Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide (TR-518), 2016

Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport
PO Box 20
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
© Copyright 2016, by the Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport. All Rights Reserved.
This document, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form without written permission
of the publisher.
ROADSIDE DESIGN GUIDE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ i
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ xx
Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................................................... xxii
1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Purpose and scope ........................................................................................................... 1
1.3 The application of the Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide ................................................ 1
1.3.1 Background to Some of the Key Approaches Adopted .............................................. 2
1.3.2 A Performance Based Approach Rather Than a Prescriptive One ............................. 2
1.3.3 The Use of Proprietary over Non-Proprietary Systems .............................................. 3
1.3.4 Use of a Single Testing Standard .............................................................................. 4
1.3.5 The Use of NCHRP350 and MASH Tested Products Instead of EN1317 ................... 4
1.4 Scope of the ADRSDG ..................................................................................................... 5
1.4.1 Overview ................................................................................................................... 5
1.4.2 Chapter 2 “Risk Mitigation Approach” ........................................................................ 5
1.4.3 Chapter 3 “Concept and Calculation of Clear Zone”................................................... 6
1.4.4 Chapter 4 “Identification of Roadside Hazards”.......................................................... 6
1.4.5 Chapter 5 “Passively Safe Support Structure and Traversable Objects” .................... 6
1.4.6 Chapter 6 “Description of Roadside, Median and Bridge Barriers” ............................. 6
1.4.7 Chapter 7 “Selection and Application of Roadside, Median, and Bridge Barriers” ...... 6
1.4.8 Chapter 8 “Motorcyclist Protection Systems” ............................................................. 6
1.4.9 Chapter 9 “Terminals” ................................................................................................ 7
1.4.10 Chapter 10 “Crash Cushions” .................................................................................... 7
1.4.11 Chapter 11 “Transitions” ............................................................................................ 7
1.4.12 Chapter 12 “Economic Assessment” .......................................................................... 7
1.4.13 Chapter 13 “Urban Roadside Design” ........................................................................ 7
1.5 References ....................................................................................................................... 8
2 ROADSIDE RISK MITIGATION ............................................................................................... 9
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 9
2.2 Definition of Risk from a Roadside Safety Perspective ................................................... 10
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TOC FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
2.3 Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide Risk Mitigation Approach ........................................ 10
2.3.1 Outline of the Risk Mitigation Approach ................................................................... 10
2.3.2 Step 1 - Understand the Area under Evaluation ....................................................... 11
2.3.3 Step 2 – Calculate the Clear Zone ................................................................................ 12
2.3.4 Step 3 – Identify Hazards within Clear Zone ................................................................. 14
2.3.5 Step 4 – Identify Applicable Treatment Options ............................................................ 15
2.3.6 Step 5 – Assessment & Ranking of Treatment Options ................................................. 20
2.3.7 Step 6 – Choose the Optimal Treatment Option ............................................................ 23
2.3.8 Step 7 – Design the Optimal Roadside Treatment ........................................................ 23
2.4 Abu Dhabi DoT Product Approval Process ..................................................................... 25
2.5 Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................. 25
2.6 References ..................................................................................................................... 26
3 CONCEPT AND CALCULATION OF CLEAR ZONE.............................................................. 28
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 28
3.2 The Clear Zone Concept................................................................................................. 28
3.3 Factors Affecting the Clear Zone Distance ...................................................................... 30
3.3.1 Traffic Volume ......................................................................................................... 30
3.3.2 Design Speed .......................................................................................................... 30
3.3.3 Roadside Topography ............................................................................................. 31
3.3.4 High Risk Hazards ................................................................................................... 32
3.4 Calculation of Clear Zone Distance ................................................................................. 33
3.4.1 Clear Zone Model .................................................................................................... 33
3.4.2 Base Clear Zone Width ............................................................................................ 33
3.4.3 Modification for the Outside of Curves ..................................................................... 35
3.4.4 Clear Zone on Combination of Slopes ..................................................................... 35
3.4.5 High Risk Hazards ................................................................................................... 36
3.4.6 Other Considerations ............................................................................................... 37
3.5 Example Clear Zone Distance Calculations .................................................................... 37
3.5.1 Example 1 – Simple Recoverable Side Slope .......................................................... 37
3.5.2 Example 2 – Side Slope on the Outside of a Curve ................................................. 39
3.5.3 Example 3 – Variable Side Slope............................................................................. 40
3.5.4 Example 4 – High Risk Hazard ................................................................................ 42
3.6 References ..................................................................................................................... 43
4 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS........................................................................................... 45
PAGE II
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 45

4.2 Overview of Roadside Hazards....................................................................................... 45
4.3 Hazards with Risk to Vehicle Occupants ......................................................................... 47
4.3.1 Roadside Topography ............................................................................................. 47
4.3.2 Non-deformable Single Objects ............................................................................... 56
4.3.3 Non-deformable Continuous Objects ....................................................................... 71
4.3.4 Bodies of Water ....................................................................................................... 74
4.4 Hazards with Risk to Third Parties .................................................................................. 74
4.4.1 Adjacent Roads and Carriageways .......................................................................... 74
4.4.2 Storage of Hazardous Material ................................................................................ 75
4.4.3 Places of Frequent Pedestrian Activity / Places of Public Gathering ........................ 75
4.4.4 Cycle Lanes ............................................................................................................. 76
4.4.5 Structures at Risk of Collapse .................................................................................. 77
4.4.6 Rail Lines ................................................................................................................. 78
4.5 Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................. 78
4.6 References ..................................................................................................................... 79
5 Passively safe support structures & traversable obstacles ..................................................... 81
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 81
5.2 Passively Safe Support Structures .................................................................................. 81
5.2.1 Types of Passively Safe Support Structures ............................................................ 82
5.2.2 Small Roadside Signs and Their Supports ............................................................... 85
5.2.3 Large Roadside Signs and Their Supports .............................................................. 90
5.2.4 Gantries and Cantilever Sign Supports .................................................................... 92
5.2.5 Passively Safe Lighting Columns (Luminaires) ........................................................ 94
5.2.6 Passively Safe Traffic Signal and Surveillance Camera Supports ............................ 95
5.2.7 Emergency Telephones ........................................................................................... 96
5.2.8 EN12767, NCHRP350 and MASH Performance Classifications for Passively Safe
Supports ................................................................................................................................ 98
5.2.9 Selection Criteria for Passively Safe Support Structures ........................................ 101
5.2.10 Application Criteria for Passively Safe Supports .................................................... 103
5.3 Traversable Obstacles .................................................................................................. 109
5.3.1 Culverts and Drainage Structures .......................................................................... 110
5.3.2 Transverse Slopes ................................................................................................. 110
5.3.3 Ditches .................................................................................................................. 110
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5.4 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................... 110

5.5 References ................................................................................................................... 111
6 DESCRIPTION OF ROADSIDE, MEDIAN AND BRIDGE BARRIERS ................................. 113
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 113
6.2 Safety Barrier Elements ................................................................................................ 114
6.3 Classification of Safety Barriers by Performance .......................................................... 116
6.3.1 Overview ............................................................................................................... 116
6.3.2 NCHRP350 and MASH Performance Classifications ............................................. 117
6.3.3 Test Types in NCHRP350 and MASH.................................................................... 117
6.3.4 The European Standard EN1317 ........................................................................... 125
6.4 Classification of Safety Barriers as Non Proprietary or Proprietary ............................... 126
6.4.1 Non-Proprietary (Generic) Systems ....................................................................... 126
6.4.2 Proprietary Systems .............................................................................................. 126
6.5 Classification of Safety Barriers by Rigidity ................................................................... 127
6.5.1 Flexible Systems ................................................................................................... 128
6.5.2 Semi-Rigid Systems .............................................................................................. 132
6.5.3 Rigid Systems........................................................................................................ 136
6.7 References ................................................................................................................... 143
7 SELECTION AND APPLICATION OF ROADSIDE, MEDIAN AND BRIDGE BARRIERS ..... 145
7.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 145
7.2 Selection Criteria .......................................................................................................... 145
7.2.1 Containment Requirements ................................................................................... 146
7.2.2 Deflection Distance Requirements ......................................................................... 149
7.2.3 Impact Severity Level Requirements...................................................................... 150
7.2.4 Site Considerations................................................................................................ 151
7.2.5 Cost Considerations .............................................................................................. 151
7.2.6 Traffic Considerations ............................................................................................ 151
7.2.7 Installation, Maintenance and Inspection Requirements ........................................ 152
7.2.8 Compatibility Requirements ................................................................................... 152
7.2.9 Aesthetic and Environmental Considerations ......................................................... 153
7.2.10 Field Experience .................................................................................................... 157
7.3 Application Criteria for Roadside, Median and Bridge Barriers ...................................... 157
7.3.1 Length of Need ...................................................................................................... 158
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7.3.2 Minimum Length and Gaps in Barriers ................................................................... 162

7.3.3 Lateral Placement .................................................................................................. 162
7.3.4 Shy line offset ........................................................................................................ 164
7.3.5 Barrier deflection distance ..................................................................................... 165
7.3.6 Lateral Placement of Barriers behind Kerbs ........................................................... 168
7.3.7 Foundation Conditions ........................................................................................... 170
7.3.8 Common Installation, Maintenance and Inspection Issues ..................................... 172
7.4 Additional Application Criteria for Roadside Barriers ..................................................... 176
7.4.1 Placement on slopes ............................................................................................. 176
7.4.2 Rate of Flare .......................................................................................................... 178
7.4.3 Short Radius Barriers at Intersections.................................................................... 180
7.4.4 Sight Distance ....................................................................................................... 184
7.5 Additional Application Criteria for Median Barriers ........................................................ 185
7.5.1 Guidelines for the Need of Median Barrier ............................................................. 185
7.5.2 Terrain Effects on the Lateral Placement of Median Barriers ................................. 188
7.5.3 Barrier Orientation on Super-elevated Sections ..................................................... 191
7.5.4 Fixed Objects within the Median ............................................................................ 191
7.5.5 Emergency and Maintenance Crossings................................................................ 192
7.5.6 Glare Screens........................................................................................................ 195
7.6 Additional Application Criteria for Bridge Barriers.......................................................... 197
7.6.1 Material type .......................................................................................................... 198
7.6.2 The Attachment of Hardware to Bridge Barriers ..................................................... 199
7.6.3 Heights of Bridge Barriers ...................................................................................... 201
7.6.4 Fixation to Bridge Decks ........................................................................................ 202
7.7 Upgrading Roadside, Median and Bridge Barriers ........................................................ 204
7.7.1 Barriers with Structural Inadequacies..................................................................... 204
7.7.2 Barriers with Design/Placement Inadequacies ....................................................... 205
7.7.3 Establishing priorities of upgrading needs.............................................................. 206
7.7.4 Specific Issues with Bridge Barriers ....................................................................... 206
7.8.1 Summary and Conclusions Applicable to all Types of Barriers .............................. 209
7.8.2 Summary and Conclusions Specific to Roadside Barriers...................................... 211
7.8.3 Summary and Conclusions Specific to Median Barriers ......................................... 211
7.8.4 Summary and Conclusions Specific to Bridge Barriers .......................................... 211
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7.8.5 Summary and Conclusions on Upgrades to Barriers.............................................. 212

7.9 References ................................................................................................................... 212
8 MOTORCYCLIST PROTECTION SYSTEMS ...................................................................... 213
8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 213
8.2 Road Safety Barriers from Motorcyclists’ Point of View ................................................. 214
8.3 Types of Motorcyclist Protection Systems ..................................................................... 217
8.3.1 Continuous Motorcyclist Protection Systems (CMPS) ............................................ 217
8.3.2 Discontinuous Motorcyclist Protection Systems (DMPS)........................................ 219
8.3.3 Barriers with Motorcyclist Protection Incorporated in Design .................................. 220
8.4 Performance Assessment of Motorcyclist Protection Systems ...................................... 221
8.4.1 TS1317-8 Test Types ............................................................................................ 221
8.5.1 Compatibility with the Existing Barrier .................................................................... 222
8.5.2 Areas of Potential Sand Accumulation ................................................................... 222
8.6 Application Criteria........................................................................................................ 222
8.6.1 Common Locations Where a Motorcyclist Protection System may be required ...... 222
8.6.2 Assessment of the Need for a Motorcyclist Protection System .............................. 225
8.7 Maintenance and Inspection Requirements .................................................................. 226
8.9 References ................................................................................................................... 227
9 TERMINALS ........................................................................................................................ 230
9.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 230
9.2 Types of Terminals & Design Principals ........................................................................ 231
9.2.1 Full Height vs. Ramped Down End Treatments ..................................................... 232
9.2.2 Flared vs. Parallel End Terminals .......................................................................... 235
9.2.3 Energy Absorbing vs. Non-Energy Absorbing Terminals........................................ 237
9.2.4 Gating vs. Non Gating Terminals ........................................................................... 239
9.2.5 Single Sided vs. Double Sided Terminals .............................................................. 239
9.3 NCHRP350 and MASH Performance Classifications .................................................... 240
9.3.1 Test Types ............................................................................................................. 240
9.3.2 Containment Level ................................................................................................. 241
9.3.3 Deflection Characteristics ...................................................................................... 243
9.3.4 Impact Severity Level ............................................................................................ 244
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9.4.1 Speed Class .......................................................................................................... 246

9.4.2 Selection of Gating and Non Gating Terminals ...................................................... 246
9.4.3 Space Available for Installation .............................................................................. 246
9.4.4 Capacity to Absorb Nuisance Hits.......................................................................... 246
9.4.5 Location in Relation to Approaching Traffic ............................................................ 247
9.4.6 Compatibility with Barrier Type .............................................................................. 247
9.4.7 Cost and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements ............................................ 247
9.5.1 Length-of-need point for a terminal ........................................................................ 248
9.5.2 Flared Terminals .................................................................................................... 249
9.5.3 Site Grading for Terminals ..................................................................................... 249
9.5.4 Example Applications ............................................................................................ 253
9.7 References ................................................................................................................... 257
10 CRASH CUSHIONS ......................................................................................................... 258
10.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 258
10.2 Types of Crash Cushions.............................................................................................. 260
10.2.1 Crash Cushion Types by Design Principles ........................................................... 260
10.2.2 Gating vs. Non Gating Crash Cushions ................................................................. 262
10.2.3 Redirective vs. Non-Redirective Crash Cushions ................................................... 262
10.2.4 Sacrificial, Reusable or Low Maintenance / Self-Restoring Crash Cushions .......... 264
10.3.1 Test Types ............................................................................................................. 266
10.3.2 Containment Level ................................................................................................. 269
10.3.3 Deflection Characteristics ...................................................................................... 269
10.3.4 Impact Severity Level ............................................................................................ 269
10.4.1 Speed Class .......................................................................................................... 270
10.4.2 Selection of Gating and Non Gating Crash Cushions............................................. 272
10.4.3 Space Available for Installation .............................................................................. 272
10.5.1 Evaluation of Site Characteristics .......................................................................... 276
10.5.2 The use of Crash Cushions in Gore Areas ............................................................. 279
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10.6 The Decision to use Crash Cushions or Energy Absorbing Terminals .......................... 280
10.7 Example applications .................................................................................................... 282
10.9 References ................................................................................................................... 284
11 TRANSITIONS ................................................................................................................. 285
11.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 285
11.2 Types of Transitions ..................................................................................................... 286
11.4 Test Types .................................................................................................................... 287
11.5.1 Containment Requirements ................................................................................... 289
11.5.2 Deflection Requirements........................................................................................ 289
11.5.3 Impact Severity Level Requirements...................................................................... 290
11.5.4 Maintenance and Inspection Requirements ........................................................... 290
11.6.1 Connections........................................................................................................... 294
11.6.2 Specific Transitional Arrangements ....................................................................... 295
11.6.3 Example applications ............................................................................................. 302
11.8 References ................................................................................................................... 304
12 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................ 306
12.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 306
12.2 Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide Economic Assessment Process ............................ 307
12.3 Benefit Cost Ratio Analysis ........................................................................................... 308
12.3.1 Assessment of Treatment Benefits ........................................................................ 311
12.3.2 Assessment of Annual Treatment Costs ................................................................ 320
12.3.3 Project Present Value of Costs and Benefits.......................................................... 320
12.3.4 Example BCR Calculation...................................................................................... 321
12.4 Treatment Prioritization Methods .................................................................................. 326
12.4.1 Ranking by Incremental BCR ................................................................................. 326
12.4.2 Ranking by Risk Reduction .................................................................................... 329
12.4.3 Non-Monetary Considerations ............................................................................... 331
12.4.4 Selection of an Appropriate Treatment Option ....................................................... 331
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12.6 References ................................................................................................................... 333
13 Urban Roadside Design ................................................................................................... 335
13.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 335
13.2 Hazards on the Sidewalk .............................................................................................. 336
13.3 Evaluation of Safety of Individual Sites ......................................................................... 337
13.3.1 Identification of Risk Factors .................................................................................. 337
13.3.2 Sites Requiring Increased Clearance Distances .................................................... 337
13.4 Pedestrian Facilities...................................................................................................... 341
13.5 Bicycle Facilities ........................................................................................................... 346
13.6 Roadside Safety Barriers in Urban Areas ..................................................................... 350
13.6.1 Determining use of roadside safety barriers ........................................................... 350
13.6.2 Roadside Safety Barrier Warrants ......................................................................... 352
13.6.3 Common Urban Barrier Treatments ....................................................................... 352
13.7 Common Urban Roadside Features.............................................................................. 353
13.7.1 Curbs ..................................................................................................................... 353
13.7.2 Shoulders & Sidewalks .......................................................................................... 354
13.7.3 Traffic Islands & Medians....................................................................................... 354
13.7.4 Gateways .............................................................................................................. 355
13.7.5 Pedestrian Fencing ................................................................................................ 355
13.7.6 Anti-glare Screens ................................................................................................. 357
13.7.7 Street Furniture...................................................................................................... 358
13.7.8 Utility Poles ............................................................................................................ 358
13.7.9 Lighting & Visibility ................................................................................................. 359
13.7.10 Sign Posts .......................................................................................................... 360
13.7.11 Landscaping, trees and shrubs .......................................................................... 360
13.8 Summary & Conclusions............................................................................................... 361
13.9 References ................................................................................................................... 362
Appendix A: ................................................................................................................................ 363
The European Standard EN1317 ................................................................................................ 363
A.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 364
A.2. EN1317-1: Terminology and General Criteria for Test Methods .................................... 365
A.3. EN1317-2: Performance Classes, Impact Test Acceptance Criteria and Test Methods for
Safety Barriers Including Vehicle Parapets .............................................................................. 366
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A.3.1. Performance Classes ................................................................................................ 366

A.4. EN1317-3: Performance Classes, Impact Test Acceptance Criteria and Test Methods for
Crash Cushions ....................................................................................................................... 368
A.4.1. Performance Classes ................................................................................................ 370
A.5. ENV1317-4: Performance Classes, Impact Test Acceptance Criteria and Test Methods for
Terminals and Transitions of Safety Barriers ........................................................................... 371
A.5.1. Performance Classes for Terminals ......................................................................... 371
A.5.2. Impact Severity Classes for Terminals .................................................................... 372
A.5.3. Lateral Displacement Classes for Terminals .......................................................... 372
A.5.4. Performance Classes for Transitions ....................................................................... 373
A.6. EN1317-5: Product requirements and evaluation of conformity for vehicle restraint systems
................................................................................................................................................ 373
A.7. TR1317-6: Pedestrian Parapets ....................................................................................... 373
A.8. TS1317-8: Motorcycle road restraint systems which reduce the impact severity of
motorcyclist collisions with safety barriers ............................................................................... 374
A.9. References ...................................................................................................................... 374
Appendix B ................................................................................................................................. 375
Length of Need Calculations ....................................................................................................... 375
B.1. Determining the Length of Need ................................................................................... 376
B.2. Calculation of Length of Need ....................................................................................... 379
B.3. Adjustments to the Calculated Length of Need ............................................................. 379
B.4. Identifying the Trailing End of the Barrier on Dual Carriageways .................................. 380
B.5. Opposing traffic ............................................................................................................ 381
B.6. Graphical Representation of Length of Need ................................................................ 381
B.7. Procedure for determining the LON by Graphical Methods ........................................... 382
B.8. Examples of determining the LON by Graphical Methods ............................................. 385
B.9. References ................................................................................................................... 390
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 - Risk from a roadside safety perspective..................................................................... 10
Figure 2.2 – Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide risk mitigation approach..................................... 11
Figure 2.3 – Understanding the area under evaluation.................................................................. 13
Figure 2.4 – Clear zone area ........................................................................................................ 14
Figure 2.5 – Hazard removed from the area ................................................................................. 16
Figure 2.6 – Hazard relocated beyond the clear zone ................................................................... 17
Figure 2.7 – Hazard made passively safe ..................................................................................... 18
Figure 2.8 – Hazard shielded with a roadside barrier .................................................................... 19
Figure 2.9 – Hazard delineated ..................................................................................................... 19
Figure 2.10 – Overview of treatment assessment & ranking process ............................................ 20
Figure 2.11 – Selection of optimal treatment option through engineering judgment ...................... 24
Figure 3.1 – Distance from the edge of travelled way vs proportion of errant vehicles which may
reach it by highway type [6]........................................................................................................... 30
Figure 3.2 – Recoverable slope .................................................................................................... 31
Figure 3.3 – Non-recoverable slope .............................................................................................. 32
Figure 3.4 – Critical slope ............................................................................................................. 32
Figure 3.5 – Variable Slope........................................................................................................... 35
Figure 3.6 – Drainage channel ...................................................................................................... 36
Figure 4.1 – A hazardous embankment ........................................................................................ 47
Figure 4.2 – Critical side slope by an interchange ramp ................................................................ 47
Figure 4.3 – Concrete covered foreslope ...................................................................................... 48
Figure 4.4 – Hazard assessment for fill slopes .............................................................................. 49
Figure 4.5 – A hazardous rock cut, shielded by barrier ................................................................. 50
Figure 4.6 – Typical rock cut section [6] ........................................................................................ 50
Figure 4.7 – Typical roadway ditch section [6]............................................................................... 51
Figure 4.8 – Assessment of cross sections for flat bottomed ditches [2]........................................ 52
Figure 4.9 – Assessment of cross sections for V-profile ditches [2] ............................................... 53
Figure 4.10 – Incorrect and correct placement of roadside hardware around ditches ................... 54
Figure 4.11 – Example of a transverse slope at an intersecting road ............................................ 55
Figure 4.12 – Example of bridge edge with a very high drop ......................................................... 56
Figure 4.13 – Bridge drop height ................................................................................................... 56
Figure 4.14 – Trees located in a median ....................................................................................... 57
Figure 4.15 – A cantilever sign support ......................................................................................... 57
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Figure 4.16 – Small (left) and large (right) roadside sign supports ................................................ 58
Figure 4.17 – Effect of pole spacing .............................................................................................. 60
Figure 4.18 – Examples of large luminaire support (left) and CCTV mast (right) ........................... 60
Figure 4.19 – Examples of concrete foundations protruding from the ground ................................ 61
Figure 4.20 – A bridge pier (left) & a bridge abutment (right) ......................................................... 62
Figure 4.21 – Examples of unprotected bridge railing and concrete barrier ends .......................... 62
Figure 4.22 – Examples of roadside furniture as hazards ............................................................. 63
Figure 4.23 – Test performance of a passively safe control cabinet [8] ......................................... 63
Figure 4.24 – Examples of a pipe (a) and a multi-cell box culvert (b) [9] ....................................... 64
Figure 4.25 – Cross and parallel drainage .................................................................................... 64
Figure 4.26 – Hazardous (left) [9] and traversable (right) pipe inlets [11] ...................................... 65
Figure 4.27 – Example of a hazardous cross-drainage culvert; with a large opening .................... 65
Figure 4.28 – Traversable safety grate (left) [9] and pipe runners (right) [11] ................................ 66
Figure 4.29 – Design criteria for safety treatment of pipes and culverts [2] ................................... 66
Figure 4.30 – Examples of hazardous culvert headwalls protruding from the ground [13] ............. 67
Figure 4.31 – A cross-drainage culvert within the clear zone area ................................................ 67
Figure 4.32 – Cross-drainage culvert extended beyond the clear zone ......................................... 68
Figure 4.33 – Cross-drainage culvert changed with traversable design......................................... 68
Figure 4.34 – Example of a non-traversable parallel drainage structure [13] ................................. 69
Figure 4.35 – Traversable safety grate (left) [13] and pipes (right) [14] ......................................... 69
Figure 4.36 – Design criteria for safety treatment of parallel drainage structures [2] ..................... 70
Figure 4.37 – Alternate location for a parallel drainage culvert [2] ................................................. 70
Figure 4.38 – Pedestrian fencing along an urban road .................................................................. 71
Figure 4.39 – Potentially hazardous retaining wall; covered with decorative panels [6] ................. 72
Figure 4.40 – A retaining wall; with structural elements protruding from the surface ..................... 72
Figure 4.41 – Example of a noise barrier ...................................................................................... 73
Figure 4.42 – Permanent body of water ........................................................................................ 74
Figure 4.43 – Example of unauthorised pedestrian presence at the side of a freeway .................. 76
Figure 4.44 – Cycle lane ............................................................................................................... 77
Figure 4.45 – Abutment of a pedestrian footbridge ....................................................................... 77
Figure 5.1 – Example of a slip-base support ................................................................................. 83
Figure 5.2 – Example of a slip-base pole mechanism ................................................................... 84
Figure 5.3 – Example of the failure mechanism for an energy absorbing support ......................... 84
Figure 5.4 – Examples of impact absorbing poles ......................................................................... 85
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Figure 5.5 – Braced sign support [4] ............................................................................................. 86

Figure 5.6 – Examples of yield supports for small signs ................................................................ 87
Figure 5.7 – Drilled holes in wooden posts.................................................................................... 88
Figure 5.8 – Examples of unidirectional (top) and multidirectional (bottom) slip bases .................. 90
Figure 5.9 – Example of an omnidirectional passively safe support before (left) and during (right)
impact ........................................................................................................................................... 90
Figure 5.10 – Example of the failure mechanism for an upper hinge design ................................. 91
Figure 5.11 – Example of a support for a large sign with a hinge .................................................. 92
Figure 5.12 – An example of an overhead gantry.......................................................................... 92
Figure 5.13 – An example of a cantilever sign............................................................................... 93
Figure 5.14 – Example of a passively safe gantry [7] .................................................................... 93
Figure 5.15 – Example of 14m high lighting columns installed in the median ................................ 94
Figure 5.16 – The complex siting of traffic signs ........................................................................... 96
Figure 5.17 – The siting of surveillance cameras .......................................................................... 96
Figure 5.18 – Example of an EN12767 test ................................................................................... 99
Figure 5.19 – Pitch and Roll Angles ............................................................................................ 101
Figure 5.20 – Passively safe supports should not be installed in the working width of a safety
barrier ......................................................................................................................................... 103
Figure 5.21 – Reducing pole numbers by increasing spacing ..................................................... 104
Figure 5.22 – Use of passively safe support structures on slopes ............................................... 106
Figure 5.23 – Example of poor lighting column positioning at a traffic island ............................... 107
Figure 5.24 – An example of a traffic island with no lighting columns .......................................... 108
Figure 5.25 – Example of a surveillance camera and control cabinet .......................................... 109
Figure 6.1 - Definition of the components of a length of safety barrier ......................................... 115
Figure 6.2 – Impact testing of a roadside safety barrier ............................................................... 116
Figure 6.3 – A hazard, located within the deflection distance of the safety barrier ....................... 120
Figure 6.4 – Working Width and Dynamic Deflection for two example systems ........................... 121
Figure 6.5 – Zone of intrusion for higher vehicles ........................................................................ 122
Figure 6.6 – Zone of intrusion as seen during an impact test ...................................................... 122
Figure 6.7 - Wire Rope Safety Barrier – an example of a flexible safety barrier........................... 128
Figure 6.8 – Examples of WRSB profiles .................................................................................... 129
Figure 6.9 – Examples of WRSB foundation types ...................................................................... 130
Figure 6.10 – Weak Post W-Beam Barrier .................................................................................. 131
Figure 6.11 – Effect of barrier type on sand accumulation........................................................... 132
Figure 6.12 - Strong post W-Beam Barrier with block out ............................................................ 132
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Figure 6.13 - Examples of single sided W-Beam profiles ............................................................ 133

Figure 6.14 - Examples of double sided W-Beam profiles ........................................................... 135
Figure 6.15 – Examples of roadside (left) & median (right) concrete barriers .............................. 136
Figure 6.16 - Examples of double sided concrete barrier profiles ................................................ 137
Figure 6.17 - Examples of single sided concrete barrier profiles ................................................. 138
Figure 6.18 – Effect of concrete barrier height on impact performance ....................................... 138
Figure 6.19 – Examples of in-situ (left) [10] and pre-cast (right) concrete barriers ....................... 139
Figure 6.20 – Example of a pre-cast concrete barrier connection mechanism............................. 139
Figure 6.21 – Examples of concrete barrier foundations ............................................................. 140
Figure 6.22 – Sand accumulation on the side of a closed profile concrete barrier ....................... 140
Figure 6.23 – Example of a concrete median barrier with backfill ................................................ 141
Figure 6.24 – Examples of common bridge barrier profiles ......................................................... 142
Figure 7.1 - Examples of hazards located within the deflection distance of the barrier ................ 150
Figure 7.2 - Lack of Cmcpatibility between barrier and overhead sign support (left) and a possible
solution (right) ............................................................................................................................. 153
Figure 7.3 - An example of a bridge parapet designed to incorporate aesthetic considerations .. 154
Figure 7.4 - The Effect of Drifting Sand ....................................................................................... 154
Figure 7.5 - Sand accumulation on the face of a concrete barrier ............................................... 155
Figure 7.6 - Example of a corroded barrier post .......................................................................... 156
Figure 7.7 - Electrical cabinet on a raised concrete base ............................................................ 156
Figure 7.8 - Barrier length of need layout (one-way or dual two way divided roadways) .............. 160
Figure 7.9 - Barrier length of need layout (two-way roadways) .................................................... 161
Figure 7.10 – Barrier placement in front of hazards .................................................................... 166
Figure 7.11 – Consideration of ZOI in barrier placement ............................................................. 167
Figure 7.12 - Barrier placement in front of embankments ............................................................ 167
Figure 7.13 - Different generic post types (from left to right: standard post, long post, standard post
with pressure plate, longer post with pressure plate)................................................................... 168
Figure 7.14 – Placement of w-beam barriers in-line with kerbs ................................................... 169
Figure 7.15 - Placement of w-beam barriers set-back from kerbs ............................................... 170
Figure 7.16 - Push testing of a driven (left) [9] and a surface mounted (right) post ...................... 172
Figure 7.17 - The lap of adjoining w-beam rails........................................................................... 172
Figure 7.18 - Lack of continuity in a w-beam barrier .................................................................... 173
Figure 7.19 - Steel posts supplied with integrated concrete foundations ..................................... 174
Figure 7.20 - Effect of uncompacted soil on a barrier impact....................................................... 174
Figure 7.21 – Concrete foundations protruding out off the ground............................................... 175
PAGE XIV
Figure 7.22 - Use of incorrect fixings for a surface mounted post ................................................ 175
Figure 7.23 - Design parameters for vehicle encroachments on slopes [5] ................................. 177
Figure 7.24 – Barrier placement considerations on 1V:6H embankments ................................... 177
Figure 7.25 – Flare rate layout .................................................................................................... 179
Figure 7.26 – Difficulties of barrier placement at intersections .................................................... 181
Figure 7.27 – Possible solution to barrier placement at intersections .......................................... 182
Figure 7.28 - Short radius barrier at intersection (2.5 m to 10 m radius) ...................................... 183
Figure 7.29 - Short radius barrier at intersection ( to 10 m radius)............................................. 184
Figure 7.30 - Recommendations for median barriers on high speed, fully controlled-access
highways ..................................................................................................................................... 186
Figure 7.31 - Recommended barrier placement in non-level medians [5] .................................... 189
Figure 7.32 - Example of preferred barrier orientation on super-elevated sections ...................... 191
Figure 7.33 - Continuous median barrier ..................................................................................... 192
Figure 7.34 - The closure of an emergency access with permanent concrete barrier units.......... 192
Figure 7.35 - Example of a median gate (12m) ........................................................................... 194
Figure 7.36 – The use of glare screens in the median................................................................. 195
Figure 7.37 - Cut-off angle for glare screens ............................................................................... 198
Figure 7.38 – An example of a precast concrete bridge barrier ................................................... 199
Figure 7.39 – An example of a steel bridge barrier ...................................................................... 199
Figure 7.40 – Example of decorative features attached to a bridge parapet ................................ 200
Figure 7.41 – Presence of a pavement on a bridge structure ...................................................... 201
Figure 7.42 – Fixation of bridge deck posts................................................................................. 202
Figure 7.43 – Typical metal barrier connection to bridge deck .................................................... 203
Figure 7.44 – Typical cast in-situ concrete barrier connection to bridge deck .............................. 203
Figure 7.45 – Example of a pre-cast concrete barrier connection to bridge deck ........................ 204
Figure 7.46 – Installation of a reinforced concrete block in front of an existing (substandard) rail [5]
................................................................................................................................................... 208
Figure 8.1 – A W-beam barrier from a motorcyclist’s perspective [4] ........................................... 214
Figure 8.2 – Types of barrier posts from a motorcyclist’s perspective ......................................... 215
Figure 8.3 – Wire rope barrier from a motorcyclist’s perspective ................................................. 215
Figure 8.4 – Concrete barrier from a motorcyclist’s perspective .................................................. 216
Figure 8.5 – Impact test of a new jersey profile concrete barrier [9] ............................................ 216
Figure 8.6 – Example of a continuous MPS, Bike Guard from Highway Care Ltd. [11] ................ 217
Figure 8.7 – Example of a plastic CMPS, DR46 from SNOLINE [12] .......................................... 217
Figure 8.8 – Example of a composite CMPS, BASYC [13] .......................................................... 218
PAGE XV
Figure 8.9 – Example of a typical CMPS profile .......................................................................... 218

Figure 8.10 – Example of a discontinuous MPS application on a W-beam barrier, Motoprotec from
Motoprotec Security Systems [14]............................................................................................... 219
Figure 8.11 – Example of discontinuous MPS application on a wire rope barrier in South Australia
[15] ............................................................................................................................................. 220
Figure 8.12 – Example of a barrier with motorcyclist protection incorporated in its design, CUSTOM
from CSM SpA ............................................................................................................................ 220
Figure 8.13 – Example of an EN1317-8 test configuration [10] ................................................... 221
Figure 8.14 – Example of a sharp bend on a single carriageway [4] ........................................... 223
Figure 8.15 – Areas to be considered for MPS installation on an interchange [16] ...................... 224
Figure 8.16 – Examples of reverse/inadequate super-elevation [17] ........................................... 225
Figure 8.17 - High risk horizontal road alignment combinations for motorcyclists [17] ................. 225
Figure 9.1 - Incorrect application of terminals (no terminals present) .......................................... 230
Figure 9.2 - Correct application of terminals (impact tested terminal on approach, engineered detail
on departure). ............................................................................................................................. 231
Figure 9.3 – Example of a splayed end / fish tail end treatment .................................................. 232
Figure 9.4 - An example of a typical semi-rigid ramped down end treatment .............................. 233
Figure 9.5 – Example of a full-height crashworthy terminal ......................................................... 233
Figure 9.6 - Example of a typical ramped concrete barrier end treatment ................................... 234
Figure 9.7 – Use of a terminal and a transition at the end of a concrete barrier........................... 234
Figure 9.8 – Example of a WRSB ramped down terminal ........................................................... 235
Figure 9.9 - Example of a flared terminal .................................................................................... 235
Figure 9.10 – Example of a parallel terminal ............................................................................... 236
Figure 9.11 – Example of a buried-in-backslope end treatment [7].............................................. 236
Figure 9.12 – An example of an energy absorbing crashworthy end terminal.............................. 238
Figure 9.13 – An example of a non-energy absorbing end treatment. ......................................... 238
Figure 9.14 – Example of a double sided terminal ...................................................................... 240
Figure 9.15 – Measurement of dynamic and permanent deflection for terminals ......................... 243
Figure 9.16 - Determining terminal speed class and basic performance ..................................... 245
Figure 9.17 –Terminal length of need for an example system ..................................................... 249
Figure 9.18 – Advance grading area ........................................................................................... 250
Figure 9.19 – Adjacent grading area ........................................................................................... 251
Figure 9.20 – Grading for flared guardrail terminal ...................................................................... 251
Figure 9.21 – Grading for parallel guardrail terminal ................................................................... 252
Figure 9.22 – Runout distance requirements .............................................................................. 253
PAGE XVI
Figure 9.23 - A good (left) and poor (right) examples of markings for terminal systems .............. 253
Figure 9.24 - Examples of poor terminal applications .................................................................. 253
Figure 9.25 – Examples of appropriate terminal applications ...................................................... 254
Figure 10.1 - Lack of crash cushion at gore area ........................................................................ 258
Figure 10.2 - Application of crash cushion at gore area .............................................................. 259
Figure 10.3 - An example of a crash cushion used to shield a single object in Abu Dhabi ........... 259
Figure 10.4 – Example of a crash cushion based on the Kinetic Energy Principle ....................... 261
Figure 10.5 – Example of a crash cushion based on the Conservation of Momentum Principle [1]
................................................................................................................................................... 261
Figure 10.6 - Gating and non-gating crash cushions ................................................................... 263
Figure 10.7 - Redirective and non-redirective crash cushions ..................................................... 264
Figure 10.8 - Examples of energy absorbing cartridges in crash cushions [1], [4] ....................... 265
Figure 10.9 - Example of a self-restoring crash cushion .............................................................. 265
Figure 10.10 - The minimum required space for a crash cushion ................................................ 269
Figure 10.11 - Crash cushion minimum performance decision tree ............................................. 271
Figure 10.12 - Selection of crash cushion width to protect road users from hazards ................... 272
Figure 10.13 - Crash cushion type decision tree [6] .................................................................... 275
Figure 10.14 - Cross slope should not exceed 5% in front of a crash cushion ............................. 277
Figure 10.15 - Distance between rear of crash cushion and hazard ............................................ 278
Figure 10.16 - Examples of crash cushion delineation ................................................................ 279
Figure 10.17 - Guidelines for the provision of crash cushions at gore areas [6]........................... 279
Figure 10.18 - The use of terminals and crash cushions at nosings ............................................ 282
Figure 10.19 - Examples of areas which should be equipped with a crash cushion .................... 283
Figure 10.20 - Examples of appropriate median crash cushion applications ............................... 283
Figure 11.1 – An example of vehicle pocketing ........................................................................... 285
Figure 11.2 – An example of reduced post spacing and a rubbing rail ........................................ 292
Figure 11.3 – Projections on the face of a transition.................................................................... 292
Figure 11.4 – An unacceptably short transition ........................................................................... 292
Figure 11.5 – Transitional design with increasing stiffness .......................................................... 293
Figure 11.6 – Unacceptable transition details.............................................................................. 293
Figure 11.7 – An example of changes in connected barrier height .............................................. 294
Figure 11.8 – Example of a poor transition (unconnected barrier systems) ................................. 295
Figure 11.9 – An example of a flared back top parapet rail ......................................................... 295
Figure 11.10 – Example of a WRSB to W-beam transition by overlapping installation ................ 296
PAGE XVII
Figure 11.11 - Example of a WRSB to W-beam transition ........................................................... 298

Figure 11.12 - An example of a transition between wire rope barrier and a concrete barrier ....... 299
Figure 11.13 – Exposed step of concrete barrier......................................................................... 300
Figure 11.14 - The Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport standard detail for
transition from guardrail to rigid concrete barrier [13] .................................................................. 301
Figure 11.15 – Examples of inappropriate transitions.................................................................. 302
Figure 11.16 – Example of appropriate transition between a w-beam and a concrete barrier...... 303
Figure 12.1 – Overview of the economic assessment process .................................................... 307
Figure 12.2 – Calculation of the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) .......................................................... 310
Figure 12.3 – Effect of short-term and long term observed crash frequency ............................... 311
Figure 12.4 – Example average crash frequency estimation ....................................................... 312
Figure 13.1 – Lateral offset for objects at horizontal curves on curbed facilities [1] ..................... 338
Figure 13.2 – Lateral offset at merge locations [1] ...................................................................... 339
Figure 13.3 – Lateral offset at driveways [1] ................................................................................ 339
Figure 13.4 – Clear sight viewing triangle for viewing traffic approaching from the left [3] ........... 340
Figure 13.5 – Example of a pedestrian buffer area ..................................................................... 342
Figure 13.6: Pedestrian realm elements [5] ................................................................................. 344
Figure 13.7 – Typical curb ramp and tactile strip configuration [3] ............................................... 345
Figure 13.8: Typical raised crosswalk (avenue) [3]...................................................................... 346
Figure 13.9 – A fully segregated off-carriageway cycle track....................................................... 347
Figure 13.10 – Typical bicycle facilities [5] .................................................................................. 349
Figure 13.11 – Typical details of an upstand curb [3] .................................................................. 353
Figure 13.12 – Typical details of vehicle barrier curbs [3] ............................................................ 354
Figure 13.13 – Example gateway layout ..................................................................................... 355
Figure 13.14 – Example pedestrian fencing restricting crossing over a main street .................... 356
Figure A.1 - EN1317-4 terminal permanent displacement zones [8] ............................................ 373
Figure B.1 - Barrier length of need layout (one-way or dual two way divided roadways) ............. 377
Figure B.2 - Barrier length of need layout (two-way roadways) ................................................... 378
Figure B.3 – Identification of the trailing end of barrier on dual carriageways .............................. 380
Figure B.4 - Graphical layout of barrier along a horizontal curve ................................................. 381
Figure B.5 - Barrier length (amount of flare) vs. amount of grading ............................................. 382
Figure B.6 - Barrier length of need calculation (tangent roadways only) ...................................... 383
Figure B.7 - Barrier length of need calculation (Example 7.1) ..................................................... 386
PAGE XVIII
PAGE XIX
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 – Calculation of clear zone distance, Cz ........................................................................ 33
Table 3.2 - Recommended base clear zone width, Bcw (in metres)................................................ 34
Table 3.3 – Modification factor for the outside of curves, Mc [1] .................................................... 35
Table 4.1 – Guidance towards potential roadside hazards [1] ....................................................... 46
Table 5.1 – An example of spacing of emergency telephones ...................................................... 97
Table 5.2 – EN12767 impact speed categories [2] ........................................................................ 99
Table 5.3 – EN12767 energy absorption categories [2]............................................................... 100
Table 5.4 – EN12767 occupant safety classification [2] .............................................................. 100
Table 5.5 – Percentage reduction in pole crashes with increasing distance from the roadway [1]105
Table 6.1 - Test requirements for NCHRP350 [2] ........................................................................ 118
Table 6.2 - Test requirements for MASH [1] ................................................................................ 118
Table 6.3 – Examples of ZOI width for selected barrier types and test levels*............................. 123
Table 6.4 - Preferred and maximum allowable OIV & ORA values from MASH [1] ...................... 125
Table 6.5 – Effect of post spacing on barrier deflection* ............................................................. 134
Table 7.1 - Selection criteria for roadside barriers ....................................................................... 147
Table 7.2 – Key considerations in barrier selection ..................................................................... 148
Table 7.3 - Soil Corrosivity Scale [2] ........................................................................................... 155
Table 7.4 - Suggested shy-line offset .......................................................................................... 165
Table 7.5 - Example bumper trajectory data ............................................................................... 177
Table 7.6 - Suggested flare rates for barrier design .................................................................... 180
Table 7.7 - Recommended bridge parapets heights .................................................................... 202
Table 9.1 - Recommended test matrix for TL-3 terminals, NCHRP350 [2] .................................. 242
Table 9.2 - Recommended test matrix for TL-3 terminals, MASH [3] ........................................... 242
Table 10.1 - Test requirements for TL-3, NCHRP350 [5] ............................................................ 267
Table 10.2 - Test requirements for TL-3, MASH [3] ..................................................................... 268
Table 10.3 - Dimensions for the provision of crash cushions in gore areas [6] ............................ 280
Table 11.1 - Test requirements for NCHRP350........................................................................... 288
Table 12.1 – Example roadside safety related CMFs from the literature ..................................... 316
Table 12.2 –Average societal costs of crashes [19] .................................................................... 319
Table 12.3 – Estimated annual reduction in crash frequency by each treatment ......................... 323
Table 12.4 – Annual monetary benefits of change in crashes caused by each treatment ............ 324
Table 12.5 – Converting annual values to present values (benefits) ........................................... 324
Table 12.6 - Converting annual values to present values (costs) ................................................ 325
PAGE XX
Table 12.7 – Calculation of the BCR for each treatment option ................................................... 325
Table 12.8 – Example situation, where BCR does not provide a clear choice ............................. 327
Table 12.9 – Example of incremental BCR selection................................................................... 329
Table 12.10 – Example of ranking by risk reduction .................................................................... 330
Table 13.1 - Design strategies to protect pedestrians in motor vehicle crashes [1] ..................... 342
Table 13.2 - Clearances between pedestrians and vehicular traffic [4] ........................................ 343
Table 13.3: Width for pedestrian realm zones [3] ........................................................................ 345
Table 13.4 - Indicative range of cycling provision by type of street [8] ......................................... 348
Table 13.5 - Design strategies for bicycles [1] ............................................................................. 350
Table A.1 – EN1317-2 vehicle impact test descriptions [6] .......................................................... 366
Table A.2 – EN1317-2 containment levels .................................................................................. 367
Table A.3 – EN1317-2 impact severity levels [6] ......................................................................... 368
Table A.4 - EN1317-2 working width classification [6] ................................................................. 369
Table A.5 – EN1317-2 vehicle intrusion classification [6] ............................................................ 369
Table A.6 – EN1317-3 vehicle impact test descriptions for crash cushions ................................. 370
Table A.7 – EN1317-3 performance levels for crash cushions [7] ............................................... 371
Table A.8 – EN1317-3 impact severity levels for crash cushions [7] ........................................... 371
Table A.9 – EN1317-4 performance classes & impact test criteria for terminals .......................... 372
Table A.10 - EN1317-3 impact severity levels for terminals [7] ................................................... 372
Table A.11 – EN1317-4 permanent lateral displacement classification for terminals [8] .............. 373
PAGE XXI
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
AD Police Abu Dhabi Police
ADRSDG Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide
ADT Average Daily Traffic
ASI Acceleration Severity Index
AV Annual Value
BCR Benefit Cost Ratio
CEN European Committee for Standardization
CIP Critical Impact Point
CMF Crash Modification Factor
CMPS Continuous Motorcyclist Protection Systems
CRF Crash Reduction Factor
DDHV Directional Design Hour Volume
DMA Department of Municipal Affairs
DMPS Discontinuous Motorcyclist Protection Systems
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
HE High Energy Absorbing (for EN12767 Systems)
HGV Heavy Goods Vehicle
HIC Head Injury Criterion
HSM Highway Safety Manual
KSI Killed or Seriously Injured
LE Low Energy Absorbing (for EN12767 Systems)
MASH Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware
MPS Motorcyclist Protection systems
MUTCD Abu Dhabi Manual for Uniformed Traffic Control Devices
NARD Numerical Analysis of Roadside Design Program
NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program
NE Non Energy Absorbing (for EN12767 Systems)
NMUs Non-Motorized Users
OIV Occupant Impact Velocity
ORA Occupant Ride-down Acceleration
PDO Property Damage Only
PV Present Value
RRRAP Road Restraint Risk Assessment Process
RSAP Roadside Safety Analysis Program
SAVERS Selection of Appropriate Vehicle Restraint Systems
THIV Theoretical Head Impact Velocity
TL Test Level
UPC Urban Planning Council
VRS Vehicle Restraint Systems
WRSB Wire Rope Safety Barrier
ZOI Zone of Intrusion
PAGE XXII
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
In 2010, the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport commenced with the
“Unifying and Standardizing of Road Engineering Practices” Project. The objective of the project
was to enhance the management, planning, design, construction, maintenance and operation of all
roads and related infrastructures in the Emirate and ensure a safe and uniform operational and
structural capacity throughout the road network.
To achieve this objective a set of standards, specifications, guidelines and manuals were
developed in consultation with all relevant authorities in the Abu Dhabi Emirate, including the
Department of Municipal Affairs (DMA) and Urban Planning Council (UPC). In future, all authorities
or agencies involved in roads and road infrastructures in the Emirate shall exercise their functions
and responsibilities in accordance with these documents. The purpose, scope and applicability of
each document are clearly indicated in each document.
It is recognized that there are already published documents with similar objectives and contents
prepared by other authorities. Such related publications are mentioned in each new document and
are being superseded by the publication of the new document, except in cases where previously
published documents are recognized and referenced in the new document.
1.2 Purpose and scope

The guidance supplied in this document, the Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide (ADRSDG), is
based on established international practices. This especially includes the American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Roadside Design Guide [1] and is
supplemented by recent research and documents prepared by the CEDR funded ‘SAVERS’ [2]
project, the United Kingdom, Austroads [3] and Dubai [4].
This Guide has been prepared to provide uniform practices for government transport agencies
within the Abu Dhabi Emirate and consultant personnel preparing studies, reports and contract
road plans for these agencies. The designer should use this document to develop roadside
designs that meet the operational and safety requirements while preserving the aesthetic, historic,
and cultural resources of an area. This Guide will be updated regularly as new data and
experience with best practices become available.
Roadside design is defined as the design of the area between the outside shoulder edge and the
right-of-way limits. The Abu Dhabi Emirate is reducing the number of fatalities year on year,
however, roadside crashes account for a significant portion of the total fatal highway crashes.
Approximately 25 percent are the result of a single vehicle run-off-the-road crash. This emphasizes
the importance of providing as safe a roadside design as practical.
1.3 The application of the Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide

The guidance presented in this document is intended for the roadside design of new construction
and major reconstruction of roads and streets located within the Abu Dhabi road network. Local
municipalities are encouraged to adopt these guidelines to ensure uniformity of roadside designs
PAGE 1
01 INTRODUCTION FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
within the Emirate. Design guidance is provided, and is considered applicable, for all facility types
in both urban and rural locations.
The designer should attempt to meet all criteria and practices presented in this Guide; however, it
should not be considered a standard that must be met regardless of cost and impacts. Designers
must exercise good judgment on individual projects and, frequently, they must be innovative in
their approach to roadside design. Designers should review the listed references to gain an
understanding of the basis for the selected roadside design criteria. The guidance provided in this
document should not be a substitute for good engineering knowledge, experience, or sound
judgment. The concepts, designs and philosophies presented in this Guide may not be applicable
to every project. Each project is unique and offers an individual opportunity to enhance that
particular roadside environment.
The amount of monetary resources available for all roadside safety enhancements is limited. The
objective of designers is to maximize roadside safety on a system-wide basis with the given funds.
Accomplishing this objective means addressing those specific roadside features that can
contribute the most to the safety enhancement of that individual project. Given that objects and
slope changes must be introduced at varying points off the pavement edge, the enhancement of
roadside safety involves selecting the “best” choice among several acceptable design alternatives.
This document is intended to represent the spectrum of commonly available roadside design
alternatives.
1.3.1 Background to Some of the Key Approaches Adopted

One of the main aims of this Guide is to provide guidance on roadside design based on
international best practice which fits best to reflect the local conditions, requirements and
applications. To help achieve this, a team of internationally recognised, independent road safety
specialists have carried out site visits around the Abu Dhabi Road Network, reviewed the existing
processes and assessed the local conditions in collaboration with the Abu Dhabi Department of
Municipal Affairs and Transport. A summary of these assessments were presented in the “Abu
Dhabi Roadside Design Guide – Inception Report” (See Appendix B).
An important outcome of the Inception Report was recommendations for some key approaches,
which helped form the basis of this Guide. An overview of these key approaches is presented in
the following sections. For more detail, please refer to Appendix B.
1.3.2 A Performance Based Approach Rather Than a Prescriptive One

During the development of Vehicle Restraint Systems (VRS), the number and type of systems
available to the roadside designer/engineer were limited. The limited number of designs would
have distinct performance characteristics and therefore the designer/engineer could prescriptively
refer to these systems. For example a designer/engineer could expect a concrete or a cable barrier
to perform at a certain performance level. As alternative systems were developed, the available
types of different systems increased substantially, and now there are many different systems
available on the market together with variants of the same original design, all with slightly different
performance characteristics. As the number of the alternative designs increased, the gaps
between the performance levels of the original VRS designs were filled by new products. Therefore
it is no longer valid to use a product-specific prescriptive approach, where reference is only made
to a number of specific designs.
PAGE 2
A prescriptive approach, which focuses on the use of a limited number and type of systems, is not
necessarily the best one. The lack of choice can force a designer/engineer to use systems which
may not be the optimal solution for a specific site in terms of performance and cost. This sort of
prescriptive approach not only limits the ability of the designer to use engineering judgment but it
also makes it difficult for new systems to enter the market. It furthermore leads to less of an
understanding from the engineer, which may lead to inappropriate systems and arrangements
being used in certain locations.
In order to overcome these issues, current international best practice is to identify the performance
requirements and physical constraints of a site under consideration and then let the
engineer/designer chose the most appropriate solution based on proven properties of impact
tested and approved systems. Therefore, this version of the manual is based on the required
performance specifications, rather than prescriptive descriptions of certain products. In order to
achieve this, rather than listing the design details of certain products available on the market, the
proposed layout of the roadside design guide was organised to explain, for each VRS type, in
basic terms:
 The main types of systems available on the worldwide market;
 The performance classifications of the products based on impact testing;
 The selection criteria based on the performance classifications of the product.
1.3.3 The Use of Proprietary over Non-Proprietary Systems

The term ‘proprietary’ means that the system has been independently designed and successfully
tested by a VRS manufacturer, who is ultimately responsible for the design of the system.
Conversely, non-proprietary systems have often been developed by National Road Authorities
and/or Universities, who have subsequently published the drawings of the system and, as such,
these can be manufactured by anyone.
Whilst many of the non-proprietary systems have historically performed well, many of these
systems were developed a number of years ago, and were tested to older versions of the testing
standards. Due to budgetary constraints within the original developers of the systems, these
systems are often not updated, nor are they supported in terms of future development and product
refinement.
This is not the case in the commercial domain of the proprietary systems, where development of
systems continues on a frequent basis, with product designers keen to develop more effective
products than their rivals, testing and certifying products to the latest standards. This competition
and the continuous development have led to proprietary products which perform better (higher
containment levels with less deflection and lower acceleration severity) than their non-proprietary
predecessors.
For these reasons, it is now common practice for many countries to install proprietary systems,
with a number of countries, such as the UK, USA (FHWA) and Ireland maintaining a list of
‘accepted’ vehicle restraint systems products. Therefore the use of proprietary systems is
recommended over non-proprietary ones.
PAGE 3
1.3.4 Use of a Single Testing Standard

In the past, barriers successfully tested to the requirements of USA NCHRP350 [5]/MASH [6],
European EN1317 [7], and non-proprietary systems were permitted for use on the Abu Dhabi road
Network, and in many other countries. However, the testing parameters for these two types of
international systems are very different. As a result, no comparison or equivalence can be
assumed between systems tested to the different standards. This can lead to, for example,
inappropriate transitions between systems, and unknown levels of performance where the
performance of one system depends on that of another (for example where the performance of a
safety barrier relies on the performance of a terminal). For this reason it is recommended that
systems which are tested only to a single standard are permitted for future use on the Abu Dhabi
road network.
1.3.5 The Use of NCHRP350 and MASH Tested Products Instead of

EN1317
The road network and the vehicle fleet in Abu Dhabi are more similar to an American one rather
than a European one. The adoption of the American testing standards NCHRP350 and MASH are
felt to be more suitable for the Abu Dhabi road network, over the European test standard EN1317
for the reasons explained in the following sub-sections. However, it is felt that the knowledge of the
European test standard EN1317 [7] can still be useful to designers/engineers, especially when
comparing VRS products tested to different standards. The Appendix A provides a brief overview
of the EN1317. The information provided includes the test types and performance classes and test
criteria for barriers, bridge parapets, terminals, transitions and crash cushions.
1.3.5.1 Weight of Vehicles used in NCHRP350, MASH & EN1317

Vehicles used in NCHRP350 and more recently MASH, represent larger and heavier vehicles,
such as pickup trucks, which are more common in the USA; whilst EN1317 uses smaller and
lighter vehicles which are more common in Europe. This can be seen by comparing Test Level-3 of
MASH and NCHRP350 to containment level N2 of EN1317 as these are the most commonly used
base performance criteria for America and Europe, respectively.
In MASH, a product should perform satisfactorily during impact testing to achieve the basic test
level TL-3 using a 1,100 kg passenger car and a 2,270kg pickup truck. While in EN1317 to achieve
an N2 containment level, a barrier should perform satisfactorily using a 900kg passenger car and a
1,500kg passenger car (see Appendix A). There is currently no vehicle type in EN1317 which
represents an SUV or a pickup truck, which are common in the Abu Dhabi vehicle fleet.
As a result, it can be said that American testing standards MASH and NCHRP350, offer a better
representation of the vehicle fleet, more specifically enabling vehicle restraint systems to prove
their ability to safely contain and redirect (under standard testing conditions) the high percentage of
SUVs in Abu Dhabi; while the vehicle classes in EN1317 do not represent the SUVs and therefore
are not guaranteed to work on impact with these types of vehicles.
1.3.5.2 Height of Vehicles used in NCHRP350, MASH & EN1317

The weight of the vehicles used in NCHRP350 and MASH are a better representation of the SUVs
which represent a high percentage of the vehicles used in Abu Dhabi. However, it is not only the
PAGE 4
weight of the vehicles that make American standards a better fit for Abu Dhabi, but it is also the
height, more specifically the height of the centre of mass, required for the test vehicles.
Vehicle rollover is one of the more common types of incidents observed in Abu Dhabi. Vehicles
with a higher centre of mass, such as SUVs are more likely to roll over. The minima required
centre of mass locations for a pickup truck for testing to the basic TL-3 containment levels in
MASH & NCHRP350 are 710mm and 700±50mm, respectively. In EN1317 the highest vehicle
used to test a N2 normal containment level, requires to have a centre of mass location 530mm
above the ground. As can be seen from these numbers, EN1317 test vehicles are far from
representing the higher centre of mass seen with SUVs, which are common in Abu Dhabi.
Therefore, there is no guarantee that an SUV, which is likely to have a centre of mass higher than
530mm, will be contained by an N2 containment level barrier.
1.3.5.3 Impact Angles used in NCHRP350, MASH & EN1317

Another important difference between the American and European testing standards is the angle
of impact. A good comparison can be made between the base performance levels of TL-3 for
MASH/NCHRP350 and N2 for EN1317. MASH uses an impact angle of 25˚ for car and pickup
truck impacts, to demonstrate a successful TL-3 classification. EN1317 on the other hand, uses an
impact angle of 20˚ for TB11 and TB32 tests, which are required to demonstrate a successful
classification of N2.
The roads in Abu Dhabi, in general, appear to be wider than the European ones, with expressways
regularly featuring up to 4 lanes in each direction with generous shoulder areas provided on each
side of the road. Research shows that in similar conditions, impacts with roadside barriers are
more likely to occur with higher angles of incidence on wider carriageways. For this reason it is
believed that the larger impact angles used in MASH and NCHRP350 may provide a better
representation of the actual impacts that are likely to occur on the Abu Dhabi road network.
1.4 Scope of the ADRSDG
1.4.1 Overview
This Guide has been developed to enable practitioners to follow a step-by-step risk-based process
to understand and mitigate the risks posed by hazards, integrating International best practice.
This has been achieved by first introducing the user of the Guide to the Risk Mitigation Approach,
explaining the concept of the clear zone, and assisting users in the identification of hazards. The
following chapters provide information on experience-based advice and internationally recognised
practices, to assist Engineers in dealing with the hazards present. This includes details of the
various product types available on the market to mitigate road user risk. An overview of the ways in
which these solutions can be assessed on an economic basis is then presented. The final chapter
of this Guide deals exclusively with the risks existing within the urban environment, and ways in
which such risks should be assessed. An overview of the content of each chapter is presented
below:
1.4.2 Chapter 2 “Risk Mitigation Approach”

This chapter discusses the hazard mitigation process and the forgiving roadside approach to road
safety. The Chapter also introduces the clear roadside concept and its application to roadside
design.
PAGE 5
1.4.3 Chapter 3 “Concept and Calculation of Clear Zone”

This chapter gives further details of the clear zone concept, providing advice on how the clear zone
distance should be calculated for straight sections, foreslopes, backslopes and for curved sections
of road. Consideration is also given for determining the clear zone for medians and high risk
hazards. To aid understanding, examples of clear zone calculations are also detailed.
1.4.4 Chapter 4 “Identification of Roadside Hazards”

Once the user of this Guide has followed the procedures within Chapter 3 to determine the clear
zone for a particular road scheme, location or hazard, Chapter 4 assists the designer in
determining whether objects and/or features within the clear zone are hazards. This includes the
identification of risks to third parties.
1.4.5 Chapter 5 “Passively Safe Support Structure and Traversable

Objects”
This chapter investigates ways in which hazards can be made passively safe or traversable (i.e.
less hazardous to road users in the event of an impact). Advice is given on the types of
commercially available systems and technologies which exist, and how these should be selected
and applied.
1.4.6 Chapter 6 “Description of Roadside, Median and Bridge Barriers”

If a hazard cannot be made passively safe or traversable, one of the most common road safety
devices is the barrier. However, there are many different types available and this chapter gives an
overview of the three different types available (flexible, semi-rigid and rigid). Details of the testing
procedures for barrier systems are then explained.
1.4.7 Chapter 7 “Selection and Application of Roadside, Median, and

Bridge Barriers”
This chapter firstly gives an overview of the way in which roadside, median and bridge barriers
should be specified, in terms of their containment level, deflection characteristics, impact severity
level and both maintenance and inspection requirements.
Secondly, the chapter provides guidance on how the barrier systems should be used on the
roadside in terms of the length required and where this should be sited, how to place the barrier
laterally at the side of the road, and how to flare back the end of the barrier to reduce road user
risk. Guidance on barrier foundations, such as compaction requirements, push-and-pull test and
common foundation mistakes to avoid, are also given.
Specific guidance is also presented for roadside barriers (in terms of barriers which are installed on
sharp horizontal curves), median barriers (in terms of emergency and maintenance crossings and
glare screens), and bridge barriers (in terms of minimum height requirements and fixation to bridge
decks).
1.4.8 Chapter 8 “Motorcyclist Protection Systems”

This chapter gives details of the different types of motorcyclist protection systems (MPS) available
(continuous and discontinuous), and gives details of the impact testing requirements for such
systems. An explanation of the performance classifications resulting from this testing is also given,
together with a description of how to use the performance classifications for the application of the
PAGE 6
products. Specific guidance is given with regard to locations where a positive cost/benefit could
result from the application of an MPS.
1.4.9 Chapter 9 “Terminals”

This chapter gives details of the different types of terminals available (ramped down end, full
height, flared and buried), and gives details of the impact testing requirements for such systems.
An explanation of the performance classifications resulting from this testing (for example gating
and non-gating terminals) is also given, together with an explanation of how to use the
performance classifications for the application of the products. Specific guidance is provided with
regard to the site grading for terminals.
1.4.10 Chapter 10 “Crash Cushions”

This chapter gives details of the different types of crash cushions available (redirective/ non-
redirective, sacrificial/reusable and both low maintenance and self-restoring crash cushions). The
chapter gives details of the impact testing requirements for such systems, and an explanation of
the performance classifications resulting from this testing (for example gating and non-gating
terminals). An explanation of how to use the performance classifications for the application of the
products is also outlined. Specific guidance is provided with regard to the site grading for crash
cushions.
1.4.11 Chapter 11 “Transitions”

This chapter gives details of the different types of terminals available and gives details of the
impact testing requirements for such systems. An explanation of the performance classifications
resulting from this testing is also provided, together with an explanation of how to use the
performance classifications for the application of the products. Specific guidance is provided with
regard to the design of terminals, and examples of good and bad practice are outlined.
1.4.12 Chapter 12 “Economic Assessment”

The chapter discusses the use of economic analysis to make roadside safety decisions, and
provides an overview of the economic assessment process which should be undertaken. The first
part of the chapter focuses on the assessment of economic feasibility for alternative roadside
treatment options. A step by step guide into benefit/cost ratio (BCR) analysis is presented.
Guidance is provided into the prediction of expected number of crashes at a site, prediction of
decrease in the number of crashes due to a safety treatment and the estimation of monetary
benefits associated with roadside crashes prevented. Example calculations are included for each
step of the BCR analysis. A wide range of crash modification factors is provided to help
designer/engineers estimate the reduction in the number and/or severity of crashes due to specific
roadside safety treatments.
The second part of the chapter focuses on treatment prioritization methods. Guidance is given on
treatment assessment and ranking based on cost-effectiveness, risk reduction and non-monetary
considerations.
1.4.13 Chapter 13 “Urban Roadside Design”

This final chapter of this Guide identifies risk relating to the specific case of urban areas, and
provides overarching guidance as to how the risks in these areas differ and, hence, which
additional measures should be considered when mitigating risk to road users, and to vulnerable
users of the road corridor (such as pedestrians).
PAGE 7
Guidance is provided on the lateral offset required between the roadway and the roadside hazards,
for different road configurations, such as curves, merge locations and junctions. Information is also
provided on the specific applications for pedestrian and bicyclist facilities. Finally, specific guidance
is provided into the application of common urban roadside features, such as curbs, pedestrian
barriers, street furniture, etc.
1.5 References
[1] AASHTO, Roadside Design Guide, 4th Edition, Washington D.C.: American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials, 2011.
[2] CEDR, “SAVERS (Selection of Appropriate Vehicle Restraint Systems) - WP1: Defining the
Different Parameters which can Influence the Need and Selection of VRS (Unpublished
Report),” Conference of European Directors of Roads, 2014.
[3] Austroads, Guide to Road Design Part 6: Roadside Design, Safety and Barriers, Sydney, NSW:
Austroads, 2010.
[4] Roads & Transport Authority, Roadside Design Guide for Dubai, First Edition, Dubai: RTA,
2008.
[5] NCHRP, “NCHRP Report 350, Recommended Procedures for the Safety Performance
Evaluation of Highway Features,” Transportation Research Board, National Research Council,
Washington DC, 1993.
[6] AASHTO, “Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware,” Ammerican Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials, Washington DC, 2009.
[7] CEN , “EN 1317 Road Restraint Systems - Part 2: Performance classes, impact test
acceptance criteria and test methods for safety barriers including vehicle parapets,” CEN
(European Committee for Standardization), Brussels, 2010.
PAGE 8
2 ROADSIDE RISK MITIGATION

2.1 Introduction
There are many reasons why vehicles may leave the road and potentially encroach on the
roadside. These include:
 Driver fatigue or inattention;

 Excessive speed;
 Crash avoidance;
 Roadway conditions (e.g. pavement deterioration);
 Vehicle component failure;
 Poor visibility; and
 Driver impairment.
When a vehicle runs off the road, it may reach a hazard, collide or overturn; all of which may result
in injuries or even fatalities. These casualties may be reduced by making every roadside flat,
traversable and free of obstacles; therefore giving enough space to errant vehicles to regain
control and return to the road with a reduced likelihood of injury. However, in reality this is not
always possible due to physical and economic constraints. Engineers and designers often have to
find an optimal solution; one that finds a balance between the maximum amount of safety and
economic feasibility.
A good way of achieving this is to evaluate each roadside on a case by case basis with a risk
based approach. Not every road has the same probability of a vehicle running off the road, nor
does every roadside hazard have the same level of consequences, if reached by an errant vehicle.
It is important to identify and prioritise the sites with a higher level of risk and apply the necessary
countermeasures to keep the risk to a reasonable level.
This approach forms the basis for the roadside design guides and standards of many countries
around the world [1]. In the UK the decision for roadside treatments is based on The Road
Restraint Risk Assessment Process (RRRAP); a software based tool which aims to decrease the
level of risk for the evaluated area to “As Low as Reasonably Practicable” [2]. In Germany, the
decision on whether to implement a roadside barrier is based on the probability of a vehicle
running off the road and the level of risk posed by different type of hazards [3]. In the United
States, a recommended practice is the evaluation of different roadside treatment options with
Roadside Safety Analysis Program (RSAP); a risk based benefit/cost analysis tool [4].
Following International best practice, the Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide is structured as an
easy to use and understand roadside risk mitigation tool.
This chapter presents an explanation of the concept of risk from a roadside safety perspective and
the recommended risk mitigation approach of this Guide.
PAGE 9
02 ROADSIDE RISK MITIGATION FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
2.2 Definition of Risk from a Roadside Safety Perspective

There are many definitions of hazard and risk, but for the purpose of roadside safety design a
hazard can be described as a roadside feature or object that can cause physical, economic, time-
based or strategic harm or loss. Risk is the chance, high or low, that somebody or something will
be harmed by the roadside hazard.
Risk, as shown in Figure 2.1, is directly related to the likelihood of the hazard being reached by a
vehicle and the resulting consequences if the hazard is reached.
Figure 2.1 - Risk from a roadside safety perspective
As shown in Figure 2.1, the likelihood of a roadside accident depends on the probability of a
vehicle running off the road and the probability of the errant vehicle subsequently reaching the
hazard if it does leave the carriageway. Run-off-the road probability is related to parameters such
as traffic volume and horizontal curve radius; while the probability of an errant vehicle reaching a
hazard depends on factors such as the distance of the hazard from the edge of the travelled way,
speed of the errant vehicle and roadside topography.
When a vehicle reaches a hazard, the most obvious consequences are the ones to the occupants
of the vehicle, in the form of physical harm and economic loss. But some hazards, if reached by
errant vehicles can have consequences for third parties as well. For example, an errant vehicle
reaching the opposite side of a dual carriageway can cause serious harm to the people travelling
on the other side. An errant vehicle entering a water reservoir may contaminate the drinking water
needed by many others.
Engineers and designers can mitigate the level of risk by controlling either or both likelihood and/or
consequences of a roadside accident. The following sections present the methodology to achieve
this.
2.3 Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide Risk Mitigation Approach
2.3.1 Outline of the Risk Mitigation Approach

Figure 2.2 presents the risk mitigation approach adopted for this Design Guide. As can be seen
from the figure, the corresponding chapter/s for each step is also presented.
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Step 1
Understand the area
under evaluation Chapter 4
Step 2
Calculate the Chapter 3
clear zone
Step 3
Identify the hazards
within clear zone
Step 4
Identify applicable
treatment options Chapters 5 to 11
Remove Relocate Provide Recoverable Make Passively Shield Delineate

Roadside Safe
Step 5
Assess & Rank
treatment options Chapter 12
Step 6
Choose the Optimal
treatment option
Step 7
Design the Optimal
roadside treatment
Figure 2.2 – Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide risk mitigation approach
The following sections present further explanation on each step of the hazard mitigation approach.
2.3.2 Step 1 - Understand the Area under Evaluation

The first action the designer/engineer needs to take is to gather information and understand the
conditions at the site being evaluated. The area under evaluation may be a section of roadside /
median, or it may even be a specific hazard with a known history of accidents. As defined in
Section 1.3.1, the area of evaluation may be a part of the design of a new construction or a major
reconstruction of an existing road.
Information gathered at this stage will not only be necessary in the following steps of the risk
mitigation process, but it will also enable the designer/engineer to establish an overall
PAGE 11
understanding of the site and hence will enable them to make more informed decisions in each of
the following steps of the risk mitigation process.
The following are some example questions which can guide a designer/engineer into a better
understanding of the area:
 What are the traffic characteristics? Traffic information such as volume and speed are
not only necessary for the clear zone calculations (See Section 2.2.3), but they are also
useful during the assessment of treatment options (See Section 2.2.5). For example the
designer/engineer may consider a motorcyclist protection system (MPS) installation
depending on the volume of motorcyclist traffic; subject to engineering judgment. However,
depending on the traffic speed, they may not always be able to gain the full benefits from
these systems, as they are designed to work up to certain impact speeds. (See Chapter 8).
 What are the physical characteristics of the road and the roadside? Geometric
characteristics such as horizontal curve radius and the gradient of the side slope are not
only necessary information for the calculation of the clear zone (See Section 2.2.3), but
they may also become physical boundary conditions; limiting the type of countermeasures,
which may be applicable to the site. For example, relocating a hazard (See Section 2.2.5.2)
may not be a possible option if there isn’t enough physical space for this, and all mitigation
measures, such as crash cushions and terminals have a defined road space requirement,
both for their installation, and their operation.
 What is the history of accidents on the site? This document is designed to give
guidance to designers/engineers on the mitigation of most common roadside risks, based
on international best practice. However, every site is different and should be evaluated
individually. Studying the accident history can reveal local problems, which would help in a
more focused risk mitigation approach.
 What and why are the potential hazards located on the roadside? Identifying the
potential hazards on the roadside is one of the required steps of the risk mitigation
approach (see Section 2.2.4). But understanding the nature and reasons why they are
located on the roadside is also important for identifying applicable countermeasures. For
example, a roadside sign may need to be within a certain distance to the roadside, and
therefore relocating it beyond the clear zone may not even be an applicable
countermeasure.
Figure 2.3 introduces an example of a typical roadside hazard in Abu Dhabi. Examination of this
example case will be followed through in the subsequent step-based analysis. The figure
represents some of the information that needs to be gathered at Step 1.
2.3.3 Step 2 – Calculate the Clear Zone

The second step of the hazard mitigation process is the calculation of the clear zone. The clear
zone is the area beside the road, along which the majority of the errant vehicles are expected to
regain control. This is the area which should ideally be kept clear of any hazards; hence leading to
the title “Clear Zone”.
PAGE 12
Figure 2.3 – Understanding the area under evaluation
Clear Zone effectively represents the “likelihood” element of the risk formula shown in Figure 2.1,
as it is a measure of how far errant vehicles are likely to travel along the roadside. It therefore
gives an idea of the likelihood of a hazard being reached, depending on parameters such as traffic
volume, design speed, horizontal curve radius, gradient of side slope and the distance of the
hazard from the edge of the travelled way. By controlling one or more of these parameters, the
designer/engineer may be able to decrease the likelihood of a hazard being reached; hence
decreasing the risk posed by the hazard.
Figure 2.4 shows the required clear zone area for the example roadside and it can be seen that the
sign post lies within it. Hazards lying within the clear zone are more likely to be reached by errant
vehicles than the hazards lying beyond it.
Chapter 3 presents a detailed explanation of the concept and the calculation of recommended
clear zones.
PAGE 13
Figure 2.4 – Clear zone area
2.3.4 Step 3 – Identify Hazards within Clear Zone

Step 3 in hazard mitigation process involves the identification of all roadside hazards within the
clear zone and consideration of high-risk hazards beyond the clear zone, for example a railway
line. The road designer should identify all roadside hazards within the area of interest (based on
clear zone widths). However, it is not always straightforward to understand if and when a roadside
feature becomes a hazard. For example, a roadside ditch may be considered a hazard or a
traversable roadside feature, depending on its geometry. A tree may be considered a hazard or
not, depending on the diameter of its trunk. A shallow pool of water may become a hazard with
floods following seasonal rain.
To help the designer/engineer with identifying hazards within the clear zone, Chapter 4 presents a
detailed explanation of the types and properties of the most common types of roadside hazards.
The following types of hazards are explained in detail within Chapter 4:
 Foreslopes (Embankments);
 Backslopes(Cutting Slopes);
 Ditches;
 Transverse Slopes;
 Trees;
 Overhead Gantries and Cantilevers;
 Other Sign Supports;
 CCTV Masts and Luminaire Supports;
PAGE 14
 Concrete Foundations Protruding from the Ground;

 Bridge Piers, Abutments and Portals;
 Bridge Railing Ends & Ends of Concrete Barriers;
 Above Ground Equipment;
 Culverts, Pipes, Headwalls;
 Pedestrian Fences and Walls;
 Retaining Walls;
 Noise Barriers;
 Bodies of Water;
 Adjacent Roads and Carriageways;
 Storage of Hazardous Material;
 Places of Frequent Pedestrian Activity / Places of Public Gathering;
 Cycle Lanes;
 Structures at Risk of Collapse;
 Rail Lines
 Speed cameras.
Hazard identification effectively relates to the “consequences” element of the risk formula shown in
Figure 2.1, as it is a measure of how severe the consequences would be if an errant vehicle
reaches a hazard. Hazards that lie within the clear zone, as previously shown in Figure 2.4, pose a
risk to road users and this risk should be mitigated through one of the treatment options explained
in the following step.
2.3.5 Step 4 – Identify Applicable Treatment Options

Where hazards exist within the clear zone (or outside the clear zone in the case of high-
consequence hazards), potential treatment options should be identified so that their effectiveness
in reducing the risk associated with the hazard can be assessed.
The following are the basic treatment options that should be considered:
 Remove the hazard;

 Relocate the hazard;
 Make the hazard passively safe or traversable;
 Shield the hazard with a longitudinal barrier or crash cushion;
 Delineate the hazard;
 Design roadside safety (refer Austroads Sections 4.4 bullet point no: 3).
These options are listed in an order of decreasing desirability from a safety perspective; i.e. it is
more desirable to completely remove a hazard than shielding it with a barrier, if costs and physical
attributes are not constraints. Details of each of these approaches are given in the subsequent
sections.
PAGE 15
2.3.5.1 Remove the hazard

The first approach in decreasing roadside risk is to remove the hazard. This is the most desirable
treatment option from a safety perspective as it completely eliminates the risk of a roadside
accident through eliminating the consequences if a vehicle were to run-off-the road.
This option, although desirable from a safety perspective, may not always be physically possible,
as the hazard may be an item of essential roadside infrastructure, or it may not be cost effective,
as the costs of completely removing the hazard may not be justified by the benefits. See Chapter
12 for more information on Economic Assessment. Figure 2.5 follows the previous example and
shows the hazard removed from the clear zone, therefore eliminating the risk.
Figure 2.5 – Hazard removed from the area
2.3.5.2 Relocate the hazard

If removing a hazard is not physically possible or cost effective, the second option to be considered
is the relocation of the hazard beyond the clear zone, where it is less likely to be reached by an
errant vehicle.
Relocating a hazard may not always be physically possible due to right-of-way or other physical
constraints. For example a roadside sign may have to be within a certain distance from the
travelled way, so that it is clearly visible by all travelling vehicles. Relocating some of the roadside
features may be too expensive to justify the benefits. Figure 2.6 follows the previous example and
shows it with the hazard relocated beyond the clear zone.
PAGE 16
Figure 2.6 – Hazard relocated beyond the clear zone
2.3.5.3 Provide recoverable roadside

This treatment option refers to the provision of a recoverable roadside between the road and the
hazard, which would assist the driver to regain the control of the vehicle once it has left the road,
before reaching the hazard. This type of treatment is related to the likelihood part of the risk model,
more specifically to the probability of an errant vehicle reaching the hazard, once it runs off the
road. An example to this kind of treatment is flattening of a foreslope between the edge of the
travelled way and a hazard. Errant vehicles travel further on steeper foreslopes and therefore a
wider clear zone is required. By flattening the foreslope, designer/engineer may decrease the
required clear zone to a point where the hazard is left outside. Therefore the risk of a vehicle
reaching the hazard would be considerably less. Section 3.3.3 provides further guidance on the
effects of roadside topography on the required clear zone.
2.3.5.4 Make the hazard passively safe or traversable

Another treatment option is to make the hazard either passively safe or traversable. For example, it
may be possible to replace a fixed sign post with a crash tested passively safe alternative, such as
slip-base system (see Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5). A cross-drainage culvert may be made traversable
by installing an appropriate grate to cover the opening (see Section 4.3.2.9).
Unfortunately, not every roadside hazard can be made passively safe or traversable; therefore this
alternative may not always be applicable. Chapter 5 provides guidance on the use of available
passively safe roadside hardware and the ways of making roadside features traversable.
Figure 2.7 shows the example roadside with the sign post still within the clear zone, but with the
post made passively safe through the use of a slip base system.
PAGE 17
Figure 2.7 – Hazard made passively safe
2.3.5.5 Shield the hazard with a longitudinal barrier or crash cushion

If none of the previous alternatives is physically possible or cost effective, the alternative of
shielding the hazard with an appropriate VRS (or a longitudinal barrier or crash cushion) should be
considered. At this point the designer should remember that vehicle restraint systems, although
designed to provide controlled impact, are a hazard themselves and they should ideally be used
only if the consequences of hitting the VRS is likely to be less than the consequences of reaching
and/or impacting the hazard behind.
VRS systems have their own physical requirements, which they need in order to perform as
designed, such as enough clear space behind, minimum length of installation, etc. The roadside
under consideration may not always have the required physical space or it may not always be cost
effective to install VRS for hazards that are less likely to be reached.
Chapters 6 to 11 provide comprehensive information on vehicle restraint systems; i.e. roadside

and median barriers, parapets, terminals, transitions and crash cushions. Information on the
general principals of these systems, testing requirements and detailed design properties are also
provided.
Figure 2.8 shows the example roadside with the sign post being shielded by a roadside barrier.
PAGE 18
Figure 2.8 – Hazard shielded with a roadside barrier
2.3.5.6 Delineate the hazard

The final treatment option is to delineate the hazard; i.e. make it more visible to the motorists and
make them aware of the danger. This may be achieved by using reflective material, as shown in
Figure 2.9, and/or by warning signs. This treatment option does not provide any physical protection
but it may still be better than doing nothing, where other options are either physically impossible or
not cost effective.
Figure 2.9 – Hazard delineated
PAGE 19
2.3.6 Step 5 – Assessment & Ranking of Treatment Options
2.3.6.1 Overview of Treatment Assessment & Ranking Process

Once the potential treatment options are identified, each option should be assessed from a
perspective of physical applicability and economic feasibility. The options which are both physically
applicable and economically feasible should then be ranked based on the amount of risk reduction
they provide, their benefit cost ratio and other non-monetary considerations should be determined
for a final decision. An overview of the treatment assessment and ranking process is shown in
Figure 2.10. Further detail on each individual step of the process is presented in the following
sections.
Figure 2.10 – Overview of treatment assessment & ranking process
PAGE 20
2.3.6.2 Assess Physical Practicability

After a hazard and the possible safety treatments are identified, an initial evaluation to the physical
practicability of the treatment should be carried out. A treatment option may not be reasonably
practicable for reasons such as:
 Constructability of the treatment;
 Right of Way Limitations;
 Insufficient physical space for the treatment to function as intended;
 Intended function of the hazardous object.
Some of the more obvious of the physically impracticable or extremely difficult to apply treatment
options may be related to the removal of a hazard. For example for coastal roads, the sea may be
considered as a continuous hazard, if the water is located within the clear zone distance, removal
of such a hazard would be considered extremely difficult, if not entirely impossible.
Some treatment options may not be possible due to the right of way limitations. For example a
hazard may not be able to be relocated beyond the clear zone, if the end of the clear zone area
lies outside the right-of-way boundaries.
Some treatment options may not be practicable due to restrictions in physical space available. For
example “shielding a hazard with a barrier” is only possible if the distance between the back face
of the barrier and the hazard is less than the deflection distance of the barrier (eee Section 7.3.5).
If not, the impacting vehicle would still reach the object behind as the barrier deflects. If the hazard
is simply too close to the travelled way, designer/engineer may not be able use certain types of
barriers, due to physical limitations of the product and the physical space available on the site.
Sometimes the intended function of a roadside hazard may be a reason for a treatment to be
impracticable. For example “relocation of the hazard beyond clear zone” may not be possible for a
road sign as the sign should be within a certain distance from the road to fulfil its intended function.
Similarly “removal of the hazard” may also not be an option for the same hazard.
For some treatment options, assessing the physical practicability is relatively straightforward.
Treatment options, which are either extremely difficult to apply or simply impracticable may be
discarded from the risk mitigation process, or the treatment may be modified and reassessed
again.
Treatment options which are physically practicable should be carried over to the next phase of the
process.
2.3.6.3 Assess Economic Feasibility

Once the physically impracticable treatment options are eliminated, the remaining should be
assessed for their economic feasibility. The expected benefits of a treatment (i.e. the anticipated
reduction in the frequency and severity of injuries, reduction in economic loss, reduction in losses
due to traffic disruptions, etc.) should be more than the associated costs (i.e. construction costs,
maintenance costs, etc.) for its application. In other words, the Benefit/Cost Ratio (BCR) of any
safety treatment should be more than 1 (see Chapter 12 for Economic Analysis).
PAGE 21
Any treatment option with a BCR less than or equal to 1.0 should be discarded from the risk
assessment process and the following phase should continue for options with a BCR greater than
1.0.
2.3.6.4 Rank Treatment Options

After economically feasible treatment options are identified, they should be compared and ranked
from a risk reduction and an economic perspective. Ranking is useful to identify the optimal
treatment option.
Rank by Risk Reduction:

Different safety treatments provide different levels of reduction in overall risk. For example, as
explained in Section 0.1, removing a hazard usually provides a higher risk reduction than shielding
the hazard with a VRS. For this reason, alternative treatment options should be ranked by the
amount of risk reduction they are expected to provide. The amount of risk reduction can be
quantified in terms of the expected reduction in crash frequency, injuries and property damage.
Example methods of carrying out such a ranking are presented in Chapter 12. At this point the
road authority or the designer/engineer may choose to set a certain level of risk reduction as a
minimum and eliminate any treatment options which do not provide the minimum desired level of
risk reduction.
Once the treatment options are ranked in risk reduction order, options that provide a higher level of
risk reduction should be given greater consideration. However the amount of risk reduction is not
the only factor to be used to determine the optimal solution. The treatment which provides the
highest level of risk reduction may also be the most expensive. In such a case, a second
alternative may provide an acceptable level of risk reduction for a better economic value. For this
reason, the treatment options should also be assessed from an economic perspective:
Rank by Benefit Cost Ratio

As explained above, the amount of risk reduction is not the only important factor when deciding
upon the optimal safety treatment. Treatment options which provide an acceptable level of risk
reduction should also be evaluated and ranked from a cost effectiveness perspective. BCR is a
good indicator of project value. However, simply comparing the BCR of different treatment options
to each other may be misleading. This is because BCR is a ratio of the benefits of a specific
treatment to its costs and it does not necessarily provide a meaningful comparison between the
benefits of different treatment options.
For example, “delineation of a hazard” is often the cheapest treatment option and due to its low
cost compared to its potential benefits, it is usually the option with the highest BCR. However, this
high BCR does not necessarily mean that the benefits gained from delineation is more than the
benefits gained from a more expensive option, for example shielding the hazard with a barrier. A
barrier would cost more, but its benefits would also be greater than for delineation. Therefore, a
solution can provide higher benefits, but with a lower BCR.
In such a case an incremental BCR analysis may be applied to rank the treatment options
economically. For incremental BCR and more on Economic Analysis, see Chapter 12.
PAGE 22
The economic ranking of treatment options is essential, but is not the only consideration for
deciding upon an optimal solution. The decision should also be based on the assessment of non-
monetary considerations.
2.3.6.5 Assess Non-Monetary Considerations

In most cases, the main benefits of applying a roadside safety treatment can be quantified in
monetary terms; i.e. the monetary gains expected due to a reduction in crash frequency, severity,
and the associated repair costs.
However, there are some factors which may be influential in the decision about which safety
treatment to adopt which cannot be quantified in monetary terms. Examples of these
considerations include:
 Aesthetics;
 Public demands and perception of road safety improvements;
 Air quality, noise, visual intrusion or other environmental considerations;
 Road user needs.
As these considerations cannot be quantified, their effect in the final decision should be evaluated
on a case by case basis through engineering judgment. For example, aesthetics may be of a
significant importance in the selection of a certain type of treatment over the other alternatives
around areas of natural beauty, land marks, major tourist attractions, etc. while it may not be an
important factor in a remote rural area of no special importance.
Environmental concerns may be of significant importance in areas such as natural reserves,

natural protection areas such as source of drinking water, in conservation areas for a certain
species of animal, etc.
In some cases the designer/engineer may choose to apply a certain treatment option to satisfy the
public demand, although it may not be the best option from an economic perspective. For example,
one may choose to install a motorcyclist protection system on a certain location to satisfy the
demands of a motorcyclist action group.
Non-monetary considerations can be of significant importance in the final decision; however the
designer/engineer should always ensure that an adequate level of safety is provided.
2.3.7 Step 6 – Choose the Optimal Treatment Option

Once the risk reduction and BCR ranking, and the non-monetary assessment of treatment options
are complete, the designer/engineer should rank the preferred treatment options based upon the
risk reduction, cost effectiveness and non-monetary considerations. As each site is different,
engineering judgment should be used to find the optimal solution that fits the needs of the
particular site, as shown in Figure 2.11.
2.3.8 Step 7 – Design the Optimal Roadside Treatment

The final step in the risk mitigation process is the detailed design of the appropriate (optimal)
roadside treatment. This step may include the design of just a single treatment or the whole safety
improvement scheme along a section of road which addresses different types of hazards in one
PAGE 23
go. In some cases Abu Dhabi DoT Standard Drawings will provide the necessary detail, whereas
the road design layout will show the location of the treatment as well as information not covered by
the standard drawings. Necessary guidance for the design of individual roadside safety treatments
is provided between Chapters 3 to 11 of this Guide.
Figure 2.11 – Selection of optimal treatment option through engineering judgment
The designer/engineer of a specific treatment should consider that the final design of the roadside
treatment can affect the other responsible bodies which provide roadside infrastructure items, such
as signage and lighting. Lateral extensions of the clear zone or hazard corridor should be shown
on the final plans so the other responsible bodies can assess the final design from their own
perspective.
The final design should include, but not be limited to the following information:
 All hazards for which a treatment warrant has been identified;
 The treatment options chosen for those hazards;
 The priority of the treatment options.
PAGE 24
2.4 Abu Dhabi DoT Product Approval Process

Prior to the use of any proprietary vehicle restraint system on the Abu Dhabi road network, the
system must have been accepted for use by the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and
Transport, or their representatives. This is to ensure that the product has been successfully tested
to appropriate standards (NCHRP350 and MASH), and that sufficient consideration has been
given to the local conditions and demands of the Abu Dhabi road environment. Whilst a large
number of systems currently exist on the market, these have often been developed with the local
requirements of the USA, Australasia and (in some cases) European road conditions in mind, not
necessarily those of Abu Dhabi. A list of those products deemed to be acceptable for use on such
roads is available.
In order for a product to be listed, an application must first be filed with the Abu Dhabi Department
of Municipal Affairs and Transport, or its representatives. The Department will then issue a
proforma detailing questions regarding the suitability of product for the local conditions in Abu
Dhabi. This must be completed in a satisfactory way, supported by evidence where possible.
For each product, the manufacturer will also be required to supply a set of full (i.e. not summary)
impact test reports and videos of their system to the Department of Municipal Affairs and
Transport, or its representatives, for assessment against the relevant testing standard (either
NCHRP350 or MASH). This should be accompanied by any other relevant supporting evidence
which may include:
 Inspection, maintenance and repair requirements;

 Installation manual;
 Restrictions on the use of the product, and compatibility with other products;
 Details of any modifications made to the product since it was tested, and any supporting
evidence/independent approval of the modifications made;
 Details of agreements with local distributors;
 Drawings and specifications for the system;
 Details of any in-service performance evaluation (including impacts with higher and faster
vehicles than specified in the testing standards);
 Details of any durability/environmental testing;
 Promotional literature;
 Any other information supporting the application.
Note that whilst the acceptance of a product in another territory (e.g. by Federal Highways in the
USA or by the award of a CE mark within Europe) may be considered as part of the approval
process, this will be no guarantee of acceptance for use by the Abu Dhabi Department of
Municipal Affairs and Transport due to its local needs and road conditions.
2.5 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter explains the recommended risk mitigation approach for Abu Dhabi. It also provides an
overview of how the manual should be used in general, by referencing the related chapters of the
manual for each step of the risk mitigation procedure.
PAGE 25
Risk, from a roadside safety perspective, is defined as the probability, high or low, that somebody
or something will be harmed by a roadside hazard. Roadside risk is directly related to both the
likelihood of a roadside accident and the consequences of it. Designers/engineers can mitigate the
risk by controlling either or both the likelihood or consequences of a run-off-the road accident,
through the recommended treatment options.
The recommended risk mitigation approach consists of the following stages:
1. Understand the area under evaluation;

2. Calculate the clear zone;
3. Identify the hazards located within the clear zone;
4. Identify applicable treatment options to mitigate risks from the hazards located within the
clear zone. Recommended treatment options include:
o Remove the hazard;
o Relocate the hazard;
o Provide recoverable roadside;
o Replace the hazard with a passively safe system;
o Shield the hazard with a VRS;
o Delineate the hazard;
5. Assess and rank applicable treatment options:

o Assess physical applicability;
o Assess economic feasibility;
o Rank treatment options economically;
o Assess non-monetary considerations;
6. Choose the optimal treatment option through engineering judgment;

7. Design the appropriate (optimal) roadside treatment.
An overview of the DoT product approval process is also given in this chapter. Prior to the use of
any proprietary vehicle restraint system on the Abu Dhabi road network, the system must have
been accepted for use by the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport, or its
representatives.
2.6 References
[2] TD19/06 Design Manual for Roads and Bridges, Volume2 Highway Structures: Design, Section
2 Special Structures, Part 8, The Highways Agency, Transport Scotland, Welsh Assembly
Government, The Department for Regional Development Norther Ireland, 2006.
[3] FGSV, Traffic Management Work Group, “Guidlines for passive protection on roads by vehicle
PAGE 26
restraint systems,” FGSV Verlag GmbH, Koln, 2009.
PAGE 27
3 CONCEPT AND CALCULATION OF CLEAR ZONE

3.1 Introduction
The “Clear Zone Concept” is a key part of this Guide’s risk mitigation process, as it provides
engineers and designers an easy to use tool for the assessment of risk of a roadside accident for
selected road environments.
The chapter starts with a brief look at the concept of clear zone, its origins and its evolution over
time. This is followed by a look at the factors which may affect the required clear zone distance for
different roads.
The Clear Zone Calculation Model for this Guide is presented in detail and followed by examples
on clear zone distance calculations.
3.2 The Clear Zone Concept

“The clear zone is the unobstructed, traversable area provided beyond the edge of the through
travelled way for the recovery of errant vehicles”. [1]
In an ideal world, providing unlimited, flat and obstacle-free areas along every road would
completely eliminate the problem of roadside accidents. However, in reality this is neither
economically viable, nor physically possible. For this reason, engineers and designers should
assess the level of risk along each roadside and find an optimal design solution; one which
provides a balance between the amount of forgiving roadside provided and the economic feasibility
of the selected application.
Accordingly, AASHTO became the first organization to promote the idea of providing clear
recovery areas along highways. In 1974, the AASHTO document known as the “Yellow Book”
stated that, “for adequate safety, it is desirable to provide an unencumbered roadside recovery
area that is as wide as practical on a specific highway section. Studies have indicated that on high-
speed highways, a width of 9 m or more from the edge of the through travelled way permits about
80 percent of the errant vehicles leaving the roadway to recover.” [2]. The idea of providing 9m
wide clear zones was trialled by several highways agencies, and it was understood that a constant
width of recovery space is not always the optimal solution for roads with different characteristics.
Errant vehicles travel further along the roadside with increased traffic speeds, sharper horizontal
curves and steeper side slopes. Therefore 9m clear zone was not always enough for errant
vehicles to recover safely. On the other hand it was understood that 9m is too wide and
economically not viable for roads with lower speeds and traffic volumes.
For these reasons, in 1977 AASHTO modified its earlier clear zone concept by introducing variable
clear-zone distances based on traffic volumes, speeds and roadside geometry [3]. This new
approach was well received and became widespread. Many countries around the world today
either use the exact AASHTO variable clear zone model or modified versions of it to fit the specific
needs of their road networks. [4]
The clear zone distances recommended by AASHTO Roadside Design Guide [1] are based on
empirical research data, which was later extrapolated to fill in the gaps of the database. Therefore,
they are intended as reference points rather than definitive values. It should be noted that these
PAGE 28
03 CONCEPT AND CALCULATION OF CLEAR ZONE FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
clear zone values, although considered sufficient for majority of errant vehicles to safely regain
control, are not enough to stop all 100% of errant vehicles. For example, the recommended clear
zone widths may not be enough for an over-speeding errant vehicle to safely regain control. A
clear zone, where even the over-speeding errant vehicles would regain control before reaching the
end, would require a considerably wider space. However, considering the low probability of such
incidents, providing this extra space is not always economically viable. However, The Abu Dhabi
DoT lately extended the speed range of AASHTO Table, shown in Table 3.2, up to 140 km/h. The
values given were only extracted by interpolating the trend of previous speed ranges given by
AASHTO.
The relationship between the distance from the edge of the travelled way to a hazard and the
proportion of errant vehicles that will be able to reach the hazard has been the subject of several
researches. One of the most comprehensive datasets of run-off-road accidents was collected
during late 1970s in Canada by P. Cooper [5]. Cooper’s research involved weekly observations of
wheel tracks on grass-covered roadsides of rural highways of various functional classes, where he
looked at the distance travelled by errant vehicles.
Cooper’s encroachment data was later re-analysed for development of the RSAP [6], and the
relationship shown in Figure 3.1 was derived. Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of errant vehicles
which are expected to travel over a certain distance from the edge of the travelled way during a
run-off-road accident. The relationship is presented for two-lane undivided roads, multi-lane
divided roads and for the combination of both undivided and divided roads. It can be seen from the
figure that, as the distance from the edge of the travelled way increases, the proportion of errant
vehicles which are likely to reach the distance decreases.
Figure 3.1 shows that clear zone distances recommended by AASHTO are likely to allow enough
space for approximately 85% of the errant vehicles to stop or regain control. In other words,
roughly 15% of errant vehicles could still reach a hazard beyond these distances. A considerably
wider space is required to ensure that more than 85% of the errant vehicles will stop within the
clear zone. For example for divided road, increasing the proportion of vehicles which would stop
within the clear zone from 85% to 95%, would require the clear zone distance to increase from
roughly around 12m to 20m. To take the same ratio from around 85% to around 100%, the clear
zone distance should almost be tripled from 12m to 30m. The considerable increase in the
required clear zone to cater for every single possible incident may not always be justified due to
economic reasons. Therefore, the designer should always use engineering judgment on a site-by-
site basis when deciding the acceptable clear zone distance.
However, some hazards, especially the ones where third parties may be affected, would yield
more severe consequences if reached by an errant vehicle. Examples of these are chemical
plants, school playgrounds, areas of public gathering, source of drinking water, etc. The
consequences of a vehicle reaching these hazards would be so high, that even a low likelihood of
a vehicle reaching them would pose a significant risk (see Section 2.2). For such high
consequence hazards, the extra width required to increase the 85% mark to 95-100% may be
justified.
This approach of providing wider clear zones for higher consequence hazards is adopted by
several countries around the world. For example, the Norwegian VRS Manual [7] recommends up
to doubling the clear zone distance for higher risk hazards, while the German guidelines [8]
recommend 8, 4 and 3m of extra clear zone space for high risk hazards located close to highways
of 100, 80 and 60km/h posted speed limit, respectively. This approach forms the basis of the clear
zone calculation model for the ADRSDG.
PAGE 29
P
er
c
e
nt
of
v
e
hi
cl
e
s
e
x
c
e
e 10
di
n
g
la
te Distance from the edge of travelled way (m)
ra
Figure 3.1 –
l Distance from the edge of travelled way vs proportion of errant vehicles which
di may reach it by highway type [6]
st
3.3 Factors
a Affecting the Clear Zone Distance
n
The requiredc clear zone distance along a particular road is related to several factors. These factors
are explained
e briefly to provide an insight into how the clear zone calculation model works.
3.3.1 Traffic Volume

Traffic Volume is an important factor which affects the required clear zone distance, as it is directly
related to the exposure level of a roadside. Probability of a vehicle running off the road increases
as the number of vehicles passing through the area increases.
Traffic volume does not directly affect the distance travelled by an errant vehicle. However, there is
an indirect effect, as the probability of a faster vehicle running off the road increases with increased
traffic volume. For this reason, the required clear zone distance goes up with increased volume of
traffic.
3.3.2 Design Speed

Design speed is another important factor, which affects the required clear zone distance. Design
speed determines the distance up to which an errant vehicle will travel and therefore the likelihood
of the vehicle reaching a hazard within a certain distance. For this reason, the required clear zone
distance goes up with increased design speed.
PAGE 30
3.3.3 Roadside Topography

Roadside topography has an important effect on how far an errant vehicle would travel; i.e. the
probability of an errant vehicle reaching a hazard within a certain distance. Due to the change in its
potential energy, an errant vehicle is likely to travel further distance along steeper downhill slopes,
i.e. foreslopes, and is likely to travel less distance along steeper uphill slopes, i.e. backslopes.
3.3.3.1 Foreslopes
According to their gradient, foreslopes are usually divided into three categories:
Recoverable Slopes:
Recoverable slopes are those on which a motorist can retain or regain control of a vehicle. Slopes
equal to or flatter than 1V:4H, as shown in Figure 3.2, are considered recoverable. Smooth,
compact slopes with no significant discontinuities and no protruding fixed objects are required from
a safety standpoint. Slope should be rounded so that an encroaching vehicle remains in contact
with the ground. Also the toe of the slope should be rounded to improve reversibility by an errant
vehicle.
Figure 3.2 – Recoverable slope

Non-recoverable Slopes:
A non-recoverable foreslope is defined as one that is traversable but from which most vehicles will
not be able to stop or return to the roadway easily. A foreslope with gradient between 1V:4H and
1V:3H, as shown in Figure 3.3, is considered as non-recoverable, as long as it has firm compacted
surface or if it is treated with concrete, rip-rap, etc. Conversely if it has a loose sandy surface which
may cause a vehicle to overturn, a foreslope with gradient between 1V:4H and 1V:3H should be
considered as a hazard rather than a non-recoverable slope. See Chapter 4 for more information
on hazard assessment of foreslopes.
An errant vehicle reaching a non-recoverable slope would continue at least until it reaches the end
of it. For this reason, fixed obstacles along such slopes should be avoided and a clear runout area
should be provided at the base. This is also why, for the calculations, the total width of a non-
recoverable slope is added to the clear zone distance.
PAGE 31
Figure 3.3 – Non-recoverable slope

Critical Slopes:
A foreslope with gradient steeper than 1V:3H, as shown in Figure 3.4, is considered as a critical
slope; one on which an errant vehicle has a higher probability to overturn. For this reason a
foreslope is considered as a hazard by itself. Critical slopes which are located within the clear zone
should ideally be flattened. If this is not possible, or economically viable, a barrier is typically used.
Figure 3.4 – Critical slope
3.3.3.2 Backslopes
A backslope in a cut section may be traversable depending on its relative smoothness and the
presence of fixed obstacles. It may not be a significant obstacle if the front slope between the
roadway and the base of the backslope is traversable (1V:3H or flatter) and the backslope is
obstacle-free. However, a steep, rough-sided rock cut normally should begin outside the clear
zone or be shielded. A rock cut normally is considered to be rough-sided when the face will cause
excessive vehicle snagging rather than provide relatively smooth redirection.
3.3.4 High Risk Hazards

The type of a hazard does not affect the probability of an errant vehicle reaching it. However, it is
still an important factor for the determination of the required clear zone distance as it affects the
overall risk. As explained in Section 3.2, some hazards yield higher consequences than others in
case of an errant vehicle reaching them. Since risk is a product of likelihood and consequences
(see Chapter 2), these high consequence hazards can still pose a considerable risk for even low
PAGE 32
probability of a vehicle reaching them. Therefore, high risk hazards affect the required clear zone
distance, as they can economically justify the provision of wider clear zones.
3.4 Calculation of Clear Zone Distance
3.4.1 Clear Zone Model

The clear zone is calculated by using the following formula, as detailed in Table 3.1:
Where:
Table 3.1 – Calculation of clear zone distance, Cz
Calculation of Clear Zone Distance, Cz

Cz=(Bcw x Mc)
Bcw, Base Clear Zone Width See Table 3.2
Straight Sections & Inside of Curves Mc=1.0

Mc, Modification Factor for
Outside of Horizontal Curves
Outside of Curves See Table 3.3
3.4.2 Base Clear Zone Width

The base clear zone width is the recommended clear zone width from the edge of the travelled
way for straight road sections, and it is determined on the basis of ADT, Design Speed and Side
Slope, by using Table 3.2. The clear zone distances presented in Table 3.2 are based on the clear
zone distances suggested by AASHTO Roadside Design Guide [1]. To cater for the needs of the
Abu Dhabi Road Network the AASHTO clear zone values are extrapolated for design speeds up to
140km/h.
The clear zone values presented in Table 3.2 are based on empirical research data, which was
later extrapolated to fill in the gaps of the database. Therefore, they are intended as guidance
values rather than definitive values. It should be remembered that, as explained in Section 3.2,
some vehicles can still travel further than these recommended clear zone distances. Therefore,
designer/engineer should assess the risk for each site on a case-by-case basis, using engineering
judgment.
In Table 3.2, a two-way ADT should be used for single carriageways and one-way ADT should be
used per direction of dual carriageways. The traffic volumes should be based on a 20-year
projection from the anticipated date of construction. For recommended clear zone widths over
15m, an additional assessment should be carried out to justify the required empty space, as these
are likely to cross the right-of-way limitations.
PAGE 33
Table 3.2 - Recommended base clear zone width, Bcw (in metres)
Design Year ADT

Design
Speed Under 750 750-1500 1500-6000 Over 6000
(km/h)
60 2.0 - 3.0 3.0 - 3.5 3.5 - 4.5 4.5 - 5.0
80 3.0 - 3.5 4.5 - 5.0 5.0 - 5.5 6.0 - 6.5
1V:6H 90 3.5 - 4.5 5.0 - 5.5 6.0 - 6.5 6.5 - 7.5

or 100 5.0 - 5.5 6.0 - 7.5 8.0 - 9.0 9.0 - 10.0
flatter 110 5.5 - 6.0 7.5 - 8.0 8.5 - 10.0 9.0 - 10.5
120 6.5 - 7.0 8.5 - 10.0 10.5 - 11.5 11.0 - 12.5
Foreslopes
140 9.5 - 10.5 12.5 - 14.0 15.5* - 16.5* 16.0* - 17.5*

60 2.0 - 3.0 3.5 - 4.5 4.5 - 5.0 5.0 - 5.5
Steeper 80 3.5 - 4.5 5.0 - 6.0 6 - 8.0 7.5 - 8.5

than 90 4.5 - 5.5 6.0 - 7.5 7.5 - 9.0 8.0 - 10.0
1V:6H to
100 6.0 - 7.5 8.0 - 10.0 10.0 - 12.0 11.0 - 13.5
Flatter
than 110 6.0 - 8.0 8.5 - 11.0 10.5 - 13.0 11.5 - 14.0
1V:3H 120 8.5 - 10.5 10.5 - 13.5 13.0 - 16.5* 14.5 - 18.0*
140 13.5 - 15.5* 15.5* - 20.0* 19.0* - 25.0* 20.0* - 27.0*
60 2.0 - 3.0 3.0 - 3.5 3.5 - 4.5 4.5 - 5.0
80 2.5 - 3.0 3.0- 3.5 3.5 - 4.5 4.5 - 5.0
1V:3H 90 2.5 - 3.0 3.0 - 3.5 4.5 - 5.0 5.0 - 5.5

or 100 3.0 - 3.5 3.5 - 4.5 4.5 - 5.5 6.0 - 6.5
steeper 110 3.0 - 3.5 3.5 - 5.0 5.0 - 6.0 6.5 - 7.5
120 3.5 - 3.5 3.5 - 5.0 5.5 - 6.0 6.5 - 7.5
140 4.0 - 4.5 4.0 - 6.0 6.0 - 7.0 8.0 - 9.0
60 2.0 - 3.0 3.0 - 3.5 3.5 - 4.5 4.5 - 5.0
Steeper 80 2.5 - 3.0 3.5 - 4.5 4.5 - 5.0 5.5 - 6.0

Backslopes
than 90 3.0 - 3.5 4.5 - 5.0 5.0 - 5.5 6.0 - 6.5

1V:6H
100 3.5 - 4.5 5.0 - 5.5 5.5 - 6.5 7.5 - 8.0
Flatter
than 110 4.5 - 5.0 5.5 - 6.0 6.5 - 7.5 8.0 - 9.0
1V:3H 120 5.0 - 5.5 6.5 - 7.0 7.0 - 8.0 9.0 - 10.0
140 6.5 - 7.0 8.0 - 8.5 9.0 - 10.0 11.5 - 12.5
60 2.0 - 3.0 3.0 - 3.5 3.5 - 4.5 4.5 - 5.0
80 3.0 - 3.5 4.5 - 5.0 5.0 - 5.5 6.0 - 6.5
1V:6H 90 3.0 - 3.5 5.0 - 5.5 6.0 - 6.5 6.5 - 7.5

or 100 4.5 - 5.0 6.0 - 6.5 7.5 - 8.0 8.0 - 8.5
flatter 110 4.5 - 5.0 6.0 - 6.5 8.0 - 8.5 8.5 - 9.0
120 5.5 - 5.5 7.5 - 8.0 9.0 - 10.0 10.0 - 10.5
140 7.0 - 8.0 10.0 - 10.5 11.5 - 13.0 13.0 - 13.5
* Clear Zone distances over 15m should be evaluated on a site-by-site basis to justify the extra space
PAGE 34
3.4.3 Modification for the Outside of Curves

The base clear zone width (Bcw) values in Section 3.4.2 assume a tangent alignment. However,
horizontal curves may increase the angle of departure from the roadway and thus increase the
distance the vehicle will need to recover. The designer should adjust the tangent values to provide
wider clear zones on the outside of horizontal curves. Table 3.3 provides recommended
modification factors for the outside of curves (Mc). A value of Mc=1.0 should be used for straight
sections and insides of curves, as a modification is not necessary for these.
3.4.4 Clear Zone on Combination of Slopes
3.4.4.1 Variable Slopes

Sometimes a combination of two different side slopes may be used on a roadside, as shown in
Figure 3.5. A common application is a relatively flat recovery area immediately adjacent to the
roadway followed by a steeper foreslope. This type of application, often called as ‘barn roof’, can
provide the flat recovery area by using less material and space than a single continuous slope
would require.
Figure 3.5 – Variable Slope
If the clear zone width required for the first slope does not reach the second one, no extra
consideration is necessary, as an errant vehicle would stop before reaching the second slope. If
the clear zone width required for the first slope extends beyond the first and overlaps into the
second slope, the clear zone width for the steeper slope should be used.
Table 3.3 – Modification factor for the outside of curves, Mc [1]
Design Speed km/h

Radius (m)
60 70 80 90 100 110 120
900 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3
700 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 -
600 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 -
500 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 -
400 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 - -
300 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 - -
200 1.3 1.4 1.5 - - - -
100 1.5 - - - - - -
PAGE 35
3.4.4.2 Drainage Channels

Drainage channels are typically variable slopes with at least one foreslope and one backslope, as
shown in Figure 3.6. Drainage channels, depending on their geometry, can become hazards by
themselves. This can be checked from Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 in Chapter 4.
Drainage channels, which are not considered to be hazards, should be treated as variable slopes,
and the clear zone should be calculated accordingly, as explained in Section 3.4.4.1.
Figure 3.6 – Drainage channel
3.4.5 High Risk Hazards

High risk hazards are the ones where people other than the vehicle occupants (third parties) may
be harmed if reached by an errant vehicle. Chapter 4, Section 4.4 presents more detail into the
identification of some of the more common high risk hazards. Following are some of the examples
to high risk hazards where 3rd parties may be harmed:
 Adjacent roads and carriageways (Section 4.4.1)

 Storage of hazardous material (Section 4.4.2)
 Places of frequent pedestrian activity / places of public gathering (Section 4.4.3)
 Cycle Lanes (Section 4.4.4)
 Structures at Risk of Collapse (Section 4.4.5)
 Rail Lines (Section 4.4.6)
As explained in Sections 3.2 & 3.3.4, the recommended clear zone distances in Table 3.2 are
expected to provide enough space for approximately %85 of the errant vehicles to stop or regain
control. However, roughly %15 of errant vehicles may still travel further than the recommended
clear zone distance. It is possible to ensure a safe stop for a higher percentage of errant vehicles
by providing even wider clear zones. However, for regular roadside hazards, the costs of providing
the extra space may not always be justified by the benefits gained.
However, in the case of 3rd party hazards, the consequences can be so high, that even a 15%
probability of an errant vehicle reaching the hazard may result in an unacceptable level of risk.
Therefore, if a high risk hazard is located in the vicinity of the travelled way, the designer/engineer
should check for distances which are even further than the clear zone width recommended in
Table 3.2. Based on the information presented in Figure 3.1, it is recommended that the risk posed
by any 3rd party hazard located up to 30m to the travelled way should be assessed using
engineering judgment. If the assessment suggests that the likelihood of a vehicle reaching the 3rd
party hazard is too high, then the hazard should be removed, relocated to a further distance or
PAGE 36
shielded by an appropriate barrier. Considering the high consequences of the hazard, a high
containment level barrier should be used (see Chapter 7).
3.4.6 Other Considerations
3.4.6.1 The Use of Engineering Judgement

As explained in the previous sections, the recommended clear zone widths presented in this
chapter are based on empirical research data, which was later extrapolated to fill in the gaps in the
database. Therefore, the clear zone distances recommended in this chapter should only be taken
as guidance, rather than definitive values. The designer/engineer should assess each site on a
case-by-case basis applying engineering judgment and a justification should be provided for the
final decision.
3.4.6.2 Departures from Standards

A Departure or Departure from Standard can be described as a non-compliance with a Mandatory
Requirement of a Declared Standard. The clear zone distances presented in this chapter are given
as reference points rather than definitive values. However, the designer/engineer should aim to
provide at least the minimum recommended clear zone width for each site. Where special
circumstances arise and the straightforward application of the technical requirements cannot be
achieved or justified for some reason, such as the environmental impact, exceptional layout
situations or cost, users are encouraged to come forward with Departures or to propose additional
criteria (for aspects not covered by existing documents) based on a reasoned assessment.
Full justification for the grounds of the proposed departure must be forwarded to Abu Dhabi
Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport at an early stage in design. The departure must
demonstrate that the risk level of the proposed solution is as low as reasonably practicable. Formal
approval of the proposed Departure must be received before incorporation into the design and the
commencement of construction. Departures from Standard are determined on an individual basis
and a decision regarding a Departure for one location must not be assumed to apply to any other
site, even for similar situations.
3.5 Example Clear Zone Distance Calculations
3.5.1 Example 1 – Simple Recoverable Side Slope

Calculate the clear zone and evaluate the location of the electrical box.
Road Type: Multilane Divided
ADT: 10,000 per direction
Design Speed: 120km/h
Horizontal Alignment: Straight
PAGE 37
Solution:
Step 1 - Determine Base Clear Zone Width (Bcw)
Using Table 3.2 for:
 A foreslope of 1V:10H (i.e. 1V:6H or flatter)
 Design Speed: 120km/h
 ADT: 10,000 (i.e. over 6,000)
Bcw = 11.0 to 12.5m
Step 2 – Modifier for Outside of Curves

 This is a straight section of road; a curve modification is not necessary. Mc = 1.0
Step 3 – Calculate the Clear Zone Distance (Cz)
Cz = Bcw x Mc
Cz = 11.0 to 12.5m
Step 4 – Comment on the location of the electrical box

As shown in the figure below, the electrical box lies within the minimum recommended clear zone
distance of 11.0m from the edge of the travelled way.
The following treatment options should be evaluated:

 Remove the electrical box
 Relocate the electrical box beyond the 11.0 to 12.5m clear zone
 Use a passively safe electrical box
 Shield the electrical box with a barrier
 Delineate the electrical box, for example with reflective material.
PAGE 38
3.5.2 Example 2 – Side Slope on the Outside of a Curve

Calculate the clear zone and evaluate the location of the tree.
Road Type: Two Lane Undivided
ADT: 5,000 for both directions
Radius of Horizontal Curvature: 900m
Solution:

 A foreslope of 1V:4H.(1V:6H to 1V:4H)
 Design speed: 60km/h
 ADT: 5,000 (1,500 – 6,000)
Bcw = 4.5 to 5.0m
Step 2 – Determine Modifier for Outside of Curves (Mc)

 Radius: 900m
 Design speed: 60 km/h,
Mc = 1.1
Step 3– Calculate the Clear Zone Distance (Cz)
Cz = Bcw x Mc
Cz = (4.5 x 1.1) to (5.0 x 1.1)
Cz = 4.95m to 5.5m
PAGE 39
Step 4 – Comment on the location of the tree

 As shown in the figure below, the tree lies outside both minimum and maximum
recommended clear zone distance. Therefore no action is required.
3.5.3 Example 3 – Variable Side Slope

Calculate the clear zone for the variable side slope.
ADT: 8,000 per direction
Surface Condition of the Side Slope: Firm Compacted Soil
Solution:
Step 1 - Determine if the Non-Recoverable Side Slope (1V:3.5H) is a Hazard by Itself:

The surface of the side slope is firm and compacted, therefore, it should be considered as a non-
recoverable slope rather than a hazard by itself (see Section 3.3.3.1)
Step 2 - Determine Base Clear Zone Width (Bcw) for each side slope
Using Table 3.2 for both side slopes:
 For foreslope 1V:10H Bcw = 9.0 to 10.0m
 For foreslope 1V:8H, Bcw = 9.0 to 10.0m
 Foreslope 1V:3.5H is a non-recoverable slope. An errant vehicle would continue until the
bottom of the slope.
PAGE 40

 This is a straight section of road; a curve modification is not necessary. Mc = 1.0
 For side slope 1V:10H, Cz = (9.0 x 1.0) to (10.0 x 1.0) = 9.0 to 10.0m
 For side slope 1V:8H, Cz = (9.0 x 1.0) to (10.0 x 1.0) = 9.0 to 10.0m
 Because foreslopes 1V:10H & 1V:8H both require the same clear zone width of 9.0 to
10.0m, there is no need to prioritise one distance over the other. If different clear zone
distances were required for the two side slopes, the one with the longest width should have
been selected as the deciding distance.
 The non-recoverable foreslope 1V:3.5H falls within the recommended clear zone distance
of the 1V:10H foreslope. Because an errant vehicle would continue travelling until it
reaches the bottom, the clear zone distance cannot logically end on a non-recoverable
slope. In such cases, an additional clear zone space is needed at the bottom of the non-
recoverable slope. This additional clear zone is referred to as the Clear Runout Area. The
width of the Clear Runout Area should be equal to that portion of the clear zone distance
that is located on the non-recoverable slope. In this example, the clear zone distance based
on the recoverable slope (9.0 to 10.0 meters) overlaps on to the non-recoverable slope by
2.0 to 3.0 meters. Therefore, a Clear Runout Area of 2 to 3m is added from the bottom of
the non-recoverable slope, as shown in the figure below.
 Alternatively, the full width of the non-recoverable slope (3.0m) can be added to the
suggested clear zone distance based on recoverable slope (9.0 to 10.0m). Therefore, for
the combination of all three slopes;
Cz = 9.0+3.0 = 12.0m to 10.0+3.0 = 13.0m.
As shown in the figure below, this would give the same result, as the previous method.
PAGE 41
3.5.4 Example 4 – High Risk Hazard

Calculate the clear zone and evaluate the location of the high speed railway.
Design ADT: 25,000 per direction
Solution:

 A foreslope of 1V:8H.(1V:6H or flatter)
 Design speed: 120km/h
 ADT: 25,000 (Over 6,000)
Bcw = 11.0 to 12.5m

This is a straight section of road; a curve modification is not necessary. Mc = 1.0
Cz = Bcw x Mc
Cz = (11.0 x 1.0) to (12.5 x 1.0)
PAGE 42
Cz = 11.0 to 12.5m
Step 4 – Check for High Risk Hazards

 There is a railway line located 3.0m further away from the minimum recommended clear
zone and 1.5m further away from the maximum recommended clear zone.
Step 5 – Comment on the location of the railway line

As shown in the figure above, the railway line does not lie within the normally recommended clear
zone distances. However, as explained in Section 3.2, a small percentage of errant vehicles may
still travel further than the recommended clear zone distance. Considering the high consequences
of an errant vehicle reaching a high-speed railway line, and the relatively close distance of the
railway line to the minimum required clear zone width (3.0m), it can be said that the level of risk
posed by the current layout is unacceptable.
Designer/ Engineer should evaluate the following treatment options:
 Remove the railway line
 Relocate the railway line further away from the road
 Shield the railway line with an appropriate roadside barrier
3.6 References
[2] J. Graham and D. Hardwood, “NCHRP Report 247: Effectiveness of Clear Recovery Zones,”
NCHRP, Transportation Research Board, Washington D.C., 1982.
[3] AASHTO, Guide for Selecting, Locating and Designing Traffic Barriers., Washington D.C.:
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, 1977.
[5] P. Cooper, “Analysis of Roadside Encroachments - Single Vehicle Run-off-road Accident

Data Analysis for Five Provinces,” B.C. Research, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada,
PAGE 43
March 1980.
[6] M. King and D. Sicking, “NCHRP 492 - Roadside Safety Analysis Program Engineer's
Manual,” Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C., 2003.
[7] Norwegian Public Roads Administration, “Manual 231E, Vehicle Restraint Systems and
Roadside Areas,” Norwegian Directorate of Public Roads, Oslo, 2011.
PAGE 44
4 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
4.1 Introduction
A hazard is a roadside feature or object that can cause physical, economic, time-based or strategic
harm or loss, if reached by an errant vehicle (see Section 2.1).
Identification of roadside hazards is an integral part of the risk mitigation process. Hazards that lie
within the recommended clear zone area (see Chapter 3) are under the risk of being reached by
errant vehicles, which may lead to injury or even fatal accidents. Therefore, it is very important to
identify and evaluate all hazards within the clear zone, so that suitable countermeasures can be
applied.
However, it may not always be clear to the engineer/designer, whether a specific roadside feature
should be considered a hazard. For example, a roadside ditch may be considered a hazard or a
traversable roadside feature, depending on its geometry. A tree may be considered a hazard,
depending on the diameter of its trunk.
This chapter provides guidance to designer/engineers in the identification of roadside hazards. The
chapter presents a general overview of the types and properties of roadside features that may be
considered as hazards. Each type of feature is presented with local photos and physical properties
to help designers determine if the feature should be considered a hazard.
Information presented in this chapter does not cover every single possible roadside hazard and
therefore should be taken as a general guidance, rather than a definitive check-list. Engineering
judgment should be used to assess possible hazards on a case by case basis, prior to a final
decision.
4.2 Overview of Roadside Hazards

Table 4.1 presents an overview of the common roadside features that may be considered as a
hazard. As can be seen from the table, roadside hazards can be grouped into two main categories:
 Hazards with consequences to vehicle occupants;
 Hazards with consequences to vehicle occupants and third parties.
The first group of hazards are the roadside objects and terrain features, which may cause harm or
loss to the occupants of the errant vehicles.
The second group of hazards are the roadside features and areas, which may also have
consequences for third parties. The term “third parties” refers to a group or collection of people in a
public space, such as school, hospital or railway that might be injured in numbers by an errant
vehicle or by a hazard that is hit by an errant vehicle or a high value asset or facility that might be
adversely affected by such an event. These hazards are often referred to as “high risk hazards”. A
more detailed description for each of the hazards is presented in the following sections.
PAGE 45
04 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
Table 4.1 – Guidance towards potential roadside hazards [1]
Type of Hazard Examples of Parameters to Evaluate

A - Hazards with Consequences to Vehicle Occupants
Foreslopes (Embankments) Gradient
Height
Backslopes (Cutting Slopes) Compaction
Surface Condition
Ditch Type
Roadside Topography
Gradient of Foreslope
Gradient of Backslope
Ditches
Bottom Width
Compaction
Surface Condition
Gradient
Road Type
Transverse Slopes Design Speed
Compaction
Surface Condition
Edges of Bridges & Retaining Walls Drop Height
Trunk Diameter
Trees
Stump Height
Non-deformable Single Objects
Overhead Gantries and Cantilevers Passively Safe or Not

Support Structure
Roadside Sign Supports Diameter & Thickness of Support Posts
Passively Safe or Not
CCTV Masts and Luminaire Supports Passively Safe or Not
Concrete Foundations Protruding from the Ground Height from the Ground
Bridge Piers, abutments, tunnel portals Always considered as a hazard
Bridge Railing Ends & Ends of Concrete Barriers Always considered as a hazard
Above Ground Equipment Passively Safe or Not
Level with Ground Profile?
Drainage Pipes & Culverts Pipe Diameter
Traversable or not?
Non-deformable extensive obstacles parallel to direction of
Passively Safe or Not
travel
Continuous Objects
Non-deformable
Retaining walls Surface Roughness

Noise barriers Barrier Incorporated or not?
Fencing (Stone wall, wooden fence, concrete wall, etc.) Passively Safe or Not
Roadside Barriers Is it Necessary or not?
Water Depth
Permanent bodies or streams of water
Flooding Expected or not?
B - Hazards with Consequences to 3rd Parties
Volume of Adjacent Road
Adjacent Roads / Opposite Side of Dual Carriageways
Speed of Adjacent Road
Locations of Hazardous Material Storage such as Chemical Plants Always considered as a hazard
Structures at risk of collapse, support and load bearing Always considered as a hazard
Average Number of People
Places of public gathering and heavy pedestrian activity Volume of Pedestrian Traffic
Average Time People are Exposed
Heavily used bicycle paths Volume of Bicycle Traffic
Structures at risk of collapse Always considered as a hazard
Number of Trains per day
Adjacent Rail lines
Average Speed of Trains
Area of environmental concern such as source of drinking water Always considered as a hazard
PAGE 46
4.3 Hazards with Risk to Vehicle Occupants
4.3.1 Roadside Topography
4.3.1.1 Fill Slopes / Embankments

Fill slopes / embankments are the front slopes extending outward and downward from the shoulder
or verge hinge point to intersect with the natural ground line. Consequences of reaching a fill slope
for an errant vehicle may be more serious depending on height, gradient, surface condition and
compactness of the slope. A steep embankment with a very high drop, such as the one shown in
Figure 4.1, is an obvious hazard for errant motorists. However, for embankments with less steep
side slopes and lower drops, it may not always be obvious if a foreslope should be considered as a
hazard.
Figure 4.1 – A hazardous embankment
A foreslope of 1V:3H or steeper, such as the one shown in Figure 4.2, is considered as critical (see
Section 3.3.3.1) and a hazard by many countries around the world (such as US [2], UK [3],
Germany [4], etc.). This is because experience shows that the likelihood of a rollover increases
significantly when the slope is steeper than the 1V:3H level.
Figure 4.2 – Critical side slope by an interchange ramp
PAGE 47
Foreslopes which have a gradient between 1V:3H and 1V:4H are generally considered as non-
recoverable by many countries around the world (such as US [2], UK [3], Australia [5], etc.). A
vehicle entering a non-recoverable slope is generally not expected to overturn, but it is expected to
continue to the bottom of the slope as it cannot generally regain control and return to the road. As
long as they are free of obstacles and have a traversable smooth surface, these slopes are not
usually considered as hazards. However, the sandy roadside environment of Abu Dhabi introduces
an additional level of risk, as local experience indicates that vehicles are more likely to overturn on
areas of loose sand; even on side slopes flatter than 1V:3H. Unfortunately the available research
on the effect of loose sand on rollover incidents is not sufficient to provide a quantifiable
relationship. For this reason, engineering judgment should be used when evaluating fill sections
with side slopes from 1V:3H to 1V:4H and the height of the embankment and the compactness of
the soil should also be part of the evaluation process.
If the side slope has a loose sandy surface, which may cause vehicle snagging, the
designer/engineer may consider foreslopes up to 1V:4H as non-traversable and therefore a
hazardous slope. Conversely, if the foreslope has a firm compacted surface, or if it is treated with a
concrete surface, as shown in Figure 4.3, it may not be considered as a hazard for gradients
between 1V:3H and 1V:4H, subject to engineering judgment.
Figure 4.3 – Concrete covered foreslope
Fill slopes which are 1V:4H or flatter are considered as traversable and therefore generally not
considered a hazard. However 1V:6H is the recommended gradient for fill sections in new roads by
the Abu Dhabi Road Geometric Design Manual [6]. Therefore, ideally, the designer/engineer
should aim for foreslopes of 1V:6H or flatter. In addition to increased roadside safety, such flat
foreslopes are also ideal for maintenance operations and erosion control.
Figure 4.4 summarizes the recommended approach on evaluating if a fill slope should be
considered as a hazard or not. This is based on the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide [2]
approach and modified for the requirements of the Abu Dhabi road network.
A fill section should ideally have a smooth surface, be free of rocks and any other obstacles. Fill
sections with non-smooth surfaces may be considered as hazards, subject to engineering
judgment.
PAGE 48
EMBANKMENT IS NOT
CONSIDERED TRAVERSABLE
AND THEREFORE IT IS A HAZARD
DECISION BASED ON ENGINEERING

JUDGMENT AND SURFACE CONDITION
EMBANKMENT IS CONSIDERED
TRAVERSABLE AND THEREFORE
IT IS NOT A HAZARD
Figure 4.4 – Hazard assessment for fill slopes
The following countermeasures should be considered, for hazardous fill slopes that lie within the
clear zone:
 Flatten the side slope

 Provide adequate compaction for loose soil
 Provide a smooth surface of the slope
 Stabilise the top soil with cement (as shown in Figure 4.3)
 Shield the slope with a barrier
PAGE 49
4.3.1.2 Backslopes / Rock Cuts

A backslope in a cut section may be traversable and therefore not a hazard depending on its
relative smoothness and the presence of fixed obstacles. It may not be a significant obstacle if the
front slope between the roadway and the base of the backslope is traversable (1V:6H or flatter)
and the backslope is obstacle-free. However, a steep, rough-sided rock cut, as shown in Figure
4.5, is normally considered as a hazard and should begin outside the clear zone or be shielded. A
rock cut is considered to be rough-sided when the face is likely to cause excessive vehicle
snagging, rather than provide relatively smooth redirection.
Figure 4.5 – A hazardous rock cut, shielded by barrier
A common hazard associated with rock cuts is the rocks and boulders which may fall onto the
road. These rocks and boulders pose a significant danger to vehicles. To counter this problem,
roadside ditches that are wide enough to capture the falling rock, as shown in Figure 4.6, are one
solution provided alongside rock cuts. Other solutions which may be used include providing nets
and stabilising surface with spray concrete.
The bottom flat section of the ditches for capturing falling rocks should also be considered as
hazards and therefore should not be located within the clear zone. If the ditch and the cut face
have to be within the clear zone, they should be shielded by an appropriate roadside barrier.
Figure 4.6 – Typical rock cut section [6]
PAGE 50
4.3.1.3 Roadside Ditches

On facilities without curbs, roadside ditches may be provided adjacent to embankment locations
and in cut sections to control drainage, as shown in Figure 4.7. A smooth and relatively flat ditch,
with rounded corners can be safely traversable and not considered a hazard. These traversable
ditches should be considered as variable slopes, for clear zone calculation purposes (see Section
3.4.5.1). Conversely a ditch with steeper slopes and non-smooth toe transitions may not be safely
traversable and could therefore pose the risk of overturning or even launching an errant vehicle
into the air. These non-traversable ditches should be considered a hazard, and ideally should not
be located within the clear zone.
Figure 4.7 – Typical roadway ditch section [6]
Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 give guidance on the assessment of basic ditch configurations, from a
hazard perspective, based on the profile, foreslope and back slope. In the figures, light grey areas
represent traversable geometry combinations as recommended by the AASHTO Roadside Design
Guide [2]. Ditches with these properties are not considered hazards. White areas are considered
as non-traversable and a hazard and therefore should be redesigned to be located within the
traversable area.
PAGE 51
Ditch sections which are considered a hazard should be redesigned to a traversable cross section
to eliminate the risk, if practical,. However, if a redesign is not practical, a roadside barrier may be
warranted.
HAZARDOUS AND
NON-TRAVERSABLE
DITCH
(NON-PREFERABLE
CROSS SECTION)
NON-HAZARDOUS AND
TRAVERSABLE DITCH
(PREFERABLE
CROSS SECTION)
Note: This chart is applicable to flat bottom ditches with bottom widths equal to or
greater than 1.2 m.
Figure 4.8 – Assessment of cross sections for flat bottomed ditches [2]
PAGE 52
HAZARDOUS AND
NON-TRAVERSABLE
DITCH
(NON-PREFERABLE
CROSS SECTION)
NON-HAZARDOUS AND
TRAVERSABLE DITCH
(PREFERABLE
CROSS SECTION)
Note: This chart is applicable to all V-ditches and flat-bottom ditches with bottom
widths less than 1.2 m.
Figure 4.9 – Assessment of cross sections for V-profile ditches [2]
In addition to the geometry, the ditch should be smooth, well graded and should have well
compacted firm ground. Roadside hardware such as road signs, luminaire supports, electrical
cabinets, etc. should not be located in or near ditch bottoms, as shown in Figure 4.10, even if they
are designed to be passively safe. This is because an errant vehicle reaching the ditch is likely to
be funnelled into the bottom of the ditch. Therefore, any hazardous object located at or near the
ditch bottom would be more likely to get hit. Furthermore, due to the geometry of the ditch, an
errant vehicle may hit the roadside hardware while sliding sideways or even go airborne. In such
an impact the passively safe system may not function as intended. For these reasons roadside
hardware should be moved beyond the ditch and outside of clear zone.
PAGE 53
Roadside Hardware
located beyond the

ditch; outside of the
Roadside clear-zone
hardware located
at the bottom of
the ditch
Figure 4.10 – Incorrect and correct placement of roadside hardware around ditches
4.3.1.4 Transverse/Intersecting Slopes

Transverse slopes are slopes that are created by intersecting roadways, median crossovers,
berms or driveways. A transverse slope is actually the foreslope located at the side of the
intersecting road, as shown in
Figure 4.11. However, from the perspective of vehicles using the main road, these are slopes
which increase in height in the direction of traffic. As an errant vehicle may engage them almost
head-on, depending on the gradient of the slope, these may act as a ramp and launch an errant
vehicle in the air, or may even act as a rigid object and result in a head-on impact. For this reason
the gradient of the transverse slope is of importance when assessing whether it should be
considered a hazard or not.
Transverse Slope
F
Direction of or
Travel e
sl
o
p
e
Transverse Slope
Foreslope
PAGE 54
Figure 4.11 – Example of a transverse slope at an intersecting road

Transverse slopes located in the vicinity of freeways and expressways should be considered as
hazards. However, ideally there should not be any transverse slopes located at the sides of
freeways and expressways as these should be access-controlled via ramps, and perpendicular
access at grade intersections should not permitted. Transverse slopes may exist in the median of
freeways and expressways at the areas of emergency access; however, these areas should
already be shielded by barriers under DoT’s policy to stop illegal U-Turns.
For other road types, transverse slopes should be as flat as possible to eliminate any risk of
ramping. A transverse slope of gradient 1V:10H or flatter is considered desirable and therefore not
a hazard. The designer/engineer should ideally aim for transverse slopes of 1V:10H or flatter.
However, transverse slopes this flat may not always be applicable due to right of way and drainage
restrictions. If this is the case a transverse slope of gradient 1V:6H or flatter may be considered
acceptable, if the speed is considered low enough to not pose a significant risk. Speeds under
80kph are generally considered low speed. Transverse slopes which are steeper than 1V:6H pose
the risk of ramping and therefore should always be considered a hazard.
Once a transverse slope is identified as a hazard, the designer/engineer should assess the option
of flattening the slope to an acceptable level. If the slope cannot be flattened it should be shielded
by a roadside barrier.
Transverse slopes should be free of roadside hardware such as road signs, luminaire supports,
electrical cabinets, because an errant vehicle may get launched into these hazards head on.
Passively safe systems located on a transverse slope may not always function as intended either.
This is because hitting the slope head on would cause the front suspensions of the errant vehicle
to get compressed and this would alter the vehicle dynamics and impact height with the passively
safe system.
The evaluation of a transverse slope application at a specific site should depend upon many
factors, including:
 Height of transverse embankment,
 Traffic volumes,
 Presence of culverts and practicality of treating the culvert end,
 Construction costs, and
 Right-of-way and environmental impacts.
4.3.1.5 Edges of Bridges & Edges of Retaining Walls

A vehicle falling off the edge of a bridge or the edge of a retaining wall may lead to severe injury. A
vehicle falling off the edge of the bridge shown in Figure 4.12 is highly likely to cause severe or
fatal injury. The edge of such a bridge should be considered a hazard. However for bridges
spanning a much smaller and lower gap, it may not be obvious if the edge of the bridge should be
considered a hazard or not.
In Abu Dhabi, edges of bridges and retaining walls which have a drop height over 1m, as shown in
Figure 4.13, should be considered a hazard, and an appropriate bridge parapet should be
provided.
PAGE 55
For more details on the selection and application of bridge parapets, refer to Chapter 7.
Figure 4.12 – Example of bridge edge with a very high drop
Figure 4.13 – Bridge drop height
4.3.2 Non-deformable Single Objects
4.3.2.1 Trees
Trees with a trunk diameter over 100mm at maturity, measured from 400mm above ground level
should be considered a hazard. Groups of small trees with trunk diameter less than 100mm may
also be considered a hazard, if located close to each other. Tree stumps which protrude more than
150mm from the ground should also be considered a hazard.
PAGE 56
Figure 4.14 – Trees located in a median
Designers and engineers should remember that the removal of trees is a sensitive issue within Abu
Dhabi and therefore may not be acceptable. It is for this reason that designer and engineers
should asses the position of trees and landscaping carefully for new road projects; with a special
focus on possible future expansion of the road.
4.3.2.2 Overhead Gantries & Cantilever Sign Supports

In Abu Dhabi, roadside signs are required to carry both Arabic and English languages. The dual
language requirement leads to larger and heavier road signs. Overhead gantries and cantilever
supports are often required to support these large signs, as shown in Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.15 – A cantilever sign support
PAGE 57
Overhead gantries and cantilever sign supports should always be considered hazards. These
structures, due to their size and weight, are not designed to yield or breakaway during impact and
pose a risk to the occupants of errant vehicles. They also pose a risk of collapse on other road
users during an impact by a vehicle. For these reasons, the option of using a passively safe
system is generally not available. Also, it is usually not possible to relocate them too far off the
road, as they should be clearly visible to road users.
Due to these limitations, roadside barriers are often the only treatment option available to reduce
the risk posed by these systems when they are located within the clear zone.
4.3.2.3 Roadside Sign Supports

Roadside sign supports may be considered crashworthy or a hazard, depending on their structure.
Any support structure which would not yield and cause the impacting vehicle to stop abruptly
should be considered a hazard.
Unlike gantries and cantilevers, large and small roadside sign supports can be designed to yield,
break away or absorb the energy during an impact. Signs with an area greater than 5m2 may be
defined “large” and those with an area smaller or equal to 5m2 may be defined “small” [2], as
shown in Figure 4.16. These passively safe sign supports are not considered hazards if their
impact performances are proven in accordance with an impact test standard acceptable by Abu
Dhabi DoT, i.e. NCHRP350, MASH or EN12767. See Chapter 5 for more information on the
passively safe support structures and their testing.
Figure 4.16 – Small (left) and large (right) roadside sign supports
In addition to the impact worthy systems mentioned above, supports which are below certain
physical properties may also be accepted as passively safe and therefore not a hazard. These
include:
 Steel posts that do not exceed the equivalent section properties of a tubular steel post
having an external diameter of 89 mm or less and a wall thickness of 3.2 mm or less [7]
 Wood posts with dimensions of 100 mm x 100 mm or less [2]
Once a hazardous sign support is identified within the clear zone, the designer/engineer should
first consider removing or relocating the sign, as this would eliminate the risk of impact. Removal or
relocation is not always practical as signs should remain near the travelled way to serve their
PAGE 58
intended purpose, therefore passively safe systems or shielding with a vehicle restraint system
should be considered.
Another important factor to consider is the spacing of consecutive sign posts. Ideally, individual
sign posts should be as far away from each other as possible. This is firstly because consecutive
signs in a small area would catch the attention of drivers for a longer time and may cause
confusion, which in turn may lead to accidents. The second reason is that the probability of an
errant vehicle hitting a pole increases as the pole spacing decreases, as shown in Figure 4.17 –
Effect of pole spacing
4.3.2.4 CCTV Masts and Luminaire Supports

Similar to sign supports, luminaire supports and CCTV masts are also considered as hazards if not
designed to be passively safe. Currently, luminaire supports which are up to a height of 18,5m & a
mass of 450kg may be designed to be passively safe [2]. However, passively safe designs are not
generally possible for high-level lighting supports and CCTV masts, which are fixed-base support
systems. For more information on the assessment of passive safety of luminaire supports please
refer to Chapter 5.
PAGE 59
Figure 4.17 – Effect of pole spacing
Figure 4.18 – Examples of large luminaire support (left) and CCTV mast (right)
PAGE 60
Once a hazardous luminaire support is identified with the clear zone, the designer/engineer should
first consider removing or relocating the poles, as these would eliminate the risk of impact
completely. However, removal or relocation is not always practical as illumination and the CCTV
mast may need to remain close to the travelled way to serve their intended purpose. Therefore,
passively safe systems or shielding with a vehicle restraint system should be considered.
Additionally, similar to the sign posts, spacing of the illumination and CCTV masts is an important
factor to consider. As shown in Figure 4.17-Effect of pole spacing, the probability of a vehicle
hitting a hazard goes up as the spacing between the poles goes down. Therefore the
designer/engineer should aim to minimise the number and frequency of poles as reasonably
possible.
4.3.2.5 Concrete Foundations Protruding from the Ground

Concrete foundations of roadside furniture such as luminaire supports, control boxes, etc. are rigid
objects, and can cause significant harm if impacted by errant vehicles.
Ideally, concrete foundations should be level with the ground. However, soils in Abu Dhabi are
generally extremely corrosive. One of the applied methods to tackle corrosion in Abu Dhabi is to
elevate the roadside furniture above the ground level with concrete foundations protruding from the
ground, as shown in Figure 4.19. This way the contact of metal with soil is partly prevented.
However, breakaway systems such as luminaire and sign supports, would not work as intended if
the concrete foundations which they are installed on are protruding high above the ground.
Concrete foundations which protrude more than 150mm from the ground level should be
considered as individual roadside hazards, regardless of the system installed above them.
Proper compaction of the soil around concrete foundations is also of extreme importance. Wind
may blow loose sand off and expose the sides of an originally level concrete foundation. This may
transform the foundation into a hazard.
Figure 4.19 – Examples of concrete foundations protruding from the ground
4.3.2.6 Bridge Piers and Abutments

Bridge piers and abutments, as shown in Figure 4.20, are rigid load bearing structures which pose
a significant risk to the occupants of errant vehicles in the event of an impact. These structures are
also at risk of collapse if not protected properly and suffer a high energy impact by a heavy vehicle.
For these reasons, bridge piers and abutments should always be considered hazards.
PAGE 61
It is often not possible to remove or relocate these structural elements. Shielding with an
appropriate vehicle restraint system is often the only available option to mitigate the risk associated
with these hazards.
Figure 4.20 – A bridge pier (left) & a bridge abutment (right)
4.3.2.7 Bridge Railing Ends & Ends of Concrete Barriers

Ends of bridge railings and concrete barriers, as shown in Figure 4.21, are rigid obstacles that are
at risk of head-on impacts if left unprotected. They should always be considered hazards, and
therefore, any restraint system should be properly connected to it to eliminate the hazard.
Figure 4.21 – Examples of unprotected bridge railing and concrete barrier ends
Due to their intended function, these systems are more likely to be within the clear zone and
therefore should be protected with one of the following options:
 Shield with a crash cushion,

 Connect to a crashworthy terminal, via proper transition,
 Connect to an adjacent barrier system via proper transition.
Treatment is always necessary for the approach ends in both dual and single carriageway roads.
On single carriageways the departure ends should also be treated as these may be reached by
vehicles travelling on the opposite direction.
For more information on crashworthy terminals, see Chapter 9. For more information on crash
cushions see Chapter 10. For more information on transitions see Chapter 11.
PAGE 62
4.3.2.8 Other Roadside Furniture, including Control Cabinets,

Electricity Cabinets, Speed Cameras, etc.
In addition to the specific examples given in the previous sections, there may be other items of
roadside furniture located within the clear zone, such as control cabinets, electricity cabinets, and
speed cameras, as shown in Figure 4.22.
In general, these objects should be considered hazards if they are expected to cause vehicle
snagging and an abrupt stop to an impacting errant vehicle. Conversely, if they are not expected to
cause vehicle snagging, they may not be considered hazards. One way of achieving this is the use
of passively safe systems. For more information on passive safety, refer to Chapter 5.
Figure 4.22 – Examples of roadside furniture as hazards
As shown in Figure 4.22, these objects come in different shapes and sizes, from a single electrical
box to multiple poles. When evaluating poles, guidance provided in Sections 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.2.4
should be followed. When evaluating foundations protruding from the ground, guidance provided in
Section 4.3.2.5 should be followed.
For electrical boxes and control cabinets, it is possible to use passively safe systems. These
systems are designed to break away to minimize the forces exerted on the impacting vehicle, as
shown in Figure 4.23. They are also designed with electrical connections which disconnect during
an impact to eliminate the risk of electrocution. More information on these systems is given in
Chapter 5.
Figure 4.23 – Test performance of a passively safe control cabinet [8]

PAGE 63
4.3.2.9 Drainage Pipes and Culverts

Drainage pipes and culvers are conduits which convey water flow through a roadway embankment
or past some other type of flow obstruction. Drainage pipes and culverts are constructed from a
variety of materials and shapes; from a single metal pipe to a multi-cell concrete box, as shown in
Figure 4.24.
Figure 4.24 – Examples of a pipe (a) and a multi-cell box culvert (b) [9]
Pipes and culverts can be classified as either cross-drainage or parallel-drainage, according to

their orientation relative to the direction of travel, as shown in Figure 4.25.
Direction
of Travel
Figure 4.25 – Cross and parallel drainage
Sections provide detailed guidance on the hazard assessment of cross and parallel drainage pipes
and culverts. In general, pipes and culverts located within the clear zone should be considered
hazards if they are not designed to be traversable. A pipe or culvert may be considered as non-
traversable and therefore a hazard, if:
 Its inlet and outlet is not matching the surface of the side slopes (see Figure 4.26);
 It has large gaps, into which a vehicle may fall and stop abruptly (see Figure 4.27);
 It has features such as headwalls or pipe ends protruding from the ground, which may
cause an errant vehicle to stop abruptly (see Figure 4.30); and if
 It is high enough (over 1m drop height see section 4.3.1.5) to be considered as a bridge
(see Figure 4.24).
PAGE 64
Cross Drainage Structures:

Cross drainage structures are designed to carry water underneath the roadway embankment and
are in perpendicular orientation to the direction of travel. A cross drainage structure can be
anything from a single pipe to a multi-cell box as shown previously in Figure 4.24.
Research [10] shows that a small cross drainage pipe, with a diameter equal to or less than
900mm, is traversable and therefore not a hazard, as long as long as the pipe inlets are matched
with the slope of the embankment.
A pipe inlet which is protruding from the ground, as shown in Figure 4.26a, is a hazard and should
be levelled with the slope surface, as shown in Figure 4.26 .

Diameter < 900mm
Figure 4.26 – Hazardous (left) [9] and traversable (right) pipe inlets [11]
Cross drainage structures with an opening wider than 900mm are considered as non-traversable
and a hazard [2]. Figure 4.27 shows an example of a hazardous cross-drainage culvert with a
large opening. An errant vehicle reaching such a culvert may overturn on impact or fall into the
opening and come to an abrupt stop.
Figure 4.27 – Example of a hazardous cross-drainage culvert; with a large opening
Hazardous culverts with large openings can be made traversable by covering the opening with
appropriate pipe runners or a safety grate, as shown in Figure 4.28.
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Figure 4.28 – Traversable safety grate (left) [9] and pipe runners (right) [11]
Bar spacing and pipe diameter are important parameters when designing traversable pipe runners
or bar grates. Figure 4.29 shows the recommended design criteria for safety grates and pipe
runners, by AASHTO Roadside Design Guide [2].
Span Length Pipe Runner Diameter

Up to 3.65 m……………………………………………75 mm
3.65 - 4.90 m……………………………………….…..87 mm
4.90 – 6.10 m……………………………………….….100 mm
6.10 m or less with center support……………….….75 mm
Maximum 750mm
Figure 4.29 – Design criteria for safety treatment of pipes and culverts [2]
Bar grates and pipe runners designed to the above criteria were crash tested at the Midwest
Roadside Safety Facility in United States [12]. These tests showed that vehicles can traverse
cross-drainage structures with grated-culvert end sections constructed of steel pipes spaced on
760 mm centres on slopes as steep as 1V:3H and at speeds ranging from 30 km/h to 100 km/h.
The results clearly demonstrated that the culvert safety grates and pipe runners recommended in
Figure 4.29 are traversable and meet the safety performance guidelines set forth in NCHRP-350.
Modifications to the culvert ends to make them traversable should not significantly decrease the
hydraulic capacity of the culvert. Safety treatments should be hydraulically efficient. The 750mm
bar spacing recommended in this manual is not expected to significantly change the flow capacity
of the culvert pipe unless debris accumulates and causes partial clogging of the inlet. The designer
should consider shielding the structure with a barrier if significant hydraulic capacity or clogging
PAGE 66
problems could result. Where flood debris is not a concern for median drainage, much smaller
openings between bars may be acceptable and grates similar to those commonly used for drop
inlets may be appropriate.
Another potential hazard related to culverts is headwalls protruding from the ground, as shown in
Figure 4.30. Ideally, culverts should be level with the surface and no structural element, which may
cause an impacting vehicle to stop abruptly, should protrude from the ground. Such headwalls
should be considered as hazards.
Figure 4.30 – Examples of hazardous culvert headwalls protruding from the ground [13]
Non-traversable cross drainage culverts located within the clear zone, as shown in Figure 4.31 are
hazards.
Figure 4.31 – A cross-drainage culvert within the clear zone area
Once a hazardous cross drainage culvert is identified within the clear zone, the following treatment
options should be considered:
1. Remove the structure or extend it beyond clear zone. For inlets of pipes and culverts that
cannot be readily made traversable, designers may consider extending the structure so the
obstacle is located beyond the clear zone, as shown in Figure 4.32. However, this practice
does not completely eliminate the possibility of the pipe being hit. If the extended culvert
headwall is the only significant fixed object at the edge of the clear zone and the roadside is
generally traversable to the right-of-way line elsewhere, simply extending the culvert to
beyond the clear zone may not be the best alternative, particularly on freeways and
expressways. However, extending individual structures to the same minimum distance from
PAGE 67
traffic may be appropriate if the roadway has numerous fixed objects at the edge of the
clear zone.
Figure 4.32 – Cross-drainage culvert extended beyond the clear zone
2. Cover the culvert with a traversable safety grate. The preferred treatment is to extend or
shorten the cross-drainage structure to intercept the roadway embankment and to match
the inlet slope to the front slope with a traversable safety grate or pipe runners, as shown in
Figure 4.33. The design of the safety grate and pipe runners should conform to the criteria
shown in Figure 4.29.
Figure 4.33 – Cross-drainage culvert changed with traversable design
3. Shield the structure with a barrier. If the hazardous drainage structure cannot be removed,
relocated or made traversable, then it should be shielded with an appropriate roadside
barrier, with an appropriate crash worthy terminal leading to it.
Parallel Drainage Structures:

Parallel drainage structures are those that are oriented parallel to the main flow of traffic. They are
typically used under driveways, access ramps, intersecting side roads, and median crossovers, as
shown in Figure 4.34. As explained in Section 4.3.1.4, transverse/intersecting slopes should not
exist on high speed, fully access controlled roads such as motorways and expressways. Therefore
parallel drainage structures should not exist on these high speed roads either.
PAGE 68
Figure 4.34 – Example of a non-traversable parallel drainage structure [13]
As an errant vehicle is likely to impact the structure at approximately 90, parallel drainage
structures represent a potential hazard. Ideally, any parallel drainage structures will be located
outside of the clear zone; however, this will often not be practical because of the typical locations
for these structures. In addition, the designer must coordinate their design with that of the
surrounding transverse slope (See section 4.3.1.4) to minimize the hazard.
Research shows that parallel drainage pipes with a diameter equal to or less than 600mm are
traversable [10] and therefore not a hazard, as long as long as the pipe inlets are matched with the
slope of the embankment and the gradient of the transverse slope is 1V:6H or flatter, as
recommended in Section 4.3.1.4.
Pipes with a diameter over 600mm are considered non-traversable and a hazard. However, just
like cross drainage structures, it is possible to make parallel drainage structures traversable via
safety grates or pipe runners, as shown in Figure 4.35.
Figure 4.35 – Traversable safety grate (left) [13] and pipes (right) [14]
Bar spacing and pipe diameter are important parameters when designing traversable safety
grates. Research has shown that for parallel drainage structures, a grate consisting of pipes set on
610mm centres will significantly reduce wheel snagging [2]. Figure 4.36 shows a possible design
for parallel safety grates, recommended by AASHTO Roadside Design Guide [1].
PAGE 69
Figure 4.36 – Design criteria for safety treatment of parallel drainage structures [2]
Once a hazardous parallel drainage structure is located within the clear zone, the
designer/engineer should consider the following treatment options:
4. Remove the structures. The first treatment option to be considered is the removal of the
parallel drainage structure. Although this option completely eliminates the risk posed by this
hazard, it may not always be applicable due to drainage requirements. In low-volume
locations, such as local or collector roads, it may be possible to eliminate the parallel pipes
by constructing an overflow section on the intersecting side road.
5. Relocate the structure. The second treatment option to consider is the relocation of the
drainage feature to outside the clear zone, where it would be less likely to be reached by an
errant vehicle. Figure 21 presents a suggested design treatment.
Figure 4.37 – Alternate location for a parallel drainage culvert [2]
6. Cover the structure with a traversable safety grate. The third option is to make the drainage
feature traversable by matching its inlet to the slope surface and covering with a safety
grate or pipe runners as shown in Figure 4.36.
PAGE 70
7. Shield the structure with a barrier. If the hazardous drainage structure cannot be removed,
relocated or made traversable, then it should be shielded with an appropriate roadside
barrier, with an appropriate crash worthy terminal leading to it.
The following summarizes the preferred practices on the roadside safety treatment of parallel
drainage structures within the clear zone:
 Pipe diameter  450 mm. For these pipe sizes, a projecting end is acceptable.
 Pipe diameter > 450 mm to  600 mm. For these pipe sizes, the end of the pipe should
match the slope of the surrounding transverse slope. The opening to the pipe may remain.
 Pipe diameter > 600 mm. For these pipe sizes, the end of the pipe should match the
surrounding transverse slope, and the designer should provide grates across the opening.
This will reduce wheel snagging if an errant vehicle impacts the pipe end.
4.3.3 Non-deformable Continuous Objects
4.3.3.1 Fencing and Walls

Fencing and walls may be required along roads to protect drivers from unexpected intrusions from
outside of the right-of-way line. Fencing deters unauthorised and unsafe entry to the roadway by
vehicles, pedestrians, or animals.
Figure 4.38 – Pedestrian fencing along an urban road
Fence types used in Abu Dhabi include: woven wire, chain link, camel fence and pedestrian fences
[6].
Fences and walls which are not designed to be passively safe should be considered hazards if
they are located within the clear zone. Unfortunately, currently there is no testing standard
available specifically for the test of such systems. For this reason engineering judgment should be
used to assess the passive safety of such systems. For more information on fencing, see Chapter
16.5 of Abu Dhabi Road Geometric Design Manual [6].
PAGE 71
4.3.3.2 Retaining Walls

Retaining walls may be considered hazards, depending on the smoothness of the surface and
whether the surface of the wall is sturdy enough to resist the shock of the initial impact with a
vehicle.
Generally, the following types of retaining walls should be considered a hazard:
 Retaining walls which are covered by decorative panels for aesthetic purposes, such as the
one shown in Figure 4.39. If these walls are not designed to resist structural loading such
as that from an errant vehicle, there is a risk of an impacting vehicle snagging and stopping
abruptly, instead of sliding along the surface.
 Retaining walls with structural elements protruding from the surface, which may cause
vehicle snagging, such as the one shown in Figure 4.40.
 Retaining walls with a non-smooth surface, such as the types made of stacked
prefabricated elements, with large protruding parts.
Conversely, a retaining wall may not be considered a hazard if it has a smooth surface which
would not cause vehicle snagging and let the impacting vehicle slide along the surface. An
example of this may be a reinforced concrete retaining wall.
Figure 4.39 – Potentially hazardous retaining wall; covered with decorative panels [6]
Figure 4.40 – A retaining wall; with structural elements protruding from the surface
PAGE 72
When a hazardous retaining wall is located within the clear zone, it should be shielded with a
barrier. This may either be achieved with an incorporated and integral concrete barrier shape, as
shown in Figure 4.39, or with a separate barrier system, placed offset from the shoulder, as shown
in Figure 4.40.
In addition, the following will apply to the roadside safety aspects of retaining walls:
8. Flare rates. Use the same rates as those for concrete barrier. See Chapter 7.
9. End treatment. Preferably, the retaining wall will be buried in a back slope thereby shielding
its end. If this is not practical, use a crashworthy end treatment or crash cushion. See
Chapters 9 and 10.
4.3.3.3Noise Barriers
A noise barrier may take the form of an earth mound, a wall or solid fencing, or a combination of
these. Noise barriers with rigid structures should be considered as hazards, unless they are
designed to be crashworthy in accordance with NCHRP350 or MASH. Some designs use a
concrete safety shape as an integral part either of the noise barrier or as a separate roadside
barrier.
Figure 4.41 – Example of a noise barrier
Noise barriers may be required to be located within a certain distance to the edge of the travelled
way. Moving them away from the road would necessitate a taller barrier, which may introduce
problems associated with wind loads and aesthetics. For these reasons relocating a noise barrier
may not always be an applicable option if it is located within the clear zone.
The traffic facing the end of a noise barrier should also be considered as a hazard, which poses
the risk of a head on collision. Caution should be exercised when locating noise barriers near gore
areas.
PAGE 73
4.3.4 Bodies of Water

Bodies of water represent areas of high risk to road users due to the possible severe
consequences of vehicle submergence.
Still or flowing bodies of water such as, the sea, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, etc. with a water depth
over 1m are usually considered a hazard. When assessing bodies of water, engineer/designers
should also evaluate the sites where the water’s depth may rise over 1m during certain times of the
year, due to seasonal events such as heavy rain, tide and flooding.
Figure 4.42 – Permanent body of water
If the body of water under assessment is of any environmental significance, such as a reservoir, or
source of drinking water, it should also be assessed as a hazard with potential consequences to
third parties. A vehicle going into such a body of water may cause contamination, and affect others
who use the water.
4.4 Hazards with Risk to Third Parties
4.4.1 Adjacent Roads and Carriageways

Median crossovers are the cause of some of the highest severity accidents. Especially for roads
with high traffic speeds and volume, a crossover incident poses the potential risk of multiple high
speed collisions involving several vehicles. For these locations, the adjacent carriageway not only
poses a risk to the occupants of an errant vehicle, but also to many others travelling on the other
carriageway.
Adjacent roads with high speeds and heavy traffic, such as motorways, expressways and arterials,
should be treated as high risk hazards. The opposite side of dual carriageways should also be
treated as adjacent roads and therefore high risk hazards.
For divided roads, the median width represents the distance from the edge of the travelled way to
the hazard (adjacent road). If the median width is less than the required clear zone distance, and a
barrier is not used, the risk of a crossover incident reaches an unacceptable level.
Due to the right of way limits, it is often not possible to provide medians that are large enough to
mitigate the crossover risk without the need for barriers. For this reason median barriers are often
required to mitigate the risk of crossover incidents.
PAGE 74
4.4.2 Storage of Hazardous Material

Facilities such as chemical works, petroleum storage tanks or depots, facilities manufacturing or
storing hazardous chemicals in bulk may cause severe environmental and health problems if
reached by an errant vehicle. Such facilities should be treated as high risk hazards, and if they are
located within the clear zone, they should be removed, relocated or shielded by a barrier.
4.4.3 Places of Frequent Pedestrian Activity / Places of Public Gathering

Places of public gathering and frequent pedestrian activity are high risk third party hazards.
Consequences of an errant vehicle reaching a crowd would be extremely severe.
Examples of such places are:

 Heavily used public walkways,
 Schools,
 Residences,
 Businesses,
 Hospitals,
 Stadiums,
 Recreational facilities,
 Retail facilities,
 Factories, etc.
When evaluating these areas, the following parameters should be considered to assess the level
of risk:
 Volume of pedestrian traffic: as the number of people using the area increases, so does
the probability of an errant vehicle hitting at least one person and therefore the
consequences of the incident.
 Type of pedestrians in the area: The area may be considered a higher risk in the
presence of specific type of pedestrians, such as school children.
 Geometry and characteristics of the road: Certain road geometries, such as a sharp
horizontal curve located at the end of a long straight, may increase the likelihood of a run-
off-the road incident. If the pedestrian area is located at such an area the risk would be
higher.
 Type of traffic on the road: If high volumes of certain types of vehicles may cause even
more harm than the regular traffic, for example heavily laden freight vehicles, the
pedestrian area may be considered to be under higher risk
Once a high risk pedestrian area is identified, the following treatment options should be
considered:
 Design and manage the road to minimise the likelihood of vehicles running off the road and
reaching the pedestrians
 Locate (or for existing facilities relocate) the pedestrian area beyond the clear zone
PAGE 75
 If previous options are not applicable, shield the pedestrian area with barrier.
On low-speed streets the practice is generally to separate pedestrians from traffic by a sidewalk
separated from the roadway by a raised curb. However, at speeds over 40km/h a vehicle may
mount the curb for relatively flat approach angles. Furthermore, it is generally impractical to
separate pedestrians from the roadway with a longitudinal roadside barrier. Thus, for streets with
speeds over 40km/h, separating the sidewalk from the edge of the roadway with a buffer space is
encouraged [2].
When evaluating pedestrian activity, the designer/engineer should also consider the daily, weekly,
and seasonal fluctuations in the number of people using the area. If heavy pedestrian presence is
expected only for a short period of time for a specific event, such as a football match, concert etc.,
temporary barriers may be considered instead of permanent installations.
Road user behaviour, including unauthorised pedestrian presence, as shown in Figure 4.43,
should also be considered. This type of risk should be eliminated through enforcement and by
access control. For more information on fencing, refer to Chapter 16.5 of the Abu Dhabi Geometric
Design Manual.
Figure 4.43 – Example of unauthorised pedestrian presence at the side of a freeway
4.4.4 Cycle Lanes

Cycle lanes, similar to pedestrian facilities, may be considered as high risk hazards depending on
factors such as:
Frequency of Bicycle Traffic: Frequency is an important factor, because the probability of an errant
vehicle hitting a cyclist increases as the frequency of the cyclists on the cycle lane goes up.
Conversely for infrequently used cycle lanes or those designed with a roadside buffer, such as the
one shown in Figure 4.44, even if a vehicle runs off the road, the probability of it hitting a cyclist
would be lower.
 Type of cyclists on the area: The area may be considered a higher risk in the presence of
specific type of cyclists, such as school children
 Geometry and characteristics of the road: Certain road geometries, such as a sharp
horizontal curve located at the end of a long straight, may increase the likelihood of a run-
off-the road incident. If the cycle lane is located near such an area the risk would be higher.
PAGE 76
Figure 4.44 – Cycle lane
If a cycle lane is identified as high-risk, after the evaluation of the criteria mentioned above, the
following treatment options should be considered:
 Design and manage the road to minimise the likelihood of vehicles running off the road and
reaching the cycle lane
 Locate (or for existing facilities relocate) the cycle lane beyond the clear zone
 If previous options are not applicable, shield the cycle lane with a barrier.
4.4.5 Structures at Risk of Collapse

Some structures may pose the risk of collapsing on other road users if impacted by a vehicle, for
example, overhead bridges, pedestrian footbridges, gantries, high level masts, etc. A high energy
impact, caused by a heavy vehicle may cause significant damage to even the most rigid of
structures, such as the one shown in Figure 4.45.
A pedestrian footbridge, if collapsed due to a heavy vehicle impact, would not only harm the
occupants of the errant vehicle, but also the people who are on the footbridge and the road users
on which the footbridge may collapse. For this reason, these structures should always be
considered high risk hazards. If these structures cannot be removed, or relocated, they have to be
shielded by an appropriately specified barrier.
Figure 4.45 – Abutment of a pedestrian footbridge
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4.4.6 Rail Lines

Although rare, if an errant vehicle collides with a train, the consequences are often catastrophic.
The “Selby Rail Crash” was a high-speed train accident, which occurred in England in 2001. This
incident, where a high speed train hit an errant vehicle from a nearby road bridge, caused 10
fatalities and 82 severe injuries [15].
Railway lines, including high speed rail, tram, light rail and others, should always be considered a
high risk hazard.

A hazard is a roadside feature or object that can cause physical, economic, time-based or strategic
harm or loss, if reached by an errant vehicle. Hazards that lie within the recommended clear zone
area are under the risk of being reached by errant vehicles, which may lead to injury or even fatal
accidents.
This chapter presented an overview of the types and properties of roadside features that may be
considered hazards.
As a generalization, majority of the roadside hazards can be classified into one of the following
categories:
A. Hazards with Consequences to Vehicle Occupants

a. Roadside Topography
i. Foreslopes
ii. Backslopes
iii. Ditches
iv. Transverse Slopes
v. Edges of Bridges and Retaining Walls
b. Non-deformable Single Obstacles
i. Trees
ii. Overhead Gantries and Cantilevers
iii. Roadside Sign Supports
iv. Luminaire Supports & CCTV Masts
v. Concrete Foundations Protruding from the Ground
vi. Bridge Piers, Abutments & Tunnel Portals
vii. Above Ground Equipment
viii. Drainage Pipes & Culverts
c. Non-deformable Continuous Obstacles
i. Retaining Walls
ii. Noise Barriers
iii. Fencing
iv. Permanent Bodies or Streams of Water
B. Hazards with Consequences to 3rd Parties.
a. Adjacent Roads
b. Hazardous Material Storage
c. Places of Public Gathering & Pedestrian Activity
d. Heavily Used Bicycle Paths
e. Structures at Risk of Collapse
PAGE 78
f. Rail Lines
g. Areas of Environmental Concern
Information presented in this chapter does not cover every single possible roadside hazard and
therefore should be taken as a general guidance, rather than a definitive check-list. Engineering
judgment should be used to assess possible hazards on a case by case basis, prior to a final
decision.
4.6 References
[3] TD19/06 Design Manual for Roads and Bridges, Volume2 Highway Structures: Design,
Section 2 Special Structures, Part 8, The Highways Agency, Transport Scotland, Welsh
Assembly Government, The Department for Regional Development Norther Ireland, 2006.
[5] Austroads, Guide to Road Design Part 6: Roadside Design, Safety and Barriers, Sydney,
NSW: Austroads, 2010.
[6] Abu Dhabi Department of Transport, Road Geometric Design Manual, Abu Dhabi: Abu Dhabi
Department of Transport, 2014.
[7] CEN, Eurpean Standard EN12767: Passive Safety of Support Structures for Road Equipment
- Requirements, Classification and Test methods, CEN, Eurpopean Committee for
Standardization, 2007.
[8] Ritherdon & Company Ltd, “Ritherdon Passively Safe Cabinet,” [Online]. Available:
http://www.ritherdon.co.uk/products/passive-safety/passively-safe-cabinet-product.html.
[Accessed 16 07 2015].
[9] J. Schall, P. Thompson, S. Zerges, R. Kilgore and J. Morris, Hydraulic Design of Highway
Culverts, Third Edition, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administration, 2012.
[10] H. Ross, T. H. D.L. Sicking, H. Cooner, J. Nixon, S. Fox and C. Damon, “Safety Treatment of
Roadside Drainage Structures,” Transportation Research Record, no. 2060-08, 1982.
[11] Texas DoT, Hydraulic Design Manual, Texas Department of Transportation, 2014.
[12] D. Sicking, R. Bielenberg, J. Rohde, J. Reid, R. Faller and K. Polivka, “Safety Grates for
PAGE 79
Cross-Drainage Culverts,” Transportation Research Record, no. 2060, pp. 67-73, 2008.
[13] H. McGee, D. Nabors and T. Baughman, Maintenance of Drainage Features for Safety,
Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, 2009.
[14] Cherokee Culvert, “www.cherokeeculvert.com,” 17 05 2016. [Online]. Available:

http://cherokeeculvert.com/end-treatments/.
[15] BBC, “BBC News,” 6 January 2003. [Online]. Available:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk/2001/selby_train_crash/default.stm. [Accessed 1 May
2015].
PAGE 80
5 PASSIVELY SAFE SUPPORT STRUCTURES &

TRAVERSABLE OBSTACLES
5.1 Introduction
Passively safe support structures and traversable objects are those items of roadside furniture
which have been designed (and in many cases tested) so as to reduce the risk and severity of
injury to road users in the event of an impact.
“Roadside furniture” means any roadside objects used for the safety and control of traffic in
addition to those for assisting and informing the driver. This will include items such as highway
signs, roadway lighting and traffic signals.
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is always preferable, where practical and financially viable, to remove
or relocate a roadside hazard located within the clear zone of the roadside; however, there may be
instances where this is not possible. In such circumstances, consideration should therefore be to
replace the existing hazard with a passively safe support structure, or to make the hazard
traversable.
This Chapter will examine the ways in which the performance of passively safe support structures
and traversable objects can be determined, how they should be implemented into the roadside,
and how existing hazards within the clear zone (for examples culverts) can be made traversable.
5.2 Passively Safe Support Structures

Chapter 4 details those items of roadside furniture, and roadside features which are considered to
be hazardous and should be reviewed as part of the clear zone approach.
The use of passively safe support structures may be effective in reducing the severity of support-
related crashes, if removal or relocation of the support structure is not feasible or financially viable.
These types of supports are designed to collapse or break away on impact, thereby reducing the
severity of injury to the occupants of an impacting vehicle, compared to those that could occur if
the support was rigid.
However, due to the collapse modes of such systems, the risk to other people in the vicinity of the
passively safe support structure also needs to be considered. Therefore, the following issues also
need to be considered when specifying passively safe sign supports and their setback from the
roadway:
 The area behind the support should be free of other hazards and, in the case of breakaway
supports, a run-out area may be required. It is not acceptable for an errant vehicle to pass
through a passively safe structure and then strike an additional hazard behind.
 There should be limited pedestrian activity in the vicinity of the support as any detached
elements from the support posts could pose a high level of risk to pedestrian and other
vulnerable road users (see Section 5.2.1).
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05 PASSIVELY SAFE SUPPORT STRUCTURES & FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
 The speed limit of the road, and which systems have been successfully tested to those
speed requirements;
 Whether the road is kerbed or un-kerbed, as any impact prior to that with a passively safe
support structure may influence the dynamic performance of the support structure;
 The location of the support structure (mid-block or at an intersection) as this will identify the
direction(s) in which the passively safe support structure may be struck. Some structures
are impact direction sensitive, and therefore the possible impact scenarios should be
understood and considered when selecting a passively safe support structure;
 Whether the support structure is to be located behind a road safety barrier as this will assist
in determining the level of safety which needs to be provided by the support structure;
 Maintenance, repair and replacement requirements and associated costs [1].
The damaged support and any elements that detach under impact should not pose a risk to other
road users, and any level of risk should be quantified before the use of a passively safe support
structure is included within any roadside design. This may involve locating them at the property line
(urban and rural) or in an easement (rural). In general, impact absorbing poles should be favoured
over slip-base ones in areas of low traffic speed, parking and in areas with large amounts of
pedestrian activity. This is because the impact absorbing poles do not become detached from their
base during an impact, whereas the slip-base ones do. Therefore, the slip-base systems have a
higher risk of moving further than their base and collapsing on top of pedestrians or other
vulnerable road users.
Location of sign structures is important for road user safety. Factors such as road geometric
alignment, sight lines and decision distances should be considered to make sure the road users
are provided with enough time to read, understand and safely execute any manoeuvre required.
5.2.1 Types of Passively Safe Support Structures

There are a number of support structures often present in the roadside which can be made
passively safe, including:
 Supports for small and large roadside signs

 Gantries and cantilever sign supports (albeit in a small number of situations)
 Lighting columns
 Supports for traffic signals and surveillance cameras
 Emergency telephones
There are two main designs of passively safe support structures:
a) Slip-base and non-energy absorbing supports such as that shown in Figure 5.1 and Figure
5.2 are designed to breakaway at their base upon impact, allowing the vehicle to pass
beneath the support to minimise damage to the impacting vehicle and reduce the risk of
injury to the vehicle occupant(s). This may be achieved by a slip plane, plastic hinge,
fracture element, or a combination of these features. These can be uni-directional, bi-
directional, or omni-directional, and details on these three subtypes can be found within
Section 5.2.2.3.
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b) Energy absorbing supports collapse on impact by an errant vehicle and are designed to
decelerate an impacting vehicle in a controlled way. In some cases this means that the
vehicle will stop at the base of the support. These deformable supports are designed to
remain in the ground after being struck as shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.1 – Example of a slip-base support
The two types of passively safe sign supports outlined in this section are typically integrated into,
or promoted as, proprietary systems. However, in addition to these designs of supports, there are
a number of non-proprietary sign supports which are deemed to be passively safe, and which are
therefore also not considered to represent a roadside hazard. These are:
 Steel posts that do not exceed the equivalent section properties of a tubular steel post
having an external diameter of 89 mm or less and a wall thickness of 3.2 mm or less [2],
and
 Wood posts with dimensions of 100 mm x 100 mm or less [3].
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Figure 5.2 – Example of a slip-base pole mechanism
Figure 5.3 – Example of the failure mechanism for an energy absorbing support
PAGE 84
Figure 5.4 – Examples of impact absorbing poles
5.2.2 Small Roadside Signs and Their Supports

There are some circumstances where the size and therefore weight of a sign exceeds that which
can be supported by a single sign support, and this will depend on the design of the support
structure selected. Advice in this regard will be provided by the manufacturer of the support
structure, and in such cases more than one sign support should be used.
The Abu Dhabi Standard Drawings Manual contains details for structural supports for traffic control
devices. The Abu Dhabi MUTCD identifies practices for the selection, location, and design of
highway signs. For roadside safety applications, the following will apply to highway signs.
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Small roadside signs are usually defined as those supported by one or more posts and which have
a sign panel not greater than 5 m2 in area [3]. The supports for small roadside signs are typically
installed in one of the following ways:
 Set in a precast cylindrical concrete base,
 Driven directly into the soil,
 Set in drilled holes, or
 Mounted on top of a separately installed base.
Unless successfully impact tested to the requirements of NCHRP 350 or MASH (see Section
5.2.8), sign supports should not be braced as this can significantly affect the impact performance
of an otherwise acceptable design, especially in the case of yielding supports (see Figure 5.5). To
avoid the need for bracing, larger breakaway or multiple breakaway posts should be considered
when it is necessary to increase the strength of a support structure.
Figure 5.5 – Braced sign support [4]
The breakaway mechanisms for small sign supports consist of yielding, fracture or a slip-base
design. The most commonly used small sign support hardware and the characteristics of each are
described in the following sections. The mode of breakaway will be determined by the performance
of the sign support during the impact testing of the system.
Sign supports, gantries, cantilever sign supports, VMS and traffic light supports shall be designed
according to Abu Dhabi “Road Structures Design Manual” [4]. For issues not covered, the
“AASHTO Standard Specifications for Structural Supports for Lighting Signs, Luminaires and
Traffic Signals” [5] shall be used.
5.2.2.1Yielding supports for small signs

Yielding supports for small signs typically consist of:
 U-channel steel posts,
 Perforated square steel tubes,
 Thin-walled aluminium tubes, or
 Thin-walled fibreglass tubes.
Examples of these are presented in Figure 5.6.
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U-Channel Steel Post Perforated Square Steel Tube
Thin Walled Aluminium or Fibreglass Tube
Figure 5.6 – Examples of yield supports for small signs
To prevent the sign from twisting due to wind loading, a steel plate may be bolted or welded to the
pipe support. Experience from the US has shown a suitable plate size for such applications to be
PAGE 87
100 mm  300 mm  6 mm [3]. It is more difficult to predict the performance of yielding supports
than other support types as their dynamic behaviour can vary according to factors such as:
 The soil resistance,

 Variations in the depth of embedment,
 The size of the sign which is attached to the sign support,
 Stiffness of the sign support, and
 Mounting height of the sign.
5.2.2.2 Fracturing supports for small signs

Fracturing sign supports are those posts connected at ground level to a separate anchor. Anchors
for steel pipe and steel post systems are normally driven into the ground. Wood posts are typically
set in drilled holes and backfilled [3].
The breakaway feature for wood posts with dimensions greater than 100 mm x 100 mm can be
achieved through the process of drilling two 38 mm diameter holes near the ground level
perpendicular to the flow of traffic, and filled with expanding Styrofoam to prevent post
deterioration [7]. It is recommended by the Federal Highways Administration (FHWA) in the US
that such holes are drilled 10.2cm (4”) and 45.7cm (18”) from the ground, as shown in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7 – Drilled holes in wooden posts
PAGE 88
5.2.2.3 Slip-base supports for small signs

Slip-base designs are designed to break/shear when impacted by an errant vehicle, detaching the
main part of the sign support from an anchorage in the ground. The scheme designer should use
engineering judgement to consider where the disconnected post may land following an impact.
Slip-base designs can be classified as unidirectional (i.e. they are designed to work in one
orientation only), multidirectional (i.e. they are designed to be impacted in more than one direction)
or omnidirectional (i.e. they can impacted in any direction). Unidirectional and multidirectional
design should be installed in those locations where they can only be impacted in the direction for
which they have been designed (and tested). Conversely, omnidirectional slip-bases can be
installed in any location as they have been designed (and tested) to be impacted in any direction.
The most basic types of unidirectional breakaway supports for small signs are horizontal and
inclined slip bases, which use a 4-bolt slip base inclined in the direction of traffic at 10 to 20
degrees from horizontal, as shown in Figure 5.8. As shown during full scale impact testing, the slip-
bases have been designed so that on impact the sign will move upward to allow the impacting
vehicle to pass under it and not hit the windshield or the top of the car, thus reducing the risk of
injury to the occupants of the impacting vehicle. The inclined slip-base can only be impacted in one
direction, as shown by the red arrow. For this reason, neither the horizontal nor the inclined slip-
base designs should be used in medians, traffic islands, or other locations where impacts from
more than one direction are possible.
The multidirectional slip-base shown in Figure 5.8 is designed to function in two directions. This is
indicated by the red arrows. Multidirectional or omnidirectional bases (as shown in Figure 5.9)
should be used in the following locations:
 Channelizing islands;
 Intersections;
 Medians;
 Ramp terminals; and
 Other locations where a sign may be impacted from several directions.
Unlike rigid supports for small signs, there is a number of installation and maintenance problems
which can arise for slip-base systems, and these include:
 Wind and other vibration loads may cause the bolts in the slip base to loosen;
 The clamping bolts, which have low torque requirements, may “walk” or migrate from the
slots under wind loading;
 Over-torqueing of the bolts within the slip-base assembly.
PAGE 89
Figure 5.8 – Examples of unidirectional (top) and multidirectional (bottom) slip bases
Figure 5.9 – Example of an omnidirectional passively safe support before (left) and during
(right) impact
5.2.3 Large Roadside Signs and Their Supports

Large roadside signs are those which have a sign panel greater than 5 m2 in area. Due to their size
and the resulting wind loading and weight, large roadside signs will generally be supported by
more than one post.
PAGE 90
The breakaway mechanisms for the supports of large signs consist of fracture or a slip-base
design. Typically, the supports for large signs do not have a yielding mechanism. Further details of
these failure mechanisms can be found within Section 5.2.2.
5.2.3.1 Supports for large signs with an upper hinge design

A number of supports for large signs incorporate an upper hinge design – by this it is meant that
there is a designed saw cut through the web of the post to the rear flange and a slotted fuse plate
on the expected impact side. The rear flange then acts as a hinge when the post rotates upwards
in the event of an impact, as demonstrated in Figure 5.10. Slotted plates may be used on both
sides of the post if impacts are expected from either direction, thus making it multidirectional. An
example of such a sign support is shown in Figure 5.11.
Figure 5.10 – Example of the failure mechanism for an upper hinge design
Due to the functional nature of supports with an upper hinge, there are a number of restrictions for
their use:
 All signs should not be installed in such a way as to interfere with the functioning
mechanism of the post;
 Supplementary signs should not be installed below the hinges if the supplemental sign is
likely to strike the windshield of an impacting vehicle;
 The total mass of the support structure and any connected signs between the bottom of the
hinge and the top of the shear plate of the breakaway base should not exceed 270 kg [3];
 The hinge should be at least 2 m above the ground so that no portion of the sign or upper
section of the support is likely to penetrate the windshield of an impacting vehicle.
PAGE 91
Figure 5.11 – Example of a support for a large sign with a hinge
5.2.3.2 Slip-base supports for large signs

The mechanism and operational requirements for slip-base supports for large signs are the same
as those for small signs. For more details, refer to Section 5.2.2.
5.2.4 Gantries and Cantilever Sign Supports

Due to the size and/or quantity of signage which they support, overhead gantries (see Figure 5.12)
and cantilevers (see Figure 5.13) are often substantial structures and can in many circumstances
span multiple lanes of freeways or expressways. However, due to their substantial nature, it is
often very difficult to make the supports passively safe and hence, their posts can often represent
significant hazard to road users. It is for this reason that the posts of gantries and cantilever sign
supports should be considered significant roadside hazards, and dealt with in line with the
requirements of Chapter 2 (i.e. remove, relocate or protect with a vehicle restraint system).
Figure 5.12 – An example of an overhead gantry
PAGE 92
Figure 5.13 – An example of a cantilever sign
There are a number of passively safe gantries (see Figure 5.14) available on the market, and
these have the following advantages [8]:
 Lightweight construction;
 Passive safety – as shown by full scale impact testing conducted by TRL on behalf of
the UK Highways Agency in 2005 (shown in Figure 5.14);
 Strength;
 Quick installation;
 No maintenance (for aluminium systems);
 A fully engineered and developed design using proven components;
 Factory fabrication with good quality control of materials and components;
 Easy to recycle when the gantry is no longer needed.
Figure 5.14 – Example of a passively safe gantry [7]

PAGE 93
However, despite these advantages, in the event of an impact these may have serious
consequences for other road users. This may be the gantry falling down over or across the road
and in some cases, following traffic impacting the gantries and/or supported signs which would
then lie in the carriageway. Hence, before implementing a passively safe gantry across a
carriageway, the risks associated with its installation, and any subsequent impact must be
ascertained and quantified. If in any doubt, a vehicle restraint system should be provided in front of
the legs of the gantry, even if it is a passively safe system. It should be noted that the placement of
overhead sign structures is important for driver safety. Consider sight lines, decision distance, and
road alignment to provide the motorists with sufficient time to read, interpret, and safely execute
any manoeuvres required [7].
Necessary vertical and horizontal clearances should be provided for gantries and cantilevers; i.e.
6.5m vertical and 9.0m horizontal clearance. These requirements are presented in Abu Dhabi
Manual for Uniformed Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD).
5.2.5 Passively Safe Lighting Columns (Luminaires)

The Abu Dhabi Road Lighting Manual presents a detailed discussion on roadway lighting with
respect to:
 The requirement to provide lighting and lighting columns;
 The requirements for locating the lighting columns; and
 The design of lighting columns to provide the required level of luminance and uniformity.
5.2.5.1 The Height and Mass of Passively Safe Lighting Columns

The height of the lighting column to be used in a particular location(s) will depend on the length of
the arm at the top of the lighting column and the intensity of the light given by the luminaire,
however, as a general rule, lighting columns typically used in Abu Dhabi are 10 m or 14 m in
height. A typical installation of lighting columns in the median of the E20 (Airport Freeway is shown
in Figure 5.15.
Figure 5.15 – Example of 14m high lighting columns installed in the median
Following the risk assessment and mitigation approach within Chapter 2, if 10 m and 14 m lighting
poles cannot be removed or relocated outside of the clear zone, it may be possible to make them
passively safe, and a number of such products are available in the market. A level of passive
PAGE 94
safety can be achieved through either use of a slip-base, or by making the lighting column energy
absorbing in its overall design (for example by designing it to yield on impact). More details about
these passively safe failure modes can be found in Section 5.2.1.
The height of passively safe lighting columns should generally not exceed 12.5m on roadsides.
However, on central reservations, 15m and 18 m high poles can be used [8]. This is due to:
 The approximate maximum height of currently accepted hardware; and
 The height that can accommodate modern lighting design practices when foundations are
set at approximately the roadway grade.
On a limited number of roads, where adequate luminescence cannot be provided by using 18m
high lighting columns, high masts (which are 25 m high) are used. Due to their height, these
lighting columns are very rigid and therefore present a significant risk to road users. It is for this
reason that these lighting columns should always be protected by a safety barrier [3].
Following the clear roadside principals in Chapter 2, designers should also consider the use of
high-mast lighting columns as these can be used to both reduce the number of lighting columns
within the roadside, as well as enabling the columns to be placed further away from the travelled
carriageway. High-mast lighting columns are fixed-base systems which are not passively safe.
Where used, such systems should be located outside of the clear zone or shielded with an
appropriately specified barrier and should be located away from the natural impact side of the
roadway (e.g. the inner side of a loop interchange). As with all roadside hazards, high-mast lighting
columns should be located sufficiently far behind the barrier in such a way that in the event of an
impact, the deflection of the barrier will not interfere with the lighting column. This distance will be
determined by the dynamic performance of the barrier during full-scale impact testing to
NCHRP350 or MASH (see Chapter 6).
The mass of a breakaway lighting column should not exceed 450 kg to reduce the potential for
serious consequences [3].
5.2.6 Passively Safe Traffic Signal and Surveillance Camera Supports

The Abu Dhabi Traffic Signals, Electronic Warning, and Information Systems Manual presents a
detailed discussion on the design of these elements.
Traffic signal supports and surveillance cameras are a special situation where the use of a
passively safe support structure may not be suitable for a number of reasons. The first is that the
signals will typically be installed in areas of high traffic volumes and, in some cases, high
pedestrian volumes (refer to Figure 5.16 and Figure 5.17). As a result any detached elements are
likely to pose an unacceptably high level of risk to these parties. In addition, the confusion and
level of risk posed by the absence of a traffic signal is also likely to be high in the event of an
impact.
For these reasons, the use of a passively safe support for a traffic signal or a surveillance camera
is only likely to be suitable in a limited number of applications, following the application of
engineering judgement. In the majority of cases, traffic signals and surveillance cameras should
not be made passively safe, but should be moved away from the edge of the carriageway as far as
PAGE 95
Figure 5.16 – The complex siting of traffic signs
reasonably practicable, and located behind a safety barrier system; however, this will depend on
site conditions and available space, posted speed, vehicle movements, and the movement of
vulnerable road users such as pedestrians and cyclists.
Figure 5.17 – The siting of surveillance cameras
5.2.7 Emergency Telephones
5.2.7.1 Purpose and Need for Emergency Telephones

Emergency telephones provide motorists with a means of reporting incidents, which may include
an incident, a disabled vehicle obstructing a roadway or other emergencies for which assistance is
needed.
In general, emergency telephones should be provided on freeways with high traffic volumes
(>50,000 ADT). When determining the need for telephones in this situation, the effect of incidents
on congestion and safety is the main consideration. In rural areas, traffic volumes are generally
lower and congestion is not normally a primary consideration.
PAGE 96
Factors that need to be considered before placing an emergency telephone include isolation of the
road from abutting properties (e.g. limited access), the time required to obtain medical assistance,
any history of high incident rates, road geometry, roadside topography, issues with the provision of
telecommunications cables, and climate.
During the planning of an emergency telephone system, consultations should be held with
organisations responsible for the operation and servicing of the system, such as the
telecommunications supplier, the intended operator, and the emergency services. More details on
post supports for emergency telephones are provided in Section 5.2.7.2.
5.2.7.2 Locating Emergency Telephones

Given the rise in mobile communications the need for emergency telephones is likely to decrease
over time; however, engineering judgement should be applied as to the need for such telephones,
taking into account factors such as mobile telephone connectivity coverage.
The location of emergency telephones is determined by the acceptable walking distance for
motorists to safely and conveniently use the service, the level of risk in using it, and the location of
major features (e.g. interchanges) that may increase the need for the service at the particular site.
Pedestrian movements across freeways and other high-speed roads should be strongly
discouraged. Therefore, emergency/help telephones should generally be placed in pairs, directly
opposite each other (there should not be more than a lateral displacement of 50m between
opposite telephones) as shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 – An example of spacing of emergency telephones
Road type Situation Spacing (m) Consideration

General application 1000 Maximum walking distance 500 m
Increased because of difficulty in providing
Special circumstances 1200
Urban freeway safe access. Not for general use.
400 Particularly vulnerable to congestion.
Critical road sections
200 Severe network and safety implications
General (< 10,000 AADT) 4000 Lower probability of incidents
Rural freeway Higher volume (>10,000
2000 Depends also on site circumstances
AADT)
In addition the following factors should also be considered before locating an emergency
telephone:
 Telephones should only be installed on the right-hand side of the roadway where there are
up to two lanes per roadway;
 Telephones should be installed on both sides of the roadway where there are three or more
lanes per roadway provided that a vehicle can stand clear of through traffic on the median
side (i.e. there is a wide shoulder or an emergency parking bay available);
 Locations within interchanges should allow access by users of ramps as well as the main
roadway, and pedestrians should not be required to cross a heavily trafficked entrance or
exit ramp;
 Where no roadside barrier is present, the telephone should be located just outside the
shoulder, preferably outside of the clear zone;
PAGE 97
 Isolated sections of roadside barrier should not be introduced solely for the protection of a
telephone. Where a continuous roadside barrier is present, the telephone should be placed
near the end of the barrier;
 It desirable that emergency telephones are oriented so that the user faces the oncoming
traffic while operating the telephone;
 Emergency telephones should be situated at or near each major road feature, such as a
major interchange on a freeway or a major intersection on a highway. In such cases,
telephones are placed on the departure side of the feature;
 Approaching drivers should have adequate sight distance to the telephone;
 Visibility of the site from surveillance cameras should also be maintained;
 Access to telephone lines should be considered whilst determining the location of an
emergency telephone;
 Ambient noise levels should not unduly affect telephone usage;
 The location of lighting columns and signs must not conflict with the site proposed for the
telephone. However, at the same time road lighting must provide adequate illumination of
the telephone and phones should be placed within 10m on the approach side of a street
lighting pole. If street lighting is not provided, or is inadequate for identification and/or
operation of the telephone, special provisions may be needed to enable operating
instructions to be followed;
 Existing or planned vegetation must not obscure telephones or the vision of camera
coverage of the site;
 The topography of the ground in the vicinity of the telephone should also be considered
and, where possible, emergency telephones should be located in areas with a gradient of
1:6 or flatter (locations on steep batters are unsuitable);
 All emergency telephones should be numbered to assist callers reporting incidents, and to
provide unambiguous identification of the site for the deployment of emergency services
and maintenance staff.
Emergency telephones should be readily identifiable from the road during the day and at night from
a distance that enables drivers to stop safely.
5.2.8 EN12767, NCHRP350 and MASH Performance Classifications for

Passively Safe Supports
All passively safe structures shall have demonstrated compliance with the European requirements
of EN12767 [2] and/or the American recommendations in either NCHRP350 [10] or MASH [11] and
additional local conditions for the Abu Dhabi Road Network. Evidence of this shall be presented
and approved by the Overseeing Organization prior to the use of these systems. Only systems
approved by the Overseeing Organization shall be used.
After January 1, 2011, newly-tested passively safe support structures must be evaluated in
accordance with either EN12767 or MASH. However, support structures that were accepted before
the adoption of MASH by using criteria contained in NCHRP350 may remain in place and may
continue to be manufactured and installed.
PAGE 98
The European standard EN12767 classifies the support structures according to three main
categories:
 Impact Speed;
 Energy Absorption; and
 Occupant Safety.
All EN12767 tests are carried out with a 900kg test vehicle; impacting the support structure head-
on, as shown in Figure 5.18.
There are four different types of tests; all with different impact speeds as shown in Table 5.2. All
systems must first be tested with an impact speed of 35km/h. This low speed test is designed to
demonstrate if the failure mechanism works, even in low energy impacts. A secondary impact test,
with an impact speed of either 50, 70 or 100km/h, then follows. This secondary test determines the
system’s Impact Speed Class, as shown in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.18 – Example of an EN12767 test
Table 5.2 – EN12767 impact speed categories [2]
Speed Class km/h Impact Speeds km/h

50 35 and 50
70 35 and 70
100 35 and 100
An important measure of performance for a passively safe support structure is the amount of
energy absorbed during the impact. The lower the impact absorption, the higher the safety is likely
to be. As an example, a regular support structure would absorb all the energy during an impact
and therefore the impact force is exerted into the vehicle and then to the occupants; causing injury.
In EN12767, the energy absorption characteristic of a system is assessed through the reduction in
the speed of the vehicle, as a result of the impact. Depending on the amount of reduction, the
product is classified as either High Energy Absorbing (HE), Low Energy Absorbing (LE) or Non
Energy absorbing (NE), as shown in Table 5.3.
PAGE 99
Table 5.3 – EN12767 energy absorption categories [2]
Impact Speed (km/h) 50 70 100
Energy Absorption Category Exit speed, ve (km/h)
HE ve = 0 0 ≤ ve ≤ 5 0 ≤ ve ≤ 50
LE 0 < ve ≤ 5 5 < ve ≤ 30 50 < ve ≤ 70
NE 5 < ve ≤ 50 30 < ve ≤ 70 70 < ve ≤ 100
In addition, EN12767 also requires passively safe products to be classified by their impact severity.
During the test, longitudinal and angular accelerations are measured through accelerometers
installed on the test vehicle. The occupant safety is then assessed through severity indices, which
are based on the accelerometer measurements. Following are the indices, which are used to
evaluate occupant safety in EN12767:
 Acceleration Severity Index (ASI): A concept which has been developed for assessing
occupant impact severity for vehicles involved in collisions with road restraint systems;
 Theoretical Head Impact Velocity (THIV): A concept where the theoretical velocity of the
impact of an occupant’s head with the interior surface of the vehicle is assessed as a
measure of impact severity.
Once the ASI and THIV are calculated, the Occupant Severity Level is then determined as shown
in Table 5.4. The lower the ASI and THIV values are, the higher the occupant safety would be.
Therefore, the Occupant Severity Level 3 provides the highest level of safety, which is followed by
Levels 2 and 1.
Table 5.4 – EN12767 occupant safety classification [2]
Speeds
Energy Mandatory Low Speed Test at Speed Class Impact Test at 50,
Occupant 35km/h 70 or 100km/h
Absorption
Severity Level
Categories Maximum Value Maximum Value
ASI THIV (km/h) ASI THIV (km/h)
High Energy 1 1,0 27 1,4 44
Absorbing 2 1,0 27 1,2 33
(HE), 3 1,0 27 1,0 27
1 1,0 27 1,4 44
Low Energy 33
2 1,0 27 1,2
Absorbing (LE)
3 1,0 27 1,0 27
1 1,0 27 1,2 33
Non Energy 2 1,0 27 1,0 27
absorbing 3 0,6 11 0,6 11
(NE), No No Impact speed - exit speed
4
requirement requirement <3km/h
In addition, during the test the structure must ensure that:

PAGE 100
 The test item shall behave in a manner predicted by the manufacturer, in terms of shearing
or detaching, deforming only, or deforming and shearing;
 The test item or detached elements, fragments or other major debris from the test item shall
not penetrate the occupant compartment. The windscreen may be fractured but shall not be
penetrated;
 The vehicle shall remain upright for not less than 12 m beyond the impact point with a (roll
angle) less than 45º and a (pitch angle) less than 45º. Roll and pitch refer to the angle of
change along x and y axes respectively, as shown in Figure 5.19.
For testing to the American requirements of NCHRP350 or MASH, the breakaway support must
perform in a predictable manner when struck head-on by an 820 kg car (NCHRP350) and/or an
1100 kg car and a 2270 kg pickup truck (MASH), at a speed from 30 km/h to 100 km/h [2]. In
addition, the testing is conducted to ensure that:
 When impacted, the structural support must react in a predictable manner by breaking
away, fracturing or yielding;
Figure 5.19 – Pitch and Roll Angles
 No components must penetrate or show potential to penetrate the occupant compartment

of the test vehicle;
 The vehicle must remain stable and upright during and after the impact;
 There must be no significant deformation or intrusion of the windshield or passenger
compartment;
 Limits are placed on the transverse and longitudinal components of the occupant impact
velocity to avoid the possibility of serious injury.
These specifications also establish a maximum stub height of 150 mm. This reduces the possibility
of snagging the undercarriage of a vehicle after a support has broken away from its base.
5.2.9 Selection Criteria for Passively Safe Support Structures

In Abu Dhabi, breakaway supports can be used on roads with a design speed equal to, or greater
than 80 km/h.
PAGE 101
Where a passively safe support is to be used, it shall have been tested to an impact speed which
reflects the posted speed limit of the road. Within NCHRP350 and MASH, the maximum
designated test speed is 100km/h. For roads with a speed limit equal to or in excess of 100km/h,
the passively safe structure shall have been tested to 100km/h.
When choosing an EN12767 system, the following should be considered, with regards to Energy
Absorption characteristics. Category NE supports provide a lower risk of injury to vehicle
occupants than HE or LE, and can be the most appropriate choice on non-built up roads with
insignificant volumes of non-motorized users (NMUs). Category LE and HE supports reduce the
risk of secondary incidents and collision with NMUs, as the vehicle exit speed is lower, and thus
can have advantages on built-up roads where there is a significant volume of NMUs. [12]
Category NE supports are generally slip-base systems. Slip-base supports are mostly suitable for
locations where vehicle speeds are greater than 60 km/h and are the preferred type of frangible
poles [13]. Due to the risk posed from detached elements from the slip-base systems, impact
absorbing supports are suited to locations where it is undesirable for a pole to fall to the ground,
such as in high pedestrian use areas or where the median or traffic island in which the pole is
located is narrow and traffic volumes are high [13]. Impact absorbing supports are usually category
LE in EN12767. In areas where pedestrians are likely to exist, the volume of pedestrian traffic
should be reviewed to determine if a slip-base support will present a greater potential hazard to the
pedestrian traffic than a non-breakaway support will to the vehicular traffic. This should be
ascertained using engineering judgement and experience. Locations where the hazard potential to
pedestrian traffic may be greater than the risk to vehicle occupants will include:
 Parking lots;
 Tourist attractions;
 School zones; or
 Central business districts and local residential neighbourhoods where the posted speed
limited is 50 km/h or less [3].
In these locations, non-passively safe supports and lighting columns may be a better choice. Non-
passively safe supports are generally category HE in EN12767. Other locations that typically
require the use of non-breakaway bases, regardless of the pedestrian traffic volume, are rest areas
and combined light and traffic signal poles.
In some rare cases an engineer may consider placing a passively safe support structure within the
working width of a barrier. However, whilst they are designed to reduce the risk of injury to road
users in the event of an impact, passively safe products should not be placed within the working
width of a safety barrier (or equivalent for other vehicle restraint system types). One such case is
shown in Figure 5.20; where there is an existing barrier to shield the rock face but not enough
space beyond the working width of the barrier to place a support structure. In this case an engineer
may be tempted to place a passively safe system, within the working width, as there is not enough
space to place a rigid one behind the working width. The safety of this kind of installation is
debatable; as these systems are designed and tested to work without secondary impacts.
PAGE 102
Figure 5.20 – Passively safe supports should not be installed in the working width of a
safety barrier
5.2.10 Application Criteria for Passively Safe Supports

The Abu Dhabi Standard Drawings Manual presents the hardware details for the safe installation
of roadside furniture such as highway signs, lighting columns, and traffic signals.
Following the approach detailed within Chapter 3, before specifying the use of any type of support
structure within the roadside or median, the following points should be considered [1]:
 Avoid placing poles close to the roadway - Any roadway improvement that involves
reconstruction of utility services should take the opportunity to avoid placement of poles
close to the roadway. This proactive approach will avoid problems rather than having to
rectify them in future. Where possible, poles should be located as far away from the
roadside as possible to minimise the risk of an errant vehicle hitting them;
 Pole removal – In all cases, poles should be removed wherever possible. It should be
noted however, that on tangents to curves where there is a crash history, the removal of a
pole may lead to crashes migrating to the next available pole. When considering removal of
a pole with a crash history it is important to understand why vehicles are leaving the road
and take action to keep vehicles on the road;
 Undergrounding cables – The relocation of utility services to underground ducts and
removal of the poles is the most effective option for the treatment of hazardous poles;
 Rationalisation of pole functions - It may be possible to rationalise the number of poles
along a road corridor by combining separate functions and services onto common poles.
For example, traffic signals, road lighting and large signage may be supported by the same
poles. Power cables, telecommunication services and spotlights can share common poles.
However, care must be taken so as not to overload the post and, in the case of passively
PAGE 103
safe sign supports, adversely affect their impact performance characteristics. It may be
possible to place all poles on the side of the road that has the better safety performance or
least risk. This may involve changing the poles from side to side as the crash risk changes
along a curved route;
 Reducing pole numbers by increasing spacing - Increased pole spacing provides areas
for errant vehicles to pass between poles as shown in Figure 5.21.
 The effective gaps for vehicles to pass through are dependent on the width of the vehicle
and the exit angles. If increased pole spacing is used to reduce the roadside risk then
designers should check that the poles being removed to increase pole spacing are those
that have been involved in crashes or have the higher risk. It would be counterproductive to
remove poles which have not been a hazard but leave the high-risk poles in place;
Relocation - Pole relocation needs to target areas where the run-off-road crashes are
likely, for example on the approach to curves, the outside of curves, near lane merges, lane
terminations, adjacent to exits from roundabouts and intersections. Research [1] has
confirmed the belief that the number of crashes decreases as poles are moved further from
the roadway. The expected percentage reduction in pole crashes with increasing distance
from the roadway is shown in Table 5.5.
Figure 5.21 – Reducing pole numbers by increasing spacing

PAGE 104
Table 5.5 – Percentage reduction in pole crashes with increasing distance from the roadway
[1]
Distance from roadway Distance from roadway after relocation (m)
before relocation (m) 1.8 2.4 3.0 3.7 4.6 5.2 6.1 7.6 9.1
0.6 50 58 64 68 72 74 77 80 82
0.9 35 46 53 58 64 67 70 74 77
1.2 22 35 44 50 57 60 65 69 73
1.5 11 26 36 43 51 55 59 65 69
1.8 0 17 28 36 45 49 54 61 65
2.1 8 20 29 39 44 50 57 62
2.4 0 13 23 33 39 45 53 58
3.0 0 11 23 29 37 45 52
3.3 5 18 25 33 42 49
3.7 0 14 20 29 39 46
4.0 9 16 25 35 43
4.3 4 12 21 32 40
4.6 0 8 17 29 37
Example: A lighting pole is located 1.8m from the edge of the travelled way. If the pole is relocated
to 5.2m from the edge of the travelled way, a 49% reduction is expected in the number of crashes
with the pole; using Table 5.5.
5.2.10.1 Foundation Requirements for Passively Safe Systems

In many cases, the performance of a passively safe support will be dependent on the foundations
surrounding the support. In some cases, the design of the support system will be such that any
movement or rotation of the support in the ground may inhibit (or in extreme cases, stop) the safe
functioning of the passively safe device. For this reason it is essential that the promoter of the
system is requested to provide details of the foundation requirements for their system, prior to its
installation. In those cases where the system has not been tested in the soil type into which it is to
be installed, the promoter should be asked to provide supporting evidence to ensure that the full
performance of the system can be realised in the foundation into which it is to be installed.
As shown through full-scale impact testing, slip-base mechanisms (see Section 5.2.2.3) are
designed to release when impacted at a typical bumper height of about 500mm and properly to
activate if loaded in shear rather than bending stress. For this reason, slip-base systems should
only be installed in areas where the foreslope is limited to 1V:6H. Supports placed on foreslopes
that are between 1V:4H and 1V:6H are only acceptable when the face of the support is within
600mm of the intersection of the shoulder slope and the foreslope, as shown in Figure 5.22.
No passively safe supports should be located in drainage ditches where erosion of the ditch could
affect the proper operation of the breakaway mechanism. A vehicle entering the ditch could also be
inadvertently guided into the support.
PAGE 105
Intersection of shoulder
slope and fore slope
Passively Safe Support Structure
Foreslope between 1V:4H and 1V:6H

Less than 600mm
Acceptable
Greater than 600mm

Not Acceptable
Figure 5.22 – Use of passively safe support structures on slopes
5.2.10.2 Electrical Disconnection of Passively Safe Lighting columns,

Traffic Signals and Illuminated Signs
For passively safe lighting columns, traffic signals and illuminated signs, a power supply will be
required into to provide the power for the lighting systems. In many passively safe designs, the
associated electrical connections are also designed to disconnect in the event of an impact, and
then subsequently easy to reconnect.
There are a range of different commercially available electrical isolation solutions, and these fall
into three broad categories [8]:
Pull-out plug – This solution utilises a rugged plug and socket assembly mounted within the signal
pole at ground level. In the event of an impact, the plug assembly will be pulled apart due to the
movement of the pole, therefore achieving electrical isolation of the pole. Both LE and NE products
will probably give the movement needed to separate a pull-out plug system. If the broken post was
effectively tethered by the electrical supply, this would interfere with the movement of the post and
the vehicle might overrun the post, or a restrained post might hit a windscreen [8]. A HE support
may not give the movement needed to separate a plug system depending on the rotation of the
post in the ground.
Circuit breaker – This method obtains electrical isolation by using a current sensor to ascertain if
the electrical current drawn exceeds a present threshold. If a fault state is achieved, isolators
automatically turn off the power within a maximum duration of 0.4 seconds.
Impact sensor – Similar to the circuit breaker system, the impact sensor is mounted in the pole,
which in the event of a vehicle striking the pole, is used to activate isolators mounted in the traffic
signal cabinet.
Any exposed electrical connection (when detached from the support structure), can pose a risk of
electrocution to the occupant of the errant vehicle, other road users and/or emergency services
attending the scene. For this reason the electrical circuit controlling the power to the mounted
system should operate with a maximum disconnection time of 0.4 seconds when fault conditions
occur [2]. In addition, the electrical disconnection should take place in a location which is as close
to the foundation as practicable.
PAGE 106
5.2.10.3 Locating Passively Safe Sign Supports

Although the Abu Dhabi MUTCD specifies the general location of large roadside signs, the
designer has to apply engineering knowledge with regard to the exact placement of any given sign.
Further guidance on the locating of posts can be found within Section 5.2.10.
It should be borne in mind that once struck, the sign can become a maintenance problem,
requiring repair. It is for this reason that even passively safe sign supports should be located where
they are least likely to be hit and, when feasible, outside the clear zone. Furthermore, the
continuous wind buffeting caused by passing vehicles may create fatigue problems on the
threaded components of sign supports, if they incorporate such components. To overcome this
problem, passively safe signs should wherever possible be placed so that the edge of the sign is
not closer than 1.2 m from the carriageway edge [12].
5.2.10.4 Locating Passively Safe Lighting Columns

It may be the case that the design of the lighting is such that lighting columns are needed to be
place in high risk locations such as gore areas, traffic islands, off ramps, and intersections. At all
times, the safety implications of locating the lighting column should be considered using
engineering judgement and if possible, the lighting column should be moved to a location which
would represent a lower level of risk to the road user. This may mean removing the lighting
column. In cases where the column cannot be moved, engineering judgement should be applied to
determine the best solution to reduce the risk posed to road users.
Figure 5.23 gives an example of a poor location of a lighting column as there is little protection
given to road users on the main line of the road, those turning right, or those turning from the road
on the right onto the main line. In such a location, it would be prudent to consider removing the
lighting column (an example of which is shown in Figure 5.24), moving it behind the safety barrier
further down the road, or to consider the use of a crash cushion in front of the lighting column and
signs. Note that in the example shown in Figure 5.24, the large posts and raised kerb will also
present a hazard and hence, this is still not an optimised solution.
Figure 5.23 – Example of poor lighting column positioning at a traffic island
PAGE 107
Figure 5.24 – An example of a traffic island with no lighting columns
In both of the examples shown in Figure 5.23 and Figure 5.24 further risk assessment and
remedial work should be undertaken to reduce the risk to road users from the unprotected signs
located on the island (unless they are passively safe). Such a risk assessment should assess each
of the possible vehicle approaches, and the hazards which may exist within that road space.
Possible speeds and angles of impact should be considered, and the probability and
consequences of each scenario assessed. Remedial measures should then be undertaken to
reduce these risks to a point which is as low as reasonably practicable (refer to Chapter 2).
Because of the potential hazard to road users posed by the rigid nature and large size of lighting
columns, the general approach to lighting is to use breakaway supports wherever possible. All new
lighting columns located within the clear zone of a roadway (refer to Chapter 3) where no
pedestrian facilities exist will be placed on breakaway supports, unless they are located behind or
on a barrier or protected by crash cushions, which are necessary for other roadside safety
reasons. Engineering judgement should also be applied to lighting columns located outside the
clear zone to assess whether they too should be passively safe if there is a reduced probability of
them being struck by errant vehicles.
A luminaire support will generally fall near the line of the path of an impacting vehicle with the mast
arm usually rotating so it points away from the roadway when resting on the ground. This action
generally prevents the pole from going into other traffic lanes. However, these falling poles may
endanger bystanders such as pedestrians and bicyclists or other motorists and these risks should
be quantified before the specification of passively safe lighting columns (refer also to Section
5.2.1).
5.2.10.5 Locating Passively Safe Traffic Signals and Surveillance

Cameras
Due to the need to provide information and instructions to road users, designers will have only
limited options available in determining acceptable locations for the placement of traffic signal and
surveillance pedestals, signal and surveillance poles, pedestrian detectors, and control cabinets,
as shown in Figure 5.25.
Considering roadside safety, these elements should be placed as far from the roadway as
practical. However, due to visibility requirements, limited mast-arm lengths, limited right-of-way, or
pedestrian requirements, traffic signal and surveillance equipment often must be placed relatively
PAGE 108
close to the travelled way as shown in Figure 5.25. Note that in the example of Figure 5.25 risks to
road users are also posed from the trees and the other roadside posts/lighting columns.
Figure 5.25 – Example of a surveillance camera and control cabinet
When placing passively safe traffic signals and surveillance cameras, the requirements of Chapter
3 should be considered, and the hazard should be placed outside of the calculated clear zone.
However, it is not only the support which poses a risk to road users, it may also be the associated
control cabinet.
In determining the location of the control cabinet, the designer should consider the following:
 The controller cabinet should be placed in a position so that it is unlikely to be struck by

errant vehicles. It should be outside the clear zone, if practical;
 The controller cabinet should be located where it can be easily accessed by maintenance
personnel;
 The controller cabinet should be located so that a technician working in the cabinet can see
the signal indications in at least one direction;
 The controller cabinet should be located where the potential for water damage is
minimized;
 The controller cabinet should not obstruct intersection sight distance;
 The power service connection should be reasonably close to the controller cabinet [3]
A good example of locating the control cabinet can be seen in Figure 5.25 where the cabinet is
located away from the edge of both carriageways, and between two rigid objects (trees) which will
provide protection to the cabinet, in the absence of a barrier system. However, ease of access to
the cabinet by a maintenance team should also be considered.
5.3 Traversable Obstacles

As identified in Chapter 4, there are a number of roadside hazards which relate more to the
geometry of the roadside, rather than to specific types of hazards or items located within it. Such
roadside geometry cannot be made ‘passively safe’ in the purest sense of the word, instead they
PAGE 109
can be made traversable, i.e. they have been designed such that a vehicle can cross over them
whilst limiting the risk of injury to the vehicle’s occupants.
Obstacles which can be made traversable include:

 Culverts and drainage structures;
 Transverse slopes;
 Ditches.
The following sections, and those referenced therein, give details of how these features can be
made traversable. Where a roadside feature exists which is not specifically covered by these
sections, the engineering approach explained within these sections should be adapted for the
feature under review.
5.3.1 Culverts and Drainage Structures

For further details on design methods for making culverts and drainage structures traversable,
refer to Section 4.3.2.9.
In summary, culverts and drainage structures can be made traversable by using one or more of the
following approaches:
 Extend the culvert opening beyond the clear zone with smooth, traversable earth graded
transitions;
 Provide a traversable end section; and/or
 Shield the culvert with a roadside barrier and a crashworthy end treatment facing oncoming
traffic.
5.3.2 Transverse Slopes

For further details on traverse slopes, refer to Section 4.3.1.4. Transverse slopes can be
traversable by making them as flat as practical, ideally with a gradient of 1V:6H or flatter.
5.3.3 Ditches
For further details on roadside ditches, refer to Section 4.3.1.3. Roadside ditches can be made
traversable by ensuring that they have a smooth and relatively flat ditch, with rounded corners.
Those ditches which are considered to be traversable are shown in grey in Figure 4.7.

Where a hazard exists within the clear zone and it cannot be removed or relocated outside of the
clear zone, consideration should be given to making the hazard passively safe or traversable. In
both cases, the objective is to reduce the risk to road users from the impact of striking a roadside
object or topographical feature.
Roadside hazards which can be made passively safe include:

 Supports for small and large roadside signs;
 Gantries and cantilever sign supports (albeit in a small number of situations);
PAGE 110
 Lighting columns;
 Supports for traffic signals and surveillance cameras;
 Emergency telephones.
Roadside topography which can be made traversable includes:
 Culverts and drainage structures;
 Transverse slopes;
 Ditches.
There are two main types of passively safe support structures:

 Slip-base and non-energy absorbing supports are designed to breakaway at their base
upon impact, allowing the vehicle to pass beneath the support to minimise or avoid injury to
vehicle occupants;
 Energy-absorbing supports collapse on impact by an errant vehicle, and are designed to
decelerate an impacting vehicle to a controlled way.
When using slip-base supports, consideration should be given to whether the system is
unidirectional (i.e. they are designed to work in one orientation only), multidirectional (i.e. they are
designed to be impacted in more than direction) or omnidirectional (i.e. they can impacted in any
direction). Unidirectional and multidirectional should be installed in those locations where they can
only be impacted in the direction for which they have been designed (and tested). Conversely,
omnidirectional slip bases can be installed in any location as they have been designed (and tested)
to be impacted in any direction.
Slip-base mechanisms are designed to release when impacted at a typical bumper height of about
500mm and properly activates if loaded in shear rather than bending stress. For this reason, slip-
base systems should only be installed in areas where the foreslope is limited to 1V:6H. Supports
placed on foreslopes that are 1V:4H through 1V:6H are only acceptable when the face of the
support is within 600mm of the intersection of the shoulder slope and the foreslope. In addition, no
passively safe supports should be located in drainage ditches where erosion of the ditch could
affect the proper operation of the breakaway mechanism. A vehicle entering the ditch could also be
inadvertently guided into the support.
In addition, when utilising a slip-base system, the hazard posed from detached parts of slip-base
systems, should be considered, in particular the risk posed to other road users, in particular
pedestrians. This may restrict the use of slip-base systems in some locations.
All passively safe system used should meet the testing requirements of EN12767, NCHRP350 or
MASH. Where a passively safe support is to be used, it shall have been tested to an impact speed
which reflects the speed limit of the road. Within NCHRP350 and MASH, the maximum designated
test speed is 100km/h. For roads with a speed limit equal to or in excess of 100km/h, the passively
safe structure shall have been tested to 100km/h.
5.5 References
PAGE 111
[2] CEN, Eurpean Standard EN12767: Passive Safety of Support Structures for Road Equipment -
Requirements, Classification and Test methods, CEN, Eurpopean Committee for
Standardization, 2007.
[4] Abu Dhabi Department of Transport, Road Structures Design Manual, First Edition, Abu Dhabi:
Department of Transport,
[5] AASHTO Standard Specifications for Structural Supports for Lighting Signs, Luminaires and
Traffic Signals, Fifth Edition, Washington D.C.: American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, 2009
[6] Federal Highway Administration, Maintenance of Signs and Sign Supports, Washington D.C.:
US Department of Transportation, January 2010.
[7] Alberta Infrastructure and Transportation, Roadside Design Guide, Alberta Infrastructure and
Transportation, November 2007.
[8] The Passive Revolution, Designing Safer Roadsides, A Handbook for Engineers, Exeter, UK:
Hemming Information Services in association with The Passive Revolution and Traffic
Engineering & Control, 2008.
[9] G. Williams, J. Kennedy, J. Carroll and R. Beesley, “The use of passively safe signposts and
lighting columns, PPR342,” Transport Research Laboratory, Wokingham, UK, August, 2008.
[11] FHWA, “Manual for Assesing Safety Hardware (MASH),” [Online]. Available:
http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/roadway_dept/policy_guide/road_hardware/ctrmeasures/mash/.
[Accessed 23 02 2015].
[12] BSI, “Passive safety of support structures for road equipment - Requirements, classification
and test methods,” British Standards Institution, October 2009.
2008.
PAGE 112
6 DESCRIPTION OF ROADSIDE, MEDIAN AND

BRIDGE BARRIERS
6.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have shown that once the width of the clear zone has been defined (Chapter 3),
and it has been identified as being a hazard (Chapter 4), the preferable way of reducing the risk to
road users from the hazard is to remove it completely, or to move it outside of the clear zone
(Chapter 2). If this is not possible, the hazard should be made passively safe or traversable in line
with the recommendations of Chapter 5. If, and only if all of these options are not available, or not
economically viable (refer to Chapter 12) should a vehicle restraint system be installed. Due to the
risk posed to road users from the presence of a barrier, safety barrier systems should only be used
as a last resort.
There are many different barrier systems available on the market today. Historically, safety barriers
were primarily developed by the national road authorities and the available systems on the market
were limited to a few designs. These “non-proprietary” systems were the first of their kind and have
seen widespread application around the world. However, over the last few decades, with the help
of standardized impact testing and a competitive market place, the number of systems developed
by private companies, i.e. “proprietary” systems, has far surpassed the number of the non-
proprietary ones. The level of safety has also benefited from the increased number of systems, as
the barrier manufacturers keep developing better performing systems to position themselves
ahead of their competition within the market.
Due to these reasons, it is no longer a valid approach for a designer/engineer to limit themselves
to, and memorize the properties of a certain number of non-proprietary systems. Due to the ever
improving nature of the available systems, it is not practical or possible to provide the details of
every single system in this Guide either. Therefore the designer/engineer should be able to
interpret the performance characteristics and installation requirements of every system on a case
by case basis. To help the designer/engineer achieve that, this Chapter provides an overview to
the classification and the properties of safety barrier systems.
Safety barriers can be classified into different categories by several of their properties. These
include:
A Classification by Impact Test Performance:
o Classification by Containment Level;
o Classification by Working Width & Dynamic Deflection;
o Classification by Vehicle Intrusion;
o Classification by Impact Severity;
B Classification by Developer of the System:

o Proprietary Systems;
o Non-Proprietary Systems;
PAGE 113
06 DESCRIPTION OF ROADSIDE, MEDIAN & FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
BRIDGE BARRIERS
C Classification by Rigidity & General Design:

o Flexible Systems;
o Semi-Rigid Systems;
o Rigid Systems.
The classifications shown above are applicable to roadside, median and bridge barriers. Therefore,
the information presented in this Chapter is applicable to all roadside, median and bridge barriers.
All of these classifications are explained in detail in the following sections, to help the
designer/engineer develop an overall understanding of the road safety barrier systems.
Detailed information on the impact testing standards accepted by the Abu Dhabi Department of
Transport, i.e. MASH & NCHRP-350, is also provided within the following sections.
The information presented in this Chapter focuses on the types and properties of safety barriers
only. Guidance into the selection and application criteria of these systems is provided in Chapter 7
– Selection and Application of Roadside, Median and Bridge Barriers.
6.2 Safety Barrier Elements

Figure 6.1 shows the different components of a length of safety barrier installation. Further details
of roadside, median and bridge barriers can be found within this Chapter, whilst further details of
terminals can be found within Chapter 9, and details of transitions are in Chapter 10. It should be
noted that Figure 6.1 is only indicative to show the various elements of the safety barrier, and does
not provide guidance with regard to the layout and specification of safety barrier systems. Further
details of this can be found within Chapter 7.
Roadside barriers, in general, can be located along the side of roads to provide three main
functions:
 To shield errant vehicles from natural hazards along the roadside; or
 To shield errant vehicles from man-made obstacles along the roadside; or
 To shield 3rd parties located along the roadside from errant vehicles.
Median barriers, in general, are installed to provide one of the following three functions:
 On a divided carriageway to separate opposing traffic;
 On roadways to separate through traffic from local traffic; or
 To separate through traffic from a frontage road.
Two sided Median barriers are designed to redirect vehicles striking either side of the barrier.
Bridge barriers are intended to prevent a vehicle from running off the edge of a bridge.
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Terminal: A terminal is essentially a crashworthy anchorage, a

device used to anchor a flexible or semi-rigid barrier to the ground.
Being crashworthy, terminals are normally used at the end of a barrier
that is located within the clear zone or that is likely to be impacted by
errant vehicles.
Roadside Barrier: A longitudinal barrier used to shield roadside

obstacles or non-traversable terrain features. It may occasionally be
used to protect pedestrians or “bystanders” from vehicle traffic.
Transition: A section of barrier between two different barriers or,

more commonly, where a roadside barrier is connected to a bridge
railing or to a rigid object such as a bridge pier. The transition should
produce a gradual stiffening of the approach rail so vehicular
pocketing, snagging, or penetration at the connection can be avoided.
Bridge Barrier: A longitudinal barrier whose primary function is to

prevent an errant vehicle from going over the side of the bridge
structure
Median Barrier: A longitudinal barrier used to prevent an errant

vehicle from crossing the highway median.
* Components shown in the figure are not to scale and are for demonstrative purposes only.
Figure 6.1 - Definition of the components of a length of safety barrier
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6.3 Classification of Safety Barriers by Performance
6.3.1 Overview
Perhaps the most important and relevant type of classification for safety barriers is the
performance classification. The performance classification is assessed and demonstrated through
a series of standardised full scale impact tests, such as the one shown in Figure 6.2. These impact
tests not only prove whether a barrier performs satisfactorily under certain impact conditions, but
they also provide a controlled way of accurately measuring certain impact characteristics of the
system under test. These important impact characteristics, such as dynamic deflection, working
width, zone of intrusion and impact severity levels, provide the vital information that a
designer/engineer needs when designing the roadside geometry and selecting an appropriate
barrier system. These impact characteristics, which are explained in further detail in the following
sections, are often more relevant to the roadside designer/engineer than the individual dimensions
of the system.
Figure 6.2 – Impact testing of a roadside safety barrier
At the moment there are two main established impact test standards, which are used widely
around the world. These are:
 The American Guidelines - MASH [1] (previously NCHRP350 [2]); and

 The European Standard – EN1317 [3].
Due to the reasons explained in Chapter 1, the selected impact test guidelines for the safety
barriers to be used in the Abu Dhabi Road Network are MASH and NCHRP350. All safety barriers
(used in the roadside, median and on the edge of bridges) shall have demonstrated compliance
with the American recommendations in either NCHRP Report 350 (FHWA, 2004) or MASH
(AASHTO, 2009) and additional local conditions for the Abu Dhabi Road Network. Evidence of this
shall be presented and approved by the Overseeing Organization prior to the use of these
systems. Only systems approved by the Overseeing Organization shall be used. Performance
classification according to these guidelines is presented in more detail in the following sections. A
brief overview of the EN1317 standard is also provided in Section 6.3.4, for informative purposes
only. This is further expanded in Appendix A.
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6.3.2 NCHRP350 and MASH Performance Classifications

After January 1, 2011, newly-tested safety barriers must be evaluated in accordance with MASH.
However, vehicle restraint systems that were accepted before the adoption of MASH by using
criteria contained in NCHRP Report 350 may remain in place and may continue to be
manufactured and installed.
In order to meet the requirements of NCHRP350, or MASH, the safety barrier must demonstrate
that it can successfully decelerate (and in some cases redirect) an impacting vehicle without the
unsafe detachment of elements. During such times, the impacting vehicle should maintain an
upright orientation, whilst meeting the requirements of two severity indices; Occupant Impact
Velocity (OIV) and Occupant Ride-down Acceleration (ORA). The portion of the end treatment
included in a barrier’s length-of-need must have re-directional characteristics similar to those of the
barrier to which it is attached.
The purpose of NCHRP350 and MASH is to present uniform guidelines for the impact testing of
both permanent and temporary highway safety features and recommended evaluation criteria to
assess test results. It should be noted that both NCHRP350 and MASH are guidelines and not
formal standards and hence, they only provide advice on the way in which testing should be
conducted.
6.3.3 Test Types in NCHRP350 and MASH

The guidelines of NCHRP350 and MASH contain a number of Tables and Figures to explain the
testing which was undertaken to demonstrate the performance of a particular vehicle restraint
system. This is based on over 40 years of experience from those involved within the industry, on
an International basis. The underlying philosophy in the development of the guidelines is that the
testing conditions should represent the “worst case.” This is particularly true for the determination
of the impact weight, speed and angles of the tests.
For example, the weight of the small passenger car test vehicle was selected to represent
approximately the 98th percentile of passenger type vehicles in the USA; i.e. only two percent of
vehicles weigh less than the specified test weight. The impact speed and angle combination
represents approximately the 92.5 percentile of real-world crashes [2]. The test requirements for
longitudinal barrier systems are included in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2.
When the combined effects of all testing parameters are considered, the testing represents the
extremes of impact conditions to be expected in real-world situations. At the same time, the
existence of consistent guidelines ensures that there is a level platform on which to test, and
therefore ultimately compare, the performance of different products.
It is also implicitly assumed that, if a roadside safety feature performs satisfactorily at the two
extremes, for example at TL-1 and TL-6, then the feature would also work well for all impact
conditions in between, such as TL-2, TL-3, TL-4 and TL-5. This assumption has shown to be
reasonable for most roadside safety features [2].
Following an impact test to the requirements of NCHRP350 or MASH, the performance of the
tested system is evaluated in terms of the stability of the impacting vehicle; risk of injury to the
occupants inside the impacting vehicle, the structural adequacy of the safety feature, the exposure
to workers and pedestrians that may be behind a barrier or in the path of debris resulting from
impact with a safety feature, and the post-impact behaviour of the test vehicle.
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Table 6.1 - Test requirements for NCHRP350 [2]
Test conditions
Test Level Vehicle speed Impact angle
Test vehicles
(km/h) (°)
820-kg passenger car 50 20
TL-1
2000-kg pickup truck 50 25
TL-2
TL-3
TL-4 2000-kg pickup truck 100 25
8,000-kg single-unit truck 80 15
36,000-kg semi-trailer truck 80 15
36,000-kg tanker truck 80 15
Table 6.2 - Test requirements for MASH [1]
Test conditions
Test Level Vehicle speed Impact angle
Test vehicles
(km/h) (°)
TL-1

TL-2

TL-3
10,000-kg single-unit truck 90 15
36,000-kg semi-trailer truck 80 15
36,000-kg tanker truck 80 15
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If a system successfully meets these parameters, its performance during the impact test is then
classified by:
 Containment Level;
 Deflection Distance;
 Zone of Intrusion;
 Impact Severity Level.
Further details of these classifications are given in the following sections. These factors can then
be used to specify the performance of the system which is required at a particular site. It is
therefore emphasised that for a particular road safety application, it is not a product which should
be specified, but the performance requirements of the safety measure which is to be installed.
Once the performance requirements of a particular site are specified, a product which meets the
requirements can be selected from the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport’s
list of accepted proprietary products.
Other factors that should be evaluated in the design of a safety feature, include aesthetics, cost
(initial and maintenance), and durability (ability to withstand environmental conditions, wind-
induced fatigue loading, sand accumulation, effects of moisture, ultraviolet radiation, etc.). These
are not addressed by these testing standards, as this is not their purpose. However, the
designer/engineer should evaluate the importance of these factors on a site-by-site basis through
engineering judgment.
6.3.3.1 Classification by Containment/Test Level

The containment/test level of a safety barrier relates specifically to the combination of weight,
impact angle and speed of test vehicle which the barrier has shown to successfully contain and
redirect under full scale impact testing to NCHRP350 or MASH. Reference should be made to
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 for further details on the testing requirement for each containment/test
level.
For example, if a barrier was shown to contain an 1100kg passenger car at 100km/h and 25
degrees, and a 2270kg pickup truck at 100km/h and 25 degrees, the system would be classified as
a ‘TL-3’ safety barrier under the criteria defined in MASH (Table 6.2).
It can also be observed from these tables, that the higher test levels require successful
performance with heavier impact vehicles or higher impact speeds. Therefore, the higher test
levels prove successful performance with higher energy impacts.
The TL-1 & TL-2 systems have been developed primarily for passenger cars and pick-up trucks for
roads where the speed limit isn’t over 50km/h or 70km/h respectively. These systems provide less
protection compared to the systems which are designed to the higher test levels. The most
commonly used barriers around the world today are the TL-3 systems [6]. TL-4 and TL-5 systems
are generally designed for heavier vehicles, weighing up to 10,000 and 36,000kg respectively. TL-
6 systems are also designed for impacts with vehicles up to 36,000kg, but for the TL-6 test a
tanker truck is used, whereas for the TL-5 test a semi-trailer truck is used.
The higher test level barriers (TL-4 and over) are usually more expensive compared to the lower
test level ones. However, they may be justified for locations with high traffic volumes, higher traffic
speeds, poor road geometry, significant volume of heavy vehicle traffic and 3 rd party risk nearby
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(See Chapter 4, Section 4.4). On the other hand, a TL-3 system may not be cost effective for
locations with low traffic speed and volume. In such locations a TL-2 or a TL-1 system may be
enough to contain the likely range of vehicle impacts.
For design of barriers and railings refer to “AASHTO-LRFD Bridge Design Specifications” [4] and
“AASHTO Standard Construction Specifications” [5].
6.3.3.2 Classification by Deflection Characteristics

Deflection characteristics are among the most important features of a safety barrier. The amount of
deflection, which a system shows during an impact, changes from one design to another.
In general, barrier systems with higher deflection characteristics, i.e. flexible systems (see Section
6.5.1), would dissipate the energy of a crash more and therefore lower the impact forces imposed
upon the vehicle occupants. On the other hand, systems with higher deflection would require more
clear space behind them to work safely. This is because, an errant vehicle can still reach the
hazard behind and experience a secondary impact, as shown in Figure 6.3, if the distance
between the hazard and the barrier is less than the barrier’s deflection distance. For this reason,
depending on the available space on the site, the designer/engineer may need to choose a system
which has less deflection (see Chapter 7 for application requirements).
Figure 6.3 – A hazard, located within the deflection distance of the safety barrier
The deflection characteristics of a safety barrier are determined through full scale impact testing
and are expressed with the following properties:
 Dynamic Deflection: is the maximum dynamic lateral displacement of the traffic face of
the barrier that occurs during impact [1], as shown in Figure 6.4;
 Working Width: is the distance between the traffic face of the barrier before the impact
and the maximum lateral position of any major part of the system or vehicle, during the
impact as shown in Figure 6.4.
Both dynamic deflection and working width are determined through the analysis of high speed
video coverage, recorded during the impact test. The designer/Engineer can find this information
through the promoter of the system or within the test report.
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Figure 6.4 – Working Width and Dynamic Deflection for two example systems
The working width is important in that it determines the space that must be maintained between
the hazard and the barrier. If a hazard were allowed to remain within the deflection distance of a
barrier, the longitudinal movement of an errant vehicle can still carry it into that obstacle. It is for
that reason that no hazard (which cannot be removed, relocated or made passively
safe/transferable) should be present within the working width of a safety barrier system.
It is essential that the deflection distance available on site is known, and that the deflection
distance quoted by the promoter for their system is less than the available distance on site. If a
barrier must be located immediately adjacent to the hazard, a rigid barrier may be the only viable
option.
6.3.3.3 Classification by Zone of Intrusion (ZOI)

The Zone of Intrusion (ZOI) is the region measured above and behind the face of a barrier system
where an impacting high sided vehicle or any major part of the system (i.e. part over 2kg in mass)
was seen to encroach during an impact, as shown in Figure 6.5. Hence, there is a risk that an
impacting vehicle may also encroach into this space in the event of an incident.
The ZOI is determined following the full scale impact test of the system, in a similar way to the
deflection distance, as shown in Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.5 – Zone of intrusion for higher vehicles
Before Impact During Impact
Zone of
Intrusion
Figure 6.6 – Zone of intrusion as seen during an impact test
The ZOI is an important measurement to make, as it will assist with identifying the space within
which there should be no hazard, even in the event of a vehicle rolling on the top of the safety
barrier system. This is particularly important in the case of safety barriers located in front of bridge
piers where there is a risk (to be mitigated) of an impacting vehicle striking the barrier, rolling on
the top of the barrier, and subsequently striking the bridge pier. The barrier height and profile and
the vehicle size, speed, and angle of impact determine the amount of intrusion behind the barrier.
The designer should try to accommodate this additional distance behind the barrier, especially for
applications with a Test Level of 4 and higher. This is because the heavy vehicles for which the TL-
4 and higher systems are designed for (see Table 6.2) usually have significantly wider zones of
intrusion, caused by their height and size, as shown in Figure 6.6. The cargo box located at the
back of heavy vehicles lean much further over the barrier during an impact, compared to the cab,
as shown in Table 6.3. This can especially be a problem in the vicinity of bridge piers.
It may not always be possible to move bridge piers beyond the clear zone and therefore a barrier is
often required to shield the errant vehicles from an impact with the pier. From a roadside safety
perspective a TL-3 barrier is generally considered sufficient to protect majority of the passenger
vehicles from a pier. However, a TL-3 barrier is not likely to be enough to stop a heavy vehicle,
which may then continue and hit the bridge pier. This can especially be a problem if the bridge is
known to have structural issues, as the impact may cause significant damage. Therefore, a TL-4 or
higher containment level barrier may be required.
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Table 6.3 – Examples of ZOI width for selected barrier types and test levels*
Test Barrier Height Zone of Intrusion

Barrier Type
Level Range (Bh) in mm Width (ZOIw) in mm
Concrete 508-686 711

TL-2
Concrete 686-1067 305
Sloped-face
762-813 457
Concrete
Vertical
737-813 610
Concrete
Combination
TL-3 of concrete 889-1067 610
and steel
Steel tubular
813-864 457
rails on curb
Steel tubular
705-914 762
without curbs
864 2030
TL-4 All 737-1067
(ZOIw_cab) (ZOIw_cargo)
* Adapted from AASHTO Roadside Design Guide [5]

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As guidance, in the USA, the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications [7] set out the
requirements for design evaluation and rehabilitation of bridges. According to these specifications,
bridge piers that are within 9m of the travelled way should be designed to withstand a large impact
load or be shielded with a barrier. The following height guidelines from the AASHTO LFRD Bridge
Design Specifications are based on offset from the travelled way to the face of the pier [6]:
 A 1370mm high barrier located 3m or less from the pier; or
 A 1070mm high barrier located more than 3m from the pier [7].
These values are only given as general guidance. The engineer/designer can identify the ZOI of
individual systems by referring to the crash test reports and high speed videos. This way, the
required distance between the barrier and the pier can be adjusted according to the impact
behaviour of the individual product.
Narrowing of the roadway is not preferred on high-speed facilities to accommodate additional
clearance for ZOI. For example, do not reduce the shoulder width to gain additional clearance
behind the barrier to meet the ZOI guidelines. In those cases where the height of the hazard does
not exceed the height of the barrier, the ZOI is not considered to be relevant.
6.3.3.4 Classification by Impact Severity Level

Another important characteristic of a safety barrier is the impact severity level. As explained in
Chapter 2, a roadside barrier should also be considered as a hazard and it should only be used if
the consequences of hitting the barrier are expected to be less than hitting the hazard behind.
Every barrier has different impact characteristics and some absorb the impact energy better than
the others, therefore exerting less impact forces on the occupants of the errant vehicle. Rigid
barriers for example (see Section 6.5.3) do not deflect as much during an impact, as the flexible
barriers (see Section 6.5.1) would and therefore usually higher forces are exerted on the vehicle
occupants during an impact with a rigid system.
The impact severity level of a system is determined through full scale impact testing. Due to the
cost, reliability and design of impact test dummies, occupant risk in NCHRP350 and MASH is
assessed by the response of a theoretical unrestrained front seat occupant whose motion, relative
to the occupant compartment is determined by the vehicle’s accelerations. The ‘point mass’
occupant is assumed to move through space until it strikes a hypothetical part of the vehicle’s
interior, and subsequently is assumed to then experience the remainder of the vehicle’s
acceleration pulse by remaining in contact with the vehicle interior. The two performance factors,
which determine the impact severity level for a barrier, are:
a) Occupant Impact Velocity (OIV): Which is the lateral and longitudinal component of
occupant velocity at the time when it impacts the vehicle’s interior;
b) Occupant Ride-down Acceleration (ORA): Which is the highest lateral and longitudinal
component of the resultant vehicular acceleration averaged over a 10ms interval following
the impact
Methods for calculating these values can be found in both NCHRP350 [2] and MASH [1]. Table 6.4
presents the preferred and maximum allowable OIV & ORA Values from MASH.
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Table 6.4 - Preferred and maximum allowable OIV & ORA values from MASH [1]
Occupant Impact Velocity (OIV) Limits

Component Preferred Maximum Allowable
Longitudinal and Lateral 9.1 m/s 12.2 m/s
Longitudinal 3.0 m/s 4.9 m/s
Occupant Ride-down Acceleration (ORA) Limits
Component Preferred Maximum Allowable
Longitudinal and Lateral 15.0 G 20.49 G
* For more information on test types, please refer to MASH [1]
OIV and ORA provide a method of ranking the severity of the impact with the safety barrier system,
and give an indicative guide to the level of injury which might be expected from an impact with an
errant vehicle (assuming all of the impact parameters are the same as those under which the
safety barrier was tested). In general terms, the lower the value of OIV and ORA for a particular
system, the lower the risk of injury would be to the vehicle occupants in the event of an impact.
6.3.4 The European Standard EN1317

Whilst vehicle restraint systems used within Abu Dhabi should be successfully tested to the
requirements of NCHRP350 and MASH, for completeness, reference is also made to the
European Standard for the testing of road restraint systems, EN1317 (see also Appendix A).
The European standard has been prepared by the European Committee for Standardization
(CEN). During the initial drafting of EN1317 in the mid-1990s, developments within the preparation
of NCHRP350 were followed closely by the standards writers in Europe, and every effort was
made to harmonize the impact performance standards (e.g. using the same or similar testing
conditions and evaluation criteria). However, given the inherent differences in highway and traffic
conditions between the United States and EU, differences between the U.S. guidelines and CEN
standards arose. The gap between these two sets of requirements has opened even further in the
preparation of the MASH and latest published versions of EN1317 [8].
Despite a number of attempts, no equivalence can be found between testing to NCHRP350/MASH

and EN1317. Due to the different testing methods, test vehicle types and speeds, the use of both
EN1317 and NCHRP350/MASH products on the same scheme is strongly discouraged.
EN1317 is split into a number of different parts, each concentrating on a different product sector,
the latest published versions of which are outlined below:
 EN1317-1: 2010 - Terminology and general criteria for test methods;
 EN1317-2: 2010 - Performance classes, impact test acceptance criteria and test methods
for safety barriers including vehicle parapets;
for crash cushions;
 ENV1317-4; 2002 - Performance classes, impact test acceptance criteria and test methods
for terminals and transitions of safety barriers;
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 EN1317-5:2007+A2 2012 - Product requirements and evaluation of conformity for vehicle

restraint systems;
 TR1317-6: 2012 - Pedestrian parapets.
It should be noted that there is a move to split the requirements of ENV1317-4 into two documents,
one which will solely cover the requirement for transitions (TR1317-4) and another which will solely
cover the requirements for terminals (EN1317-7). Whilst drafts of these new parts have been
prepared, they are currently awaiting publication.
6.4 Classification of Safety Barriers as Non Proprietary or Proprietary

All vehicle restraint systems (i.e. safety barriers, motorcyclist protection devices, terminals, crash
cushions and transitions) can be categorised as being either proprietary or non-proprietary.
6.4.1 Non-Proprietary (Generic) Systems

For many years, the FHWA in the USA and European countries such as the UK and Germany
developed vehicle restraint systems. Some of these designs were tested at the time to the
appropriate standards, whilst some were not. However, once the designs of these generic (non-
proprietary) systems had been concluded, they were ‘handed over’ to industry for them to fabricate
the products and promote them, without patents. Previously these non-proprietary systems have
been accepted for use by the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport, and they
are detailed in the Abu Dhabi Standard Drawings Manual.
Application of these systems over time has meant that there is a great deal of experience in the
use (and restrictions of use) of these products. However, in many cases there is a lack of
continued support for these products in terms of future development and the design and testing of
transitions and connections to such systems. Due to the lack of continuous development, many of
these systems were tested in accordance with the older versions of impact test standards and
therefore usually with lighter vehicles which are not representative of today’s vehicle fleets. For this
reason, the impact performance of such systems with the heavier and higher speed modern
vehicles would be questionable.
Since these systems were developed by national road authorities, they were generally developed
to fit the specific needs of their own network and geographic conditions. Therefore, they may not
always fit the local conditions in other countries. This can especially be an issue in Abu Dhabi,
where local conditions such as extreme heat, corrosive soils and sandy roadsides may require
certain characteristics such as better corrosion resistance, free flow of sand, etc. This can lead to
difficulties in the provision of a continuous level of safety, as these systems are not continuously
supported by the original designer to fit the needs of different local conditions.
6.4.2 Proprietary Systems

In general, proprietary systems are commercially available and as such they are sold and
promoted by individual companies. As a result, such systems are often very competitively priced,
and designed and tested to the standards of NCHRP350 or MASH or EN1317.
Due to the worldwide competition, private barrier manufacturers need to continuously improve their
systems to position themselves ahead of their competition. This leads to a continuous
improvement in the safety level of barrier systems available in the market. Today, many proprietary
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systems perform better than the similar non-proprietary designs. For example, it is common to find
proprietary systems which achieve same containment level as a non-proprietary system, but with
less deflection and lower impact severity levels.
Proprietary systems are often tested or re-tested to the latest version of the impact test standard,
to position their products ahead of their competition. This means that these products are often
tested with heavier vehicles and vehicles with higher centres of gravity, which represent the
modern vehicle fleets better than the older standards.
As the design of the system belongs to the manufacturer, they will often provide their own
guidance as to the suitability of the system in a certain location, and provide details of the training
required for installation and maintenance requirements for their products. The manufacturers can
also choose to develop or modify their systems to perform better within the local conditions. This
gives a level of assurance and accountability from the manufacturer as to the performance of the
system which they have placed on the market. As such, proprietary systems are preferred to non-
proprietary systems.
To use a proprietary roadside barrier, the system must have been accepted for use on the Abu
Dhabi road network by the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport, or its
representatives. In order to be deemed acceptable, the manufacturer will be required to supply full
test reports and videos of their system(s) to the Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport for
assessment against the relevant testing standard (either NCHRP350 or MASH) mention EN1317.
In addition, questions regarding the suitability of the product for local conditions must also be
completed in a satisfactory way, supported by evidence where possible. Note that whilst the
acceptance of a product in another territory (e.g. by Federal Highways in the USA or awarded a
CE mark within Europe) may be considered as part of the approval process, this will be no
guarantee of acceptance for use by the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport,
due to its local needs and road conditions. A list of those approved products deemed to be
acceptable for use on the AD DoT road network is available.
6.5 Classification of Safety Barriers by Rigidity

Historically, safety barriers have been grouped into three categories as flexible, semi-rigid and
rigid, according to their deflection characteristics resulting from an impact. This type of
classification is an approximate one, based on general characteristics of the system and therefore
does not rely on a quantifiable relationship. This classification has been useful in explaining the
advantages and disadvantages of certain type of systems, at a time when the available systems on
the market were limited to a certain number of non-proprietary designs. Today however, with the
increased number of varied proprietary systems available on the market, the boundaries between
the flexible, semi-rigid and rigid categories have been blurred. Therefore, a more meaningful and
the recommended type of classification is the performance based one, which is presented in
Section 6.3.
The classification by rigidity is also included in this design guide for informative reasons. The
following sections give general information into flexible, semi-rigid and rigid barrier systems.
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6.5.1 Flexible Systems

Flexible barrier systems have been historically characterised by relatively high deflections upon
impact, which dissipate the energy of a crash and result in lower impact forces imposed upon the
vehicle occupants. This behaviour can often result in lower levels of injury risk to vehicle occupants
when compared with semi-rigid and rigid barrier systems. Whilst the specific performance of a
barrier system will vary from one barrier to another, flexible barriers often display good control of
vehicle trajectories after impact, which assists in redirecting an errant vehicle on a path along the
line of the barrier. This minimises the likelihood of secondary impacts with other vehicles.
The primary advantages of flexible barrier systems is the low deceleration forces which are
imparted onto the vehicle occupants, effective vehicle containment, redirection over a wide range
of vehicle sizes and installation conditions, and low initial cost. Damaged posts are usually easily
replaced because these are often located in plastic sleeves in concrete foundations.
However, once hit by an errant vehicle, the length of damaged section is often longer for flexible
systems than more rigid designs. Unlike more rigid systems, flexible systems usually require
immediate repair after an impact as they lose their functionality after the first impact, and therefore
they are the most dependant on continuous monitoring and maintenance.
Wire rope safety barrier (WRSB) systems have historically been shown as the most commonly
used type of flexible barrier on the AD DoT road network, an example of which can be seen in
Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.7 - Wire Rope Safety Barrier – an example of a flexible safety barrier
The WRSB normally comprises three or four strands of tensioned cable, held in the designed
heights by flexible posts. The design principle is the redirection of the impacting vehicle, once
sufficient tension is developed in the cables. There are many different proprietary designs available
on the market today, some of which are shown in Figure 6.8, through indicative profiles.
As can be seen from the figure, the number and the configuration of cable positioning change from
one product to another. Depending on the design, the cables may be:
 Positioned on one side of posts throughout the installation;
 Positioned on the opposite side of each consecutive post;
 Positioned inside the posts;
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 Or intertwined.
Apart from the ones where the cables are positioned on a single side of the posts throughout the
installation, the WRSB are designed to contain impacts from both sides and are therefore
commonly used as median barriers.
*Profiles are not to scale and are shown for indicative purposes only.
Figure 6.8 – Examples of WRSB profiles
It is not possible to make a general statement about the impact performance characteristics of
different cable configurations, i.e. it is not possible to say that one configuration is safer than the
other. The engineer/designer should refer to the test results and manufacturer’s specifications to
compare different products. The majority of the WRSB systems available on the market today are
tested to TL-3; however, there are also TL-4 systems available.
The height of the individual cables is important and changes from one system to another. A typical
system can have an upper cable height of 580mm to 720mm from the ground level [9]. The cable
heights are generally designated as the result of numerous crash tests and computer simulations
to provide the optimum performance. If the cables are too low, an impacting vehicle may go over
the barrier; whereas if the cables are too high, an impacting vehicle may go under the barrier. For
this reason it is very important that the cable heights of the installed system is the same as the
crash tested one.
Another important property is the post spacing. Although the main aim of the posts in a flexible
system is to keep the cables at the designated height and easily bend under the vehicle impact,
they do also add stiffness to the overall system. As the post spacing decreases, the stiffness of the
system increases and therefore the deflection of the system decreases. A lot of the proprietary
systems are available in different post spacing configurations to provide systems with different
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working widths. However, as the number of posts increase, so does the cost of the system. As a
very general guidance, a typical WRSB system can have post spacing anywhere between 1.8m to
3.2m.
Depending on the type of soil, the post may be driven directly to the ground, installed in sockets
which are driven into the ground or installed in sockets with concrete casings, as shown in Figure
6.9. Type and the depth of foundation required changes from one design to another, and therefore
the selection should be made according to the manufacturer’s instructions. However, as a very
general guidance, a typical WRSB system can have foundation depths anywhere between 400mm
to 1,000mm, although these may need to be increased where sandy or weak soil conditions exist.
Figure 6.9 – Examples of WRSB foundation types
The majority of the WRSB systems available on the market today are designed to have higher
tensions on the cables, compared to the first WRSB designs. During the evolution of these
systems, it was understood that by applying higher tension to the cables, lower deflections can be
achieved under impact. As the cables are already tensioned before the impact, it takes less
deflection for the system to build the necessary tension to redirect the errant vehicle. For this
reason, it is important that the tensions on the cables are kept within the acceptable limits. These
limits change from one product to another and every product should be tensioned to the
manufacturer’s specifications. This is especially important in Abu Dhabi, where the high
temperatures can cause the cables to expand and therefore decrease the tension. The tension in
the cables can be increased or decreased through cable tensioners located at the anchorages
(see Figure 6.7) or on the cables, depending on the design and length of installation.
A negative effect of using tensioned cables is that it limits the road geometries on which the
systems can be installed. This is especially true on tight horizontal curves, where the high tension
can bend the posts; and on sag vertical curves, where the high tensions can lift the cables from the
posts and increase the cable height to unacceptable limits. The minimum allowable horizontal
curve radius for WRSB installation changes from one design to another, but as a general guideline
200m can be indicated as the recommended minimum for most systems [9].
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The length of the tested system makes a considerable difference in the deflection characteristics. It
is known that short test installations, such as 100-150m, can demonstrate lower deflections
compared to longer installations such as 250-300m. This is because, in short installations, the
tension builds up with less deflection and some of the tension is shared by the ground anchors
located at the ends of the system. As a result, WRSB systems should ideally not be installed on
the roadside, in lengths longer than the ones used during the impact test. If they are installed in
longer lengths, they may deflect further than the distances recorded during the impact test; which
may cause errant vehicles to reach the hazards behind the barrier.
Another type of flexible system is the weak post w-beam barrier, an example of which is shown in
Figure 6.10. This system behaves like a low tension WRSB, i.e. the barrier posts are weak and
designed to bend easily during an impact, without too much resistance. Naturally, this system does
not incorporate blockouts, as these would increase the stiffness of the posts and therefore would
be against its working principle. The posts are placed far apart and their main function is to keep
the w-beam at the required height rather than adding significant stiffness to the system. Variations
of this system have been successfully tested to TL-2 and TL-3 [5]. The weak posts used in these
systems are similar to those of the WRSB designs. Similar to the WRSB, the required beam
height, foundation depth and post spacing would change from one system to another, and
therefore the system installed on the roadside should be the same as the system tested during the
full-scale crash test. Please refer to the individual details of products provided by manufacturers.
However, as a very general guidance, a typical weak post system can have post spacing of around
3.8m, a beam height of around 710mm and a foundation depth of around 900mm.
Figure 6.10 – Weak Post W-Beam Barrier
In sandy areas, the open design of the wire rope system prevents drifting on or alongside the
roadway. However the local experience shows that the sand accumulation is still a problem with
the weak post w-beam system. Therefore designer/engineer should assess the potential sand
accumulation of a system, on a product-by-product basis; independent of its rigidity classification.
Such accumulation of sand against the face of a barrier can, in itself, present a risk of injury to road
users, as shown in Figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.11 – Effect of barrier type on sand accumulation
The disadvantages of flexible systems include their sensitivity to correct height installation and
maintenance, their reduced effectiveness on the inside of horizontal curves, the clear area needed
behind the barrier to accommodate the deflection of the system upon impact, and the
comparatively long lengths of barrier that are non-functional and in need of repair following a major
impact.
6.5.2 Semi-Rigid Systems

Semi-rigid barriers have been historically classified as the systems which are positioned between
the flexible and rigid categories, based on their deflection characteristics. The majority of w-beam
(excluding the weak post systems) and the thrie-beam systems available on the market today can
be categorised as semi-rigid barriers, an example of which can be seen in Figure 6.12.
Figure 6.12 - Strong post W-Beam Barrier with block out
These systems have historically been shown to be the most commonly used type of semi-rigid
barrier within the AD DoT road network. Resistance in these systems results from a combination of
tensile and flexural stiffness of the rail and the bending or shearing resistance of the posts. There
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are many different proprietary designs available on the market today, which are developed from
the original non-proprietary w-beam systems, some of which are shown in Figure 6.13, through
indicative profiles. The majority of the proprietary w-beam systems available on the market are
successfully tested to either TL-3 or TL-4.
As can be seen from the figure, these systems can have different beam profiles, but the most
common ones are the w-beam and the thrie-beam. The thrie-beam is known to provide increased
rigidity compared to the w-beam, however, the overall performance of these systems would
change from one design to another. The beams can either be connected directly to the steel posts
or they can be connected through steel, plastic or wooden blockouts. Blockouts are used to
prevent a vehicle from snagging on the (generally) stiff posts of the system and to maintain rail
alignment (and therefore reduce the risk of vaulting) in the event of an impact. Some proprietary
systems feature double blockouts in their design as an energy absorbing mechanism or to
increase the post offset.
Figure 6.13 - Examples of single sided W-Beam profiles
Beam height is important and is usually measured from the ground to the top of the beam, as
shown in Figure 6.13. Required beam height changes from one design to another. But as a rough
guidance, a typical w-beam system can have a beam height of around 700mm to 800mm; whereas
a thrie-beam system can have a beam height around 800mm to 850mm. The cable beam heights
are generally designated as the result of numerous crash tests and computer simulations to
provide the optimum performance. If the beam is installed too low, an impacting vehicle may go
over the barrier; whereas if the beam is installed too high, an impacting vehicle may go under the
barrier. For this reason it is very important that the beam height of the installed system is the same
as the crash tested one.
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Another important property is the post spacing. As the post spacing decreases, the stiffness of the
system increases and therefore the deflection of the system decreases. This effect is
demonstrated in Table 6.5, through very general, indicative values for selected systems. The table
shows the effect of changing the post spacing on the maximum deflection. The values shown here
are based on two sources. The first source is the results of a computer simulation using the
Numerical Analysis of Roadside Design (NARD) Program. The second source is the full scale
impact tests carried out by the Kansas Department of Transportation. Both, the simulations and the
full scale impact tests shown in the table were carried out with a 2,000kg passenger car at an
impact angle and speed of 25° and 97km/h [6]. As can be seen from the table, barriers deflect
more once the post spacing is increased. The values shown in this table are very general and for
indicative purposes only. A lot of the proprietary systems are available in different post spacing
configurations to provide systems with different working widths. However, as the number of posts
increases, so does the cost of the system. As a very general guidance, a typical w-beam system
can have post spacing anywhere between 0.6 m to 5.0m. The designer/engineer should refer to
the crash test reports for each individual product to determine the maximum deflection and working
width. Impact tested products should not be modified on site to alter their post spacing, as doing so
effectively creates a new system, and therefore further impact testing is required.
Table 6.5 – Effect of post spacing on barrier deflection*
Maximum Deflection (mm)

Impact Post Spacing
Barrier Type Simulation Impact Test
Angle (°) (mm)
Result Result
Single 25 1,905 907 754

W-beam 25 952 541 597
Double 25 952 437 498

W-beam 25 476 320 N/A
Single 25 1,905 716 N/A

Thrie-Beam 25 952 480 N/A
* Adapted from AASHTO Roadside Design Guide [6]
It is often possible to find double sided versions of a lot of the designs available on the market. The
double sided systems are designed to be used in the median as they can withstand impacts from
both sides. The addition of the second beam on the opposite side increases the rigidity and as a
result affects the impact characteristics of the system. For this reason, the double sided versions of
the single sided w-beam designs should also be impact tested. Experience shows that the double
sided versions of single sided w-beam design often successfully pass the same test levels with
less deflection. Figure 6.14, shows some indicative profiles of the common double sided w-beam
systems.
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Figure 6.14 - Examples of double sided W-Beam profiles
Similar to WRSB systems, the w-beam posts can be driven directly to the soil, placed in sockets
which are driven into the soil or placed in concrete casings (see Figure 6.9). The type and depth of
the foundation required changes from one design to another and therefore, a selection should be
made according to the manufacturer’s instructions. However, as very general guidance, a typical
w-beam system can have foundation depths anywhere between 1,000mm to 1,200mm.
Semi-rigid barriers deform or deflect upon impact but to a lesser extent than flexible systems.
When struck by an errant vehicle, the support posts are designed to bend/collapse and the barrier
rail to deform and act as a belt to absorb some of the impact force. The tensile forces developed
in the barrier rail assist in redirecting the impacting vehicle. Resistance is achieved through the
combined flexure and tensile strength of the rail.
In terms of advantages and disadvantages, semi-rigid barriers are positioned between flexible and
rigid systems.
 Their initial cost is usually higher than the flexible ones but lower than the rigid ones;
 Depending on the severity of impact, semi-rigid barriers usually retain a level of functionality
(albeit reduced) after a slight/moderate collision, thereby eliminating the need for immediate
repair [6]. This makes the semi-rigid systems more durable compared to the flexible ones.
Therefore, they are less dependent on maintenance and immediate repair, compared to the
flexible systems. However, they are not as durable or maintenance-free as the rigid
systems;
 In terms of impact forces exerted on to vehicle occupants, semi-rigid systems, in general,

provide a smoother deceleration compared to rigid systems. However, the flexible systems
provide even smoother deceleration than the semi-rigid systems;
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 In terms of the deflection characteristics, semi-rigid systems are generally positioned

between flexible and rigid systems. Although every system is different from another,
generally speaking, semi-rigid systems achieve the same test levels with less deflection,
compared to flexible systems. On the other hand, semi-rigid systems generally deflect
more, compared to rigid systems. This can be seen as an advantage against the flexible
systems and a disadvantage against the rigid systems, in locations where the clear space
behind the barrier is limited.
6.5.3 Rigid Systems

Rigid barriers have historically been categorised as systems which do not deflect or deform to any
significant extent when impacted. Impacts with rigid barrier systems tend to be more severe than
the impacts with more flexible systems due to lack of deflection. This leads to higher forces exerted
on the occupants of the impacting vehicle and hence to a higher risk of injury. Although this
assumption is generally valid, a more reliable comparison between different systems can be
achieved by looking at the impact severity parameters OIV and ORA, as explained in Section
6.3.3.4.
Systems with higher impact severity parameters should be restricted to locations where there is a
very limited width for barrier deflection or where there the risk to third parties is greater than the
risk to vehicle occupants. The most commonly used rigid barrier systems within Abu Dhabi are
concrete barriers, examples of which are shown in Figure 6.15. The majority of the concrete
barriers available on the market today are successfully tested to TL-4 and TL-5.
Figure 6.15 – Examples of roadside (left) & median (right) concrete barriers
Figure 6.16 presents some of the most common profiles available on the market today. Profile of a
concrete barrier has a significant effect on the way it redirects errant vehicles. For example, the F-
Shape barrier was developed as a modified version of the New Jersey type and is often seen as a
safer system for smaller vehicles, due to redirection characteristics. Some profiles provide higher
containment levels, whereas others provide lower impact severity.
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Figure 6.16 - Examples of double sided concrete barrier profiles
As can be seen from the figure, some of the concrete barriers are designed to be surface mounted,
such as the Dutch Step Profile, whereas others may require to be partially embedded under the
surface level, such as the F-Shape and some may require significant foundations, such as the
Vertical Wall. Some designs are installed as free-standing systems while others utilise ground
anchorages to keep the barrier from moving during the impact. These foundation requirements
change from one design to another and therefore, reference should be made to the manufacturer’s
specifications for each individual system.
Concrete barriers are also available as single sided systems, to be used as roadside barriers.
Figure 6.17 shows some of the common single sided concrete barrier profiles available on the
market today.
Height is an important property of concrete barriers and changes from one design to another.
Typical height of an F-Shape and New Jersey barrier is 810mm, whereas Dutch Step design is
usually 900mm; single slope barriers are 1076mm and a vertical wall can be around 1400mm. The
barrier heights are generally designated as the result of numerous crash tests, two of which are
shown in Figure 6.18. Figure 6.18 shows two of the impact tests carried out during the
development of the vertical wall barrier in UK. The barrier shown on the left had a height of 810mm
and the impacting vehicle overturned. This system was later modified to a height of 1400mm, as
shown on the right and the vehicle was successfully contained. For this reason it is very important
that the heights of the installed system is the same as the crash tested one.
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Figure 6.17 - Examples of single sided concrete barrier profiles
Figure 6.18 – Effect of concrete barrier height on impact performance
Due to their rigid nature, and their ability to successfully contain vehicles with minimal damage, the
cost to maintain and repair rigid barriers over their life (often quoted as 50 years) is less than for
semi-rigid and flexible systems [9]. However, it is often the case that the cost of initially installing
rigid systems will be greater than for semi-rigid and flexible systems with the same containment
capability.
Concrete barriers can be installed in two methods, precast or cast in-situ, as shown in Figure 6.19.
In precast systems, the individual concrete blocks are built at a factory and joined together on site.
This type of concrete barrier takes less time to install compared to in-situ alternative. The
connection details between the individual blocks changes from one system to another and is of
vital importance. The Engineer/Designer should make sure the connections are done in-line with
the original design and the system on the road is installed to the same standard as the impact
tested system.
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The in-situ concrete barriers are cast on the site via mobile slip form machines. The installation in
this type of system takes longer compared to pre-cast systems; however, the resulting barrier often
provides higher performance due to its continuous structure.
Figure 6.19 – Examples of in-situ (left) [10] and pre-cast (right) concrete barriers
Pre-cast systems utilise a number of different interlocking mechanisms to connect individual

concrete blocks. These mechanisms often require a block to be slid over the edge of the next one
to create an interlocking connection. Some of these are patented systems and are unique to
specific manufacturers. A representation of such an interlocking mechanism is shown in Figure
6.20.
Figure 6.20 – Example of a pre-cast concrete barrier connection mechanism
Concrete barriers can be installed in a number of different ways, as shown in Figure 6.21. The in-
situ systems are often cast on asphalt or gravel bases and are free-standing. Pre-cast systems can
be embedded within a layer of asphalt, placed on a gravel or asphalt base or they can be anchored
to the ground. Embedding the system within a layer of asphalt adds additional resistance against
lateral movement during impact, and therefore helps decrease the deflection. On the other hand,
the freestanding pre-cast systems may deflect during an impact, depending on the specific design.
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This free movement usually decreases the impact severity for vehicle occupants; however, more
space is required behind the barrier to accommodate the extra deflection. Some systems
incorporate ground anchors to fix the concrete blocks to the ground. This adds stiffness to the
freestanding pre-cast system and usually eliminates the lateral deflection during an impact. It is not
possible to state that one foundation type is generally better than the others. The
designer/engineer should evaluate each foundation according to the properties and requirements
of each individual site.
It is important to make sure that the barrier installed on the roadside has the same foundation set-
up as the one which was impact tested. This is because changing the type of foundation used can
cause noticeable difference in impact performance levels, such working width or impact severity.
For example, a pre-cast system which was embedded in asphalt may show no deflection during
the impact test. However, the same system may show deflection, if it is tested in free standing
installation. In such cases, further impact testing may be required to demonstrate the effects of
change in foundation. Proprietary concrete barrier manufacturers often test their systems with
different foundation combinations and create selections of different performance levels with the
same profiles. Further detail about individual systems should be provided by the manufacturers.
Figure 6.21 – Examples of concrete barrier foundations
A disadvantage of the concrete systems is that they do not allow the free flow of sand and
therefore can cause sand accumulation on the edges of the barrier, as shown in Figure 6.22.
Figure 6.22 – Sand accumulation on the side of a closed profile concrete barrier
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A rigid barrier can be considered for freeways, truck roads, and expressways in the following
cases:
 to shield objects close to the roadway where deflection space is limited;

 On truck roads where there is a high volume (10% or more) of heavy trucks [12];
 To minimize repair and maintenance;
 To reduce headlight glare into nearby buildings or other sensitive areas;
 To reduce headlight glare between frontage roads and the mainline, especially where the
alignment directs headlights at opposing traffic; and
 Areas where it is especially critical to contain errant vehicles.
Where a concrete barrier is used as a rigid barrier system, the following considerations should be
made:
 For roadside and bridge applications, the safety shape should be located on the traffic side
with (if present), the vertical face on the back;
 Concrete barriers can be backfilled behind the barrier, as shown in Figure 6.23, to provide
lateral support and to further reduce deflection in the event of an impact;
Figure 6.23 – Example of a concrete median barrier with backfill
 Due to the rigid nature of the system, taller vehicles such as HGVs and buses may roll on
the top of the barrier (see ZOI in Section 6.3.3.3). This should be considered when
specifying the concrete barrier system, and the distance between the front of the barrier
system and the hazard located behind it;
 Due to their rigid nature, concrete barriers should ideally only be located in places where
the anticipated angle of impact is less than 15 degrees to reduce the risk of injury to vehicle
occupants in the event of an impact. These are mainly high speed dual carriageway roads;
 Concrete barriers must not be located more than 4 m from the edge of the nearest traffic
lane because greater distances increase the risk of higher angle collisions with the barrier
[9];
 For a concrete barrier to be effective, the barrier must be able to resist the impact load
through a combination of moment and shear loads. To achieve this, a minimum length of
barrier is required. Achieving this minimum length depends on the type of system, method
of anchorage of the barrier and the detail of the connections between elements of the
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system. Therefore designer/engineer should refer to the installation guidelines of the

system, as recommended by the manufacturer.
Bridge barriers are also considered as rigid systems. Due to the higher risks associated with the
consequences of falling off the side, bridge barriers are usually designer to containment level of
TL-4 and higher. These systems can be made of concrete, aluminium, steel or a combination of
concrete and metal. Some of the common profiles are shown in Figure 6.24, for indicative
purposes.
Figure 6.24 – Examples of common bridge barrier profiles
Concrete systems are generally known for their ability to contain heavier vehicles and lower
maintenance costs, as they require virtually no maintenance for most hits. Concrete barriers such
as New Jersey, F-Shape, Single Slope and Vertical wall are considered to be MASH TL-5 bridge
railings when adequately reinforced and built to a minimum height of 1,067mm [6]. However, these
systems are heavy and introduce a permanent load on the bridge, which should be considered
during the bridge design. Sometimes metal sections are added on top of the concrete to increase
the height of the system and therefore the containment level.
Metal bridge barriers can be made of aluminium or steel. The metal systems, especially the
aluminium ones, are lighter than concrete alternatives and therefore introduce less loading on the
bridge. However, they are more likely to be damaged during impacts than the concrete ones and
therefore have higher maintenance costs. In general, steel systems can contain heavier vehicles
than the aluminium one do; although this would change from one design to another. Aluminium
systems available on the market are mostly tested up to TL-4, whereas it is possible to find TL-5
steel systems. Bridge barriers available on the market are predominantly proprietary systems and
therefore the design details can change dramatically from one system to another. Further
information should be provided by the manufacturer.

Safety barriers can be classified into different categories by several of their properties. These
include:
 Impact Test Performance:
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o Containment Level;
o Working Width & Dynamic Deflection;
o Vehicle Intrusion;
o Impact Severity.
 Developer of the System:
o Proprietary Systems;
o Non-Proprietary Systems;
 Rigidity and General Design:
o Flexible Systems;
o Semi-Rigid Systems;
o Rigid Systems.
Of all these classifications, the most important and relevant ones are the performance
classifications. The performance classification of a system is determined through full scale impact
testing. Performance of barrier systems should be specified in terms of containment/test level (i.e.
the weight and speed of vehicle for which the system has been successfully tested), deflection
distance (i.e. the distance which the barrier deflects under impact), zone of intrusion (i.e. the
distance above and behind the barrier where a higher vehicle may roll into), and impact severity
(i.e. how high is the risk of injury to the occupant of a vehicle in the event of an incident).
The recommended impact test guidelines for Abu Dhabi are MASH and NCHRP350.
Barrier systems can be designated as either proprietary (i.e. they are owned by a manufacturer) or
non-proprietary (i.e. they are patent free). Proprietary systems are to be preferred as they are
tested to the latest standards and will have a great amount of supporting information in terms of
site suitability, training and maintenance requirements.
Historically, barrier systems have been categorised as flexible, semi-rigid and rigid. With the
increase of the number and variety of available systems on the market, the boundaries between
these categories have disappeared. Therefore a more meaningful and recommended classification
is the performance based one.
Each type of barrier has its place on the Abu Dhabi Road Network. However, care must be taken
to ensure that the minimum performance requirements specified for a particular barrier type are
correct and that the barrier selected meets or exceeds these minimum requirements.
Only barrier systems accepted by the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport
are permitted to be installed on the road network.
6.7 References
[1] FHWA, “Manual for Assesing Safety Hardware (MASH),” [Online]. Available:
[Accessed 23 02 2015].
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[3] CEN, “EN 1317 Road Restraint Systems - Part 2: Performance classes, impact test acceptance
criteria and test methods for safety barriers including vehicle parapets,” CEN (European
Committee for Standardization), Brussels, 2010.
[4] AASHTO-LRFD Bridge Design Specifications, 7th Edition, Washington D.C.: American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, 2014.
[5] Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges, 17th Edition, Washington D.C.: American
Association of State Highways and Transportation Officials, 2005.
[7] American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, AASHTO LRFD Bridge
Design Specifications, Washington DC: AASHTO, 2010.
[8] Roadside Safety Design Comittee, “Transportation Research Circular E-C172,” Transportation
Research Board, Washington D.C., 12 July 2012.
[9] RTA, Roadside Design Guide for Dubai, First Edition, Dubai: Roads and Transport Authority,
2008.
[10] G. Williams, “Whole Life Cost-Benefit Analysis for Median Safety Barriers,” TRL, 2008.
[11] Delta Bloc, Delta Bloc International GmbH, [Online]. Available:

http://www.deltabloc.co.uk/en/Product-
Categories/Permanent_Safety_Barriers8/pproducts/0.html. [Accessed 06 09 2015].
Austroads, 2010.
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7 SELECTION AND APPLICATION OF ROADSIDE,

MEDIAN AND BRIDGE BARRIERS
7.1 Overview
Chapter 6 has given details of the different types of barriers which are available (i.e. flexible, semi-
rigid or rigid), the testing which is required of these barriers to NCHRP350 or MASH, and the way
in which these barriers can be classified following the testing. Barriers are typically classified
according to their level of containment, their deflection characteristics, and their impact severity
level.
This Chapter details the way in which these performance classifications should be specified for a
particular location to ensure that the barrier installed (under testing conditions) has shown to be
capable of providing a level of risk reduction which is acceptable.
Furthermore, in order to ensure that a level of performance is maintained in the event of an impact,
an overview of the maintenance and inspection requirements for barrier systems is also provided,
giving examples of those issues more regularly witnessed on the Abu Dhabi road network,
reasoning why such issues are not acceptable and more importantly, what can be done to remedy
the situation.
7.2 Selection Criteria

The selection of a barrier system for a particular location should be primarily governed by safety
considerations and secondarily by cost. In general, more flexible barriers will have the lowest
lateral deceleration rates and will perform better at gradually redirecting an errant vehicle.
However, when a flexible system has an impact, it will usually require repair work before it will
function properly again. In areas with frequent accidents, this may result in a significant
accumulation of time during which the barrier is not operational, thus increasing risk to other road
users. Also, the regular presence of repair crews must be considered as a potential hazard, both
for the motorist and for the workers themselves. In such circumstances, use of a semi-rigid barrier
or a rigid concrete barrier may be warranted, which require less repair work.
The safety of a given barrier system will also vary, depending on the type of vehicle involved. It is
partly for that reason that proprietary barrier systems are preferred as they will have been tested to
a particular test level in accordance with NCHRP350 or MASH and hence, the impact parameters
for which the barrier has demonstrated performance will be known.
As stated in Chapter 3, the preference should always be to remove or relocate hazards from clear
zones where practical rather than simply installing barriers.
Because of their size, buses and large trucks are not well protected by flexible barrier systems and
even if they contain a larger impacting vehicle, the extra vehicle weight may cause larger than
normal deflections. If the cable is adjacent to an embankment, large vehicles may still reach the
slope. With their higher centres of gravity, they will be more likely to roll over, even on relatively
mild slopes. Rigid barriers function best for large vehicles, and higher barriers reduce the chance
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07 SELECTION AND APPLICATION OF ROADSIDE, FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
that the large vehicles will flip over the barrier. The designer should review the distribution of
vehicle types expected as a factor in selecting appropriate barrier types.
Factors that should be considered in the selection of the type of barrier to be used at a specific site
include:
 Restraint requirements (i.e. performance capability);
 Dynamic deflection and clearance;
 Site conditions;
 Traffic volumes and percentage of heavier vehicles;
 End treatments (see Chapter 9);
 Sight distance (see Chapter 5 of the Abu Dhabi Road Geometric Design Manual);
 Costs;
 Maintenance;
 Aesthetics; and
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 outline these requirements. The following sections elaborate on these
considerations.
7.2.1 Containment Requirements

The primary purpose of all roadside barriers is to prevent a run-off-the-road vehicle from striking a
fixed object or terrain feature that is less forgiving than striking the barrier itself. Containing and
redirecting the impacting vehicle using an appropriate and well-specified barrier system
accomplishes this.
Because the dynamics of an impact crash are complex and will vary wildly from impact to impact,
the most effective means of assessing barrier performance is through full-scale impact tests based
on a similar testing and assessment requirements. By standardising such tests, designers can
compare the safety performance of alternative designs. Traditionally, most roadside barriers have
been developed and tested for passenger cars and offer marginal protection when struck by
heavier vehicles at high speeds and at other than flat angles of impact. Therefore, if the safety of
the occupants of passenger vehicles is the primary concern, flexible barrier systems will normally
be selected. However, locations with high traffic volumes, high speeds, high-crash experience,
and/or a significant volume of heavy trucks and buses may warrant a higher performance level
barrier, which is typically more rigid. This is especially important if barrier penetration by a vehicle
is likely to have serious consequences, for example, when there is a high consequence third party
located behind the barrier.
The initial determination that needs to be made is the level of containment that the barrier must
provide at a given site. The “basic” level is to provide for light passenger vehicles, including four-
wheel drive vehicles and light commercial vehicles, and this is accomplished in many cases by
specifying TL-3 longitudinal barriers (although this will depend on the speed of the road). Similarly,
TL-2 barriers may be appropriate on lower speed roadways where design speeds are 70 km/h or
less.
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Table 7.1 - Selection criteria for roadside barriers
Criteria Comments
1. Containment requirements The barrier must be structurally able to contain and redirect an
(Performance Capability) errant vehicle, and hence the appropriate Test Level (TL) should
be selected.
2. Deflection distance and Adequate deflection distance must be available so that the barrier
clearance can deflect on impact without contacting rigid objects behind the
barrier. This will also require consideration of the Zone of Intrusion
(ZOI).
3. Site Conditions The slope approaching the barrier, slope behind the barrier, and
distance from travelled way may preclude the use of some barrier
types, as too might the ground conditions into which the barrier will
be installed.
4. Cost Standard barrier systems are relatively consistent in cost, but

special-use systems can cost significantly more.
5. Traffic Volumes and A high volume of traffic on the road will increase the exposure of
percentage of heavier the barrier system to impacts (both collision and nuisance hits).
vehicles Roads with a higher percentage of heavier vehicles will require the
provision of barrier with a higher test level (level of containment)
6. Maintenance
a. Routine The barrier should not require a significant amount of routine
maintenance.
b. Collision Damage Generally, flexible systems require significant repair after a

collision, semi-rigid systems have fewer repair requirements and
rigid systems or higher performance railings require an even
smaller amount of repair, sometimes nil. [1]
c. Nuisance Hits Flexible barriers will require the most frequent attention for
nuisance hits (e.g. mowers, minor vehicular encroachments).
Semi-flexible barriers will require repairs where nuisance hits
cause kinks or tears. Rigid barriers will seldom require repairs for
nuisance hits.
d. Materials Storage The fewer the number of different systems used, the fewer
inventory items/storage space required.
e. Simplicity Simpler designs, in addition to costing less, are more likely to be

repaired properly by field personnel.
7. Compatibility The barrier system selected may need to be connected to other

systems and/or terminals.
8. Aesthetics There may be some instances where the appearance of the

barrier, or the ability to see through the barrier may influence the
choice of barrier used.
9. Field Experience The performance and maintenance requirements of existing

systems should be monitored to identify problems that could be
lessened or eliminated by using a different barrier type.
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Table 7.2 – Key considerations in barrier selection
Barrier
Consideration
Type
Length of the tested WRSB makes a considerable difference on deflection characteristics. It is known that
short test installations, such as 100-150m, can demonstrate lower deflections compared to longer
installations such as 250-300m. This is because in short installations the tension builds up with less
deflection, and some of the tension is shared by the ground anchors located at the ends of the system.
Length Therefore, for proposed installations which are longer than the ones used during the impact test, the
designer/engineer should consider the potential effect on the maximum deflections. Similarly, the minimum
length of installation at full height (excluding transitions from the end anchors to full height) should be in-line
with the manufacturer’s specifications. The manufacturer and road authority should be consulted when
determining anchorage spacing.
The WRSB manufacturer should be consulted in case of proposed installations on horizontal curves with
Horizontal less than 600m radius. This is because the high tension on the ropes may bend the posts and cause
problems with rope height and tension during or after an impact. The minimum recommended horizontal
curves
curve radius is around 200m for most WRSB installations.
Flexible
The WRSB manufacturer should be consulted in case of proposed installations on vertical curves, where
the high tensions can lift the cables from the posts or the posts from their sockets at the bottom of the
curve and increase the cable height to unacceptable limits. In cold weather this effect can be more
Vertical apparent due to the contraction of the cables. Cables which are higher than acceptable limits can cause
curves the impacting vehicle to go under the barrier. This is especially more likely at the bottom of sag vertical
curves, where the front suspension of an impacting vehicle would be more likely to get compressed;
lowering the impact height of the vehicle.
Ground slope on which the WRSB will be installed can be a limiting factor. Generally, a slope of 1V:10H is
Ground considered as the maximum acceptable ground slope. The WRSB manufacturer should be consulted in
Slope case of proposed installations on slopes steeper than 1V:10H.
The WRSB systems should not be connected directly to other, more rigid systems, unless the safety of the
transition is proven through full scale impact testing. This is because the combination of the high
deflections of a WRSB with the lower deflection of a stiffer system can cause pocketing, when hit by errant
Transition vehicles; i.e. the impacting vehicle can be directed to a head-on collision with the end of the stiffer system.
However, WRSB may be installed in close proximity to rigid or semi-rigid barriers provided that there is
sufficient distance between the barriers to accommodate the dynamic deflection.
To perform satisfactorily, barriers must have sufficient length to enable the tension to be developed
through the system and into the foundations and/or anchorages as impact occurs. For proprietary
Length systems, the minimum length of a barrier system should be stated within the manufacturer’s installation
manual. However, as a general guide, for semi-rigid systems, the barrier should have at least 30 m of
barrier section; exclusive of terminal sections and/or transition sections.
Semi-rigid
W-beam and Thrie-beam barriers are known to contain errant vehicles relatively well on the outside of
curves, as the concave shape helps the development of tension in the rail. The inside of the small radius
Horizontal curves may be a bit more problematic as it becomes more difficult to develop the tension, without
curves significant deflections. However, this problem is usually specific to installations, such as the corners of
intersections, for which appropriate designs are available (see section 7.4.3).
When installing a barrier in the vicinity of a kerb, the barrier face should ideally be in-line with the kerb. If
Kerbs this is not achievable, the barrier should be placed a certain distance away from the kerb face, depending
on the traffic speed. Further information is available in section 7.3.6.
The minimum length of installation should be stated within the manufacturer’s specifications. However, as
Length a general guide, for rigid systems, this value is likely to be around 20-30m.
Rigid barriers are known for their higher impact severities, due to lack of deflection. For this reason, they
should generally be avoided in locations where they are likely to get hit in high impact angles, such as
Rigid
Horizontal outside of small radius horizontal curves. However, it is not always possible to avoid this in all situations,
curves particularly on loop ramps at urban freeway interchanges. At least on loops ramps, the impact speeds are
expected to be relatively low.
Water outlets should be provided under the system to help discharge storm water from the road
Drainage pavement.
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Due to the high number of variables and local considerations to be made, the decision whether to
install a barrier system with a higher level of containment (TL3 or greater) will largely depend on
engineering judgement, and consideration of the following points:
 High percentage of heavy vehicles in traffic stream (i.e. on truck roads);

 Routes where hazardous materials (such as chemicals, solvents, pesticides, oils (except
edible ones), nuclear waste) are transported;
 Adverse geometrics, such as sharp curvature, that are often combined with poor sight
distance
 Severe consequences associated with penetration of a barrier by a large vehicle; and
 For bridge parapets, the height of the bridge, and the type of hazard located below the
bridge.
With regard to the specific case of median barrier systems, a proprietary TL-3 barrier (capable of
redirecting passenger cars, vans and light trucks) will be adequate in most cases. However,
consideration should be given to the bulleted points above when determining the test level of the
barrier to be installed, especially if the result of a heavy vehicle penetrating a median barrier is
likely to be catastrophic. In such cases the use of a proprietary TL-4 or TL-5 median barriers
should be specified as these have an increased capability to contain and redirect large vehicles.
Further, with regard to the specific case of bridge barriers:
A. TL-4. This is the standard Abu Dhabi bridge rail on most bridges. Its use is appropriate,
except for those conditions identified in point C below where a TL-5 bridge rail should be
used.
B. TL-5. This performance level should be designated for:
 All truck roads;
 All roads with significant truck volumes (say, 100 DDHV or higher); and
 All other sites where a TL-5 rail can address a specific concern (e.g. truck lean over,
potential catastrophic consequences for heavy vehicle penetration).
C. TL-6. This is the highest performance level and it is only considered for the rare cases
where a route is regularly used by high numbers (say, 100 DDHV or higher) of tankers or
similar vehicles and there are hazards with risk to third parties (See Chapter 4, Section 4.4)
within the vicinity of the travelled way.
7.2.2 Deflection Distance Requirements

As detailed within Section 6.3.3.2 the distance which the barrier deflects during the
NCHRP350/MASH testing will be reported for every proprietary product. The deflection distance is
important in that it determines the space that must be maintained between the hazard and the
barrier. If a hazard were allowed to remain within the deflection distance of a barrier, as shown in
Figure 7.1, the longitudinal movement of an errant vehicle can still carry it into that obstacle. It is
for that reason that no hazard (which cannot be removed, relocated or made passively
safe/transferable) should be present within the deflection distance of a safety barrier system.
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Figure 7.1 - Examples of hazards located within the deflection distance of the barrier
Field experience has shown that, during impact, a large truck or similar high-centre-of-gravity
vehicle can lean over more rigid barrier systems, and therefore intrude behind the rear face of the
barrier system. The Zone of Intrusion (ZOI) is the clear area that should be provided behind the
barrier and beyond its dynamic deflection distance to account for this behaviour, and more details
regarding the determination of this area is given within Section 6.3.3.3. The designer should
consider the ZOI when locating a barrier to shield a rigid object, such as a bridge pier or sign
support. In some cases, however, providing a separation between the barrier and the object will
not be practical. In critical areas, it then may be desirable to use a higher performing barrier or, for
a concrete barrier, to increase the barrier height to minimize vehicular overhang in a crash. In the
specific case of median barriers, relatively wide, flat medians are suited for flexible or semi-rigid
barriers, if the deflection distance of the barrier system is less than one-half of the width of the
median. Narrow medians, where little or no deflection is acceptable, within heavily travelled
roadways usually require a rigid barrier.
7.2.3 Impact Severity Level Requirements

Section 6.3.3.4 provides details of the severity indices (OIV and ORA) which are calculated during
impact testing to NCHRP 350 and MASH. These provide a method of ranking the severity of the
impact with the safety barrier system, and give an indicative guide as to the level of injury which
might be expected from an impact with an errant vehicle (assuming all of the impact parameters
are the same as those under which the safety barrier was tested). In general terms, the lower the
value of OIV and ORA for a particular system, the lower the risk of injury would be to the vehicle
occupants in the event of an impact. For proprietary systems used within the Abu Dhabi
Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport’s road network, preference should be given to those
systems meeting the ‘preferred’ values within Table 6.4. No systems exceeding the ‘maximum’
values within Table 6.4 shall be used without prior approval of the Abu Dhabi Department of
Municipal Affairs and Transport with all of the values being detailed on the Abu Dhabi Department
of Municipal Affairs and Transport’s list of accepted vehicle restraint systems.
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7.2.4 Site Considerations

Site conditions will often influence the choice of barrier type. Regardless of the type of barrier
being used, it is preferable that the slope in front and behind of the barrier is essentially flat
(1V:10H or flatter) because the requirements of NCHRP350 and MASH are such that safety
barriers have (generally) only been tested in such configurations. The result on an impact with a
specific barrier in a slope is generally unknown.
If the barrier is to be placed on a slope steeper than approximately 1V:10H, a flexible or semi-rigid
type should be used to reduce the severity of impact between the errant vehicle and the barrier
system - this is likely to increase due to additional lateral forces on the vehicle as a result of
travelling across the slope. However, no barrier should be placed on any slope steeper than
1V:6H. Instead, the barrier should be placed closer to the edge of the carriageway (where the
gradient is likely to be less), or remedial works undertaken to flatten the running surface prior to the
barrier location. The full width between the traffic lanes and a concrete barrier should be suitably
paved to ensure optimum barrier performance.
7.2.5 Cost Considerations

Full details regarding the economic evaluation of different treatment options (which can equally be
applied to different barrier systems under review) can be found in Chapter 12. The selection of a
barrier should consider the life cycle costs of optional systems. The initial capital cost of the barrier
is only one component of economic evaluation. Repair and future maintenance costs may vary
substantially for different systems. The initial cost of the system will still be an important budgetary
and project management consideration. In general, the initial cost of a system increases as rigidity
and strength increase, but repair and maintenance costs usually decrease with increased strength.
Where clear space will allow, a flexible or semi-rigid median barrier may be the best choice due to
the less severe impacts which will result, if a barrier can be located in the centre of a median
where it is less likely to be hit and repairs do not necessitate closing a lane of traffic. However, a
rigid barrier (requiring no significant routine maintenance or repair) is recommended if a barrier
must be located immediately adjacent to a high-speed, high-volume traffic lane, or if there is a high
density of heavier vehicles (refer to Section 7.2.1).
7.2.6 Traffic Considerations

Higher traffic volumes increase the probability of a barrier impact, both in terms of a heavy impact,
but also in terms of nuisance strikes. However, it is not just the impact itself which should be
considered, but also the effects of the resulting repair works. Closing lanes to work (particularly in
the case of median barriers) causes more traffic complications where traffic volumes are high.
Therefore, in high-traffic volume locations, rigid barriers are generally preferred because they
usually provide continuous, crashworthy service without generating maintenance and repair.
Where there is a high volume of heavy vehicles (for example on a truck road) or a history of heavy
vehicle, cross-median crashes, a rigid barrier is preferred because it is more likely to contain and
redirect heavy vehicles. Maintenance and repairs are not usually required after a hit. The designer
must also consider the Zone of Intrusion (see Section 6.5.4) for the system, together with the other
performance requirements detailed in Section 7.2.
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7.2.7 Installation, Maintenance and Inspection Requirements

For all proprietary system, installation, maintenance and inspection requirements should be
provided by the promoters associated with the barrier system. They should also have an
established training scheme for the operatives undertaking these activities.
Maintenance factors that need to be considered before selecting a particular barrier system
include:
 Routine maintenance of the barrier;
 Damage repair;
 Effect of the barrier on road and roadside maintenance (pavement overlays for example);
 Material and component requirements (e.g. stockpiling of spare parts); and
 Experience of maintenance repair crews.
It is desirable that the number of different roadside barrier systems used in Abu Dhabi be limited.
This practice has advantages in that maintenance personnel need to be familiar with and trained to
inspect and maintain a limited number of systems and stocks of replacement parts are more easily
managed. However, at the same time, a wide variety of products give designers choice in the
products which they can use, as a result competition will increase and costs reduce.
Rigid systems are generally not damaged during impact and therefore have lower maintenance
requirements and associated costs. Therefore, rigid barriers may be advantageous on urban
freeways and expressways where maintenance workers are particularly vulnerable. However, this
advantage is offset to some extent by the likelihood of more serious crashes and a greater level of
subsequent traffic disruption.
Flexible systems generally become ineffective following an impact. In the case of a wire rope
safety fence, many hundreds of metres of barrier may become ineffective following an impact on
the system. However, flexible systems can be relatively easy to repair even when a significant
number of posts are damaged during impact. The combination of concrete ground sockets, slotted
posts and the cables used for wire rope systems enables damage to be quickly repaired.
Repair maintenance is usually a more important factor for median barriers than roadside barriers.
One or more high-speed lanes will normally need to be closed in order to repair or replace
damaged barriers because median barriers are typically installed closer to the travelled way. This
creates a safety concern for both the repair crew and for motorists using the road. Consequently, a
rigid barrier system is likely to be preferable in many median applications, particularly for high-
volume urban freeways and expressways where the barrier must be located in close proximity to
the traffic lane.
7.2.8 Compatibility Requirements

The total roadside barrier system, including bridge rails, must function effectively as a unit. As a
result, impact tested transitions should be used when the approach roadside barrier significantly
differs in strength, height, and deflection characteristics from the connected system (refer to
Chapter 9). In certain circumstances, the barrier will also need to demonstrate a level of
compatibility with other features, such as:
 Local terrain;
 Lighting columns and overhead sign supports; and
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 Bridge piers.
Figure 7.2 (left) shows a lack of compatibility between a concrete barrier and the kerb located in
front of it – in this case there is a lack of continuity in protection, caused by the gap in the barrier as
a result of the location of the overhead sign support. Ideally, the support would be removed or
moved rearwards from the edge of the carriageway, however, if this is not possible, an acceptable
solution would be to install a short length of profiled steel plate (as shown in the right-hand side
photograph). Whilst this does not provide complete continuity, it does address of the need to have
a gap in the barrier, whilst maintaining the profile of the barrier system and reducing the risk of
pocketing.
A Possible Solution
Lack of Compatibility
Figure 7.2 - Lack of Cmcpatibility between barrier and overhead sign support (left) and a
possible solution (right)
7.2.9 Aesthetic and Environmental Considerations

While aesthetics are a concern, they are not normally the controlling factors in the selection of a
roadside barrier, except in environmentally sensitive locations (e.g. recreational areas, parks). In
these instances, a natural-looking barrier that blends with its surroundings may be appropriate, as
shown in Figure 7.3. However, it should be ensured that the barrier still meets the structural and
performance specifications. Aesthetics may also be important in tourist or recreational areas. In
some situations, barriers that blend with the surroundings may be preferred.
The designer should make every effort in the treatment of all structures, including bridge rails, to
reflect the Islamic design and culture. Design concepts should be easily implemented. Also,
incorporate the construction considerations into the architectural treatment concepts. Architectural
elements should be functional, durable, and easily maintained. Desirably, maintain a sense of
continuity throughout the entire highway corridor.
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Figure 7.3 - An example of a bridge parapet designed to incorporate aesthetic

considerations
Environmental factors may be important to consider in the selection process. For example, barriers
with considerable frontage area may contribute to drifting of sand in some areas. Figure 7.4 shows
that whilst drifting and blown sand can be an issue for road user visibility, it is clear that, due to the
open nature of some barriers, it can be less of a risk to road users if the sand is permitted to blow
through the barrier system. This should be compared to Figure 7.5 where the solid face of the
concrete barrier acts as a barrier to the flow of the sand and hence, sand is seen to accumulate on
the face of the barrier. This accumulated sand will be detrimental to the safety of road users as it
will reduce the ability of the barrier system to function as designed. Hence, in areas where drifting
sand is frequent and large in volume, barriers with an open design should be considered.
Figure 7.4 - The Effect of Drifting Sand
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Figure 7.5 - Sand accumulation on the face of a concrete barrier
In a similar way, open profile barriers should be preferred in areas liable to flooding to allow the
passage of water through the system. Of course, the provision and maintenance of drainage
solutions in these areas should be reviewed when flooding is an issue.
Certain types of steel barrier will deteriorate in corrosive or abrasive environments; typically the
soils in Abu Dhabi are generally extremely corrosive due to the resistivity of the soil, the
temperature and humidity, and high winds.
Soil Resistivity is a measure of how much the soil can resist the flow of electricity. Corrosiveness of
a soil can be rated according to its resistivity; smaller resistivity results in more severe corrosivity
rating. The soil resistivity in Middle Eastern sandy desert environment is usually less than
2000ohm cm, which makes it severely corrosive as shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 - Soil Corrosivity Scale [2]
Soil Resistivity Range (Ω cm) Corrosivity Rating
0 – 2000 Severe
2000 - 10000 Severe to moderate
10000 - 30000 Mild
30000 and above Not likely
Temperature and humidity are important factors in soil corrosivity. High yearly means of
temperatures and humidity contribute to Abu Dhabi’s very corrosive environment. Wind velocity is
relatively high in coastal regions; sometimes with blowing sand (as shown in Figure 7.4). The
combination of all of these properties creates a very corrosive environment, which tests the
durability of road safety systems and in particular, their foundations.
Acceptable solutions such as protective coatings or thicker gauge metal could be utilised. The
posts used for a particular location will depend on two main aspects:
 The performance requirements and design of the barrier system;
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 The local ground conditions.
Within the manufacturer’s installation manual, guidance will be given with regard to the post types
which are suitable for their system (as this will vary from system to system). The evaluation of the
ground conditions and the foundations available at a particular location can be found in Section
7.3.7.
The corrosion effects of weathering of steel can be seen by the deterioration of the post in Figure
7.6. These weathering effects will be lessened if the steel post is installed with a concrete sleeve
around it although the rate of degradation will vary depending on the local conditions of the site.
Figure 7.6 - Example of a corroded barrier post
The high corrosivity of the soils in Abu Dhabi has led the Authorities to use concrete foundations
for some items of roadside furniture, which protrude above ground level. These should not exceed
150mm. Concrete foundations will protect the electrical connections of objects such as luminaire
supports, by cutting their contact with the ground, as shown in Figure 7.7. However, care must be
taken that this will not interfere with the dynamic performance of systems, particularly passively
safe devices. Further details on restrictions and requirements in such cases can be found in
Section 4.3.2.5.
Figure 7.7 - Electrical cabinet on a raised concrete base
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7.2.10 Field Experience

There is no substitute for documented proof of a barrier’s field performance. If a particular barrier
system is working satisfactorily and does not require an extraordinary amount of maintenance,
there is little reason to select and install another barrier for which these characteristics are not
conclusively known. It is particularly important that impact performance and repair cost data be
maintained by appropriate personnel and that the information is made available to design
engineers charged with selecting and installing traffic barriers.
The manner in which a barrier performs in the field, and how this relates to the original full scale
testing can be identified by reviewing experience from impacts with barrier systems where
available and by documenting the resulting damage and repair costs. In general, designers should
consider using only a few different roadside barrier systems on any particular scheme. The
advantages of this practice include:
 The systems in use have been proven effective over the years;
 The site-specific design details are better understood;
 Construction and maintenance personnel are familiar with the systems;
 Parts and inventory requirements are simplified when only a few different types of barrier
are routinely used; and
 End terminals and transition sections for normal installations also can be standardized.
7.3 Application Criteria for Roadside, Median and Bridge Barriers

After consideration of Chapters 3 and 4, and determining that the system cannot be made
passively safe or traversable in accordance with Chapter 5, consideration should be given to the
performance of the barrier needed of a particular application, in line with the guidance in Chapter
6, and Section 7.2.
This Section presents guidelines with regard to the way in which the barrier system should then be
designed. However, it is emphasised that at all times within the design process, engineering
judgement should be applied and the final design thoroughly reviewed before implementation.
When determining the placement of a barrier system, either in the roadside, median, or on a bridge
structure, the following detailed aspects of the barrier design should be made:
 Length of need;
 Minimum length and gaps in barriers:
 Lateral placement from the edge of the travelled way;
 Shy line offset;
 Barrier deflection distance;
 Effect of kerbs; and
 Foundation conditions.
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The following points should also be considered with particular reference to roadside barriers (refer
to Section 7.4):
 Effect of embankments;
 Rate of flare;
 The presence of a short radius; and
 Sight distance.
In addition, the following points should be considered with particular reference to median barriers
(refer to Section 7.5):
 Terrain effects on the lateral placement of median barriers;

 Superelevated sections;
 Fixed objects within the median;
 Emergency and maintenance crossings;
 Gates; and
 Glare screens.
Furthermore, the following points should be considered with particular reference to bridge parapets
 Material type;
 Hardware attachments;
 Additional lateral placement considerations;
 Heights of bridge parapets;
 Fixation to bridge decks.
These factors are discussed in the following sections.
7.3.1 Length of Need

A barrier must be extended a sufficient distance upstream and/or downstream from the hazard to
safely protect a run-off-the-road vehicle. Otherwise, the vehicle could travel behind the barrier and
impact the hazard. The determination of the LON, adjustments, graphical representations and
solved examples are shown in the appendix at the end of this Guide.
Vehicles depart the road at relatively small angles (as demonstrated by the relatively small impact
angles specified for testing within NCHRP350 and MASH). These flat angles of departure result in
the need to extend the barrier a significant distance upstream from the hazard.
Many factors combine to determine the appropriate length of need for a given roadside condition.
These include:
 The distance to the outside limit of the hazard (LA) or the clear zone (LC), whichever is
smaller;
 The distance between the edge of travelled way and the barrier (L2);
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 The runout length (LR), which is based on the design speed (V) and the traffic volume on
the facility;
 The length of hazard (L1), as measured parallel to the roadway;
 Whether or not the barrier is on a flare; and
 On two-way facilities, whether or not the barrier needs to be extended to provide protection
for the traffic in the opposing direction.
Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9 illustrate the variables that will determine the barrier length of need.
Figure 7.8 applies to a roadway with traffic moving in one direction or to a two-way roadway where
the hazard is not within the clear zone of the opposing direction of travel. For two- way, two-lane
undivided highways, all barrier ends should be terminated with an approved crashworthy end
terminals (see Chapter 9). Figure 7.9 applies to a two-way undivided facility where the roadside
hazard is within the clear zone of the opposing direction of traffic.
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L1

3.81m

PAGE 160
L1 = Length of hazard
L2 = Distance to barrier
Notes: LC = Clear zone
 Use appropriate crashworthy terminal. See Chapter 9.

LA = Distance to back of hazard
Note that the Length of need starts 3.81m downstream
of the terminal.
L3 = Distance to front of hazard
 Use acceptable anchorage terminal. See Chapter 9.
LR = Runout length
 The use of the 25° angle to locate the end of the trailing
barrier end will be determined on a case-by-case basis X = Length needed for approach end
depending on site conditions.
L4 = Length to be omitted from length of need
Figure 7.8 - Barrier length of need layout (one-way or dual two way divided roadways)
FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016


3.81m
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LC = Clear zone

Notes:
 Use appropriate crashworthy terminal. See Chapter 9. Note that
the Length of need starts 3.81m downstream of the terminal. LR = Runout length
Figure 7.9 - Barrier length of need layout (two-way roadways)

 If Lc for opposing traffic < LA, then X = 0 for opposing traffic. X = Length needed for approach end

7.3.2 Minimum Length and Gaps in Barriers

To perform satisfactorily, barriers must have sufficient length to enable the strength to be
developed through the system and into the foundations and/or anchorages as impact occurs.
Hence, even if the length of need is shorter, the installation length of a barrier system should at
least be the minimum length of the barriers systems. Designers should, therefore, check that the
distance between the leading and trailing points of need is greater than the minimum length of
barrier for the chosen barrier type. The lengths to be considered in the design of roadside barriers
are the [3]:
 Terminal lengths;
 Transition length; and
 Minimum length of barrier.
For proprietary systems, the minimum length of a barrier system should be stated within the
manufacturer’s installation manual. However, as a general guide, for semi-rigid systems, the
barrier should have at least 30m [1] of barrier section exclusive of terminal sections and/or
transition sections. For flexible systems, the minimum length is 60m [4], exclusive of the terminal or
transition sections. For rigid barriers, a minimum length of 20-30m may be suitable [1].
Likewise, short gaps between runs of barrier are undesirable. This is because short gaps introduce
discontinuities into the system, and increase the risk for errant motorists; as they can hit the ends
of the barriers. These barrier ends should be shielded by crashworthy terminals (see Chapter 9). A
single gap requires two terminals (one for each end) and the cost of two crash-worthy terminals is
likely to be more than the cost of a short distance of standard barrier section. Ultimately, the cost
effectiveness of each option will depend on the costs of terminals and the standard section of
barrier and also on the length of the gap. The evaluation should be done by the designer/engineer
for each scenario. However as a rough guidance, gaps of less than 60m between barrier termini
should be connected into a single run, unless a gap is required for access, in which case the end
of the barriers should be terminated using appropriate terminal designs.
7.3.3 Lateral Placement

Barriers in themselves can be hazardous to errant vehicles, it is just that the risk of injury, and
severity of injury should be less than that resulting from an impact with the hazard located behind
the barrier system. However, the lateral position of a barrier can greatly affect the outcome on an
incident, either affecting the probability of the incident occurring, or the severity of injuries resulting
from an impact. This equally applies to roadside, median and bridge barrier systems.
As a general rule, a roadside barrier should be placed as far from the travelled way as practical,
while maintaining the proper operation and performance of the system [5]. This way, a wider clear
area is provided, which would increase the chances of an errant vehicle to regain control, without
hitting the barrier. Furthermore, the designer/engineer should understand the following effects, with
regards to the lateral placement of barriers:
PAGE 162
 As the distance from the edge of the travelled way increases, the proportion of errant
vehicles which are likely to reach the distance decreases (see Chapter3, Figure 3.1). This
means that, barriers which are placed closer to the edge of the travelled way are more
likely to get hit by errant vehicles, compared to ones which are placed further away.
Therefore, the barriers which are located closer to the edge of the travelled way are likely to
be impacted more frequently than the ones located further away. This, in effect, is likely to
cause higher property damage costs for road users and higher maintenance costs for road
authorities, and as a result, increase the risk of injury to road workers during maintenance
and repair;
 Barriers which are located closer to the edge of the travelled way, on average, are likely to
get hit at higher speeds than the ones located further away. This is simply because barriers
which are located further away will provide more empty space, along which the errant
vehicle can slow down, before reaching the barrier;
 Experience shows that barriers which are located closer to the edge of the travelled way
are likely to get hit at lower impact angles, whereas the barriers which are located further
away are likely to get hit at higher impact angles [1]. This is because the errant vehicles do
not always follow a straight line as they leave the road. In scenarios, where an errant
vehicle follows a curved path, the angle of impact would increase as the distance of the
barrier from the edge of the road increase. This can especially be a problem for rigid
systems, such as concrete barriers, as high impact angles, combined with the rigid nature
of the system can increase the impact severity. Therefore, consideration should be taken,
when placing rigid systems further away from the road. However, by their nature, rigid
systems are more likely to be chosen, in locations where the lack of space does not permit
other systems, due to working width requirements. Therefore, rigid barriers are likely to be
located close to the edge of the travelled way anyway;
 Barriers which are placed too close to the edge of the travelled way may cause drivers to
consider them as hazards and to shy away from barrier and drive closer to the lane on the
other side. The net effect is a reduction in traffic speed, which affects the capacity of the
road. The distance from the edge of the travelled way beyond which a roadside barrier will
not be perceived as a hazard and result in motorists reducing speed or changing vehicle
position on the roadway, which is referred to as the shy-line offset [5]. Further information
on the shy-line offset is provided in Section 7.3.4;
 There is an increased risk of sideswipe crashes if lane widths less than 3.65m are used
next to barriers. This occurs because drivers tend to move away from the barrier and may
encroach into adjoining travel lanes;
 Drivers will travel at moderate speeds close to long lengths of barrier; however, this is
generally only successful in a high-stress driving environment (e.g. tunnels and bridges)
where drivers are attentive and ready to react quickly to risks;
 Driving close to barriers increases the stress of the driving task and cannot be sustained for
long periods.
PAGE 163
In addition to operational considerations, a roadside barrier and its foundation should not [1]:
 interfere with any utilities, drainage conduits or structures; or
 impair access of personnel or machinery to any utilities, drainage conduits or installation or
structures.
The lateral position of a barrier is influenced by the [1]:

 Road cross-section (e.g. need for shoulder and/or kerb);
 Barrier-to-hazard clearance (see Section 7.3.5);
 Shy line offset (see Section 7.3.4);
 Trajectory of vehicles when crossing kerbs and slopes (see Section 7.3.6); and
 Desire to avoid nuisance damage (frequent strikes).
Depending on the local circumstances, it may be preferable to provide the same shoulder width
adjacent to barriers as is provided elsewhere along a road as this will provide the road user with a
consistent roadside geometry. However, consider the provision of a wider shoulder (e.g. 3m to 4m
from the edge of the adjacent traffic lane to the barrier) to provide space for vehicles parked on the
nearside to open their doors and/or to provide space for maintenance vehicles to stand clear of the
traffic lane [1].
In some cases, the distance between the edge of the travelled way and the hazard may be limited,
in which case, the designer must consider how the available space will be best used and what type
of barrier is most suitable for the particular situation. Where space is limited, and discretionary
parking or emergency stopping is not essential, it may be preferable to provide a reduced shoulder
width in front of the barrier, provided that the shy line principle (refer to Section 7.3.4) is given
adequate consideration [1].
When a vehicle passes over a kerb or a slope, its trajectory and/or the height of the vehicle may be
affected and this may, in turn, affect the way in which the vehicle interacts with the barrier system.
For that reason it is important to consider the effect of the kerb strike and/or slope geometry on the
lateral placement of the barrier system. Further details of these issues are considered in Sections
7.3.6 and 7.4.1.
The barrier offset should match or exceed the desirable shoulder width on the roadway for the
service life of the infrastructure element being designed. For example, for a new bridge, the
projected traffic volume for the next 50 years is of interest. It is normal practice on new bridge
designs to provide sufficient width such that widening would not be required in the 25 to 30 years
following construction [6]. As long as the barrier is located beyond the perceived shoulder of a
roadway, it will have minimum impact on driver speed or lane position [5].
7.3.4 Shy line offset

When roadside features such as bridge railings, parapets, retaining walls, fences or roadside
barriers are located too close to traffic, drivers in the adjacent traffic lane tend to reduce speed,
drive off-centre in the lane, or move into another lane. The distance from the edge of the travelled
way beyond which a roadside object will not be perceived as a hazard and results in motorists
PAGE 164
reducing speed or changing vehicle position on the roadway is referred to as the shy-line offset [5].
Table 7.4 provides suggested shy line offsets based on design speed.
Where possible, barriers should be located outside of the shy-line, particularly where relatively
short lengths of barrier are used. For long, continuous runs of barriers, this offset distance is not as
critical, especially if the barrier is first introduced beyond the shy-line and gradually transitioned
toward the roadway [1].
However, there is also some evidence available that the presence of a safety barrier may influence
the operating speed of traffic. Research has shown that the mean traffic speed on sections of road
with median road safety barriers is higher than similar sections of road without median road safety
barriers. Experience in Sweden is that traffic speeds increased on a narrow road after construction
of a median wire rope road safety barrier [1].
Shy-line offset distance is seldom a controlling criterion for barrier placement. It will have minimum
impact on driver’s speed or lane position as long as the barrier is located beyond the perceived
shoulder of a roadway. However, the shy-line offset should not be used to determine the shoulder
width. Where a roadside barrier is needed to shield an isolated condition, adherence to the uniform
clearance criteria is not critical; however, barrier deflection distance (7.3.5) needs to be
considered. It is more important in these cases that the barrier is located as far from the travelled
way as practical.
Table 7.4 - Suggested shy-line offset
Design speed (km/h) Shy line offset (m)
140 3.8
130 3.7
120 3.2
110 2.8
100 2.4
90 2.2
80 2.0
70 1.7
60 1.4
50 1.1
Source: Adapted from AASHTO Roadside Design Guide [5]
7.3.5 Barrier deflection distance

When a vehicle strikes a roadside barrier, the dynamic deflection of a barrier varies according to
the characteristics of the impacting vehicle, impact speed, angle of impact and the characteristics
of the barrier system. Sufficient lateral clearance should be provided between the barrier and a
hazard to accommodate the appropriate dynamic deflection [1]. Further information regarding the
determination of the deflection distance for barrier systems during impact testing at NCHRP350
and MASH can be found in Sections 6.3.3.2 and 7.2.2. The designer needs to consider the
distance a barrier will deflect upon impact as a critical factor in the selection and lateral placement
of barrier, in particular if the obstruction being shielded is a rigid object.
PAGE 165
When deciding on the lateral placement of a barrier, the designer/engineer should ensure that the
distance between the front face of the barrier and the hazard is wider than the working width of the
barrier, as shown in Figure 7.10. This way, enough clear space will be provided behind the barrier,
to prevent a secondary impact with the hazard.
Figure 7.10 – Barrier placement in front of hazards
For vehicles with a relatively high centre-of-gravity the Zone of Intrusion (ZOI) should also be
considered so that the roll of the vehicle will not enable it to strike a hazard located at the rear of
the barrier. When deciding on the lateral placement of a barrier, the designer/engineer should
ensure that the distance between the front face of the barrier and the hazard is wider than the zone
of intrusion width (ZOIw) of the barrier, as shown in Figure 7.11. More details regarding the ZOI can
be found in Section 6.3.3.3.
In some cases, the available space between the barrier and the hazard may not be adequate and
in these cases, a different barrier system should be specified. This will generally mean that a more
rigid barrier system will need to be used for the particular application.
PAGE 166
Figure 7.11 – Consideration of ZOI in barrier placement
When used in front of embankments, sufficient space should be provided between the back of
posts and the embankment, as shown in Figure 7.12. This is done to ensure that adequate soil
support is provided behind the posts to obtain proper operational characteristics of the barrier.
Figure 7.12 - Barrier placement in front of embankments
Limited test results indicate that the offset distance for embankments is not as critical as it is for
rigid objects. A 600mm distance is desirable for adequate post support, but this may vary
depending on the slope of the embankment, soil type, expected impact conditions, post cross
section and embedment, and the type of barrier system. Increasing the embedment length of
barrier posts by 300mm or more can compensate for the reduced soil foundation support near the
slope break point [5], as too can the use of posts with soil plates’ located at the bottom of the posts
to increase the area of interaction between the post and the supporting ground. However, the
PAGE 167
designer/engineer should not carry out any modifications to impact tested systems without
consulting the manufacturer and the highways authority.
Ground Level
60 900m
0m m
m
Soil Plate
Figure 7.13 - Different generic post types (from left to right: standard post, long post,
standard post with pressure plate, longer post with pressure plate)
7.3.6 Lateral Placement of Barriers behind Kerbs

Kerbing has been shown to be a major contributor to the vaulting and destabilization of impacting
errant vehicles, particularly at high speeds and with higher kerbs. When the tyres of an errant
vehicle strike a kerb, the impact tends to bounce the vehicle upwards, which can contribute to
vaulting or penetration of the rail. This effect contributes to destabilization. When the destabilizing
or vertical bounce effects act in combination with either the destabilizing effects of striking a rigid
barrier or the large deflection of a flexible barrier system, unsatisfactory results may occur and the
barrier may be breached, and the vehicle not contained.
When a vehicle strikes a kerb, the resulting trajectory of the impacting vehicle depends upon
several variables:
 Size, weight and suspension characteristics of the vehicle;
 Size of the impacting vehicle’s tyres;
 The impacting vehicle’s impact speed and angle; and
 The height, shape and the overall installation of the kerb itself.
Barrier/kerb combinations should be discouraged on high speed roads. At those locations where a
kerb might be considered an appropriate solution (e.g. for drainage or delineation), alternative
treatments should be considered when a roadside barrier system is to be installed. In particular,
where a rigid barrier is used, a kerb will impart a vertical force to the vehicle, the dynamic effect of
which could adversely affect the performance of the barrier [7].
Where there are no feasible alternatives, the designer should consider using a 100mm or less
sloping kerb and/or consider stiffening the barrier to reduce the potential deflection. Kerbs with a
lower height are preferred in all cases, and again, if the kerb can be removed, this is the most
preferable action.
PAGE 168
On lower-speed facilities (i.e. less than 70km/h), a vaulting potential still exists, but the risk of such
an occurrence is lessened [5]. Engineering judgement should be applied on a case-by-case basis
for each situation considering the anticipated speeds and consequences of vehicular penetration.
7.3.6.1Recommended Installation Procedures for Semi-Rigid W-Beam

Barriers In-line with a Kerb
When using a semi rigid barrier in combination of a sloping-face kerb, the ideal way of installation
is to have the front face of the barrier flush with the front face of the kerb. The recommended types
of kerbs to be used in these types of installations differ according to the design speed of the road.
These are shown in Figure 7.14 and explained further below. Note that the height of the barrier
must be measured from the pavement surface and should be in accordance with the
manufacturer’s installation instructions for the product.
 Design Speed < 80km/h: A semi-rigid w-beam barrier can be used with any combination
of a sloping-faced kerb that is 150mm or shorter if installed in-line with the front (traffic) face
of the barrier for design speeds up to80 km/h;
 Design Speed 80 to 100km/h: For design speeds above 80 to 100km/h, a 100mm or

shorter sloping kerb is recommended for installations where the face of the kerb is flush
with the face of the barrier;
 Design Speed > 100km/h: For design speeds greater than 100 km/h, the sloping kerb face
should be 1V:3H or flatter and no higher than 100mm although the use of kerbs on roads
with a design speed of 100km/h or greater is discouraged.
Figure 7.14 – Placement of w-beam barriers in-line with kerbs
7.3.6.2Recommended Installation Procedures for Semi-Rigid W-Beam

Barriers - Set-back from a Kerb
When using a semi rigid barrier in combination of a sloping-face kerb, the ideal way of installation
is to have the front face of the barrier flush with the front face of the kerb (as explained in Section
7.3.6.1). However, it may not always be possible to install the barrier in-line with the front face of
the kerb. In such cases the barrier may be installed at a set-back, which provides enough space
for the suspension and bumper of the errant vehicle to come back to their normal pre-departure
PAGE 169
state, before reaching the barrier. Once the suspension and bumper have returned to their normal
position, impacts with the barrier are not as adversely affected. The minimum recommended set-
back, and the maximum recommended kerb height for such installations differ according to the
design speed of the road. These are shown in Figure 7.15 and explained further below. Note that
in case of set-back installations, the height of the barrier must be measured from the top surface of
the kerb and should be in accordance with the manufacturer’s installation instructions for the
product.
 Design Speed < 70km/h: For design speeds less than 70 km/h, sloping-face kerbs of
150mm or lower may be used as long as the face of the barrier is located flush with or at
least 2.5m behind the face of the kerb;
 Design Speed 70 to 80km/h: At design speeds between 70 and 80 km/h, a minimum

lateral offset distance of 4m is required to allow the vehicle suspension to return to its
normal pre-departure state. Once the suspension and bumper have returned to their normal
position, impacts with the barrier are not as adversely affected. Sloping-face kerbs of
100mm or lower may be used as long as the face of the barrier is flush with the face of the
kerb or located at least 4m behind the kerb;
 Design Speed > 80km/h: Set-back installations are not recommended for roads with a
design speed over 80km/h. In such locations, in-line installations should be preferred, as
explained in Section 7.3.6.2.
Figure 7.15 - Placement of w-beam barriers set-back from kerbs
Note that in all cases, it is assumed that the running surface between the front edges of the kerb
and the barrier is flat (i.e. 1V:3H or flatter). If this is not the case, engineering judgement, taking
into account the consideration the points raised within this Section and within Section 7.4.1, should
be used to evaluate any adjustment which might need to be made to the height of the safety
barrier beam in order for it to function and perform as designed.
7.3.7 Foundation Conditions

For many barrier systems, the interaction of a post with the ground in which it is located can have a
significant effect on the dynamic performance of the barrier system. It is for that reason that the
PAGE 170
performance of the barrier in the ground into which it is to be installed should be understood. This
may not necessarily mean that the barrier will be tested within the soil (although this is preferable),
but in some cases it will be possible for manufacturers and promoters to demonstrate the change
in performance (if any) due to the installation in different ground. The testing requirements within
NCHRP350 and MASH provide details on the different types of soils into which guardrails for
testing could be installed, and on the requirements for the associated compaction of the soil [3],
[7].
For proprietary systems, the effect of different ground conditions and the ways in which different
ground conditions can be dealt with will be contained within the manufacturer’s installation manual.
On the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport road network, all soil should be
compacted or stabilised such that there is additional foundation support provided by the soil
surrounding the posts.
Whilst not applying in all cases, in general terms many systems (particularly flexible systems) work
by the post to rail connections breaking on impact (as designed), and the impacting vehicle
travelling over the resulting line of posts, bending them to ground level as the vehicle passes over
them. At this time, the beam of the barrier system is maintained at a constant height by the posts in
front of, and behind, the impacting vehicle. Therefore, in order for the system to perform as
designed, the ability of the ground to withstand the impact forces (applied through the post) and for
the ground to not move during the event, is critical to the performance of the barrier system. There
are two ways in which this can be achieved:
1. Regulate the material into which the post of the barrier is located on the roadside so that it
mirrors that into which the barrier was installed during full scale testing; and
2. Understand the ability of the ground to withstand the impact forces.
The first way, i.e. recreating the ground conditions as it was tested, is generally considered an
unrealistic solution. This is due to two reasons. The first one is the difficulty of recreating the same
ground conditions in different places, due to the differing local conditions and the effects of
compaction, ground water table, humidity, etc. The second reason is the high costs involved.
Instead, it is recommended to measure the quasi-static properties of the soil and to ensure that
these meet minimum values. This is the technique often employed within the installation manual
for proprietary systems.
The design of the test procedure for ground conditions has been in use within the UK for many
years, and is detailed within the British Standard BS7669-3 [8]. An alternative testing method
(involving an instrumented post and a trolley can be found in Annex B of MASH [7], however, this
test method is tailored for test house use, and not for use on the roadside. The UK test method is
commonly known as the ‘push/pull’ test, and requires and incremental load to be applied to the top
of a post (not connected to the beam of a barrier at the time of testing). This incremental load can
either be applied through pushing or pulling the top of the post, as shown in Figure 7.16.
The process for undertaking the push post testing (which is the most commonly used of the two
methods) is explained in BS7669-3: Vehicle Restraint Systems - Part 3: Guide to the Installation,
Inspection and Repair of Safety Fences [8]:
PAGE 171
Figure 7.16 - Push testing of a driven (left) [9] and a surface mounted (right) post
7.3.8 Common Installation, Maintenance and Inspection Issues

Whilst every attempt is made to install, maintain and inspect the barrier systems on the Abu Dhabi
road Network in accordance with best practice, a number of common issues with regard to the way
in which barrier systems had been installed prevail. The following sections outline these issues,
and offer solutions for ways in which these issues can be avoided in the future.
7.3.8.1 Problems with Lap Joints in W-Beams

For W-beam barriers, the way in which adjacent rails are lapped is of extreme importance. Beams
which are lapped incorrectly are known to fail at the joints on impact, subsequently impaling
impacting vehicles and greatly increasing the risk of severe injuries to the vehicle occupants. An
example of an incorrect lap-joint barrier beam overlap is shown in Figure 7.17. In all cases, the lap
of the barrier should be such that, in the direction of traffic, the end of the first barrier encountered
is located in front of the approach end of the second barrier encountered, as shown in the right
hand picture in Figure 7.17.
Figure 7.17 - The lap of adjoining w-beam rails
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7.3.8.2 Lack of Continuity in Barrier Systems

One of the fundamental requirements for the predictable performance of a barrier is for a
continuous length of barrier to be provided, and for all components of the barrier to work in unison
in the event of an impact. As a result, longitudinal barrier elements which are not connected will
represent a risk of injury to road users in the event of an impact. This is the case where barrier
beams have been removed by operatives (for example to gain access through the barrier for the
purposes of irrigation, as shown in Figure 7.18).
Figure 7.18 - Lack of continuity in a w-beam barrier
7.3.8.3 Beam Height Issues

The height to which a guard rail should be set will be contained within the manufacturer’s
installation manual, and this should be followed. If, for any reason, such a height is not achievable,
this should be reported to the manufacturer and resolution should be sought. Such resolution may
be a change in post type or, in extreme cases, may mean that a different barrier solution should be
found. Barriers which are set too low are more likely to be traversed and climbed over by an
impacting vehicle. Hence, with a barrier which has been installed too low, there is a risk of the
barrier being overcome, and the hazard at the rear of the barrier being struck and/or traversed.
This is likely to result in an increase in risk of injury to the vehicle occupants. Therefore, the height
of a barrier must be set in accordance with the manufacturer’s specifications.
In many cases the manufacturer’s specification for the height of the barrier beam will assume that
the running surface between the edge of the carriageway and the front face of the beam will be
relatively flat (i.e. 1V:10H or flatter). Due to site constraints, this may not be the case and hence, in
such circumstances, engineering judgement may need to be applied when setting the height of the
safety fence, taking into account the likely orientation and height of an errant when impacting the
barrier. This is of particular importance for barrier systems with beams where the compatibility
between the vehicle and the barrier is more important than for those systems (such as concrete
systems) whose performance is less dependent on the height of the impacting vehicle due to their
wide impact face.
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7.3.8.4 Foundation and Compaction Related Issues

The installation of barrier systems, particularly for semi-rigid systems, the posts of safety barrier
systems may be provided with an integral concrete foundation, as shown in Figure 7.19.
Reinforced concrete strip footings that have been structurally designed are acceptable to support
barrier systems where the relevant road authority has accepted a base plated post version. When
placed in concrete strips, the posts should be able to deflect laterally during an impact.
Figure 7.19 - Steel posts supplied with integrated concrete foundations
To ensure appropriate performance of the concrete foundations and the post and rail systems
ground conditions must be compacted properly to ensure the foundations do not become extracted
from the ground upon vehicle impact as shown in Figure 7.20. For w-beam barriers, a potential
improvement to the soft soil conditions is to install the system with 2100mm trie-beam posts
instead of the standard 1800mm posts [1].
Figure 7.20 - Effect of uncompacted soil on a barrier impact

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Another problem observed with the foundations was exposed concrete foundations on some of the
barrier systems, as shown in Figure 7.21. This may be either due to erosion of the supporting
sandy surface sand with wind, or due to inadequate installation in the first place. Please refer to
Section 7.3.7 for further information.
Figure 7.21 – Concrete foundations protruding out off the ground
In locations where surface mounted posts are required (for example on bridge decks), fasteners
specified by the manufacturer must be used. This was not the case in the installation shown in
Figure 7.22. In this case, small screws have been used instead of larger holding down bolts for the
installation. As a result, instead of the post remaining affixed to the ground and the post screw
(between the post and the rail) breaking on impact, as designed, the post has been pulled out of
the ground, remaining attached to the beam. This could pose a serious risk to road users and will
significantly affect the performance characteristics of the barrier system.
Figure 7.22 - Use of incorrect fixings for a surface mounted post
PAGE 175
7.4 Additional Application Criteria for Roadside Barriers
7.4.1 Placement on slopes

Terrain conditions between the travelled way and the barrier can have significant effects on the
barrier’s impact performance. Generally, acceptable impact conditions at the moment of impact
occur when all of the wheels of the vehicle are on the ground and its suspension system is neither
compressed nor extended. Such is the vehicle’s orientation and stability at the time of impact
during the testing to NCHRP350 and MASH – testing under which the performance characteristics
of the barrier systems are determined.
Similar to crashes involving kerbing, a wide range of factors will influence the behaviour and
trajectory of errant vehicles as they traverse slopes (e.g. suspension stiffness, vehicle weight,
speed of impact, angle of impact). Consequently, there is uncertainty about where to position
barriers so that [7]:
 The vehicle does not vault over the barrier; or

 The vehicle does not go under the barrier with consequent snagging on the barrier supports
and other problems.
Figure 7.23 illustrates the bumper trajectory as a car leaves the travelled way and crosses the
shoulder and the embankment. The primary area of concern is the zone where the bumper height
is likely to be above that of normal bumper height. A barrier placed in this zone can be expected to
be struck at a point higher than had it been installed on a level surface and, unless it has been
designed for such impacts, its performance may be inadequate, and the barrier may fail to
successfully contain and/or redirect an errant vehicle.
Figure 7.23 also illustrates parameters (∆HS, ∆HM, ∆H2, LM, and L) for determining bumper heights.
Values ∆HS and ∆H2 are important because most roadside barriers are placed between the edge of
the shoulder and 0.6m off the shoulder.
Table 7.5 contains trajectory data for rounded embankments for 100km/h encroachments at angles
of 25 and 15 degrees. These numbers were obtained primarily from computer simulation [5].
Figure 7.24 shows an example application of Table 7.5, to determine the areas to avoid on a
1V:6H slope for barrier installation. In general, barrier installations on 1V:6H slopes are not
recommended. Slopes in front of a barrier should be 1V:10H or flatter [10]. This also applies to the
areas in front of the flared section of barrier and to the area approaching the terminal ends, as
shown in Figure B.5 in Appendix B.
A rounded slope configuration will reduce the risk of an errant vehicle becoming airborne and
affords the driver more control over the vehicle. Typically 1.2m to 1.8m is used for slope rounding
and this can generally be obtained as part of the slope grading and vegetation establishment.
The type of barrier is also important as the performance of those systems with a very open profile
(such as wire rope and steel post and rail systems) is likely to be more affected by the height of an
impacting vehicle than for closed profile systems (such as concrete barriers). In these cases the
area of compatibility between vehicle and barrier is much increased and therefore closed systems
may be more preferable in locations where they are installed in a slope location.
PAGE 176
Figure 7.23 - Design parameters for vehicle encroachments on slopes [5]
Figure 7.24 – Barrier placement considerations on 1V:6H embankments

Table 7.5 - Example bumper trajectory data
Encroachment
Embankment ∆HM
Angle L (m) ∆HS (mm) ∆H2 (mm) Lm (m)
Slope (V:H) (mm)
(degrees)
25 1V:6H 9.1 102 122 175 6.1

25 1V:4H 10.7 102 122 200 7.0
25 1V:3H 12.2 102 122 200 7.0
25 1V:2H 12.2 102 122 200 7.0
15 1V:6H 7.0 48 71 114 4.9
15 1V:4H 7.9 48 71 175 5.5
15 1V:3H 8.5 48 71 210 6.1
15 1V:2H 10.1 48 71 244 7.6
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7.4.2 Rate of Flare

Motorists are less likely to perceive roadside barriers to be a hazard if the barrier is introduced
gradually to the roadside environment through the use of a “flare”, i.e. the line of the barrier at the
beginning of the terminal is set back a distance from the travelled way and is then gradually
brought closer to the line of the travelled way. Consequently, some end terminals are designed to
be flared away from the approaching traffic. The flare rate is the ratio of the length of the flared part
of the barrier (measured parallel to the road) to the barrier offset [1].
Using a flared barrier in advance of a roadside hazard may be advantageous. A barrier may be
flared to:
 Locate the barrier terminal farther from the travelled way;
 Minimize a driver’s reaction to an obstacle near the roadway by gradually introducing a
parallel barrier installation;
 Transition a roadside barrier closer to the roadway because of an obstacle; or
 To reduce the total length of barrier need.
Also following should be considered:

 A flared barrier results in increased impact angles with the potential for greater severity of
impact;
 A flared barrier increases the likelihood that the vehicle will be redirected into the opposing
lane of traffic or across the roadway;
 The grading required to provide 1V:10H or flatter slopes in front of the flared section of
barrier may interfere with roadside drainage and/or may require additional right of way.
The flare rate is typically expressed as a ratio (a:b), as shown in Figure 7.25. For example, a flare
rate of 19:1 means that for every one metre travelled rearwards from the edge of the carriageway
(b), the line of the barrier should be such that 19 metres are travelled along the carriageway (a).
As indicated, one disadvantage is that a flare will increase the vehicular angle of impact, although
some w-beam barriers have been successfully crash tested with flare rates as high as 1:7 [5]. It will
also increase the amount of earthwork needed to provide 1V:10H slopes in front of the barrier and
approaching the terminal. When choosing how much to flare the barrier, the designer will need to
strike a balance between the length of the barrier and how far the installation projects toward the
ditch and the corresponding need for flattening the approach slopes.
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Figure 7.25 – Flare rate layout
Table 7.6 presents suggested flare rates for roadside barriers based on design speed and barrier
type. It should be noted that the flare rate values required for rigid and semi-rigid barrier
installations within the shy-line, yield smaller flare angles, compared to situations where they are
located outside the shy-line. It should also be noted that for proprietary systems, the manufacturer
should provide details of the recommended flare rate for their system within their accompanying
installation manual.
Flatter flare rates (i.e. those with a lesser gradient) may be used, particularly where extensive
grading of the existing ground surface would be required to obtain a flat approach to the barrier
from the travelled way. Note that the recommended flare rate for barriers within the shy-line is
approximately twice that for barriers located outside the shy-line distance [5]. This is more
applicable where the approach roadway is wider than the roadway near the obstacle and has an
offset less than the suggested shy-line offset. For example, if an approach roadway is wider then a
bridge roadway, the designer should use flatter flare rates based on inside the recommended shy-
line values.
Another disadvantage to flaring a barrier installation is the increased likelihood that a vehicle will
be redirected back into or across the roadway following an impact. This situation is especially
undesirable on single carriageways where the impacting vehicle could be redirected into oncoming
traffic.
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Table 7.6 - Suggested flare rates for barrier design
Flare rate for Flare rate for barrier at or

Design
barrier Shy-line beyond shy line
speed
inside shy line Offset
(km/h) Rigid Semi-rigid Flexible
(a:b) (a:b) (a:b) (a:b)
140 38:1 3.8 26:1 21:1 50:1
130 35:1 3.7 24:1 19:1 50:1
120 32:1 3.2 22:1 17:1 50:1
110 30:1 2.8 20:1 15:1 50:1
100 26:1 2.4 18:1 14:1 50:1
90 24:1 2.2 16:1 12:1 50:1
80 21:1 2.0 14:1 11:1 50:1
70 18:1 1.7 12:1 10:1 50:1
60 16:1 1.4 10:1 8:1 50:1
50 13:1 1.1 8:1 7:1 50:1
Source: Adapted from AASHTO Roadside Design Guide [5].
7.4.3 Short Radius Barriers at Intersections

A side road or entrance within the length of need of a barrier installation poses a severe challenge
to the design of a safe roadside. This is especially true if the intersection is located close to a
bridge. Figure 7.26 demonstrates these difficulties through three example scenarios. Scenario a)
shows a standard barrier installation which can be used to shield motorists from hazards such as
rigid roadside furniture, a river, road, railway or the end of a rigid bridge barrier. In this scenario a
minimum length of barrier is required both to stop errant vehicles reaching the hazards (see
Section 7.3.1) and due to the minimum length of installation required for the barrier to work as
intended (see Table 7.2).
Scenario b) introduces a side road connection within close proximity to the bridge. The close
proximity of the side road does not allow enough space for the minimum length of installation
required. In such a scenario, the only hazards located in the vicinity of the intersection can be rigid
roadside furniture. Intersection corners often have hazardous roadside furniture installed, such as
traffic signs, signals, electrical cabinets, utility poles, etc. These hazards, should either be
removed, relocated or made passively safe (see Chapter 2), if possible. This way the need for the
barrier could completely be eliminated.
However, in scenarios where the intersection is located close to a bridge, which is located over a
higher risk hazard such as a river, railway or another road, it may not be possible to eliminate the
need for a barrier. This is because, as shown in Scenario c), even if the ends of the rigid barriers
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a)
b)
c)
Figure 7.26 – Difficulties of barrier placement at intersections
on the bridge are shielded with crash cushions, there is still a high risk of an errant vehicle
reaching the high risk hazard, i.e. the river, railway or the other road, because the length of need
requirements are not met.
In all scenarios, the preferred solution is to close or relocate the intersecting road and install the
required length of barrier with an appropriate transition and a crashworthy terminal (i.e. scenario
“a” in Figure 7.26). However, it may not always to close or relocate the intersecting road.
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In such cases, a short radius barrier installation may be considered, as shown in Figure 7.27. The
difficulty with the short radius barrier installations is the potential of high angle impacts, which is
likely to cause high severity outcomes for regular rigid and semi-rigid systems; whereas flexible
systems are unsuitable for such small radii. A vehicle impacting the radius at a high angle and
speed may penetrate the barrier, or vault over the barrier after the posts lean back, creating a
ramping effect. Where penetration or vaulting does not occur, the vehicle may be decelerated at an
excessive rate. However, there are some short radius barrier systems, which are specifically
designed and successfully crash tested for these situations. Examples of these systems are shown
in Figure 7.28 and Figure 7.29. The principle of these systems is to provide acceptable rate of
deceleration for vehicles impacting at high angles. This is achieved by:
 The use of break-away (may be wooden) posts at 2.0m spacing;
 Omitting blockouts;
 Not providing washers on the mushroom-headed bolts connecting the rail to blockouts. [1]
When using short radius barriers, it should be remembered that they should only be used if the
alternative of removing the side road is not applicable. When they are the only choice, the use of a
short radius barrier system will impose constraints on how close it can be installed to a bridge,
what radius can be used, and how far it must run along the intersecting side road. When
terminating the radius barrier system, the barrier on the intersecting roadway should be completed
to any required length of need and terminated with an appropriate end treatment.
Figure 7.27 – Possible solution to barrier placement at intersections
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5. Remove blockouts
Source: Adapted from Austroads Guide to Road Design [1]
Figure 7.28 - Short radius barrier at intersection (2.5 m to 10 m radius)
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Source: Adapted from Austroads Guide to Road Design [1]

Figure 7.29 - Short radius barrier at intersection ( to 10 m radius)
7.4.4 Sight Distance

Concrete barriers and, to a lesser extent, w-beam barriers can obstruct visibility. Barriers located
close to intersections can impede the safe intersection sight distance and minimum gap sight
distance available to drivers attempting to select a safe gap in traffic on the major road. This issue
applies to barriers located on the verge and barriers located in medians [3]. Where barriers are
needed on the inside of curves, the horizontal sight distance should be checked in accordance with
the criteria for stopping sight distance. The designer should check to determine if barrier conflicts
exist on a given curve and should carefully weigh the alternatives before selecting the barrier
configuration.
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Options to consider are:
 Offsetting the barrier to the inside of the curve enough distance to obtain the required sight
distance;
 Flattening or extending roadside slopes so the barrier may be moved farther from the
travelled lanes;
 Using open systems (such as wire rope) as opposed to the more closed systems (such as
concrete barrier);
 Reducing the height of barriers (retesting may be needed to establish any effect on the
revised ZOI for the system) and overall performance; and
 Providing overhead lighting to aid night-time visibility.
7.5 Additional Application Criteria for Median Barriers

Many of the general barrier application criterion identified previously in Section 7.3 can be equally
applied to median barrier systems. However, this Section builds upon these requirements and
identifies specific areas for consideration and modification to deal with the specific hazards and
alignment issues which may arise from locating a barrier within the median. In particular, this
Section addresses the issues of:
 Terrain effects on the lateral placement of median barriers;

 Super-elevated sections;
 Fixed objects within the median;
 Emergency and maintenance crossings, i.e. Gates; and
 Glare screens.
7.5.1 Guidelines for the Need of Median Barrier

Median cross-over crashes are those of particularly high consequences. Therefore, additional
consideration should be given when assessing the need for a barrier in the median. Figure 7.30
shows recommended guidelines for the use of median barriers on high-speed, fully controlled-
access roadways, such as freeways and expressways. As can be seen from the figure, a median
barrier is recommended for roads with more than 20.000 ADT, a median width less than 9m.
For locations with an ADT more than 20,000 and a median width between 10m to 15m, a median
barrier should be considered based on local conditions. In such locations a decision should be
made through a cost/benefit analysis or engineering judgment, by considering factors such as
history of cross-over incident in the area, horizontal and vertical alignment, expected future traffic,
median terrain configuration, the need to prevent U turn, etc.
For medians with less than 20.000ADT and width less than 15m, or a median width of more than
15m and for any ADT volume, a barrier is optional. Even if a median barrier is not deemed
necessary today, the median should be left in a state where a barrier can be installed in the future,
if necessary for reasons such as increase of ADT over 20.000 or increase in the frequency of
cross-over crashes.
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Optional
BARRIER BARRIER
CONSIDERED OPTIONAL*
based on but normally not
engineering needed.
judgement of
site conditions
* May be used for purposes such as providing a restriction to prevent illegal U turns.
Figure 7.30 - Recommendations for median barriers on high speed, fully controlled-access
highways
Example:
Comment if a median barrier is required or not.

Design ADT: 12,000 per direction
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Solution:
Using Figure 7.30 for:
 ADT: 12,000+12,000 = 24,000 for both directions
 Median Width: 8.0m
A Barrier is recommended.
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7.5.2 Terrain Effects on the Lateral Placement of Median Barriers

As detailed within Section 7.4.1, barriers perform best when an impacting vehicle has all of its
wheels on the ground at the time of impact, and its suspension system is neither compressed nor
extended, i.e. the vehicle is in a stable condition. This is the way in which barrier systems are
tested and hence, their performance (under defined impact conditions) is known. Therefore, the
effect of terrain is a major factor to consider when locating a median barrier. As a result,
consideration should be given to the following aspects when determining the placement of such
barriers, and engineering judgement should be applied in all cases:
 The most desirable median is one that is relatively flat (i.e. slopes of 1V:10H or flatter) and
free of objects. The median barrier then can be placed at the centre of the median.
Placement guidelines are necessary when these conditions cannot be met. However, a
rigid barrier should not be used in the middle of wide medians (i.e. greater than 3.0 m to 4.0
m from the edge of the traffic lane) because of the likelihood of higher impact angles and
resultant higher severity of impacts [1]. A flexible barrier located on both sides of the
median has the advantage that it maximises the opportunity to contain deflections within
the median. However, a central location has the advantages in that [1]:
o Debris from damaged barriers is less likely to encroach into the carriageway;
o Sight distance past the barrier on curves is maximised;
o The barrier sustains less nuisance impacts than a barrier on the side of the median;
and
o The cost is less than a barrier on both sides of a median.
 Features within the median between the travelled way and the barrier can have a
significant effect on the barrier’s impact performance. Kerbs and sloped medians (including
super-elevated sections) are two prominent features that deserve attention. Refer to
Section 7.3.6 for further guidance regarding the use of barriers in conjunction with kerbs.
Uncompacted ground conditions and drainage swales can impart a roll moment on a
traversing vehicle, and the slopes in the median can affect the performance of the barrier
as the vehicle suspension is compressed. A vehicle that traverses one of these features
prior to impact may go over or under the barrier or snag on the support posts of a strong-
post system.
 Figure 7.31 illustrates the basic median sections for which placement guidelines are
presented:
o Depressed medians or medians with a ditch section (Median Section I);

o Stepped medians or medians that separate travelled ways with significant
differences in elevation (Median Section II); and
o Median embankments (Median Section III).
7.5.2.1 Depressed medians or medians with a ditch section (Median

Section I)
Firstly the slope and the ditch sections should be examined in line with the recommendations
within Chapter 3 to determine if a roadside barrier is warranted (if the slopes and ditches cannot be
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made traversable). In such cases that a barrier is warranted the barrier should be located as
indicated below, with reference to Figure 7.31:
Figure 7.31 - Recommended barrier placement in non-level medians [5]
PAGE 189
Illustration 1: A roadside barrier should be placed near the shoulder on each side of the median
(as shown at locations “b” and “d”), if both slopes require shielding (i.e. the ditch is non-
traversable). A median barrier should be placed at “b,” if only one slope requires shielding (e.g. S2).
In this situation, a rigid or semi-rigid barrier is typical.
Illustration 2: This applies where neither slope requires shielding but either one or both are
steeper than 1V:10H. In such cases the median barrier should be located on the side with the
steeper slope. This will typically be a rigid or semi-rigid system.
Illustration 3: If both slopes are relatively flat, the median barrier should be located at or near the
centre of the median (at “c”) if vehicle override is unlikely. The designer can use any type of
median barrier having an appropriate test level for the application, if its dynamic deflection is not
greater than one-half the median width. It is not generally desirable to locate the barrier in the drain
at the centre of wider medians because of the potential for debris to accumulate around the barrier
and adversely affect flow within the drain. There is also potential for the post foundations to be
affected due to sodden soil within the drain [1].
When locating a barrier in a non-level application, the manufacturer/promoter of the system should
be consulted to ascertain whether the system would be suitable for such an application.
7.5.2.2 Stepped medians or medians that separate travelled ways with

significant differences in elevation (Median Section II)
For this section, the following placement criteria apply, with reference to Figure 7.31:
Illustration 4: If the embankment slope is steeper than approximately 1V:10H, the median barrier
should be located “b.”
Illustration 5: If the slope contains obstacles or consists of a rough rock cut, a roadside barrier
should be located at both “b” and “d.” This section may have a retaining wall at “d.” If so, the base
of the wall should be smooth and continuous – where possible the profile should reflect that of a
successfully tested concrete barrier system.
Illustration 6: If the cross slope is flatter than approximately 1V:10H, a barrier should be located at
or near the centre of the median.
7.5.2.3 Median embankments (Median Section III)

For this section, the following placement criteria apply, with reference to Figure 7.31:
Illustration 7: This type of median design should not be considered to be a barrier or to provide
positive protection against crossover crashes. A barrier should be installed and located at “b” and
“d” if both slopes are not traversable. If retaining walls are used at “b” and “d,” contour the base of
the wall should be smooth and continuous – where possible the profile should reflect that of a
successfully tested concrete barrier system.
If the slopes are traversable, and it is considered that a vehicle could pass over the apex of the
median (indicated by “c”), a non-rigid median barrier may be placed at the apex of the cross
section. For non-traversable slopes, a barrier should be placed adjacent to the shoulder of each
carriageway. If retaining walls are used adjacent to each carriageway, it is recommended that the
base of the wall be constructed to the external shape of the preferred standard concrete barrier [1].
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7.5.3 Barrier Orientation on Super-elevated Sections

Figure 7.32 illustrates the preferred orientation of the centreline of a barrier based on the roadway
slope on a super-elevated section.
Figure 7.32 - Example of preferred barrier orientation on super-elevated sections
7.5.4 Fixed Objects within the Median

Several important factors are related to safety-shape concrete median barriers. For high-angle,
high-speed impacts, passenger size vehicles may become partially air-borne and, in some cases,
may reach the top of the barrier. Fixed objects (e.g. luminaire supports) on top of the wall may
cause snagging or separate from the barrier and detach into opposing traffic lanes. Even for
shallow-angle impacts, the roll angle toward the barrier imparted to high-centre-of-gravity vehicles
may be enough to permit contact by the top portion of the cargo box with fixed objects on top of or
immediately behind the wall. For this reason, it is important that consideration is given to the
identified Zone of Intrusion (ZOI) for the barrier system being used, and a barrier system specified
for which hazards will not be located within the ZOI (more details of which can be found in Section
6.5.4)
If there is a hazard in the median such that it is outside of the clear zone for one carriageway, but
within the clear zone of the other carriageway the barrier should be treated as a roadside barrier
(refer to Sections 7.3 and 7.4). Bridge piers, lighting columns, trees and overhead sign support
structures are examples of objects that are often located in a median. These are often numerous
and hence, a continuous barrier should generally be provided within the median as shown in
Figure 7.33. This will then also counter the risks posed by illegal U-turns through the median.
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Figure 7.33 - Continuous median barrier
7.5.5 Emergency and Maintenance Crossings

There are various options available to create an emergency/maintenance crossing, however, it
should be noted that emergency and (in particular) maintenance crossings are non-preferred and,
in many cases, are now being closed due to the risk to road users who perform illegal U-turns
through such openings, see Figure 7.34. Note that in this Figure, there is no transition between the
steel barrier system and the concrete units and thus the end of the concrete units represent a
hazard to road users. Emergency/maintenance crossings may take the form of a gate or a
removable barrier, and a typical example of a gate is shown in Figure 7.35. Note that this gate is
also available with a length of 10m and other lengths too.
Figure 7.34 - The closure of an emergency access with permanent concrete barrier units
Each of the two options (to install a gate or a removable barrier) varies in cost and ease of
operation. In those locations where an emergency/maintenance crossing point is permitted,
consideration must be given to the protection of road users from the risks posed by the ends of the
barriers, as well as to the flare rates used at the crossing. Note that the flare rates must not exceed
the requirements of
Table 7.6.
PAGE 192
For emergency crossings, the main requirement is the speed with which the emergency crossing
can be opened and operational; and this will depend on the option chosen. It will also depend on
whether special equipment or personnel are required to operate or open the emergency crossing.
In most cases, a time of less than 30 minutes to open the gate or dismantle a permanent safety
barrier would be desirable.
For maintenance crossings, speed may not be as much of an issue as the opening can be
planned. Where regular maintenance is required, then it may be beneficial to provide permanent
maintenance crossings at each end that can be opened and closed quickly. For other situations,
there are two options:
 Provide a maintenance crossing from the outset; or

 Create a maintenance crossing only when required (i.e. take down or break out the
permanent system; this can often by the most cost effective solution.
PAGE 193
Figure 7.35 - Example of a median gate (12m)
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07 SELECTION AND APPLICATION OF ROADSIDE, MEDIAN AND BRIDGE BARRIERS FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
7.5.6 Glare Screens

Headlight glare may be defined as a sensation experienced when a person’s vision is interrupted
by a light source that has a much higher intensity than the surrounding area. It is frequently cited
as a major contributing factor in night time crashes that occur on unlighted highways [5]. By
definition, glare screens are most often installed on median barriers, and an example of this can be
seen in Figure 7.36.
Figure 7.36 – The use of glare screens in the median
The magnitude and severity of headlight glare depends on various combinations of a wide variety
of factors, including:
 Headlight systems, which includes the headlight configuration, mounting height, and output
intensity;
 Roadway features, which include the roadway alignment, geometrics, and pavement
reflectivity;
 Transmission media, which includes the atmosphere and physical features through which
the light must pass, such as windshields and eyeglasses; and
 Human variables, which include driver’s age, visual ability, and fatigue.
Depending on the severity and effect glare has on a driver, it may be classified as discomfort or
disability glare, defined as follows:
 Discomfort glare does not necessarily impair the vision. However, it frequently causes
drivers to become tense and apprehensive, which increases the level of fatigue and may
lead to driver error. This type of glare is common and usually occurs where median or outer
separator widths are greater than approximately 10m.
 Disability glare definitively impairs a driver’s vision, frequently causing temporary blindness;
consequently, it should be addressed whenever practical. Disability glare occurs usually
where median or outer separator widths are less than approximately 10 m in width or on
horizontal curves.
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MEDIAN AND BRIDGE BARRIERS FIRST EDITION-DECEMBER 2016
7.5.6.1 The Need for Glare Screens

As indicated, headlight glare from opposing traffic can be bothersome and distracting. Glare
screens are not needed in properly lighted areas, but glare screens can be used with median
barriers to eliminate headlight glare when no other practical alternative exists (e.g. wider median,
outer separation, highway lighting, landscaping). The designer should consider if the following
conditions exist when determining the need for a glare screen:
 Unlighted divided highways where design speeds are 80 km/h or greater and medians 10 m
or less in width;
 Horizontal curves on divided highways;
 Points where the separation between a mainline and frontage road is minimal and
alignment is such that mainline traffic is affected by the lights of vehicles using the frontage
road;
 Points of transition that create critical glare angles between opposing vehicles;
 Locations where night time crash rates are unusually high; and
 Any location where conflicting light sources cause a distorted or confusing view of the
driver’s field of vision.
The typical application of glare screens is on urban freeways with narrow medians and high traffic
volumes. Another application is between on/off ramps at interchanges where the two ramps adjoin
each other. Here, the sharp radii and the narrow separation may make headlight glare especially
bothersome. The designer should consider the use of glare screens at these sites.
7.5.6.2 Glare screen types

The following describes the glare screens used:
 Concrete glare screen: Where a glare screen is warranted for a section of roadway with
concrete barrier, the designer may specify a concrete glare screen, which simply involves
increasing the barrier height. This type of glare screen is advantageous on high-volume
routes due to its low maintenance (Figure 7.37);
 Glare screen blades (as shown in Figure 7.36): As an alternative to the concrete glare
screen, a series of thin vertical blades may be mounted on top of the concrete barrier. The
designer must specify the spacing, height, and longitudinal spacing of the blades on the
plans.
7.5.6.3 Glare screen design

The following applies to the design of a glare screen:
 Glare screens must not be used as a wind shield nor should they detract from the
aesthetics of the highway;
 Glare screens should be durable and easy to maintain;
 Glare screens should be designed for a cut-off angle of 20°. This is the angle between the
median centreline and the line of sight between two vehicles travelling in opposite
directions, as shown in Figure 7.37. The glare screen should be designed to block the
headlights of oncoming vehicles up to the 20° cut-off angle. On horizontal curves, the
PAGE 196
design cut-off angle should be increased to allow for the effect of curvature on headlight
direction:
Cut-off Angle (in degrees) = 20  1746 .8

R
where: R = radius of horizontal curve of the road, in metres;
 Glare screens may reduce the available horizontal sight distance. For curves to the left, the
designer will need to check the middle ordinate to determine if adequate stopping sight
distance will be available;
 When determining the necessary glare screen height, the designer may ignore the effect of
sag vertical curvature;
 The upper and lower elevations of the glare screen must be such that light does not shine
over or under the barrier. The height of glare screens may be established by examining the
following factors:
o Height of driver’s eye in relation to the pavement (1080 mm for passenger vehicles
and 2.3 m for large trucks);
o Height of the headlights of various size vehicles in relation to the pavement;
o Changes in elevation across the entire roadway width including the median.
 The preceding steps address the design of glare screen. However, the calculation of
detailed height requirements does not imply that the height of glare screen should vary
repeatedly from location to location along a road scheme. The height of glare screen used
should encompass the needs of the entire road scheme, or road scheme segment.
 Prior to affixing a glare screen to the top of a proprietary system, the
manufacturer/promoter should be consulted to ascertain whether the addition of the glare
screen will detrimentally affect the dynamic performance of the barrier system.
7.6 Additional Application Criteria for Bridge Barriers

Many of the general barrier application criterion identified previously in Section 7.3 can be equally
applied to bridge barrier systems. However, this Section builds upon these requirements and
identifies specific areas for consideration and modification to deal with the specific hazards and
alignment issues which may arise from locating barriers on bridges. In particular, this Section
addresses the issues of:
 Material type of bridges;
 Hardware attachments to bridges;
 Additional lateral placement considerations;
 Heights of bridge parapets;
 Fixation to bridge decks.
Bridge rails generally need to be designed to provide higher levels of containment compared to
other longitudinal barriers due to the higher risk and likely consequences of an impact on a bridge
structure. High risk situations include bridges over other roads, deep water and railways, and for
high overpasses. Bridge rails in these situations need to provide greater resistance against the
possibility of penetration or the chances that a vehicle will roll over the top of the barrier. Vehicles
with greater mass or higher centre of gravity are particularly at risk [7].
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Figure 7.37 - Cut-off angle for glare screens
7.6.1 Material type

Bridge rails manufactured from both precast (see Figure 7.38) or cast in-situ concrete or
manufactured from metal (see Figure 7.39) are available today; however, despite the lower dead
weight load of metal systems, concrete bridge barriers are often used in Abu Dhabi. The
advantages of concrete bridge rails include:
 Better ability to contain heavy vehicles;
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 Lower maintenance costs; and

 Much simpler structural connection to the bridge deck.
Figure 7.38 – An example of a precast concrete bridge barrier
Figure 7.39 – An example of a steel bridge barrier
7.6.2 The Attachment of Hardware to Bridge Barriers

Hardware attachments to bridge rails may include:
 Pedestrian and bicycle railings;

 Traffic enforcement cameras;
 Sign supports;
 Luminaire poles;
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 Large sign support structures;

 Fences; and
 Decorative features (see Figure 7.40).
Figure 7.40 – Example of decorative features attached to a bridge parapet
Bridge rails that are impacted by high centre-of-gravity vehicles may lean over and extend past the
top of the bridge rail. The clear area that should be provided behind a bridge rail and beyond its
dynamic deflection distance to account for this behaviour is called the Zone of Intrusion (ZOI),
additional information for which is included in Section 6.3.3.3. Hardware attachments placed on
bridges at sensitive sites such as overpasses where debris could fall onto the paths of roadway
traffic below should be avoided unless the attachments are placed outside of the ZOI.
7.6.2.1Additional Lateral Placement Considerations

A full, continuous shoulder should be provided across a bridge to maintain a uniform clearance to
roadside elements. The approach railing should have the appropriate flare rate shown in
Table 7.6 when the bridge railing is located within the recommended shy-line offset distance (see
Table 7.4). For new bridges, kerbs should not be installed in front of bridge barriers due to the
instability which they can induce into impacting vehicles prior to the impact with the bridge railing
(refer to Section 7.3.6).
An impact tested transition should be used between the approach barrier and the end of the bridge
rail (refer to Chapter 11).
In urban areas, pavements are typically present on a bridge and at lower speeds; this sidewalk is
separated from the adjacent roadway by a vertical kerb, which is typically 150 mm to 200 mm high
(refer to Figure 7.41). However, at higher speeds, the vertical kerb will interfere with the proper
vehicular/bridge rail interaction. Therefore, the following should apply to the location of a bridge rail
in combination with a sidewalk:
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 On roads with a speed limit  70 km/h: The bridge rail is typically located on the outside
edge of the sidewalk;
 On roads with a speed limit  80 km/h: The bridge rail should be located between
pedestrians and traffic; i.e. between the roadway portion of the bridge deck and the
sidewalk. There should be no kerb present between the roadway and the sidewalk.
Figure 7.41 – Presence of a pavement on a bridge structure
7.6.3 Heights of Bridge Barriers

A concern that must be considered in selecting a bridge barrier is its height. A railing may have
adequate strength to prevent physical penetration (which will be demonstrated during impact
testing) but unless it also has adequate height, an impacting vehicle or its cargo may roll over the
railing or onto its side, away from the railing after redirection. Whilst full scale impact testing will
give an indication as to the likelihood of such an occurrence taking place, this is only under
predefined impact parameters and will not take into account the variations in impact conditions
likely when the barrier system is put into service.
In the USA, there are two main concrete barrier types in service, the basic F-shape and the New
Jersey shape which have an overall height of 815 mm. When designing a scheme which
incorporates bridge barriers, the designer should evaluate whether a bridge barrier rails higher
than the standard 815 mm is warranted. The issues that may merit this include:
 The need for a TL-5 or TL-6 barrier system;
 The need to address the overhang of large trucks into the ZOI – this will be of particular
interest on truck roads where the probability of a higher vehicle impacting the bridge barrier
is increased.
When selecting a proprietary system, the height of the barriers under consideration must
be obtained and considered within the design process, with engineering judgement applied
to the associated risk of using barriers with different heights. As a guide,
Table 7.7 indicates the recommended range of heights of parapets to be specified for particular
applications.
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Table 7.7 - Recommended bridge parapets heights
Application Height of Parapet
For all bridge barriers, except as below: 840mm to 1067mm
For all bridges and structures over railways carrying freeways or

1067mm to 1250 mm
expressways
For all other bridges and structures over railways, except as below: 1067mm to 1500 mm
For cycle ways immediately adjacent to the bridge barrier 1067mm to 1400 mm
For TL-5 or TL-6 barriers 1067mm to 1500 mm
For automated railways and where there is a known vandalism

1067mm to 1800 mm
problem over railways
7.6.4 Fixation to Bridge Decks

The importance of ground conditions has been identified in Section 7.3.7; however, the
considerations only cover posts located within ground. For the specific case of bridge barriers it is
likely that a different style of fixation to the bridge deck will be required. Figure 7.42 shows an
example of bridge deck posts and Figure 7.43 a fixing method often used to attach the bridge
barrier posts to a bridge deck.
Figure 7.42 – Fixation of bridge deck posts
As with all post designs, bridge barrier posts should be installed in accordance with the
manufacturer’s instructions – this includes both the fixings, and any adhesives which are specified
for the installation process.
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*Drawing not to scale, not structural, and shown for indicative purposes only.
Figure 7.43 – Typical metal barrier on bridge deck
In the case of concrete barriers on the edge of bridges, these should be connected to the bridge
deck and if precast, adjacent units should also be connected to ensure that the barrier system
functions and performs as designed (and tested), and that the concrete units do not fall from the
bridge in the event of an impact. Examples of typical in-situ and pre-cast concrete bridge barrier
installations are shown in Figure 7.44 and Figure 7.45 respectively.
Figure 7.44 – Typical cast in-situ concrete barrier on bridge deck
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Figure 7.45 – Example of a pre-cast concrete barrier on bridge deck
7.7 Upgrading Roadside, Median and Bridge Barriers

Inadequate (generally older) barriers will normally fall into one of two categories:
 Those that have structural inadequacies (i.e. they are showing signs of degradation); or
 Those that are functionally inadequate with regard to design and/or placement.
Designers should remain up-to-date with current barrier standards, designs, products and
guidelines in addition to investigating promising new research findings. However, there is no
substitute for field data or crash records to evaluate the performance of an existing barrier
systems.
Whilst this Section does not provide detailed guidance on the review of existing barrier systems,
care should be taken to follow the manufacturer’s inspection and maintenance manuals for their
systems. The information contained within the following sections is generic and should be used to
supplement the product specific requirement.
7.7.1 Barriers with Structural Inadequacies

Structural inadequacies are characterised by reduced performance when barriers are struck. The
most obvious structural inadequacies include:
 Lack of blockouts for a strong-post system without specific design features to

accommodate this configuration;
 Weakened posts;
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 Substandard or obsolete roadside barriers;

 Missing components;
 Inadequate post spacing;
 Inadequate, non-conforming, or non-existent end treatment;
 Inadequate transition section;
 Damaged rail; or
 Corroded rail.
7.7.2 Barriers with Design/Placement Inadequacies

Design or placement inadequacies increase the likelihood of reduced performance from an
otherwise acceptable barrier system. Some of the most common deficiencies are:
 Barriers that are improperly placed on slopes or behind kerbs;

 Barriers, which are not really necessary at a location and could be removed;
 Barriers with deflection distances that exceed the distance between the rail and the
shielded fixed object;
 Barriers that are too long or too short to adequately shield an obstacle or non-traversable
terrain feature;
 Barriers that are too high or too low;
 Median barriers located in a steep (see Section 7.5.2) depressed median or a median with
surface irregularities where:
o The barrier can be moved near the shoulder’s edge (i.e. Figure 7.31, Illustration 1 or
2);
o The barrier can be relocated to a position, where the terrain between the edge of
the travelled way and the barrier has an acceptable slope; or
o The shoulder can be extended to the lateral distance desired and the barrier can be
placed on the shoulder.
 Strengthening bridge rails to the appropriate performance level by:

o Adding new rails, and posts if required, in front of the existing bridge rail;
o Improving anchorage of the bridge rail to the bridge deck;
o Strengthening the rail and/or posts.
 Increasing the bridge rail height to meet the requirements of the desired performance level;
 Removing or shielding of bridge rail appurtenances that have the potential for causing
vehicle snagging; or
 Eliminating kerbs, which have a detrimental effect on bridge rail-vehicle interaction.
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7.7.3 Establishing priorities of upgrading needs

Obsolete roadside, median and bridge barriers are often upgraded as part of reconstruction
projects. These devices may also be considered for replacement as part of system-wide safety
improvement projects. In each case, the designer should determine the scope and extent of the
barrier upgrade to be accomplished. The major factors that should be considered include, but not
limited to:
 The nature and extent of barrier deficiency;

 Crash history;
 The results of any retesting of the product, or similar products; and
 The cost-effectiveness of recommended improvements.
These factors are interrelated, and the designer should rely on experience and judgement to reach
a preferred solution. The first step is an analysis of the continued need for an existing barrier. If it is
cost-effective to eliminate the shielded object by removal, relocation, or redesign, this is the option
of choice. If the feature requiring shielding cannot be eliminated, the designer should assess the
adequacy of the existing barrier installation. If the barrier is essentially non-functional (i.e. it cannot
reasonably be expected to function satisfactorily under most expected impacts), it should be
upgraded to current criteria.
Common deficiencies include:
 Installations that are too short, too low, or too high to be effective;
 Non-typical barrier types;
 Barriers improperly installed on slopes or behind kerbs; and
 Transition sections and end treatments.
In some cases, these deficiencies will be so obvious that the appropriate course of action is readily
apparent; but many times the deficiencies may be marginal and a decision may be based on
engineering judgement or an economic analysis. This may include further evaluation to verify
critical design details (e.g. base plate connections, anchor bolts, material brittleness, welding
details, reinforcement development). Then the past crash history at a specific site or an in-service
performance evaluation with a specific feature can be considered with respect to the cost of
upgrading the barrier. If the defective barrier is located on a road where the traffic speeds and
volumes are relatively low and therefore the impacts are less likely, then a temporary solution may
be to delineate the defective section.
7.7.4 Specific Issues with Bridge Barriers

Older bridge barrier systems may have a kerb or walkway between the travel lane and the bridge
railing. The kerb or the walkway may cause an impacting vehicle to go over the barrier or impact it
from an unstable position and subsequently roll over. In such installations, steel and aluminium
designs may cause snagging, as the vehicle may hit the gaps between the beams in abrupt
angles. This can produce high deceleration forces potentially leading to occupant injuries. This
type of issue can be detected through an analysis of available crash reports.
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In some cases, existing bridge barriers currently installed do not meet the requirements of the
testing standards NCHRP350 or MASH. In such cases, it may not be practical, or cost effective to
completely replace the barrier system installed. Instead, it may be more appropriate to apply a
retrofit solution to the location.
Retrofit designs refer to changes, modifications, and additions to existing bridge railings that
elevate these railings to acceptable performance levels. These designs may:
 Eliminate snagging potential;

 Increase the strength of the railing;
 Provide an acceptable transition from the approach rail to the bridge rail itself;
 Provide longitudinal continuity to the system; and
 Reduce or eliminate undesirable effects of kerbs or narrow walkways in front of the bridge
rail.
A number of specific retrofit concepts that can be adapted to numerous types of obsolete designs
have been developed and tested within the USA [5]. A number of these designs are in place within
the Abu Dhabi road network and hence, these approaches may be implemented where justified.
These solutions relate to:
 Concrete retrofit (safety shape or vertical);
 W-beam/thrie-beam retrofits; and
 Metal post-and-beam retrofits.
7.7.4.1 Concrete retrofit (safety shape or vertical)

If an existing substandard bridge barrier is located on a bridge, one retrofit technique is to
construct a concrete barrier in front of the bridge barrier (if there is sufficient space). Details of this
retrofit solution are given in Figure 7.46.
This design is most effective when the existing railing can remain in place and does not require
extensive modifications. The concrete safety shape commonly used for new construction often can
be added to an existing substandard bridge railing as an economical retrofit design:
 If the structure can carry the additional dead load; and
 If the existing railing configuration can meet the anchorage and impact forces needed for
the retrofit barrier.
Although a vertical-faced retrofit can cause relatively high deceleration forces for high-angle
impacts, its addition to the top of an existing kerb creates an effective barrier. A protruding kerb
that may contribute to vehicular vaulting in shallow angle impacts should not be installed in front of
the concrete shape as this may cause considerable wheel and suspension system damage.
7.7.4.2 Continuation of Approach Roadside Barrier Beam

One potential retrofit improvement consists of rebuilding the approach roadside barrier to current
standards, providing an acceptable transition section and continuing the metal beam rail element
across the structure to provide railing continuity. Where kerbs are present on the bridge, the retrofit
railing can be blocked out to minimize the possibility of a vehicle ramping over the bridge railing.
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Carrying an approach roadside barrier across the structure is an inexpensive, short-term solution
to inadequate bridge railings. This treatment can be particularly effective on low-speed roadways.
It can also significantly improve the impact performance of an obsolete railing, although it may not
bring an existing bridge railing into full compliance with applicable crash test requirements.
Continuous metal-beam rails across a structure also eliminate one of the major problems of a
bridge-rail/transition-rail design - adequate anchorage to prevent the approach rail from pulling out
when struck. When the approach barrier is extended across the bridge, the only transition design
elements that remain critical are gradual stiffening and elimination of a snagging potential.
Figure 7.46 – Installation of a reinforced concrete block in front of an existing (substandard)

rail [5]
7.7.4.3 Metal post-and-beam retrofits

A metal post-and-beam retrofit railing mounted at the kerb edge may be appropriate to use on an
existing structure with a raised kerb or walkway.
The crash test specimen for the post attachment to the kerb or bridge deck can be a yielding
design that eliminates bridge deck damage in high-angle, high-speed impacts. Metal rail elements
should line up with the face of the kerb and the elements should be spaced to minimize the
likelihood of vehicle intrusion and subsequent snagging on the posts.
This design has the advantage that it separates motor vehicles from pedestrians who are using the
sidewalk on a bridge. In many cases, the existing bridge railing can be used or converted to a
pedestrian railing.
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7.8.1 Summary and Conclusions Applicable to all Types of Barriers

Factors that should be considered in the selection of the type of barrier to be used at a specific site
include:
 Restraint requirements (i.e. performance capability);
 Dynamic deflection and clearance;
 Site conditions;
 Traffic volumes and percentage of heavier vehicles;
 End treatments
 Sight distances;
 Costs;
 Maintenance;
 Aesthetics; and
 Field experience.
With regard to the containment requirements for barrier systems, the “basic” level is to provide for
light passenger vehicles, including four-wheel drive vehicles and light commercial vehicles, and
this is accomplished by specifying TL-3 longitudinal barriers. The decision whether to install a
barrier system with a higher level of containment will largely depend on engineering judgement,
and consideration of the following points:
 High percentage of heavy vehicles in traffic stream (i.e. on truck roads);

 Hazardous materials routes;
 Adverse geometrics, such as sharp curvature, that are often combined with poor sight
distance;
 Severe consequences associated with penetration of a barrier by a large vehicle; and
 For bridge parapets, the height of the bridge, and the type of hazard located below the
bridge.
With regard to the specific case of bridge barriers, the following identifies Abu Dhabi practices for
the selection of a bridge rail restraint requirement:
A. TL-4. This is the standard Abu Dhabi bridge rail on most bridges. Its use is appropriate,
except for those conditions identified in point C below where a TL-5 bridge rail should be
used.
B. TL-5. This performance level should be designated for:

 All truck roads;
 All roads with significant truck volumes (say, 100 DDHV or higher); and
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 All other sites where a TL-5 rail can address a specific concern (e.g. truck lean over,
potential catastrophic consequences for heavy vehicle penetration).
C. TL-6. This is the highest performance level and it is only considered for the rare cases
where a route is regularly used by high numbers (say, 100 DDHV or higher) of tankers or
similar vehicles and there are hazards with risk to third parties (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4)
within the vicinity of the travelled way.
No hazard (which cannot be removed, relocated or made passively safe/transferable) should be
present within the deflection distance of a safety barrier system.
For proprietary systems used on the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport
road network, preference should be given to those systems meeting the ‘preferred’ values for the
impact severity parameters OIV and ORA. No systems exceeding the ‘maximum’ values for OIV
and ORA shall be used without prior approval of the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs
and Transport (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.4).
It is preferable that the slope in front of the barrier is essentially flat (1V:10H or flatter) because the
requirements of NCHRP350 and MASH are such that safety barriers have (generally) only been
tested in such configurations. The result on an impact with a specific barrier in a slope is generally
unknown.
Maintenance factors that need to be considered before selecting a particular barrier system
include:
 Routine maintenance of the barrier;

 Damage repair;
 Effect of the barrier on road and roadside maintenance (pavement overlays for example);
 Material and component requirements (e.g. stockpiling of spare parts); and
 Experience of maintenance repair crews.
With regard to specific maintenance issues identified within the Abu Dhabi road network, the
following advice is recommended:
 In all cases, the lap joint of a barrier should be such that, in the direction of traffic, the end
of the first barrier encountered is located IN FRONT of the approach end of the second
barrier encountered;
 All lap joints should incorporate all eight of the fasteners required;
 No barrier components should be cut or drilled on site;
 Longitudinal barrier elements which are not connected will represent a risk of injury to road
users in the event of an impact;
 The manufacturer’s installation instructions should be followed at all times, with particular
reference to installation height; and
 Soil should be sufficiently compacted around the base of barrier posts, and none of the
concrete foundations should be exposed above ground level.
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When determining the placement of a barrier system, either in the roadside, median, or on a bridge
structure, the following considerations should be made (see Section 7.3):
 Length of need (see Section 7.3.1);

 Minimum length and gaps in barriers (see Section 7.3.2);
 Lateral placement from the edge of the travelled way (see Section 7.3.3);
 Shy-line offset (see Section 7.3.4);
 Barrier deflection distance (see Section 7.3.5);
 Effect of kerbs (see Section 7.3.6); and
 Foundation conditions (see Section 7.3.7).
7.8.2 Summary and Conclusions Specific to Roadside Barriers

The following points should also be considered with particular reference to roadside barriers (refer
to Section 7.4):
 The effect of embankments (see Section 7.4.1);

 The rate of flare (see Section 7.4.2);
 The presence of a short radius (see Section 7.4.3); and
 The sight distance (see Section 7.4.4).
7.8.3 Summary and Conclusions Specific to Median Barriers

In addition, the following points should be considered with particular reference to median barriers
 Terrain effects on the lateral placement of median barriers (see Section 7.5.2);
 Super-elevated sections (see Section 7.5.3);
 Fixed objects within the median (see Section 7.5.4);
 Emergency and maintenance crossings (see Section 7.5.5);
 Glare screens.
7.8.4 Summary and Conclusions Specific to Bridge Barriers

Furthermore, the following points should be considered with particular reference to bridge barriers
 Material type (see Section 7.6.1);

 Hardware attachments (see Section 7.6.2);
 Additional lateral placement considerations (see Section 7.6.2.1);
 Heights of bridge parapets (see Section 7.6.3); and
 Fixation to bridge decks (see Section 7.6.4).
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7.8.5 Summary and Conclusions on Upgrades to Barriers

When planning upgrades to roadside, median and bridge barriers, the structural and functional
inadequacies should be considered in relation to the:
 Nature and extent of barrier deficiency;

 Crash history;
 The results of any retesting of the product, or similar products; and
 The cost-effectiveness of recommended improvements.
7.9 References
[2] V. Hock, R. Lampo, S. Johnston and J. Myers, “Corrosion Mitigation and Materials Selection
Guide for Military Construction in a Severely Corrosive Environment,” US Army Corps of
Engineers, Construction Engineering Research Laboratory, 1988.
Evaluation of Highway Features,” Transportation Research Board, National Research
Council, Washington DC, 1993.
[4] Vicroads, “The use of Wire Rope Safety Barrier (WRSB), RDN 06-02 C,” Vicroads, Victoria,
2015.
[6] Alberta Infrastructure and Transportation, “Roadside Design Guide,” 2007.
[7] AASHTO, “Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware,” Ammerican Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials, Washington DC, 2009.
[8] British Standards, “BS7669-3: Vehicle Restraint Systems - Part 3: Guide to the Installation,
Inspection and Repair of Safety Fences,” BSI, 1994.
[9] R. Setchell, “Eastern Daily Press,” [Online]. Available:

http://www.edp24.co.uk/polopoly_fs/1.867564!/image/1569740063.jpg_gen/derivatives/land
scape_490/1569740063.jpg. [Accessed 5 5 2016].
[10] J. W. Hutchinson, “The Significance and Nature of Vehicle Encroachments on Medians of

Divided Highways,,” in Highway Engineering Series No 8, Urbana, IL, University of Illinois,
1962.
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8 MOTORCYCLIST PROTECTION SYSTEMS

8.1 Introduction
Motorcyclists impacting roadside barriers has been raised by motorcyclists’ groups throughout the
world, and studied in road safety research for more than a decade.
The problem is largely based on the fact that a vast majority of the vehicle restraint systems
installed along the roads today are not primarily designed with motorcyclists in mind. As such,
these barriers are not specifically designed to stop errant riders from reaching the hazards behind,
and may themselves pose a risk to motorcyclists due to exposed posts, sharp edges and corners.
Motorcycle to barrier impacts are infrequent, but high severity accidents. According to 2012 UK
data, motorcycles (2.86 fatal accidents per billion vehicle mile) were approximately 48 times more
likely to become involved in a fatal barrier accident than cars (0.06 fatal accidents per billion
vehicle mile) [1]. In 2005, motorcycle crashes were found to be the leading source of fatalities in
guardrail crashes in the USA. In terms of fatalities per registered vehicle, motorcycle riders were
dramatically overrepresented in the number of fatalities resulting from guardrail impacts.
Motorcycles comprised only 2% of the vehicle fleet, but accounted for 42% of all fatalities resulting
from guardrail collisions. From 2000 to 2005, approximately one in eight motorcyclists who struck a
guardrail were fatally injured – a fatality risk over 80 times higher than for car occupants involved in
a collision with a guardrail [2].
In order to reduce risk of injury to a motorcyclist when impacting a safety barrier, a number of
Motorcyclist Protection Systems (MPS) have been developed throughout Europe. This has led to
the further development of a European Technical Specification for the testing of such devices
(TS1317-8:2012). Details of TS1317 are given in Section 8.4 of this chapter. At the time of writing
of this document, there was no standardised crash test methodology available according to the
American guidelines NCHRP-350 or MASH. The TS1317-8 is currently the only standardised way
of impact testing the MPS and therefore it is the chosen way of assessing MPS for this design
guide.
However, the installation of an MPS onto an existing barrier system will result in additional cost,
and a careful evaluation has to be made in order to ensure that the use of public funding for the
installation of such systems is best utilised to achieve the highest benefit to cost ratio among many
possible alternative safety measures. Consideration is also given to the effect that the addition of
the MPS may have on the performance of the barrier when impacted by other roads users (car
drivers for example).
This Chapter provides information on the types of MPS available on the market today and the
performance assessment of these through the European testing standard TS1317-8:2012.
Recommendations on the locations where these systems may be required are also presented.
Finally guidance on the selection and application of MPS is given.
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08 Motorcyclist Protection Systems First Edition-December 2016
8.2 Road Safety Barriers from Motorcyclists’ Point of View

The majority of the roadside safety barrier systems in use today are designed to bring passenger
cars and/or heavy vehicles to a controlled and safe stop. However, when struck by errant
motorcyclists, these systems may fail to provide protection, and could contribute towards serious
or fatal injuries.
Research shows that there are two dominant types of motorcycle to barrier accidents [1]. In the
first type, motorcyclists hit the barrier while sliding on the ground, having fallen from their
motorcycle. In this type of accident, the impact mainly occurs with the lower section of the barrier.
In the second type, motorcyclists hit the barrier at an upright position while they are still on the
motorbike. In this type of accident, the impact mainly occurs with the upper section of the barrier.
A steel guardrail, as shown in Figure 8.1, does not provide the necessary protection for a
motorcyclist, as errant riders who are sliding on the ground, can easily go between the posts and
under the rail to reach the hazard behind the barrier. Hitting the barrier itself is not an acceptable
option either, as the exposed barrier posts constitute the leading cause of injury in motorcycle to
barrier accidents [3].
Figure 8.1 – A W-beam barrier from a motorcyclist’s perspective [4]
The type of barrier post can have an important effect on the outcome of a motorcyclist-to-barrier
impact. I-beam posts, such as the IPE posts (I-beam posts manufactured according to European
standard EN10025), as shown in Figure 8.2, are known to be the most aggressive design from a
motorcyclist safety perspective, due to sharp edges and corners, which can cause significant
injuries. Sigma, Z or C profile barrier posts, as shown in Figure 8.2, are less aggressive
alternatives, with no exposed edges on the impact side. However, even these posts are not
completely safe for errant riders impacting them.
For riders who hit the barrier at an upright position, the sharp corners located at the top of the
posts also pose a significant danger. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration’s Handbook 231
[5] has identified the top of the posts as being particularly hazardous for motorcyclists if they
become dismounted from their motorcycle during an impact and fall on top of these; a view shared
by Gibson and Benetatos [6] and Duncan et al [7].
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Figure 8.2 – Types of barrier posts from a motorcyclist’s perspective
Wire rope is another common barrier type which poses similar dangers to errant motorcyclists as
the W-beam systems do. Contrary to popular belief among motorcyclists, research shows that it is
the exposed posts which pose the biggest danger, not the wire ropes [1]. For example a study
carried out in the USA by Daniello and Gabler found that there was no significant difference in the
percentage of killed or seriously injured (KSI) for riders involved in motorcycle collisions with W-
beam (40.1% KSI) and cable barriers (40.4% KSI) [8]. Duncan et al. have stated that there is no
substantial evidence to show that wire rope barriers pose a greater risk to motorcyclists than the
objects from which they are designed to shield the road user, such as trees, posts, or oncoming
traffic [7]. Duncan et al also added that there is no evidence of the “cheese cutter effect” during
injury events.
Figure 8.3 – Wire rope barrier from a motorcyclist’s perspective
Concrete barriers, unlike the steel alternatives, do not feature any sharp edges or corners which
may cause injuries to motorcyclists. Especially for low angle impacts, an errant rider can simply
slide along or over the barrier without getting caught in any sharp features. This characteristic
makes concrete a more motorcyclist friendly choice over steel; especially for median applications,
where the angles of impact are more likely to be narrow. Also, unlike steel systems, concrete
barriers do not let errant riders to pass through and reach the hazard located behind.
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Figure 8.4 – Concrete barrier from a motorcyclist’s perspective
A study in the USA by Gabler, using 2005 Fatality Analysis Reporting System data, found that the
fatality risk in motorcycle to guardrail collisions (12.4%) is almost 1.5 times higher than the fatality
risk in a motorcycle to concrete barrier collision (7.9%) [8]. However, concrete barriers are not
perfectly motorcycle-friendly either. In 2007, the Spanish Motorcyclists Association “Association
Mutua Motera”, carried out a full-scale crash test for a “New Jersey” profile concrete barrier [9], as
shown in Figure 8.5 (see Section 8.4 for impact testing of MPS). The results of the test have
shown a head injury criteria value of more than 1.5 times the acceptable limit (Head Injury Criterion
i.e. HIC is the index representing the head injury risk and it is calculated by using the accelerations
acting on the head of the dummy, which are recorded during the test [10]). This shows that
concrete barriers, although more desirable than steel systems from a motorcyclist safety
perspective, are not as safe as dedicated motorcyclist protection systems.
Figure 8.5 – Impact test of a new jersey profile concrete barrier [9]
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8.3 Types of Motorcyclist Protection Systems

There are currently more than thirty different MPS designs available on the market today [1] and
these can be categorized into one of three main categories: continuous MPS, discontinuous MPS
and barriers with motorcyclist protection incorporated in their design.
8.3.1 Continuous Motorcyclist Protection Systems (CMPS)

CMPS are the most common type currently being manufactured and promoted around the world.
In this type of MPS, a secondary protective element is fitted underneath the main longitudinal of
the barrier system, as shown in Figure 8.6.
Figure 8.6 – Example of a continuous MPS, Bike Guard from Highway Care Ltd. [11]
This type of system provides continuous protection of the posts, to errant motorcyclists impacting
the barrier while sliding along the ground, having fallen from their motorcycles. However, these
systems do not provide any protection from the top of the barrier and are therefore less effective
for motorcycle impacts in upright position.
CMPS available on the market today come in many different designs and materials, including
metal, as shown in Figure 8.6, plastic, as shown in Figure 8.7, and composite materials, as shown
in Figure 8.8. From a performance perspective, it is not possible to say if one material is safer than
the others. The designer/engineer should asses the performance of individual systems through
impact test results (see Section 8.4), regardless of the material type. However, from a durability
perspective, some materials may be a better fit for the environmental conditions in Abu Dhabi, i.e.
high temperatures and humidity. For this reason, the designer/engineer should assess each
system on a product by product basis.
Figure 8.7 – Example of a plastic CMPS, DR46 from SNOLINE [12]
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Figure 8.8 – Example of a composite CMPS, BASYC [13]
Installation requirements of CMPS vary from one system to another. Some CMPS are connected
directly to the barrier posts, as shown in Figure 8.7, some are connected directly on to the main
beam, as shown in Figure 8.6. Some systems are designed to be connected to the posts through
simple cable ties, as shown in Figure 8.7, while others my require special equipment for the
installation, as shown in Figure 8.8. The ease of installation, depends on the requirements of the
specific system. The designer/engineer should refer to the manufacturers specifications and
installation manual to assess the ease of installation for each indivdual system.
*Profile is not to scale and is shown for indicative purposes only.
Figure 8.9 – Example of a typical CMPS profile
Most CMPS are designed to be installed on to more than one type of barrier system. For example,
it is possible to install the Bike Guard and the DR-46 systems, as shown in Figure 8.6 and Figure
8.7 respectively, on to various types of guardrail, including w-beam and open box beam systems.
However, the added MPS may cause a difference in the impact performance of the barrier, on to
which it is attached. For this reason, the MPS and the barrier should be tested together, according
to MASH or NCHRP-350, to prove the acceptable performance of a specific combination (see
Section 8.4).
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The main advantage of these systems is that they can be fitted easily under the existing barrier
installations, without the need of replacing them. A disadvantage of these systems is that they can
be problematic at the areas prone to sand accumulation, as they wouldn’t allow the sand to flow
under the system. For this reason they ideally should not be installed in areas of potential sand
accumulation. Another potential disadvantage is the installation limitations at very sharp horizontal
curves. The minimum radius of curvature, which the system can be installed at, changes from one
design to another.
8.3.2 Discontinuous Motorcyclist Protection Systems (DMPS)

The DMPS focus only on the most aggressive element of a barrier system, the post. These are
discontinuous systems where each post is covered individually, as shown in Figure 8.10.
Figure 8.10 – Example of a discontinuous MPS application on a W-beam barrier, Motoprotec

from Motoprotec Security Systems [14]
Similar to CMPS, these systems only provide protection for errant riders sliding along the ground.
They generally do not provide protection for from the top of the barrier and are therefore less
effective for motorcycle impacts in upright position.
DMPS available on the market today also come in different designs and materials, including
plastic, foam and other composite materials. The designer/engineer should asses the
performance of individual systems through impact test results (See Section 8.4), regardless of the
material type. However, from a durability perspective, some materials may be a better fit for the
environmental conditions in Abu Dhabi, i.e. high temperatures and humidity. For this reason, the
designer/engineer should assess each system on a product by product basis. Most DMPS are also
designed to be installed on to more than one type of barrier system, such as the W-beam shown in
Figure 8.10 and the wire rope systems shown in Figure 8.11. The applicability is often based on
the profile of the barrier posts, as shown in Figure 8.2, and changes from one design to another.
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Figure 8.11 – Example of discontinuous MPS application on a wire rope barrier in South
Australia [15]
DMPS, similar to CMPS, are relatively easy to install systems. Unlike some DMPS designs, CMPS
are not limited by the minimum horizontal curvature of the road. It can be installed at even the
sharpest curves. DMPS designs do not completely obstruct the lower section of the barrier and
therefore allow the windblown sand to freely pass through. This makes it a better alternative at
areas prone to sand accumulation.
8.3.3 Barriers with Motorcyclist Protection Incorporated in Design

This tested proprietary system is a barrier with motorcyclist protection incorporated in their
fundamental design. As shown in Figure 8.12, these systems do not feature any exposed posts,
corners or sharp edges. In addition to providing protection for sliding riders, unlike other
alternatives they also provide protection for the riders impacting the barrier in an upright position.
Figure 8.12 – Example of a barrier with motorcyclist protection incorporated in its design,
CUSTOM from CSM SpA
They are currently the least frequent MPS type on the market and are likely to be more expensive
and more time consuming to install than the other alternatives, as they would require a complete
replacement of the existing barrier. However, the additional level of safety provided may justify
their application. Similar to CMPS, these systems are not recommended in areas of potential sand
accumulation as they wouldn’t allow the sand to blow through.
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8.4 Performance Assessment of Motorcyclist Protection Systems

Currently the common standardized way of assessing the performance of a MPS is the European
Technical Specification TS1317-8 “Motorcycle road restraint systems which reduce the impact
severity of motorcyclist collisions with safety barriers” [10]. TS1317-8 succeeds and is a
combination of both the Spanish Test Standard UNE-135900 and Test Protocol of the French test
house LIER. NCHRP350 and MASH do not include any methods for the impact performance
assessment of MPS. Therefore TS1317-8 is the recommended guidance of the MPS performance
assessment for Abu Dhabi.
The recommended procedure is to test a MPS first according to TS1317-8 to assess its impact
performance for motorcyclists. Since TS1317-8 tests are only carried out with test dummies sliding
on the ground, they do not contradict with MASH and NCHRP350 methodologies. If the MPS
shows satisfactory performance from a motorcyclist safety perspective, then the combination of the
MPS and the barrier, to which it will be attached, should be tested as one system, according to
MASH or NCHRP350. This secondary level of testing is required to demonstrate that the addition
of MPS does not adversely affect the performance of the barrier during impacts with other vehicles.
TS1317-8 specifies requirements for the impact performance of systems designed for the
reduction of impact severity for motorcyclists. Currently TS1317-8 considers only the scenario of a
rider impacting a barrier whilst sliding along the ground, having fallen from their motorcycle. Other
incident scenarios, such as riders impacting the barrier while still on their motorcycle are not yet
considered in TS1317-8. The systems reviewed by TS1317-8 are those fitted to barriers, or
barriers that have inherent rider protection or risk reduction capability.
8.4.1 TS1317-8 Test Types

The full-scale impact tests in TS1317-8 consist of launching a Hybrid III Test Dummy with a
modified shoulder at a given speed against a barrier with an MPS installed. At the moment of
impact, the dummy is sliding with its back and legs in contact with ground in a stable way, as
shown in Figure 8.13 . The dummy is equipped with a helmet and dressed in motorcyclist safety
clothes in accordance with the requirements specified in the technical specification.
Figure 8.13 – Example of an EN1317-8 test configuration [10]
During the test, accelerations, forces and moments acting on the head and neck are measured
with instrumentation inside the dummy. High and normal speed cameras are used to capture test
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footage that describes the behaviour of the MPS, barrier and dummy. Main performance indicators
of a TS1317-8 test are Speed and Severity Level classification.

Once the decision for the installation of a MPS is made, following criteria should be used in
deciding the type of MPS to be installed.
8.5.1 Compatibility with the Existing Barrier

It is not possible to install every MPS on to every barrier system available in the market. The
chosen MPS should be compatible with the existing barrier.
Compatibility should also be assessed from a performance perspective. Adding an MPS to an

existing barrier can have some adverse effects during an impact with a car. This concern was
supported by tests carried out in BAst, Germany [18]. The testing indicated that there would be an
increased probability of a car climbing up the barrier due to the addition of the lower secondary rail,
although the results of the testing were still deemed to meet the requirements of the European
Barrier Test Standard EN1317-1&2. This is why a MPS ideally should not be installed on the road,
without testing the combination of barrier + MPS as a single system through MASH or NCHRP350.
If the combination passes the tests, then there would be significantly less worry for a vehicle to
climb over the barrier.
It should be noted that different MPS-barrier combinations can result in different impact
characteristics. Therefore, it is important to test the complete systems both to a MPS testing
standard (TS1317-8) & a barrier testing standard (MASH or NCHRP-350 for Abu Dhabi) before
installation.
In all cases, the compatibility of an MPS with a barrier system should be checked with the
manufacturer/promoter of the system, prior to installation. This may result in a different MPS and/or
barrier being selected for a particular application.
8.5.2 Areas of Potential Sand Accumulation

As explained in Section 8.3.1, continuous motorcyclist protection systems can cause problems in
areas of blowing sand. These systems do not allow the free movement of sand and therefore may
cause accumulation under the barrier. Consideration should be given for the selection of an
appropriate MPS in such areas. From a motorcyclist’s point of view, ideally, the designer/engineer
should try to eliminate the risk by removing or relocating the hazards, in such areas. If this is not
possible, then a barrier design, which would allow the free movement of the sand, can be
considered. This is likely to be a WRSB system, due to their better performance in letting the sand
to flow underneath. If this is the case, then the posts of the WRSB should be shielded with an
appropriate MPS, such as the example shown in Figure 8.11.
8.6 Application Criteria
8.6.1 Common Locations Where a Motorcyclist Protection System may

be required
Motorcycle to barrier accidents are rare but high severity incidents. Due to their rarity, covering the
whole network with MPS is often not feasible from a cost effectiveness perspective. However, due
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to the high severity of these incidents, well targeted MPS installations are likely to provide high
cost/benefit ratio. For this reason it is important to identify the most common locations of
motorcycle to barrier incidents. Once identified, these locations can then be evaluated for the
installation of a MPS.
Following are the common locations of motorcycle to barrier accidents, based on international best
practice, which should be evaluated for the installation of a MPS:
8.6.1.1Sharp Bends on Single Carriageways

On single carriageways, the most common locations for motorcycle-to-barrier incidents are sharp
bends, especially the ones with a horizontal curve radius less than 200m, as shown in Figure 8.14.
These locations are even more susceptible to motorcycle-to-barrier incidents if one or more of the
contributing characteristics, which are presented in Section 8.6.1.3, exist.
Figure 8.14 – Example of a sharp bend on a single carriageway [4]
On single carriageways, the following areas should be prioritised for the evaluation of a MPS
installation:
 Left hand bends with a curve radius of 200m or less – in such cases the rightside barrier
provision should be prioritised for assessment;
 Right hand bends with a curve radius of 200m or less – in such cases the leftside barrier
provision should be prioritised for assessment.
8.6.1.2Vicinity of Interchanges on Dual Carriageways

Research shows that on high speed dual carriageway roads, such as freeways and expressways,
motorcycle-to-barrier accidents occur most commonly at the vicinity of the interchanges [1], such
as the one shown in Figure 8.15.
Motorcycle-to-barrier accidents also occur on uninterrupted straight (horizontal curve radius

>2000m) sections of dual carriageways. However, due to the relatively low number of incidents
compared to the very long stretch of dual carriageways on the network, it is not feasible to prioritise
these sections for MPS installation.
On an interchange, the following areas should be prioritised for the evaluation of a MPS
installation:
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On Ramps/Slip Roads:
 On left hand bends with a curve radius of 200m or less – in such cases the rightside barrier
provision should be prioritised for assessment;
 On right hand bends with a curve radius of 200m or less – in such cases the leftside barrier
provision should be prioritised for assessment.
Areas to be considered
for a MPS installation
Figure 8.15 – Areas to be considered for MPS installation on an interchange [16]
8.6.1.3 Additional Road Characteristics for the use of a Motorcyclist

Protection System
Enhanced prioritisation should also be given to areas where one or more of the following
characteristics exist:
a) Locations with a known history of motorcycle-to-barrier accidents;

b) Routes regularly travelled by motorcyclists/where the percentage of motorcyclist traffic is
high;
c) Locations where the barrier system is located close to the edge of the carriageway;
d) Inadequate geometric design, such as reverse and/or insufficient super-elevation, as shown
in Figure 8.16;
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Figure 8.16 – Examples of reverse/inadequate super-elevation [17]
e) Consecutive curves with changing direction and horizontal curve radii, such as mountain
terrain, as shown in Figure 8.17, A).;
 This is a physically challenging combination for the riders. It is easier to make an
error and miss the correct line during the successive direction changes;
f) Sharp horizontal curves located at the end of long straights, without a sufficient transition
spiral, as shown in Figure 8.17, B);
 The long straight gives enough distance for reaching higher speeds, while judging
the brake point before the sharp curve can be tricky for riders. This combination is
also against rider expectations;
g) Consecutive curves in the same direction, with decreasing radius, as shown in Figure 8.17,
C);
 It is very hard to judge and keep the correct cornering line in this combination as the
correct line changes suddenly in the middle of the corner. This design is also
against rider expectations;
Figure 8.17 - High risk horizontal road alignment combinations for motorcyclists [17]
h) Locations with poor sight distance;

i) Locations likely to experience sand accumulation and skidding;
j) Locations where other hazards to motorcyclists exist, subject to engineering judgment.
8.6.2 Assessment of the Need for a Motorcyclist Protection System

Once an area of potential motorcycle-to-barrier incidents is identified, the following treatment
options should be evaluated; listed in order of decreasing level of desirability from a road safety
perspective.
1) Investigate the methods that would decrease the probability of a motorcyclist leaving the
carriageway (e.g. improving road surface, improved signage or better visibility);
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2) Where possible, eliminate the need and remove the barrier:

a. Remove any existing hazard(s);
b. Move any existing hazard(s) further from the carriageway;
c. Make the hazard(s) passively safe for an impact by a motorcyclist (as there is no
published testing standard to ascertain the passive safety performance of roadside
hazards through an impact by motorcyclist, engineering judgement should be used
to make this assessment);
3) If the barrier cannot be removed, then installation of an MPS, compliant with TS1317-8,
should be considered.;
4) If the installation of an MPS cannot be justified (for example due to a cost benefit analysis),
then a review of the proximity of any remaining hazards to the front face of the barrier
should be carried out to ascertain whether the working width of the system could be
increased by the removal of posts from the barrier system. The removal of the posts would
decrease the probability of an impact by a motorcyclist, and thus reduce the risk of injury.
8.7 Maintenance and Inspection Requirements

Motorcyclist Protection Systems should be inspected in line with the manufacturer’s Installation
and Maintenance manual. MPS, in general, are relatively simple systems which are attached to the
existing barriers. The majority of the MPS available on the market today require little regular or
routine maintenance. However, it is important that periodic maintenance checks are performed, in
line with the manufacturer’s recommendations so that each installed unit remains fully functional. It
may be time and cost-effective to carry out the MPS inspection together with the inspection of the
barrier system, which they are attached to. Similar to safety barriers, maintenance and inspection
requirements for an MPS should be provided by the promoter associated with the system. They
should also have an established training scheme for the operatives undertaking these activities.
The majority of the available MPS are designed to remain functional after an impact by an errant
motorcyclist sliding on the ground. However, due to their flexible nature, impact with a vehicle may
easily cause enough damage to render a MPS ineffective. Similar to their installation, repair of
MPS is relatively quick and easy, even when a significant length of the system is damaged.
Ideally, MPS should not be used in areas where they can cause potential sand accumulation.
Accumulated sand would not only render the MPS ineffective, but it can also adversely affect the
impact performance of the barrier, which it is attached to (See Section 7.2.10).
Some MPS, similar to a W-beam barrier, are designed in the form of rails which need to be lapped
in a certain direction. Guidance given in Section 7.2.8.1 also applies to these systems. Therefore,
correct lapping of the systems should also be checked during inspections.
Some MPS are made of materials, which may be more sensitive to heat than others, such as
plastic, composites, etc. If such a system is chosen for installation, the effect of the high
temperatures and humidity observed in Abu Dhabi should be checked during inspection. MPS
should not deform or get affected by heat in any other way.

The majority of the barrier systems are not designed to provide protection for motorcyclists.
Motorcycle-to-barrier impacts are rare but high severity incidents. In order to reduce risk of injury to
PAGE 226
a motorcyclist when impacting a safety barrier, a number of Motorcyclist Protection Systems (MPS)
have been developed.
MPS available on the market can be grouped into three categories:

 Continuous MPS;
 Discontinuous MPS;
 Barriers with MPS incorporated in design.
Performance of a MPS can be assessed through the European Technical Specification TS1317-8.
Main performance indicators of a TS1317-8 test are Speed and Severity Level classification.
The need for a MPS should be assessed for road sections with a higher risk of a motorcycle-to-
barrier incident. Locations to prioritise for an assessment are:
 Areas with a history of motorcycle-to-barrier accidents;
 Sharp bends in single carriageways;
 Vicinity of Interchanges on dual carriageways, with a special focus on ramps.
Once an area for possible motorcycle-to-barrier accidents is identified, it should be evaluated for a
MPS installation. A MPS is only recommended if the barrier cannot be removed.
Once the decision to install a MPS is made, the type should be selected according to:
 Compatibility with the existing barrier;
 Potential risk of sand accumulation.
The chosen MPS should be compatible with the existing barrier. Adding a MPS to an existing
barrier can have some adverse effects during an impact with a car. This is why, ideally, a MPS
should not be installed on the road, without testing the combination of barrier + MPS as a single
system through MASH or NCHRP350.
CMPS can cause problems with sand accumulation and therefore should not be used in areas
prone to blowing sand.
MPS should be inspected in line with the manufacturer’s installation and maintenance manual. The
majority of the available MPS are designed to remain functional after an impact by an errant
motorcyclist sliding on the ground.
Some MPS are made of materials, which may be more sensitive to heat than others. If such a
system is chosen for installation, the effect of the high temperatures and humidity observed in Abu
Dhabi should be checked during inspection.
8.9 References
[1] C. Erginbas and G. Williams, “Motorcyclists and Barriers on the Highways Agency Road
Network,” TRL (Unpublished), 2015.
[2] H. C. Gabler, “THE RISK OF FATALITY IN MOTORCYCLE CRASHES WITH ROADSIDE

BARRIERS,” Virginia Tech, United States, 2007.
PAGE 227
[3] M. Mcdonald, “Motorcyclists and Roadside Safety Hardware,” in A2A04 Summer Meeting,
2002.
[4] FEMA, “New Standards for Road Restraint Systems for Motorcyclists - Designing Safer
Roadsides for Motorcyclists,” Federation of European Motorcyclists' Associations, 2012.
[5] Norwegian Public Roads Administration, “MC Safety Design and Operation of Roads and
Traffic Systems,” Directorate of Public Roads, Norway, 2004.
[6] T. Gibson and E. Benetatos, “Motorcycles and Crash Barriers,” NSW Motorcycle Council, New
South Wales, 2000.
[7] C. Duncan, B. Corben and N. &. T. C. Truedsson, “Motorcycle and Safety Barrier Crash-
Testing: Feasibility Study,” Accident Research Centre, Monash University, 2000.
[8] A. Daniello and H. C. Gabler, “Effect of Barrier Type on Injury Severity in Motorcycle-to-Barrier
Collisions in North Carolina, Texas, and New Jersey,” Transportation Research Record:
Journal of the Transportation Research Board, p. pp. 144–151, 2011.
[9] J. C. Toribio, “Barreras rígidas de hormigón Comportamiento ante el impacto de motoristas

(Rigid Concrete Barriers, Behaviour on the Impact of Motorcyclists),” Asociacion Mutua Motera
, pp. 62-65, 2008.
[10] CEN, CEN/TS 1317-8, Road Restraint Systems - Part 8: Motorcycle Road Restraint Systems
Which Reduce the Impact Severity of Motorcyclist Collisions with Safety Barriers, Brussels:
CEN, European Committee for Standardization, 2012.
[11] EuroRAP, “Barriers to change: designing safe roads for motorcyclists,” EuroRAP,
Basingstoke, 2008.
[12] SNOLINE, “www.snoline.com,” [Online]. Available: http://www.snoline.com/dr46-1. [Accessed

2015 09 15].
[13] BASYC Systemas de Seguridad Vial, [Online]. Available: http://www.basyc.eu/. [Accessed

2015 09 15].
[14] World Highways, “www.worldhighways.com,” [Online]. Available:

http://www.worldhighways.com/categories/road-markings-barriers-workzone-
protection/features/crash-cushion-design/. [Accessed 15 09 2015].
[15] Governmen of South Australia Depratment of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure,

“www.dpti.sa.gov.au,” [Online]. Available:
http://www.dpti.sa.gov.au/towardszerotogether/safer_roads/building_safer_roads. [Accessed
15 09 2015].
PAGE 228
[17] FGSV, “Merkblatt zur Verbesserung der Verkehrssicherheit auf Motorradstrecken (Leaflet to
Improve Road Safety on Motorcycle Roads),” Forschungsgesellschaft für Straßen und
Verkehrswesen, 2007.
[18] BAST, “Einsatzkriterien für Schutzeinrichtungen mit geringerem Verletzungsrisiko für

Motorradfahrer. Bundesanstalt für Strassenwesen,” BAST, 2004.
PAGE 229
9 TERMINALS
9.1 Overview
A terminal is a crashworthy treatment at the beginning and/or the end of a safety barrier. Note that
terminals are also used for anchoring a barrier system to the ground to enable the barrier to
develop its tensile strength during an impact. The untreated end of a barrier can pose a high risk of
injury to vehicle occupants if it is located within the clear zone and is facing the oncoming traffic,
where it is more likely to be hit head-on by an errant vehicle. An errant vehicle impacting the
unprotected end may come to a sudden stop, be penetrated by the barrier parts or roll over.
Therefore, crashworthy terminals should always be provided:
 At both ends of those barriers which are located along single-carriageway roads with two-
way traffic (as both ends of the barrier have a chance to get hit head-on in this
configuration); and
 At the end which faces the oncoming traffic for barriers which are located along dual-
carriageways and single-carriageways with one-way traffic (as only one end of the barrier
has a chance to get hit head-on in this configuration).
Furthermore, a treatment is also needed at the trailing end, which does not face any on-coming
traffic, to provide anchorage. However, these do not necessarily need to be crashworthy designs
as they are not likely to get hit head-on by errant vehicles. Examples of these treatments are given
in Section 9.2.
The above requirement equally applies to cases where the beam of the guardrail has been
removed for a short period of time (for example, to enable access through the barrier for irrigation
purposes) as shown in Figure 9.1. Instead, a more permanent solution should be developed as
shown in Figure 9.2. The detail shown in Figure 9.2 is a good example of the use of terminal
systems – there is an impact tested terminal on the approach end of the departure end barrier.
This will greatly reduce the risk of injury to the occupant of an errant vehicle in the event of an
impact with an unprotected end of a rail. At the same time, the arrangement on the departure end
of the approach barrier rail will ensure that maintenance workers are protected from the risk of
injury from the end of an unprotected barrier beam when working on site.
Figure 9.1 - Incorrect application of terminals (no terminals present)
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09 Terminals First Edition-December 2016
Figure 9.2 - Correct application of terminals (impact tested terminal on approach,

engineered detail on departure).
In countries such as Sweden and the UK [1], impact tested energy absorbing end terminals are
frequently used to prevent head-on impacts by safely decelerating the vehicle to a stop or by safely
redirecting an errant vehicle around the object of concern.
This Chapter gives guidelines for the site grading and the structural and performance
characteristics of end terminals. It also includes descriptions, selection guidelines, and placement
recommendations for systems that have been successfully crash tested according to NCHRP-350
[2] and MASH [3] are provided.
9.2 Types of Terminals & Design Principals

There are a number of different types of terminals available on the market today that are designed
to be used with rigid, semi-rigid or flexible systems. These systems can be classified into several
categories based on their design principles. These categories include:
 Full Height vs. Ramped Down;

 Flared vs. Parallel;
 Energy Absorbing vs. Non-Energy Absorbing;
 Gating vs. Non-gating;
 Single Sided vs. Double Sided.
A terminal may have more than one of these properties. For example, a terminal may be
categorised as full-height, energy absorbing, flared and single sided at the same time. Each end
terminal functions on a number of different principles, and it is essential that the most appropriate
form of terminal is chosen for each particular situation. For example, it should be noted that
ramped down end terminals should only be used in low-speed environments (60 km/h or less), or
where the terminal cannot be struck head-on by a vehicle; for example, on one-way roads or on
divided roads with a protective median barrier.
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9.2.1 Full Height vs. Ramped Down End Treatments

Terminals and non-crashworthy end treatments can be categorised as full height or ramped down,
depending on their design. Full-height designs are the ones where the height of the standard
section of a barrier is continued all the way to the end of the terminal; whereas ramped down
designs are the ones which slope down from the standard height of the barrier to the ground level.
Following sections present specific details about the differences between full height and ramped
down end treatment designs for semi-rigid, rigid and flexible systems.
9.2.1.1Semi-Rigid Systems
A brief look at the historic evolution of end treatments for semi-rigid systems is very useful in
understanding the difference between full-height and ramped down solutions. Historically, semi-
rigid systems did not incorporate crash-worthy end treatments. The barrier was simply ended with
a full-height splayed end (also known as a “fish tail”), such as the one shown in Figure 9.3.
Through in-service experience, it was understood that the unprotected ends of barrier rails in this
configuration pose a great risk of impaling the errant vehicles which hit them head-on. This type of
end-treatment should never be used on the approach end of barriers. They may only be
considered on the trailing end of a barrier where there is no risk that a vehicle travelling in the
opposite direction will collide head-on with the terminal (i.e. roads with single-directional traffic). It
is not generally recommended to use such systems and they are prohibited in other countries.
Figure 9.3 – Example of a splayed end / fish tail end treatment
Once the danger of full-height, non-crashworthy end treatments was understood, a cost effective
solution was found in sloping the ends of the barriers from full height to the ground level, as shown
in Figure 9.4. These ramped down end treatments prevented the ends of the W-beam from
impaling errant vehicles. However, over time, experience has shown that these end treatments
created a new problem. Accident data analyses have shown that the ramped down end treatments
often cause errant vehicles to overturn, launch in the air and even land on the hazards behind the
barrier [4]. Furthermore, these adverse effects of the ramped down end treatments were
demonstrated through full-scale impact tests carried out by the Federal Highway Research Institute
(BASt) of Germany [5]. Therefore, this type of end treatment is not generally recommended on the
approach end of barriers, where they are more likely to get hit head-on. The only places where
they may be considered on the approach end of barriers are where the speed limit is 60km/h or
less [6]. Road safety improvement programs should seek opportunities, as part of road
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maintenance and renewal activities, to progressively replace existing ramped end terminals in
high-risk locations with posted speeds above 60km/h with appropriate crashworthy terminals.
Ramped down end treatments may be used on the departure ends of barriers where they cannot
be struck in this direction. The length over which the ramp is formed can vary and therefore so can
the gradient of the ramp. This will depend on the design of the ramped end and the guardrail
system to which it is attached.
Figure 9.4 - An example of a typical semi-rigid ramped down end treatment
The lessons learnt from using non-crashworthy full-height and ramped down end treatments led to
the development of crashworthy full-height terminals such as the one shown in Figure 9.5. These
crash tested systems are designed to stop an errant vehicle in a controlled way, without the risk of
impaling, rollover or being launched in the air. There are many different tested NCHRP350 and
MASH proprietary, full-height, crashworthy terminals available on the market today.
Figure 9.5 – Example of a full-height crashworthy terminal
9.2.1.2Rigid Systems
Unprotected ends of rigid barriers are serious hazards as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.7.
Due to their rigid nature, it is not possible to design the ends of these systems in a crashworthy
way, against head-on impacts by errant vehicles. A full-height rigid barrier end is a rigid wall, which
can cause severe injuries to the occupants of an impacting vehicle.
In the past, ramped down end treatments, such as the one shown in Figure 9.6, were thought to be
an acceptable solution to mitigate the risk posed by a full height, untreated rigid barrier end.
However, similar to the situation with the semi-rigid ramped down ends, it was understood that this
type of design caused vehicles to overturn and launch them in the air; both of which are likely to
PAGE 233
cause severe injuries to the occupants of an errant vehicle. Therefore, ramped down rigid barrier
ends should not be installed where an end-on impact is possible.
Figure 9.6 - Example of a typical ramped concrete barrier end treatment
The ends of concrete barriers should be treated either by an appropriate crash cushion (see
Chapter 10) or by an appropriate transition to steel barrier followed by a crashworthy end terminal,
as shown in Figure 9.7. Further details on transitions can be found within Chapter 11.
Transition
Terminal
Rigid Barrier
Figure 9.7 – Use of a terminal and a transition at the end of a concrete barrier
9.2.1.3 Flexible Systems

In the case of WRSB systems, the terminals are an integral part of the system and act as anchors.
Therefore, it is not possible to combine these systems with terminals of other makes and models.
The WRSB available on the market are predominantly proprietary systems, and most of them
feature ramped down designs, as shown in Figure 9.8. This is expected, as the cables need to be
anchored to the ground and this leads to a ramped down set up.
Unlike the semi-rigid and rigid ramped down end treatments, the WRSB ramped down terminals
often have crashworthy designs. The end anchors are often frangible and designed to detach from
the anchor block when hit by an errant vehicle. Furthermore, these end anchors are held in place
by safety cables, which stop the anchors from being thrown into traffic when they become
detached. Therefore they do not launch an errant vehicle in the air, as the semi-rigid ramped down
ends do.
There are many different WRSB systems available on the market today and most have terminal
designs which are unique to the manufacturer. While some designs have all cables anchored at
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the same block, as shown in Figure 9.8, others may have each individual cable anchored to
individual blocks. For more details, the designer/engineer should refer to manufacturers’
specifications.
Figure 9.8 – Example of a WRSB ramped down terminal
9.2.2 Flared vs. Parallel End Terminals

Terminals can also be classified as being either ‘flared’ or ‘parallel’, depending on their lateral
placement, with regards to the edge of the carriageway.
By ‘flared’ it is meant that the end of the terminal is typically located 0.9 -1.2m behind the front face
of the downstream barrier installation (away from the edge of the carriageway), as shown in Figure
9.9. Because the flared terminal is located further from the travelled way, head-on impacts are less
likely. Further benefits of flaring and the details of flare rate application can be found within
Chapter 7, Section 7.4.2.
Figure 9.9 - Example of a flared terminal
By ‘parallel’ it is meant that the terminal is in line with the carriageway, as shown in Figure 9.10.
Parallel terminals may be installed with a 300mm to 600mm offset from the edge of the shoulder
(over the entire terminal length) to minimize ’damage only’ strikes.
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Figure 9.10 – Example of a parallel terminal
In general, the choice of whether a terminal should be installed in a flared or a tangential

arrangement will be determined by the installation instructions provided by the supplier of the
terminal system.
A special type of flared end treatment application is where the end of the barrier is flared away
from the edge of the carriageway and buried in a backslope, as shown in Figure 9.11. It provides
full tension for the W-beam and eliminates the risks posed by the end of the beam, as it is buried
inside the slope. This type of application requires a natural back slope in the vicinity of the roadway
and therefore is usually only possible in areas of cut sections. Due to the formation of the roadside
within Abu Dhabi, it is deemed unlikely that such a layout would be achievable; however, buried
end terminals and requirements for them are included for completeness.
Figure 9.11 – Example of a buried-in-backslope end treatment [7]
When properly designed and located, buried end terminals provide full shielding of the identified
hazard, which eliminates the possibility of any end-on-impact with the terminal, and minimizes the
likelihood of the vehicle passing behind the rail. However, before installing a buried-in-backslope
terminal, the site needs to be carefully reviewed, giving consideration to the foreslope, backslope,
and ditch configurations as well as identifying provisions that may be needed to provide proper
drainage.
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An effective installation of buried end terminals should satisfy several design criteria:
 The steepness of the slope that covers the end of the barrier should be nearly vertical (such
as 1V:2H) so that the slope effectively becomes an extension of the barrier face and a
motorist cannot physically get behind the terminal [8];
 In such a case, the barrier can be brought into the backslope as soon as possible by using
the maximum flare rate appropriate for the design speed of the highway (refer to Table 7.6
of Chapter 7);
 If the backslope is flatter than 1V:3H, a buried-in-backslope design can be easily
overridden, and should therefore be avoided [8];
 For all buried-in-backslope designs, the length-of-need begins at the point where the
installation crosses the ditch bottom.
The buried-in-backslope design has been successfully crash tested with foreslopes of 1V:10H,
1V:6H, and 1V:4H. Experience has shown that for adequate performance the height of the W-
beam at the end of the system should be kept at the same level, in relation to the elevation of the
shoulder, all the way until the barrier crosses the bottom of the ditch. When the distance from the
ground to the bottom of the beam fails to meet the requirements of the manufacturer’s installation
manual, the supplier should be contacted for further advice.
Due to the installation limitations, the WRSB terminals are only placed in a parallel layout. Similar
to the effect of the installation on a horizontal curve, the high tension on the ropes are likely to
bend the posts, in a flared installation.
In case of rigid barriers, as explained in section 9.2.1.2, the ends should be treated either by an
appropriate crash cushion or by an appropriate transition to steel barrier followed by a crashworthy
end terminal. Therefore, the differentiation between flared vs. parallel is not relevant for rigid
systems.
9.2.3 Energy Absorbing vs. Non-Energy Absorbing Terminals

Traditionally, guardrail terminals have also been classified as being either ‘energy absorbing’ or
‘non-energy absorbing’. By ‘energy absorbing’ it is meant that the terminal is designed to gradually
deform, dissipating impact energy, and bringing the impacting vehicle to rest in such a way that the
risk of injury to vehicle occupants is minimised. The dissipation of energy is generally achieved by
the compression of deformable elements. In high speed impact tests (to NCHRP-350 and MASH),
terminal systems have demonstrated their ability to stop impacting vehicles in less than 15m.
Almost all of the full-height, parallel terminals available on the market today (ones known to the
authors of this design guide) are energy absorbing systems. An example of a full height energy
absorbing terminal is given in Figure 9.12. There are also some full-height, flared and energy
absorbing terminals available. However, most flared designs available today are non-energy
absorbing.
‘Non-energy absorbing’ means that the terminal itself is not designed to deform during an impact,
with such terminals typically providing an anchorage for the connected guardrail system. This
means that for some systems, particularly flexible systems such as wire rope, the longitudinal
forces generated within the system in the event of an impact need to be anchored into the ground
to enable the barrier system to contain and redirect the impacting vehicle as designed. An example
of such a system is shown in Figure 9.8.
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Figure 9.12 – An example of an energy absorbing crashworthy end terminal
Due to the fact that non-energy absorbing terminals are not designed to deform during an impact
they can present a risk of hazard to road users. As a result, these types of terminals should be
flared away from the carriageway where used. An example of a non-energy absorbing end
treatment is provided in Figure 9.13.
Figure 9.13 – An example of a non-energy absorbing end treatment.
Following International best practice of countries such as the UK and the USA, non-energy
absorbing terminals should not be used on the approach end of guardrails in roads with a speed
limit greater than 60km/h.
At locations where non-energy absorbing terminals are used on the approach end of guardrails (on
roads with a speed limit of 60km/h or less) the terminal should ideally be flared away from the
carriageway. More details on how this should be achieved are given in Section 9.5.2 and Section
7.4.2 in Chapter 7. Non-energy absorbing terminals can be used on the departure end of
guardrails on all dual carriageway roads with any speed limit as long as it is unlikely that the
direction of the traffic will be reversed (for example in the event of road works and contraflow
running).
In addition to the speed limit of the road, the decision of whether to use either an energy-absorbing
terminal or a non-energy-absorbing terminal should be based on the likelihood of an end-on
impact, the nature of the recovery area immediately behind and beyond the terminal and
engineering judgement. If the barrier length-of-need is properly determined, it is unlikely that a
vehicle will reach the primary shielded object after an end-on impact, regardless of the terminal
type selected. More details regarding this aspect are given within Section 7.3.1. However, if the
terrain beyond the terminal and immediately behind the barrier is not safely traversable, an energy-
absorbing terminal is recommended [8]. Further information on the site grading before, under and
beyond terminals can be found in Section 9.5.3.
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9.2.4 Gating vs. Non Gating Terminals

Traditionally, and particularly in the USA, guardrail terminals have also been classified as being
either ‘gating’ or ‘non-gating’.
‘Gating’ terminals are typically non-energy absorbing and, when impacted by a vehicle on either its
end or the side at an angle near the nose, will break away and allow the vehicle to pass through or
over it, behind the line of the barrier system. In Europe, such systems are often referred to as ‘non-
redirective’.
As they allow the errant vehicle to pass through, gating terminals are unsuitable for installation at
locations where errant vehicles can continue travelling after hitting the terminal and reach a hazard
or the opposite side of traffic. From this perspective, the main idea of a gating terminal is to protect
the errant vehicle from the dangers of an exposed beam end, but not to redirect it back to the
travelled way. As the errant vehicles are likely to continue after hitting the terminal, a traversable
level terrain, which is free of obstacles, should be provided behind a gating terminal. This
application is known as grading, and the requirements are stated in Section 9.5.3.
For non-gating terminals, due to the lack of re-directional capabilities, the point of the length of
need starts from a certain distance downstream from the end of the terminal (see Figure 7.8 in
Chapter 7). This is because a vehicle impacting the system until this point will continue behind the
barrier and can reach the hazard. This distance after which the system starts to redirect vehicles
should be determined from the results of full-scale crash tests. However, as a rough guidance,
3.81m is often quoted (see Figure 9.17) as the typical distance from the end of the terminal to the
point of length of need for most W-beam terminals [8].
‘Non-gating’ terminals are typically energy absorbing and when impacted by a vehicle on either its
end or the side will not allow the vehicle to pass through or over them. They will instead redirect
the vehicle along the travelled way in a similar way to a guardrail. In Europe, such systems are
often referred to as ‘redirective’. The majority of non-gating systems are crash attenuators. As the
system has re-directional capabilities, the point of need for a non-gating system often starts closer
to the end of the terminal.
Guidance on whether to select a ‘gating’ or a ‘non-gating’ terminal for a particular application is

given in Section 9.4.1.
9.2.5 Single Sided vs. Double Sided Terminals

Finally, it is possible to categorize terminals as single sided or double sided (also known as median
terminals) systems. Most terminals are designed for vehicular impacts from only one side;
however, some proprietary terminal designs have been developed to be hit from both sides.
Example of such a terminal is shown in Figure 9.14.
Single sided terminals are predominantly designed for roadside installations. However, these
systems are only designed to be hit from one side and this limits their applicability in locations
where there is a risk of being hit from both directions. These locations are mainly medians and
gore areas, as shown in Figure 9.14.
There are a number of double sided terminal systems available on the market today, which are
designed to be used with semi-rigid barriers. These are all proprietary systems and the installation
requirements should be provided by their manufacturers. It is essential that before selecting a
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terminal system for a median application, it is checked with the manufacturer that the system has
been designed and tested to function from either side.
From the perspective of rigid barriers, the sloped down end treatments can be considered as
double sided systems. However, as explained in Section 9.2.1.2, this type of end treatment is not
recommended due to the risks it poses to errant vehicles.
Figure 9.14 – Example of a double sided terminal
WRSB terminals are almost always designed to be hit from both directions and therefore can
generally be considered as double sided solutions. However, confirmation should always be
provided by the manufacturer to make sure that this is the case.
9.3 NCHRP350 and MASH Performance Classifications

All end treatments proposed for use within the Emirate of Abu Dhabi shall have demonstrated
compliance with the American recommendations in either NCHRP Report 350 [2] or MASH [3].
Evidence of this shall be presented and approved by the Overseeing Organization prior to the use
of these systems. Only systems approved by the Overseeing Organization shall be permitted.
After January 1, 2011, newly-tested terminals must be evaluated in accordance with MASH.
However, terminals that were accepted before the adoption of MASH by using criteria contained in
NCHRP Report 350 may remain in place and may continue to be manufactured and installed.
In order to meet the requirements of NCHRP350, or MASH, the terminal must demonstrate that it
can successfully decelerate (and in some cases redirect) an impacting vehicle without the unsafe
detachment of elements. During such times, the impacting vehicle should maintain an upright
orientation, whilst meeting the requirements of two severity indices; OIV and ORA. More details on
these severity indices can be found within Section 6.5.5. The portion of the end treatment included
in a barrier’s length-of-need must have re-directional characteristics similar to those of the barrier
to which it is attached.
9.3.1 Test Types

NCHRP Report 350 and MASH contain recommended procedures for evaluating the performance
and test procedures for terminals. Testing of a terminal system requires the successful completion
of a series of full-scale impact tests. The most common performance classification used (on an
International basis) is that of Test Level 3. Table 9.1 and Table 9.2 show the recommended impact
PAGE 240
tests which need to be carried out to achieve TL-3 classification, according to NCHRP350 and
MASH respectively. Each test configuration is described in terms of the type and mass of the
impacting vehicle, impact point, speed and angle of impact. As can be seen from Table 9.1
according to NCHP350, some test types are only recommended for gating systems, some are only
recommended for non-gating systems and some are recommended for both. According to MASH
however, all the test configurations listed in Table 9.2 are recommended for both gating and non-
gating systems; with the only difference being the evaluation criteria of the test outcome. The non-
gating systems are expected to contain or redirect the vehicle or bring the vehicle to a controlled
stop, whereas the performance of gating systems are considered acceptable in case of redirection,
controlled penetration or controlled stopping of the test vehicle. Other performance classes (TL-1
testing at 50km/h and TL-2 testing at 70km/h) may also be specified for lower speed roads (refer to
Section 9.4.1), however, the number of products available which meet these requirements are
limited.
It should be noted that unlike guardrails there are no terminals which are designed to be tested at
Test Levels exceeding TL-3. The reason for this is that in order to design a terminal system
capable of safely decelerating an errant vehicle above TL-3, whilst still meeting the small car
impact requirements with regard to the safety levels ORA and OIV, would mean that the length of
terminals would greatly increase. Whilst such systems have yet to be designed and tested, it is
hypothesised that the resulting terminals would be so long that they would be unsuitable for
inclusion on road schemes. Therefore, in such cases where a guardrail exceeding TL-3 is required
for a particular location, a TL-3 terminal should be used and connected to a TL-3 guardrail system.
In turn, this TL-3 guardrail should then be connected (via a suitable transition - refer to Chapter 11)
to the required increased TL guardrail. Such an approach is of particular relevance to truck roads
where the required TL of the guardrail is likely to exceed TL-3.
9.3.2 Containment Level

Test Level (TL)-3 (which is the basic level) provides protection for vehicles with masses up to
2000kg (NCHRP350) and 2270kg (MASH) for impact speeds of 100 km/h and impact angles of 20
degrees (NCHRP350) and 25 degrees (MASH) (refer to Table 9.1 and Table 9.2).
All test levels include the testing of cars and light duty commercial vehicles up to the size of a
pickup truck. The pickup truck is similar to many of the four-wheel-drive vehicles currently using
the road network within Abu Dhabi - hence the reliance on the NCHRP350 and MASH test
methods. These test methods do not include tests involving larger vehicles such as single unit
trucks and semitrailers.
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Table 9.1 - Recommended test matrix for TL-3 terminals, NCHRP350 [2]
Impact Conditions
Test Feature Impact Impact
Impact Point
Level Type Test Vehicle Speed Angle
(km/h) (°)
G/NG 820kg Car 100 0 Head-on at ¼ vehicle width
G/NG 2000kg Pickup Truck 100 0 Head on, centre
G/NG 820kg Car 100 15 on the nose of the terminal
G/NG 700kg Car 100 15 on the nose of the terminal
G/NG 2000kg Pickup Truck 100 15 on the nose of the terminal
TL-3 G 820kg Car 100 15 at the critical impact point

(Basic G 700kg Car 100 15 at the critical impact point
Level)
G 2000kg Pickup Truck 100 20 at the critical impact point
NG 820kg Car 100 15 at the critical impact point
NG 2000kg Pickup Truck 100 20 at the critical impact point
G/NG 2000kg Pickup Truck 100 20 at ½ terminal length
Notes:
G/NG – Applicable for gating and non-gating terminals
G – Applicable for gating terminals only
NG – Applicable for non-gating terminals only
Table 9.2 - Recommended test matrix for TL-3 terminals, MASH [3]
Impact Conditions
Test Feature Nominal Nominal Impact Point
Level Type Vehicle Speed Angle
(km/h) (°)
G/NG 1100kg Car 100 0 at ¼ vehicle width

G/NG 1100kg Car 100 5/15 on the nose of the terminal
TL-3
G/NG 2270kg Pickup Truck 100 5/15 on the nose of the terminal
(Basic
G/NG 1100kg Car 100 15 at the critical impact point
Level)
G/NG 2270kg Pickup Truck 100 25 at the critical impact point
G/NG 1500A 100 0 Head on, centre
Notes:
G/NG – Applicable for gating and non-gating terminals
G – Applicable for gating terminals only
NG – Applicable for non-gating terminals only
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9.3.3 Deflection Characteristics

Following the impact testing of a terminal system (independent of its type and performance
characteristics) the maximum permanent and dynamic deflection of the system will be reported
(refer to Figure 9.15). The permanent deflection is the distance (measured from the line of the pre-
test front face of the barrier system) that the terminal deforms following the impact test, and once
the impacted system has come to rest. The dynamic deflection (measured in the same way) is the
deflection which is seen during the impact test, and is often larger than the permanent deflection
characteristics of the system. The assessment of the dynamic performance will be undertaken
through the analysis of high speed video recorded during the impact test.
Figure 9.15 – Measurement of dynamic and permanent deflection for terminals
Both of these measurements are very important when selecting and siting a terminal system as it
is important to ensure that if the terminal system is impacted by an errant vehicle on the road, the
risk of the terminal deflecting and impacting another road user or road worker is minimised to a
level which is as low as reasonably practicable.
Adequate clearance of the terminal from any fixed object or an area used by motorists or Non-
Motorised Users (that is, behind the installation) shall be maintained and not compromised. In
some situations, this may preclude the use of certain terminals. Therefore, an object should not be
placed within the zone of the dynamic deflection.
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9.3.4 Impact Severity Level

Following the impact testing of a terminal system (independent of its type and performance
characteristics), the impact severity level of the system will be reported in terms of the Occupant
Risk Values. These provide a method of ranking the severity of the impact with the terminal, and
give an indicative guide as to the level of injury which might be expected from an impact with an
errant vehicle (assuming all of the impact parameters are the same as those under which the
terminal was tested). Further details on these impact severity indices can be found within Section
6.3.3.4.
For end terminals, the impact severity level shall be as low as practicable to reduce the risk of
injury to the occupants of errant vehicles. For systems tested to NCHRP Report 350 (FHWA, 2004)
or MASH (AASHTO, 2009), lower values for OIV and ORA should be preferred (refer to Table 3 of
Section 7.2.3).

The most appropriate crashworthy end terminal should be selected considering the terminal’s
performance and, as a minimum:
 The speed limit of the road (refer to Section 9.4.1);
 Its gating characteristics (refer to Sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.2);
 The space available for installation of the terminal (i.e. consideration should be given to the
‘footprint’ required to site to terminal, and sufficient space should be allocated to permit the
system to fully dynamically deform during impact (see Section 9.3.3);
 Its capacity to absorb nuisance crashes i.e. how robust is the system and will it require
repair after small, low speed impacts (refer to Section 9.4.4);
 Its location in relation to approaching traffic (approach or departure end) (refer to Section
9.4.5);
 Its compatibility with the barrier type (refer to Section 9.4.6); and
 Cost and maintenance factors (refer to Section 9.4.7).
Guidance on the determination of a classification of a gating/or non-gating for a terminal is
provided in Section 9.2.4.
Once the classification of a terminal has been determined, products meeting this specification
should be identified from the Abu Dhabi Department for Transport’s list of approved proprietary
products.
Where the classification of a terminal has been determined in accordance with Figure 9.16 and a
proprietary system is unavailable, generic (or non-proprietary) terminals exist that may be used
subject to the approval from the DoT. Specifications for these devices are available from the Abu
Dhabi Standard Drawings Manual. There are no approved generic terminals for rigid roadside
barriers. These must be shielded with a proprietary crash cushion (see Chapter10) or a transition
on the upstream end to a semi-rigid barrier system can be provided, which can then be terminated
with a terminal (as previously shown in Figure 9.7).
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Is adequate runout distance

available behind the barrier
Speed Limit of Road
downstream of the terminal?



More than
80km/h

Figure 9.16 - Determining terminal speed class and basic performance
PAGE 245
9.4.1 Speed Class

When selecting a particular terminal system, it is important to consider the conditions under which
the system has been tested; one of the most important factors being the speed class under which
it has demonstrated compliance. Guidance on which Test Level (TL) is appropriate for which
location is given in Figure 9.16.
It should be noted that the runout distance for each terminal will vary by product and as such, the
manufacturer should be consulted and this information requested if it is not presented within the
product documentation (for example within the product installation manual). In those cases where
the speed limit of the road exceeds 100km/h (the testing speed for TL-3 products), the
manufacturer/promoter of the system should be contacted to ascertain whether any additional
testing has been undertaken at higher speeds and/or whether there is any in-service experience
with vehicles impacting at greater speeds. Where such evidence is presented, with positive results,
this should be taken into account when specifying a product, and such products should be
preferred
9.4.2 Selection of Gating and Non Gating Terminals

The selection of gating and non-gating terminals should be based on the requirements detailed
within Figure 9.16. In all cases the run out distance required behind the guardrail will be
determined by the manufacturer and will be detailed within the manufacturer’s installation
requirements. In general terms, if the run out distance behind the guardrail, downstream of a
terminal, is not adequate a non-gating terminal must be used. Conversely, if the run out distance
behind the guardrail downstream of a terminal is adequate, a gating terminal may be used. The
selection of a gating or a non-gating terminal may also depend on the grading of the soil in the
area surrounding the terminal. More details regarding the requirements for this soil is given in
Section 9.5.3.
9.4.3 Space Available for Installation

The available space behind the barrier may be a limiting factor in the selection of a terminal
system. Different systems are designed to take different footprints when installed, and the
deflection of the systems during an impact changes from one system to another. The deflection
characteristics of terminals were described in Section 9.3.3. When choosing a terminal, the
designer/engineer should make sure that there is enough empty space behind the terminal to
provide sufficient space to permit the full dynamic deflection of the system.
Furthermore, the grading requirements should be taken into consideration when selecting a
terminal. There should be enough space around the terminal to provide the necessary advance
grading (see Section 9.5.3.1) and adjacent grading (see Section 9.5.3.2). A hazard-free runout
distance (see Section 9.5.3.3) should also be provided. The required clear space is likely to be
larger for gating systems than the non-gating ones.
9.4.4 Capacity to Absorb Nuisance Hits

Terminals are susceptible to nuisance crashes, i.e. small, low speed impacts. It is preferable if the
terminal can withstand a number of nuisance crashes and continue to perform satisfactorily before
requiring any repair. Terminals which can withstand nuisance crashes better, are likely to lead to
less repair costs, and this helps their cost-effectiveness through the lifetime of the installation. Non-
gating systems are likely to withstand nuisance crashes more than the gating ones.
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09 TERMINALS FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
9.4.5 Location in Relation to Approaching Traffic

As previously explained in Section 9.1 and Section 9.2, the location in relation to the approaching
traffic is an important decisive factor in which types of end treatments are acceptable and which
are not. A crashworthy terminal should always be provided:
 At both ends of barriers, which are located along single-carriageway roads with two-way
traffic (as both ends of the barrier have a chance to get hit head-on in this configuration);
and
 At the end, which faces the oncoming traffic, for barriers which are located along dual-
carriageways and single-carriageways with one-way traffic (as only one end of the barrier
has a chance to get hit head-on in this configuration).
Furthermore, if the barrier is located in a place where it can get hit from both sides, i.e. in the
median or a gore area, a double sided terminal (see Figure 9.14) or a crash cushion (see Chapter
10) should be used.
Non-crashworthy end treatments such as the flared-ends or the ramped down solutions, should not
be used in the traffic facing side of barrier installations, where they can get hit head on. These may
only be considered on the trailing end of barriers, where they are not likely to get hit head on.
Exceptions should be made for ramped down WRSB terminals, as these are usually crashworthy
designs which detach in a controlled way during an impact and do not pose the same threat to
errant vehicles as the semi-rigid and rigid ramped down designs do.
9.4.6 Compatibility with Barrier Type

All terminals undergo impact testing and evaluation whilst connected to particular guardrail
systems as terminals must be connected to a barrier system, both for testing and when installed on
the road network. However, the manufacturer of the terminal may be able to demonstrate and
receive approval for the use of the terminal with different barrier systems than those with which it
was tested. This may be achieved through minor modifications, and/or with the use of additional
components. However, before using any end terminal it is essential that a check is made to ensure
that approval has been given for the terminal to be used with the proposed barrier system.
Additionally, it is essential that before using a guardrail system, a check is made to ensure that
terminal systems are available which are compatible with it – one important reason for this is that
the guardrail may require the terminal to provide an anchorage for it, and a check must therefore
be made to ensure that the terminal selected has the capability to provide this.
Given the different working mechanism of different terminal and guardrail systems, it is essential
that the correct terminal is connected to the correct guardrail system. In all cases, the
manufacturer or promoter of the system should be consulted to ensure that the terminal system
proposed would not invalidate or adversely affect the performance of the guardrail to which it is
connected.
9.4.7 Cost and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements

Whole-life cost-benefit should be taken into consideration when selecting a terminal. Cost
effectiveness of a terminal can be assessed with the economic analysis methodology described in
Chapter 12. When carrying out an economic analysis for a terminal, the initial construction costs,
maintenance costs and the risks associated with the maintenance repair times should be taken
into consideration. Systems which are less durable to nuisance hits are likely to have higher repair
PAGE 247
costs. Frequent requirement for repair also means a higher risk for road workers who need to be
by the roadside throughout every repair. From this perspective, the ease of installation and the
time required for repairs can also be important factors in selection; they not only affect the amount
of risk to road workers but they also affect the time for which lane closures may be required. Once
a device is in-service, proprietary terminals should be inspected in line with the manufacturer’s
Installation and Maintenance manual. Non-proprietary terminals should be inspected every two
years as a minimum.
Roadway elements upon which the proper performance of the device depends should receive
similar inspection. This includes, but is not limited to, the following:
 Grading to provide for a traversable area in front of, behind, and beyond the device;
 Maintenance of the specified mounting height; and
 Fastener torque and cable tension (where appropriate).

In addition to the previously mentioned selection criteria aspects of terminals (i.e. speed class,
deflection, gating and severity characteristics and maintenance/inspection requirements), there are
several other important considerations in selecting an appropriate terminal for a given barrier
installation, including:
 Compatibility of the terminal with the barrier system;
 Length-of-need point;
 Site grading; and
 Delineation.
Each of these considerations will be discussed in the following sections.
9.5.1 Length-of-need point for a terminal

An important performance characteristic of a terminal is the point at which the terminal will contain
and redirect an impacting vehicle along its face, i.e. its ‘length-of-need point’. The length-of-need
point is established by a successful angled impact crash test in accordance with either MASH or
NCHRP Report 350 procedures. The critical impact point used for testing in either tests 34 or 35
(for gating terminals) or tests 36, 37, or 39 [3] (for non-gating devices) in accordance with MASH or
NCHRP350, (which involve an angled impact on the side of the terminal or terminal/barrier
interface) becomes the length-of-need point which should be declared by manufacturers, and used
by designers.
An impact upstream of the terminal’s length-of-need point will typically result in the vehicle passing
through the terminal and traversing the roadside behind it because it does not have the functional
capability to contain and redirect the impacting vehicle. This may be for a number of reasons, and
will vary from system to system, however, the most likely cause is due to insufficient anchoring of
the terminal at the approach end, and/or an inability of this anchor to withstand the impact forces
generated during the test. This may be the case even if the terminal is a non-gating system.
As explained in Section 9.2.4, for non-gating systems, the point of need often starts closer to the
end of the terminal, due to the re-directional characteristics of the system. However, for gating
systems, the point of length of need is placed a certain distance downstream from the end of the
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terminal. This value changes from one system to another and should be determined based on the
crash test results. Therefore, the manufacturer should be consulted for this information before the
system is included in any road schemes. However, as a rough guidance, 3.81m is often quoted as
the typical distance from the end of the terminal to the point of length of need for most W-beam
terminals [7].
3.81m
Figure 9.17 –Terminal length of need for an example system
Because most impacts on or near the ends of terminals will allow vehicle passage through the
terminal (particularly for gating systems, but also for non-gating systems), the run out area behind
and beyond the terminal is an area of concern, and hence guidelines for the recommended grading
in this area are included in Section 9.5.3.
9.5.2 Flared Terminals

Flared terminals are typically located between 0.9m and 1.2m, behind the front face of the
downstream barrier installation (away from the edge of the carriageway). Flared terminals
generally require a 1.2m offset, although some designs have been successfully tested with offsets
less than 900mm. Because the flared terminal is located further from the travelled way, head-on
impacts are less likely. Guidance on the suitability of flaring the terminal should be sought from the
manufacturer of the terminal product as they will have details appropriate to their systems, should
they permit such a configuration for their system.
9.5.3 Site Grading for Terminals

The grading of any slopes in and around the area of a terminal is an important consideration as
terminals are tested to NCHRP350 and MASH on flat and unobstructed terrain, a situation seldom
found in the field.
The site grading should be considered from three perspectives:
A. Advance grading;
B. Adjacent grading; and
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C. Runout distance grading.
9.5.3.1Advance grading
Advance grading refers to the area over which a vehicle may travel prior to making contact with a
terminal, as indicated in Figure 9.18. The requirement for the length of advance grading in front of
the terminal should be stated within the manufacturer’s installation manual, and should be
sufficient for an impacting vehicle to stabilise in its horizontal, lateral, and vertical alignment prior to
an impact with the terminal.
Figure 9.18 – Advance grading area
For W-beam terminals, this area should ideally have a lateral slope of no steeper than 1V:10H to
ensure that the vehicle is stable at the moment of contact – this will reflect the conditions under
which the terminal will originally have been tested. The soil should be adequately compacted to
ensure the errant vehicle does not get stuck in the loose soil, before reaching the system. This
may require the construction of an additional, flatter surface in the roadside. In such cases, the
additional surface should be constructed in such a way that there is a smooth transition in the
roadside slope, to avoid any discontinuities that may cause motorists to lose control of their
vehicles and possibly overturn before reaching the terminal. It should be noted that in those cases
where it is not practical to flatten the slide slope to a slope of 1V:10H (or flatter), engineering
judgement should be applied to provide as flat an area as practicable in advance of the terminal.
In some instances, it may be more cost effective to extend the barrier itself so its terminal can be
installed without the need for additional earthworks.
9.5.3.2 Adjacent grading

Adjacent grading refers to the area on which the terminal is installed and the area immediately
behind it, as indicated in Figure 9.19.
Ideally, this area should also be essentially flat and compacted so that the terrain itself does not
contribute to vehicle roll, pitch, or yaw on impact with the terminal.
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Figure 9.19 – Adjacent grading area
Figure 9.20 (for flared terminals) and Figure 9.21 (for tangent terminals) show the recommended
dimensions for grading platforms. For the section of the system, where the redirection is expected,
the posts should generally have at least 600mm of soil support behind them, and the soil should be
adequately compacted to provide the necessary resistance. A relatively flat area should extend
1.5m behind the end of the terminal, in a direction which is away from the roadway, so the errant
vehicles hitting the terminal with the left front of the vehicle will not get to a high roll angle before
impact. If a grading platform is to be constructed, the departure end of this platform should be
gradually blended into the usually steeper side slopes behind the barrier. In all cases, the minimum
recommended grading platform for the terminal should be stated by the manufacturer within their
installation manual.
From the point of practicality, a slope of 1V:4H behind the terminal is generally considered as a
reasonable compromise [8].
Figure 9.20 – Grading for flared guardrail terminal
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Preferred grading
Alternative grading
Figure 9.21 – Grading for parallel guardrail terminal
9.5.3.3Runout distance grading

Runout distance grading refers to the area into which a vehicle may travel after impacting a
terminal ahead of its length-of-need point [8].
Impact tests have repeatedly shown that for angled impacts at the nose of some gating terminals,
test vehicles have travelled more than 60m behind and away from the roadway. However, clearly,
providing runout distances so wide is impractical.
The manufacturers of terminal systems should be able to provide the minimum runout distance for
their proprietary systems. However, the minimum recovery area behind and beyond a terminal
should be an obstacle-free area approximately 25m long (from the terminal length of need point)
and 6m wide (from the front face of the barrier), as shown in Figure 9.22. A lesser recovery area
may be adequate for energy absorbing terminals while a larger area may not be practical because
of physical constraints (e.g. restricted right-of-way, environmental concerns) and engineering
judgement. Discussion with the manufacturer should always be undertaken before finalising the
area of the runout distance.
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6m (approx.)
Terminal length 25m (approx.) Runout

of need point distance
Figure 9.22 – Runout distance requirements
9.5.3.4Delineation of Terminals
The designer must ensure that all terminal delineation is consistent with the Abu Dhabi MUTCD [9]
with respect to size, legend, colour scheme, etc. An example of a terminal with (left) and without
(right) appropriate markings is shown in Figure 9.23.

Figure 9.23 - A good (left) and poor (right) examples of markings for terminal systems
9.5.4 Example Applications

Figure 9.24 and Figure 9.25 demonstrate the types of applications used for terminals in Abu Dhabi.
These give an indication of both poor and appropriate terminal applications.
Figure 9.24 - Examples of poor terminal applications
In the specific case of the photograph in the bottom right corner of Figure 9.25, whilst the
application of the terminal may initially appear to be acceptable with it being a full height terminal
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applied to the end of the steel guardrail, and a subsequent transition into a concrete barrier
system, it is not acceptable for two reasons:
 The presence of the kerb in front of the terminal will make any impacting vehicle unstable
prior to an impact with the terminal (hence the requirements for advance grading contained
within Section 9.5.3.1 have not been incorporated); and
 At the departure end of the steel guardrail system, the transition to the concrete barrier will
present a hazard due to the exposed concrete step at the bottom of the concrete barrier
section. More details regarding acceptable transitions, and design considerations for
terminals can be found in Chapter 11.
Following the above example, it should be noted that the area in front of a terminal system should
be generally flat (as per the requirements within Section 9.5.3), and therefore the use of kerbs in
advance of a terminal (which could affect the pre-impact trajectory of an impacting vehicle) is not
preferred.
 
 
Figure 9.25 – Examples of appropriate terminal applications
The photograph in the top left corner of Figure 9.25 shows a typical arrangement for a wire rope
safety barrier system. Further information on these types of end treatments are provided in Section
9.2.1.3. Requirements for the layout of the terminals of such systems are product specific and
therefore should be contained within the manufacturer’s product specification/installation manual.
Where this is not provided, the manufacturer should be consulted.
Whilst it may not be practicable in all cases, it is preferable to anchor all of the longitudinal wires
for a wire rope system to ground, rather than to transition them into a full height terminal system,
as this will better represent the tested system, and hence, the performance characteristics are
better known.
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The end treatment for the wire rope system should be tested (as for all terminal systems) to the
requirements of NCHRP350 and MASH.

The untreated end of a roadside barrier can pose a high level of risk of injury to vehicle occupants;
the vehicle may be stopped abruptly, barrier elements could penetrate the passenger
compartment, or the vehicle may become unstable and potentially, roll over. A terminal is the
treatment of the beginning and/or the end of a safety barrier. Note that a terminal can also provide
an anchorage for the barrier system.
Terminals must be provided at both ends of all guardrails, even if the end of the guardrail is to be
exposed for a short period of time.
Most terminals are designed for vehicular impacts from only one side; however, some proprietary
terminal designs have been developed for median applications where there is potential for impact
from either side.
It is essential that before selecting a terminal system for a median application, it is checked with
the manufacturer that the system has been designed and tested to function from either side.
There are a number of different types of terminals. These systems can be classified into several
categories based on their design principles. These categories include:
 Full Height vs. Ramped Down Ends;

 Flared vs. Parallel Terminals;
 Energy Absorbing vs. Non-Energy Absorbing Terminals;
 Gating vs. Non-Gating Terminals;
 Single Sided vs. Double Sided Terminals.
Each end terminal functions on a number of different principles and it is essential that the most
appropriate form of terminal is chosen for each particular situation. For example, it should be noted
that ramped down end terminals should only be used in low-speed environments (60 km/h or less),
or where the terminal cannot be struck head-on by a vehicle, that is, on one-way roads or on
divided roads with a protective median barrier.
Traditionally, guardrail terminals have also been classified as being either ‘energy absorbing’ or
‘non-energy absorbing’. ‘Energy absorbing’ means that the terminal is designed to gradually
deform, dissipating impact energy, and bringing the impacting vehicle to rest in such a way that the
risk of injury to vehicle occupants is minimised. In both Europe and the USA, energy absorbing
terminals are often designed so that they are ‘full height’ terminals – this means that the height of
the guardrail beam is maintained at its full height and it is not decreased at the end of the length of
guardrail.
‘Non-energy absorbing’ means that the terminal itself is not designed to deform during an impact,
with such terminals typically providing an anchorage for the connected guardrail system. At
locations where non-energy absorbing terminals are used on the approach end of guardrails (on
roads with a speed limit of 60km/h or less) the terminal should ideally be flared away from the
carriageway.
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Traditionally, guardrail terminals have been classified as being either ‘flared’ or ‘tangent’. ‘Flared’
means that the terminal is typically located behind the front face of the downstream barrier
installation (away from the edge of the carriageway). ‘Tangent’ means that the terminal is in line
(parallel) with the carriageway. In general, the choice of whether a terminal should be installed in a
flared or a tangential arrangement will be determined by the installation instructions provided by
the supplier of the terminal system. Where such guidance is not provided, energy absorbing
terminals should be installed in a tangential arrangement, with non-energy absorbing terminals
installed with a flare. The decision should be made, based on site condition and engineering
judgment.
All end treatments proposed for use within the Emirate of Abu Dhabi shall have demonstrated
compliance with the American recommendations in either NCHRP Report 350 or MASH. Evidence
of this shall be presented and approved by the Overseeing Organization prior to the use of these
systems. Only systems approved by the Overseeing Organization shall be permitted.
Testing of a terminal system requires the successful completion of a series of full-scale impact
tests. The most common performance classification used (on an International basis) is that of Test
Level 3. Other performance classes (TL-1 testing at 50km/h and TL-2 testing at 70km/h) may also
be specified for lower speed roads.
There are no terminals which are designed to be tested at Test Levels exceeding TL-3. In such
cases where a guardrail exceeding TL-3 is required for a particular location, a TL-3 terminal should
be used and connected to a TL-3 guardrail system. In turn, this TL-3 guardrail should then be
connected (via a suitable transition) to the required increased TL guardrail. Such an approach is of
particular relevance to truck roads where the required TL of the guardrail is likely to exceed TL-3.
The most appropriate crashworthy end terminal should be selected considering the terminal’s
performance and, as a minimum:
 The speed limit of the road;
 Its gating characteristics;
 The space available for installation of the terminal;
 Its capacity to absorb nuisance crashes;
 Its location in relation to approaching traffic (approach or departure end);
 Its compatibility with the barrier type;
 Cost and maintenance factors;
 Compatibility of the terminal with the barrier system;
 Length-of-need point;
 Site grading; and
 Delineation.
Once the classification of a terminal has been determined, products meeting this specification
should be identified from the Abu Dhabi Department for Transport’s list of approved proprietary
products.
In those cases where the speed limit of the road exceeds 100km/h (the testing speed for TL-3
products is 100km/h), the manufacturer/promoter of the system should be contacted to ascertain
whether any additional testing has been undertaken at higher speeds and/or whether there is any
in-service experience with vehicles impacting at greater speeds. Where such evidence is
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presented, with positive results, this should be taken into account when specifying product and
such products preferred.
The compatibility of the terminal with the guardrail to which it is to be attached should be assessed
by the manufacturer to ensure approval by the Overseeing Organisation.
The grading of the slopes prior to, underneath and beyond the terminal should not, in general
terms, exceed 1V:10H. Kerbs should also not be installed in front of a terminal system.
Once an end terminal device is in-service, proprietary terminals should be inspected in line with the
manufacturer’s Installation and Maintenance manual. Non-proprietary terminals should be
inspected every two years as a minimum.
9.7 References
[1] TD19/06 Design Manual for Roads and Bridges, Volume 2 Highway Structures: Design, Section
2 Special Structures, Part 8, The Highways Agency, Transport Scotland, Welsh Assembly
Government, The Department for Regional Development Northern Ireland, 2006.
[3] AASHTO, Manual for Assesing Safety Hardware (MASH), Washington D.C.: American
[4] E. Tomasch, H. Hoschopf, M. Gobald, H. Steffan, B. Nadler, F. Nadler, B. Strnad and F.

Schneider, “Single vehicle run-off-road accidents colliding turned down terminals of guardrails,”
in ESAR Expert Symposium on Accident Research, At Hanover, Germany, 2010.
[5] U. Ellmers, “Erkenntnisse aus Anprallversuchen über Anfangs und Endkonstruktionen einer
Schutzeinrichtung,” The Federal Highway Research Institute (BASt), 1996.
2008.
[7] W. J. Fitzgerald, “W-Beam Guardrail Repair - A Guide for Highway and Street Maintenance
Personnel,” U.S. Department f Transportation - Federal Highway Administration, Washington
D.C., 2008.
[9] Abu Dhabi Department of Transport, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Device (MUTCD) AD-D-
01, Abu Dhabi, 2014.
PAGE 257
10 CRASH CUSHIONS
10.1 Overview
A crash cushion is a crashworthy safety device, which is designed to protect errant vehicles from
the high severity outcomes of impacting fixed objects. In a similar way to energy absorbing
terminals, this is achieved by gradually decelerating the impacting vehicle to a safe stop, before
reaching the fixed hazard. All crash cushions are designed to provide protection for head-on
impacts; however, some of them also provide further protection by redirecting a vehicle away from
the fixed object when impacted on the side.
Crash cushions are stand-alone objects and therefore, unlike terminals, are generally not
connected to the end of guardrails. Like other safety hardware, crash cushions primarily serve to
lessen the severity of an impact rather than prevent impacts from occurring in the first place.
Ideal places for crash cushion installations are locations where fixed objects within the clear zone
cannot be removed, relocated, or made passively safe. Gore areas (i.e. diverge areas) and
medians, are places where crash cushions are most commonly used. This is because these places
often have hazards such as sign supports or ends of rigid barriers, which may not always be made
passively safe or shielded with a crash-worth terminal. One such location is shown in Figure 10.1.
In this gore area the end of the rigid barrier poses a risk of head-on collision for errant vehicles,
therefore a crash cushion can be used to improve the safety of road users. Figure 10.2 shows an
example of a crash cushion application on another gore area. Note, that in this example the crash
cushion provides protection from the ends of the rigid barrier and the gantry located behind.
Figure 10.1 - Lack of crash cushion at gore area
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10 CRASH CUSHIONS FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
Figure 10.2 - Application of crash cushion at gore area
A crash cushion may be suitable for deployment in front of an isolated obstruction, which cannot
be removed, relocated or be protected by an adequate length of longitudinal safety barrier. In
North America particularly, crash cushions have widely been deployed for many years to protect
drivers from isolated structures and other potentially hazardous features, particularly at the
approach to gore areas. Such structures and hazardous features should also be equipped with a
crash cushion in Abu Dhabi, as shown in Figure 10.3.
Figure 10.3 - An example of a crash cushion used to shield a single object in Abu Dhabi
Only proprietary crash cushions (i.e. those which are promoted by manufacturers and their
representatives) should be used, as these will have been carefully designed and tested by their
associated manufacturers. More details on the differences between proprietary and non-
proprietary systems can be found in Section 6.4.
This Chapter briefly explains the design principles behind crash cushions and where their use may
be considered. Descriptions, design procedures, selection guidelines, and placement
recommendations for systems that have been successfully crash tested also are provided.
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10.2 Types of Crash Cushions

There are numerous different types of crash cushion systems available on the market today.
These systems can be classified into several categories based on their design principles. These
include:
 Design Principle, i.e. Kinetic Energy vs. Conservation of Momentum;

 Gating vs. Non-Gating;
 Redirective vs. Non-Redirective;
 Sacrificial, Reusable or low maintenance/Self-Restoring.
A crash cushion may have more than one of these properties. For example, a crash cushion may
be categorised as non-gating, redirective, and reusable at the same time. Given the different mode
of operation of different crash cushion types, it is essential that the correct system is used in any
particular situation. In all cases, the manufacturer or promoter of the system should be consulted to
ensure that the crash cushion proposed is suitable for the application under which it is to be used.
10.2.1 Crash Cushion Types by Design Principles

The purpose of a crash cushion is to slow down an impacting vehicle into a controlled stop by
dissipating the impact energy. Crash cushions can be divided into two categories according to the
design principle through which they achieve the controlled deceleration of the impacting vehicle.
These categories are:
 The systems which are designed according to the work-energy principle; and
 The systems which are designed according to the conservation of momentum principle.
Both of these types are outlined in the following sections.
10.2.1.1 Crash Cushions based on Kinetic Energy Principle

The crash cushions which are based on kinetic energy principle utilise crushable or plastically
deformable components, to convert the kinetic energy of an impacting vehicle into other forms of
energy such as, mechanical, potential, heat and sound. As the impact progresses, some of the
kinetic energy of the vehicle is converted into mechanical energy through the deformation of the
vehicle and crash cushion components. Some of these components will convert the kinetic energy
into potential energy and deform back towards their pre-impact shapes towards the end of the
impact. This is similar to the working principle of a spring. Some of the kinetic energy is converted
into heat by the friction between the system components and the vehicle. And finally, some of the
kinetic energy is converted into sound, through the noise generated during the impact.
These types of systems are also referred to as ‘compression’ systems. The majority of the crash
cushions available on the market today are designed to the kinetic energy principles, such as the
example shown in Figure 10.4. This type of crash cushion is required to be fixed to a rigid surface
or support structure to provide the necessary resistance during a collision. This fixing is usually
achieved in the form of ground anchors or other connections to the object behind, such as the
connection to a road safety barrier, as shown in Figure 10.4. All systems have their own unique
designs and therefore products must be installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations.
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Figure 10.4 – Example of a crash cushion based on the Kinetic Energy Principle
10.2.1.2 Crash Cushions based on Conservation of Momentum

Principle
The crash cushions which are based on the conservation of momentum principle (sometimes
referred to as the ‘inertial’ type) utilise materials of expendable mass, such as sand, into which the
kinetic impact energy of the vehicle can be transferred during the collision. The material of
expendable mass is often kept in containers such as drums or buckets, as shown in Figure 10.5.
As the impacting vehicle collides with each container, the expandable mass located inside the
container is shifted and dispersed around the crash by the transfer of momentum from the vehicle
to the mass. Usual practice is to provide an increasing amount of mass within each row of
containers, and / or increase the number of containers from the impact face of the system towards
the back. The net effect of this layout is a gradual increase in the amount of mass within the
system and therefore a gradual decrease of speed for the impacting vehicle.
Figure 10.5 – Example of a crash cushion based on the Conservation of Momentum

Principle [1]
Historically, this type of system was mainly used in the United States. However, over the years,
with the development of numerous crash cushions which are based on the kinetic energy principle,
the use of these systems has declined. This is mainly due to the following disadvantages of these
types of systems:
 They occupy considerably more space than other available crash cushions;
 They are sacrificial by design, i.e. they are usually not functional after an initial impact (see
Section 10.2.4);
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 The dispersion of sand upon impact can create a safety and maintenance problem;
 If not sealed properly, the amount of sand within each container can increase due to the
drifting sands and sand storms observed in Abu Dhabi. This can affect the impact
behaviour of the system.
However, these systems do have the following advantages:
 They do not require to be fixed to a rigid surface or support structure, as they are designed
to be free-standing;
 This is the only type of crash cushion the design of which can be determined analytically.
10.2.2 Gating vs. Non Gating Crash Cushions

In a similar way to terminals, crash cushions can also be classified as either being ‘gating’ or ‘non-
gating’, as shown in Figure 10.6.
Gating crash cushions are designed to allow vehicles impacting near the beginning or nose of the
system to safely pass through the unit and travel behind the cushion, as shown in Figure 10.6.
As crash cushions (unlike terminals) are often installed close to the hazards from which they are
protecting road users, gating crash cushions are not preferred. Vehicles that pass through a gating
treatment are directed into the area behind the end treatment. It is therefore necessary to ensure
that this run-out area should:
 Contain no fixed hazards (e.g. poles and trees);

 Be traversable, with a lateral slope of 4:1 or flatter:
 Extended parallel to the barrier/terminal at least for a distance of 18 m beyond the point of
need for the barrier/terminal;
 Be at least 6 m wide [2].
If a runout area cannot be provided or would be smaller than the required dimension, a non-gating
system should be used.
Non-gating crash cushions, when impacted on either end by a vehicle, will not allow the vehicle to
pass through or over it, but instead contain or redirect the vehicle along the travelled way.
Depending on their characteristics, non-gating crash cushions can further be categorised as
redirective or non-redirective (see Section 10.2.3).
10.2.3 Redirective vs. Non-Redirective Crash Cushions

Further to the classification of being gating or non-gating, a crash cushion can also be classified as
being either ‘redirective’ or ‘non-redirective’, as shown in Figure 10.7.
‘Redirective’ crash cushions have been designed so that when impacted by a vehicle on the side
they will redirect the vehicle along the travelled way (in the direction that it was originally travelling).
The classification of a crash cushion as redirective or non-redirective is based on the performance
of the system during side impacts. On the other hand, the classification of gating or non-gating is
based on the performance during impacts with near the beginning or nose of the system.
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Therefore, it is possible for a redirective system to be either gating or non-gating. Such systems
are preferred in all locations as they also offer positive performance for side impacts.
Traffic Flow
Traffic Flow
Traffic Flow
Traffic Flow
Figure 10.6 - Gating and non-gating crash cushions
‘Non-Redirective’ crash cushions are designed so that when impacted by a vehicle on their side,
they will either allow the vehicle to pass through or contain the vehicle within the system, as shown
in Figure 10.7. These systems are designed to safely accommodate most impacts with the front of
the crash cushion, but they do not have the capability to redirect vehicles impacting near the rear.
As a result, most non-redirective cushions are designed to be wider than the hazard to be shielded
and are typically used farther from traffic where the risk of high-energy impacts near the rear of the
cushion is lower [3]. The non-redirective systems are predominantly the ones which are designed
according to the conservation of momentum principle, i.e. the barrel and sand systems, and
therefore they are predominantly gating systems. This is also recognised by NCHRP-350 and
MASH, which do not describe any impact tests which are applicable to non-redirective non-gating
systems (see Section 10.3.1).
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Figure 10.7 - Redirective and non-redirective crash cushions
10.2.4 Sacrificial, Reusable or Low Maintenance / Self-Restoring

Crash Cushions
Crash cushions can also be grouped into three categories according to the amount of repair
required to return the system back into a crashworthy state after an impact. These are:
 Sacrificial crash cushions;
 Reusable crash cushions; and
 Low maintenance / self-restoring crash cushions.
A ‘sacrificial crash cushion’ is a crash cushion designed for a single impact before requiring
significant repair and replacement of components. In general, a sacrificial crash cushion will
require the replacement of the system following an impact. Most examples of this type of system
absorb impact energy by crushing steel rail elements. Other devices contain energy absorbing
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elements which are designed to permanently deform on impact, gradually decelerating the
impacting vehicle and bringing any impacting vehicle to a controlled stop.
This may include components such as plastic cartridges containing foam, sand or water, as
indicated in Figure 10.8. Major components of sacrificial crash cushions are destroyed by impacts,
but it should be noted that other parts may still be reusable.
Figure 10.8 - Examples of energy absorbing cartridges in crash cushions [1], [4]
A ‘reusable crash cushion’ is a crash cushion system for which some of the major components
have been designed to be reusable after an impact. However, some of the components will need
to be replaced after an impact to ensure that the crash cushion is maintained to produce the
original level of performance in a subsequent impact. In locations where designers expect to have
frequent impacts these devices are likely to have a great cost/benefit ratio, and are therefore more
appropriate.
The category of ‘Low Maintenance / Self-restoring Crash Cushions’ contains those crash cushion
systems that suffer very little, if any, damage upon impact and which are designed to be easily
pulled back into their full operating condition, an example of which is given in Figure 10.9.
Alternatively, they can partially rebound after an impact and may only need an inspection to ensure
that no parts have been damaged or misaligned. As with any crash cushion system, inspections
should be undertaken in line with the manufacturer’s requirements, as detailed within their
Installation, Inspection and Maintenance manual.
Figure 10.9 - Example of a self-restoring crash cushion

PAGE 265
There are relatively high levels of cost associated with the initial purchase and installation of such
crash cushion systems. But there are subsequent low levels of repair and maintenance. This
means that these types of crash cushions should be installed in high-speed, high-traffic volume
ramps or medians (where there is an anticipated high frequency of high severity incidents) to
reduce the risk to road users and the exposure of maintenance workers to the traffic (during
repairs).
For all crash cushion systems it is essential that all of the components and fixings for the crash
cushion are checked for damage following an impact, and if necessary appropriate repairs are
made to ensure that the crash cushion is restored to full working order.
Requirements for the inspection and repair of crash cushions should be provided by the
manufacturer of the proprietary system within their Installation, Inspection and Maintenance
manual. Where there are any questions or doubts regarding damage to a component, this should
be checked with the manufacturer of the system. If in any further doubt, the component should be
replaced. All replacement parts should be provided by the manufacturer (or their representatives).

All crash cushions shall have demonstrated compliance with the American recommendations in
either NCHRP Report 350 [5] or MASH [3] and additional local conditions for the Abu Dhabi Road
Network. Evidence of this shall be presented and approved by the Overseeing Organization prior
to the use of these systems. Only systems approved by the Overseeing Organization shall be
used.
After January 1, 2011, newly-tested crash cushions must be evaluated in accordance with MASH.
However, crash cushions that were accepted before the adoption of MASH by using criteria
contained in NCHRP Report 350 may remain in place and may continue to be manufactured and
installed.
In order to meet the requirements of NCHRP350, or MASH, the crash cushion must demonstrate
that it can successfully decelerate (and for redirective, non-gating crash cushions, redirect) the
impacting vehicle without the unsafe detachment of components. During the impact testing event,
the impacting vehicle should maintain an upright orientation, whilst meeting the requirements of
two severity indices; OIV and ORA. More details regarding these severity indices can be found in
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.4.
10.3.1 Test Types

NCHRP Report 350 and MASH contain recommended procedures for evaluating the performance
and test procedures for crash cushions. The testing of a crash cushion requires the successful
completion of a series of full-scale impact tests. Table 10.1 and Table 10.2 show the parameters
for the most commonly available impact test level (TL-3). Each test configuration is described in
terms of the type and mass of the impacting vehicle, impact point, speed and angle of impact.
As can be seen from Table 10.1, according to NCHP350 for re-directive crash cushions, some test
types are only recommended for gating systems, some are only recommended for non-gating
systems and some are recommended for both. According to MASH however, all the test
configurations for redirective crash cushions listed in Table 10.2 are recommended for both gating
and non-gating systems; with the only difference being the evaluation criteria of the test outcome.
The non-gating systems are expected to contain or redirect the vehicle or bring the vehicle to a
controlled stop, whereas the performance of gating systems are considered acceptable in case of
PAGE 266
redirection, controlled penetration or controlled stopping of the test vehicle. For non-redirective
crash cushions however, both NCHRP350 and MASH specify tests which are only applicable for
gating systems. There are no tests described for non-redirective and non-gating systems. This is
because a system is unlikely to be both non-redirective and non-gating at the same time.
Table 10.1 - Test requirements for TL-3, NCHRP350 [5]
Impact Conditions
Test Impact Impact
Feature Type Impact Point
Level Vehicle Speed Angle
(km/h) (°)
G/NG 820kg Car 100 15 on nose of cushion
G/NG 700kg Car 100 15 on nose of cushion

Redirective Crash Cushions
G/NG 2000kg Pickup Truck 100 15 on nose of cushion
G 820kg Car 100 15 at the critical impact point
G 700kg Car 100 15 at the critical impact point
G 2000kg Pickup Truck 100 20 at the critical impact point

TL-3
G/NG 2000kg Pickup Truck 100 20 at ½ cushion length

G 820kg Car 100 0 at ¼ vehicle width
G 700kg Car 100 0 at ¼ vehicle width
Non-Redirective Crash
G 2000P 100 0 Head on, centre

G 820kg Car 100 15 on nose of cushion
Cushions
G 700kg Car 100 15 on nose of cushion
G 2000kg Pickup Truck 100 15 on nose of cushion
G 2000kg Pickup Truck 100 20 at ½ cushion length
Notes:
G/NG – Applicable for gating and non-gating crash cushions
G – Applicable for gating crash cushions only
NG – Applicable for non-gating crash cushions only
PAGE 267
Table 10.2 - Test requirements for TL-3, MASH [3]
Impact Conditions
Test Impact Impact
Feature Type Impact Point
Level Vehicle Speed Angle
(km/h) (°)
TL-3 G/NG 1100kg Car 100 0 Head-on at ¼ vehicle width
G/NG 1100kg Car 100 5/15 on the nose of the cushion

Redirective Crash Cushions
G/NG 2270kg Pickup Truck 100 5/15 on the nose of the cushion
G/NG 1100kg Car 100 15 at the critical impact point
G/NG 1500kg Car 100 0 Head on, centre

G 1100 kg Car 100 0 Head-on at ¼ vehicle width
Non-Redirective Crash
G 2270kg Pickup Truck 100 0 Head on, centre
G 1100 kg Car 100 5/15 on nose of cushion

Cushions
G 2270 kg Pickup Truck 100 5/15 on nose of cushion
G 2270 kg Pickup Truck 100 20 at critical impact point
G 1500kg Car 100 0 Head on, centre

Notes:
G/NG – Applicable for gating and non-gating crash cushions
G – Applicable for gating crash cushions only
NG – Applicable for non-gating crash cushions only
Table 10.1 and Table 10.2 also present the impact point for each test configuration. It can be seen
that some of the tests are carried out at the critical impact point. For crash cushions, the critical
impact point is described as the point where the behaviour of the system changes from redirecting
the impacting vehicle to either capturing the vehicle (for non-gating systems) or allowing it to gate
through the system (for gating systems) [3]. The critical impact point is often first estimated through
computer simulations and then identified through a series of full scale crash tests described in
NCHRP350 and MASH.
All test levels include the testing of cars and light duty commercial vehicles up to the size of a
pickup truck. The pickup truck is similar to many of the four-wheel-drive vehicles currently using
the road network within Abu Dhabi and hence the reliance on the NCHRP350 and MASH test
methods. These test methods do not include tests involving larger vehicles such as single unit
trucks and semitrailers.
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10.3.2 Containment Level

TL-1 provides test requirements for vehicle impact speeds of 50km/h, TL-2 provides for vehicle
impact speeds of 70km/h and TL-3 (which is the basic level) provides for vehicle impact speeds of
100km/h (refer to Tables Table 10.1 to Table 10.2). Guidance on which TL is appropriate for which
location is provided in Figure 10.11.
10.3.3 Deflection Characteristics

Adequate clearance of the crash cushion to any fixed object or an area used by motorists or
NMUs, that is, behind the installation, shall be provided. This is not only the footprint of the crash
cushion system being used, but also the distance into which the crash cushion is likely to deflect in
the event of an impact by an errant vehicle. As shown in Figure 10.10, the deflection distance of a
crash cushion will typically be wider, but shorter than that of the crash cushion footprint, and
therefore the overall deflection zone required for the crash cushion will be a combination of both
zones (with the length of the undeformed system L1, and the width of the deformed system W 2).
The minimum area required to accommodate both the footprint of the system and the required
deflection area will vary from system to system, and will be included within the manufacturer’s
Installation manual. Due to the space requirements for a particular system, this requirement may
preclude the use of certain crash cushions.
Crash Cushion
footprint W1
L1
Crash Cushion W2 > W1

deflection zone W2
L1 > L2
L2
Minimum Required
Space for Crash W2
Cushion
L1
Figure 10.10 - The minimum required space for a crash cushion
10.3.4 Impact Severity Level

Following the impact testing of a crash cushion (independent of its type and performance
characteristics), the impact severity level of the system will be reported in terms of the OIV and
ORA. More details on OIV and ORA are given in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.4. For all crash
cushions, the impact severity level shall be as low as practicable to reduce the risk of injury to the
occupants of errant vehicles. For systems tested to NCHRP Report 350 or MASH, lower values for
OIV and ORA should be sought (refer to Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.4).
PAGE 269

The most appropriate crash cushion should be selected by considering:
 The speed limit of the road (see Section 10.4.1);
 The gating characteristic of the crash cushion (see Section 10.2.2 & 10.4.2);
 The space available for installation of the crash cushion (see Section 10.4.3);
 The cost considerations of the project, including but not limited to:
o Maintenance and inspection requirements (see Section 10.4.4.1);
o The selection of Reusable, Sacrificial or Self Restoring Crash Cushions (See
Section 10.4.4.2);
o The capacity of the system to absorb nuisance hits (see Section 10.4.4.3).
There may be locations where the application of a crash cushion may not be appropriate. Risk
reduction may be better provided by the installation of an approved guardrail equipped at its
approach end with an impact tested terminal (refer to Chapter 9). Section 10.6 provides further
guidance about the decision between using a crash cushion or a terminal.
Once the classification of a crash cushion has been determined in accordance with guidance
provided in this section, available products meeting the specification should be identified from the
Abu Dhabi Department for Transport’s list of approved proprietary products.
With regards to the crash cushion selected, the manufacturer should declare (within their
Installation and Maintenance requirements), the space required for the installation of the crash
cushion, together with the additional space required for the displacement of the crash cushion in
the event of an impact. It is essential that this information is acquired from the manufacturer prior
to a final decision being made about which crash cushion to install at a particular location.
10.4.1 Speed Class

When selecting a particular terminal system, it is important to consider the conditions under which
the system has been tested; one of the most important factors being the speed class under which
it has demonstrated compliance. Guidance on which Test Level is appropriate for which location is
provided in Figure 10.11.
In those cases where the speed limit of the road exceeds 100km/h (the testing speed for TL-3
products), the manufacturer/promoter of the system should be contacted to ascertain whether any
additional testing has been undertaken at higher speeds and/or whether there is any in-service
experience with vehicles impacting at greater speeds. Where such evidence is presented, with
positive results, this should be taken into account when specifying product and such products
preferred.
PAGE 270
MINIMUM PERFORMANCE
50km/h Yes
or less Any TL-1
Speed Limit of Road Is adequate runout distance
available behind the crash No
cushion? TL-1, non-gating only
60 or Yes
adequate runout distance Any TL-2
70km/h
available behind the crash
cushion? No
TL-2, non-gating only
More
than Yes
Is adequate runout distance Any TL-3
70km/h
available behind the crash
cushion? No TL-3, non-gating only
Figure 10.11 - Crash cushion minimum performance decision tree
PAGE 271
10.4.2 Selection of Gating and Non Gating Crash Cushions

The selection of gating and non-gating crash cushions should be based on the requirements
detailed within Figure 10.13, with reference to Figure 10.6. It should be noted that the runout
distance for each crash cushion will vary by product and as such, the manufacturer should be
consulted and this information requested if it is not presented within the product documentation (for
example within the product installation manual). If this is not available, the recommended runout
distance for a gating crash cushion is 18x6m for 100km/h sites. In general terms, if the runout
distance behind the crash cushion is not adequate, a non-gating crash cushion must be used.
10.4.3 Space Available for Installation

When selecting a crash cushion for a particular application, one of the main factors to consider is
the physical size of the crash cushion. This is not just the footprint which the crash cushion
occupies, but also the space into which the crash cushion is likely to deflect in the event of an
impact by an errant vehicle (also refer to Section 10.3.3 and Figure 10.10). Both of these
dimensions should be available from the manufacturer, and it must be ensured that there is
sufficient space available on site.
Adequate clearance of the crash cushion to any fixed object or an area used by motorists or NMUs
(that is, behind the installation) shall be maintained and not compromised. In some situations, this
may preclude the use of certain crash cushions. The crash cushion installed should be wider than
the hazard it protects such that it fully shields the hazard. In the extreme case this may mean that
the width of the crash cushion is wider than the hazard that it is located in front of, as shown in
Figure 10.12. Whilst such an arrangement is not preferred, it must be ensured that the alignment of
the side of the crash cushion reflects that of any barrier at the rear of the crash cushion when
travelling in the direction of the main line traffic. Whilst in the example in Figure 10.12 protection is
given from the end of the concrete barrier, it would have been preferable to reduce the width of the
crash cushion such that the alignment of the right hand side of the cushion was such that it aligned
with the barrier at its rear.
Edge of hazard at
rear of crash cushion
Edge of rear of crash

cushion
Figure 10.12 - Selection of crash cushion width to protect road users from hazards
PAGE 272
In all cases, the result of the full-scale impact testing (to NCHRP350 and/or MASH) will indicate
any anticipated movement of the rear of the crash cushion, and any movement of components of
the crash cushion behind the rear back plate of the crash cushion. Both of these should be
considered when locating the crash cushion. In many cases, manufacturers will provide guidance
on the ‘protected zone’ offered by the crash cushion, i.e. the area into which hazards should be
located.

Cost considerations should not just include the initial cost of purchasing the crash cushion, but
should also include the costs associated with installation, maintenance, and repair or replacement
costs. This can vary significantly depending on the structural characteristics of the crash cushion. It
should also be noted that site preparation costs can be significant when accommodating certain
systems. At locations where frequent impacts with the crash cushion are expected, life-cycle costs
for repairing or replacing a crash cushion system also may become a significant factor in the
selection process. The following sections give further details about the crash cushion properties
which would affect their life-time costs and therefore affect their selection for a given application.
10.4.4.1 Maintenance and Inspection Requirements

The maintenance considerations for crash cushions will include routine maintenance, maintenance
after an impact and the need to stock and maintain spare parts for the system. Due to the need to
repair crash cushions quickly after they have suffered damage caused by an impact (due to their
location in front of rigid non-deformable hazards) there is an associated need to have a ready
supply of spare parts for the systems, and local, trained maintenance operatives to carry out the
works. This will be checked during the approval of proprietary systems onto the Abu Dhabi List of
Approved Products, but the designer should check with the supplier that this is still the case during
the procurement procedures. The maintenance characteristics of each crash cushion will, in many
cases, play an important role in the selection process.
Many of the more commonly available proprietary crash cushion systems require little regular or
routine maintenance. However, it is important that periodic maintenance checks are performed in
line with the manufacturer’s recommendations so that each installed unit remains fully functional. It
is possible that damage can occur to the crash cushion as the result of a minor impact which could
have a significant effect on the dynamic performance of the crash cushion in the event of a second
impact. In addition, if a crash cushion is located in an area that is accessible to pedestrians,
vandalism may be a problem, and therefore checks should be made to ensure that the crash
cushion is undamaged. Again, full details of the frequency and the requirements of each inspection
can be found within the manufacturer’s Installation and Maintenance Manual.
The frequency and extent of impact maintenance at each crash cushion location should be
maintained as they dictate the most effort and expenditure during the life of an installation. If a
particular site has a relatively high frequency of crashes, using a crash cushion that has some
degree of reusability or self-restoration is recommended, whilst the reasoning behind the number
of impacts should be established to identify whether there are any other road safety measures
which could be implemented to reduce the number of impacts (for example, changes to road
alignment, improved signage, the use of road surfaces with greater friction properties). Similarly, if
nuisance strikes on the crash cushion are relatively common, a crash cushion with redirection
PAGE 273
capability should reduce or eliminate the maintenance effort for minor repairs or partial
replacement of a system.
10.4.4.2 Selection of Reusable, Sacrificial or Self-restoring Crash

Cushions
The expected crash frequency is an important factor to consider when selecting the type of crash
cushion to be installed at a site. A higher frequency of impacts will increase the life-time costs, as
each impact will generate a new repair cost. The repair cost will change dramatically for sacrificial,
reusable and self-restoring systems. Therefore, the frequency of accidents becomes an important
factor when selecting between these systems. The Annual Daily Traffic (ADT) has been shown to
be a good indicator for expected impact frequency. The higher the ADT, the more impacts with the
crash cushion is expected. The proximity of the crash cushion to the edge of the travelled way will
also affect the number of impacts, as more impacts are expected for installations located closer to
the traffic. Furthermore, the location of the crash cushion will affect the costs associated with lane
closures for repairs. Systems which are close to the road can necessitate lane closures, whereas
this may be avoided for locations where the crash cushion is further away from the edge of the
travelled way. Figure 10.13 provides a decision tree for the crash cushion type selection, based on
these considerations.
Due to the low initial cost, but greater level of repair required (in the event of an impact), sacrificial
crash cushions should only be used in areas where the risk of impact is low. It should be noted
however, that whilst many of the components of a sacrificial crash cushion will be permanently
deformed in an impact (and will require replacement), due to the testing requirements of
NCHRP350 and MASH, such systems will afford the same level of risk reduction as equivalent
reusable crash cushions.
Sacrificial crash cushions are generally recommended for areas with an ADT of less than 25,000,
with a low history or expectation of impacts occurring during the lifetime of the crash cushion and
in locations which are greater than 3m from the travelled way and/or outside of the clear zone
(refer to Figure 10.13) [6].
Reusable crash cushions are generally recommended for areas with an ADT of less than 25,000,
which have a history or expectation of one or fewer impacts each year and which are greater than
3m from the travelled way. They are also suited for locations where there is an unlimited repair
time (Refer to Figure 10.13) [6].
Self-restoring crash cushions are generally recommended for areas with an ADT of 25,000 or
more, with a history or expectation of multiple impacts each year and locations within 3m of the
travelled way. They are also suited to sites requiring night repairs and/or with repair time limitations
[6].
10.4.4.3 Capacity to Absorb Nuisance Hits

Crash cushions, similar to terminals, are susceptible to nuisance crashes, i.e. small, low speed
impacts. It is preferable if the crash cushion can withstand a number of nuisance crashes and
continue to perform satisfactorily before requiring any repair. Crash cushions which can withstand
nuisance crashes better are likely to lead to less repair costs, and this helps their cost-
effectiveness through the lifetime of the installation.
PAGE 274
TYPE of CRASH CUSHION

Low
Less than throughout Yes
25,000 Location greater than 3m Sacrificial Crash Cushion
History or lifetime
Average Daily Traffic away from the travelled way
expectation of
and/or outside clear zoneIs No
impacts Low Maintenance and/or Self
Restoring Crash Cushion
One or fewer Location greater than 3m Yes

Reusable Crash Cushion
each year away from the travelled way
and/or outside clear zone No
Low Maintenance and/or Self
More than Restoring Crash Cushion
or equal to
25,000 Low Maintenance and/or Self
Restoring Crash Cushion
Figure 10.13 - Crash cushion type decision tree [6]
PAGE 275

10.5.1 Evaluation of Site Characteristics
Due to the nature of crash cushions and the way in which they are designed to function, it is
essential to consider their dynamic performance when locating them, ensuring that adequate
space for the crash cushion to shield non-removable fixed objects is considered. This is not just
the footprint of the crash cushion, but also the space required for the cushion to deform and deflect
into when impacted, and consideration on the likely vehicle trajectory following an impact.
It should be noted that the footprint and space required for the designed performance operation of
the crash cushion should be obtained from the manufacturer prior to the selection of a crash
cushion type. This is likely to be contained within the manufacturer’s Installation and Maintenance
manual.
When addressing the need for a crash cushion for a particular location, the following are examples
of areas where a crash cushion should be considered:
 Concrete barrier end;
 Guardrail end;
 Bridge pier;
 Bridge rail;
 Toll booth;
 Exposed work area – workers of equipment.
To ascertain the space available for the locating of the crash cushion at such sites (refer to Figure
10.10), , the width and height of the hazard should be calculated.
Several additional factors should be considered in the placement of a crash cushion, and these are
as follows:
10.5.1.1 Site Grading for Crash Cushions

All crash cushions shall have been designed and tested to NCHRP350 and/or MASH, and
therefore their performance has only been demonstrated on level site conditions. As such, their
performance on an excessively sloped non-level site is unknown and could produce undesirable
vehicular behaviour. Therefore, when installed on site, crash cushions should be placed on a base
or pavement slightly sloped to facilitate drainage; however, the cross slope should not exceed the
value determined by the manufacturer and specified within their Installation and Maintenance
manual (as highlighted in Figure 10.14).
10.5.1.2 Curbs
Again, due to the testing requirements of NCHRP350 and/or MASH, the performance of a crash
cushion has only been demonstrated on level site conditions, and therefore, their performance on
a raised surface (with a curb for example) is unknown and could produce undesirable vehicular
behaviour. Therefore, for new constructions, crash cushions should not be built on raised surfaces
with curbs, unless this has been specified by the manufacturer.
PAGE 276
Figure 10.14 - Cross slope should not exceed 5% in front of a crash cushion
Existing crash cushion locations should be reviewed to determine if the presence of a curb is likely
to affect the performance of the unit, and if so, appropriate modifications should be made when
roadway rehabilitation occurs. In such cases, the views of the manufacturer should be sought to
ascertain the effect which the curb may have on the dynamic performance of the crash cushion.
10.5.1.3 Surface
Many crash cushion systems require anchoring into a paved, bituminous, or concrete pad. This
requirement, together with the fixings of the crash cushion to the surface, will be determined and
specified by the manufacturer within their Installation and Maintenance manual, based on the
results of impact testing.
10.5.1.4 Location
The crash cushion must not infringe on the travelled way. There should be a minimum of 600mm
behind crash cushion systems, as shown in Figure 10.15, and in front of the hazard to allow
access to the system – this distance may be extended by the manufacturer’s specification.
PAGE 277
Min 600mm
Figure 10.15 - Distance between rear of crash cushion and hazard
In all cases, the crash cushion should be located as far away as possible from the hazard located
in front, to ensure that in the event of a head-on impact with the crash cushion, the deformed crash
cushion does not enter into the space occupied by the hazard. Additionally, the crash cushion
should not be located so far in front of the hazard that a snagging point is generated between the
rear of the crash cushion and the front face of the hazard. Both, sound engineering judgement and
risk analysis techniques should be applied to ensure that the placement is safe.
Guidance on locating the crash cushion in relation to the hazard will be available from the
manufacturer of the crash cushion, and should be adhered to in all cases.
In all cases, the possible impact scenarios for the site requiring a crash cushion should be
understood, together with an understanding as to whether an impact is likely from only one side
(for example if installed in the roadside), or both sides (for example if installed in the median, or
within a gore area). Most crash cushions are designed for impacts on either side, but prior to the
selection of a particular system, it must be checked whether the crash cushion design will be
suitable for the application.
10.5.1.5 Bridge joints

The use of all crash cushions over bridge expansion joints or deflection joints should be avoided
because movement in these joints could create destructive strains on the crash cushion. This may
be avoided by choosing a different length of crash cushion (whilst maintaining the required ‘Test
Level’), or by re-examining the layout of the site, and choosing other options (for example
guardrails and a full height terminal).
10.5.1.6 Delineation of Crash Cushions

The designer must ensure that all crash cushion delineation is provided to ensure the crash
cushion is clearly visible to approaching traffic. Examples of ways in which a crash cushion can be
delineated are shown in Figure 10.16; note, that this can include the use of plastic delineation
bollards.
PAGE 278
Figure 10.16 - Examples of crash cushion delineation
10.5.2 The use of Crash Cushions in Gore Areas

As can be seen from many of the figures within this Chapter, one of the main applications for crash
cushions in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi is to protect road users from the hazard presented by the
end of safety barriers at nosings and gore areas. It is recommended that the required space for
crash cushion installation for these locations should be considered from the preliminary design
stage. This should be done to prevent any compatibility issues between the selected crash cushion
and the final design, caused by the lack of required space.
Figure 10.17 and
Table 10.3 give recommendations for the area which should be made available for crash cushion
installation. Although it depicts a gore area, the same approach could be applied to other types of
objects from which road users will need to be shielded. Note that the dimensions shown in
Table 10.3 are not definitive and are provided for guidance only. The manufacturer should always
be consulted to ascertain whether there are any specifications specific to their product, prior to the
finalisation of the scheme design.
Figure 10.17 - Guidelines for the provision of crash cushions at gore areas [6]
PAGE 279
Table 10.3 - Dimensions for the provision of crash cushions in gore areas [6]
Design Dimensions for Crash Cushion, Reserve Area (in metres)

Speed
on Minimum
Main Preferred
Line Unrestricted Conditions Restricted Conditions
(km/h) N L F N L F N L F
50 3.5 5 1.5 2.5 3.5 1 2 2.5 0.5
80 3.5 10 1.5 2.5 7.5 1 2 5 0.5
110 3.5 17 1.5 2.5 13.5 1 2 8.5 0.5
130 3.5 21 1.5 2.5 17 1 2 11 0.5
N = for preliminary design purposes, an assumed width of space necessary for placement of crash cushions
L = for preliminary design purposes, an assumed length of space necessary for placement of crash cushions
F = for preliminary design purposes, an assumed maximum width of a fixed object that will need to be shielded with a
crash cushion
As can be seen from
Table 10.3, the dimensions are given for three different scenarios. These scenarios are:
 Preferred: These are the preferred dimensions to be provided, if other concerns such as
cost, available space, etc. are not an issue. This is the optimal solution;
 Minimum for Unrestricted Conditions: These are the minimum recommended

dimensions to be provided, if the concern of cost is not an issue;
 Minimum for Restricted Conditions: These are the minimum recommended dimensions
to be provided, if the cost of providing more space cannot be justified.
10.6 The Decision to use Crash Cushions or Energy Absorbing

Terminals
This Chapter has discussed the use of crash cushions and given examples of where their use will
be to the benefit of road safety. Chapter 9 has also considered the provision of energy absorbing
terminals. In any respect, both types of device are very similar in both their function, their mode of
operation, and the resulting levels of safety afforded to road users. There will be times, when the
designer/engineer will need to choose between a crash cushion or a terminal (or two terminals).
This decision will often have to be made based on the size and location of the hazard, the space
available for installation and the cost associated with each system.
Terminals will generally be the system of choice for locations where the traffic is found only on one
side of the device, such as the roadsides. Generally, for one sided installations, terminals will be
cheaper than crash cushions and the required space for installation will be less, although this
would ultimately depend on the individual systems.
PAGE 280
For locations where the traffic is found on both sides of the device, such as medians and gore
areas, the decision between a terminal and a crash cushion will be determined on factors such as
the width of the hazard, available space and cost. As explained in Chapter 9, Section 9.2.5, there
are double sided terminals available on the market. However, these systems are relatively
narrower than the crash cushions, and therefore the main limiting factor for these systems is likely
to be the maximum allowable distance between the barriers located on each side of the median or
gore area. This is demonstrated through two example locations shown in Figure 10.18.
The location shown on the top image has a double sided terminal installed on a gore area,
whereas the location shown on the bottom image has a crash cushion installed on another gore
area. It can be seen for the double sided terminal installation that the barriers located on each side
are positioned much closer to each other, compared to the situation behind the crash cushion
installation. It can also be observed that the crash cushion does not only provide protection from
the ends of the semi-rigid barriers, but it also provides protection from the traffic sign located
behind. To be able to accommodate the traffic sign, the barriers located on each side need to be a
certain distance away from each other.
This distance required to accommodate the traffic sign is likely to be wider than the maximum
design width of a double sided terminal. Therefore, a crash cushion is the natural choice for the
location. To be able to use a double sided terminal on this location, the barriers located on each
side would need to be elongated further upstream of the gore area, until they are positioned close
enough to accommodate the terminal. Such an application increases the length of the installation.
The required space to accommodate the extra length of installation may not be available, which in
turn eliminates the double sided terminal as a viable option. When a crash cushion is to be
connected to roadside barriers, as shown in Figure 10.18, appropriate transition sections should be
provided between the crash cushion and the two barrier ends.
PAGE 281
Figure 10.18 - The use of terminals and crash cushions at nosings
In locations where the width of the hazard, or the distance between barriers is enough to
accommodate either a double sided terminal or a crash cushion, the decision should be made
based on the criteria explained in Section 10.4, and also in Chapter 9, Section 9.4,. These include
factors such as, compatibility with the barrier system to be connected, cost, maintenance
requirements, capacity to absorb nuisance hits, gating or non-gating character of the system, the
space required for installation and the space available on site.
For the special case of concrete barrier ends located on gore areas and medians, such as the
ones previously shown in Figure 10.1 and Figure 10.2, crash cushions are likely to be the system
of choice. To be able to use double sided terminals on these locations, a section of steel barrier
would need to be elongated from each side of the gore area until they meet in the middle, and the
ends of these steel barrier sections would need to be connected to the concrete barrier through
appropriate terminals. Such an application would often require a considerable amount of space
and added cost, which would make the crash cushion a better choice in general.
In other cases, for example, where there is a requirement for the end treatment to provide an
anchoring function for the connected guardrail system, only a terminal could be used as generally,
crash cushions are not designed to perform such a function.
10.7 Example applications

Figure 10.19 gives examples of locations where crash cushions should have been installed (but
have not), whilst Figure 10.20 demonstrates good applications of crash cushions used in Abu
Dhabi. These give an indication of both poor and appropriate applications, with regards to crash
cushion provision.
PAGE 282
Figure 10.19 - Examples of areas which should be equipped with a crash cushion
 

Figure 10.20 - Examples of appropriate median crash cushion applications

Crash cushions should be used at locations where fixed objects cannot be removed, relocated, or
made passively safe, or be protected by an adequate length of longitudinal safety barrier, for
example in gore areas and nosings.
All crash cushions used should be successfully tested to NCHRP350, MASH and/or EN1317-3,
and approved by the Overseeing Organisation. In all cases, the TL rating of the terminals should
be applicable for the speed limit of the road on which it is being used. In addition, the choice of
crash cushion type should be based on the ADT and incident history of the site. Crash cushions
should be located, installed, inspected and maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s
instructions.
Crash cushions should be located sufficiently far in front of a hazard to ensure that in the event of
a head-on impact with the crash cushion, the deformed crash cushion does not infringe on the
space occupied by the hazard. However, the crash cushion should not be located so far in front of
the hazard that a snagging point is generated between the rear of the crash cushion and the front
face of the hazard. Typically, a distance of 0.6m between the back of the crash cushion and the
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front face of the hazards will meet both of these criteria; however, the distance required will vary
from product to product. Hence, the manufacturer’s installation manual should be consulted for
details relating to the specific requirements for the crash cushion being installed.
Adequate clearance of the crash cushion from any fixed object or an area used by motorists or
NMUs (that is, behind the installation) shall be maintained and not compromised. This should take
into account the area required for the footprint of the crash cushion, and the area into which the
crash cushion will deflect in the event of an impact. In some situations, this may preclude the use
of certain crash cushions.
10.9 References
2008.
Austroads, 2010.
[4] Laura Metaal Road Safety, “TAU Permanent redirective crash cushion,” [Online]. Available:
http://laurametaal.nl/en/content/guard-rail-double-sided/guard-rail-double-sided/guard-rail-
double-sided/guard-rail-double-6. [Accessed 10 09 2015].
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11 TRANSITIONS
11.1 Overview
A transition is a section of barrier between two different barriers or, more commonly, where a
roadside barrier is connected to a bridge railing or to a rigid object such as a bridge pier or parapet.
The aim of a transition is to provide a gradual change in stiffness from one system to another so
vehicular pocketing, snagging, or penetration at the connection can be avoided.
A transition is required for any location where one type of vehicle restraint system is required to be
connected to another, such as at approaches to bridge locations and between a rigid and semi
rigid barrier system. This is typically between two barrier systems of different rigidity, but the same
principles should also apply for the transition between a terminal and a safety barrier.
In general, the purpose of a transition is:
 To provide a safe connection between two types of vehicle restraint systems;

 To provide a gradual change in stiffness from one system to another;
 To protect traffic from a head-on collision with the end of another vehicle restraint system.
Without a correctly designed and implemented transition, there is a risk of an abrupt change in
deflection performance characteristics, creating a risk of pocketing and/or snagging which in turn
represents a high level of risk to road users. ‘Pocketing’ means that (on impact) a flexible system
on the approach end of the transition may deflect so far that the impacting vehicle then strikes the
end of the more rigid system connected at the other end of the transition, as shown in Figure 11.1.
Figure 11.1 – An example of vehicle pocketing
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11 TRANSITIONS FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
Where practicable, vehicle restraint systems must be physically connected together, and the
transition used to complete this connection should be designed so as to provide a gradual change
in stiffness, height, profile and/or containment from one barrier to another.
The connection between two safety barriers having the same type, cross-section and material, is
not considered a transition, as long as the deflection characteristics of the two different connected
systems are matched.
11.2 Types of Transitions

The Abu Dhabi Standard Drawings Manual presents one example of a transition (between a single
rail steel corrugated beam and a rigid concrete barrier (refer to Section 11.6.2.4).
A list of accepted transitions may be obtained from the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs
and Transport’s list of Accepted Vehicle Restraint Systems. In addition, individual
manufacturers/promoters may also be able to give details of transitions appropriate for their
systems which have been accepted for use in other countries.
There are ten factors which will constitute a transition:
 Change in deflection characteristics;
 Change in material;
 Change in overall shape;
 Change in shape and/or dimensions of the supporting posts (by increasing the thickness of
the material used and/or by increasing the overall dimensions of the posts’ cross section);
 Change in shape and/or size of beam;
 Change in containment (TL) level;
 Change in overall height;
 Change in individual rail height (for example if connecting two guardrails, one with a beam
height of 610mm, and another with a rail height of 750mm);
 Change in lateral stiffness (i.e. the system is made more rigid and there is therefore a risk
of pocketing between the two systems);
 Change in vehicle restraint system type.
In order to design an effective transition between two vehicle restraint systems, each of these
factors should be considered, and further guidance on how this could be achieved is given in
Section 11.6.
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All transitions shall have demonstrated compliance with the American recommendations in either
NCHRP 350 [1] or MASH [2] and additional local conditions for the Abu Dhabi Road Network.
Evidence of this shall be presented and approved by the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal
Affairs and Transport prior to the use of these systems. Only systems approved by the Abu Dhabi
Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport shall be used.
In all cases, and due to the high number of transitions which could exist between systems,
acceptance of a transition can be based on one or more of the following methods (in order of
preference):
 Full scale impact testing to the requirements of NCHRP350 or MASH (refer to Section
11.4);
 Virtual testing to the requirements of the European Technical Report TR16303-4;
 Good engineering judgement based on the design rules within Section 11.6.
However, it is emphasised that in all cases, transitions should be approved by the Abu Dhabi
Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport prior to specification and installation.
Virtual testing (more commonly known as computer simulation) can be used to demonstrate the
anticipated dynamic performance of a transition, however the development, use and interpretation
of computer simulation is a specialised subject. As a result, European standardisation groups have
developed a Technical Report (TR16303-4) which gives guidance for the conduct of those working
with virtual testing. The TR identifies minimum requirements for the models which are used for the
simulation, and provides details on how these should be validated so that the result of the virtual
testing can be relied upon.
Whilst vehicle restraint systems used within Abu Dhabi should be successfully tested to the
requirements of NCHRP350 and MASH, for completeness, reference is also made to the
European Standard for the testing of road restraint systems, EN1317 in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.4
and Appendix A.
11.4 Test Types

NCHRP Report 350 and MASH contain recommended procedures for the testing of transitions.
Testing of a transition requires the successful completion of a series of full-scale impact tests, the
parameters for which are shown in Table 11.1.
As shown in Table 11.1, all transition testing should be conducted at the critical impact point (CIP).
For transitions, the CIP is described as the point that maximizes the risk of test failure [2]. The CIP
is often estimated by the test house through computer simulations or use of specialist software
such as The Barrier VII [3]. Further information about the identification of CIP can be found in
NCHRP 350 and MASH.
The following sections describe transition performance characteristics in further detail:
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Table 11.1 - Test requirements for NCHRP350
Impact Conditions
Test Level Impact Speed Impact Impact Point
Vehicle
(km/h) Angle (°)
NCHRP350
TL-3 820kg Car 100 20 At CIP
Basic Level 700kg Car 100 20 At CIP
2000kg Pickup Truck 100 25 At CIP
700kg Car 100 20 At CIP
8000kg Single Unit Truck 80 15 At CIP
36000kg Tractor/van-type 80 15 At CIP
36000kg Tractor/tank-type 80 15 At CIP
MASH
Basic Level 2270kg Pickup Truck 100 25 At CIP
10000kg Single Unit Truck 90 15 At CIP
36000kg Tractor/van-type 80 15 At CIP
36000kg Tractor/tank-type 80 15 At CIP

In many cases, the selection of a transition will be greatly limited as it is likely that there will only be
a small number of possible solutions for connecting one vehicle restraint system to another.
However, there are a number of factors which should be considered before the selection of any
proposed transitional arrangement. These are, as a minimum:
 The vehicle restraint systems to be connected as transitions will typically only be suitable
for the connection of two specific systems, and will not be of a generic design;
 The containment requirements for the transition (refer to Section 11.5.1);
 The deflection characteristics of the transition (refer to Section 11.5.2);
 The impact severity level of the transition (refer to Section 11.5.3);
 Maintenance and inspection requirements (refer to Section 11.5.4); and
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 Cost considerations (refer to Section 11.5.5).

Once the classification of the transition has been determined, available transitions of this
classification should be identified from the Abu Dhabi Department for Transport’s list of approved
proprietary products.
It is possible that in a number of cases, a suitable transition may not exist. In such cases the
promoters/manufacturers of the two vehicle restraint systems to be connected should be contacted
to ensure that a transition can be developed and approved by one (or more) of the methods
identified within Section 11.3.
Where no agreement can be reached between the two promoters/manufacturers, each vehicle
restraint system should be terminated in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 9. However,
it is emphasised that this is a non-preferred arrangement and in all cases, designers should strive
to encourage promoters/manufacturers to develop approved transitions.
11.5.1 Containment Requirements

TL-1 provides test requirements for vehicle impact speeds of 50km/h, TL-2 provides for vehicle
impact speeds of 70km/h and TL-3 (which is the basic level) provides for vehicle impact speeds of
100km/h (refer to Table 11.1). T-L 4, TL-5 and TL-6 provide for tests with larger vehicles such as
single unit trucks and semitrailers to determine the performance of transitions with such vehicle
types and masses.
The containment level of a transition should not be less than the lower of the two connected
systems (for example, if a transition is to connect TL-3 and TL-4 systems, the minimum
containment level for the transition is TL-3). Where a transition spans more than one containment
class (for example where a TL-3 system is connected to a TL-5 system), it is the manufacturer’s
choice whether to test the system at either the same containment level as either of the two
connected barriers (i.e. TL-3 or TL-5), or the intermediate containment level (i.e. TL-4).
Furthermore, as a general rule, the containment level of a transition between a terminal and a
safety barrier should match that of the connected safety barrier (typically TL-3).
11.5.2 Deflection Requirements

Following the impact testing of a transition (independent of its type and performance
characteristics), the working width and dynamic deflection of the system is determined and
reported, as described in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.2. The assessment of the dynamic performance
is undertaken through the analysis of high speed video coverage, recorded during the impact test.
Both of these measurements are very important when selecting the design and site of a transition
as it is important to ensure that if the transition is impacted by an errant vehicle on the road, the
risk of the system deflecting and impacting the hazard behind the transition and/or another road
user or road worker is minimised to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable. As explained
in Section 7.3.5 of Chapter 7, the distance between the front face of the system to the hazard
should be less than the working width of the system. This is to prevent the impacting vehicles
reaching the hazard as a result of the deflection in the system. The criteria explained in Section
7.3.5 are equally applicable to transitions.
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If there is insufficient space available, consideration should be given to the use of a different
transition and thus, different vehicle restraint systems at either end of the transition.
Furthermore, the dynamic deflection (see Section 6.3.3.2) of a transition should not exceed the
size of the larger dynamic deflection of the two connected systems [4]. This is to prevent
pocketing. The dynamic deflection of a transition should be between the dynamic deflections of the
two systems it connects.
11.5.3 Impact Severity Level Requirements

Following the impact testing of a transition (independent of its type and performance
characteristics), the impact severity level of the system will be reported in terms of the OIV and
ORA. These provide a method of ranking the severity of the impact with the transition, and give an
indicative guide as to the level of injury which might be expected from an impact with an errant
vehicle (assuming all of the impact parameters are the same as those under which the system was
tested). Further explanation of the severity indices can be located within Chapter 6, Section
6.3.3.4.
For transitions, the impact severity level shall be as low as practicable to reduce the risk of injury to
the occupants of errant vehicles. For systems tested to NCHRP Report 350 or MASH, lower values
for OIV and ORA should be preferred, as shown in Table 3 of Section 7.2.3.
11.5.4 Maintenance and Inspection Requirements

All transitions should be maintained and inspected in line with the manufacturer’s
recommendations. These should be contained within the documentation supplied by the transition,
and are likely to reflect the requirements for the connected vehicle restraint systems. Any non-
proprietary transitions should be inspected every two years as a minimum.

As with all roadside safety systems, cost considerations should not just include the initial cost of
purchasing the crash cushion, but should also include the costs for installation, maintenance,
repair or replacement.
Unlike other barrier elements however, the number of alternative systems available for an
acceptable installation will be limited for transitions. There are many different types of roadside and
bridge barriers available on the market today. Each combination of these systems requires a
unique transition. The costs of developing a transition is considered high compared to the number
of potential applications. This means high development costs for low sales figures for the
manufacturers. Therefore, the cost considerations are less likely to be the decisive factor for the
transition selection, as there are often no alternatives available.

The design of a transition between two connected vehicle restraint systems will require
engineering judgement, experience and knowledge of the vehicle restraint systems to be
connected.
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There are no specific rules which should be followed in the design of new transitions, however,
there are a number of factors and International best practice which should be considered and
incorporated within the design process. These specific points are highlighted below:
1. The general rule for transitions is that where practicable, vehicle restraint systems must be
physically connected together, and the transition used to complete this connection should
be designed so as to provide a gradual change in stiffness, height, profile and/or
containment from one barrier to another. This is the fundamental approach to be taken
within the design of a transition.
2. A more rigid roadside barrier transition can be provided through reducing post spacing (see
Figure 11.2); by using posts with a larger cross section or posts which go further into the
ground; and/or by using stronger or an increased number of rail elements. The use of a
wider rail system such as thrie beam may also be used. Such methods are frequently used
by the designers of proprietary products to decrease the deflection characteristics of their
products. However, as an example, within the UK, the 1.7 m length of a standard post is
increased to 1.95 m if additional stiffness is required. The use of reduced post spacing on
the approach to a more rigid barrier system can be seen within Figure 11.2.
3. Transitions should be designed to minimise the likelihood of snagging by an errant vehicle

and one from the opposing lane on a two-way facility. ‘Snagging’ means that a vehicle
impacts a flexible barrier system, which deflects to such an extent that the vehicle then
impacts the approach end of the connected barrier system. This may result in very rapid
deceleration of the errant vehicle, greatly increasing the risk to the occupants of the errant
vehicle.
4. In addition to the risk posed by the end of a barrier, a vehicle’s wheels may also become
snagged on the posts of the connected system. The snagging of a vehicle may be
mitigated through the use of block-outs between the rail and the posts of the barrier
system, or through the addition of a secondary rail underneath the main containment rail(s),
known as a ‘rubbing rail’. An example of such a rubbing rail is shown in Figure 11.2.
5. The face of the approach rail transition should be smooth. Projections from the face of the
barrier should be avoided wherever possible, and in any case limited to 25mm [5], as
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Figure 11.2 – An example of reduced post spacing and a rubbing rail
Direction of Traffic
Max 25 mm
Traffic face of Barrier B

Traffic face of Barrier A
Figure 11.3 – Projections on the face of a transition
6. To ensure that significant changes in deflection do not occur within a short distance, the
transition section should be sufficiently long. Generally, the transition length should be 10 to
12 times the difference in the lateral deflection of the two systems being connected by the
transition [6]. For example, if the deflection of Barrier A is 2.3 m, and the deflection of
connected Barrier B is 1.2 m, the transition should be between 11-13 m in length.
7. A transition such as that shown in Figure 11.4 is unacceptable for a number of reasons,
including the protrusion greater than 25 mm at the base of the transition, and the lack of a
gradual change in stiffness from the concrete barrier, to the steel beam, and back to the
concrete barrier. A more acceptable transition is that shown in Figure 11.5, where there is a
much better and controlled increase in stiffness, and a lack of protrusions due to the
alignment and design of the transition.
Figure 11.4 – An unacceptably short transition
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Figure 11.5 – Transitional design with increasing stiffness
8. The effect of impacting the departure end of the downstream barrier, and the resulting
deflection should be assessed using a risk based approach, examining the likely effect of
impacts along the length of the transition, and the probability and severity of any resulting
injury. Figure 11.6 shows a number of examples where an impact on the departure end of
the upstream barrier will result in the barrier deflecting and redirecting the errant vehicle
onto the approach end of the downstream barrier. Such details are unacceptable, and the
two connected systems should work together to contain and redirect an errant vehicle.
Departure end of
upstream barrier
Approach end of
downstream barrier
Departure end of
upstream barrier
Approach end of
downstream barrier
Figure 11.6 – Unacceptable transition details
9. The transition should be designed so that the height of the transition increases smoothly
and continuously from the lower system to the higher one. An example of such an
arrangement can be seen in Figure 11.7. International experience has shown that any
steps or slopes should not be greater than 8% [7].
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Figure 11.7 – An example of changes in connected barrier height
10. Drainage features (e.g. curbs, raised inlets, curb inlets, ditches) in front of the barrier in the
transition area may initiate vehicle instability that can, in some instances, adversely affect
the crashworthiness of the transition. The slope between the edge of the travelled lane and
the barrier should be no steeper than 1V:10H [6].
11.6.1 Connections
The strength of each connection between two different barriers should not be less than the
strength of the joint between consecutive beams in the lower containment barrier (typically the lap
joint of a TL-3 barrier). This can be demonstrated by testing or by calculations. Tests and
calculations should include combined longitudinal and bending forces if they both exist in a vehicle
impact.
Experience from within the UK has shown that as a general rule, any connection between TL-1,
TL-2 or TL-3 barriers should be capable of transmitting a tensile force of 330kN [8]. Furthermore,
any connection between a TL-4, TL-5 or TL-6 barriers should be capable of transmitting a tensile
force of 500kN [8]. Connections which are not capable of transmitting such forces are likely to
break in the event of an impact, and these tensile force restrictions will provide designers with
proven in-service and in-testing guidance for the design of connections.
It must also be ensured that at each end of a transition there is a physical connection to another
vehicle restraint system, or a terminal. It is not acceptable to leave unprotected end of systems,
neither on the approach or departure end of the transition (as shown in Figure 11.8). The
arrangement shown in Figure 11.8 is unacceptable for a number of reasons, notably that the two
systems are not connected together. There is a risk of an errant vehicle impacting the ramped end
of the concrete barrier, and launching, possibly into the column located behind the concrete
barrier.
There is also no increase in stiffness or anchorage at the end of the steel guardrail and hence, any
impact close to the departure end of the steel barrier is likely to deflect the steel barrier such that
an errant vehicle could impact the ramped concrete end with the centreline of the vehicle. An
arrangement such as that shown in Figure 11.16a should have been installed at this location – this
would include the removal of the ramped concrete end, a physical and sufficiently robust
connection (capable of transmitting a tensile force of 330kN) of the steel guardrail into the
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concrete, and a closing of the post spacing just prior to the concrete barrier to increase the
barrier’s stiffness.
Figure 11.8 – Example of a poor transition (unconnected barrier systems)
11.6.2 Specific Transitional Arrangements

There are a number of transitional arrangements that require additional consideration and
engineering judgement to be applied to ensure they can be dealt with in an appropriate way. These
are explained in the following sections.
11.6.2.1 Safety Barrier to Bridge Parapet Transitions

Within the design of a transition, any exposed ends of bridge parapet systems should be flared
backwards, away from the traffic face of the parapet at an angle of 45° [9] as shown in Figure 11.9,
unless the rail is close to the main rail of the connecting barrier system. It should be noted that,
where practical, instead of flaring back rails, it is preferable to transition all rails so as not to leave
any exposed rail ends.
Figure 11.9 – An example of a flared back top parapet rail
11.6.2.2 Wire Rope Safety Barrier to Semi-rigid Barrier

When it comes to the provision of a transition between a WRSB and a w-beam barrier, there are
different approaches utilised internationally. The first type of approach is to install both the WRSB
and the W-beam side by side for a distance, as shown in Figure 11.10. This is the type of transition
PAGE 295
which is recommended by the New Zealand Transport Agency [10]. In this application, the length
of overlap depends on the individual lengths of the WRSB and W-beam transitions. This is
because the end point of the W-beam terminal must align with (as shown in Figure 11.10) or
overlap the point of redirection of the WRSB system (i.e. the point where the WRSB terminal ends
and standard section of WRSB begins). The idea is to provide a standard section of at least one of
the barrier types along the whole transition and to keep the re-directional capabilities throughout
the whole arrangement. It should be noted that the W-beam terminal to be used for this type of
transition is a full height, parallel and an energy absorbing system. It is recommended that the
offset between the front face of the W-beam and the centreline of the WRSB should be 825mm at
the upstream end of W-beam, as shown in Figure 11.10. This offset comprises:
 225mm (450/2, nominal WRSB footing);
 100mm clearance; and
 500mm semi-rigid barrier timber or I-section posts, and blockout [10].
*Figure is not to scale and shown for indicative purposes only.
Figure 11.10 – Example of a WRSB to W-beam transition by overlapping installation
The second type of application is to install the WRSB and the W-beam side by side with enough
distance to ensure that they will perform completely independently from each other during an
impact. This is also the type of arrangement which is recommended for transitions between WRSB
and concrete barriers, and therefore it is explained in further detail in Section 11.6.2.3. This is the
type of transition arrangement which requires the largest amount of space and therefore may not
be applicable at all locations.
The final type of transition arrangement features a section where the WRSB is physically
connected on to the W-beam, as shown in Figure 11.11. This type of arrangement was originally
developed by the South Dakota Department of Transportation to provide a transition between the
strong post W-beam and low-tension WRSB systems [11]. In 1998, this system was tested in
accordance with NCHRP 350 [1] and successfully met the evaluation criteria of TL-3. However,
over the following years the low-tension WRSB system became a less preferred option with the
emergence of the high-tension proprietary WRSB systems. Over the years several manufacturers
of the high-tension proprietary systems have introduced modified versions of the South Dakota
design to fit the needs of their individual systems. Several of these designs were technically
assessed and approved for use in the USA by the FHWA [11].
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The original design utilised special steel straps to transition the individual cables of the low-tension
WRSB system over and under the W-beam. These cables were then connected to a ground
anchor located behind the W-beam. In the new designs for the high-tension WRSB systems, the
need for a ground anchor is eliminated. This is because each of the cables is attached directly on
to the W-beam rail element by special anchors. The design of these anchors change from one
system to another and therefore further detail should be provided by the individual manufacturer.
For both the original and the new designs, the post spacing of the WRSB is reduced to half for
usually a length of around 12-13 posts, as the WRSB approaches the W-beam connection. This is
done to increase the stiffness and therefore decrease deflection on the approach to the W-beam.
The length of this section will depend on the post spacing of individual system and the transition
arrangement.
The W-beam terminals used in these transitions are full-height, and energy absorbing systems.
The W-beam terminal is installed in a flared arrangement. This is done to provide more deflection
space between the WRSB and the w-beam terminal. The area leading to the w-beam terminal
should have a ground slope of 1V:10H or flatter, in-line with the requirements explained in Chapter
9, Section 9.5.3.
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Figure 11.11 - Example of a WRSB to W-beam transition
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11.6.2.3 Wire Rope Safety Barrier to Concrete Barrier

Due to the very flexible nature of wire rope, and the very rigid nature of concrete barriers, these
systems should not be connected directly to each other. Concrete and WRSB are rarely connected
to each other and therefore the number of available designs are limited. The international best
practice to combat this problem consists of untested design recommendations [12], [10]. The
recommended application is to overlap a section of concrete barrier and WRSB, in a configuration
where the distance between the two systems at any point is less than the dynamic deflection (see
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.2) of the WRSB. This configuration is shown in Figure 11.12.

Figure 11.12 - An example of a transition between wire rope barrier and a concrete barrier
In the figure the distance ‘A’ represents the minimum acceptable distance between the concrete
barrier and WRSB. This value should be less than the dynamic deflection of the WRSB. This is to
ensure that enough space is provided behind the WRSB, so in the event of an impact from
Approach 1, the barrier would not deflect all the way into the concrete barrier. This prevents a
secondary impact with the concrete barrier. As explained in Chapter 6, Section 6.5.1, the dynamic
deflection will change greatly from one WRSB system to another. Therefore, this value should be
provided by the manufacturer.
The distance ‘B’, shown in Figure 11.12, should also be less than the dynamic deflection of the
WRSB system. This is to ensure that in the event of an impact from the Approach 2, the WRSB
does not deflect into the opposing travelled way. This way a secondary impact with oncoming
vehicles is prevented. As shown in the figure, the measurement for ‘B’ should be made between
the edge of the travelled way and the first point on WRSB, which can be reached by an errant
vehicle coming from Approach 2. The angle of approach can be taken as the impact test angle
corresponding to the test level of the specific WRSB. For example, for a TL-3 WRSB, the approach
angle can be taken as 25° to represent the highest angle, to which the system was tested. The
impact angles for different test levels are provided in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3. Finally, the flare
rate of the WRSB should be within the appropriate limits. More information on flare rates can be
found in Chapter 7, Section 7.4.2.
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11.6.2.4 Steel Barrier Approaches to Concrete Barriers

Connections between semi-rigid steel barriers and rigid concrete barriers are particular areas of
concern as they present the potential for a high risk of pocketing and resulting injury. It is for this
reason that the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport has developed a
standard detail for such transitions, as shown in Figure 11.14.
Full details of this transition can be found within Drawing Number R-24 of the Abu Dhabi Standard
Drawings Manual [13]. This is a well-designed transition as there is a gradual increase in post
spacing (and therefore barrier stiffness) on the approach to the rigid barrier system (shown in red),
and a clear connection (capable of withstanding a 330kN loading) into the concrete barrier (shown
in orange). The plan view shows that there is also continuity in the alignment of the barriers
through the transition (shown in green) and no excessive protrusions within the design. However,
the transition could be further improved as the differences in profile between the steel and concrete
systems introduces an exposed step at the end of the concrete barrier which would still prove to be
an area of injury risk for the occupants of an errant vehicle. This area is highlighted on Figure
11.13.
This could be overcome by introducing an additional (rubbing) rail below the main rail and/or by
connecting the barrier into a vertically faced concrete barrier. Both of these approaches have been
implemented within the design shown in Figure 11.2 and will greatly reduce the risk to road users.
The drawing in Figure 10.13 also makes it clear that this transition is only valid for connecting
concrete and semi-rigid guardrail type designs.
Figure 11.13 – Exposed step of concrete barrier
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Figure 11.14 - The Abu Dhabi Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport standard detail for transition from guardrail to rigid concrete barrier [13], Refer to latest version.
PAGE 301
11.6.3 Example applications

Figure 11.15 demonstrates a number of inappropriate transition details
a) Steel to Concrete Barrier b) Steel to Concrete Bridge

ParapetBARRIER WARRANTED
c) Steel to Concrete Barrier d) Wire Rope to Steel Barrier
Figure 11.15 – Examples of inappropriate transitions
There are a number of reasons why each of the transitions within Figure 11.15 does not meet the
guidance within this Section with regard to the design of transitions:
Figure 11.15a: In this Figure it is clear that there is no physical connection between the two barrier
systems, no decrease in post spacing (and therefore stiffening of the steel guardrail) prior to the
concrete section and, due to the change in profile between the two barrier systems, a risk to road
users from striking the end of the concrete barrier. In the event of an impact close to the end of the
steel guardrail, it is likely that the beam will deflect to an extent such that an errant vehicle will still
strike the end of the concrete barrier. Under such circumstances, the detail shown in Figure 11.14
would reduce road user risk (although this detail in itself could be better designed as explained
above).
Figure 11.15b: This Figure is very similar in detail to that seen in Figure 11.15a, however, the
consequences of the poor detail are likely to be higher due to the larger concrete face which poses
the risk to road users. In addition, this Figure shows the importance of correct alignment between
the two sections of connected barrier. A detail similar to that within Figure 11.14 would reduce the
risk to road users at this location.
Figure 11.15c: This Figure is slightly improved on the detail within Figure 11.15a, however still not
acceptable. Whilst the end of the guardrail beam now overlaps with the end of the concrete barrier,
there is still no physical connection between the two systems. Hence, whilst the risk of injury to
road users is lower than in the case shown in Figure 11.15a, the lack of connection means that,
again, in the event of an impact towards the end of the steel guardrail, it is likely that the beam will
PAGE 302
deflect to an extent that an errant vehicle will still strike the end of the concrete barrier. This detail
could be improved by Figure 11.14.
Figure 11.15d: In this final figure there is no connection between the wire rope fence and the end
of the steel barrier system. Whilst this in isolation is not a significant problem, the barriers have
been overlapped in such a way that, due to the large deflection of the wire rope system and the
lack of movement in the terminal section of the steel guardrail, any impact towards the end of the
wire rope system is likely to deflect the wire rope in such a way that the errant vehicle will still strike
the end of the terminal.
In order to reduce the risk to road users at this point, the barriers should either be connected as
shown in Figure 11.11 or overlapped such that the systems can function independently, as shown
in Figure 11.10 or Figure 11.12. It should be noted that if the second option is to be followed, the
requirements for a full height terminal (given in Chapter 9) should be applied.
Figure 11.16 demonstrates improved transition details, as witnessed in Abu Dhabi.
Figure 11.16 – Example of appropriate transition between a w-beam and a concrete barrier

A transition is required for any location where one type of vehicle restraint system is required to be
connected to another.
In general, transitions are required:

 To provide a safe connection between two vehicle restraint systems;
 To protect traffic from a head-on, or angled collision with the end of another vehicle
restraint system.
As a general rule and where practicable, vehicle restraint systems must be physically connected
together, and the transition used to complete this connection should be designed to provide a
PAGE 303
gradual change in stiffness, height, cross-sectional shape and/or containment from one barrier to
another.
In general, the rigidity of the W-beam systems can be increased by reducing the post spacing, by
using posts with a larger cross section, and/or by using stronger or an increased number of rail
elements.
Transitions should be designed to minimise the probability of snagging by an errant vehicle and
one from the opposing lane on a two-way facility. The snagging of a vehicle may be mitigated
through the use of block-outs between the rail and the posts of the barrier system, or through the
addition of a secondary rail underneath the main containment rail(s), known as a ‘rubbing rail’.
To ensure that significant changes in deflection do not occur within a short distance, the transition
section needs sufficient length.
The transition should be designed so that the height of the transition increases seamlessly from
the lower system to the higher one. The face of the approach rail transition should be smooth.
Drainage features in front of the barrier in the transition area may initiate vehicle instability that
can, in some instances, adversely affect the crashworthiness of the transition. The slope between
the edge of the travelled lane and the barrier should be no steeper than 1V:10H.
In all cases, and due to the high number of transitions which could exist between systems,
acceptance of a transition should be based on one or more of the following methods (in order of
preference):
 Selection of proprietary transition systems which have had full scale impact testing to the
requirements of NCHRP350 or MASH (see Clause 11.3);
 Virtual testing to the requirements of the European Technical Report TR16303-4;
 Good engineering judgement based on the design rules within Section 11.6.
However, it is emphasised that in all cases, transitions should be approved by the Abu Dhabi
Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport prior to specification and installation.
11.8 References
[3] H. E. Ross, H. S. Perera, D. L. Sicking and R. P. Bligh, “National Cooperative Highway

Research Program, Report 318: Roadside Safety Design for Small Vehicles,” Transportation
Research Board, Washington, D.C., 1989.
[4] CEN, “EN 1317 Road Restraint Systems - Part 4: Performance classes, impact test
acceptance criteria and test methods for terminals and transitions of safety barriers,”
European Committee for Standardization, Brussels, 2002.
PAGE 304
[5] Alberta Infrastructure and Transportation, Roadside Design Guide, Alberta Infrastructure and
Transportation, November 2007.
[7] CEN, “EN 1317 Road Restraint Systems- Part 4 - Draft Ammendments,” Unpublished Draft -
Eurpoean Committee for Standardization, Brussels, 2014.
[8] BSI, “BS6779-1, Highway parapets for bridges and other structures - Part 1: Specification for
vehicle containment parapets of metal construction,” British Standards Institution, London,
1998.
[9] TD19/06 Design Manual for Roads and Bridges, Volume 2 Highway Structures: Design,
Assembly Government, The Department for Regional Development Northern Ireland, 2006.
[10] NZ Transport Agency, “Technical Memorandum, Road Safety Hardware Series, TM-2013,
Wire Rope Safety Barrier Transitions,” New Zealand Transport Agency, Nov 2014.
[11] FHWA, “Memorandum on the Cable Barrier Transitions to W-Beam Guardrail,” US

Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Washington DC, 2006.
[13] Abu Dhabi DoT, Standard Drawings for Road Projects - Part 3: Road Structures, Abu Dhabi:
Abu Dhabi Department of Transport, 2014.
PAGE 305
12 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
12.1 Introduction
Although the number of fatalities from roadside crashes is decreasing every year in the Emirate of
Abu Dhabi, roadside crashes account for a significant portion of the total fatal highway crashes.
Approximately 15 percent are the result of a single vehicle run-off-the-road crash. These casualties
represent a significant loss for the country’s economy and an immeasurable emotional loss for the
families of people who are involved with the incidents.
A significant proportion of these roadside casualties may be prevented by good engineering and
design practices, which would improve the level of safety and decrease the severity of accidents.
From this perspective, well targeted roadside safety improvements can generally be seen as highly
beneficial investments. However, the funds allocated to safety treatments are usually limited and
there are often more than one treatment options applicable to a site. Furthermore, every roadside
is different and the costs and benefits of a certain safety treatment would change from one site to
another. Therefore, the engineer/designer should evaluate the potential safety treatments through
economic assessment on a site-by-site basis so that the highest amount of benefits can be gained
from a limited amount of funds.
There are several methods developed around the world for comprehensive economic assessment
of roadside safety treatments; such as Road Safety Analysis Program (RSAP) [1] in USA, Highway
Safety Manual (HSM) [2] methodology in USA, Road Restraint Risk Analysis Program (RRRAP) [3]
in UK, SAVERS Tool [4] in Europe and the Austroads methods [5] in Australia. These methods all
provide useful ways through which a designer/engineer can carry out economic analysis. However,
almost all of these methods are developed to cater for their respective local conditions, by using
local data. For example, the accident prediction models, which constitute the basis of all these
models, are often developed or calibrated by using local accident, traffic and road geometry data.
Therefore, they may not be as reliable when applied to the local conditions in other regions,
including the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. Furthermore, comprehensive economic analysis often requires
a large amount and variety of data, which currently is not available for every type of road in Abu
Dhabi. Therefore, the designer/engineer may not always have enough data to be able to use the
methodologies mentioned above.
Due to these limitations, this chapter provides a general guidance on roadside safety economic
assessment process, which can help designers/engineers, who only have access to a limited
amount of data. However, designer/engineer can also use the presented methodology to carry out
more detailed economic analyses, if there is enough data to support it. References are also made
to the international methods mentioned above, for those who want to explore further on the related
topics.
In the future, as more data become available, the Abu Dhabi Department of Transport may
introduce more comprehensive economic analysis requirements.
PAGE 306
12 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
12.2 Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide Economic Assessment

Process
Economic assessment is an integral part of the Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide risk mitigation
approach. A brief overview of the economic analysis process and its standing within the whole risk
mitigation approach was presented in Chapter 2. This chapter provides the necessary tools to help
the designer/engineer achieve the steps presented in Chapter 2.
Figure 2.10 shows the recommended economic analysis process for this Guide. As can be seen
from the figure, the process explained in this chapter begins once a number of treatment options
are identified to mitigate the risk posed by a roadside hazard.
Stage 1 - Assessment of Economic Feasibility
Calculate BCR for Physically Practicable Treatment Options
BCR<1 BCR≥1
Treatment is Not Treatment Economically

Economically Justified Justified
Stage 2 - Treatment Prioritization
Non-Monetary
Rank Treatment Options
Considerations
By Incremental By Risk
BCR Reduction
Engineering Judgment
Choose the appropriate treatment option
Figure 12.1 – Overview of the economic assessment process
It should also be verified that the considered treatment options are physically practicable. Chapter
2, Figure 2.10 explains the general approach to risk mitigation. First, the alternative treatment
options are shown i.e. remove, relocate, make passively safe, use barrier, delineate hazard. Then
physical practicability of these options is checked. Only the ones which are physically practicable
are carried to the economic assessment stage. Economic Analysis is only a part of this whole
process. Therefore the flowchart shown in this chapter is only focusing on the economic
assessment and the treatment prioritisation.
As can be seen from Figure 2.10, the economic assessment process consists of two main stages:
PAGE 307
 Stage 1: Assessment of economic feasibility for each treatment option;

 Stage 2: Prioritization of economically feasible treatment options.
Stage 1: The first stage includes the assessment of economic feasibility of each option to make
sure the expected benefits of a safety treatment outweigh its costs. The recommended method for
checking this is a Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) Analysis. Necessary guidance to carry out this analysis
is presented in Section 12.3. Any project with a BCR less than 1.0 is considered not feasible and
therefore is not economically justified. The assessment continues with the treatment options with
BCR equal to or greater than 1.0.
Stage 2: The second stage includes the selection between one of the economically justified
treatment options. This selection is not straightforward and requires a multi layered assessment
with the priorities changing from one site to another. Depending on the project and site
requirements, a designer/engineer may need to rank or assess the treatment options from one or
more of the following perspectives:
 By benefit cost ratio, as explained in Section 12.4.1;

 By the amount of risk reduction, as explained in Section 12.4.2;
 By non-monetary considerations, as explained in Section 12.4.3.
Once the options are assessed through these considerations, the designer/engineer should assess
and choose the most suitable treatment for the specific site.
12.3 Benefit Cost Ratio Analysis

BCR Analysis is a systematic process for calculating, and comparing the benefits and costs of a
proposed project or investment. It has two main purposes:
 To determine if an investment decision is sound (i.e. the justification for/ feasibility of the
decision). This involves comparing the total expected cost of the counter-measure against
the total expected benefits, to see whether the benefits outweigh the costs, and by how
much; and
 To provide a basis for comparing alternative projects. This involves comparing the total
expected costs of the different options against their total expected benefits, to assess the
most economically advantageous option.
The BCR is the ratio of the total benefits relative to the total costs of a project, both expressed in
monetary terms. It summarises the overall value for money of a project proposal. All benefits and
costs are expressed in discounted present values. If the BCR exceeds 1.0, then the project is
considered viable and potentially a good investment; the higher the BCR the more economically
advantageous the investment is likely to be. However, the BCR figure can be misleading when
comparing different options. For example, a high BCR may be a consequence of a very small
scheme with low costs but relatively high benefits generating a high BCR. Meanwhile a large
investment may generate very high benefits, but at a very high cost as well as generating a
relatively low BCR. It is therefore essential only to compare similar schemes in investment
decisions, for example projects of a similar size or value. So, in addition to considering the BCR,
the total net benefits as well as the overall costs should also be considered when comparing
alternative investments in the decision making process.
PAGE 308
To calculate the BCR, the following procedures should be undertaken:
A. Calculate the Benefits of the Treatment Option
Step 1. Determine the expected crash rate without the treatment (Section 12.3.1.1)
Step 2. Determine the expected reduction in crash rate caused by the treatment (Section
12.3.1.2)
Step 3. Calculate the estimated annual monetary value of reduction in crashes (Section
12.3.1.3)
Step 4. Calculate the Present Value of the benefits (PVbenefits) (Section 12.3.3)
B. Calculate the Costs of the Treatment Option
Step 5. Estimate the annual costs of the treatment (Section 12.3.2)
Step 6. Calculate the Present Value of the costs (PVcosts) (Section 12.3.3)
C. Calculate the BCR for the Treatment Option
Step 7. Calculate the BCR using Equation 12.1
Equation 12.1
Where:
BCR = Benefit-Cost Ratio

PVbenefits = Present value of project benefits
PVcosts = Present value of project costs
A summary of the BCR calculation process is presented in
Figure 12.2. Following sections provide the necessary guidance on the individual steps of BCR
calculation.
PAGE 309
Treatment Benefits Treatment Costs
Determine the expected crash rate Crash Records or Estimate the annual costs of the
Step 1 without the treatment (Nwot) Prediction Model treatment (AVcosts)
(Section 12.3.1.1) (Section 12.3.2)
Step 5
Determine the expected reduction in Crash Modification
Step 2 crash rate with the treatment (Nwt) Factors Design and Maintenance Other
(Section 12.3.1.2) Construction costs costs costs
the treatment
Calculate the estimated annual Cost of Crashes
Step 3 monetary value of reduction in crashes
(AVbenefits) (Section 12.3.1.3)
Calculate the Present Value of the Discount Rate (%) Calculate the Present Value of the
Step 4 benefits (PVbenefits) Costs (PVcosts) Step 6
Project Life (Years)
(Section 12.3.3) (Section 12.3.3)
Step 7
Calculate the
Benefit Cost Ratio
(BCR)
Figure 12.2 – Calculation of the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR)
PAGE 310 FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016

12 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
12.3.1 Assessment of Treatment Benefits

The first part of a BCR calculation involves the assessment of project benefits. Main benefits of a
roadside safety treatment include reduction in either or both the number and/or the severity of
crashes. Another benefit of reducing the number of crashes is the reduction in traffic disruptions,
which are caused as a result. Benefits of reduction in traffic disruptions are usually included within
the unit costs of crashes and therefore, additional calculations are usually not necessary. The
following sections explain the individual steps involved in calculating the benefits caused by a
treatment.
12.3.1.1 Determination of the Expected Crash Rate

The first step in assessing treatment benefits is the estimation of the expected crash rate (number
of crashes per year) at the roadside under evaluation, without any treatments. This can be
achieved through two types of approaches:
 Estimation through observed/historic crash frequency;
 Estimation through statistical methods.
In the first approach, historic crash data is used as an indicator for future crashes. This may be
established from the DoT’s crash database. This type of approach is often the only available
method of estimation in the absence of any other methodology or detailed data. This is currently
the case in Abu Dhabi and therefore the use of historic crash frequency is the recommended
approach within this Guide. An advantage of using observed crash frequency is the ease of
understandability, as these values are easier to interpret then statistical models.
On the other hand the designer/engineer should be aware of the limitations of using historic crash
data. These limitations are mainly related to the lack of predictability and natural variations in crash
data over time. Roadside crashes are random events and their frequencies naturally fluctuate over
time at any given site. The random nature of the crashes means that short-term crash frequencies,
such as for one or two years, are not reliable for the estimation of the long term situation. As
shown in Figure 12.3, if a two year period of crashes was used as the sample to estimate the crash
frequency, it would be difficult to know if this two year period represents a typically high, average,
or low crash frequency.
Short-Term
Observed Crash FrequencyAverage Crash
Frequency
Long-Term
Average
Crash Frequency
Short-Term
Average Crash
Frequency
Years
Figure 12.3 – Effect of short-term and long term observed crash frequency
PAGE 311
For roadside safety projects, generally a three or five year period is considered appropriate to
determine the average number of injury and fatal crashes per year for the base case (existing
conditions). It may be appropriate to adjust the base case crash rate to account for an expected
future increase in the frequency of crashes due to traffic growth (an example of this is
demonstrated in Section 12.3.4). For newly build roads, where there would not be any history of
crashes, the designer/engineer can estimate the average crash frequency, based on historic data
of similar roadways or facilities.
Example:
The number of crashes observed at a site is as shown in Figure 12.4. The observed crash
frequency for this site can be estimated as follows:
12
11
Number of Crashes Observed
10
8 Average crash
Frequency
7
4
1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
Figure 12.4 – Example average crash frequency estimation
The second approach in the estimation of crashes is the use of statistical methods. These methods
are usually based on regression analyses and require detailed local traffic and road geometry data
to develop and calibrate. This type of comprehensive data is currently not available at Abu Dhabi
and the authors are not aware of any statistical crash prediction models developed for the local
conditions. However, these models can be developed in the future and therefore the
designer/engineer should keep up to date with latest developments and publications on this area.
Currently there are a number of international economic and risk assessment tools/manuals which
are widely used in different parts of the world. These tools/manuals make use of different statistical
models for the prediction of the number of crashes. However, these models are developed and
calibrated for their respective local traffic and road conditions and therefore they are not directly
applicable to the Abu Dhabi road network. References to these tools/manuals are provided; with a
brief description of each. Further information can be obtained from the individual sources.
PAGE 312
 AASHTO - Highway Safety Manual (HSM) [2]: The AASHTO HSM is a three volume
manual, which arguably provides the most comprehensive guidance on quantitative safety
analyses, among the resources available today. Part C of HSM provides a comprehensive
guide to prediction of crashes through development of Safety Performance Functions
(SPFs). SPFs are statistical base models, which are used to estimate the average crash
frequency for a facility type with specified base conditions. Once the SPFs are developed,
the predicted crashes for the base case are then adjusted for specific road characteristics
through the use of Crash Modification Factors (CMFs). The final step of the HSM prediction
methods is the calibration of the estimated crashes for local conditions through the use of a
Calibration Factor.
 Road Safety Analysis Program (RSAP) [1]: The RSAP is a computer program for
performing benefit-cost analysis on roadside design alternatives. The RSAP was originally
developed under NCHRP Project 22-9 and distributed with the 2002 edition of the AASHTO
Roadside Design Guide [6]. The RSAP encroachment module uses a two-step process to
estimate crash frequency. The first step involves estimating a base or average
encroachment rate based on highway type and then multiplying the encroachment rate with
the traffic volume to estimate encroachment frequency. The next step is to adjust the base
encroachment frequency to account for specific highway characteristics that affect
encroachment rates.
 Austroads Guide to Road Design – Part 6 [5]: Part 6 of the Austroads Guide to Road
Design: Roadside Design, Safety and Barriers include a crash frequency prediction model
in Section 4.6. The Austroads prediction model is very similar to the RSAP approach and
the reference is made to the RSAP base encroachment model as one of the recommended
resources. Similar to the RSAP method, the base encroachment rate is then adjusted
through several factors to predict the number of crashes on a specific road configuration.
The adjustment factors used in this model are developed to cater for the local conditions in
Australia.
 Road Restraint Risk Analysis Program (RRRAP) [3]: The RRRAP is roadside risk
assessment software developed as part of the UK design standard Design Manual for
Roads and Bridges (DMRB). The crash frequency prediction module used in RRRAP is
similar to a SPF as described in the HSM. The RRRAP is developed for the UK roads
having a speed limit of 50mph or greater and ADT of 5000 or greater.
 Selection of Appropriate Vehicle Restraint Systems (SAVeRS) [4]: SAVeRS was a

cross border funded research project for the Conference of European Directors of Roads.
The final result of the SAVeRS project was an Excel based barrier selection tool. This tool
included a run-off-road crash prediction module, which was developed and calibrated for
Austria, Great Britain, UK, Ireland, Italy and Sweden, using HSM methodology. The final
tool of the SAVeRS Project can be found at www.saversproject.com.
PAGE 313
12.3.1.2 Determination of the Reduction in Crash Rate Caused by the

Proposed Treatment
The second step in assessing the treatment benefits is the estimation of the amount of reduction in
crash rate caused by the proposed safety treatment. This is achieved through the use of Crash
Modification Factors (CMFs). A CMF is the ratio of the crash frequency of a site under two different
conditions and it represents the relative change in crash frequency due to change in one specific
condition, as shown in Equation 12.2. Therefore a CMF may serve as multiplicative factor to
compute the expected number of crashes after implementing a given treatment at a specific site,
as shown in Equation 12.3.
Equation 12.2
Where:
CMF = Crash Modification Factor
Nexpected A = Expected Average Crash Frequency with Site Condition A
Nexpected B = Expected Average Crash Frequency with Site Condition B
Equation 12.3
Where:
Nwt = Expected Average Crash Frequency at the site with treatment
Nwot = Expected Average Crash Frequency at the site without treatment
With no change of conditions at a site, the value of CMF is 1.00. A CMF value less than 1.00
means the treatment alternative reduces the estimated average crash frequency in comparison to
the base condition. A CMF value of more than 1.00 means the treatment alternative increases the
estimated average crash frequency in comparison to the base condition. The relationship between
a CMF and the expected percent change in crash frequency is shown in Equation 12.4. It should
be noted that the % reduction in crash frequency, as shown in Equation 12.4, is also referred to as
a Crash Reduction Factor (CRF) within the literature.
Equation 12.4
Example:
 If a CMF=0.85, then the expected percent change is 100 x (1.00 – 0.85) = 15%, indicating a
reduction in expected average crash frequency by 15%;
 If a CMF=1.25, then the expected percent change is 100 x (1.00 – 1.25) = - 25%, indicating
a 25% increase in expected average crash frequency.
CMFs are generally presented for the implementation of a particular treatment or an alternative
design. Examples include relocating a hazard beyond the clear zone, using passively safe lighting
columns, installing a semi-rigid barrier, changing the rigidity of a barrier, etc.
CMFs for different treatments are established by research studies, which have evaluated the
effects of applying roadside safety treatments. CMF development has been a hot topic in road
safety research for over two decades and there are many CMFs available in the published
PAGE 314
literature for many different types of treatments. Ideally, if available, the CMFs which are
developed with local data, for local conditions should be used. However, currently there are no
CMFs developed specifically for Abu Dhabi. In the future, as more data become available,
research studies may develop CMFs, which are specific to Abu Dhabi. Therefore, the
engineer/designer should be responsible of keeping their knowledge up to date. In the absence of
local alternatives, internationally developed CMFs may be used. However, when using these
CMFs, the designer/engineer should refer to the source research and understand the conditions
under which the CMFs were estimated. Some CMFs are developed for a particular type of crash,
for example only run-off-road crashes, while others may relate to all crashes recorded at a site.
Similarly, some CMFs are developed to predict certain types of incident severity, such as fatal
crashes, injury crashes, property-damage only crashes, whilst others are developed for all
crashes, without the detail of severity. Sometimes multiple CMFs may be available for the same
treatment, from different research studies. In such a case the designer/engineer should analyse
and choose the one which suits the site under evaluation.
There are new CMFs being developed every day. The designer/engineer should check for new
research for updated and better fitting CMFs. A good resource for finding up to date CMFs is the
website: Crash Modification Factors Clearinghouse [7], which is funded by the U.S. Department of
Transport Federal Highway Administration and maintained by the University of North Carolina
Highways Safety Center. This website is a regularly updated online database of published CMFs,
including the CMFs from the HSM. It includes a search function, through which the
designer/engineer can find specific CMFs for many different types of safety treatments.
References are also made to each individual research, for more detailed information on each of
the CMFs published on the website.
Another good resource for CMFs is the Austroads Research Report – Improving Roadside Safety
[8]. This report provides a comprehensive literature review into the available roadside safety
related CMFs. There are many useful CMFs identified and presented within this report.
Table 12.1 presents a list of CMFs, which are selected from the international literature available.
The table does not contain every single published CMF to date and it is provided for guidance only.
It is the responsibility of the designer/engineer to understand the limitations by referring to the
source research. If they become available in the future, the designer/engineer should prefer CMFs
which are developed for local conditions.
PAGE 315
Table 12.1 – Example roadside safety related CMFs from the literature
Severity Crash
Type of Treatment CMF Source
Level Type
Hazard Removal, Relocation, Modification
Clear Zone Related
Remove or relocate fixed hazards Fatal &
0.29 Run-off-road [9]
outside of clear zone Injury
Run-off-road
Relocate hazard (utility pole) - increase
0.67 Injury crashes into [10]
in lateral offset by 1.5m
utility poles
1.5m 0.87
On two-lane rural roads, 2.4m 0.79
increase roadside recovery All Crashes* Run-off-road [11]
distance by: 3.0m 0.75
4.6m 0.65
Reducing the number of hazards
Reduce from 38 to 25 per km 0.75
number of from 25 to 13 per km 0.75 All Crashes* All Crashes [11]
poles per
km from 38 to 13 per km 0.5
Traversable Side Slopes
to 1V:4H 0.90
Flatten Side to 1V:5H 0.85
Slope from
1V:2H to 1V:6H 0.79
to 1V:7H 0.73
to 1V:4H 0.92
Slope from
1V:3H to 1V:6H 0.81
On Rural to 1V:7H 0.74 Single
two-lane All Crashes* [2]
Flatten Side to 1V:5H 0.94 Vehicle
roads
Slope from to 1V:6H 0.88
1V:4H to 1V:7H 0.81
Slope from
1V:5H to 1V:7H 0.86
Flatten Side
Slope from to 1V:7H 0.92
1V:6H
1V:7H or
1.00
flatter
to 1V:6H 1.05
On Rural Change Side
multilane Slope from to 1V:5H 1.09 All Crashes* All Crashes [2]
highways 1V:7H
to 1V:4H 1.12
to 1V:2H
1.18
or steeper
* All Crashes include Fatal, Injury and Property Damage Only
PAGE 316
Table 12.1 - Example roadside safety related CMFs from the literature (continued)
Severity Crash
Level Type
Hazard Removal, Relocation, Modification
Drainage Structures
Lengthen or extend culvert further away All
0.56 All Crashes [12]
from the road Crashes*
Fatal &
Widen and flatten culvert outlets 0.00 All Crashes [13]
Injury
Passively Safe Poles

Run-off
All Road
0.6 [14]
Crashes* Crashes on
Straight
Replace rigid pole with passively safe
poles (slip-base, impact absorbing, etc.)
0.4 Fatal All Crashes [9]
0.7 Injury All Crashes [9]

All
Move utility services underground 0.6 All Crashes [12]
Crashes*
Remove lighting poles in urban area 0.6 Injury All Crashes [15]
Hazard Shielding
Roadside & Median Barriers

All
0.7
Crashes*
0.44 Fatal
0.77 Injury
New semi-rigid roadside barrier Fatal & Run-off-

0.74 [16]
installation Injury road
Property
0.66 Damage
Only
Semi-rigid roadside barrier installation on Fatal & All Crash

0.72 [9]
inside of curves Injury Types
Semi-rigid roadside barrier installation on Fatal & All Crash
0.37 [9]
outside of curves Injury Types
Changing barrier along embankment to 0.68 Injury Run-off-
[2]
less rigid type 0.59 Fatal road
PAGE 317
Table 12.1 - Example roadside safety related CMFs from the literature (continued)
Severity Crash
Level Type
Hazard Shielding
Roadside & Median Barriers (continued)
on a 0.21 Injury
rural Run-off-
Installation of continuous freeway Serious road and
0.13
flexible barrier on roadsides Injury cross- [17]
ad in medians on an 0.14 Injury median
urban Serious head-on
0.17
freeway Injury
0.57 Fatal
For ADT of
20,000 to Install any type of median 0.7 Injury
60,000 on barrier
All All Crashes [2]
multilane 1.24
Crashes*
divided
highways Install steel median barrier 0.65 Injury
Install cable median barrier 0.71 Injury
Crash Cushions
0.31 Fatal
0.31 Injury Fixed
Install Crash Cushion Property object [18]
0.54 Damage Impacts
Only
Example:
The expected average crash frequency without treatment (Nwot) with a fixed object at a roadside
is estimated to be 4 injury crashes per year. It is planned to install a crash cushion in front of the
hazardous object to decrease the frequency of injurious accidents. Using
Table 12.1, a CMF=0.31 is chosen to estimate the decrease in injury accidents with fixed object
impacts, caused by a crash cushion installation.
Using Equation 12.3,
Nwt = Nwot× CMF
Nwt = 4 × 0.31 = 1.24 injury crashes per year
PAGE 318
Therefore, the reduction in injury crash frequency, due to the installation of a crash cushion is
estimated as: 4.0 − 1.24 = 2.76 injury crashes per year. In other words a 69% reduction in the
number of accidents with an injurious outcome is expected.
12.3.1.3 Conversion of Benefits into a Monetary Value

Once the reduction in the annual crash frequency due to a treatment is estimated, these values
should then be converted into a monetary value. This can be achieved by multiplying the estimated
reduction in the crash frequency with the average societal cost of crashes as shown in Equation
12.5.
Equation 12.5
Where:
y = Year in the service life of the treatment

AVbenefits(y) = Annual Monetary Value of Benefits for year y
Cc = Average Societal Cost of a Crash
Nwt (y)= Expected Average Crash Frequency at the site for year y with treatment
Nwot (y) = Expected Average Crash Frequency at the site for year y without treatment
As can be seen from Equation 12.5, in order to calculate the monetary benefits of a treatment,
average societal crash costs (Cc) are required. Table 12.2 provides the average crash costs by
severity for Abu Dhabi. This table is only provided as an example. The designer/engineer should
always justify the reasoning behind the selected crash costs for a specific project.
Table 12.2 –Average societal costs of crashes [19]
Accident Type by Severity Per Crash (AED)
Fatal 2,596,212
Serious Injury 1,044,122
Moderate Injury 111,262
Minor Injury 49,508
Weighted Average for All Injuries including Fatal 460,413
Property Damage Only (PDO) 10,418
As can be seen from Table 12.2, the average societal costs may be available for individual types of
accidents by severity. Therefore Equation 12.5, in theory, can be applied to calculate the AVbenefits
for crash types of different severity. However, CMFs and the expected crash frequency estimations
do not always differentiate between fatal, serious and slight injury accidents. As a result, it is
usually not possible to estimate the number of expected crashes individually for different types of
severity. For this reason the usual practice is to establish an average societal cost that is
representative of a combined fatal/injury crash. This can be achieved by weighting the average
crash costs by the number of crashes in each type of severity. This is done for the 2009 values
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and the average crash cost for all fatal and injury accidents is estimated as AED 460,413, as
shown in Table 12.2.
Example:
The crash cushion installation shown in the previous example was estimated to reduce the number
of injury/fatal crashes by 2.76 per year. Assuming that this installation will increase the number of
PDO crashes by 2.00 per year; what is the annual monetary benefit (AVbenefit) associated with this
crash cushion installation?
Using Table 12.2 as a reference for Cc and applying Equation 12.5 for Injury and PDO crashes
separately:
AVbenefits for Injury/Fatal crashes: 2.76 x AED 460,413 = AED 1,270,740 per year
AVbenefits for PDO crashes: - 2.00 x AED10,418 = - AED 20,836 per year
Total AVbenefits for all crashes: AED1,270,740 - 20,836 = AED 1,249,904 per year
12.3.2 Assessment of Annual Treatment Costs

Estimating the project costs associated with implementing a treatment should follow the same
procedure as developing cost estimates for other highway construction projects. The expected
costs are likely to differ between sites and each treatment. The cost of implementing a treatment
will include a range of factors; for example, rights of way acquisition, material costs, earthworks,
utility relocation etc. All such costs should be included in the BCR Analysis. These include, but
may not be limited to:
 Project development, design and management;

 Rights of way costs, including land acquisition;
 Construction costs;
 Traffic management during construction;
 Operating costs;
 Maintenance costs; etc.
Some of these costs, such as construction costs, would occur at the beginning of the project while
the others, such as maintenance, occur over the life time of the project. These should be estimated
as annual costs (AVcosts) for each year and discounted into a present value as explained in Section
12.3.3.
12.3.3 Project Present Value of Costs and Benefits

Previous sections (12.3.1 and 12.3.2) presented the methodology to estimate the annual values
(AV) of treatment costs and benefits. However, in economic analysis all costs and benefits incurred
in future years should be discounted to an equivalent Present Value (PV). This is done to reflect
the value of money over time. Due to depreciation and the society’s preferences for current
consumption over long term investments, the benefits which will occur in the future are valued less
PAGE 320
today. Adjustment of annual monetary values into present values is achieved through the use of a
present worth factor (Fp), as shown in Equation 12.6, Equation 12.7 and Equation 12.8.
Equation 12.6
Equation 12.7
Where:
PVbenefits = Present value of project benefits

PVcosts = Present value of project costs
AVbenefits(y) = Annual Monetary value of project benefits for year y
AVcosts (y) = Annual Monetary value of project costs for year y
Ep = Number of years (evaluation period or project life) for which the annual costs are to be
discounted.
Fp (y) = Present worth factor for year y
Equation 12.8
Where:
Fp(y) = Present worth factor for year y
i = Discount Rate (i.e., if the discount rate is 5 percent, i = 0.05)
12.3.4 Example BCR Calculation

The example presented in this section illustrates the process for calculating the benefits and costs
for three alternative safety treatments at a problematic road section. This example does not belong
to a real case study, but rather it is designed to demonstrate the processes involved in a BCR
calculation. The values presented in this example, such as costs of individual countermeasures, or
the expected crash frequency, may not be accurate in terms of real world values. The
designer/engineer should therefore not use any of the values presented in this example in their
BCR calculations.
Background Information:
The roadside along a section of highway is under safety evaluation. The initial assessment
revealed that the rigid lighting columns along the road are all located within the clear zone.
Engineers have identified the following three treatment options to mitigate the risk posed by the
lighting columns:
 Treatment Option 1: Relocate the rigid lighting columns beyond the clear zone;
PAGE 321
 Treatment Option 2: Replace the rigid lighting columns with a passively safe alternative
design;
 Treatment Option 3: Shield the rigid lighting columns with a semi-rigid barrier;
The Facts:
The roadway agency has analysed the crash history along the road under evaluation and decided
the following frequency is a good estimation of the expected casualty crashes (fatal/injury) with
rigid lighting poles, if the roadside is left in its current condition:
 Nwot = 0.4 casualty crashes per year.
A 2% annual increase in the crash frequency is also estimated, as a result of the expected future
increase in traffic volume in the area.
Following a literature review, the following CMFs were identified as suitable for the proposed
treatment options (see Table 12.1):
CMF1 = 0.29, “Remove or relocate fixed hazards outside of clear zone, for fatal & injury, run-off-
road crashes [9]”
 CMF2 = 0.60 “Replace rigid pole with passively safe poles (slip-base, impact absorbing,
etc.), for fatal & injury, Run-off Road Crashes on Straight [14]”
 CMF3 = 0.74 “New semi-rigid roadside barrier installation, for fatal & injury, run-off-road
crashes [16]”
The roadway agency finds the societal crash costs shown in Table 12.2 acceptable. The agency
decided to conservatively estimate the economic benefits of countermeasures. Therefore, they are
using the average injury crash cost (i.e. the weighted average of all severities including fatal) as
the crash cost value (Cc) representative of the predicted fatal and injury crashes.
 Cc= AED460,413
The discount rate (i) is accepted as the following:

 i = 4.0%
The evaluation period (Ep) is selected as the following:
 Ep= 10 years – Please note that 10 years is chosen, to keep the length of calculations and
the space required for this example at a reasonable limit. In reality, the design life of the
treatment is likely to be chosen as the analysis period.
The costs of each treatment option are estimated as follows:
 Treatment Option 1: An initial construction cost of AED 166,800, with negligible annual
costs in the following years.
 Treatment Option 2: An initial construction and equipment cost of AED 150,000, with an
annual repair and maintenance cost of AED 6,255 in the following years.
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 Treatment Option 3: An initial construction and equipment cost of AED 120,000, with an
annual repair and maintenance cost of AED 21,016 in the following years.
Solution:
Step 1: Calculate the expected frequency of crashes with (Nwt) and without (Nwot) treatment
Expected crash frequency without any treatment (Nwot) is calculated for each year, as shown in
Table 12.3. The initial crash frequency of 0.4 crashes per year is adjusted with an annual increase
of 2% to include the effect of expected increase in traffic volume in the area.
Once the expected crash frequency (Nwot) for each year is estimated, the individual CMFs for each
treatment are used with Equation 12.3 to calculate the expected crash frequencies (Nwt) after each
treatment, as shown in Table 12.3.
It can be seen that, relocation of the hazard is estimated to provide the highest reduction in crash
frequency. This is followed by the use of passively safe columns and the use of a semi-rigid
barrier.
Table 12.3 – Estimated annual reduction in crash frequency by each treatment
Treatment 1 - Treatment 3 -
Hazards removed or Treatment 2 - Hazards Hazards shielded
Expected Crash relocated beyond made passively safe with a semi-rigid
Frequency clear zone barrier
Year in
without
Service
Treatment Expected Expected Expected
Life (y)
(Nwot) Crash Crash Crash
CMF1 CMF2 CMF3
(Crashes/Year) Frequency Frequency Frequency
(Nwt1) (Nwt2) (Nwt3)
1 0.40 0.29 0.12 0.60 0.24 0.74 0.30

2 0.41 0.29 0.12 0.60 0.24 0.74 0.30
3 0.42 0.29 0.12 0.60 0.25 0.74 0.31
4 0.42 0.29 0.12 0.60 0.25 0.74 0.31
5 0.43 0.29 0.13 0.60 0.26 0.74 0.32
6 0.44 0.29 0.13 0.60 0.26 0.74 0.33
7 0.45 0.29 0.13 0.60 0.27 0.74 0.33
8 0.46 0.29 0.13 0.60 0.28 0.74 0.34
9 0.47 0.29 0.14 0.60 0.28 0.74 0.35
10 0.48 0.29 0.14 0.60 0.29 0.74 0.35
Total 4.38 1.27 2.63 3.24
Step 2: Calculate the annual monetary benefits (AVbenefits) caused by reduction in crash rate
for each treatment
Equation 12.5 is used to estimate annual monetary benefits for each year, as shown in
PAGE 323
Table 12.4:
Table 12.4 – Annual monetary benefits of change in crashes caused by each treatment
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Year in Average Cost Average Annual Average Annual Average Annual

Service of a Crash (Cc) Reduction Monetary Reduction Monetary Reduction Monetary
Life (y) (AED) in Crash Benefits in Crash Benefits in Crash Benefits
Frequency (AVbenefits) Frequency (AVbenefits) Frequency (AVbenefits)
(Nwot-Nwt1) (AED) (Nwot-Nwt2) (AED) (Nwot-Nwt3) (AED)
1 460,413 0.28 130,757 0.16 73,666 0.10 47,883
2 460,413 0.29 133,372 0.16 75,139 0.11 48,841
3 460,413 0.30 136,040 0.17 76,642 0.11 49,817
4 460,413 0.30 138,761 0.17 78,175 0.11 50,814
5 460,413 0.31 141,536 0.17 79,739 0.11 51,830
6 460,413 0.31 144,367 0.18 81,333 0.11 52,867
7 460,413 0.32 147,254 0.18 82,960 0.12 53,924
8 460,413 0.33 150,199 0.18 84,619 0.12 55,002
9 460,413 0.33 153,203 0.19 86,312 0.12 56,103
10 460,413 0.34 156,267 0.19 88,038 0.12 57,225
Step 3: Convert the annual monetary benefits (AVbenefits) into present value of benefits
(PVbenefits)
Equation 12.6 is used to convert the annual monetary benefits (AVbenefits) into present value of
benefits (PVbenefits) for each treatment, as shown in Table 12.5.
Table 12.5 – Converting annual values to present values (benefits)

Present Annual Annual Present Annual Present
Year in Present
Worth Monetary Monetary Value of Monetary Value of
Service Value of
Factor Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs
Life (y) Costs (PVcosts)
(Fp) (AVcosts) (AVcosts) (PVcosts) (AVcosts) (PVcosts)
(AED)
(AED) (AED) (AED) (AED) (AED)
1 1.00 130,757 130,757 73,666 73,666 47,883 47,883
2 0.92 133,372 123,310 75,139 69,471 48,841 45,156
3 0.89 136,040 120,939 76,642 68,135 49,817 44,288
4 0.85 138,761 118,613 78,175 66,824 50,814 43,436
5 0.82 141,536 116,332 79,739 65,539 51,830 42,601
6 0.79 144,367 114,095 81,333 64,279 52,867 41,781
7 0.76 147,254 111,901 82,960 63,043 53,924 40,978
8 0.73 150,199 109,749 84,619 61,830 55,002 40,190
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9 0.70 153,203 107,638 86,312 60,641 56,103 39,417

10 0.68 156,267 105,568 88,038 59,475 57,225 38,659
Total 1,158,904 652,903 424,387
Step 4: Convert the annual monetary costs (AVcosts) into present value of costs (PVcosts)
Table 12.6 presents the estimated annual project costs for each one of the treatment options.
Please observe that Treatment Option 1 is estimated to have only an initial construction cost, while
Treatment Options 2 & 3 are estimated to have initial construction, equipment, annual
maintenance and crash repair costs. Once the annual costs are estimated, Equation 12.7 is then
used to convert the annual monetary costs (AVcosts) into present value of costs (PVcosts) for
each treatment, as shown in Table 12.6
Table 12.6 - Converting annual values to present values (costs)

Present Annual Present Present Annual Present
Year in
Worth Monetary Value of Annual Monetary Value of Monetary Value of
Service
Factor Costs Costs Costs (AVcosts) Costs Costs Costs
Life (y)
(Fp) (AVcosts) (PVcosts) (AED) (PVcosts) (AVcosts) (PVcosts)
(AED) (AED) (AED) (AED) (AED)
1 1.0 166,800 166,800 150,000 150,000 120,000 120,000
2 0.9 0 0 6,255 5,783 21,016 19,430
3 0.9 0 0 6,255 5,561 21,016 18,683
4 0.9 0 0 6,255 5,347 21,016 17,965
5 0.8 0 0 6,255 5,141 21,016 17,274
6 0.8 0 0 6,255 4,943 21,016 16,609
7 0.8 0 0 6,255 4,753 21,016 15,970
8 0.7 0 0 6,255 4,570 21,016 15,356
9 0.7 0 0 6,255 4,395 21,016 14,766
10 0.7 0 0 6,255 4,226 21,016 14,198
Total 166,800 194,719 270,251
Step 5: Calculate the BCR
Once the present value of costs (PVcosts) and benefits (PVbenefits) are estimated, the BCR can then
be calculated for each treatment option by using Equation 12.1, as shown in Table 12.7.
Table 12.7 – Calculation of the BCR for each treatment option

PVcosts (AED) 166,800 194,719 270,251
PVbenefits (AED) 1,158,904 652,903 424,387
BCR 6.9 3.4 1.6
PAGE 325
Discussion of Results:
This example demonstrated BCR calculations for three alternative treatment options. The results
show that all treatment options are economically feasible as the BCR for all are over 1.00. Of the
three options, relocation of the hazards is expected to provide the highest BCR with a value of 6.9.
However, in reality, relocating lighting columns beyond the clear zone may not be applicable. This
is because the lighting columns should be located within a certain distance from the travelled way
to fulfil their intended function. Normally, this option could have been discarded even before going
into lengthy BCR calculations. However, it was included in this example on purpose to show the
effects of such a treatment.
Among the two practicable treatment options, use of passively safe lighting columns provides the
highest BCR with 3.4, while shielding the existing columns with a barrier provides a BCR of 1.6.
The use of passively safe columns is the likely choice of treatment for this situation, as it provides
higher benefits for lower costs.
It can also be observed that the initial cost of using passively safe columns is estimated to be
higher than the initial cost of a semi-rigid barrier installation. However, as the annual maintenance
and crash repair costs for the barrier are estimated to be higher, the use of passively safe columns
is expected to be the cheaper option over the 10 year analysis period. These numbers were
selected on purpose to show that the option with the cheapest initial cost may not always be the
cheapest over a longer period. In reality the initial and following annual costs of a barrier and a
passively safe column would change from one product to another.
12.4 Treatment Prioritization Methods

Once the CBR Analysis is complete, the designer/engineer can identify the treatment options
which are not economically feasible and eliminate these from further consideration. The following
task is to choose one of the economically feasible options for application. At this stage the
designer/engineer may choose to make a decision based on one or more of the following
considerations:
 Economic effectiveness – Ranking by Incremental BCR;

 The amount of risk reduction – Ranking by Risk Reduction;
 Non-monetary considerations.
Each site is different and the importance of one of these considerations may be higher for some
sites than the others. Therefore, the designer/engineer should be aware of them all and make an
informed decision based on engineering judgment to choose the best option for the specific site.
To help with the decision process, the designer/engineer may choose to rank and prioritize the
treatment options based on these criteria. This section provides guidance into how these rankings
can be carried out.
12.4.1 Ranking by Incremental BCR

The first way of ranking treatment options is through their economic effectiveness. A good
measure for economic effectiveness is the BCR. At this point of economic assessment, BCR for
each treatment option will already be available to the designer/engineer. A simple way of
comparing alternative treatment options is simply ranking them by their BCR in decreasing order.
PAGE 326
The project with the highest BCR is estimated to provide the highest monetary return with respect
to the investment required. This type of ranking is easy to interpret when the project with the
highest benefits is also the project with the lowest cost, as was the case with the example shown in
Section 12.3.4.
However, there are some situations where it is not straightforward to choose one treatment option
over the other, simply by comparing their BCR. As previously explained in Section 12.3, a high
BCR may be a consequence of a very low cost treatment, such as delineation of a hazard, with
relatively high benefits. Meanwhile a more expensive treatment, such as installation of a crash
cushion, may generate very high benefits, but at a higher cost and therefore generate a lower
BCR. One such example is shown in Table 12.8. In this example Treatment 1 has a higher BCR
(5.00) compared to Treatment 2 (2.00). However, Treatment 2 provides much higher benefits (AED
100,000) compared to Treatment 1 (AED50,000). In such a situation, choosing only by BCR alone
would lead to a very simple treatment, which would not lead to a significant improvement. On the
other hand, to choose Treatment 2, the designer/engineer should be able to justify the extra costs
required. In such cases an Incremental BCR Analysis can be used to make more informed
decisions.
Table 12.8 – Example situation, where BCR does not provide a clear choice
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
PVcosts (AED) 10,000 50,000
PVbenefits (AED) 50,000 100,000
BCR 5.00 2.00
Incremental BCR Analysis is an extension to the individual BCR calculations for alternative
treatment options. Incremental CBA provides the designer/engineer a method through which they
can compare alternative treatment options and assess if the additional cost required to implement
an alternative treatment are justified by the added benefits.
To calculate the incremental CBA the following procedures should be undertaken:
Step 1. Calculate the BCR for all alternative treatment options.
Step 2. Arrange all alternative treatment options with a BCR>1.0, in ascending order based on
their estimated cost (PVcosts). The project with the lowest cost is ranked first.
Step 3. Calculate the incremental B/C ratio (BCRb/a) of the second treatment option with respect
to the first one, using Equation 12.9:
Equation 12.9
PAGE 327
Where:
BCRb/a = Incremental BCR of treatment option b with respect to option a
PVbenefits_a , PVbenefits_b = Present value of benefits for treatment options a and b
PVcosts_a , PVcosts_b = Present value of costs for treatment options a and b
a = treatment option with the lower cost compared to option b
b = treatment option with the higher cost compared to option a
Step 4. If the BCRb/a > 1.0, the additional funds required to implement option b rather than a yield
more benefit than the incremental increase in cost. Therefore option b is preferred over a.
Analysis continues with the comparison of b to the next treatment option in the list.
If the BCRb/a < 1.0, the additional funds required to implement option b rather than a yield
less benefit than the incremental increase in cost. Therefore option b is not preferred over
a. Analysis continues with the comparison of a to the next project in the list.
If the costs (PVcosts) for two options are equal, the option which provides higher benefits
for the same cost is preferred. Analysis continues with the comparison of the chosen
option with the next one on the list. This process is repeated. The project selected in the
final pairing is considered to be the best investment on economic grounds.
Step 5. Continue Steps 3 and 4 until a comparison with the last (highest cost) treatment option in
the list. Treatment option selected in the last comparison is considered the best economic
investment.
Step 6. Once the best economic investment is identified, steps 2 to 5 can be repeated for the
remaining options to identify the second best investment. This process can be repeated
until the ranking of every treatment option is identified.
Example:
Calculate the incremental BCR for the example shown in Table 12.8.
Using Equation 12.9, BCRtreatment2/treatment1 = (100,000 – 50,000) / (50,000 – 10,000) = 1.25
The result shows that the added funds required for the implementation of treatment Option 2 over
Option 1 yield more benefit than the incremental increase in cost. Therefore Option 2 is the better
economic investment.
Example:
Table 12.9 shows an example of a typical incremental BCR analysis. In this example there are four
alternative treatment options to choose from. As can be seen from the table, alternative treatment
options are listed from left to right with an order of increasing costs (PVcosts). The analysis starts
with the comparison of the second cheapest option, Treatment 2, with the cheapest option,
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Treatment 1. Using Equation 12.9, the BCR2/1 is calculated as 1.25. This value is over 1.00
therefore Treatment 2 is preferred over Treatment 1.
The analysis continues with the comparison of Treatment 2 with the next one, which is Treatment
3. Again using Equation 12.9, BCR3/2 is calculated as 0.40. This value is less than 1.0 and
therefore the added cost of Treatment 3 over Treatment 2 is not justified by the relative increase in
benefits. Treatment 2 is still the preferred option.
The analysis continues with the comparison of Treatment 2 with the next one on the list, which is
Treatment 4. Once again using Equation 12.9, BCR4/2 is calculated as 7.40. This value is over 1.0
and therefore Treatment 4 is preferred over Treatment 2. Since Treatment 4 is the last option in
the list, there are no more comparisons to make, therefore it can be concluded that Treatment 4 is
the best economic investment among the alternatives.
Table 12.9 – Example of incremental BCR selection
To achieve a full economic ranking of all treatment options, Treatment 4 is removed from the table
and the process described above is repeated for the remaining options. This will show that the
second best economic investment is Treatment 2. Treatment 2 is then removed from the list for the
final comparison, which reveals that Treatment 1 is the third best economic investment. Therefore,
the economic ranking of the alternative treatment options is as follows:
1. Treatment Option 4
12.4.2 Ranking by Risk Reduction

The second way of ranking treatment options is by the amount of risk reduction provided. As
previously shown in Table 12.8, a treatment option with the highest BCR does not necessarily
provide the highest amount of risk reduction. Cost effectiveness is essential for a well targeted
road safety treatment. However, this should be achieved while providing an acceptable level of
benefits, i.e. reduction in the number and/or severity of crashes. To ensure this, local road
authorities can often set targets for minimum acceptable risk. For example in UK, roadside design
PAGE 329
decisions are done through the software RRRAP [3]. The RRRAP calculates the risk for each
treatment option and expresses the risk in equivalent fatalities per 100million vehicle km travelled.
If the risk after a treatment is expected to be above a certain value (this value is currently not
public information), the level of risk and therefore the treatment option is considered unacceptable
[20].
Similarly the road authority or the designer/engineer may choose to rank the alternative treatment
options from a number of different risk reduction measures. These measures include:
 Monetary value of treatment benefits;

 Total number of crashes reduced;
 Number of fatal and incapacitating injury accidents reduced;
 Number of fatal and injury crashes reduced.
As an outcome of a ranking procedure, the project list is ranked high to low on any one of the
above measures. At this point the road authority or the designer/engineer may choose to set a
certain level of risk reduction as a minimum and eliminate any treatment options which do not
provide the minimum desired level of risk reduction. Many simple improvement decisions,
especially those involving only a few sites and a limited number of project alternatives for each site
can be made by reviewing rankings based on two or more of these criteria.
Example:
Table 12.10Table 12.10 presents an example scenario which demonstrates how the amount of risk
reduction provided can affect the final decision, in treatment selection. According to this scenario,
the road authority has a set goal of decreasing the frequency of injury accidents by 50% within the
next 10 years. A problematic site is chosen for safety improvements. There are three alternative
treatment options identified to decrease the frequency of injury crashes observed at the site.
Table 12.10, the first treatment option is estimated to provide a 35% reduction, while treatment
options 2 and 3 are estimated to provide 60% and 70% reduction respectively. In-line with their
casualty reduction targets, the road authority does not consider a 35% reduction high enough.
Therefore treatment option 1 is discarded. An incremental BCR is calculated between options 2
and 3 as follows:
BCRtreatment3/treatment2 = (350,000 – 300,000) / (190,000 – 150,000) = 1.25
As the BCR is larger than 1.0, the treatment option 3 is chosen over treatment 2.
Table 12.10 – Example of ranking by risk reduction
Treatment Treatment Treatment

Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
% Reduction in Crashes 35% 60% 70%
PVcosts (AED) 14,000 150,000 190,000

PVbenefits (AED) 175,000 300,000 350,000
BCR 12.5 2.0 1.8
PAGE 330
However, this selection could have been different if the road authority did not have a specific
percentage of risk reduction set as a threshold value. In such a situation the treatment option 1
would not have been discarded. In that case, the results of an incremental BCR analysis shows
that the added funds required for the implementation of treatment options 2 and 3 over option 1
doesn’t yield more benefit than the incremental increase in cost. Therefore, Option 1 is chosen as
the better economic investment.
BCRtreatment2/treatment1 = (300,000 – 175,000) / (150,000 – 14,000) = 0.92; 0.92<1.00
BCRtreatment3/treatment1 = (350,000 – 175,000) / (190,000 – 14,000) = 0.99; 0.99<1.00
As demonstrated within this example, some roadside safety treatments may provide a good value
for money. However, the amount of risk reduction provided may not always be considered enough.
12.4.3 Non-Monetary Considerations

In most cases, the main benefits of applying a roadside safety treatment can be quantified in
monetary terms; i.e. the monetary gains expected due to a reduction in crash frequency, severity,
and the associated repair costs. However, implementing safety counter-measures can have
several impacts some of which cannot be evaluated using monetary criteria. These are
nevertheless important and should form part of the decision-making process. Examples to non-
monetary impacts include the following:
 Public demands & road user needs;

 Public perception of road safety improvements;
 Meeting established community objectives to improve safety or accessibility along a
particular route or in a certain area;
 Air quality, noise, visual intrusion or other environmental considerations;
 Aesthetics;
 Experience from other, similar sites;
 In-service performance of treatment options.

As these considerations cannot be quantified, their effect in the final decision should be evaluated
on a case by case basis through engineering judgment. For example, aesthetics may be of a
significant importance in the selection of a certain type of treatment over the other alternatives
around areas of natural beauty, land marks, major tourist attractions, etc. while it may not be an
important factor in a remote rural area of no special importance. In some cases the
designer/engineer may choose to apply a certain treatment option to satisfy the public demand,
although it may not be the best option from an economic perspective. For example, one may
choose to install a motorcyclist protection system on a certain location to satisfy the demands of a
motorcyclist action group.
Non-monetary considerations can be of significant importance in the final decision; however, the
designer/engineer should always ensure that an adequate level of safety is provided.
12.4.4 Selection of an Appropriate Treatment Option

Once the risk reduction and BCR ranking, and the non-monetary assessment of treatment options
are complete, the designer/engineer should find a balance between the risk reduction, cost
PAGE 331
effectiveness and non-monetary considerations. As each site is different, in some scenarios

monetary constraints will be the decisive factor, in others amount of risk reduction may be, and in
some unique situations, non-monetary considerations may be more important than cost
effectiveness. It is therefore up to the DoT to specify which is the priority for the specific project,
and up to the designer/engineer to fulfil these requirements, ensuring that engineering judgment
should be used to find the optimal solution that fits the needs of the particular site. More
information on the final selection of the optimal roadside treatment is provided in Chapter 2.

This chapter provides a general guidance to the designer/engineer on roadside safety economic
assessment process. Comprehensive economic analyses usually require a considerable amount of
data and local crash prediction models, which are not available for Abu Dhabi at the moment. Due
to these limitations, the guidance provided in this Chapter is aimed for designer/engineer, which
may not have access to a wide range of data. References are also made to more comprehensive
international methods and tools.
The economic assessment process starts with the assessment of economic feasibility for each
treatment option identified for the roadside under evaluation. Recommended method for this
assessment is benefit/cost ratio (BCR). BCR calculation involves the following steps:
 Assessment of Treatment Benefits;
o Determination of the Expected Crash Rate;
o Determination of the Reduction in Crash Rate Caused by the Proposed Treatment;
o Conversion of Benefits into a Monetary Value;
 Assessment of Treatment Costs;
 Discounting of Costs and Benefits;
 Calculation of BCR.
Each of these steps is supplemented with example calculations, which demonstrates all steps
included in a BCR analysis. References are also made to international resources, to help the
designer/engineer identify key parameters, such as crash modification factors (CMFs) & average
crash costs, in the absence of local values.
Once the BCR for each treatment option is calculated, the ones with a BCR less than 1.0 are
eliminated from the analysis, as these are considered as economically infeasible. The assessment
then continues with prioritization of the economically feasible treatment options from different
perspectives. Guidance is given to help the designer/engineer to assess and/or rank the treatment
options, based on the following criteria:
 Economic effectiveness;
 The amount of risk reduction;
 Non-monetary considerations.
Following the assessments based on these criteria, the designer/engineer can then choose the
most appropriate treatment option for the site under evaluation, based on engineering judgment.
PAGE 332
12.6 References
[1] K. K. Mak and D. L. Sicking, “NCHRP 492 - Roadside Safety Analysis Program (RSAP)
Engineer's Manual,” Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C., 2003.
[2] AASHTO, Highway Safety Manual, 1st Edition, Washington D.C.: American Association of
Highway and Transportation Officials, 2010.
[3] TD19/06 Design Manual for Roads and Bridges, Volume2 Highway Structures: Design,
Assembly Government, The Department for Regional Development Norther Ireland, 2006.
[4] CEDR, “SAVERS (Selection of Appropriate Vehicle Restraint Systems),” Conference of

European Directors of Roads, 2015.
[6] AASHTO, Roadside Design Guide, Washington D.C.: American Association of Highway and
Transportation Officials, 2002.
[7] University of North Carolina Highway Safety Research Center, “Crash Modification Factors
Clearinghouse,” U.S. Department of Transport Federal Highway Administration, [Online].
Available: http://www.cmfclearinghouse.org/. [Accessed 26 10 2015].
[8] C. Jurewicz, L. Steinmetz, C. Phillips, G. Veith and J. McLean, “Improving Roadside Safety,
Stage 4 - Interim Report (AP-R436-14),” Austroads, Sydney, Australia, 2014.
[9] A. Gan, J. Shen and A. Rodriguez, “Update of Florida crash reduction factors and
countermeasures to improve the development of district safety improvement projects: final
report,” Florida Department of Transportation, Tallahassee, FL, USA, 2005.
[10] C. V. Zageer, “SETTING PRIORITIES FOR REDUCING UTILITY POLE CRASHES,”

Transportation Research Circular, no. E-C030, pp. 9-31, 2001-4.
[11] C. Zegeer, J. Hummer, D. Reinfurt, L. Herf and W. Hunter, “Safety cost-effectiveness of

incremental changes in cross-section design: informational guide, report FHWA/RD-87/094,”
Federal Highway Administration, Washington, DC, USA, 1987.
[12] Federal Highway Administration, Toolbox of countermeasures and their potential effectiveness
for roadway departure crashes, Washington, DC, USA: FHWA, 2008.
[13] B. Corben and S. Newstead, Evaluation of the 1992-1996 Transport Accident Commission
funded accident blackspot treatment program in Victoria, report 182, Melbourne, Vic.: Monash
University Accident Research Centre, 2001.
[14] Roads and Traffic Authority, Accident reduction guide Part 1: accident investigation and
prevention, report TD2004/RS01, Sydney, NSW: RTA, 2004.
[15] VicRoads, ‘Road safety program: guidelines for the selection of projects under the road
conditions sub-program (incorporating accident blackspot projects, mass action projects,
PAGE 333
railway level crossing projects)’, Kew, Vic: VicRoads, 1990.
[16] Arizona Department of Transportation, Traffic engineering policies, guides and procedures:
section 231: benefit/cost ratio economic analysis, Phoenix, AZ, USA: Arizona DOT, 2009.
[17] N. Candappa, A. D’Elia, B. Corben and S. Newstead, Evaluation of the effectiveness of

flexible barriers along Victorian roads: final report, report 291, Clayton, Vic: Monash University
Accident Research Centre, 2009.
[18] R. Elvik, A. Hoye, T. Vaa and M. Sorensen, The handbook of road safety measures, 2nd
edition, Bingley, UK: Emerald, 2009.
[19] Abu Dhabi Department of Transport, Summary of Crash and Injury Costs, 2009.
[20] Mouchel Parkman, “Guidance on the use of the Road Restraint Risk Assessment Process
(RRRAP) associated with TD 19/06,” Mar 2011. [Online]. Available:
http://www.standardsforhighways.co.uk/tech_info/rrrap.htm. [Accessed 20 October 2015].
PAGE 334
13 URBAN ROADSIDE DESIGN

13.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have provided a detailed description of the main approaches to safe roadside
design for roads outside built-up areas. However, when considering roads in urban areas, there
are some important differences that have to be taken into account. In particular:
 Speed limits and traffic speeds are often lower;
 Traffic volumes are likely to be higher than for equivalent roads in rural areas;
 Traffic speeds vary more between peak and off-peak periods;
 There will be greater numbers of pedestrians and cyclists in the vicinity of the road, and
needing to cross;
 Intersections and driveways will be much more closely spaced;
 The edge of the carriageway will often be curbed;
 Parking, pick-up and set-down (e.g. taxis) and loading will often take place at the curb side;
 Bus stops will be more commonplace, with associated signposts and shelters at the curb
side and stationary buses;
 There will be more street furniture and facilities used by pedestrians, such as seating,
refuse bins, public telephones;
 Where shops and cafes are present, there are likely to be additional signs, including
advertising boards;
 Public utilities install roadside poles and equipment cabinets, and more roadworks for
maintenance and installation.
Crucially, space is more constrained, with the width available for the highway already limited by
existing developments. This means there is often less space available for separating vehicles from
pedestrians and cyclists, in providing clearance zones and in meeting the requirements for
sightlines.
This Chapter therefore discusses how the issues listed above are taken into account in roadside
design in urban areas, and identifies where the practices described elsewhere in this guide may
need to be modified. It is strongly recommended that when planning any urban highway scheme,
an initial assessment is made of these local factors at an early stage in the design process. In
particular, gathering information on pedestrian and cycle demand, including an assessment of
desire lines (the most direct routes between the main origins and destinations) will make it easier
to ensure that their needs are taken into account in the design, and that conflicts can be avoided.
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13 URBAN ROADSIED DESIGN FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
13.2 Hazards on the Sidewalk

With constrained space next to the roadside the sidewalk becomes a natural location for many
features that have the potential to present hazards to road users. These include poles for road
signs and signals; utility poles and cabinets; bus stops and shelters; refuse bins; public seating and
cycle parking. Where streets are significantly used for shopping or cafes there may be advertising
boards and stalls/kiosks for street vendors. There may also be pedestrian guard railings, and trees.
It is important to distinguish between hazards to errant vehicles encroaching on to the sidewalk,

and hazards to pedestrians on the sidewalk. In the latter case the main risk is from errant vehicles,
although consideration also needs to be given to the risks (including trips and falls) to pedestrians,
and the obstruction caused by poorly designed features on the sidewalk. Strategies to minimise
risk of conflict between motor vehicles and pedestrians are detailed in Section 13.4.
From the perspective of vehicles travelling along the carriageway, the following hazards are
presented by features on the sidewalk [1]:
 Collision in the event that the vehicle leaves the carriageway;
 Reduced sightlines;
 Adverse impacts on lane position, including encroachment into adjacent or opposing lanes
if drivers feel it necessary to increase their passing distance;
 The risk of contact with protruding parts of the vehicle (e.g. mirrors) and the overhang of
long vehicles.
It is recommended that a minimum clear-zone of 0.5m should be provided (0.9m at intersections)

to avoid the problems listed above. Ideally, this should be 1.2m from the curb [1]; research
undertaken in the United States in 2008 showed that 80% of crashes in an urban environment
involved an object with lateral offset equal to or less than 1.2m [2]. The clear-zone value of 0.5m
should be considered the minimum standard and where space constraints permit the value of 1.2m
should be used, especially at a number of potential high risk zones as detailed in Section 13.3.2.
In most urban environments breakaway designs are not necessary, they should generally be used
for structures less than 1.8m from the curb on roads with a posted speed limit of 80km/h or above,
which will be limited to urban Expressways and Freeways. However, the use of breakaway designs
can still be considered for lower speed roads if necessary, especially in higher risk zones. There
are exceptions to the use of breakaway designs, for example except for bus shelters or locations
with very high pedestrian flows (the risk to pedestrians arises chiefly from the errant vehicle rather
than anything they might hit, and with the exception of crash barriers, the majority of features that
might be installed in the footway are not intended to stop stray vehicles and would not be effective
in doing so even if designed not to break).
For roadside furniture, the following examples generally are not considered a roadside hazard in
the urban environment at operating speeds less than 60km/h:
 Street furniture such as pedestrian railing, bollards, bins, benches;
 Furniture not within the roadside clear zone; and
 Furniture located behind a roadside barrier.
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13.3 Evaluation of Safety of Individual Sites
13.3.1 Identification of Risk Factors

Given the diversity of roadside environments found in an urban area it cannot be assumed that a
single approach will be suitable at all locations within a particular scheme. Analysis of road crash
statistics shows that they are not wholly randomly distributed, with some particular locations often
standing out as experiencing more frequent crashes. There can be quite significant local variations
in speed and road geometry, as well as factors that lead to pedestrians being exposed to much
greater risk in particular places, for example near bus stops, schools, or where there is greater
demand for pedestrians to cross. If the higher risk locations can be identified, then they can be
given priority for safety improvements. One approach is to increase the clearance distances
described in 0 at sensitive locations, so there is less risk of errant vehicles striking roadside
objects.
When evaluating sites for potential increased risk the factors below should be considered.
Crash history- where available, crash statistics and police records should be assessed to identify
places where a disproportionate number of crashes have occurred.
Traffic speed- crash severity is much greater at higher speeds, which in urban areas are most
likely to occur when speeds are not constrained by congestion or engineering measures. For this
reason the 85th percentile for off-peak speeds should be used. In urban areas this may be higher
than the design speed for the road.
Proximity to curb- where parking, or a cycle lane, or some other untrafficked margin keeps the
main traffic flow away from the curb, this space can be included in the clearance zone, and such a
location would be considered at lower risk of encroachment.
Pedestrians- it is important to identify significant pedestrian flows, including both alongside the
road, where they congregate and places where they cross. Consideration should also be given to
where children are most likely to be found.
Cyclists- cyclists are at greatest risk at intersections, and this applies where cyclists are given
dedicated routes alongside links as well as when they are sharing the road with other vehicles.
Street furniture and other roadside features can obstruct cyclists, or their sightlines to the main
traffic flow, and present an increased risk in the event of a crash.
13.3.2 Sites Requiring Increased Clearance Distances

There are particular locations where greater clearances should be allowed than the minimum
recommendations given in section 13.2. These include the outside of curves and locations where
the curb is dropped, for example at pedestrian crossings and driveways. Consideration should also
be given to the need to maintain sightlines at turnings. These are discussed in greater detail in the
sub sections below.
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13.3.2.1 On Horizontal Curves

Hazards next to curved sections of road should be regarded as presenting greater risks. Vehicles
are more likely to leave the carriageway on the outside of curves and there is a greater likelihood
of encroachment by overhanging long vehicles. It is therefore recommended that greater clearance
distances are provided at such high risk locations.
It is recommended that at least 1.8m lateral clearance is provided from the face of the curb on the
outside of a curve whilst maintaining 1.2m offset elsewhere. Where there is no vertical curb
provision then this clearance should be increased to 3.6m [1]. Figure 13.1 shows an example of a
curbed curve.
A further consideration is to ensure that the drivers’ line of sight is maintained around the curve. As
such a clear zone should also be maintained on the inside of the curve, albeit over a shorter
distance, as shown in Figure 13.1 [1]. Obstructions on the inside of a horizontal curve, which
continue for a considerable length and interfere with the line of sight on a continuous basis, can
include roadside barriers, walls and buildings. However, in general, obstructions such as traffic
signs and utility poles are not considered for this purpose.
Figure 13.1 – Lateral offset for objects at horizontal curves on curbed facilities [1]
13.3.2.2 At Merge Locations

Lane merge locations, which in urban areas include places such as the ends of bus stop bays,
present an increased risk of conflict between vehicles on the road, and hence of vehicles leaving
the road, especially if they fail to merge and continue in their previous path to avoid a crash.
It is recommended that a 3.7m clear zone is maintained in the vicinity of the taper point, as shown
in Figure 13.2. Research shows that longitudinal placement of objects within approximately 3.1m of
the taper point, increases the frequency of roadside crashes in this location [1]. For this reason it is
recommended that the clear zone should be extended at least 3.1m beyond the taper point as
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Figure 13.2 – Lateral offset at merge locations [1]
13.3.2.3 At Driveways
The risk of roadside crashes is increased at driveways, for several reasons. As at any intersection
there is greater risk of conflict between vehicles entering or leaving the driveway and those on the
main carriageway. There is also a loss of delineation of the edge of the carriageway where there is
no white line, which is common in urban areas, increasing the risk that drivers will misjudge the
boundary of the road, leading to increased risk of collision with objects on the far side of the
driveway. Furthermore, at driveways there is no curb to provide redirection of errant vehicles. For
these reasons increased clearance zones are recommended on the far side of the driveway, a
lateral offset of 3.0 to 4.6m should be provided [1]. Furthermore, visibility triangles for vehicles
exiting the driveway should be clear of obstructions; these should be relocated, removed or
lowered. The offset distance will vary along with the extent of the visibility triangle depending on
the design or operating speed of the major road, as specified in the relevant design standards. The
lateral offsets at driveways are shown in Figure 13.3.
Figure 13.3 – Lateral offset at driveways [1]
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13.3.2.4 At Intersections
Crashes disproportionately occur at intersections, where there is greater potential for conflicting
manoeuvres, as well as a greater concentration of roadside infrastructure, such as signposts,
traffic signal poles and cabinets, lighting; and potentially traffic islands and bollards. The risk of
errant vehicles leaving the carriageway is increased by the presence of dropped curbs at
pedestrian crossings. Furthermore, there is a risk that turning vehicles will not follow the intended
turning path and will encroach into the sidewalk area, with greater risk of collision with roadside
objects.
Design approaches for managing these risks are described below.
 Objects on the inside of turning movements should be as far as possible from the curb. It is
recommended that a clearance zone of 1.8m (with a minimum of 0.9m) is provided [1];
 Where there are dropped curbs for pedestrian crossings, objects should not be positioned
in the path that an errant vehicle would follow if directed up the access ramp [1];
 Traffic islands should be clearly visible to drivers while not encroaching in their path, and
should conform to the appropriate design guidance [3].
Similar to driveways in Section 13.3.2.3, adequate sight distance should be available for a driver to
perceive potential conflicts and to perform the actions needed to negotiate the intersection safely.
A visibility triangle is determined that allows a driver approaching an intersection to observe the
actions of vehicles on the crossing leg(s). This involves establishing the needed sight triangle by
determining the legs of the triangle on the two crossing roadways. Within this clear sight triangle,
any object that would obstruct the driver’s view should be removed, lowered or lateral offset
increased. The obstructions can include buildings, parked or turning vehicles, trees, hedges,
plantings, signs, fences and retaining walls.
Figure 13.4 provides details for constructing and measuring visibility triangle and the subsequent
offset requirements. The lateral offset will vary depending on the design or operating speed of the
major road and the intersection layout, as specified in the relevant design standards.
Figure 13.4 – Clear sight viewing triangle for viewing traffic approaching from the left [3]
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13.3.2.5 Roundabouts
Special consideration should be applied to roundabouts with regard to the lateral offset of objects.
Similar to horizontal curves, there is an increased likelihood of encroachment by overhanging long
vehicles. It is therefore recommended that greater clearance distances are provided these
locations.
Furthermore, the position of objects relative to the curbs at a roundabout is influenced by speed
and possible errant vehicles. In particular, give care to the placement of objects along the exit leg
of the roundabout to consider potential paths of errant vehicles and within the central island on the
entry legs.
It is recommended that at least 1.2m lateral clearance is provided from the face of the curb on the
outside of a roundabout through the circulatory carriageway. Where possible objects should not be
placed alongside the exit leg through the exit radius, but where necessary the clearance of 1.2m
should be maintained. On entry to the roundabout any poles or other furniture in the direct path of
a potential errant vehicle should be of breakaway or frangible design.
13.4 Pedestrian Facilities

Pedestrian facilities include:
 Sidewalk/pathways;
 Pedestrian crossing locations;
 Pedestrian crossing design (type of crossing);
 Dropped curbs (curb ramps).
Sidewalks and pedestrian facilities generally do not pose a hazard to motorists. The safety concern
for locating these facilities adjacent to the road is the risk to the pedestrians using the facilities.
Guidance for the use of sidewalks on urban streets is in the Abu Dhabi Road Geometric Design
Manual [3].
Table 13.1 describes common strategies for eliminating or minimizing motor vehicle–pedestrian
crashes at roadside locations.
The approach taken to design should take into account the local context and function of the road or
street. For higher speed roads, such as urban freeways, the ‘movement’ function dominates, and
the focus would be on physically separating pedestrians from the traffic flow. For a shopping or
residential street in an urban centre the ‘place’ function dominates, and the focus would be on
reducing traffic speed and flow, giving space to pedestrians and facilitating freedom of movement.
An additional feature of the roadside environment is a pedestrian buffer area (often referred to as a
buffer strip). As shown in Figure 13.5, the pedestrian buffer is a physical distance separating the
sidewalk and the vehicle travelled way. Buffer areas often accommodate on-street parking, transit
stops, street lighting, planting areas for landscape materials, and common street features. Buffer
strips may be either planted or paved, and they are encouraged for use between urban roadways
and their companion sidewalks.
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Table 13.1 - Design strategies to protect pedestrians in motor vehicle crashes [1]
Purpose Strategy
Reduce motor vehicle–pedestrian crash  Provide continuous pedestrian facilities

likelihood at roadside locations
 Provide safe crossing facilities that are
conveniently located for desire lines
 Install pedestrian refuge medians or

channelized islands
 Offset pedestrian locations away from

travelled way with pedestrian buffers
 Physically separate pedestrians from

travelled way at high-risk locations
 Improve sight distance by removing objects

that obscure driver or pedestrian visibility
Reduce severity of motor vehicle–pedestrian  Reduce roadway design speed, operating

crashes at roadside locations speed, or both in high pedestrian volume
locations
Figure 13.5 – Example of a pedestrian buffer area
Guidance on recommended clearance distances between pedestrians and vehicular traffic has
been issued in the Roadside Design Guide for Dubai, reproduced, but amended to suit Abu Dhabi
requirements, in Table 13.2.
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Table 13.2 - Clearances between pedestrians and vehicular traffic [4]
Desirable Minimum Absolute Minimum

Road class Comments
Clearance Clearance Clearance
Where it is absolutely
As a general rule pedestrians
Equal to the necessary to provide for
Equal to or should not have access to the
clear zone pedestrians within the
greater than right-of-way. However, if a
width right-of-way the
Freeway the clear zone sidewalk or walkway is required,
clearance may only be
width (see Ch. (see Ch. 3) pedestrians are to be excluded
reduced if appropriate
3) from access to the roadway by
vehicle restraint systems
means of a suitable barrier.
are installed.
Where it is absolutely
Pedestrians are in general to be
necessary to provide for
Equal to or Equal to the excluded from expressways by
pedestrians within the
greater than clear zone suitable barrier and fencing or
right-of-way, the
Expressway the clear zone width grade separation. Where access
clearance may only be
width (see Ch. is required connecting walkways
(see Ch. 3) reduced if appropriate
3) should be provided with vehicle
vehicle restraint systems
restraint system separation.
are installed.
Speed limit ≥ If curbside parking is permitted,

Equal to or 80 km/h: Speed limit ≥ 80 km/h: the sidewalk may extend to the
greater than 2.0m 1.2m back of the curb. On high speed
the clear zone roads (≥ 80 km/h) the provision
Arterial Roads
width of suitable barriers should be
Speed limit < Speed limit < 80 km/h: considered if pedestrian activity
(see Ch. 3) 80 km/h: 0.5m is high and minimum clearance
1.2m cannot be achieved.
Equal to or
greater than Often there will be a parking
Collector the clear zone Sidewalk can be immediately adjacent to lane which provides separation
Roads width curb between pedestrians and
moving vehicles.
(see Ch. 3).
Generally there will be a parking

lane which provides separation
Local Roads Sidewalk can be immediately adjacent to curb
between pedestrians and
moving vehicles.
Speed limit >60km/h: install a vehicle restraint system at

Sidewalks should not be
the curb line between sidewalk and traffic lanes
provided on bridges on roads
Bridges which do not have pedestrian
access, including freeways and
Speed limit ≤60km/h*: sidewalk may extend to the curb
expressways.
line*
*A vehicle restraint system can be provided for roads with a speed limit ≤60km/h if deemed necessary for
the safety of pedestrians where activity is high. The barrier shall be designed as a normal longitudinal
roadside safety barrier and located at a suitable offset relative to the curb. See Section 13.6 for further
details.
When planning pedestrian facilities consideration should also be given to:

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 Comfort and security- surface quality, ensuring satisfactory lighting, ensuring that routes
are overlooked and do not provide places of concealment;
 Capacity- considering flows and the effective width of the sidewalk when obstacles are
taken into account. The recommended widths for sidewalks and determining levels of
comfort are detailed in the Abu Dhabi Road Geometric Design Manual [3]. The manual
details the four primary zones that constitute the pedestrian realm, which are illustrated in
Figure 13.6 and the required widths for each of the realm elements for various contexts are
detailed in Table 13.3;
 The needs of people with impaired vision or mobility, in particular in relation to surface
quality, avoidance of trip hazards and obstacles, dropped curbs at crossings, and provision
of tactile surfaces in line with the appropriate standards. The Abu Dhabi Urban Street
Design Manual [5] provides guidance on the use and provision of tactile surface treatments
whilst Figure 13.7 shows typical tactile provision at curb ramps;
 The presence of children, particularly near schools and play areas;
 Sight lines to the traffic lanes, especially at crossings;
 Bus stops, including access from sidewalk where not adjacent to the road, and providing a
comfortable and secure waiting area that does not congest the sidewalk.
Figure 13.6: Pedestrian realm elements [5]
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Table 13.3: Width for pedestrian realm zones [3]
Street Family Frontage Through Furnishing Cycle Track Edge*

Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
City Context
Boulevard 0.5 1.5 2.8 4.0 1.2 3.5 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Avenue 0.5 1.5 2.4 4.0 1.0 3.0 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Street 0.5 1.5 2.4 3.0 1.0 2.4 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Access lane n/a n/a 1.8 2.5 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.2 1.5
Town Context
Boulevard 0.5 1.5 2.4 3.5 1.2 3.0 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Avenue 0.5 1.5 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.4 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Street 0.5 1.5 2.0 2.4 1.0 2.0 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Commercial Context
Boulevard 0.5 1.5 2.4 3.5 1.2 3.0 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Avenue 0.5 1.5 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.4 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Street 0.5 1.5 2.0 2.4 1.0 2.0 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Residential Context
Boulevard 0.5 1.0 1.8 3.5 1.2 2.0 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Avenue 0.5 1.0 1.8 3.0 1.2 2.0 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Street n/a n/a 1.8 3.4 n/a n/a 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Industrial Context
Boulevard 0.3 0.5 2.0 3.6 1.2 2.4 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Avenue 0.3 0.5 2.0 3.4 1.0 2.4 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
Street 0.3 0.5 2.0 3.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 2.5 0.2 2.0
* Edge zone must be a minimum of 1.5 m where there is on-street parking or a cycle track. It may only go
down to 0.2 m when sufficient room is available for signing, lighting, and utilities within an adjacent
Furnishings zone.
Figure 13.7 – Typical curb ramp and tactile strip configuration [3]
The provision of safe and convenient crossing facilities in the right location is essential for
managing crashes in the roadway. Crossing facilities need to follow desire lines as closely as
PAGE 345
possible, and to be part of legible routes, so that pedestrians make use of them naturally when
following the most obvious route to where they are going. If use of a formal crossing facility
involves a long detour, or takes a route that is not readily discernible, then pedestrians will be more
likely to attempt to cross the traffic flow at a place of their own choosing, which may lead to
increased risk of collisions. If suitably located the use of formal crossing points can be further
reinforced through good design of the sidewalk environment: ensuring that crossing points are
visible and easily identified, are clear of obstructions, use dropped curbs to improve comfort.
Typical details of a raised crossing is provided in Figure 13.8
Figure 13.8: Typical raised crosswalk (avenue) [3]
13.5 Bicycle Facilities

This Section gives a brief overview on bicycle facilities. For more detailed information please refer
to “Abu Dhabi Road Geometric Design Manual [3]”, “Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council Urban
PAGE 346
Street Design Manual [5]”, “Abu Dhabi Walking and Cycling Master Plan [6]” and “AASHTO Guide
for Development of Bicycle Facilities [7]”.
There is a wide range of type of facilities intended for use by cyclists, with many different examples
found across the world. Provision ranges widely in the extent to which cyclists are separated from
other traffic, with examples including:
 Sharing the roadway with other vehicles with no specific facilities, sometimes assisted by
speed reduction measures such as traffic calming;
 Sharing wide outside vehicle lanes;
 Shared use of bus lanes;
 Cycle lanes within the carriageway;
 Physical separation within the carriageway;
 Fully segregated off-carriageway cycle tracks, as shown in Figure 13.9;
 Off-road cycle tracks separate from the road network, which may be shared with
pedestrians.
Figure 13.9 – A fully segregated off-carriageway cycle track
The most appropriate form of facility for a particular location will need to take account of a range of
local factors, including traffic flow and speeds, cycle demand, and the space available. A street
categorisation can be used as the basis for suggesting which forms of infrastructure could be most
appropriate, as shown in Table 13.4, which is based on an example from Transport for London
London Cycle Design Standards [8].
The more the ‘movement’ function for a street dominates, the greater the traffic speed and flow
that would be expected, and hence the greater degree of separation that would be considered
appropriate. In locations with a ‘higher place’ function, such as a Souk, a scheme design might
focus on how cycling can help to bring people to the space, and then to spend time there, whilst at
the same time how motorised traffic is calmed to reduce speeds and make the place more inviting.
Where the vehicle through-movement is dominant and the place is ‘low’, the design for cycling
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should address both capacity and safety issues including managing conflict with other vehicle
types and pedestrians, cycle priority and the minimization or avoidance of delay.
In Table 13.4 the types of cycling intervention are categorised according to the ‘degree of
separation’ they offer between cyclists and motor vehicles. Where the street has a higher
movement function, improved level of service for cyclists can be achieved by greater user
separation and by traffic calming measures.
Table 13.4 - Indicative range of cycling provision by type of street [8]
High movement Medium movement Low movement

high place
low place medium place
Collector / Local
Collector / Local
Degree of separation
Minor Arterials
Minor Arterials
Commercial
City Center
boulevard
Principal
Principal
Arterials
Arterials
Street
Street
Souk / Park
Full segregation
(e.g. cycle track, segregated lane)
Dedicated on carriageway lanes
(markings or ‘light’ separation)
Shared on-carriageway lanes
(bus lanes, wide vehicle lanes)
Sharing with other vehicles
(shared with normal traffic lane)
It is very important to recognise that a disproportionate number of cycle crashes take place at
intersections, where they are most likely to come into conflict with motorised vehicles. This is also
the case even where cycle tracks are otherwise segregated from traffic, as cyclists often lose
priority at intersections and find themselves positioned on the inside of turning vehicles when
segregation ends.
Although outside the scope of this Guide, cycle-friendly intersection design is therefore
fundamental to the development of safe cycle route networks. From the perspective of roadside
design, the position of junctions and crossings needs to be taken into account, including the detail
of how cyclists re-join the carriageway, sightlines to the vehicle carriageway the location of
dropped curbs and the position of street furniture and other features.
Further design considerations:
 Cycle tracks are commonly provided at the roadside close to trip attractors (e.g. shops,
public transport interchanges), but can cause obstruction and represent a hazard. Where
practical their installation should respect the clear zone advice set out in this document;
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 Separate signposts might be provided for cyclists, these should be treated in the same way
as other features in terms of respecting clearance distances and avoiding causing
obstruction to cyclists or pedestrians;
 Where cycle tracks are provided outside the main vehicle carriageway this space should
also be kept clear of obstructions, and where possible a clear zone of 0.5m [5] maintained
to reduce the risk of injury to cyclists in the event of an off-road fall, or conflict with
pedestrian;
 Wide shoulders and bicycle lanes provide an additional clear area adjacent to the travelled
way, so these features provide a secondary safety benefit for motorists and can be
included as part of the clear zone. These bicycle facilities also will improve the resulting
sight distance for motor vehicle drivers at intersecting driveways and streets;
 The minimum lateral clearance of 0.5m shall be used for objects adjacent to segregated
cycle track or shared path, however 1.0m is desirable to ensure enough clearance is
present taking into account extent of handlebars past the edge of the path, especially
through curves where cyclists may lean further outside the edge.
The Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council Urban Street Design Manual [5] provides a number of
diagrams detailing the design of cycle facilities in the urban environment, including at intersections.
Reference should be made to this document, and other design standards, when considering
bicycle scheme designs. An example of typical cycle facility design is reproduced in Figure 13.10
and this shows the use of a ‘buffer zone’ between pedestrian and cyclists where a segregated
track is provided, this reduces the potential for conflict and provides protection to pedestrians. All
cycle tracks should be free of obstructions with a minimum lateral clearance to obstructions of at
least 0.5m.
Figure 13.10 – Typical bicycle facilities [5]
Bicycle parking racks are often made of solid materials that do not break-away and are secured to
the ground to prevent theft. The non-yielding nature of this street furniture item has the potential to
increase injury severity if a run-off crash were to occur. Table 13.5 describes common strategies
for eliminating or minimizing motor vehicle–bicycle crashes at roadside locations and improving
bicycle safety.
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Table 13.5 - Design strategies for bicycles [1]
Purpose Strategy
Reduce likelihood of an crash  Use wider curb lanes.
 Provide segregated facilities with clear buffer
zones.
 Increase operational offsets.
 Highlight bicycle paths with coloured
pavement, especially at intersections.
 Provide advanced stop lines at signalised
intersections to allow cyclists to move ‘first’
and reduce potential for conflict.
 Provide colour contrasting material at
potential conflict zones to highlight likelihood
of encountering other users.
Reduce severity of an crash  Locate bicycle racks away from the edge of the
curb to reduce chance of vehicle strikes.
13.6 Roadside Safety Barriers in Urban Areas
13.6.1 Determining use of roadside safety barriers

Pedestrians or bicyclists may require shielding by a roadside safety barrier (vehicle restraint
system) where they are considered to be exposed to a higher than normal risk of being struck by
an errant vehicle. Where a pedestrian/bicyclist facility either exists or is proposed for an existing
site that has run-off-road crash history, an assessment of pedestrian, bicyclist, and bystander
exposure should be undertaken so that crash reductions for alternative treatments can be
considered (Section13.3).
In the evaluation, the designer should consider the combination of factors that would require
shielding of the facility including the:
 Number and type of path users (e.g. whether large numbers of people congregate in or
pass through the area, the presence of young school children);
 Factors that make the site more hazardous than other sites along the road (e.g. road
geometry and characteristics that would increase the risk of run-off-road events);
 Type of traffic that may cause a run-off-road event to be particularly severe (e.g. high
numbers of heavy vehicles);
 Situations where a roadside barrier may be appropriate are:
 Intermediate and high-speed roads where a path is within the clear zone;
 Heavily trafficked shared-use paths separated by less than 4 m from an adjacent heavily
trafficked lane, especially if the geometry is substandard (see also section 13.4);
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 Sites where there is expected to be large numbers of bystanders congregated adjacent to

the road beyond the clear zone (e.g. schoolyard, sporting facilities) and the consequences
of a crash are expected to be high.
Placing a roadside safety barrier in a pedestrian environment imposes compromises and trade-offs
between vehicle occupant safety and pedestrian/bicyclist safety. Evaluation of the trade-offs
between vehicular and pedestrian/safety should include factors contributing to the relative risk for
each user class. These include exposure of individuals and expected severity of each crash
category. To evaluate the expected severity of any crashes, consider the operating speed of the
roadway facility, the treatment under consideration, and the nature of any particular traffic barrier.
As discussed previously, analysis of speeds should refer to the off-peak, when speeds are likely to
be higher, and the most severe crashes are likely to occur.
Where there is a need to provide a roadside safety barrier between a path and roadway traffic, it is
important that the rear of the barrier is not a hazard for pedestrians and bicyclists. Designers
should ensure that:
 The barrier should be kept as far from pedestrians and cyclists as possible, with good
clearance provided between the rear of the barrier and the path;
 No sharp edges, burrs or other potential hazards (e.g. protruding bolts) exist;
 Where sufficient clearance cannot be provided, bicyclists are protected from “snagging” on
posts by the provision of suitably designed rub rails;
 Where sufficient clearance cannot be achieved, consideration is given to the need to

increase the height of the barrier either to prevent errant bicyclists from falling over the
barrier and into a traffic lane or to discourage pedestrians from jumping over the barrier to
cross the road at an unsafe location.
Where the objective is to prevent cyclists and pedestrians from encroaching onto a traffic lane from
an adjacent sidewalk or cycles track rather than to protect path users from errant vehicles, or
errant vehicles from roadside hazards, then a pedestrian fence should be adequate, see Section
13.7.5.
Where bridges are present in urban areas these usually include a sidewalk, but space for
separation is limited, so bridge roadside barriers are often used to protect pedestrians. At lower
speeds, the sidewalk is separated from the adjacent roadway by a vertical curb, which is typically
150 mm to 200 mm high. However, at higher speeds, the vertical curb will interfere with the proper
vehicular/bridge safety barrier interaction. Therefore, the following will apply to the location of a
bridge safety barrier in combination with a sidewalk:
11. Speed  70 km/h. The bridge rail is typically located on the outside edge of the sidewalk;
12. Speed  80 km/h. Place the bridge rail between pedestrians and traffic; i.e. between the
roadway portion of the bridge deck and the sidewalk. For the 815-mm concrete barrier rail,
the rail must have a metal handrail on the top of the barrier to reach the required 1050mm
height for a pedestrian rail. A 1250mm pedestrian or 1400mm bicycle rail [9] is then used at
the outside edge of the sidewalk. For this arrangement, the roadway and sidewalk portions
of the bridge deck are at the same elevation.
For further details on the provision at bridges please refer to Chapter 7 of this manual.
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13.6.2 Roadside Safety Barrier Warrants

In addition to protecting pedestrian and cyclists from errant vehicles, safety barrier may also be
warranted in the urban environment on the basis that it reduces the severity of potential crashes.
A barrier may be deemed appropriate in the urban environment if:
 There is reasonable probability of a vehicle leaving the road at that location;
 The cumulative consequences of the vehicle leaving the road outweigh the cumulative
consequences of impacts with the barrier.
Greater consideration should also be given based on the adjoining land use. Schools,
playgrounds, and parks located on the outside of curves may warrant the additional protection of a
safety barrier. Consideration should also be given to protecting commercial and residential
premises that are close to the right-of-way, particularly where there is a history of run-off crashes.
13.6.3 Common Urban Barrier Treatments
13.6.3.1 Roadside and Median Barriers

The use of standard highway barrier systems may not always be applicable in some urban
environments, especially those where the speed limit is <70km/h. In these circumstances
alternative measures of separating opposing flows of traffic should be considered, including the
use of medians, raised or flush, with flush only being considered on high speed roads that will only
be encountered on freeways or expressways.
When introducing a median that has plantings, barriers or fencing installed it is imperative that
intersection sight distance is maintained. In such circumstances the plantings or other features in
the median should be terminated or the height adjusted in advance of the intersection.
13.6.3.2 Crash cushions

Where applicable, crash cushions should always be considered at urban locations where fixed
objects cannot be relocated, removed or longitudinal barrier systems cannot be safely introduced.
The use of crash cushions as opposed to standard longitudinal barriers is potentially more
appropriate for protecting fixed objects, especially those at exit ramps, gores, ends of median
barriers, bridge piers and abutments. This is particularly the case where the increase in
maintenance levels, right-of-way constraints and varying traffic flows creates situations that limit
where removing or relocating objects is possible.
There are a number of crash cushions that are appropriate for narrow or constrained width
conditions, as detailed in Chapter 10 of this Guide. When introducing a crash cushion where curbs
are present the issue of vaulting will need to be taken into consideration, as detailed in Chapter 7
of this Guide.
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13.7 Common Urban Roadside Features
13.7.1 Curbs
13.7.1.1 High Upstand Curbs

Roads in urban areas will commonly have upstand curbs to separate pedestrians from the main
carriageway. The curb is also usually adjacent to a gutter so has a role in drainage. Curbs in urban
areas are usually 150mm (6”), but a lower 100mm (4”) curb will often suffice if drainage is the
primary function. Typical curb design for an upstand curb is provided in Figure 13.11.
Figure 13.11 – Typical details of an upstand curb [3]
While curbs will deter drivers from encroaching into the pedestrian space, they have only limited
effectiveness in redirecting errant vehicles, particularly at speeds greater than 40km/h. Larger SUV
style vehicles will more easily mount the curb than smaller cars, so the prevalence of these vehicle
types needs to be taken into account. Because of the limited redirectional capability, the guidance
on clear zones in Section 13.2 should be followed as far as possible. Traffic speed needs to be
taken into account, therefore, where the speed is 70km/h or less, fixed objects should be located
as far from the roadway as practical, but in no case closer than 500mm from the face of the curb.
Curbs should not be used on facilities where the design speed is 70km/h or greater [3]. Where
sidewalks are adjacent to the curb (i.e. there is no buffer area), locate all appurtenances behind
the sidewalk.
When a vehicle mounts the curb it will travel approximately 2.5m before its suspension returns to
its normal state. This increases the risk of it vaulting any barriers it might hit, so vehicle restraint
system should be installed either immediately adjacent to the curb or at least 2.5m away [1].
13.7.1.2 Vehicle Barrier Curbs

Vehicle barrier curbs, or treif kerbs as they are often referred, can be used on urban roads with a
speed limit ≤60km/h to prevent vehicles mounting the curb [4]. This type of curb has high profile
(typically 280mm or greater) and has proven effective at redirecting vehicles at speeds up to
60km/h at impact angles up to five degrees. At speeds greater than this the curbs effectiveness of
redirecting is reduced and in turn acts as hazard to errant vehicles by providing an overturning
opportunity so should not be used on roads with a speed limit >60km/h [4]. Figure 13.12 provides
typical details of a vehicle barrier curbs.
This type of curb should predominately be used in areas of high pedestrian use to provide
additional protection from any possible errant vehicles. However, in providing this type of curb it
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needs to be understood that the curb height is an impediment to pedestrians in crossing the road
and the following considerations should be taken into account:
 If implemented provide the curb on both sides of the road, and the median if present, to
ensure pedestrians do not become ‘stranded’ in the road. This may occur if one side of the
road has standard upstand curbs;
 If used in the vicinity of pedestrian crossing care should be taken at the dropped curb
location to ensure the gradient of the drop is not excessive and impede use. Transition to
upstand kerbs and then to dropped curbs may be required.
Figure 13.12 – Typical details of vehicle barrier curbs [3]
13.7.2 Shoulders & Sidewalks

Where space permits, urban roads may have a paved shoulder between the traffic lanes and the
curb. They increase separation of traffic from the curb and any sidewalk present, so their width
should be counted as part of the clear-zone. Shoulders have the advantage of reducing the
likelihood of errant vehicles leaving the road, however they have the disadvantage of encouraging
higher speeds, because of the perceived greater road width that results. The decision to include a
shoulder, and the width provided, should therefore take into account considerations of the purpose
of the road or street, the overall urban design objectives, and hence the traffic speeds that are
appropriate to provide for in the design.
13.7.3 Traffic Islands & Medians

Traffic movements are often separated by features such as traffic islands and median strips.
Clearly these, and any additional objects, such as lighting columns or signposts, placed within
them, present a hazard to errant vehicles. The guidance on clearance zones and lateral offsets
given earlier in this Chapter should therefore be applied to these features.
Specific design considerations for medians and islands are [1]:
 Widening the median will help reduce the likelihood of errant vehicles colliding with any
objects placed within it;
 The severity of crashes can be reduced by ensuring that only breakable items are located
in medians or islands, or by shielding rigid objects with vehicle barrier curbs (trief curbs) on
low speed roads. On an urban freeway or expressway vehicle restraint systems should be
implemented if an appropriate clear zone cannot be achieved.
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13.7.4 Gateways
Gateway treatments are a combination of features used to create a sense of arrival to place and
can take many forms. They are used at the perimeter of a local area to inform road users they are
entering a slow speed environment and that they can expect to encounter localized features
intended to induce a traffic calming effect. Gateways are used to emphasize the change in
character of the road environment and its use.
Gateways can take many forms and use structures or features such as lighting units, raised
planting, trees, walls and public art features, to illustrate the approach to a gateway. Many of these
features could be considered hazardous roadside features. The operating speed on approach to a
gateway is a key design consideration in determining what features can be used and subsequently
how far they must be set back from the road.
 Where approach speeds are high (>70km/h) then clear-zone guidance as detailed in
Chapter 3 of this Guide shall be applied;
 In low speed locations fixed features can be used and placed closer to the road, but must
maintain the 0.5m minimum lateral clearance, with greater clearance provided where site
conditions allow;
 The use of speed reduction signs, both upright and pavement markings, tactile road
pavement surfaces and other gateway treatments will aid in reducing speed and the
likelihood of run-off crashes [1].
An example gateway design incorporating audio tactile pavement surface treatment, pavement
marking speed limit reinforcement, reduced width running lanes and accompanying mature trees is
detailed in Figure 13.13.
Figure 13.13 – Example gateway layout
13.7.5 Pedestrian Fencing

A high proportion of pedestrian casualties occur from crashes when pedestrians are crossing the
road away from formal crossing points. While, as discussed in Section 13.4, the starting point for
resolving this problem is to ensure satisfactory provision of safe crossing places, pedestrian
fencing (or restraint systems as they are often referred) have a role in discouraging crossing away
from formal crossings at high risk locations, for example mid-block crossing on major streets.
Furthermore pedestrian fencing should be used for the following purposes:
 Assist in directing pedestrians to formal and safe crossing locations;
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 Prevent pedestrians entering the road and conflicting with vehicular traffic where pedestrian
activity is high;
 To exclude pedestrians from high volume and speed roads, urban freeways and
expressways with speed limit >80km/h.
Figure 13.14 details a typical use of pedestrian fencing to prevent pedestrians crossing a busy
three lane main street by installing the fencing between the service road and main road. In this
instance the fencing will direct pedestrians along the sidewalk to the next formal crossing location.
Figure 13.14 – Example pedestrian fencing restricting crossing over a main street
In addition to their use in preventing pedestrians from crossing at high risk locations, pedestrian
fencing has a role at particular locations where pedestrian flows need to be managed, or
encroachment by groups of pedestrians discouraged. Examples include [3]:
 Outside schools;
 At busy bus stops to keep queuing passengers away from the roadway;
 Where off-road pedestrian or cycle routes join routes adjacent to the carriageway, and
there is a risk of vulnerable road users over-running into the traffic.
On high speed roads pedestrian fencing can be installed in tandem with road safety barrier within
the median and edge of the road to discourage pedestrians crossing these roads.
There are number of types of pedestrian fencing that can be used to contain and direct
pedestrians. The principle design considerations include [3]:
 Fencing should be constructed from vertical members, as far as it is practical, to restrict the
ease at which people can climb the fence;
 Rigid horizontal members should be avoided to limit the potential for fence components to
spear through a vehicle;
 Fencing located in a clear zone must not be hazardous to vehicle occupants or
pedestrians. The fencing should not be designed to resist penetration by a vehicle;
 All fencing shall have a lateral offset of 0.5m minimum from the curb, but where space
allows this should be increased. If a large area is left between the road and the fencing
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then landscaping or pedestrian deterrent surface treatment should be used in the space so
it is not attractive for pedestrian use.
A major downside to pedestrian fencing is their visual impact on the streescape. A range of
construction materials can be used to improve their appearance, and hedges can also be used to
this effect. Fencing can also present an additional crashes risk themselves- cyclists and powered
two wheeler users in particular. Fencing at intersections can result in cyclists being trapped if
caught on the inside of turning vehicles. There is also evidence that the presence of fencing can
encourage drivers to increase their speed, because they perceive the risk of crash with
pedestrians to be reduced [10].
With these disadvantages the use of fencing is inappropriate on streets with an important ‘place’
function, for example where there are shops, cafes and public spaces. Restricting the movements
of pedestrians too much in such areas would be detrimental to the intended uses of the street,
including the viability of businesses. Consideration should therefore be given to measures to
reduce the speed of the traffic so as to reduce the risk to vulnerable roads users, and also to
improve the quality of the environment.
13.7.6 Anti-glare Screens

Anti-glare screens are provided to eliminate light from oncoming vehicle headlights. They must be
designed in such a way that light directed towards the driver at oblique angles (12° to 20°) is
reduced whilst relatively maintaining an open vision (around 70°) in the sideways direction [9].
The height to effectively screen headlight glare from all types of vehicles on level ground is 2.0m
[9]. The screens can be either standalone systems or mounted on top of safety barriers.
There are a number of types of anti-glare systems that can be used. The principle design
considerations and roadside design guidance include [9]:
 Standalone anti-glare screens (not mounted on barrier systems) used on roads with a
speed limit >80km/h located in a clear zone must not be hazardous to vehicle occupants in
a run-off crash and must not resist vehicle penetration;
 Standalone anti-glare screens (not mounted on barrier systems) used on roads with a
speed limit ≤60km/h shall have a minimum lateral clearance of 0.5m. Where space permits
this should be widened to 1.2m. If a large area is left between the road and the screen then
landscaping or pedestrian deterrent surface treatment should be used in the spaces so it is
not attractive for pedestrian use, as the height of the screen may mask some pedestrians
and encourage use close to the carriageway where the risk of strikes from passing vehicles
is heightened;
 Where mounted upon safety barriers it is essential that the anti-glare screen and its fittings
do not detrimentally effect the operational safety requirements of the barrier system;
 Anti-glare screening may lose its effectiveness where there are severe undulations of the
highway alignment, particularly where there are high proportions of large goods vehicle
traffic. In such instances increased height screens may be appropriate;
 Where the highway alignment contains tight left-hand curves the anti-glare screens may
restrict sight distance leading to potential greater risks. In such instances the screen
provision will need to be reviewed to ensure appropriate sight distances are maintained
throughout;
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 Anti-glare screens can be particularly effective alongside major streets where service roads
are present and when during the hours of darkness opposing headlamps on the nearside
cause confusion.
13.7.7 Street Furniture

Street furniture includes items provided for the use and comfort of people using the space adjacent
to the road, or interchanging with public transport, or to improve the aesthetic appeal of the
streetscape. Examples include:
 Seating for public use;

 Litter (rubbish) bins;
 Public art;
 Public telephones;
 Planters;
 Bicycle parking;
 Bus shelters;
 Street vendor kiosks and stalls.
Some of these might be temporary, placed there by owners of the frontages, and may be difficult
for the highway authority to influence. Where their design and installation can be controlled the
advice set out in Section 13.2 should be followed, ensuring satisfactory clearance zones and the
use (where applicable) of breakable construction.
The main impacts of street furniture will be on the pedestrian space, so consideration should be
given to the issues discussed in section 13.4, in particular on ensuring adequate usable width for
the observed pedestrian flows is maintained, avoiding creating trip hazards and obstacles,
especially for those with impaired vision or mobility, and ensuring satisfactory sight lines to the
vehicle lanes, especially at crossing points. Where practical, street furniture should be provided as
far from the carriageway as possible, preferably within a service strip outside of the through zone
of the pedestrian area. Furthermore, street furniture should be placed so it does not restrict sight
distance for all road users including cyclists and pedestrians at dedicated crossing locations [1].
13.7.8 Utility Poles

Because of the constrained space next to urban roads, and limited rights-of-way for utility
companies, utility poles are commonly installed alongside the carriageway. These present very
significant hazards for errant vehicles, and can also obstruct the sidewalk and any off-carriageway
cycle track. Some poles have steel guy wires to provide additional support, which present
additional hazards, as vehicles can strike them and they can be hard to see trip hazards for
pedestrians, especially with impaired vision. Unlike signposts, utility poles are not suited to
breakable construction. While utilities can sometimes be relocated underground, this is very
expensive so roadside poles cannot usually be removed completely. The risk they present can be
managed however, through [1]:
 Avoiding locations with high crash risks;

 Positioning them as far as possible from the vehicle lanes;
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 Avoiding access points and junctions where sight lines can be restricted, and turning
vehicles may be more likely to encroach;
 Placing them on the inside of turns in the road, as errant vehicles will more usually leave
the road on the outside of curves.
Risks can also be reduced by locating poles where they would be protected by another feature,
such as a roadside barrier. Utility poles are also often used for street lighting and for traffic a sign,
which helps to reduce street clutter and avoids the additional risk that would otherwise arise from
the signposts and lighting columns that would otherwise be needed.
13.7.9 Lighting & Visibility

Roadside lighting in urban areas must serve two purposes- illuminating both the carriageway and
the adjacent pedestrian sidewalk. Adequate pedestrian lighting is necessary for comfort and
security, as well as safety by ensuring they are visible to drivers. This imposes different
requirements for the distribution of light from street lighting columns, which will need to be shorter
(i.e. 10m) and more closely spaced than in a purely highway environment (where 25m columns
can be used). However, this increases the number of lighting poles that need to be installed next to
the carriageway. Locating them on the side of the sidewalk furthest from the carriageway will
reduce the risk that errant vehicles will collide with them, while offering the advantage that light will
fall onto the sidewalk.
When considering lighting design and provision the illumination levels of pedestrian crossings are
of great importance, particular zebra crossings. In these instances pedestrians should be
sufficiently backlit by adjacent lighting units to ensure their visibility to approaching vehicles.
More detailed guidance is provided in the Abu Dhabi Road Lighting Manual [11].
Because of the potential hazard, the general approach to lighting standards is to use breakaway
supports wherever possible. All new lighting standards located within the clear zone of a roadway
where no pedestrian facilities exist will be placed on breakaway supports, unless they are located
behind or on a barrier or protected by crash cushions in gore areas, which are necessary for other
roadside safety reasons. Poles outside the clear zone on these roadways should also be
breakaway where there is a possibility of being struck by errant vehicles.
On roadways where pedestrian facilities exist, review the volume of pedestrian traffic to determine
if a breakaway support will present a greater potential hazard to the pedestrian traffic than a non-
breakaway support will to the vehicular traffic. Examples of locations where the hazard potential to
pedestrian traffic may be greater include:
 Parking lots;
 Tourist attractions;
 School zones;
 Central business districts and local residential neighbourhoods where the posted speed
limited is 50 km/h or less.
In these locations, non-breakaway supports may be a better choice. Other locations that typically
require the use of non-breakaway bases, regardless of the pedestrian traffic volume, are rest areas
and combined light and traffic signal poles.
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13.7.10 Sign Posts

In urban areas there can be a lot of constraints on where signposts can be located. Sign posts at
the roadside present a hazard to errant vehicles, but can also cause obstructions to pedestrians if
located on the sidewalk. Similar considerations apply to traffic signal poles, where there is even
less choice of location. In both cases poles must be placed in a location that minimizes pedestrian
conflicts and does not reduce the sidewalk width below minimum. Clearly, if the opportunity is
taken to fix signs to existing posts, for example lighting columns, where this is practicable, then
street clutter and the number of hazards at the roadside can be minimised.
As is generally the case for sign posts next to the highway, breakaway construction is usually
recommended (see Chapter 5) for posts with diameter greater than 89mm. The greatest risk to
pedestrians arises from the errant vehicles themselves rather than anything they might strike, and
sign posts are not designed to stop stray vehicles. However, there are some locations, especially
where large numbers of pedestrians congregate, where a different conclusion might be reached.
To assess whether this is the case on roadways where pedestrian facilities exist, the process and
the examples of hazardous locations is same as that detailed in Section 13.7.9.
13.7.11 Landscaping, trees and shrubs

Landscaping forms an important part of the streetscape in terms of providing high quality and
attractive areas, improving the user environment and subsequently encouraging greater use and
time spent in an area. Furthermore, mature trees can provide an essential part in providing shade
to lower ambient temperatures.
However, large mature trees and other forms of landscaping including raised planters and
decorative rocks can be hazardous to errant vehicles. Landscaping can also have a detrimental
effect on sightlines
Trees with a mature trunk size greater than 100mm in diameter are classified as fixed roadside
objects. When introduced (or expected to grow to and above this size) these should be located in
conformance with the clear zone standards specified in Chapter 3 or road safety barrier provided
on Urban Expressways and Freeways where there high operational and 85th percentile speeds.
The clear zone standards must also be applied to other landscaping that are likely to be hazardous
to an errant vehicle on higher speed urban roads.
On lower speed roads with a posted speed limit of 60km/h or less, the use of safety barrier is not
required and a minimum lateral clearance of 1.0m shall be applied to allow for vehicle overhang
and clearance of high vehicles. However, greater distance should be considered for the following
reasons [1]:
 Use of the adjacent lane, for example if parking is permitted a greater distance shall be
employed to allow easy access and egress;
 The provision of a suitable border area to take into account watering, root damage and
maintenance requirements so as not to impact on adjacent travel lanes.
In some cases vehicle barrier curbs is an option to shield landscaping that is within the clear zone
in urban areas. This is especially the case where there is a known run-off crash history or potential
high risk zones as detailed in Section 13.3.2. See section 13.7.1 for details on curb use.
PAGE 360
Sight distance standards specified in the Road Geometric Design Manual for Abu Dhabi [3] must
be adhered to in the design process and future growth and required maintenance regimes are
determined and established. Critical locations include intersections, driveways, pedestrian
crossings and median openings. However, points that must be considered are [1]:
 Landscaping shall allow full visibility for all users at driveways and intersections. Any
landscaping within the required visibility sight distance shall be removed, relocated or
lowered;
 Landscaping of very small traffic islands should be discouraged to reduce maintenance
costs, closure of traffic lanes and safety of maintenance personnel.
13.8 Summary & Conclusions

Urban areas are very diverse, with a wide range of traffic speeds and flows, road widths and
geometry, road user types and street environments. Pedestrians and cyclists will occur in much
greater numbers, with dedicated infrastructure of their own, needing both to travel along links and
also to cross them. In many locations, especially residential areas and town centres, the road
environment is part of a public space, used for social purposes and interactions, not merely as a
transport facility. It is therefore helpful to the design process to assess a location in terms of its
‘movement’ and ‘place’ function, as this has implications for the relative priority given to traffic
capacity and provision for pedestrians and cyclists, and for the vehicle speeds that are considered
appropriate.
Due to varied nature of the urban environment space is more constrained that means there is often
less space available for separating vehicles from pedestrians and cyclists and in providing
clearance zones and in meeting the requirements for sightlines detailed elsewhere in this Guide
and therefore need to be modified.
This Chapter has provided the details of the minimum lateral clearance of roadside object of 0.5m,
with a desirable extended 1.2m clearance where there are no space constraints, and widened
even further in high risk areas such as curves and intersections. These distances must be adhered
to for all urban design schemes.
In certain circumstances roadside and median safety barrier can be used in low speed urban
environments where there is a specific need to counter known run-off crash locations, where there
is increased chance of conflict (curves) and where high numbers of pedestrian are expected. Each
site will need to be assessed individually to ascertain the suitability of providing the barrier
considering the possible trade-offs. Roadside and median safety barriers should be used on high
speed urban Expressways and Freeways where adequate clearance zone treatments cannot be
applied.
Pedestrian and cycle facility requirements have also been provided relating to the placement of
street furniture and other hazards. Where possible, separation and segregation of users should be
applied to provide protection and reduce conflict. The through zones of these facilities should be
clear of objects, preferably with the use of a service strip. The minimum lateral clearance for
pedestrians and cyclists to objects should be the minimum 0.5m and preferably widened for cycle
tracks and paths to 1.0m.
This Chapter has also provided guidance on the introduction and design considerations for a
number of roadside objects and possible treatments that are affected by clearance zones or items
within the extent of clearance zones. Each site where schemes are designed are likely to vary to
PAGE 361
some extent but the recommendations and guidance set out should be adhered to in all conditions
to ensure a safe and practical urban streetscape environment for all road users. This may mean
the use of breakaway infrastructure or vehicle curbs in certain scenarios or revised entry
treatments at gateways taking into account traffic flows and speeds.
13.9 References
[1] AASHTO, Roadside Design Guide 4th Edition, Washington DC: American Association of
[2] K. K. Dixon, H. Liebler, M. Zhu, P. Hunter and Mattox B, National Corporative Highway
Research Report 612: Safe and Aesthetic Design of Urban Roadside Treatments, NCHRP,
Transportation Research Boad, Washington, DC, 2008.
[4] RTA, Roadside Design Guide for Dubai, First Edition, Dubai: Roads and Transport Authority,
2008.
[5] Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council, Abu Dhabi Street Design Manual, Abu Dhabi: UPC, 2012.
[6] Abu Dhabi Department of Transport, Walking and Cycling Master Plan, Abu Dhabi: AD DoT.
[7] AASHTO, Guide for the Development of Bicycle Facilities, Washington D.C.: American
[8] Transport for London, “London Cycle Design Standards, www.tfl.gov.uk,” TFL, 2015.
[9] Design Manual for Road and Bridges, TD 19/06 Requirements for Road Restraint Systems,
Highways England, 2006.
[10] Transport for London, “Guidance on the Assessment of Pedestrian Guardrail, www.tfl.gov.uk,”
TFL, 2012.
[11] Abu Dhabi Department of Transport, Road Lighting Manual, AD-D-13, Abu Dhabi: AS DOT,
2013.
[12] C. J. Davis, “Street Design for All,” Chartered Institute of Highways and Transportation, 2014.
PAGE 362
APPENDIX A:
THE EUROPEAN STANDARD EN1317
PAGE 363
APPENDIX A FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
A.1. Introduction
The recommended vehicle restraint system testing standards for Abu Dhabi is MASH [1] and
NCHRP350 [2], due to the reasons explained in Chapter 1. However, it is felt that the knowledge of
the European test standard EN1317 can still be useful to designers/engineers; especially when
comparing VRS products tested to different standards. For this reason a summary of the EN1317
is provided within this Appendix.
The adoption of EN1317 represented a significant change of safety and quality to European
drivers. It established an EU market based on performance, replacing previous systems that were
based on empirical experience. Practically, it provides guaranteed levels of safety for new barriers
placed on European roads in addition of providing the same level of guarantee across all EU. [3]
The European standard has been prepared by the European Committee for Standardization
(CEN). During the initial drafting of EN1317 in the mid-1990s, developments within the preparation
of NCHRP350 were followed closely by the standards writers in Europe, and every effort was
made to harmonize the impact performance standards (e.g. using the same or similar testing
conditions and evaluation criteria). However, given the inherent differences in highway and traffic
conditions between the United States and EU, differences between the U.S. guidelines and CEN
standards arose. The gap between these two sets of requirements has opened even further in the
preparation of MASH and the latest published versions of EN1317 [4].
Despite a number of attempts, no equivalence can be found between testing to NCHRP350/MASH

and EN1317. Due to the different testing methods, test vehicle types and speeds, the use of both
EN1317 and NCHRP350/MASH products on the same scheme is strongly discouraged.
EN1317 is split into a number of different parts, each concentrating on a different product sector,
the latest published versions including the ones that are outlined below:
 EN1317-1: 2010 - Terminology and general criteria for test methods [5]
for safety barriers including vehicle parapets [6].The details of the impact performance
class of the VRS includes:
o Vehicle impact test criteria
o Classes of containment
o Working width
o Vehicle intrusion
o Impact severity levels
for crash cushions [7]
 ENV1317-4; 2002 - Performance classes, impact test acceptance criteria and test methods
for terminals and transitions of safety barriers [8]
 EN1317-5:2007+A2 2012 - Product requirements and evaluation of conformity for vehicle
restraint systems [9]
 TR1317-6: 2012 - Pedestrian Parapets [10]
PAGE 364
 TS1317-8: 2012 - Motorcycle road restraint systems which reduce the impact severity of
motorcyclist collisions with safety barriers [11]
It should be noted that at the present time (mid 2016), there is a move to split the requirements of
ENV1317-4 into two documents, one which will solely cover the requirement for transitions
(TR1317-4) and another which will solely cover the requirements for terminals (EN1317-7). Whilst
drafts of these new parts have been prepared, they are currently awaiting publication.
For the manufacturers, in order to get the CE mark for their products, the road restraint systems
must be tested following the requirements from the corresponding parts within EN1317; which
describes the crash test conditions. Currently, a CE mark can only be issued for the followings of
systems:
 Permanent barriers;
 Bridge parapets; and
 Permanent crash cushions.
Currently a CE mark cannot be provided for the following types of systems:
 Temporary barriers;
 Terminals;
 Transitions;
 Gates (removable barrier sections); and
 Motorcyclist Protection Systems.
A.2. EN1317-1: Terminology and General Criteria for Test

Methods
Part 1 of EN1317 provides the terminology and general criteria for the test methods explained in
the other parts of EN1317. For this reason, the other parts of EN1317 should be read in
conjunction with Part 1.
Part 1 provides information in following areas:

 General terms and definitions
 Requirements for the test site and test vehicle
 Requirements for the vehicle instrumentation
 Theoretical basis and calculation of Impact Severity Indices:
o Acceleration Severity Index (ASI): A concept which has been developed for
assessing occupant impact severity for vehicles involved in collisions with road
restraint systems. ASI is a scalar function of time computed by applying a
mathematical equation. The more ASI exceeds unity, the more the risk to the
occupants.
o Theoretical Head Impact Velocity (THIV): A concept where the theoretical velocity
of the impact of an occupant’s head with the interior surface of the vehicle is
assessed as a measure of impact severity. A concept where the theoretical velocity
PAGE 365
of the impact of an occupant’s head with the interior surface of the vehicle is
assessed as a measure of impact severity.
A.3. EN1317-2: Performance Classes, Impact Test Acceptance

Criteria and Test Methods for Safety Barriers Including
Vehicle Parapets
Part 2 of EN1317 explains the impact test procedures and performance criteria for safety barriers
including parapets and temporary barriers.
A.3.1. Performance Classes

Performance classification in EN1317-2 is done according to three main criteria relating to the
restraint of a road vehicle:
 The containment level;

 The impact severity levels;
 The deformation as expressed by the working width and vehicle intrusion.
Safety barriers including vehicle parapets shall conform to the requirements of A.3.1.1. , A.3.1.2.
and A.3.1.3. when tested in accordance with impact test criteria defined in Table A.1.
Table A.1 – EN1317-2 vehicle impact test descriptions [6]
Test Impact Speed (km/h) Impact Angle ˚ Total Mass (kg) Type of Vehicle
TB11 100 20 900 Car
TB21 80 8 1,300 Car
TB22 80 15 1,300 Car
TB31 80 20 1,500 Car
TB32 110 20 1,500 Car
TB41 70 8 10,000 Rigid HGV
TB42 70 15 10,000 Rigid HGV
TB51 70 20 13,000 Bus
TB61 80 20 16,000 Rigid HGV
TB71 65 20 30,000 Rigid HGV
TB81 65 20 38,000 Articulated HGV
A.3.1.1. Containment Levels

The containment level classification and the necessary impact tests to achieve those are
presented in Table A.2. It can be seen from Table A.2 that the higher and very high containment
level classifications require an additional test with a 900kg car (TB11). This additional test is
required to assess the impact severity of a smaller vehicle impacting a rigid barrier, which is
designed to contain heavy vehicles.
Low angle containment levels are only applicable to temporary barriers.
PAGE 366
Table A.2 – EN1317-2 containment levels
Test conditions
Containment Containmen Test Vehicle Impact
Class t Level Type Test vehicles speed angle
(km/h) (˚)
T1 TB21 1,300kg - Car 80 8
Normal Low angle
T2 TB22 1,300kg - Car 80 15

TB41 10,000kg - Rigid HGV 70 8
T3
TB21 1,300kg - Car 80 8
N1 TB31 1,500kg - Car 80 20
TB32 1,500kg - Car 110 20
N2
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
TB42 10,000kg - Rigid HGV 70 15
H1
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
TB42 10,000kg - Rigid HGV 70 15
L1 TB32 1,500kg - Car 110 20
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
TB51 13,000kg - Bus 70 20
H2
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
Higher
TB51 13,000kg - Bus 70 20

L2 TB32 1,500kg - Car 110 20
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
TB61 16,000kg - Rigid HGV 80 20
H3
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
TB61 16,000kg - Rigid HGV 80 20
L3 TB32 1,500kg - Car 110 20
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
TB71 30,000kg - Rigid HGV 65 20
H4a
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
TB81 38,000kg - Articulated HGV 65 20
H4b
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
Very High
TB71 30,000kg - Rigid HGV 65 20

L4a TB32 1,500kg - Car 110 20
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
TB81 38,000kg - Articulated HGV 65 20
L4b TB32 1,500kg - Car 110 20
TB11 900kg - Car 100 20
A.3.1.2. Impact Severity

The impact severity is assessed through the two severity indices ASI and THIV. ASI and THIV are
only determined for cars. Methods of measuring and calculating ASI and THIV are presented in
EN1317-1 [5].
There are three impact severity classes (A, B and C) defined in EN1317-2 as a function of the
value of ASI and THIV indices, as shown in Table A.3. Impact severity level A provides a greater
level of safety for the occupant of an errant car than level B, and level B greater than level C.
PAGE 367
Table A.3 – EN1317-2 impact severity levels [6]
Impact Severity
Index Values
Level
A ASI≤1,0
B ASI≤1,4 and THIV≤33km/h
C ASI≤1,9
A.3.1.3. Deformation of the Restraint System

The deformation characteristics of the barriers are defined by three parameters:
 Dynamic Deflection (Dm): Maximum lateral dynamic displacement of any point of the
traffic face of the restraint system. It is used to evaluate the deformation of the VRS under
impact.
 Working Width (Wm): Maximum lateral distance between any part of the barrier on the
undeformed traffic side and the maximum dynamic position of any part of the barrier. It is a
measure of the deformation of the barrier under impact. It is used to determine the width
needed behind the barrier in order to work properly [3].
 Vehicle Intrusion (VIm): Maximum dynamic lateral position of a Heavy Goods Vehicle
(HGV) from the undeformed traffic side of the barrier. EN1317-5 states that all H1, H3, H4a,
and H4b vehicle restraint systems should have the Vehicle Intrusion and Working Width
variances given on the CE mark in order to allow designers to create safe and effective
VRS designs.
These values are measured through the analysis of high speed videos and are later normalised
through calculations described in the standard to get:
 Normalised Dynamic Deflection (Dn);

 Normalised Working Width (Wn); and
 Normalised Vehicle Intrusion (VIn).
 The W n and VIn values are then used to classify the system into one of the working width
and vehicle intrusion categories defined in Table A.4 and Table A.5.
A.4. EN1317-3: Performance Classes, Impact Test Acceptance

Criteria and Test Methods for Crash Cushions
Part 3 of EN1317 explains the impact test procedures and performance criteria for crash cushions.
It specifies performance classes and acceptance criteria for impact tests based on EN1317-1 with
extra test requirements and redirection zone classes. Impact severity levels for crash cushions are
limited only to levels A and B. The standard divides crash cushions into two according to their
redirection capabilities. These are:
 Redirective; which contains and redirect vehicles;
 Non-Redirective; which contains but does not redirect vehicles.
PAGE 368
Table A.4 - EN1317-2 working width classification [6]
Classes of Normalised Levels of Normalised

Working Width Working Width (m)
W1 WN ≤ 0,6
W2 WN ≤ 0,8
W3 WN ≤ 1,0
W4 WN ≤ 1,3
W5 WN ≤ 1,7
W6 WN ≤ 2,1
W7 WN ≤ 2,5
W8 WN ≤ 3,5
Table A.5 – EN1317-2 vehicle intrusion classification [6]
Classes of Normalised Levels of Normalised

Vehicle Intrusion Vehicle Intrusion (m)
VI1 VIN ≤ 0,6
VI2 VIN ≤ 0,8
VI3 VIN ≤ 1,0
VI4 VIN ≤ 1,3
VI5 VIN ≤ 1,7
VI6 VIN ≤ 2,1
VI7 VIN ≤ 2,5
VI8 VIN ≤ 3,5
VI9 VIN > 3,5
PAGE 369
A.4.1. Performance Classes

Performance classification in EN1317-3 is done according to two main criteria relating to the
restraint of a road vehicle:
 The performance levels; and

 The impact severity levels;
Crash cushions shall conform to the requirements of EN1317-1 and EN1317-2 when tested in
accordance with impact test criteria defined in Table A.6. It includes five compliant tests required at
various angles as shown in the table. For more information on different vehicle approach paths,
please refer to the standard.
Table A.6 – EN1317-3 vehicle impact test descriptions for crash cushions
Total Vehicle Mass Velocity

Test Type Vehicle Approach Path
(kg) (km/h)
TC 1.1.50 900 50
TC 1.1.80 900 80
TC 1.1.100 900 100
Frontal Centre
TC 1.2.80 1,300 80
TC 1.2.100 1,300 100
TC 1.3.110 1,500 110
TC 2.1.80 900 80
Frontal, 1/4 Vehicle Offset
TC 2.1.100 900 100
TC 3.2.80 1,300 80
TC 3.2.100 Head (centre), at 15˚ 1,300 100
TC 3.3.110 1,500 110
TC 4.2.50 1,300 50
TC 4.2.80 1,300 80
Side impact at 15˚
TC 4.2.100 1,500 100
TC 4.2.110 1,500 110
TC 5.2.80 1,300 80
TC 5.2.100 Side impact at 165˚ 1,300 10
TC 5.3.110 1,500 110
A.4.1.1. Performance Levels

The performance level of a crash cushion is determined through the successful
performance in certain tests, as shown in
Table A.7. Some test types are only applicable to redirective crash cushions.
PAGE 370
Table A.7 – EN1317-3 performance levels for crash cushions [7]
Performance
Acceptance Test
Level
50 TC 1.1.50 - - - TC 4.2.50* -
80/1 - TC 1.2.80 TC 2.1.80 - TC 4.2.80* -
80 TC 1.1.80 TC 1.2.80 TC 2.1.80 TC 3.2.80 TC 4.2.80* TC 5.2.80*
TC
100 TC 1.1.100 TC 1.2.100 TC 2.1.100 TC 3.2.100 TC 5.2.100*
4.2.100*
TC
110 TC 1.1.100 TC 1.3.110 TC 2.1.100 TC 3.2.110 TC 5.3.110*
4.3.110*
* Relevant for redirective crash cushions only
Test notation is as follows
TC 1 2 80
Test of Crash Cushion Approach Test Vehicle Mass Category Impact Speed
A.4.1.2. Impact Severity

The impact severity is assessed through the two severity indices ASI and THIV. There are two
impact severity classes (A and B) defined in EN1317-3 as a function of the value of ASI and THIV
indices, as shown in Table A.8. Impact severity level A provides a greater level of safety for the
occupant of an errant car than level B.
Table A.8 – EN1317-3 impact severity levels for crash cushions [7]
Impact Severity
Index Values
Levels
THIV ≤ 44 km/h in test 1,2 and 3*

A ASI≤1,0
THIV ≤ 33 km/h in test 4 and 5*
and
THIV ≤ 44 km/h in test 1,2 and 3*
B 1,0<ASI≤1,4
*Refer to the standard for the descriptions of individual tests
A.5. ENV1317-4: Performance Classes, Impact Test Acceptance

Criteria and Test Methods for Terminals and Transitions of
Safety Barriers
Part 4 of EN1317 explains the impact test procedures and performance criteria for terminals and
transitions. It defines performance classes and acceptance criteria for impact tests.
A.5.1. Performance Classes for Terminals

There are four performance classes defined in EN1317-4 for terminals.
Table A.9 presents these performance classes and the necessary impact tests to achieve them. A
successfully tested terminal at a given class is normally considered as having met the conditions of
lower classes. For example a P2 terminal is also considered as a P1. For a full description of
individual test types, please refer to the standard.
PAGE 371
Table A.9 – EN1317-4 performance classes & impact test criteria for terminals
Vehicle
Performance Impact Approach Velocity
Mass Test Code
Class Path (km/h)
(kg)
head on nose 1/4

P1 900 80 TT 2.1.80
offset to roadside
head on nose 1/4

900 80 TT 2.1.80
offset to roadside
P2
side, 15˚ 2/3 L 1,300 80 TT 4.2.80
side, 165˚ 1/2 L 900 80 TT 5.1.80
head on nose 1/4

900 100 TT 2.1.100
offset to roadside
P3
head-on centre 1,300 100 TT 1.2.100
side, 15˚ 2/3 L 1,300 100 TT 4.2.100
side, 165˚ 1/2 L 900 100 TT 5.1.100
head on nose 1/4

900 100 TT 2.1.100
offset to roadside
P4
head-on centre 1,500 110 TT 1.3.110
side, 15˚ 2/3 L 1,500 110 TT 4.3.110
side, 165˚ 1/2 L 900 110 TT 5.1.100
A.5.2. Impact Severity Classes for Terminals

The impact severity is assessed through the two severity indices ASI and THIV.
There are two impact severity classes (A and B) defined in EN1317-4 as a function of the value of
ASI and THIV indices, as shown in Table A.10. Impact severity level A provides a greater level of
safety for the occupant of an errant car than level B and is preferred when other considerations are
the same.
Table A.10 - EN1317-3 impact severity levels for terminals [7]
Impact Severity
Index Values
Levels
A ASI≤1,0
and
B 1,0<ASI≤1,4
*Refer to the standard for the descriptions of individual tests
A.5.3. Lateral Displacement Classes for Terminals

Terminals are classified as either x or y, according to the direction that they deflect during the
impact and as 1, 2, 3 or 4 according to the amount of their lateral displacement observed during
the impact test. Table A.11 and Figure A.1 present how the classification is done.
PAGE 372
Table A.11 – EN1317-4 permanent lateral displacement classification for terminals [8]
Class Code Displacement (m)

1 0,5
x 2 Da 1,5
3 3,0
1 1,0
2 2,0
y Dd
3 3,5
4 >3,5
Figure A.1 - EN1317-4 terminal permanent displacement zones [8]
A.5.4. Performance Classes for Transitions

For transitions, the definitions and the classification of containment classes, acceptance tests,
working width, dynamic deflection, severity index and acceptance criteria are the same as the ones
described in EN1317-2. Therefore information presented in A.3 applies to transitions as well.
A.6. EN1317-5: Product requirements and evaluation of

conformity for vehicle restraint systems
This European Standard is designed for use in conjunction with EN1317 Parts 1, 2, 3 and
ENV1317 part 4 and it specifies requirements for evaluation of conformity of the following vehicle
restraint systems:
 Permanent Safety Barriers;
 Crash Cushions;
 Vehicle / Pedestrian parapets (only for the vehicle restraint function) [9].
Furthermore, it will also cover the requirements for evaluation of conformity of terminals and
transitions, once ENV1317-4 becomes a European Norm.
A.7. TR1317-6: Pedestrian Parapets

This Technical Report specifies geometrical and technical requirements for the design and
manufacture for pedestrian parapets on road bridges, footbridges, on top of retaining walls and on
similarly elevated structures. This Technical Report also specifies test methods and provision for
the labelling and marking of these products. This Technical Report may be used for pedestrian
parapets on structures which cross over railways, rivers and canals [10].
PAGE 373
A.8. TS1317-8: Motorcycle road restraint systems which reduce

the impact severity of motorcyclist collisions with safety
barriers
Part 8 of EN1317 is a currently a technical specification, which concerns the testing methods and
performance classification of motorcycle road restraint systems which reduce the impact severity
of motorcyclists collisions with safety barriers. A detailed description of TS1317-8 can be found in
Chapter 8.
A.9. References
[1] FHWA, “Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware (MASH),” [Online]. Available:
[Accessed 23 02 2015].
[3] European Road Federation, “Road Safety and Road Restraint Systems - A Flexible and Cost-
Effective Solution,” ERF, Brussels, 2012.
[4] Roadside Safety Design Committee, “Transportation Research Circular E-C172,”

Transportation Research Board, Washington D.C., 12 July 2012.
[5] CEN, “EN1317 Road restraint systems - Part 1: Terminology and general criteria for test
methods,” CEN (European Committee for Standardization), Brussels, 2010.
[6] CEN, “EN1317 Road Restraint Systems - Part 2: Performance classes, impact test acceptance
criteria and test methods for safety barriers including vehicle parapets,” CEN (European
[7] CEN, “EN1317 Road restraint systems - Part 3: Performance classes, impact test acceptance
criteria and test methods for crash cushions,” CEN (European Committee for Standardization),
Brussels, 2010.
[8] CEN, “EN1317 Road restraint systems - Part 4: Performance classes, impact test acceptance
criteria and test methods for terminals and transitions of safety barriers,” CEN (European
PAGE 374
APPENDIX B
LENGTH OF NEED CALCULATIONS
PAGE 375
APPENDIX B FIRST EDITION -DECEMBER 2016
B.1. Determining the Length of Need

In order to determine the length of a need for a barrier system, there are two main factors which
must first be established:
 The lateral extent of the hazard (LA) is the distance from the edge of the travelled way to
the far side of the fixed object or to the outside edge of the clear zone (L C) of an
embankment or a fixed object that extends beyond the clear zone (refer to Figure 7.8 and
Figure 7.9);
 The runout length (LR) is the distance from the object being shielded to where the vehicle
departs from the travelled way. It is the distance measured along the roadway from the
upstream extent of the obstruction to the point at which a vehicle is assumed to leave the
roadway (refer to Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9).
Once the designer has determined LR and LA, the length of barrier required at a specific location
depends on the lateral distance of the barrier from the edge of the travelled way (L 2) and the flare
rate (a:b) specified for the barrier installation. In order to determine these variables, the following
considerations should also be made:
 The lateral distance of the barrier from the edge of the travelled way (L 2) should be as large
as possible as this will decrease the probability of an errant vehicle striking the barrier
system, allowing a greater distance for the driver of the vehicle to regain control, and to
take evasive action. As barrier systems have been designed (and tested such that a vehicle
will impact them in a stable manner, the area between the edge of the roadway and the
barrier installation should be made as flat as possible (i.e. 1V:10H or flatter);
 The steeper the flare rate (a:b) of the barrier, the further from the roadway the barrier
begins and therefore the shorter the calculated length of barrier required. However, a
relatively steep flare results in increased impact angles and increases the need for slope
flattening in the area between the roadway and the barrier. Hence a balance should be
struck, and more detail on how this can be achieved is contained within Chapter 7, Section
7.4.2. In many cases, particularly on projects that do not include a significant amount of
earthwork, no flare is used and the barrier is installed parallel to the roadway. This results in
a longer installation and so the designer should consider the cost of the additional length of
barrier against the cost of flattening the slope;
 Installing a barrier as far as practical from the travelled way will prevent drivers from
slowing down, changing lanes or shifting positions within their own lanes. This is known as
the shy line offset. An object outside a paved shoulder generally has no measurable effect
on a motorist’s behaviour. Problems arise when the roadway appears narrower. Barriers
1.8 m or more from the edge of the travelled way may not create driver reactions. Median
barriers can be set closer to the edge of the travel lane without affecting a motorist’s
behaviour.
PAGE 376
APPENDIX B
L1
3.81m
PAGE 377
L1 = Length of hazard
Notes: LC = Clear zone
 Use appropriate crashworthy terminal. See Chapter 9.

Note that the Length of need starts 3.81m downstream
of the terminal.
 Use acceptable anchorage terminal. See Chapter 9.
LR = Runout length (see Section 7.3.1)
 The use of the 25° angle to locate the end of the trailing
barrier end will be determined on a case-by-case basis X = Length needed for approach end
depending on site conditions.
L4 = Length to be omitted from length of need
Figure B.1 - Barrier length of need layout (one-way or dual two way divided roadways)

APPENDIX B
3.81m
PAGE 378
LC = Clear zone

Notes:
 Use appropriate crashworthy terminal. See Chapter 9. Note that
the Length of need starts 3.81m downstream of the terminal. LR = Runout length (see Section 7.3.1)
Figure B.2 - Barrier length of need layout (two-way roadways)

 If Lc for opposing traffic < LA, then X = 0 for opposing traffic. X = Length needed for approach end

B.2. Calculation of Length of Need

Once the appropriate variables have been determined, the required length-of-need (LON) in
advance of the area of concern for tangent or nearly tangent sections of roadway can be
calculated using Equation B.1:
b
 
L A    L1  L 2
LON  a Equation B.1
 b   LA 
    
 a   LR 
For a parallel installation (i.e. where there is no flare rate and therefore (b/a)=0), this equation
reduces to the following:
LA  L 2 Equation B.2
LON 
L A LR 
The lateral offset (Y) from the edge of the travelled way to the beginning of the length-of-need can
be calculated using the following equation:
LA Equation B.3
Y  LA   LON
LR
Where:
L2 = Lateral distance of the barrier from the travelled way
LA = Lateral distance of the back of the hazard from the travelled way
LR = Runout length
a:b = Flare rate (a:b; e.g. 20:1)
LON = Length needed for approach end
L1 = Tangent length of barrier upstream from the hazard
Y = Lateral offset from edge of travelled way
B.3. Adjustments to the Calculated Length of Need

Once the length of need has been calculated in accordance with Section B.2 the value should be
reviewed to take into account the following points, experience and engineering judgement:
 The calculated length-of-need should be adjusted upward to account for the manufactured
lengths of barrier sections. In general, many proprietary systems will have a standard beam
length of 4m, but the barrier manufacturer/promoter should be questioned regarding the
length of the components used within their system;
PAGE 379
 Note that the first 3.81m of an end terminal is not included when determining the length of
need. This is because most terminals are designed to breakaway or “gate” when impacted
from the side within the first 3.81m. The third post from the end is the beginning point at
which a vehicle will be redirected by the barrier [1]. Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9 illustrate this
by showing the first 3.81m section of barrier extending beyond the length of need;
 If the barrier ends near a cut section, it may be possible to extend the length of need of the
barrier such that it terminates in the backslope (refer to Section 9.2.4). This eliminates the
possibility of an end-on strike with the terminal unit and possible penetration behind the rail
system, and hence is a preferred option.
B.4. Identifying the Trailing End of the Barrier on Dual

Carriageways
On dual carriageways and roadways with one-way traffic, the length of barrier required to protect
the downstream corner of the hazard is determined by plotting a line at a defined exit angle (25°)
Figure 7.8. The barrier should have the end anchor assembly downstream of this exit angle line. It
is recommended that the barrier be extended at least 3.81m beyond the exit length-of-need line, as
shown in Figure 7.8. The designer can use this angle to determine the amount of barrier on the
trailing end that can be removed. Another option is to use a 90 degree exit angle so that the barrier
is extended to a location adjacent to the downstream corner of the hazard. This results in
additional barrier to develop and transmit rail tension forces into the anchorage. By using a
perpendicular line, the design, construction and maintenance of the barrier is simplified. See
Chapter 9 for trailing end terminals.
Figure B.3 – Identification of the trailing end of barrier on dual carriageways
PAGE 380
B.5. Opposing traffic

For opposing traffic, the clear zone width (LC) deserves special attention, and the following points
are to be considered:
 If the barrier is beyond the appropriate clear zone, no additional barrier or crashworthy
terminal is required. However, a crashworthy terminal should be provided on a two-way
single carriageway;
 If the barrier is within the appropriate clear zone but the area of concern is beyond it, no
additional barrier is needed, but a crashworthy terminal should be used;
 If the area of concern extends well beyond the appropriate clear zone, the designer may
choose to shield only that portion that lies within the clear zone by setting LA equal to LC.
B.6. Graphical Representation of Length of Need

The preferred way to plan the lay out of a barrier and to determine its length of need is by drawing
the installation in plan view using design software such as AutoCAD. Such a method assists the
design process because:
 Laying out installations along horizontal curves often requires some judgment, and it is
helpful to look at the design visually and to scale. As shown in Figure B.4, it would be very
difficult to estimate the tangential runout path and the required length of need to account for
the effect of the curve, without having a scale visual representation;
 A graphical layout allows the designer to trial and to establish a flare rate which is the best
balance between barrier length and the extent to which the barrier projects toward a side
slope or a roadside ditch, as shown in Figure B.5. Whilst greater flare rates will shorten the
length of barrier required, it may, in some circumstances require increased levels of
earthwork due to the need for a 1V:10H (of flatter) slope between the edge of the
carriageway or shoulder and the barrier;
 When designing graphically in plan view, the designer can also easily look at contours and
cross sections to determine if barrier should be extended for steep slopes.
Figure B.4 - Graphical layout of barrier along a horizontal curve
PAGE 381
Figure B.5 - Barrier length (amount of flare) vs. amount of grading
B.7. Procedure for determining the LON by Graphical Methods

If the installation is on a tangential section of roadway, the visual aid in Figure B.6 can be used to
determine the length of need. After confirming this condition, the following procedure may be used:
1. Construct a horizontal line at L2 on the y-axis (the lateral distance of the barrier from the
edge of travelled way). This assumes that the barrier is not flared; i.e. it is parallel to the
roadway;
2. Locate LA or LC, whichever is less, on the y-axis;
3. Determine LR from Table B.1 and locate LR on the x-axis. If barrier protection is needed for
only the approaching traffic, only use the scale marked “Edge of Travelled Way Scale.” If
needed for both directions of travel, locate LR on both scales marked “Edge of Travelled
Way Scale” and “Centreline Scale.” See Step 7 to determine the downstream end of the
barrier where the hazard does not require shielding for the opposing traffic;
4. Connect the points in Steps 2 and 3 with a straight line or two straight lines;
5. Locate the intersection(s) of the lines in Steps 1 and 4. From this point(s), draw a line
vertically to the LR scale(s);
6. Read X from the LR scale(s). As illustrated on Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9, the LON is
measured from the lateral edge of hazard to the third post; i.e. it does not include the gating
portion of the terminal.
PAGE 382
Figure B.6 - Barrier length of need calculation (tangent roadways only)
PAGE 383
Table B.1 - Suggested runout lengths for barrier design
Traffic volume (ADT)*
Design speed Over 10,000 5000-10,000 1000-5000 Under 1000
(km/h) Runout length Runout length Runout length Runout length

LR LR LR LR
(m) (m) (m) (m)
140 150 137 120 106
130 143 131 116 101
120 124 112 98 86
110 110 101 88 76
100 91 76 64 61
90 85 74 64 57
80 70 58 49 46
70 59 49 42 38
60 49 40 34 30
50 34 27 24 21
Source: Adapted from AASHTO Roadside Design Guide [1].
*Based on a 20-year projection from the anticipated date of construction.
 If barrier protection is only warranted for one direction of travel (Figure 7.8), use the
following procedure to determine the downstream end of the length of need:
a. Locate the distance (L3) from the front of the hazard to the edge of travelled way on
the y-axis.
b. From this point, draw a line parallel to the 25 line in Figure B.6 until it intersects the
L2 line (Step 1).
c. Move down vertically to the LR “Edge of Travelled Way Scale” and read L4.
d. As illustrated on Figure 7.8, the L4 distance is omitted from the length of need.
 A barrier flare may be used to reduce the barrier length of need. Example 3 illustrates how
to use Figure B.6 to determine LON when the barrier is flared.
 The length of need determined in the above steps must be adjusted to provide full-length
panels of barrier.
PAGE 384
B.8. Examples of determining the LON by Graphical Methods

Example 1 (One-way traffic)
Given: Design ADT = 12,000

V = 140 km/h
Slope = 1V:6H front slope
Tangent roadway
Shoulder width = 3 m
LA = 7.5 m
One-way roadway
L3 = 5 m
Unflared barrier located at edge of shoulder
Problem: Determine the barrier length of need.
Solution: Using the procedure in Section B.7, the following steps apply (see solution in
Figure B.7):
1. L2 = 3 m (as the barrier is located at the edge of shoulder). Figure B.7 illustrates the
horizontal line.
2. From the Clear Zone Table, LC is 12 to 13 m. Therefore, because LA (7.5 m) < LC (12 to 13
m), LA should be located at 7.5 m on the y-axis (“Lateral distance from edge of travelled
way”). Figure B.7 illustrates this point on the y-axis.
3. From Table B., LR = 165 m for an ADT of 12,000 and a speed (V) of 140km/h. Locate this
point on the x-axis (“Edge of Travelled Way Scale”).
4. Figure B.7 illustrates this point on the x-axis.
5. Connect the points in Step 2 (LA) and Step 3 (LR) with a straight line.
6. Identify the point where the line drawn in Step 4 crosses the line L2. At this point, draw a
vertical line down to the LR scale.
7. Read off the value of X (= 100 m).
8. Locate the downstream end of the barrier length of need by:
a) Locate L3 (= 5 m) on the y-axis.
b) Draw a line parallel to the 25 line (see
c) Figure B.7).
d) Draw a vertical line down to the LR scale. Read L4 = 2 m.
9. This is not applicable as there is no flare.
PAGE 385
10. Determine the length of barrier needed in terms of full-length panels.
Figure B.7 - Barrier length of need calculation (Example 7.1)
PAGE 386
Example 2 (Two-way traffic)

V = 100 km/h
Tangent roadway
Shoulder width = 2.4 m
LA = 5 m
Two-way roadway
L3 = 3 m
Unflared barrier located at edge of shoulder
Solution: Using the procedure in Section B.7, the following steps apply (see solution in Figure
B.8):
1. L2 = 2.4 m (as the barrier is located at the edge of shoulder). Figure B.8 illustrates the
horizontal line.
2. From the Clear Zone Table, LC = 10 to 12 m. Therefore, because LA (5 m) < LC (10 to 12
m), LA should be located at 5 m on the y-axis (“Lateral distance from edge of travelled
way”). Figure B.8 illustrates this point on the y-axis.
point on the x-axes (“Edge of Travelled Way Scale” and “Centre Line Scale”).
4. Connect the points in Step 2 (LA) and Step 3 (two LR points) with straight lines as shown in
Figure B.8.
5. Identify the point where the lines drawn in Step 4 cross the line L2. At these two points,
draw a vertical line down to the two y-axes.
6. Read off the value X = 39 m upstream from the hazard and X = 24 m downstream from the
hazard.
7. This is not applicable due to the two way traffic.
8. This is not applicable as there is no flare.
PAGE 387
PAGE 388
Example 3 (Flared barrier)
Note: Example 7.3 is identical to Example 7.1, except for the use of a barrier flare.

V = 140 km/h
Tangent roadway
Shoulder width = 3 m
LA = 7.5 m
One-way roadway
L3 = 5 m
Barrier with a 1:20 flare
Solution: Using the procedure in Section B.7 (adjusted for flare), the following steps apply (see
solution in Figure B.9):
1. L2 = 3 m (as the mainline of the barrier is located at the edge of shoulder). L2 should be
located on the graphical representation, with a 1:20 line then drawn to show the offset of
the barrier. Figure B.9 illustrates this 1:20 flare line.
2. From the Clear Zone Table, LC = 12 to 13 m. Therefore, because LA (7.5 m) < LC (12 to 13
m), LA should be located at 7.5 m on the y-axis (“Lateral distance from edge of travelled
way). Figure B.9 illustrates this point on the y-axis.
point on the x-axis (“Edge of Travelled Way Scale”). Figure B.9 illustrates this point on the
x-axis.
4. Connect the points in Step 2 (LA) and Step 3 (LR) with a straight line.
5. Identify the point where the line drawn in Step 4 crosses the line L2. At this point, draw a
vertical line down to the LR scale.
6. Read off the value of X (= 48 m). Note that for the unflared barrier in Example 7.1, X = 100
m.
7. Use the procedure to locate the downstream end of the barrier length of need:
a. Locate L3 = 5 m on the x-axis.

b. Draw a line parallel to the 25 line (see Figure B.9).
c. Draw a vertical line down to the LR scale. Read L4 = 2 m.
8. A flare rate of 1:20 has been used.
PAGE 389
B.9. References
AASHTO, Roadside Design Guide, 4th Edition, Washington D.C.: American Association of State
[1]
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Department of Municipal Affairs and Transport

4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 45

5.4 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................... 110

7.3.2 Minimum Length and Gaps in Barriers ................................................................... 162

7.8.5 Summary and Conclusions on Upgrades to Barriers.............................................. 212

9.4.1 Speed Class .......................................................................................................... 246

12.5 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................... 332

A.3.1. Performance Classes ................................................................................................ 366

Figure 5.5 – Braced sign support [4] ............................................................................................. 86

Figure 6.13 - Examples of single sided W-Beam profiles ............................................................ 133

Figure 8.9 – Example of a typical CMPS profile .......................................................................... 218

Figure 11.11 - Example of a WRSB to W-beam transition ........................................................... 298

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

1.2 Purpose and scope

1.3 The application of the Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide

1.3.1 Background to Some of the Key Approaches Adopted

1.3.2 A Performance Based Approach Rather Than a Prescriptive One

1.3.3 The Use of Proprietary over Non-Proprietary Systems

1.3.4 Use of a Single Testing Standard

1.3.5 The Use of NCHRP350 and MASH Tested Products Instead of

1.3.5.1 Weight of Vehicles used in NCHRP350, MASH & EN1317

1.3.5.2 Height of Vehicles used in NCHRP350, MASH & EN1317

1.3.5.3 Impact Angles used in NCHRP350, MASH & EN1317

1.4 Scope of the ADRSDG

1.4.2 Chapter 2 “Risk Mitigation Approach”

1.4.3 Chapter 3 “Concept and Calculation of Clear Zone”

1.4.4 Chapter 4 “Identification of Roadside Hazards”

1.4.5 Chapter 5 “Passively Safe Support Structure and Traversable

1.4.6 Chapter 6 “Description of Roadside, Median and Bridge Barriers”

1.4.7 Chapter 7 “Selection and Application of Roadside, Median, and

1.4.8 Chapter 8 “Motorcyclist Protection Systems”

1.4.9 Chapter 9 “Terminals”

1.4.10 Chapter 10 “Crash Cushions”

1.4.11 Chapter 11 “Transitions”

1.4.12 Chapter 12 “Economic Assessment”

1.4.13 Chapter 13 “Urban Roadside Design”

2 ROADSIDE RISK MITIGATION

 Driver fatigue or inattention;

2.2 Definition of Risk from a Roadside Safety Perspective

Figure 2.1 - Risk from a roadside safety perspective

2.3 Abu Dhabi Roadside Design Guide Risk Mitigation Approach

2.3.1 Outline of the Risk Mitigation Approach

Remove Relocate Provide Recoverable Make Passively Shield Delineate

2.3.2 Step 1 - Understand the Area under Evaluation

2.3.3 Step 2 – Calculate the Clear Zone

Figure 2.3 – Understanding the area under evaluation

Figure 2.4 – Clear zone area

2.3.4 Step 3 – Identify Hazards within Clear Zone

 Concrete Foundations Protruding from the Ground;

2.3.5 Step 4 – Identify Applicable Treatment Options

 Remove the hazard;

2.3.5.1 Remove the hazard

Figure 2.5 – Hazard removed from the area

2.3.5.2 Relocate the hazard

Figure 2.6 – Hazard relocated beyond the clear zone

2.3.5.3 Provide recoverable roadside

2.3.5.4 Make the hazard passively safe or traversable

Figure 2.7 – Hazard made passively safe

2.3.5.5 Shield the hazard with a longitudinal barrier or crash cushion

Chapters 6 to 11 provide comprehensive information on vehicle restraint systems; i.e. roadside

Figure 2.8 – Hazard shielded with a roadside barrier

2.3.5.6 Delineate the hazard

Figure 2.9 – Hazard delineated

2.3.6 Step 5 – Assessment & Ranking of Treatment Options