. At the other substation, a power amplifier was used to force current to flow in

the phase. A 60 Hz filter was connected in series with the amplifier to block any 60 Hz

current induced by other parallel power lines onto the phase used for testing. The current

forced on the line was a sine wave at 80 Hz and 5 Amps, to differentiate it from power or

railroad frequencies. The current out of the power amplifier was logged with a timestamp

during measurements to account for minute changes in the current while measurements

were taken. Figure 4 shows a picture of the test setup at a power substation.

Rail measurements

While the single phase carried the 80 Hz signal, measurements were made at IJ locations

along the track and recorded with a timestamp. This allowed coordination later with the

logged 80 Hz signal. To differentiate the 80 Hz signal from other frequencies,

measurements were taken using a spectrum analyzer (a frequency selective voltmeter

could also have been used). Induced voltages on the rail were also recorded at 60 Hz to

characterize a baseline or background voltage level while the transmission line was

effectively out of service.

© AREMA 2009 ®
Scaling

To account for differences in the conditions present during field testing, several scaling

factors were applied to the measured voltages. A scaling factor was applied to each

location where measurements were taken. This factor was based on calculations from

model runs to account for faults at different locations in the exposure. Since the simulated

fault was outside of the exposure, measurements had to be scaled for a fault at any other

location in the exposure.

Onsite Mitigation Test Box

A custom test box was designed by McCord Engineering to evaluate the integrity of the

installed rail voltage mitigation and mitigation-related components that were unique to

this mitigation design. These include the Rail Fault Protector (RFP), Bender “leakage”

current monitor, and the rail-to-rail 60-Hz filters. Testing is accomplished using a

common multi-meter and simple five step procedure using numbered switches as part of

routine signal system maintenance. The test box and step-by-step troubleshooting

instructions also are useful in the event of an indicated failure of any of the components.

Figure 5 shows the front panel of the Mitigation Test Box. A multi-meter is connected to

the two terminals near the bottom labeled “To AC Voltmeter”. The variac control is

integral to some of the test procedures, such as the “firing” of the RFP switches and the

Bender current monitor leakage test. A row of momentary switches along the top of the

box provide control of the tests.

© AREMA 2009 ®
 Current Leakage Monitor

To ensure against a shorted RFP, a current leakage monitor, manufactured by Bender,

Inc., was paired with a current sensor installed at each RFP location. The monitor is

shown in Figure 6. It is relatively small, measuring about 2” by 3”, and is powered by

very low current from the signal system batteries.

Under normal conditions, the RFP is open and no current flows in the connection. The

monitor is set to trip if the current flow exceeds a selectable threshold. Normally, steady-

state power conditions would induce enough current into the buried conductor to cause

the monitor to alarm in the presence of a failed (shorted) RFP. As part of the periodic

testing of the mitigation system, the current monitor functionality is also tested, using the

mitigation test box, to ensure consistent operation at every location.

Buried Conductor Integrity Testing

During the development of the rail voltage mitigation, a specific concern was raised over

monitoring the long-term integrity of the buried conductors near the track. The buried

shield conductors are a key component to this mitigation design. Without provisions it is

difficult or impossible to assess the electrical continuity of a buried conductor. If integrity

is compromised, the conductor will be less than fully effective and the mitigation will,

most likely, no longer meet the criteria targets established for the project. In addition,

experience has shown buried conductors that have been cut or otherwise compromised in

past mitigation investigations.

© AREMA 2009 ®
To address this issue, Corr Comp recommended installing small wayside enclosures, less

than two miles apart, at convenient road crossings for easy access. The boxes were

installed on posts with conduit to allow the buried conductors to remain electrically

continuous, but with access to the bare copper. The conductors were looped in the

enclosure using insulated wire, with a small section of copper exposed for measurement

and testing. Figure 7 shows a picture of an installed wayside box with a buried conductor

test loop.

The loops allow for the current flowing in the buried conductors to be measured using a

standard current probe. These measurements gave feedback on the current flowing in the

buried conductors during mitigation verification testing after it was installed.

Measurements of the buried shield conductor currents were then used for comparison to

calculated currents from a computer model of the exposure, to evaluate their

effectiveness.

Access to the buried conductors also allows for connection to a low frequency (4-Hz)

test-signal transmitter. The transmitter connection allows a surveyor to traverse the buried

conductor paths with a receiver in a process similar to that used in buried pipeline

locators (pipe current mapping). Normally, the current along an electrically continuous

wire decreases in a known profile as the distance from the transmitter increases. If

anomalies are recognized in the current map of the conductor, it could indicate

discontinuity in the conductor. This could mean the mitigation is no longer functioning to

© AREMA 2009 ®
designed specifications, and further investigation is warranted. Figure 8 shows a graph of

a representative current map.

Periodic current mapping of the buried conductors establishes a historic record for

reference. Deviation from the baseline map can indicate problems and quickly pinpoint

the region of a broken conductor.

Detection of the integrity of this crucial component of the mitigation design was a high

priority and was facilitated by small wayside enclosures and periodic buried conductor

current mapping.

Results

After the installation of mitigation in 2007, the computer model was used to calculate the

effectiveness of several stages of the installation. Although the mitigation stages modeled

were theoretical (except for the final installation), they provide some insight into the

relative effectiveness of various mitigation components.

Table 1 provides a summary of the effectiveness of mitigation measures that were used,

considering the worst-case steady-state power condition of one circuit out of service. The

mitigation effectiveness for this table relates the maximum induced rail to ground voltage

at any location along the exposure as a percentage of the calculated voltage without any

mitigation. The table compares the mitigation effectiveness for several components of the

overall mitigation including:

© AREMA 2009 ®
 • Only the added track insulated joints, without mitigation shielding

• Only the shielding conductors, without any added track insulating joints

• All installed mitigation

As much as possible, the calculations to develop the table used a model that takes account

of the conditions that existed during the time of the test so that the field measurements

could also be included in the table.

Conclusion

Several iterations of mitigation design, modeling, installation, and testing were completed

in step with increasing power requirements and evolving compatibility criteria targets.

Verification of the mitigation effectiveness was proven by measurements recorded after

each installation. The ability to perform ongoing testing of the mitigation as a part of

routine maintenance allows system maintainers to monitor the integrity of the mitigation

system and quickly address problems. Continuous and ongoing monitoring and testing

also allows for the use of unconventional mitigation system designs where conventional

designs and techniques were inadequate.

Through cooperation and compromise, BNSF Railway, ONCOR Electric, and Corr Comp

arrived at suitable mitigation designs at each stage of the project. The installed rail

voltage mitigation system provides signal system compatibility and personnel safety that

are proven by computer modeling and field verification measurements. Provisions for

ongoing testing and maintenance ensure long term reliability and integrity. Ultimately,

© AREMA 2009 ®
the mitigation measures installed reduced rail voltages by approximately 90% for worst-

case steady-state contingency operation of the power system and allow for the compatible

operation of both systems under all anticipated conditions in the shared ROW for the

foreseeable future.

© AREMA 2009 ®
Figure 1. Cross Section View of Shield Conductors, Including Catenary Shield

© AREMA 2009 ®
Figure 2. Wiring Diagram for EC Repeater Bypass Filter

© AREMA 2009 ®
Figure 3. Sketch of RFP (shown as "Electronic Switch") Connection to Signal System Ground

Figure 4. Picture Showing Equipment Used in Simulated Fault Testing

© AREMA 2009 ®
Figure 5. Picture of Installed Mitigation Test Box

© AREMA 2009 ®
 Figure 6. Rendition of Bender Current Monitor

Figure 7. Picture Showing Buried Conductor Test Loops in a Wayside Enclosure

© AREMA 2009 ®
 Continuity Test, Current Attenuation

1.600

1.400

1.200

1.000
4 Hz Amps C

0.800

0.600

0.400

0.200

0.000
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Footage

Figure 8. Example of a Current Map Profile

Table 1. Calculated Approximate Mitigation Effectiveness from Computer Model and Field
Measurements

Calculated Calculated Calculated Measured

Only Added IJ’s Only Shielding All Mitigation All Mitigation

Mitigation 47% 81% 90% 91%

Effectiveness

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Cross Section View of Shield Conductors, Including Catenary Shield
Figure 2. Wiring Diagram for EC Repeater Bypass Filter
Figure 3. Sketch of RFP (shown as "Electronic Switch") Connection to Signal System
Ground
Figure 4. Picture Showing Equipment Used in Simulated Fault Testing
Figure 5. Picture of Installed Mitigation Test Box
Figure 6. Rendition of Bender Current Monitor
Figure 7. Picture Showing Buried Conductor Test Loops in a Wayside Enclosure
Figure 8. Example of a Current Map Profile

Table 1. Calculated Approximate Mitigation Effectiveness from Computer Model and

Field Measurements

© AREMA 2009 ®