[2018] 1 LNS 112 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT PENANG IN THE STATE OF PENANG, MALAYSIA. ICIVIL APPRAT. NOs PA-11B-11-03/2017] BETWEEN AIDA MAWARNI SHAMIMI ss APPELLANT AND 1. ZULKIFLI MOHD NOOR 2. NALURIIDAMAN SDN BED --- RESPONDENTS (In the matter of Magistrate's Court, Balik Pulau In the State of Penang, Malaysia. Summons No: A73KJ - 97 - 03/2015 BETWEEN AIDA MAWARNI SHAHIMI - PLAINTIFF AND 1. ZULKIFLI MOHD NOOR, 2. NALURI IDAMAN SDN BHD DEFENDANTS) ROAD TRAFFIC: Negligence - Road accident - Collision between motoreyele and bus - Determination of liability - Conflicting evidence - Whether accident debris may represent point of impact - Whether mute 1Ee 2018] 1 LNs 112 Legal Network Series evidence could assist trial court in arriving at its conclusion in face of conflicting versions narrated by each party [Appeal dismissed with costs.] Case(s) referred to: Abdul Kadir Mohamad v. Kamarulzaman Mohd Zin & Anor [2001] 5 CLI 249 HC (ref) Ahmad Aizat Bin Kamarudin & Anor v. Muhamad Azran Bin Hashim & Anor [2015] 1 PIR [47] (ref) Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors & Another Case [1995] 3 CLJ 639 CA (ref) Ang Koon Kau & Anor v. Lau Piang Ngong [1985] CLJ Rep 24 FC (ref) Awang Bin Mat & Anor v. Marimuthu a/l N Krishnan & Anor [2015] 1 PIR [15] (ref) Chock Kek Ling v. Patt Hup Transport Co Ltd & Ors [1965] 1 LNS 25 HC (ref) Chua Chong Cher v. Teo Lang Keow & Ors [1970] I LNS 18 HC (refd) Fatimah Bt Derakman v. Wan Jusoh Bin Kolok & Anor [1994] 4 CLJ 537 HC (refd) Guan Teik Sdn Bhd v. Hj Mohd Noor Hj Yakob & Ors [2000] 4 CLJ 324 CA (ref) Iftikar Ahmed Khan v. Perwira Affin Bank Bhd [2018] 1 CLI 415 FC (refd) Jafri Elias v. Khor Tang Seah [1992] 2 CLI 601 HC (ref) ‘Menah Sulong v. Lim Soo & Anor [1983] CLI Rep 263 FC (refd)018] LLNS 112 Mohamed Bin Kasdi v. Public Prosecutor [1968] 1 LNS 78 HC (ref) Mohd Tajuddin Salleh v. Mothari Murgis & Anor [1993] 3 CLJ 42 HC (refd) Ngu Kin @ Phang Nee Kiem v. Mohamad Faiz Bin Railay [2014] 2 PIR [117] (ref) Noor Azahar Habin v. Rajaswari Sithampara Pillai & Anor [1991] 3 CLI Rep 339 HC (ref) United Plywood and Sawmill Ltd v. Lock Ngan Loi [1970] 1 LNS 164 FC (refd) Vasan a/l Devarasoo v. Mohd Nur Azwan Bin Alwi Noorbi & Anor (And Another Summons) [2014] 1 PIR [11] (ref) Wong Thin Yitv. Mohamed Ali [1971] 1 LNS 151 FC (refd) Yeoh Cheng Han v. Official Administrator, Malaya [1972] 1 LNS 180 FC (refd) Legislation referred to: Rules of Court 2012, 0. 18 r. 7(1) JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the decision of the Jearned Magistrate on the issues of liability and quantum in a running down action, Afier a full trial at the Magistrate's Court, the learned Magistrate dismissed the plaintiff's claim with cost,LNs 112 [2] The learned Magistrate made an award for special damages for the total sum of RMI9,703.20 and on the basis of 100% liability, the learned Magistrate made the following award for general damages: (@) Degloving injury right ankle and right foot ~ walks with limp ~ unable to squat ~ unable to walk or stand long ~ severe deformity RM20,000.00 (b) Haematoma right thigh RM1,500.00 (©) Skin grafting and severe scarring over the right leg RM20,000.00 (@) Abrasion Not allowed [3] In this appeal, the parties are referred to as they were at the t court,2018) LLNS 112 Legal Network Series Brief facts [4] An accident occurred on 29.07.2013 at about 7:25am at Jalan Teluk Kumbar/Balik Pulau between the plaintiff's motorcycle No. PKD 783 and the 1* defendant's bus No. PEA 8885. Both parties relate different versions of the accident. [5] It is the plaintiff’s case that she was riding her motorcycle from her home at Teluk Kumbar to work at the B. Braun factory. When she reached Jalan Teluk Kumbar/Balik Pulau, suddenly an unknown motorcycle in front of her had braked all in a sudden, The plaintiff too had braked her motorcycle and tried to take evasive manoeuvre but she lost control of her motorcycle, skidded and fell on the road in her path. The 1* defendant’s bus then came from the opposite direction and had run over her feet, [6] On the other hand, the 1* defendant relates that he was driving his bus on his way back to Balik Pulau through Jalan Teluk Kumbar. When he reached the area in front of the Saujana Height flats, he saw the plaintiff's motoreycle coming from the opposite direction had grazed with another motorcycle beside it resulting in the plaintiff losing control of her motorcycle and then encroaching into his path The 1" defendant attempted to take evasive manoeuvre and applied the brakes but the plaintiff's motorcycle had knocked into his bus. IT] According to the investigating officer (PW2), he went to the scene of the accident on 29.07.2013 at about 7:45am. He took a total of 12 photographs (exhibit P21A - P21L) depicting the scene of the accident and of both vehicles. PW2 also drew a sketch plan (exhi P7) of scene of the accident and marked in the sketch plan the position of each vehicle as he found them, brake marks on the road and glass fragments on the road which PW2 said to be of the accident debris. PW2 also examined the damage to both vehicles, The(20 plaintiffs motorcycle had a broken front cover, a broken side mirror, a bent left foot rest and scratches on its body panels. The 1* defendant's bus had a dent of its front bumper. Brief deliberation of parties Contention of the plaintiff [8] _ In support of his appeal against liability, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the 1* defendant's bus was driven at a high speed. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the bus" brake marks measured 8.20 metres and using the Speed Table in Bingham and Berrymans’ Motor Claim Cases (2000) Eleventh Edition to approximate speed, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that the 1* defendant's bus was travelling at a speed of approximately 75km/h. 19] The learned counsel for the plaintiff also argued that there is no necessity for the plaintiff's police report to not state the fact that the plaintiff fell on her rightful path or that the I* defendant's bus had encroached into the plaintiff"s path as a police report is only a step to initiate investigation. The learned counsel refers to the case of Chock Kek Ling v. Patt Hup Transport Co. Ltd. & Ors. [1966] 1 MLJ 120 in support of that proposition whereby His Royal Highness the late Justice Raja Azlan Shah (as His Royal Highness then was) held that a police report “does not and will not contain everything under the sun. It is merely the first step to bring the police machinery into effect.” [10] In challenging the grounds of the learned Magistrate whereby the learned Magistrate made a finding that the plaintiff has failed to state in her pleadings that the accident occurred as a result of the 1" defendant’s bus encroaching into the plaintiff's path, the learned2018] LENS 112 Legal Network Series counsel for the plaintiff contends that the plaintiff did plead the following particulars of negligence as follows: (a) gagal untuk mempunyai jarak yang sclamat daripada plaintiff; (0) melanggar plaintiff dari arah bertentangan; (p) memandu berhampiran dan/atau melintasi garis tengah jalan.”, and in her police report, the plaintiff states that: “Tiba-tiba sebuah motorsikal nombor tidak pasti yang berada di hadapan telah brek mengejut, saya brek dan cuba elak menyebabkan saya hilang kawalan lalu terbabas jatuh di jalan dan kemudian datang sebuah m/bas kilang No. PEA 8885 yang datang dari arah bertentangan telah melanggar pada keki saya.”, and based on these particulars of negligence, the police report and the sketch plan, it is clear that the plaintiff did plead and prove thet it was the I" defendant's bus which had encroached into the plaintiff's rightful path and caused the accident. The learned counsel for the plaintiff refers to the case of Ang Koon Kau & Anor. v. Law Piang ‘Ngong [1984] 2 MLI 277 FC whereby the Federal Court observed that in appropriate circumstances, evidence given at trial ean overcome defects in pleadings where the net result of such evidence is to prevent the other side from being taken by surprise and that the defendants in the present appeal was not at all taken by surprise. [11] The learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the learned Magistrate had also failed to consider the evidence of the investigating officer that he was not sure whether the accident debris has been tampered with because he arrived at the scene of the accident 15 about minutes after it occurred, that he could not confirm whether[2018] LLNS 112 Legal Network Series the accident debris was a result of the plaintiff's motorcycle which had fell on the road or the impact of the collision between the bus and the plaintiff's motorcycle. The investigating officer also was not sure how the plaintiff's motorcycle fell in the awkward position as pictured in the sketch plan. There was no evidence adduced to show whether the brake marks were of the front or the rear tyres of the 1% defendant's bus. [12] According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff, all these shows that the investigating officer's evidence was based on his opinion and assumptions which was not considered by the learned Magistrate in arriving at her decision. The learned counsel for the plaintiff refers to the cases of Yeoh Cheng Chan v. Official Administrator Malaya [1972] 2 MLI 7 FC and Noor Azahar Habin v. Rajaswari Sithampara Pillai & Anor. [1991] 3 CLI (Rep) 339 for the proposition that the position of vehicles after the accident do show proof as to their respective positions on the road immediately before or at the moment of the collision unless there are evidence that the vehicles stopped dead upon impact. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also refers to the case of Fatimah Bt. Derakman v. Wan Jusoh Bin Kolok & Anor. [1994] 4 CLI 53 FC whereby the Federal Court was not inlined to place great reliance on the evidence of the investigating officer who drew the sketch plan as he did not witness the accident and his evidence was therefore a conjecture. [13] The learned counsel for the pleintiff also submitted on the failure of the 1* defendant to mention in his police report that he had tried to brake and attempt an evasive manoeuvre to avoid colliding with the plaintiff which is in contrast with his evidence in court and refers to the cases of Aik Ming (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors and Another Case [1995] 3 CLI 639 CA and Mohamed Kasdi v. Public Prosecutor (1969] | MLI 135.2018] 1 LNS 112 Logal Network Series [14] With regard to his appeal against quantum, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the award for general damages in respect of “skin grafting” and “severe scarring over the right leg” should be given separately because they are two different injuries. The learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that based on the Compendium of Personal Injury Awards (Revised as at 17 April 2014), an award of RM27,000.00 should be made for “skin grafting” and an award of RM16,000.00 should be made for “severe scarring over the right leg” or that alternatively an award of RM40,000.00 should be made for both injuries based on Awang Bin Mat & Anor. v, Marimuthu a/l N. Krishnan & Anor [2015] 1 PIR [15]. For “severe soft tissue injury” which was denied any award of general damages by the leamed Magistrate, the learned counsel submits that an award of RM4,500.00 should be allowed based on the 2014 Compendium. Contention of the defendant [13] In resisting the appeal against liability, the learned counsel for the defendants contends that the result of investigation by the investigating officer could not prove that the I** defendant was negligent and also that it did not support the plaintiff's version that the accident occurred in the plaintiff's path as alleged by the plaintiff, ‘The investigating officer could not determine the point of impact but agree that all the accident marks in the prosent appeal occur in the 1* defendant's path. The learned counsel for the defendants submits that the learned Magistrate was correct in her findings when she referred to the mute evidence when faced with conflicting versions of the accident. [16] The learned counsel for the defendants refers to the case of Wong Thin Yit v. Mohamed Ali [1971] 2 MLI 175 FC whereby the Federal Court held that in an action for negligence, the onus rests{2018} 1 LNS 1 Legal Network Seri wholly on the plaintiff to prove the defendant's negligence. The learned counsel for the defendants also refers to the case of Jafri Elias v. Khor Tay Sean (1992] 2 CLJ 601 CA for the proposition that liability could not be put on the defendant if the plaintiff had not discharged the onus to prove on the balance of probabilities that the accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant. [17] The learned counsel for the defendants argue that all the mute evidence show that the accident had in fact occurred in the 1* defendant's rightful path and that the plaintiff"s version is not in all circumstances probable as even the beginning of the brake marks shows that it originates in the I" defendant's rightful path. The earned counsel for the I** defendant contends that the injury sustained by the plaintiff, namely the degloving injury, was most likely due to the fact that the plaintiff herself had fell on the road and was dragged on the road together with her motorcycle. If the injury to the plaintiff's leg was due to the 1* defendant's bus ploughing over her leg, the injury to the plaintiff's leg should have been more severe than just a degloving injury bearing in mind that it was a bus which hhad purportedly caused the injury. [18] The learned counsel for the defendants contends that the plaintiff in her evidence said that the accident occurred in her rightful path but this fact was not mentioned in her police report neither was it pleaded in her statement of claim. There was also no facts or mute evidence which supports the plaintifi’s version of the accident. The earned counsel for the defendants submits that this is an afterthought on the plaintiff's part. [19] The fearned counsel for the defendants relies on the cases of Mohd Tajuddin Bin Salleh v. Mokhari Bin Murgis & Anor. (1993] 3 CLI 42 and Abdul Kadir Mohamad v. Kamarulzaman Mohd Zin & Anor. {2001} 5 CLI 249 in support of her contention that failure to 10a2 2018) 1 UNS 112 Legal Network Series __ mention certain relevant facts in a police report is fatal and that such material omissions may be construed adversely against the person who made the report. The learned counsel for the defendants further relies on the case of Menah Sulong v. Lim Soo & Anor. [1983] CLI (Rep) 263 whereby the Federal Court held that it is not for the court to make out a case which were never laid out in the pleadings, [20] The learned counsel for the defendants further argued that the plaintiff's version of the accident is not probable. This is based on the evidence adduced during trial taking into account that the damage to the plaintifi’s motorcycle was should have been more severe if in fact it had been dragged by the 1 defendant's bus from the spot marked “X” to the spot marked “MI” in the sketch plan, It was also argued that the brake marks of the 1* defendant’s bus as part of the mute evidence do not support a logical deduction of the plaintiff's version of the accident because it appeared on the 1* defendant's path and not on the plaintiff's path. [21] In respect of quantum, the learned counsel for the defendants submits that the awards of general damages made by the learned Magistrate in respect of the injuries are reasonable and within the range of awards made for similar injuries. The following cases are cited as comparison: Ahmad Aizat Bin Kamarudin & Anor. v. Muhamad Azran Bin Hashim & Anor. (2015] 1 PIR [47], Vasan a/l Devarasoo v. Mohd Nur Azuan Bin Alwi Noorbi & Anor. (And Another Summons) [2014] 1 PIR [11], Awang Bin Mat (Sebagai bapa dan benefisiari kepada Mohd Norkidayat Bin Awang, si mati) & Anor. v. Marimuthu a/t N. Krishnan & Anor. [2015] 1 PIR [15] and Ngu Kin @ Phang Nee Kiem v. Mohamad Faiz Bin Railay (2014] 2 PIR [117]2018) Legal Network Series Evaluation and decision [22] In evaluating the decision of the trial court, this court is under duty to re-hear the case by examining the evidence as contained in the record of appeal and arriving at its conclusion as to whether the trial judge's findings and his reasons for them are supported by the evidence. In doing so, this court must always bear in mind of the audio-visual advantage of the trial judge in hearing the testimony of witnesses and observing the demeanour of witnesses first hand when they are in the witness box giving evidence. (See: Chua Chong Cher v, Teo Lang Keow & Ors. [1970] 2 MLI 21). 23] When confronted with different versions related by each party in a given case, the approach of the court is always to revert to the surrounding factors and consider the probabilities by evaluating contemporancous documents as a tell-tale signs and indication of the truth or falsity of a particular version. His Ladyship Siti Norma Yaakob JCA (as Her Ladyship then was) speaking for the Court of Appeal in Guan Teik Sdn. Bhd. v. Haji Mohd Noor bin Haji Yakob & Ors, (2000] 4 CLI 324; [2000] 4 MLJ 433; [2000] 1 MLRA 617 made the following observations “In cases where conflicting evidence are presented before a court, it is the duty of the court not only to weigh such evidence on a balance of probabilities but it is also incumbent upon the court to look at all the surrounding factors and to weigh and evaluate contemporaneous documents that may tend to establish the truth or otherwise of a given fact.” [24] In finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove its claim against the defendants, the learned Magistrate relied on the police report lodged by the plaintiff (exhibit P6). According to the leaned Magistrate, the plaintiff did not state in her police report that she had2018) 1 LNS 112 Legal Network Series fell on her path of the road or that the defendant had encroached into her path. [25] The learned Magistrate held the view thet that is a material fact which is relevant to determine the defendant’s liability in the collision. The learned Magistrate also found that similar material facts which pertain to the position the plaintiff had fell and the encroachment by the I* defendant’s bus into the plaintiff's path when the accident occurred were not pleaded in the statement of claim. [26] In respect of the brake marks and the accident debris on the road, the learned Magistrate found that they occur on the 1* defendant's path justifying the deduction that the 1* defendant's version is more probable compared with the plaintiff"s version [27] On a re-evaluation of the evidence, the plaintiff clearly said in evidence that aficr she braked and lost control of her motorcycle when the unidentified motorcycle in front of her suddenly braked, she fell on the road but within her path. She did not manage to get up in time when the 1* defendant’s bus came from the opposite direction and ploughed over her legs. The plaintiff also said that at the material time, there was heavy traffic on her side of the road wherees there was less traffic on the road at the opposite direction. When asked to mark the spot on the sketch plan where the plaintiff alleged thet she had fell, the plaintiff marked the spot as “K” which appears to be @ spot on the plaintifi"s path very close to the middle lane of the dualcarriageway road. A perusal of the police report lodged by the plaintiff shows that the plaintiff only reported that she had lost control of her motorcycle and fell on the road when the 1* defendant’s bus came from the opposite direction and ploughed through her leg. [28] In this respect, it is not disputed that the plaintiff did mention in her police report that she fell on the road. The point of contention is B(2018) LLNS 112 simply that she did not state in her police report on which side of the road she had fell, I hold the considered view that a police report is not an all-encompassing document which must contain all detailed information pertaining to the accident. [29] I am of the considered view that it is sufficient if the police report contains all material information within the reasonable contemplation of a reasonable man because an ordinary person is not expected to be fully aware of all detailed information which must be stated in a police report. The main or material information must of course be mentioned in the police report but the absence of any mention of specific detailed information on its own should not be a ground to hold it against the person who lodges the police report. In this case, I hold the considered view that the omission by the plaintiff. to state in her police report that she had fell on the road in her path is, 4 detailed fact which need not be necessarily stated in her police report bearing in mind that she had stated the fact that she had indeed fell om the road. [30] A pleading on the other hand, is a piece of document professionally prepared by solicitors after having had full instructions from his client. It is thus reasonable to infer that a pleading must contain all the material facts on which the party plead intends to rely on to prove his claim{emphasis added] and this is fortified by Order 18 rule 7(1) of the Rules of Court 2012. Order 18 rule 7(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 reads— “Facts, not evidence, to be pleaded (0. 18 r. 7) 7. (1)Subject to the provisions of this rule and rules 10, 11 and 12, every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be[emphasis added], but not the evidence by which those facts “(2018) LLNS 112 Legal Network Seri are to be proved, and the statement shall be as brief as the nature of the case admits.” [31] The principle that parties are bound by pleadings is trite and this tule has been repeatedly canvassed in numerous decided cases Recently, His Lordship Abu Samah Nordin FCJ speaking for the apexcourt in Iftikar Alimed Khan v. Perwira Affin Bank Bhd. [2018] 1 CLI 415 FC; [2017] MLU 1765; [2017] 8 AMR 517; [2018] 1 MLRA 202 reiterated the principle on pleadings and held that— “Parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded [emphasis added]. A decision based on an issue which was not raised by the parties in their pleadings was liable to be set aside. [32] The fact that when the accident occurred the plaintiff had fell on her side of the road is a material fact relied on by the plaintiff in her claim to prove that it was the 1* defendant who had encroached into her path resulting in the accident. It is axiomatic that solicitors bear a professional duty to ensure that the material facts in pleadings are sufficiently pleaded to support his client’s pleaded case. Anything short of that will not suffice and on the authority of Iftikar Ahmed Khan, parties are not allowed to adduce facts and evidence during trial unless they are pleaded. [33] In determining whether the plaintiff's version is probable, I have examined the sketch plan to look for evidence which may be used as a cursor as to the probable cause of the accident and eventually in determining which version is more probable. In the present appeal, the tell-tale signs which are apparent in the sketch plan to show the position of the 1* defendant’s bus when the accident occurred would be the brake marks on the road. There are two parallel brake marks on the 1* defendant's side of the road, each signifying each side of the tyres. These brake marks are curved from the right to the left cutting 15[2018] 1 LNS 112 Legal Network Seri through from the right side to the left side of the road on the I* defendants path suggestive of a swerving action from the right to the left when the brakes were applied by the 1* defendant. There was no indication in the sketch plan showing any brake marks on the plaintiffs path. [34] The accident debris marked by the investigating officer as P1 in the keys to the sketch plan (exhibit P7K) appears to be centred on the 1* defendant’s path on the right side of the road. The learned Magistrate had also made the same finding in respect of the location of the accident debris and concluded that that fact together with the brake marks and the absence of any other mute evidence in effect supports the 1* defendant’s contention that the accident had occurred on the rightful path of the 1* defendant. [35] The plaintiff in her testimony clearly said that in her attempt to brake her motorcycle and make an evasive manoeuvre, she had fell on the road at the spot marked “X” in the sketch plan. In her police report, she had reported the same fact that she fell on the road. If the plaintiff did in fact fall on the spot marked “X” in the sketch plan, there is no evidence to suggest that the 1% defendant's bus had encroached into the plaintiff's path into the spot marked “X". [36] The accident debris was obviously found on the 1* defendant's path and did not support the plaintifi’s version of the accident. Even the brake marks which must in all circumstance represent the route the tyres of the I* defendant's bus had travelled during the braking and points to the position of the 1* defendant’s bus during the accident do not appear to support the plaintiff's version of the accident. Although it was argued that the accident debris may not represent the point of impact as it could have been disturbed by passing traffic prior to the arrival of the investigating officer at the scene of the accident, it does2018] 1 LNS 112 Legal Network Series not detract from the most probable conclusion that the accident had occurred in the I* defendant's path. [37] Iam also of the view that the damage to the front bumper of the 1* defendant's bus which apparently was located towards the right side and the position of the plaintiff's motoreycle at “MI” of the sketch plan supports the probability of the 1 defendant's version of how the accident have occurred. [38] In the present appeal, these are the mute evidence available to assist the trial court in arriving at its conclusion on the face of the conflicting versions narrated by each party and based on these, I do not find that the learned Magistrate had fell into any error in her findings as to the how the accident occurred on the balance of probabilities. [39] Upon evaluation of the evidence, I am of the considered view that the learned Magistrate had arrived at a finding which is supported by the evidence adduced and that the plaintiff has failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the I* defendant was negligent as pleaded in her statement of claim. Sufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence has been observed by the learned Magistrate and this court at the appellate stage has no reasons to intervene in such findings. I hereby dismiss the plaintiffs appeal on liability, [40] In dealing with the award of general damages, it is trite that an appellate court can only interfere with an assessment if it is considered inordinately so low or inordinately high. See United Plywood and Sawmill Ltd. v. Lock Ngan Loi [1970] 2 MLJ 237 FC. [41] After considering the award of general damages granted by the Iearned Magistrate, the learned Magistrate had shown that she had considered comparable trends of awards and I am of the considered view that they are not manifestly low or inordinate in the[2018] 1 LNs 112 Legal Network Series cireumstances. I hereby affirm the award of general damages made by the learned Magistrate. Conelusion [42] Based on the reasons discussed, I hereby dismiss the appeal with RM2,000.00 cost subject to allocatur. Dated: 26 JANUARY 2018 (AHMAD SHAHRIR MOHD SALLEH) Judicial Commissioner High Court Penang COUNSEL: For the plaintiffiappellant - Baljit Singh; M/s Baljit Singh & Company For the defendants/respondents - Thilagam Subramaniam; M/s Chan & Su