Peter N. Stearns - World Past To World Present - A Sketch of Global History, First Edition-Routledge (2021)

World Past to World Present
World Past to World Present: A Sketch of Global History provides an unusually

brief and present-focused treatment of human history beginning with the
advent of agriculture and ending with considerable attention to world history
developments since World War II.
This accessible and concise text covers a very real but selected history of the
human experience. The book emphasizes the importance of contacts and
exchanges among different cultures and economies up to contemporary globa-
lization, and consistent attention is devoted to comparisons among major regio-
nal societies. The characteristics of agricultural, and later industrial, societies help
establish a larger framework within the text. Peter N. Stearns works to connect
past developments to contemporary global patterns and problems, explicitly
balancing major changes with significant continuities. Key features include:
A “no-frills” approach to an expansive stretch of human history

Encourages students to understand the importance of studying history
by focusing on aspects of the past that are particularly useful in assessing
the current state of the world
Invites instructors to combine the advantages of systematic summary
coverage with varied supplementary reading
Nine maps illustrate important movements and civilizations throughout
the world.
Truly international in coverage, this book has been specifically designed

as a core text for Global History survey courses.
Peter N. Stearns is University Professor of History at George Mason Uni-

versity, USA. He has taught a freshman world history course every year for
over three decades; he also helped introduce the Advanced Placement world
history program. Stearns has written widely on a variety of topics in the field,
most recently including books on time and on happiness in world history.
World Past to World
Present
A Sketch of Global History
Peter N. Stearns
First published 2022
by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2022 Peter N. Stearns
The right of Peter N. Stearns to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and
recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Stearns, Peter N., author.
Title: World past to world present : a sketch of global history / Peter N.
Stearns.
Description: New York, NY : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021010454 (print) | LCCN 2021010455 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781032055787 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032052618 (paperback) |
ISBN 9781003198185 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: World history.
Classification: LCC D20 .S8325 2022 (print) | LCC D20 (ebook) |
DDC 909–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021010454
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021010455
ISBN: 978-1-032-05578-7 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-032-05261-8 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-19818-5 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185
Typeset in Bembo
by Taylor & Francis Books
Contents
List of maps vii

List of tables viii
Acknowledgments ix
1 Introduction 1
PART I
The Agricultural Age 11
2 The Nature of Agricultural Society 13
3 Early Civilizations 28
4 The Classical Period 35
5 Religion and Trade: World History from 600 to 1200 50
6 The Mongol Period, 1200–1450 71
7 The Early Modern Period, 1450–1750: The Global Framework 82
8 New Empires, New Ideas: Regional Developments in the Early
Modern Period 99
PART II
The Industrial Age 133
9 The Nature of Industrial Society 135
10 Global Dynamics: Imperialism and Globalization before 1914 154
11 Regional Patterns and Comparisons in the “Long” 19th
Century 182
vi Contents
12 A Troubled Transition: Global Developments, 1914–1945 213
13 A More Global World, 1945–2000 239
14 How Regions Responded, 1945–2000 265
15 The 21st Century: Legacies and New Questions 294
Index 317
Maps
2.1 Origins and spread of agriculture 16

4.1 Map of the classical empires at their height 37
5.1 Postclassical trade routes 58
6.1 Map of the world in 1350: Mongol Empires and beyond 74
8.1 The world in 1763 100
10.1 Empires by 1914 166
11.1 Latin America after independence 190
12.1 Europe and the Middle East after World War I 217
13.1 The world after decolonization and the end of the Cold War 252
Tables
2.1 Dates of migration of modern humans 14

10.1 World population growth 162
Acknowledgments
Huge thanks to Patricia Mikell, who helped both with preparation and with
evaluation. Thanks also to Kimberley Smith and other Routledge editors, who
are doing so much to advance world history. Particular gratitude to the many
undergraduates who have worked on world history with me, at Carnegie
Mellon and now at George Mason. They haven’t all been deeply interested,
but a rewarding number have, and their comments have sharpened my
knowledge and emphases – this book is really for them and those to come.
1 Introduction
This book offers a brief sketch of major developments in world history, from
the advent of agriculture about 12,000 years ago to the patterns that are
emerging around us in the 21st century. The aim is to provide a coherent basic
framework – which is arguably the main advantage of a textbook – along with
abundant space for other kinds of reading, whether in primary sources or
scholarly insights or both.
Most world history texts are considerably longer than this one, for the very
good reason that many important things have happened over the course of
thousands of years, with diverse patterns in different regions and time periods.
Even the longest text – and there are some that range over 1,400 pages – must
omit crucial materials, but it is understandable that historians, who love the
richness of the past, are reluctant to surrender too much. Inevitably, this book
sacrifices some of that richness – though with the expectation that the oppor-
tunity to consider other materials will compensate.
The book reflects a concern that many world history surveys, even some
with “brief” in their titles, gobble up too much student attention in a survey
course, at the expense of different kinds of data and interpretation that will
challenge analysis in ways that a largely textbook diet cannot. If – as this book
seeks to demonstrate – a coherent and usable framework can be provided in
less space, even at the cost of some important details, it is worth consideration.
What Is World History?

The premise of world history is this: that it is possible, and desirable, to cover
the emergence and evolution of major societies in different parts of the world,
over an extended period of time, along with the development of different
kinds of mutual contacts. World historians argue that, since we live in a diverse
and interconnected world, it is important to explore this ambitious canvas
rather than focus on the activities of one society or one time period alone.
World historians also believe that they can offer some underlying coherence
in their presentations, and not just a scattered list of unconnected events and
personalities. Coherence comes from some combination of the following: (1)
the opportunity to compare different regions around some common themes,
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-1
2 Introduction
such as the role of governments or the nature of social inequality; (2) the ability
to find some shared patterns across different regions; and (3) an emphasis on the
importance of the kinds of contacts among major regions that began to emerge
surprisingly early in the human experience and that have deepened in recent
centuries.
This book uses all three of these approaches, though without some of the rich
details that are possible in a longer treatment. Comparison helps highlight major
regional characteristics, some of which can be identified rather early in the for-
mation of agricultural civilizations – such as a tendency, in the cultural systems
that first emerged in the Middle East, to emphasize a more dramatic separation
between humankind and the rest of nature than was common in other parts of
Asia or Africa, or the Americas. At the same time all agricultural societies devel-
oped some underlying patterns that operated beneath the level of regional cul-
tures – such as the pronounced inequality between men and women that was
such a basic feature of all agricultural systems and that we are still grappling with
today. Finally, contacts began to affect many regions early on, particularly
through trade, though their intensity measurably ramped up about 500 years ago.
Why Study World History?

World history provides an opportunity to recognize some of the richness of the
human experience and the discoveries and innovations provided by many dif-
ferent societies, such as the range of new technologies pioneered in early Chinese
civilization or the breakthrough discovery of the concept of zero by mathema-
ticians both in India and in Central American Mayan civilization or the artistic
creativity that so many societies generated to celebrate their sense of the divine. It
also offers recognition of the horrors that human beings have periodically inflic-
ted on each other, from surprisingly bloody wars even before the introduction of
guns to the brutality of some slave systems. Both angles – the richness and the
horror – can contribute to an evaluation of human life today.
World history can contribute to a recognition of different cultural identities.
One of the reasons world history began to win popularity on American college
campuses in the 1980s stemmed from a recognition that attention to Western
civilization alone – a standard focus before the rise of more global approaches –
left out the heritage of the African, Latin American and Asian societies where
many contemporary students identified their origins. Identity is a tricky topic in
world history, because no one identity reigns supreme and because not all group
identities can be covered in detail. But the world history approach does open the
door for further consideration. In places like the United States, one of the func-
tions of world history is to promote a recognition that the values and institutions
derived from Western Europe are not the only game in town – that world his-
tory promotes recognition of a much wider array of societies and cultures.
World history provides a range of analogies that may provide some guidance
in the world today – of developments in the past that bear some resemblance
to contemporary issues and might offer insights that could help sort out some
Introduction 3
of the complexities involved. A number of historians, for example, have noted
the tendency of some societies – the Roman Empire, for example, or more
recently the British – to overexpand, taxing resources in ways that ultimately
contributed to a need for retreat. They suggest that there are lessons in these
past episodes that might usefully guide American or Chinese policy today.
Analogy is another tricky subject, because circumstances change in ways that
complicate the application of past experience directly to the present. Even
here, gaining the ability to test analogies is a vital asset, and world history pro-
vides an abundance of opportunities.
More broadly, attention to world history promotes many of the skills
students can gain from historical work more generally. It enhances capacities
for analysis, not only in comparison but in assessing change and continuity
over time. These skills are fundamental to a grasp of world history that goes
beyond mindless memorization.
Above all, however, world history provides opportunities to grapple with
the reasons the contemporary world is as it is. Why has China been more
successful in controlling population growth than India? Why and how does
Vladimir Putin, the long-standing Russian president, contend that Russian
culture is different from, and better than, that of the West? Answers to
questions of this sort often go back to much earlier developments, at least in
part, though obviously more recent patterns, such as the advent of indus-
trialization or changing systems of global communication, contribute more
decisively. Simply put, world history offers the direct antecedents and causes
of the global issues and opportunities that shape life today.
This book, despite its brevity, offers opportunities to explore all these
world history benefits, but it concentrates particularly on the connections
between world past and world present. Coverage is selected with deliberate
emphasis on those features of the past that continue to show up, at least to
some extent, on the global stage today. To this end, each subsequent
chapter also offers a concluding “legacies” section that seeks to highlight the
contemporary relevance of key developments in the chapter’s coverage.
The focus on past-present connections also explains the need to deal with
patterns since about 1500 in somewhat greater detail than earlier developments
require, simply because the links to the present deepen. At the same time,
continuities from earlier periods gain recurrent emphasis: some aspects of the
contemporary world were launched with the rise of agriculture or the emer-
gence of early civilizations, and then intertwined with more recent trends.
Contemporary applicability can always be debated: for example, the role of
past Chinese patterns in shaping the very new society of China today is
unquestionably complex, but many scholars argue that it is essential to go back,
in part, to the unfolding of Confucianism 2,500 years ago. The role of resent-
ments against 19th-century Western imperialism in explaining key aspects of
global relations even now is not an easy topic, but there is undeniably a link.
Even the essential debates that inevitably attach to past-present relationships can
be illuminating.
4 Introduction
Using contemporary relevance to guide the selectivity of this brief world his-
tory sketch itself has drawbacks that deserve discussion. There is a risk not only of
sacrificing some of the richness of the global past – which a short text inevitably
has to do – but of minimizing one of the features historians cherish most dearly: a
sense of the “pastness” of the past. Classical India or the great African kingdoms
of the postclassical period were not simply a staging area for the developments
we see around us today; they were very different from the present, in many
important ways. The chapters that follow will strive to maintain this challenging
balance, between showing, even briefly, how distinctive the past was, how much
has changed in moving from past to present, but also how connections with the
past are vital in explaining the world around us today.
Making World History Manageable

World historians almost always use two devices to generate some coherence in
their huge topic, to avoid a sense of the global past as simply one specific
development after another. They talk about key regions of the world that,
because of a combination of geography and historical experience, generate
some identifiable and durable characteristics – even when some of these regions
are divided, as many are today, into separate political units or nations. (There
are, after all, over 200 individual countries in the world right now, and even a
long world history text cannot possibly follow up each by name.)
Along with regional definitions, the second key sorting device emphasizes
time periods that organize – if very generally – around a few common themes.
Just as a world history that deals with one nation after another would quickly
become indigestible, the same applies to an approach that would mindlessly
describe one century after another. Time periods in world history require
explicit definition, and, like regionalism, they can and should be debated –
they are, after all, inventions by scholars, not divinely ordained. But they do
make the huge chronological expanse of world history more manageable.
A brief world history text relies particularly heavily on these sorting devices –
regions and time periods. Both angles will be explored in the chapters that
follow, but it will help to have a preliminary road map that readers can refer to
at any point in the substantive chapters. The regional theme will begin to
emerge most clearly from Chapter 3 onward, with brief reference to the ear-
liest civilizations; the reliance on time periods begins with the idea of a long
“agricultural age” presented in Chapter 2.
Major Regions
Chapter 4 will focus heavily on the emergence of several “great traditions” that
began to define three or four key regions of the world – traditions that com-
bined key elements of religion and culture, like Hinduism in India or Con-
fucianism in China, with some characteristic institutional features. Regions that
clustered around these great traditions, like China and its neighbors or South
Introduction 5
Asia, have retained some distinctive qualities into the present day. However,
one of the “great traditions” areas, around the Mediterranean, split apart, and
tracing its heritage becomes a more complicated assignment. And other regions
that imported diverse traditions from elsewhere – like Africa or Southeast Asia
or the Americas – developed defining characteristics in other ways.
From Chapter 5 onward, seven or eight regions – the uncertainty depends
on decisions about South and Southeast Asia – will serve as a framework for
comparisons and for discussions of change and continuity. Some of the seven
hark back to great traditions, including some of the major world religions;
others require a looser definition.
1 East Asia. The power of Chinese society and the example it set ulti-
mately affected Japan, Korea, and Vietnam as well. The resulting East
Asian region has never been politically unified and it often embraces
considerable internal tension – as is the case today. But some shared
features provide a partial definition.
2 South Asia. Here is the second clear “great tradition” region, built
around the systems developed in classical India, again despite political
fluctuations and divisions on the Indian subcontinent. Influences from
India also affected Southeast Asia, though there were other contacts as
well, making this a more complicated regional category.
3 The Middle East and North Africa. This region gains coherence primarily
through the influence of the Islamic religion and the spread of the
Arabic language, though there is considerable internal diversity includ-
ing the importance of other linguistic groups such as Farsi (Persian),
Turkish, and Hebrew. The region was one of the heirs to the traditions
of the classical Mediterranean.
4 Sub-Saharan Africa. This is a huge region – Africa overall is the world’s
second largest continent – with a number of different climate sectors and a
welter of ethnic groups. Discussions of Sub-Saharan Africa do not benefit
from a single traditional base. However, large parts of the region were
shaped by the spread of Bantu peoples and languages, and more recently
the region as a whole shared the experience of the spurt of Western
imperialism and then the process of late-20th-century decolonization.
5 Eastern Europe. This region, another heir to Mediterranean traditions,
has been defined particularly by the spread of Orthodox Christianity
and influences from Greek language and culture, and more recently by
the importance of Slavic peoples and the expansion of Russia. The
cultural and political border between Eastern and Western Europe has,
however, fluctuated – and still does today.
6 Western Europe. The final Mediterranean heir, Western Europe was
initially defined – despite persistent political disunity –by the spread of
Catholic Christianity. More recently, Western Europe was additionally
shaped by the great cultural transformation of the Scientific Revolution
and Enlightenment in the 17th–18th centuries. Many features of
6 Introduction
Western civilization spread to Canada, the United States, Australia and
New Zealand, creating a larger civilization zone by the 18th–19th
centuries despite some pronounced internal national differences.
References to “the West” from the 18th century onward usually refer
to this larger space.
7 Latin America. Important developments in the Americas preceded the
violent intrusion of Europeans, and then enslaved Africans, after 1492.
Latin American society ultimately blended cultural and social features of
the various population strands into what is arguably the most recent
regional civilization, though one with important ties to “the West”.
All of the major world regions embrace internal complexities, and a longer
survey would provide greater detail. Latin America, for example, is not only
divided into separate nations, but offers a variety of mixtures of ethnicities and
economies – and similar issues bedevil the other regions as well. There is an
important argument that the United States is too different from other Western
nations to be lumped into the same category. Japan’s relationship with China
has frequently swerved. Central Asia is another region that frequently deserves
attention on its own, though after the 16th century it was increasingly taken
over by Russia, China, and other powers; but it has emerged again since the
end of the Cold War. Pacific Oceania, though less important in global influ-
ence, offers another distinctive regional experience ultimately brought into a
fuller global connection via Western imperialism.
Clearly, mapping world history into regions involves a combination of defin-
able features and compromises of convenience. Yet the idea of a limited number
of basic regions does provide a starting point. The regions gained a degree of
identity at different points in time – regions must be combined with time peri-
ods. Despite their complexity, they help capture some of the connections
between past and present that shape the world today. The major regions also
have had different experiences with interregional connections and contacts over
time, and these contribute to their various reactions to contemporary levels of
globalization. Following regional patterns, and refining them through compar-
ison, offer one path through the complexities of the global experience.
Time Periods
Historians who survey long stretches of chronology, whatever their specific
subject, usually seek to make their analysis more manageable by identifying
coherent periods of time. Rather than assuming that major changes occur
frequently or randomly, they try to find points where a basic framework
shifts and then explore that framework until another fundamental shift
occurs: the interval is the relevant chronological period.
World historians, despite the scope of their project, normally take this
approach quite explicitly, and there is a fair amount of agreement on what
some of the basic periods are. However, choices of periods, like definitions
Introduction 7
of regions, combine definable characteristics with decisions about manage-
ability. They can always be debated, for the length of each period depends
in part on the attention span of the user. A short world history text, like this
one, places heavy emphasis on a few basic periods, without too many
exceptions or qualifications, particularly before modern times.
Here’s an example of the pluses and minuses of a big picture periodization
approach. Most world histories define a classical period that runs from about 800
BCE until about 500 CE – in this book, the classical period and its legacy form
the substance of Chapter 4. During this time period the large regional civiliza-
tions took shape in China, India, Persia, and the Mediterranean, and there was
a certain amount of trade among these regions (along with some near neigh-
bors, like the present-day region of Ethiopia in northeastern Africa). The uni-
fying theme of this period involves the expansion, definition, and consolidation
of these major regions, which were measurably different from the smaller
civilizations that had preceded them. And the period ends when, between 200
and 550 CE, the major regional civilizations entered a period of decline or fell
apart entirely. This then triggered the advent of the next major period.
This tidy basic definition shows both the strengths and weaknesses of the
effort to identify coherent stretches of time in world history. Strengths: the
process of consolidation of three or four major regions in Asia, southern
Europe and northern Africa arguably does capture the most important single
set of developments in the long period, and the ones that have left the greatest
mark on world history thereafter. Weaknesses: developments in other parts of
the world are not included. Admittedly these other areas, though vast, had
smaller populations, but bypassing them at this point reminds us that definitions
of world history periods always work better for some regions than others,
though the global coherence becomes greater over time. And even for the
classical societies themselves, emphasis on the main themes of consolidation
risks obscuring important specific twists and turns within the period itself: to
take an obvious example, classical Mediterranean history is not a straight march
from scattered Greek city states, around 800 CE, to the great Roman Empire
at its height a thousand years later. But in this book, the need to highlight the
most basic characteristics downplays oscillations within the period.
The chapters that follow are in fact organized around two kinds of period-
ization. The first rests on the argument that human society has gone through
three fundamental organizational forms. The earliest, and by far the longest-
lasting, rested on the structures associated with a hunting and gathering econ-
omy. This original system offered all sorts of advantages, but ultimately it did
not last – only a few, small and isolated hunting and gathering groups survive
today. It was increasingly replaced, in most parts of the world, by an agri-
cultural economy, which had its own characteristic structures from family life
to war and politics. Then, more recently still, agriculture is being largely
replaced by the features of what can broadly be defined as industrial society.
Chapters 2 and 9 capture the sweeping transitions, first, to agriculture, and then
to industry.
8 Introduction
Within the Agricultural Age, and then the modern Industrial Age, it is
still useful to define shorter periods of time, defined by important shifts that
are, however, less fundamental than the arrival of the successive basic eco-
nomic systems.
Thus, in the Agricultural Age, the advent of initial civilizations – mostly
along great river valleys – leads to the second civilization phase with the
great classical societies: these two periods are covered in Chapters 3 and 4
(3500 BCE–500 CE). From about 500 CE to 1200 CE, the spread and
impact of major world religions plus the establishment of more extensive
interregional trade generated changes that would, though diversely, affect all
the major societies of Africa, Asia, and Europe (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 deals
with a time of transition between 1200 and 1450, highlighted by the brief
but striking success of the Mongol empires, which introduced yet another
set of changes into interregional contacts.
The early modern period, 1450–1750, clearly opens a new phase in global
contacts, marked by the inclusion of the Americas in world trade (Chapter 7)
but also a series of major regional developments (Chapter 8). Though definitely
still part of the Agricultural Age, the period features a number of crucial tran-
sitions both at the global and the regional level.
Obviously, world history periods tend to get shorter as they near modern
times: that’s a standard feature of most survey treatments. This may reflect a
more rapid pace of change; it also marks the fact that more recent periods have
more impact on our lives today, which is also why they warrant somewhat
more extensive coverage. Earlier time periods are treated with a broader brush.
Slightly less obvious, but even more important, is the claim that from the
classical period onward, each major period is partly defined by a change in
the nature and importance of interregional contacts. Paying attention to
these changing systems of trade and exchange, and how they affected each
major region, helps build understanding of how world history alters over
time – regional characteristics alone are not the only focus. As a result, both
because of the intensification of contacts and because of the need to handle
slightly greater detail, the pattern used for the early modern period – one
global chapter, along with a second comparative/regional unit – will be the
standard framework going forward – the only exceptions being the overall
treatment of industrial society (Chapter 9), coverage of the brief stretch
between the two World Wars (Chapter 12), and the concluding comment
on very recent developments (Chapter 15).
The Industrial Age is both more recent and – so far –much shorter than
its Agricultural predecessor. While some of its features began to emerge in
the Early Modern period, the “long” 19th century (from 1780 to 1914)
really forms the first industrial period, which also included the first phase of
modern globalization – a new set of interregional contacts. Thus, after
dealing with the major features of the industrial age (Chapter 9), two
chapters deal respectively with the global framework of the long 19th cen-
tury (Chapter 10), and regional and comparative patterns (Chapter 11).
Introduction 9
The decades of World War (1914–45) mark another brief transition, though
in many ways a rather nasty one (Chapter 12). Patterns after 1945 highlight an
acceleration of both globalization and industrialization, plus a major restruc-
turing of interregional relationships, most obviously through the rapid process
of decolonization. Here again, successive chapters will take up the larger pat-
terns – this was after all the point at which globalization was formally defined –
and the most recent set of regional features against the global backdrop
(Chapters 13 and 14). Finally, Chapter 15, dealing with the 21st century,
allows a discussion of the extent to which later 20th-century patterns are
changing once again, as well as the ways they continue to reflect older themes.
Understanding world history, making it usable as an active contributor to
the world today, involves crosshatching the major geographical regions and
the major periods of time. Crosshatching in turn raises some standard
questions: how did the new themes of period X affect region Y? Or, con-
versely, how did the regional traditions of Y affect the reception of the new
themes of period X and to what extent were the traditions reshaped as a
result? And ultimately: how has the combination of regional continuities
and successive chronological changes in global themes impacted the world
as a whole, as it nears the end of the first quarter of the 21st century?
It is a commonplace to talk about conditions in the world today as a com-
bination of the global and the local, that is, a mixture of wide-ranging contacts
and deep-seated regional characteristics. Too much emphasis on either com-
ponent risks misunderstanding. The specific features of the combination are
partially new, reflecting developments such as global media technologies or the
assertions of a newly-vigorous Chinese society. But different versions of the
combination can be found in past times as well, at least since the process of
recovery from the decline of the regional classical empires. The balance
between contacts and regional identities is never straightforward, but it is the
central focus for the exploration of world history. It also generates the most
basic comparative questions for each major time period, around regional
responses to global change. To help sort out the interplay, most of the fol-
lowing sections, from Chapter 3 onward, will include a summary of the
regional/global interplay, before the final comment on legacies.
Conclusion: Revisiting Legacies

World history is unquestionably a challenging subject. This book tries to
help readers meet the challenge by emphasizing leading developments, and
by clarifying the interaction between regional characteristics and the larger
contacts and exchanges that play such a great role in defining successive
periods of time. The aim is to show how the blend of regional features and
global interactions has shaped the major features of human life, from poli-
tical systems to cultural expressions to patterns of work and family.
Always, the ultimate goal is to highlight the connections between past
and present. This means focusing on how much major regions have
10 Introduction
changed over the main periods of world history, and how much they have
retained from the past, in explaining their characteristics and mutual rela-
tionships today. It means figuring out how the pattern of contact and con-
nection today – the pattern we now call globalization – emerged from
earlier precedents, and how it continues to evolve. The march from past to
present has not been straightforward; there was no preordained path. Yet
the contemporary world can only be explained as a product of its varied
history, and historical analysis is central to understanding and evaluating its
major features.
Further Reading
For fuller conventional textbook treatment, Peter Stearns, Michael Adas, Stuart
Schwartz, and Marc Gilbert, World Civilizations: The Global Experience, 8th
edn. (2021) and Rick Szostak, Making Sense of World History (2021). For a
basic statement of what is called Big History, that puts world history into a
larger context of the Earth’s evolution, see David Christian, Maps of Time:
An Introduction to Big History (2011). For an assessment of various approa-
ches to world history, Diego Olstein, Thinking History Globally (2014).
Part I
The Agricultural Age
2 The Nature of Agricultural
Society
Many of the great moments of history – the rise of major empires like Rome
or Han China or the Ottomans, the emergence of enduring religions from
Judaism and Hinduism to Islam – took shape in agricultural societies. They
form part of an Agricultural Age that began to emerge about 11,000 years ago
and started to draw to a close only in the 18th century – a mere three centuries
ago. Obviously the Agricultural Age generated great variety – the huge
empires, but also vibrant city-states; rulers devoted to peace but also a host of
greedy conquerors; religious devotion and secular defiance. But the agricultural
economy also provided a definable context for human activities, a context that
was at least as important as the range of events and achievements that bubbled
up from its base.
This chapter sketches the basic features of agricultural societies. Under-
standing these features will help clarify the more detailed historical develop-
ments that followed, for all the major agricultural regions shared them,
whatever their variety in other respects. Exploring the agricultural funda-
mentals also provides an active background for the modern world, which is
only just emerging from the agricultural age, still grappling with its heritage, in
some cases still lamenting its decline. Tracing the emergence of agriculture, its
characteristic strengths and weaknesses, constitutes a first step in connecting the
past to the present.
Before Agriculture
The human experience goes back well before the advent of agriculture, though
it has only consumed a brief time compared to the age of the Earth itself. The
human species emerged about 2.5 million years ago, in East Africa. It has
experienced a variety of evolutionary developments since its origins, including
the rise of homo sapiens sapiens – our particular human species, the most recent
version of homo sapiens – about 400,000 years ago, also in East Africa.
Thanks to new archeological discoveries plus techniques such as carbon
dating, knowledge about the early human experience has increased dramati-
cally in recent decades. We learn, for example, that homo sapiens sapiens not
only originated earlier than was once thought, but began to travel to other
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-3
14 The Nature of Agricultural Society
parts of Africa surprisingly quickly; fossil evidence has been found in North
Africa from over 300,000 years ago. We also know more about how this spe-
cies related to other human species like the Neanderthals – outcompeting them
ultimately, but also interbreeding with them. Keeping up with new findings,
simply as a matter of human interest, is a good way to balance out the daily
events around us.
In terms of long-term consequences, a few features of the extensive early
human experience deserve particular emphasis:
1 Later evolutionary developments included the capacity to speak and

what some evolutionary biologists call a “sociability gene.” For all its
recurrent cruelties, homo sapiens is rated as having a natural predisposi-
tion for collaboration with other humans, and this is one of the foun-
dations of species success.
2 Humans gradually improved their technologies, very slowly turning from
using found objects as tools, to crafting tools directly from stone, wood,
and bone. This would come to include the ability to build simple boats.
Supplementing technology also was the domestication of dogs (between
20,000 and 40,000 years ago; there is much uncertainty about precisely
when and initially where), which gave humankind a decided advantage
for protection and hunting. An interesting argument holds that the ability
to use dogs gave homo sapiens sapiens an edge over Neanderthals.
3 Migrations spread the species widely (Table 2.1). Various earlier human
species had migrated out of Africa, seeking more space for a hunting and
gathering economy that required considerable room (about 2.5 square
miles on average) for each individual (or about 80–200 square miles for
the typical hunting and gathering band). Homo sapiens sapiens joined the
parade about 60,000 to 80,000 years ago, first moving into the Middle
East and then branching out, with one large group heading to East Asia,
Table 2.1 Dates of migration of modern humans
Date Migration
80,000–60,000 BCE Movement out of East Africa
55,000 BCE Evidence in South Asia
50,000 BCE Australia
40,000 BCE Europe (from Central Asia)
35,000 BCE Japan
30,000 BCE Americas (reaching Caribbean by
4000–3000 BCE)
3000–1000 BCE Movement from Taiwan into Poly-
nesian Islands
1300 CE New Zealand
Note: new discoveries and debates continue about many of these dates; in several cases it is
probable that limited migrations occurred earlier but did not have durable results.
The Nature of Agricultural Society 15
others fanning out into South and Central Asia and Europe. From Asia,
groups migrated also to Australia and the Americas – crossing a land bridge
to Alaska and then moving to other parts of the Americas, often surpris-
ingly quickly; reaching Australia in primitive boats. End result: by 10,000
BCE, on the eve of agriculture, there were at most 10 million people in
the world as a whole (some estimates are much lower), widely scattered
into virtually all the land areas, including most islands, where people live
today. Only New Zealand and a few other island groups were yet
undiscovered. The wide dispersal of peoples in one sense seemed more
drastic than it was: many scattered peoples participated in a larger
shared basic language group (like Indo-European, from which most
European and many Indian languages derive); and hunting and gath-
ering groups occasionally assembled over a wider territory for rituals
like a seasonal solstice. But the opportunity to form quite varied
regional and local customs was a crucial legacy of the early human
experience – a testament to diversity and creativity but sometime also a
barrier to wider collaborations.
4 Finally, hunting and gathering populations developed successful eco-
nomic and social forms, the specifics depending on local climate and
geography. Groups were small – usually 40–80 people, half of them
children, and obviously they moved around frequently to take advan-
tage of food supplies (fishing communities, however, might be a bit
more stable). Men and women had different roles, but since women as
gatherers often brought in the larger caloric supply, they usually had a
reasonably strong position in the community as a whole. Overall
inequality was limited. War was rare, in part because groups could
move away from violence, in part because they developed specific
practices, like gift exchange, to promote peace. Many scholars, using
evidence from surviving contemporary hunting and gathering groups,
believe that these communities were usually quite contented; few
actually had words for “happiness” but this may be because they felt
reasonably happy most of the time so had no need for a special term.
The Advent of Agriculture – and Some Complications

Some human groups began to convert to a reliance on agriculture – that is,
the deliberate growing of plants and animals for food – about 11,000 years
ago, initially on the southern and eastern shores of the Black Sea (Map 2.1).
Early grains included wheat, barley, oats and rye. Agriculture was separately
discovered at least two other times: around 9,000 years ago in southern
China, relying on the cultivation of rice; and around 7,000 years ago in
Central America, based on corn (maize). It is possible that there were other
separate inventions, though for the most part the expansion of agricultural
economies depended on gradual conversions of additional regions, from
contacts with one of the early centers.
16
The Nature of Agricultural Society
Map 2.1 Origins and spread of agriculture

The rise of agriculture also included domestication of several animal spe-
cies for food, transportation and labor. Sheep, for example, were domes-
ticated in the Middle East between 11,000 and 8,000 years ago. Donkeys,
long vital for transportation and trade, were domesticated from Africa about
5,000 years ago.
Agriculture (including use of domesticated animals) spread inexorably to
many other parts of the world – but it also spread surprisingly slowly. The
agricultural economy reached southern Europe, for example, only about
4,000 years ago, despite proximity to the Middle East. Gradual transmission
reflected the fact that interregional contacts were slow and limited, but also
the equally important fact that agriculture brought a number of dis-
advantages; many groups might learn of agriculture but quite reasonably
decide they wanted no part of it. The rise of agriculture is not a magic story
of uncomplicated human progress.
Indeed, long after agriculture’s arrival, large parts of the world – particu-
larly in North America and Australia and some regions in Africa – retained
their reliance on hunting and gathering, sometimes supplemented by a bit
of transient crop growing. Other groups turned to herding horses and other
animals, developing nomadic patterns that differed both from hunting and
gathering and from agriculture. Nomadic societies emerged in several places
but they were particularly important in Central Asia, where they would
frequently interconnect with agricultural economies around them in the
Middle East, China, and elsewhere.
Avoidance of agriculture might reflect particular climate conditions or,
again, ignorance, but other factors could be involved. Settling down in one
place, though it might have long-term advantages, could seem unpleasant,
perhaps particularly for male hunters. Concentrated agricultural commu-
nities, along with more frequent contact with animals, generated higher
rates of contagious disease. War became a recurrent problem for the first
time; the first skeletal evidence of mass violence dates from not long before
the rise of agriculture, along with the first invention of implements –
maces – designed for war and nothing else. Several new motives for war
developed, beginning with the fact that agricultural communities, more
vulnerable and difficult to move around, also had surpluses that might pro-
vide targets for raids and soon including the simple desire to seize more
land. Finally, agriculture was simply harder work, at least in key seasons.
Most hunter-gatherers worked only about two and a half hours a day on
average; farm families – the backbone of agricultural societies – put in much
longer hours.
Why Agriculture?
So why did this new, and clearly complicated, economic system take hold at
all? In places of origin, some kind of necessity was probably involved at first:
changes in climate or over-hunting depleted available game animals,
highlighting the need for another food supply. Women, as gatherers, likely
had the knowledge necessary to convert to the deliberate planting of crops.
Once launched, whatever its other drawbacks, agriculture quickly gener-
ated one overwhelming strength: it could support a rapidly growing popu-
lation. Within 1000 to 2000 years after the initial development of
agriculture, the total global population probably doubled, centered mainly
in the agricultural areas. Within 10,000 years – that is, at the advent of the
Common Era – there were at least 200 million people in the world, a
twenty-fold increase (or more) since the advent of agriculture. Simply put,
agriculture produced a growing food supply that in turn supported more
people than ever before. Periodic famines (and the disease rate) did still
threaten, and the protein portion of diets deteriorated (reducing average
human height), but the overall gain was incontestable.
Larger populations in turn had several implications. Families could enjoy
more children. All agricultural societies produced cultures that emphasized
the importance of multiple children for happiness (though it was mainly
men who wrote about this). More children also meant the possibility of
more sexual activity, another potential plus.
Most obviously, more people created opportunities and needs to press for
more space, to push out into hunting and gathering areas, either displacing
local populations or insisting that they adopt this new economic system.
There is evidence that the spread of agriculture from the Middle East to
Europe mainly involved migration and invasion, rather than spontaneous
imitations by local hunter-gatherers. Much later, the intrusion of European-
origin agriculturalists into the hunting and gathering areas of North America
involved a clear pattern of resistance but superior force and numbers on the
agricultural side.
Over time, of course, agricultural economies generated other advantages
beyond sheer population size. Perhaps most obviously, unusually bright,
strong and/or lucky and ruthless individuals could seize more land than
average and develop a style of life notably superior to that of most people.
Virtually all agricultural societies generated marked social and economic
inequality. Upper classes, usually based on landowning, enjoyed better diets
and other amenities that surely made agricultural life worth living – for
them.
Agricultural surpluses – that is, the margin between what farmers could
usually produce and what they needed to survive – also commonly sup-
ported other changes that could provide satisfaction. Religions could
become more elaborate, with a larger and more formally organized priest-
hood. Impressive monuments could inspire awe. Some of these develop-
ments were also intended to ease the fear of death.
And while agriculture involved a great deal of work from ordinary
people, it could also support more elaborate leisure activities at least occa-
sionally. All agricultural societies, for example, produced the notion of a
week – a unit of 5–10 days (this varied; only gradually did the idea of a
seven-day week catch on in many places, from its origins in the Middle
East). This unit of time was purely manmade. But it suggested the need for
periodic opportunities to interrupt work to trade; and/or to devote more
time to religion; and/or simply to interrupt the daily routine. Agricultural
societies also created periodic festivals, in which villagers and city folk alike
would enjoy more elaborate food and drink than usual, plus activities like
dancing or local sports.
The overall result was a pattern of life quite different from the hunting
and gathering traditions, with a different mix of advantages and drawbacks.
A number of scholars recently have argued that for most people – and also
for the physical environment – the rise of agriculture was a turn for the
worse. It is also interesting that many agricultural peoples invented stories
about an earlier age when things were better – like the Garden of Eden
story for the religions of the Middle East, or a Chinese belief in an ancient
dynasty that outshone more recent versions.
But for agricultural peoples themselves, once the system was adopted,
there was no going back. The strengths of the new economy, and the cul-
tural attachments it created, supported a system that, in many regions,
would last thousands of years without much fundamental challenge. This
means, in turn, that understanding the most common general features of
agricultural life and structure offers a vital entry into the unfolding of world
history and into the immediate backdrop of more recent alternatives.
What Agricultural Societies Had, and Have, in Common

Several basic features of agricultural societies are almost self-evident, but
they can be obscured by the varieties of more specifically regional devel-
opments in world history:
1 Though agricultural societies developed at least some manufacturing

and trade, the importance of food production, and the labor required,
towered over other elements of the economy; and food production
depended almost entirely on manual labor supplemented by the use of
animals.
2 Land, and property in land, were of overwhelming importance, the
foundation of social structure and family formation alike.
3 These features generated deep and persistent inequalities, in social
position and gender relationships alike.
Production, Location, and Hierarchy

Invariably in agricultural societies the vast majority of the population lived
in the countryside and spent at least part of the time, and usually most of
the time, farming. Even in the most productive cases, providing adequate
food for ten people required at least eight farming families. In other words,
while important surpluses existed over mere subsistence – the basis for
political and religious activities and upper-class life – the margin was limited.
Most production in the agricultural age depended on human and animal
power. All sorts of technological changes occurred as agricultural societies
matured – China would prove to be a particularly important center for
innovations. Over time people learned to use animals more effectively,
through devices like yokes or saddles, though in the Americas before 1492
draft animals were not available at all. The rise of metal tools and weapons
would be a huge change. Artisan craft workers became steadily more skill-
ful, particularly in the cities. Water power and wind power were used,
particularly for milling grain, and shipping and navigational technologies
improved greatly. But the fundamental dependence on manual labor, sup-
plemented by the use of draft animals, remained, particularly in the all-
important agricultural sector. This was a vital component of daily life for
most people, and a basic reason that work was more demanding than had
been the case for hunting and gathering groups. It was also a fundamental
constraint on the amount of surplus available, and a basic social differ-
entiator as well, separating the majority of the population from that more
privileged minority who was able to depend on the manual labor of others
(see Box 2.1).
Box 2.1 Labor Systems

Agricultural societies generated several labor systems. The differences
were important in shaping regional social structures, but it is useful to
have a sense of the options in mind before dealing with particular cases.
Two of the systems reflected particularly pronounced inequality but also
the extent to which ordinary people often depended on some degree of
protection by those with greater economic power.
Slave holding was common, emerging fairly early in several agricultural
societies. Slaves might be prisoners seized in war; or they might be
purchased; or, as the systems took hold, they reflected hereditary status.
In some cases – as in the Roman Empire – parents in land-poor families
even sold children into slavery, hoping that they would be better pro-
vided for. Slave labor could be harsh; Greeks and Romans used slaves in
mines, and after 1500 CE plantations in the Americas typically drove
workers hard. But in many slave societies, enslaved people also did
other work, including tutoring children, running shops and even serving
in the military. The variety was considerable, though slavery was always
based on ownership of people.
A second system centered on serfdom. This system, sometimes called
feudalism but more accurately known as manorialism, arose at various
points in Asia, Europe (including Russia) and Latin America. Serfs were
peasant farmers who worked partly on their own land, but also partly on
the estates of the landlords who controlled them; they might also owe
some rent, either in money or in kind. In return, landlords were supposed

to provide protection and stability. Serfs could not legally leave their land
(though some escaped), but on the other hand landlords were not sup-
posed to evict them so long as they fulfilled their obligations.
Finally, peasant villages or independent farmers might operate on their
own, producing most of what they needed locally but also selling some
surplus to townsmen. They might also employ some workers either for a
money wage or, even more commonly, for household support – housing
them and feeding them along with their own families. With some mod-
ifications this labor system also prevailed in whatever cities there were:
individual households generated most manufacturing production, some-
times aided by a few outsiders who were provided room and board with
the family itself.
In many agricultural societies, labor systems fluctuated over time. In
China, for example, independent peasants flourished at some points, but
then greater disorder and a deterioration in government forced greater
dependence on the landlord class. Many Russian peasants were pressed
into serfdom in hopes of protection against Mongol invaders in the 14th
century, and the system simply intensified thereafter, with government
support, until the 19th century. Popular reactions to the various labor
systems constitute another important variable; both serfdom and slavery
could draw fierce resistance, though there were many barriers to protest
as well.
Agricultural societies often supported cities, but these never contained

more than 20% of the total population, and usually much less. China in the
12th century CE was rapidly expanding its manufacturing and developing a
strong urban culture – but at most 12% of the total population lived in
cities. Most cities, in turn, were fairly small; only a few passed the million
mark (like Rome, at the height of its Empire – but afterward it fell back
markedly; later the few big cities that existed arose in parts of Asia, and they
were rare even there).
Rural location meant that populations were widely scattered, which
limited possibilities for extensive government control (most rural people
encountered governments mainly as tax collectors and recruiters of troops,
occasionally through administration of justice or construction of roads and
canals). In most agricultural societies, peasant farmers clustered in villages of
300–600 people (occasionally larger). This provided some opportunities for
collective labor, as in harvests, and the development of local festivals; some
villages also built walls or took other measures for defense.
Land was the crucial determinant of wealth (though possession of animals
like cattle or horses could enter in as well). The principal social classes were
determined by relationship to land: upper classes or aristocracies might claim
power from several sources, including military strength, but landed estates
were fundamental for support. At the other end, landless groups, whether
urban or rural, could be desperately poor. Urban social classes might
develop as well, but rural stratification was particularly crucial.
Virtually all agricultural societies featured extensive social inequality – one
of the basic contrasts with conditions in hunting and gathering societies.
The ability of some individuals to seize landed properties, and then defend
their holdings as part of the social and political order, was a key factor here.
The scattered populations of agricultural societies, combined with limited
government resources, also prompted many people to seek, or be pressed to
seek, the kind of protection a local landlord might offer, against marauders
or even other landlords. Although specifics varied, the result was usually a
rather steep social hierarchy, and although this occasionally prompted pro-
test, it was often widely accepted.
The Family
In most agricultural societies, and for most of the population groups
involved, the family served as the basis for production. This was a change
from the more group-based activities of hunting and gathering societies, and
it would be displaced later on by industrialization, but it was a vital aspect of
individual and social life during the Agricultural Age.
There were exceptions. Villages grouped families for certain kinds of
labor, particularly at harvest time. Governments sometimes organized larger
clusters for public works, as in building the pyramids of Egypt or the Great
Wall of China. Slave estates and a few factories – for armaments or ship
production, for example – were other alternatives. Generally, however, the
familial basis predominated, and this in turn deeply affected the experiences
of those involved.
Aside from a privileged few, family members were a vital source of pro-
ductive labor. Peasants and artisans assumed that their children would begin
to do some work at a fairly early age, and relied extensively on the con-
tributions of teenagers and young adults. In many regions – though not all –
extended families linked a number of relatives, beyond the nuclear parent-
child unit, in mutual support.
Reliance on young people’s labor – along with that of adults – had sev-
eral implications. It fundamentally shaped decisions about family size. The
goal was enough children to contribute to the family economy and carry on
in the future, but not so many as to overwhelm resources. Average families
aimed for 6–8 offspring; the conditions of agricultural life were such that
30–50% would die, usually before age 5, leaving a manageable family labor
force and stable-to-slightly rising overall population levels. Upper-class
families had more children than the average, since they could afford them
and use them to advance family interests in various ways. For all families,
attaining the optimal size could be a challenge. Experiments with birth
control measures began early, but none proved really reliable. Many agri-
cultural societies killed off unwanted babies, though infanticide was not
practiced everywhere.
Work requirements loomed large in childhood itself. Agricultural families
placed a high premium on obedience, since they were training their chil-
dren to be reliable workers. A traditional Chinese expression, “No parent is
ever wrong,” would have seemed quite sensible in most agricultural socie-
ties. There was no sense that childhood was meant to be a particularly
enjoyable time of life. On the other hand, children often had considerable
latitude for independent play outside of their work obligations, with differ-
ent age groups joining in a variety of games.
The production functions of the family also shaped marriage, again
with emphasis on parental authority. Parentally-arranged marriages were
the preferred form, to make sure that the partners had the necessary
qualities to assure economic success. Some property exchange was typi-
cally involved: in most agricultural societies, the family of the bride
would contribute some land or other resources, though in Africa the
groom’s gift was more important.
Gender
Inequality between men and women was a striking feature of agricultural
societies, in contrast to the greater parity that had existed in hunting and
gathering communities. Amid differences in specifics, all agricultural socie-
ties were firmly patriarchal, emphasizing the authority of fathers over sons
and men over women. Patriarchy was most obvious in the upper classes,
that did not necessarily depend on women’s work, but it extended down
the social ladder as well.
Some of the reasons for gender inequality followed from the other fea-
tures of agricultural society. High birth rates meant that women typically
spent many years pregnant and caring for young children. As a result, their
work was frequently centered on activities in and around the home, some-
times including caring for gardens or livestock. Men in turn were usually
responsible for tending to the crops – particularly the grains – that provided
the greatest caloric value. This economic disparity boosted men’s claims to
superiority, which to some extent replaced the prestige men had earlier
gained from their prowess in hunting. All agricultural societies, while
emphasizing male superiority, also tried to insist on male responsibility for
providing for their families.
Patriarchal systems highlighted the importance of regulating female
sexuality – except for women who were simply beyond respectability, like
the prostitutes who emerged very early in agricultural cities. Girls were not
supposed to engage in sex before marriage, and the behavior of wives was
strictly regulated. Men might also be urged to moral behavior, but never
with the same emphasis or enforcement. Sexual control may have resulted
from the importance of property for the family economy. Men wanted to
be as sure as possible that the land or craft shop they tended would be
passed on to heirs that they were sure they had sired. Strict sexual rules
constituted another difference from the hunting and gathering past.
Women were not powerless amid the limitations of patriarchy. Individual
wives and mothers could gain power through emotional attachments. In
many cases older women helped regulate the behaviors of not only their
children, but also their daughters-in-law. This may help explain why col-
lective resistance to gender inequality was almost unknown. But it is also
true that patriarchal inequality often deepened over time, as emphasis on the
inferiority of women became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Not infrequently –
though there is no way to determine rates – outright violence against dis-
putatious wives or daughters helped enforce the system as well. Several
cultural systems explicitly justified male violence, only urging that it not
becomes excessive.
The Parameters of Agricultural Societies

The main features of agricultural societies could be implemented in a variety
of ways. In most cases, for example, male superiority in the family was fur-
ther promoted by gender differences in marriage age: men married later,
which enhanced their authority over wives. In some cases this pattern was
extended into childhood, with parents pledging girls to marriage well before
puberty – one way, among other things, to regulate their sexual behavior.
But rates of child marriage varied greatly from one society to another. The
common standard was clear: inequality within the family and emphasis on
women’s sexual restraint. But the variety around this basic parameter was
important as well.
Similarly all agricultural societies devoted great attention to defining and
enforcing social inequality. Almost always, aristocracies not only had huge
advantages in property, but also in law; crimes against them were punished
more severely than crimes against commoners (and those against slaves, if
they existed, were lower still). Cultural authorities during the Agricultural
Age similarly devoted considerable attention to explaining why social
inequality was entirely natural and necessary. Here was the common para-
meter. But the specifics of inequality – including the extent of reliance on
slavery – differed greatly from one society to the next and, in some cases,
also changed over time.
A key reason to emphasize the many common components of agricultural
societies involves highlighting an underlying core – after which the unde-
niably important variants can be explored without overdoing their magni-
tude. As a matter of fact, students in most world history courses end up
overemphasizing the differences among key regional societies – and we will
address this issue again in Chapter 3. Keeping the basics in mind is one
obvious corrective.
A few other themes merit attention, though amid somewhat greater
complexity. Many agricultural societies frowned on undue displays of
wealth outside the aristocracy. At various points, several actually passed
sumptuary laws, punishing people for wearing fancy dress or buying show-
ing items for their homes. Both peasant villages and urban artisans usually
sought to limit inequality in their ranks; craft guilds in many cities pre-
vented any one shop from overexpansion. There was also widespread
suspicion of merchants for being too interested in money or profit.
Some villages remained largely isolated, producing almost everything
their residents needed locally. On the other hand, some trade was wel-
comed – for example, purchases of salt were essential to help preserve
meat. And not all ordinary people were confined to the barest sub-
sistence. Tensions over issues like the role of merchants were common
during the Agricultural Age, but different societies, and different time
periods, varied in their response.
Legacies
The basic features of agricultural societies, though they began to take shape
in most cases not only centuries, but millennia in the past, bear on the
world around us today in three ways. Indeed, it is hard to make full sense of
the contemporary world without some grasp of the agricultural basics.
1 While agricultural society no longer predominates, important agricultural

sectors remain in many major regions, and while some of these have been
transformed by new technologies and economic systems, others retain
many traditional features. Many rural areas of India and Africa today con-
tinue to reflect patterns established many centuries ago. Agricultural tra-
ditions also prompt important forms of resistance and resentment against
the forces of change, another factor to contend with in assessing con-
temporary patterns. Almost everywhere in the world today, rural regions
are more conservative, and maintain higher birth rates, than their urban
counterparts, and the distinction is not accidental.
2 Even in the so-called advanced industrial societies, the movement away
from agricultural patterns is still relatively recent and often contested.
The shift from agricultural to industrial societies is one of the most
interesting facets of world history (see Chapter 9 and beyond), but
clearly a grasp of agricultural precedents is essential to any analysis. The
contrasts between agricultural and industrial characteristics are often
obvious, but actual transitions often remain complicated; and none of
the big changes happened overnight. In other words, the heritage of
the agricultural past remains very much in play even when it no longer
predominates. Gender is a prime example. Almost every country in the
world today has at least modified some of the traditional expressions of
patriarchal inequalities, and in most cases the changes have been really
important. But almost nowhere has the residue of patriarchal arrange-
ments and assumptions been wiped away. Some sense of agricultural
patterns must enter into an assessment of key complexities in con-
temporary life.
3 Finally, key features of the agricultural heritage remain strong, com-
bining with the forces of change. We still depend on a seven-day
week; definitions have shifted and the “weekend” has gained new
meaning, but the category persists. Remnants of agricultural festivals
still burn bright, though some have eroded. The autumn celebration of
Diwali, in Hindu and other cultures, has evolved from much older
harvest festivals in India; the same applies to Sukkoth in the Jewish
tradition. Easter, though fundamentally transformed with Christianity,
builds on an older and complex Middle Eastern planting festival; and in
English the word Easter itself derives from the name of a pre-Christian
goddess celebrated in April as part of planting ritual. More prosaically,
modern societies still generally define the school year according to
older agricultural rhythms, when summer was the busy time for child
labor. It simply has been unnecessary and even undesirable to jettison
all the structures of the Agricultural Age, and some of them arguably
still function very well.
4 Even some characteristics that have been recast retain more traditional
momentum than is sometimes realized. For example most modern
societies have rejected many of the old arguments for social inequality,
and most landed aristocracies have been at least partially dismantled;
slavery has been abolished in principle (though current estimates suggest
that at least 60 million people are still effectively enslaved in various
parts of the world, including the United States). But basic social and
economic inequality still burns as bright as it ever did in the Agri-
cultural Age. Here is another case, and an important one, in which
innovations first introduced through agriculture have proved surpris-
ingly persistent.
****
Chapters 3–8 will discuss the ways different regions developed their par-
ticular versions of agricultural society and how in many cases the agricultural
formula itself changed over time, for example, in developing a greater
dependence on trade. Regional variations and key changes have also con-
tributed to the shape of the contemporary world.
It will remain important to keep the agricultural basics in mind, for many
took deep root and, at least in some ways, functioned very well, among
other things supporting gradual global population growth except in a few
centuries shadowed by epidemic disease. Pockets of traditional agricultural
life remain strong today; transitions away from agricultural patterns are often
incomplete or contested; and selective agricultural features are widely and
directly incorporated into contemporary life.
Further Reading
On agriculture, Peter Bellwood, First Farmers: The Origins of Agricultural
Societies (2004); Mark Tauger, Agriculture in World History, 2nd edn.
(2020); Eric Vanhaute, Peasants in World History, 2nd edn. (2021). On
human migration, Patrick Manning, Migrations in World History 3rd edn.
(2020). On inequality, Walter Scheidel, The Great Leveler: Violence and the
History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century (2018);
Merry Wiesner-Hanks, Gender in History: Global Perspectives, 2nd edn.
(2021). For an appreciation of human life in hunting and gathering and
early agricultural societies, Jared Diamond, The World Until Yesterday:
What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies? (2013).
3 Early Civilizations
This chapter centers on the emergence of more complex societies, within

the agricultural framework. These societies began to take shape from 3500
BCE onward, ultimately developing in several centers. While this formative
period embraces a long stretch of time, the focus is on the installation of
several new societal characteristics, that would spread more widely later on
and become standard fixtures in the historical evolution of many regions.
There is one compelling reason to go back this far in time, even in a
survey focused on historicizing the features of the contemporary world: the
innovations wrapped up in greater social complexity – including the intro-
duction of formal governments – are very much still with us today, so it is
vital to gain at least a brief sense of how and why they started in the first
place as well as some of their initial limitations.
Reminders: in focusing on the rise of new kinds of social organization
within agricultural societies, we are not at this point covering the whole
world. Many regions continued to emphasize hunting and gathering or
nomadic herding, though nomadic groups in some cases interacted with
more settled areas. Agriculture also continued to spread, for example, in
additional parts of Europe, without yet generating greater complexity.
Several particular conditions were required to generate systems that went
beyond the agricultural basics.
Civilization
A number of developments began to come together between about 4000
and 3500 BCE in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley in what was long called
Mesopotamia – now part of Iraq. In the first place, this was an unusually
fertile agricultural area. Farming had been going on for a long time in the
region, aided by irrigation from the great rivers; there was considerable
surplus for other activities. Additionally a number of new technologies were
becoming available; some developed elsewhere and were brought to the
region, others were more local. Pottery manufacture improved, and this was
vital for food storage. Use of copper and then bronze metals (a tin/copper
alloy) improved tools and weapons and also encouraged trade for the
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-4
Early Civilizations 29
necessary raw materials (tin, particularly, was not easy to locate). The wheel
was introduced for transportation (as well as pottery production), though it
is not entirely clear when a usable wheel was first devised. Finally, people in
the region – called Sumerians – began to develop the world’s first writing
system, using pictorial symbols.
All of this promoted further innovation. Agricultural surplus and trade
helped support larger cities (usually with populations of 10,000 or more).
Some cities had emerged earlier, but how there was a considerable net-
work – and this encouraged more regional trade. Sumerian city-states began
to form governments, usually under a local king of some sort (who often
served as well as chief local priest) but with some additional officials and
military personnel. A small percentage of male children began to be sent to
schools which taught the cumbersome writing system. All of this occurred
clearly within the broader context of an agricultural society, but there was
no question that things were changing as Mesopotamia gave birth to the
world’s first civilization.
Definitions
The word civilization has (at least) three meanings. This chapter and those
that follow explicitly use two of the meanings, and worry about the third.
Some world historians prefer to avoid the word altogether precisely because
it can prove confusing, but there is no good alternative term. Civilization:
(1) can refer to more complicated social arrangements; (2) can refer to
shared cultural and historical experiences; and (3) can refer to claims of
superiority over “noncivilized” people. All of these meanings began to
emerge from 3500 BCE onward.
Meaning #1 was the first to take shape historically, as developments in
Mesopotamia suggest, and it remains important. Agricultural societies could
develop capacities, and needs, that led to more complex structures. Civili-
zations in this sense are societies that have some kind of formal government
(not just a leader); some cities as centers for trade and religious and political
activities, and some system of writing. Not all agricultural societies moved
in this direction; some “stateless” agricultural societies persisted for a long
time in West Africa; and there were cases where some features of civiliza-
tion emerged but not all. Polynesian societies had governments but not
writing or many cities; Inca society in the Andes had an elaborate structure
without writing (tax records were kept through intricately knotted ropes).
But the power and advantages of civilization – in the sense of more com-
plex structures – ultimately spread fairly widely during the Agricultural Age.
One of the reasons for the expansion of civilization was outright con-
quest; Sumerian city-states, for example, worked hard to conquer territory
from each other, and gradually expanded their range of control. And they
were succeeded by a series of invading forces that set up even larger empires
in the Middle East.
Even aside from conquest, civilization structures had advantages. Trade
could provide a wider range of products – such as precious stones or
spices – particularly but not exclusively for the pleasure of the upper classes.
Writing facilitated trade – records could be kept of distant transactions – and
was vital to government itself, and it also provided new ways to build and
store knowledge. The establishment of formal government could be attrac-
tive in providing better defenses – the Sumerian city-states all built defen-
sive walls. Governments could also set up laws and judicial courts toward
the regulation of disputes. Agricultural societies emphasized property, and
this could occasion conflict; regions like Mesopotamia that depended on
irrigation (which in turn required collaboration to organize and regulate)
had particular need for dispute regulation. Government leaders often sup-
plemented their role in providing military and judicial services by claiming
they were appointed by the gods, or were gods themselves – a sign that this
innovation needed additional devices to win acceptance. But the basic
functions of government in the judicial and military realms proved funda-
mental – as is the case still today, even when other functions have been
added.
It is important not to overemphasize the structural transformations in
agricultural civilizations. The powers and functions of governments were
often limited. For example, states issued careful laws, but they rarely had
formal police forces; one of the reasons punishments for crimes were typi-
cally quite severe, with ample use of the death penalty, was for shock value,
because other means of enforcement were lacking. Cities became more
important but again centered only a minority of the population, and often a
small minority. Writing was a vital innovation but in most agricultural
civilizations only a small minority could afford to learn to read and write.
The bulk of the population continued to transmit knowledge orally. In
other words, civilization in its first sense, the emergence of more complex
structures, was truly significant but constraints were important as well.
Meaning #2 involves civilizations as regional clusters of some shared
values and experiences. By 3000 BCE, civilizations were taking shape not
only in Mesopotamia but also in Egypt. The two civilizations interacted,
through some trade and occasional warfare (and also, once, an exemplary
peace treaty). But they had very different features. Mesopotamian culture
was gloomier, with more references to tragedy and destruction (including
an early story about a great flood that nearly wiped out humanity). Egyptian
culture was more optimistic. It developed distinctive practices to facilitate
the transition from this life to life after death, including mummification and,
for the wealthy, great tombs. Egyptians seem not to have practiced infanti-
cide, which amazed visitors from Mesopotamia.
The point is clear. Civilizations in different regions, even when they
interacted occasionally, developed different values, artistic forms, writing
systems, political structures. So a reference to Mesopotamian or Egyptian
civilization or, later, Chinese or Greek civilization, refers both to the
existence of the more complex structures and to a loosely coherent set of
beliefs and social memories. Civilization in this second sense captures dis-
tinctive regional experiences and continuities. These could, of course,
change over time. Egyptian civilization ultimately blended into a wider
Mediterranean, and ultimately Arab-Islamic civilization, rather than
remaining largely separate. But there was a strong tendency for regional
civilizations to persist, particularly from the classical period onward.
Meaning #3 sees civilized people, or people in a particular civilized
region, as superior to other people. This is the meaning that is really tricky.
Most world historians are eager to point out that civilizations often behaved
very badly, waging war on weaker areas, capturing slaves, forcing people to
change beliefs – in ways that many “noncivilizations” (whether hunting and
gathering or agricultural) did not do. Some “noncivilized” groups develop
means of controlling anger and aggression, and resolving disputes, that are
far superior to anything civilizations have to offer. They can also have ela-
borate cultural and artistic forms. Civilizations also tended to emphasize and
enforce inequalities (both social and gender) more elaborately than other
agricultural societies did. While civilizations varied in their dependence on
warfare, and other types of societies could be belligerent as well, the rise of
the civilization form was hardly a triumph for peace. (Interestingly, when
early civilizations waged war, they often interrupted hostilities so that troops
could return to harvest crops; but this nicety did not last long.)
In other words, the notion that civilizations are “better” is historically
misleading. Furthermore, civilizations that claimed to be superior often used
their claims as an excuse to mistreat or enslave others – another warning
sign. The great Greek philosopher Aristotle, for example, believed that non-
Greeks were inferior people who deserved nothing more than service as
slaves.
It was true that civilizations boasted fancier cities and upper-class lifestyles
than any other kind of society. They generated unparalleled monuments
and works of art. And, as a matter of fact, they often actively promoted a
sense of overall superiority. The Greeks, again, saw themselves as different
from the foreigners who settled in their midst. They called the foreigners
“barbarians” because their languages sounded like gibberish: “bar, bar, bar.”
Chinese civilization would also encourage a sense that people from other
societies could not possibly measure up.
Civilization, in other words, could foster a sense of differentiation and
identity that downgraded others – particularly people from societies not
organized the way civilizations were – like nomadic groups – but often
even other civilizations that were not recognized as such. The sense that
one’s own society was the only really civilized place in the world was not
confined to the Greeks or Chinese; it crops up in modern history as well.
This third meaning of civilization has real historical force, but in contrast to
the first two meanings, it is a subjective perception and, frequently, a
harmful one.
The civilization word and concept, in other words, have useful meanings
in world history, but they also have connotations to guard against.
The River Valley Centers and Their Legacies

Centers of early civilization arose in several areas – all of them in places
where agriculture had developed earlier and most of them associated with
major river valleys and irrigation systems. Besides Mesopotamia and Egypt,
the Indus river valley hosted an impressive center (in present-day Pakistan),
and a fourth outcropping took shape along the Yellow River in northern
China. Somewhat later and entirely independently, formative civilizations
arose in Central America with the Olmecs (1500–800 BCE) and then early
Mayan peoples, and in the Andes.
Early civilizations frequently lasted for many centuries, and often built
impressive structures and urban systems. Mesopotamia experienced succes-
sive waves of invasions, with empires that stretched over much of the
Middle East. Several independent centers also ultimately arose in the Middle
East along the Mediterranean coast. This included Phoenicia, a society that
developed far-flung trade not only through the Mediterranean but along
coasts in the Atlantic; and a Jewish kingdom that generated major religious
innovation. On the other hand, several of the early entrants ultimately
declined, sometimes for reasons not entirely clear – this was true, for
example, of the Indus valley center, which remains the most mysterious of
the river-valley innovators.
Legacies
From the standpoint of a selective world history summary, the most
important point about these formative centers involves the legacies they
established for later societies, particularly those that would spring up in the
same basic regions but for neighboring territories as well. (Egyptian influ-
ence, for example, helped shape a civilization tradition south along the Nile
river, in present-day Ethiopia.)
Legacy most obviously involved remembering, and building on, the basic
structures of civilization itself: the idea that formal governments should provide
some organization to society as a whole, including written laws; the precedent
of writing, including efforts to record stories that had previously been devel-
oped and transmitted by word of mouth; a commitment to trade and some
urban activity. These traditions might lapse for a time if a civilization declined,
as on the Indian subcontinent, but they could be revived.
There were more specific achievements as well, though we are most
familiar with those that took shape in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Several
societies introduced systems of coinage as a means of facilitating exchange.
Additional technologies included the manufacture of glass and an interest in
sundials and water clocks to help measure time. Scientific discoveries, often
aimed at knowledge that would benefit agriculture, included advances in
astronomy and mathematics. From Mesopotamia, for example, came
emphasis on the use of the number 60 to calculate circles and segments of
time. Written stories would also provide materials for later use, like the
flood story in Mesopotamia, and artistic styles – most obviously from
Egypt – would have lasting regional influence. Knowledge of some of these
achievements ultimately spread to other civilization centers as well. Greece,
for example, was heavily influenced by Egypt; China would benefit from
some of the devices used to calculate time in the Middle East.
Chapter 1 already suggested the possibility that in addition to basic fea-
tures in organization and knowledge, the early centers also generated deeper
beliefs that would shape later societies at least to some degree. The idea that
Mesopotamian culture promoted a sense of human superiority over nature
may have influenced later religions but also a less respectful attitude toward
the environment is at least worth considering. Later Chinese scholars
believed that notions that proved fundamental to their culture, such as the
importance of balance between principles of yin and yang, were also passed
down from an earlier age.
Late in the early civilization period in Mesopotamia, the emergence of
Jewish monotheism was another innovation that would have lasting impact,
shaping much of the Jewish experience and ultimately launching a wider reli-
gious tradition that would include Christianity and Islam. Most of the early
civilizations were polytheistic, worshipping various forces of nature – including
the sun – and giving them divine representation. Elaborate systems of worship
developed around many of these systems, which also provided rituals designed
to promote agricultural prosperity. The Jewish belief in a single God, and a
moral system decreed by God, was a major departure that would have wider
effects on world history later on.
Much of the legacy of the early civilizations for later world history, and
even for the world today, would be mediated through consolidation and
wider dissemination under the classical civilizations that followed. Oppor-
tunities to study the initial civilizations in greater detail can be a consuming
passion – as the early civilization sections of many the world’s museums
attest. Even a brief sketch can acknowledge the diverse creativity of this
long segment in the global experience.
The systems established by the early civilizations invited further develop-
ment, and this is a key theme in the chapters that follow. Government
functions and personnel could be more clearly defined, writing systems
were often simplified, and the impact of cities would be extended – all
within the framework of the Agricultural Age. It is also useful to remember
that the innovations introduced by the first civilizations remained funda-
mental later on, even amid the huge changes associated with industrializa-
tion. Writing would be put to additional use; governments would be partly
(though not completely) redefined; cities would gain unprecedented size
and importance. But the key ingredients had been established much earlier.
Further Reading
On the early civilizations, Bruce Trigger, Understanding Early Civilizations: A
Comparative Study (2007) and Chris Scarre and Brian Fagan, Ancient
Civilizations (2007).For a fascinating study of a vital aspect of state for-
mation, Jonathan Valk and Irene Marin, eds., Ancient Taxation: The
Mechanics of Extraction in Comparative Perspective (2021).
4 The Classical Period
The world around 800 BCE was shaped almost entirely still by local and
regional developments, so there was no global signal that a new historical
phase was about to begin. Some of the early civilizations did encounter
difficulties that interrupted their stability: invasions and migrations brought
change, for example, in the huge movement of Indo-European peoples
from Central Asia into southern Europe, parts of the Middle East, and India.
Scholars increasingly believe that environmental deterioration also intro-
duced new constraints in certain cases, sometimes as a result of intensive
farming; changes in water supply may have contributed to the collapse of
some early clusters in Central America.
Another basis for change involved technology. Around 1500 BCE,
probably as a result of innovations in Central Asia, some societies also began
to introduce iron, gradually replacing reliance on bronze and other materi-
als. Iron tools and weapons were unquestionably superior, and this may help
explain why it became possible for groups in certain regions to begin to
form larger empires and trade zones – which in turn would be one of the
hallmarks of the classical period.
A new Persian empire gained most of the Middle East for several cen-
turies, with influence as well on Egypt and Greece. It did not last much
longer than some of its predecessors, but its rulers did expand their regional
control, building better roads, a system of hotels to support traveling mer-
chants, and even the world’s first postal system. It began to be possible to
expand the territorial reach of some civilizations and to elaborate further on
systems of government and trade.
The Nature of the Classical Period

For the world today, the main consequence of the classical period was the
establishment of a range of distinctive social, political, and cultural tradi-
tions in key regions of the world: China, the Indian subcontinent, the
Middle East, and the Mediterranean basin. The achievements of the clas-
sical civilizations would create memories of greatness and identity that
could also play an enduring role. All of the regions embraced by the
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-5
classical civilizations would change greatly in subsequent centuries –
though to different degrees. But continuities from this formative past
remain lively and help explain contemporary regional patterns and dis-
parities. Here, obviously, is the key reason to explore this formative
regional period. But it is also true that, even more than the river valley
pioneers, classical civilizations would leave visible symbols that continue to
inspire awe – like the temples and amphitheaters of Greece and Rome or
the extraordinary series of life-sized terracotta soldiers built on the orders
of one of the great Chinese conquerors.
But for the people actually involved in establishing and maintaining the
classical civilizations, the main focus was, first, on territorial expansion and,
second, on building commercial, social, political, and cultural systems that
could take advantage of these new territories and integrate them success-
fully. These systems, in turn, would be the source of the regional legacies,
for each classical civilization developed a distinctive signature in dealing
with expansion and integration.
The most concrete example of expansion and integration involved the
formation of territorial empires. The Chinese Empire under the Han
dynasty and the Roman Empire were the great examples, but the Greeks
worked to establish regional empires and Alexander the Great briefly pro-
jected an empire that would extend from Greece to western India, while in
India itself two periods of empire formation involved a large section of the
subcontinent.
Empires were not the only point, however, and the empires themselves
depended on the development of trade links within the regions involved
and, even more, the spread of signature beliefs and styles – religions and
philosophical systems heading the list. The 6th and 5th centuries BCE wit-
nessed persuasive cultural statements from leaders in all three centers:
Buddha in India, Confucius in China, and the Greek philosophers, such as
Socrates and Plato, in the Mediterranean. The expansion of their regional
influence was at least as vital as the political empires in creating regional
identities. Finally, each region developed a characteristic social system, often
linked to the religious and philosophical beliefs, that would also have a
lasting impact.
In each case, regional patterns developed gradually – the classical
period after all extended for many centuries – and there were a variety
of complexities. Territorial expansion involved connections not only
across a substantial geography (Map 4.1), but also among a variety of
different peoples and languages, and this could generate a number
of setbacks and detours. Without lingering on the details, a summary of
each regional outcome can suggest the very different ways that the
three classical societies addressed the opportunities and problems asso-
ciated with expansion, always within the larger context of the Agri-
cultural Age.
The Classical Period
Map 4.1 Map of the classical empires at their height

37
Highlights
Formation of Hinduism in India, 800–300 BCE; Confucius, Buddha, 500s
BCE; major Greek philosophers, 400s–300s BCE; conquests of Alexander
the Great, 336–323 BCE; Maurya Empire (India), 322–185 BCE; Qin Shi
Huang unifies China, 321 BCE; Han dynasty, 202 BCE–220 CE; Roman
Empire, 27–476 CE; invention of paper, c. 180; Constantine adopts Chris-
tianity, establishes eastern capital, 306–327; Gupta Empire, c. 250–543.
Regional profiles
China
China ultimately developed one of the clearest regional patterns, but the
components emerged slowly. As early as the 11th century BCE, a new
ruling family, the Zhou, gained power over the area along the Yellow
River where states had been established earlier. The Zhou struggled for
centuries to retain power, amid a host of conflicts with other princes in
northern China. The Zhou did manage to promote the importance of a
family dynasty, a political feature that would remain a recurrent trademark
in Chinese history until the 20th century – though several different dynas-
ties would be involved over time. And the Zhou developed the idea of a
“Mandate from Heaven”: rulers were appointed by the gods, and indeed
were semi-divine, but they had to rule responsibly or the mandate might be
withdrawn. Despite political fluctuations, the population expanded and
technology improved under the Zhou, including adoption of the use of
iron from the 7th century onward.
The Zhou period was most notable for the development of the two
cultural systems that long served as pillars of Chinese civilization. The reli-
gion of Daoism stressed the importance of personal balance and alignment
with the rhythms of nature. Daoist influence sponsored a host of specific
writings and rituals, but in general promoted beliefs in simplicity and spon-
taneity, along with the cultivation of the spiritual side of human nature.
Confucianism was a more secular system, with little interest in the divine
order or the afterlife. Confucius, writing in the 6th century, was deeply
sensitive to the political instability of his age, eager to recapture what he saw
as older ideas of balance and social order. Confucianists emphasized a hier-
archy that would be mutually supportive: government would be the
responsibility of an educated upper class, the scholar gentry, who would
assure oversight of the welfare of the whole society – beyond any selfish
interests; the bulk of the population would contribute labor and appropriate
deference to their superiors, but they could in turn expect fair treatment.
The Classical Period 39
Well-organized family life was a pillar of the Confucian order, where hier-
archy and reciprocity would produce harmony. Finally, emphasis on careful
manners provided a means of restraining disruptive emotions, again in the
interest of community stability. Confucianism would prove to be one of the
most durable cultural systems in world history.
The next major step in building Chinese society came from the political
and military success of a new dynasty, the Qin (from which China would
get its name), at the end of the 3rd century BCE. An ambitious conqueror
displaced the Zhou and not only unified the states of northern China, but
extended to the south as well. Here for the first time was a single “Middle
Kingdom,” the core of Chinese geography from that point onward. The
Qin and their successors quickly worked to integrate their new territory.
The government sponsored major north-south canals, promoting trade
between rice- and grain-growing regions. It encouraged migration of
northerners to the south, toward more demographic integration, and it
fostered use of a common language – the forerunner of Mandarin – for the
upper classes and bureaucracy throughout the empire.
This work was carried forward under the great Han dynasty, over almost
four centuries of relatively peaceful rule – what is sometimes called the Pax
Sinica, to compare with the analogous Pax Romana to the west. The Han
actively promoted Confucian beliefs as a means of cultural integration,
though Daoism persisted strongly as well. Bureaucracy expanded – though
small by modern standards, at 0.2% of the total population, this was by far
the largest staff ever developed to that point. While most bureaucrats came
from the landed scholar gentry class, the Han promoted education in the
Confucian classics and established an examination system that allowed a few
talented commoners to enter the ranks; here was another unprecedented
political innovation.
Under the Han, finally, government functions expanded. The Han were
careful in their use of the military, concentrating mainly on defense of existing
territory. A classic military treatise by Sun Tzu, written earlier, emphasized the
importance of using war only as a last resort and when victory was assured;
diplomacy and careful organization were preferable to risk. Han bureaucrats
extended the system of judicial courts, preferring to mediate conflicts where
possible; Confucian culture, eager for harmony, tended to scorn lawyers.
Beyond this, the Han government actively extended public works, including
road building; helped store grain to protect urban populations against crop
failures; and even sponsored scientific research, in the interest of practical
advances in agriculture and manufacturing.
Under the Han dynasty, China became a center of technological inno-
vation, though always within the confines of an agricultural economy.
Wheelbarrows were invented by the 2nd century BCE, and soon after that
the Chinese developed paper for the first time – an obvious interest for a
society in which scholarly activity and bureaucratic exchange were unu-
sually important.
It is important not to overemphasize the coherence of the Chinese
system. The government did not impose linguistic unity on the whole
population. Confucianism and Daoism could and did coexist, but they
could also clash, with Daoists disliking Confucian practicality and careful
etiquette, Confucianists suspicious of Daoist flights of fancy (including con-
siderable interest in magic). Ordinary people might pick up some Confucian
values – over time, Confucianism flourished to the extent that it did
encourage responsible behavior by the upper classes but also mutual cour-
tesy – but they also maintained beliefs in divine spirits and a variety of local
rituals. Finally, the Han synthesis did not last forever: deteriorating govern-
ment leadership encouraged more selfish exploitation by many landlords,
along with new nomadic invasions from central Asia, leading to collapse in
the 2nd century CE.
Nevertheless, the Chinese combination of secular philosophy, political
organization, and considerable prosperity was a powerful one. Confucian
support for loyalty to the emperor was a logical extension of their com-
mitment to social order, while bureaucratic training relied heavily on Con-
fucian principles in return. The system did fail with the fall of the Han,
leading to over three centuries of internal warfare and invasion; but its
foundations were remembered, and it would be substantially revived when
order returned in the 6th century.
India
Historical developments in the classical period in India addressed many of
the same issues that prevailed in China: how to integrate larger territories
with diverse populations and languages, how to provide social order, how
to organize and justify social inequality. Indian responses to these issues,
however, were very different from those of their Chinese counterparts.
While governments developed, including two important empires, the
Indian approach relied much less on political organization than on social
structure and cultural systems. And, on the cultural front, religion and
spirituality loomed far larger than proved true in China, though not to the
exclusion of other interests in science and art.
The first step in developing a durable civilization in India involved the
gradual formation of what became the Hindu religion, elaborating on stories
of gods and goddesses imported by groups of Indo-European migrants and
sponsored by a powerful group of priests, or Brahmans. A series of epic
stories, ultimately written down, provided guidance in Hindu beliefs. The
religion emphasized worship of a number of gods and goddesses, but also an
overriding commitment to advancing toward greater spiritual perfection in a
series of reincarnations; life in this world was only one phase of a longer
journey. Hinduism also stressed a variety of religious rituals and celebrations,
under priestly guidance, and it sponsored the formation of lively art with
representations of the divinities.
While Hinduism urged the importance of meditation and spiritual con-
templation, it was also associated with the development of social castes, each
caste with its own role in this world. Fulfillment of caste obligations was the
most important way of assuring advancement through reincarnation. The
caste system itself evolved slowly, perhaps as part of efforts to integrate dif-
ferent ethnic groups amid the Indo-European influx. Initially the warrior
caste sat atop the hierarchy, but gradually its primacy was replaced by that of
the Brahmans; the warriors now ranked second, followed by the merchant
caste, and then a series of other occupational groups down to the lowest
ranked, the Untouchables (Dalits), whose jobs – dealing with the dead or
working with leather – were regarded as the most disreputable.
Taken together, Hinduism and the caste system represented a powerful
combination of religious beliefs and social arrangements, that would spread over
much of the subcontinent. The systems were complex. For example, Hinduism
valued the warrior caste but it also emphasized a principle of nonviolence
toward humans and other living creatures. Social castes became quite rigid,
regulating rank, occupation but also allowable social contacts including mar-
riage, with caste position passed through inheritance. On the other hand, within
many castes individuals could rise or fall in wealth. And holy men, devoted to
meditation and a variety of spiritual exercises and committed to poverty and
abstinence, were widely esteemed, often supported through charity.
Furthermore, Hinduism never monopolized India’s religious map. During
the centuries when it took shape, another religion, Jainism, also arose, sharing
some principles but with a different set of specific beliefs and rituals. Even more
important was the emergence of Buddhism in the 5th-4th centuries BCE as an
alternative to many Hindu beliefs. Gautama Buddha was born into an aristo-
cratic family, but became devoted to defining principles that could help people
deal with the miseries and delusions of earthly existence. In the process he took
issue with several features of Hinduism, notably its preoccupation with elabo-
rate rituals and priestly authority and its commitment to the caste system. In
contrast, Buddha urged a life of renunciation, toward advancement to union
with a divine order. Buddhist writings and teaching inspired many converts,
and led also to the formation of a major monastic movement.
The various religious strands in classical India often coexisted fairly
peacefully, though there were recurrent tensions. They did combine to
make religion and spiritual commitment a higher priority in Indian culture
than was true in classical China.
During many stretches of the classical period the Indian subcontinent was
divided among various regional states, with recurrent mutual conflict. The
religious emphasis plus the structure provided by the caste system spread
more widely and durably than any political system, and to some extent
made government organization and political theory less important than was
true in the other classical societies. Substantial regionalism was one of the
hallmarks of Indian tradition from this point onward, reflected also in the
variety of languages across the subcontinent.
Nevertheless two major empires did develop during the classical period. An
ambitious leader founded the Maurya dynasty in 322 BCE, and sponsored a
series of rapid conquests that ultimately covered most of the subcontinent – the
largest political unit in Indian history with the partial exception of the period of
British control. The empire developed a number of successful administrative
institutions, and undertook ambitious public works including a major trunk
road that sliced through northern India, running east to west. While the empire
held sway over many Hindus, the religious commitments of the rulers varied;
the founder converted to Jainism, while a later emperor, Ashoka, tired of
constant warfare, not only converted to Buddhism but also supported its mis-
sionary activity on the subcontinent and beyond.
The empire collapsed, however, in 185 BCE and did not generate the
kind of vivid political legacy that developed with the Qin and Han dynas-
ties in China. For several centuries India returned to a system of princedoms
and city states, with various specific forms of government. In the third
century CE, another empire arose, the Gupta, and though its territory
centered in the north and east, it also sponsored greater trade and also a
major surge of scholarly and artistic activity that established a number of
durable styles. Gupta rulers were religiously tolerant but they supported
Hinduism in the main, helping in fact to assure Hindu ascendancy while
Buddhism began to develop more robustly through missionary activity
outside of India. While the highpoint of Gupta rule occurred between 319
and 467, the empire collapsed entirely only in the 6th century through a
combination of internal warfare and nomadic invasions in the north. India
returned at that point to its characteristic political regionalism.
Political oscillations and the strong religious emphasis must not obscure
other features of classical India, including the commitment to trade – as the
relatively high caste position of merchants suggested – both within the
subcontinent and through active outreach to Southeast Asia. Scholarly
activity was also impressive, and the Sanskrit language provided a common
means of expression amid the otherwise great linguistic diversity in the
various regions. Indian mathematics was particularly advanced, including
discovery of the concept of zero and early work on what later became
known as algebra. From classical India also came a numbering system that
would ultimately – though much later – be adopted worldwide because of
its ease of use. Important advances in medicine included the first known
work in cosmetic surgery. Major advances in the manufacture of steel also
occurred. Classical India was, in other words – like all the classical socie-
ties – diverse in its emphases and successful in many fields, which helps
account for the powerful legacy it left for later generations.
The Mediterranean
Civilization in the Mediterranean built heavily on the precedents of Meso-
potamia and Egypt. Its development occurred in several phases. From about
800 BCE onward, Greek city states took shape, generating a variety of
political forms including tyranny, aristocratic rule, and a form of democracy.
The states combined to push back a threatened Persian invasion but internal
warfare led to decline by the 4th century. Alexander the Great’s short-lived
empire briefly unified Greece with the Middle East and Egypt, ushering in a
Hellenistic period in which Greek intellectual and artistic styles continued to
advance. The final phase began with the rise and expansion of a Roman
Republic to the west, which adopted many Greek achievements while also
gaining territory in southern Europe and North Africa. The Roman
Republic yielded to a powerful Empire early in the Common Era, whose
size and prosperity rivaled the achievements of the Han.
Through its various manifestations, Mediterranean civilization placed
great emphasis on political life and political theory, with both philosophical
discussions and concrete examples of various government forms. On the
whole, aristocratic rule was most common, both in Greece and in the
Roman Republic. But democracy in several Greek city states, headed by
Athens, was a major innovation: Greek democracy featured direct rule by
citizens, who were, however, a minority of the adult population – exclud-
ing women, slaves and people of foreign origin. Later, the Roman Empire
would emphasize the importance of military power and organization, but
also the rule of law.
Mediterranean civilization emphasized monumental temples and other
structures, while also investing heavily in roads and other public works.
Other facets of technology received less attention and while trading was
vital – aimed particularly at linking grain-growing regions, such as North
Africa, with other areas – much of it rested in the hands of foreigners.
Tensions between aristocratic landowners and ordinary farmers were
common, and reliance on slave labor was much more extensive than in
India or China.
Along with politics and public art, Mediterranean civilization had its
greatest influence in cultural life. Both Greek and Roman alphabets were
unusually efficient, and their use spread widely. Greek and Hellenistic phi-
losophers and scientists created influential political and ethical theories.
They also accumulated a great deal of scientific evidence, in physics, biology
and medicine, emphasizing as well the power of human reason to grasp
basic principles of nature. Greek and Roman literature and drama also left a
vivid legacy.
The classical Mediterranean did not directly produce a durable popular
belief system – in contrast to India and, to an extent, China. Greek and
Roman governments supported a polytheistic religion, with elaborate cere-
monies, though they also tolerated many other beliefs. The immensely
creative philosophical work had little popular resonance. However, in the
4th century CE, late in the Roman Empire, amid increasing instability, the
Emperor Constantine did move to make Christianity a state religion.
Christianity, originating earlier in the Middle East, had managed to convert
about 10% of the population to this point, amid recurrent persecution from
the Roman state. Now it began to advance more rapidly, and also devel-
oped a larger theological structure that incorporated some elements of
Greek and Roman philosophy – but with some sharp differences as well, as
in stressing the importance of faith over human reason. The Church was
also able to replicate some of the structure of the Empire itself in creating its
internal government, with the bishop of Rome – ultimately called the
Pope – at its head.
Decline and Fall

All of the classical civilizations to some degree collapsed, between the early
3rd century and the 6th. Invasions by nomadic groups from Central Asia
were involved in each case. China and the Mediterranean were also bat-
tered by epidemic disease, probably bubonic plague, that killed off up to a
quarter of the population and severely disrupted trade and production.
Internal decay included greater corruption and selfishness in the upper class,
with less devotion to public service, and increasingly ineffective leadership at
the top. No single formula was involved, but a number of common com-
ponents affected each major region. The fall of the Han dynasty was mat-
ched later by the collapse of the Gupta, while the last Roman Emperor in
the West gave up the gasp in 478.
As a result, one of the true legacies of the classical period was a memory
of vanished greatness and a nagging concern that, if these structures could
fall, no later human achievement was entirely secure. Many Indians would
look back on the classical period as a time of unrivaled success, never fully
recaptured since. Europeans had even more reason to worry over the col-
lapse of Rome, and warnings about decline and fall would resurface –
among scholars and popular pessimists alike – in the 20th century.
However, while the end of the classical period marks a key stage in world
history, it is equally important to recognize that the results varied greatly
from one region to the next, and the differences carried serious implications
for the legacies of the classical civilizations themselves.
Decline was least severe in India, though the collapse of the last great
Indian Empire, and resultant political fragmentation, were really
important. There was no huge cultural or economic crisis.
China suffered greatly for three and a half centuries, with recurrent
invasion and internal warfare. But in the 6th century a new dynasty was
established, and Chinese leaders began the process of restoring older
political structures and Confucian values. This was a different China,
but a clearly recognizable one.
In the eastern part of the Roman Empire, classical institutions survived
fairly well. The Emperor Constantine had established a separate eastern
capital in the town of Byzantium, then renamed Constantinople. As
other parts of the Empire collapsed, the imperial tradition continued in
parts of the Balkans and present-day Turkey. This renewed Byzantine
Empire was also Christian and heavily Greek. But there was no question
of its classical roots.
The story was quite different elsewhere around the Mediterranean, and
the loss of Mediterranean unity has proved durable. Byzantine emper-
ors tried to recapture parts of North Africa but failed. In most of
southern Europe, political disunity and recurrent regional warfare
replaced Roman rule. Cities shrank as trade lapsed, with growing
attention to local subsistence. While Christianity remained strong,
levels of cultural life otherwise deteriorated, with some intellectuals
admitting that they could no longer understand what some of the
classical thinkers had been talking about. In this region, classical civili-
zation had largely collapsed.
These vital distinctions obviously explain why the classical legacy proved
more successful and durable in India and China than in the West and why
the heritage of the Mediterranean, though very real, would prove unusually
complicated.
Beyond the Regions: A First Phase of Contact

The primacy of regional patterns, including territorial expansions, remains
central to any assessment of the classical period. Several durable regional
patterns formed around the “great traditions” developed in this era. How-
ever, some limited connections also emerged among the regions, which
would also have an impact on world history later on.
Interregional contact was not new. To be sure, most migrations were
one-way affairs: groups went from one area to the next but did not return;
their passages linked regions only briefly. Early on, however, trade efforts
had wider consequences. Several early civilizations established links to dis-
tant regions, seeking metals or precious stones. Some exchange clearly
occurred between Southeast Asia and East Africa, bringing new crops – like
yams – to the African continent.
More systematic trade routes emerged as the classical civilizations
matured, particularly from the 1st century CE onward. Even before this,
Alexander the Great’s conquests had promoted interesting exchanges of
artistic styles and mathematical concepts between Greece and India, though
these were short-lived.
Chinese efforts to reach out to nomadic rulers in central Asia were more
consequential. The Chinese were eager to send goods such as silks, both in
return for valuable horses and as gifts designed to keep the peace. Ultimately
their supply exceeded local demand, and nomadic traders began passing
along silks to other regions, in return for other items. This was the origin of
the great Silks Roads, running from western China through central Asia to
India and the Middle East, and ultimately onward to the Mediterranean –
where the Roman upper class proudly sported sashes of Chinese silk to
embellish their togas. Gold, slaves, spices, and exotic animals were also sent
along these routes. At the same time, trade through the Indian Ocean con-
nected the Roman Mediterranean with India (groups of Roman merchants
located in India to organize the trade), while China also linked to India by sea.
These exchanges make for intriguing stories, around exotic trade outposts
like the city of Samarkand. Their importance, however, though real, was
limited. None of the regional economies organized around distant exports;
internal trade along the Chinese canals, or through the Mediterranean, was
far more fundamental. The connections did little to expand knowledge:
Romans had only the haziest idea of where China was, for example. Most
merchants traveled only short distances, exchanging their items to another
group after 200 miles or so, and this obviously limited impact and exchange.
Chinese merchants and students of Buddhism did travel to India; Romans
ventured to India; but no Chinese expedition reached the Mediterranean,
and while there may have been one Roman excursion to Han China even
this is not definite.
The connections did, however, establish a precedent: there was clearly
money to be made for venturesome merchants who could provide unusual
goods to upper-class consumers. The precedent would be actively extended
in the next world history period, when interregional contacts began to gain
greater significance – though for a time the collapse of the empires made
overland travel more dangerous.
And there is no reason to question the power of memory: when China
began to promote new transportation routes into Central Asia and beyond,
in what it called the Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013, it capita-
lized on the precedent of the Silk Roads, even though the economic, dip-
lomatic, and technological context was massively different. Even here, the
classical legacy lives on, at least a bit.
Conclusion: Comparisons and Legacies

The classical period is an ideal point to venture serious regional compar-
isons. It is a bit early to launch systematic consideration of a regional/global
interplay – because there was no “global” yet and because the interregional
trade was so limited. It was clear that all the major societies were open to
some goods from distant places – though several Roman conservatives
blasted wasteful indulgence in silks. There was also some interest in learning
from other regions, as in the Chinese students who began to explore Bud-
dhism in the final centuries of the classical period. Of the three classical
societies, Indian merchants were probably the most venturesome, particu-
larly in reaching out to Southeast Asia – not surprising, given the sub-
continent’s long sea line. Use or adaptation of Indian script and artistic
styles, along with Buddhism and even some Hinduism, began to spread in
consequence. But on the whole it is too early to discuss differences in
regional styles of contact.
Other comparisons, however, are appropriate – indeed, almost inescapable.
The three regions generated very different cultural signatures: the Confucian
emphasis on social stability and balance, India’s greater religious interest, the
Mediterranean’s combination of political and scientific thought with official
polytheism. Social patterns were equally distinctive: the caste system, Medi-
terranean use of slavery, the Confucian hierarchy. While both China and the
Mediterranean devoted great attention to political structures, the Chinese
emphasis on bureaucracy and considerable centralization contrasted with
greater political diversity of the Mediterranean. The importance of the classical
period for contemporary history rests primarily on these kinds of regional dis-
tinctions and the ways some of them would be transmitted later on.
Contrasts should not be pressed too far. The classical civilizations were all
bounded by the basic patterns of agricultural society, including patriarchal
gender structures and, at least in China and the Mediterranean, considerable
reliance on infanticide as a means of population control. While in different
ways, all three societies not only organized social inequality but produced
cultural systems that defended it – from Hindu emphasis on the religious
rewards for caste performance to Aristotle’s assumption that slavery was an
essential means of supporting the wise rule of the aristocracy. All the classical
civilizations also cemented the basic features of civilization itself, from the
role of government to the importance of trade and writing.
At the same time, basic contrasts could generate additional comparative
distinctions. Greek and particularly Roman foreign policy, for example,
differed from that of the Chinese. While both societies were expansionist,
China did not extend its efforts at conquest indefinitely, whereas Rome
continued to press outward to the point that some historians argue it clearly
overextended its resources and hastened its own demise. While military
activity was important in all three societies, it was celebrated particularly in
Rome (though the famous terracotta army constructed by the Qin con-
queror is a reminder not to press this distinction too far); the top caste in
India and the Chinese scholar gentry were not defined by military prowess.
On another front: technological innovation lagged somewhat in the Medi-
terranean (aside from civil engineering), and some attribute this to the heavy
reliance on slavery.
Comparative analysis must combine differentiation and similarity, along
with the diversities within each of the classical societies themselves. This
same balance must apply to an initial effort to suggest the heritage of the
classical period for world history today.
Legacies
Classical legacies matter. In 2020–21, as a Hindu nationalist party sought to
consolidate power in India, a fierce debate arose over the role of Hinduism
in India’s past. For the nationalists, India’s legacy was Hindu dominance, with
the existence of other religions, and tolerance itself, a challenge to national
purity. In the process, the more complex history of classical India, and celebrated
Indian historians who had told this history, came under attack. Continuities from
the classical period do help explain aspects of the contemporary world, and not
only in India, but distortion is always a hazard.
****
The classical period left several kinds of legacies. There were, first, direct
continuities, particularly in systems of belief. Hinduism is still the majority
religion in India, and while it has changed and certainly interacts with other
developments, a core remains identifiable. Daoism is one of the five offi-
cially recognized religions in China today. Identifying Confucianism in
China today is more challenging, though there is a revival of interest in
Confucian education among some parents. Earlier in the 20th century,
however, communist leaders attacked Confucianism vigorously. Yet many
authorities believe that Confucian beliefs in the importance of community
and a strong state persist beneath the surface, along with the idea that leaders
are responsible for good governance. Some even view the democratic rising
of 1989 as a manifestation of the Confucian belief that officials must be
accountable.
Certain stylistic legacies are clear. The influence of classical Mediterranean
architecture on various kinds of public buildings in Western society is a clear
case in point; a recent American directive insisted on this style for the
future, though it may not carry much weight. And all of this is aside from
the basic cultural infrastructure like the Indian numbering system or the
popularity of the Latin alphabet.
Other legacies show up as barriers to change. The caste system of India is
officially gone, abolished with independence soon after World War II. But
getting rid of it in fact has proved far more difficult, and many Indians still
identify with caste status. Struggles of former Untouchables for real equality
are correspondingly difficult. The impact of Mediterranean slavery is more
complex. Slave systems persisted in the Middle East after the classical period,
and their revival by Western slave traders after 1500 owed something to the
Roman precedent. But it was the later association of slavery with race that
really left its mark in various parts of the Americas, so the ongoing role of
this Mediterranean precedent may be limited.
Some political legacies are obvious. India’s regionalism, beneath the larger
national unit, reflects continuities from the past. The Chinese government
programs to send Han (ethnic) Chinese into outlying territories, such as
western China, as a means of integration harks back directly to classical
precedent – though some much newer methods are being employed as
well. Is there a foreign policy legacy? Is China’s interest in territorial gains
still limited? Was the long history of Western expansionism shaped in part
by the memory of Roman policy and success?
Discussing the legacy of the classical Mediterranean is particularly com-
plex, because of the disruption caused by Rome’s collapse. Roman imperial
traditions and key aspects of Greek culture were carried on directly by the
Byzantine Empire, and some elements would persist elsewhere in the
Middle East; it is vital to remember that the Mediterranean heritage is not
Western alone. In the West, however, much of the legacy has shown up in
later samplings, rather than direct persistence. Roman law, for example,
collapsed in the West, but then it was revived, along with an expansion of
lawyers, about six centuries later. Greek democracy was all but forgotten
until the 17th–18th centuries, when new interest in political experiment
caused some philosophers to look back; but whether Greek precedent had
much importance, compared to more recent factors, can be debated.
The geography of legacy is another issue to keep in mind. The classical
societies had covered only part of Asia, and even less of Europe and Africa.
But their prestige, including visible signs of prosperity, often survived their
eclipse, and could attract interest from other areas. Japan, for example,
began to import the Chinese writing system about 400 CE, and would go
on to imitate other aspects of the Chinese classical heritage, including
Confucianism. Russia would interact with classical Mediterranean traditions,
including the idea of empire, through the Byzantines; the later use of the
term tsar, or Caesar, for the nation’s ruler was one result. Elements of the
Mediterranean heritage would accompany Christianity to northwestern
Europe. Classical heritage was strongest, of course, in the regions of origin;
elsewhere, more selective borrowing was usually involved. But expanded
influence is yet another sign of impact.
Appreciation of legacies must always allow for change, even in cases like
India or pre-20th-century China where tradition runs strong. The regional
aspect of world history depends on the interaction between legacy and
innovation. The key question must be not how many classical features
directly persist, but rather how some features have been combined with
other developments in generating regional characteristics that are still visible,
and significant, in the present. Even by this reckoning, there is no question
that the classical period did birth some significant features of the world
today, some of them now affecting many parts of the globe.
Further Reading
On the major classical societies, Mark Edward Lewis, The Early Chinese
Empires: Qin and Han (2010); Romila Thapar, The Penguin History of
Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300 (2015); Stephanie Budin, The
Ancient Greeks: An Introduction (2009); Greg Woolf, Rome: An Empire’s
Story (2013). See also Richard Smith, Premodern Trade in World History
(2008).
5 Religion and Trade
World History from 600 to 1200
Three major developments altered the patterns of world history in the six
centuries after the end of the classical period. First, additional regions in the
world built the structures associated with civilization: formal governments,
more significant cities and trade, and use of writing. In several cases these
changes were enhanced by imitating achievements of a neighboring region,
as with Japan copying aspects of Chinese culture, Russia turning to Byzan-
tium, West Africa generating new contacts with the Mediterranean. This
was a foundational period for several areas outside the boundaries of classical
geography.
Second, three missionary religions began to spread rapidly beyond their
points of origin, with one of them, Islam, a new entrant entirely. By 1200,
much of the religious map still relevant today had been established in Asia,
Europe, and some parts of Africa.
Third, interregional trade expanded well beyond the limits of the classical
period, and involving additional parts of Africa, northern Europe, and Japan.
Improvements in ship construction and navigation reflected but also pro-
moted this development. As a result, connections and mutual influences
became more important than ever before, creating what some historians
have called the first stage of globalization.
These developments, and their interaction, raise several questions. The
first is the standard one: to what extent do these innovations contribute to
an understanding of the world today, beyond the legacies of the classical
period? But next: how did the developments interact with the classical
heritage, adjusting and clarifying key characteristics in regions like China
and India? And, finally: what was the resulting “regional civilization map”
by around 1200, compared to the geography of the classical period?
This time period lacks a widely accepted label, in contrast to its predecessor.
In Western Europe these centuries form part of what is often called the Middle
Ages, based on an old and partially misleading notion that this was a low
middle point between the glories of Rome and what came later; but the label
makes no sense for world history – for the same centuries can be legitimately
labeled the “Arab Golden Age” for the Middle East and North Africa. For
convenience we will simply call the period “postclassical”.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-6
Religion and Trade: World History, 600–1200 51
One other preliminary: this was not a period of systematic political or
social innovation. Political changes occurred, but there was no large pattern
like the rise of empires in the classical period. Regional political diversity
increased as a result, complicating any overall generalizations. On the social
front, gender relations were affected by the major religions but in compli-
cated ways, and several regions introduced new practices designed to
enhance inequality. Serfdom became a more prominent labor system, but
slavery persisted in some areas as well.
The Rise of Religion

Religion had been a vital component of the human experience well before
the postclassical centuries, and most of the major religions had already been
established as well. Islam would become the only new faith, though it
quickly rose in importance. The big change, in addition to Islam, was the
rapid spread of several missionary religions to new territory, the related
decline of traditional regional polytheism, and the increased importance of
religion in many societies. In some cases, attention to religion, including
financial contributions, outstripped the activities of governments, helping to
explain the lack of systematic political developments.
The decline of the classical empires, and in some cases the rise of epidemic
disease, created a favorable climate for religious change in much of the classical
world; it was no accident, for example, that Buddhism began to spread in
China after the fall of the Han dynasty, and we have already noted the rela-
tionship between Christianity’s rise and the troubles of the later Roman
Empire. This context should not detract from the vigor of new missionary
activity or the dynamic religious vision involved, for clearly a number of factors
combined to promote the religious surge. During the postclassical centuries,
hundreds of thousands of people converted to a new religion, for a variety of
reasons – particularly moving away from polytheism.
The religions that spread most widely – Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam –
had several features in common, though the similarities between Christianity
and Islam, both building on Jewish tradition, were particularly striking. In
contrast to most earlier religions, like Mediterranean polytheism, Daoism, and
even Judaism, these three religions all believed they offered truth and guidance
to all people, not just a particular region or group. Christian leaders briefly
thought about focusing on Jews alone, and Muslims hesitated longer before
branching out beyond the Arabs, but a similar decision was reached in each
case: the religions were open to all of humanity. This was why these religions,
along with Buddhism, mounted unprecedented missionary efforts, reaching
beyond conventional political or cultural boundaries.
This new idea of a religion for all was double-edged, and the tension
would be important not only in the postclassical period but later as well –
even in the world today. On the one hand, these religions were the first
cultural movements to reach out to so many different groups; they signaled
52 Religion and Trade: World History, 600–1200
the new importance of wider interregional contacts, and missionaries
actively contributed to these contacts. By 1200, Muslims participating in the
pilgrimage to Mecca might come from Morocco in the west, South Asia to
the east, all sharing a common religious bond. On the other hand, the
notion that one religion was valid for all humanity could generate active
intolerance for other faiths and cultures. While all the religions made some
compromises with earlier beliefs, and some practiced a degree of tolerance,
there was always a potential for conflict. Christianity and Islam were parti-
cularly aggressive in working to repress traditional polytheism, seen as
offensive to God, but intolerance could extend to other religions as well.
A New Religious Map

Buddhism of course had developed first in South Asia. Fairly early, Buddhist
missionaries began to reach Sri Lanka, and later the religion would spread
widely in Southeast Asia. Buddhist activity in China led to widespread
conversions, and from China the religion would spread to Korea and Japan.
This occurred as the religion declined in India itself. Buddhist activity in
China, initially welcomed by Chinese emperors, later drew government
restrictions, as imperial bureaucrats worried that the religion would detract
from loyalty to the state and that its otherworldliness might damage family
life. The religion remained important in China, but with new limitations.
Finally, Buddhism spread initially to Central Asia, but it was later eclipsed
there by Islam; however, Tibet was drawn into the Buddhist orbit.
Christian leaders, from their original base in the Middle East, took
advantage of the stability of the Roman Empire to convert widely in the
whole region, including Armenia. Widespread Christian conversion also
occurred in neighboring Ethiopia. While Islam ultimately predominated in
the Middle East and North Africa, important Christian minorities remained.
After the fall of Rome, the big Christian missionary effort during the post-
classical period centered on other parts of Europe. From the Byzantine
Empire, missionaries spread the Eastern Orthodox version of Christianity to
many parts of the Balkans but particularly to Russia, where in the 10th
century the Russian ruler, Vladimir, converted and urged the faith on all
Russians. From Rome, missionaries spread through northern Europe, ulti-
mately reaching Scandinavia and the Baltic states – where force was used to
supplement persuasion.
Islam originated in present-day Saudi Arabia, and spread fairly quickly
through most of the Middle East (except Byzantium but including Persia) as
well as North Africa – and for several centuries into Spain. The rise of Islam
coincided with Arab military expansion through much of this region, which
led to the formation of a loosely-structured empire, or Caliphate; while
most caliphs were not particularly religious, their political and military suc-
cess undoubtedly furthered Islam’s appeal across this vast region. Outside the
Caliphate, India was also a prime target for Islamic expansion, and by the
end of the postclassical period, Muslims had become the subcontinent’s
largest religious minority – as they are today, in huge numbers. Success in
Central Asia was matched by increasing efforts in Southeast Asia up to the
southern Philippines; these were still ongoing in 1200 but would ultimately
succeed, particularly in present-day Indonesia and the Malay peninsula. This
region became religiously divided with important Buddhist and some
Hindu sectors along with Islam. Finally, Islamic conversions reached down
the Indian Ocean coast of Africa and, more selectively, into West Africa as
well.
This was, overall, a dramatically new religious map, providing linkages
among regions that had previously been culturally separate but also creating
new and potentially troublesome religious boundaries. Obviously, the mis-
sionary religions significantly modified several of the regional definitions and
alignments inherited from the Classical period.
The Missionary Religions Themselves

The three expanding religions had several similarities beyond their mis-
sionary commitment. They all stressed the primacy of spiritual goals,
including hopes for life after death – reincarnation and advancement toward
union with a divine essence, in the case of Buddhism, heaven for Chris-
tianity and Islam. While Christianity and Islam each had a holy book, the
Bible or the Qur’an, Buddhism offered a diverse set of religious sutras to
help guide believers. For Christianity and Islam, all individuals had souls –
across any divides of social class and gender; for Buddhism, again across class
and gender, all people had some spark of the divine essence. All three reli-
gions, in other words, offered a basic spiritual equality. Christianity and
Buddhism gave some believers an opportunity for a life devoted to prayer
and spiritual endeavor, in monasteries and convents; Islam would develop
an intensely spiritual version, called Sufism, that also promoted religious
fervor for some groups. Finally, while each religion had a common core,
each would splinter into a variety of specific sects, though this was most
pronounced in Buddhism.
Buddhism
As noted in Chapter 4, the core features of Buddhism involved a deep sense
that life on Earth, the pleasures as well as the pains, were essentially miseries,
that people should seek connection with a higher divine essence through
meditation and aspire to a fuller union in a later existence. Lacking a single
doctrinal statement, Buddhism generated a variety of specific beliefs and
practices, but the goal of spiritual union remained central. Monasteries and
convents permitted special practices of meditation for a minority of faithful,
often accompanied by various forms of denial. Some versions of Buddhism
included a hope that the virtues of the holy would contribute to the
spiritual quest of ordinary faithful. While Buddhism generated a general set
of goals and practices, it did not feature detailed rules for the conduct of life.
Christianity
Like Buddhism, Christianity developed a number of distinctive features of
its own, though the common elements and also the marked overlap with
Islam must be noted. The religion was monotheistic – in contrast to Bud-
dhism’s more general emphasis on a divine principle – but with a Trinity
that described different aspects of the single God. Initially highly pacifist,
with reluctance among Christians to serve in the Roman army, this changed
when the Emperor Constantine began to offer support from the Roman
state. The religion urged discipline of the body and worldly desires; Chris-
tian monks were supposed to remain celibate, and the Western Church
ultimately emphasized this for priests as well. In contrast to Greece and
Rome, Christian leaders also moved to condemn homosexuality. For
believers in general, the Christian church offered moral guidance, leadership
and prayer, and also rituals designed to promote the faith and offer religious
comfort.
As the Roman Empire fell, European Christianity increasingly divided
between an Eastern, or Orthodox version and Western Catholicism. Dis-
agreements included disputes over the authority of the Roman Pope, with
Orthodox leaders insisting on independence and greater collaboration with
the state, as well as divisions over a number of rituals and priestly celibacy.
Disputes turned into a formal division, or schism, in 1054. Christian leaders,
though particularly in the West, sought to repress any religious dissent, by
force if necessary, and frequently attacked other minorities, such as the Jews.
Both major branches of Christianity promoted artistic representations of
Christ and other religious figures, and sponsored elaborate church archi-
tecture. The religion could be aesthetically as well as spiritually satisfying.
Islam
Born of the vision of the Prophet Muhammad, regarded as divinely
inspired, Islam took shape soon after 600 CE; Muhammad saw the new
religion as a perfection of Judaism and Christianity. Strictly monotheistic,
Islam emphasized the majesty of God and his guidance for human life –
with the goal of access to a Paradise after death. Islam developed an elabo-
rate set of laws and rules of conduct, but basic obligations included proper
belief, prayer, charity, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, and if
possible a pilgrimage to the religion’s birthplace in Mecca (the hadj). Unlike
Christianity, Islam did not develop a structured religious organization, but
groups of scholars and religious leaders in various centers provided some
overall guidance; and Muslims hoped for support and protection from the
state, though they accepted other governments so long as these were not
actively hostile to the faith. Islam was less suspicious of worldly activity than
Christianity or Buddhism – including commercial activity – so long as it was
subordinate to religious duties. On the other hand, Islam sought to regulate
artistic activity to prevent possibly idolatrous representations of human or
animal form; Islamic art as a result emphasized geometric design rather than
religious scenes.
Islam was more tolerant than traditional Christianity, though no less
insistent on its possession of ultimate religious truth. Jewish and Christian
minorities were accepted but with some restrictions on religious activity –
religious services, for example, were supposed to be sufficiently restrained
that they would not attract the Muslim faithful – and payment of a special
tax. Islamic leaders in India often coexisted fairly readily with Hindus, and
vice versa, though there were periods of mutual attack, including destruc-
tion of religious buildings. Two major groups developed within Islam itself,
the larger Sunni group and a minority of Shiites; the division originated
over disagreements concerning the political heir to the Prophet, but broa-
dened to include different specific rituals; and two groups often coexisted,
even intermarried, but there were periods of conflict as well. Outside the
Middle East, the Sunni version of Islam predominated almost exclusively.
Religious Impact – and Its Limits

The missionary religions had a wider array of impacts on life and society
than had been true when polytheism had been more prevalent. The influ-
ence on art was striking; far more energy was devoted to monumental
religious buildings, in all three faiths, than to any other kind of structure.
Wealthy individuals and rulers often rivaled each other in sponsoring reli-
gious art and architecture. Philosophy was substantially reshaped as well. In
Islam and later in Christianity, partly by imitation, scholars debated the
boundary lines between faith and reason, trying among other things to
accommodate the heritage of Greek thinking to a more religious world-
view. Religious themes also played a considerable role in literature.
Religious interests did not entirely prevail. In the Middle East particularly,
amid growing cities and prosperous trade, secular literature and scientific and
mathematical research flourished as well, with fundamental contributions in
mathematics and medicine. This was the dynamic combination that explains
the idea of an Arab Golden Age.
Religion also motivated an expansion of education. Here too, thanks in
part to economic prosperity, Islam led the way, toward the goal of instilling
basic religious beliefs, often through memorization, but with some interest
in greater literacy as well. Christian schools and ultimately some universities
emerged a bit later in Europe, again under religious guidance.
Religious impact on society at large was more complex. The idea of
equality of souls did not lead to widespread efforts to modify the social
hierarchy. Indeed, through charity and emphasis on the importance of
spiritual goals, the religions could actually distract from any idea of major
social change. The poor were often urged to await their reward in heaven.
There was some concern about slavery. Islamic leaders were uncomfortable
with the idea of Muslims owning Muslims, and did try to promote decent
treatment – avoiding separation of families, for example – and manumission.
But slaveholding persisted widely nevertheless, with slaves serving a sur-
prising variety of functions, even including military service; and while slav-
ery was not the dominant labor system in Europe, it did continue.
Gender was an important challenge, again because all three missionary
religions acknowledged women’s spiritual capacity and provided opportu-
nities for religious activity. None, however, really undermined patriarchal
inequality. Islamic law allowed women to maintain property and inheri-
tance – in contrast to Christianity; but, in Islam, women and men wor-
shipped separately, and property allotments themselves, as in inheritance,
were unequal. And all the religions insisted on men as the primary religious
officials. In China, as Buddhists sought to conciliate established belief sys-
tems like Confucianism, the authority of husbands in the family was expli-
citly recognized. None of the religions in fact challenged the notion of male
superiority, within the family or in society at large.
On the other hand, there were some practical changes. Christianity and
particularly Islam fought against infanticide, with considerable success; this
was incompatible with the belief in human souls. Islam allowed women to
divorce, though with more difficulty than men faced. Religious pilgrimages,
including the hadj, gave women a chance to travel. Both Christianity and
Islam upheld the principle that both men and women should consent to
marriage, and in Christianity particularly this led to a decline in child mar-
riages. Again, the basic patriarchal system was not dislodged, and in some
ways it was confirmed, but there was some interesting impact even aside
from the new spiritual outlets for women.
Finally, religion affected politics. Many rulers sought to enhance their
popularity by supporting one of the three religions – though all three reli-
gions worked against any residual idea that the ruler was himself divine.
Arab caliphs sponsored military expansion mainly for power and territory,
but the idea of advancing the faith was not irrelevant; and courts of law
enforced religious as well as secular rules. Christian rulers similarly defended
the Christian moral code and also used military and judicial force to combat
heresy. In a major move at the end of the 11th century, the Roman Pope
called upon leaders in Western Christianity to undertake a holy war – a
series of Crusades – to reconquer Jerusalem from Islamic control, con-
demning Islam as a barbaric faith; while the effort enjoyed only brief suc-
cess, it did serve to expand European involvement in the Mediterranean and
testified in principle to the service of the state to Christian interests. Reli-
gion also motivated a war of “reconquest” in Spain, where Christian forces
moved out from the north, gradually pushing back what had often been an
extremely tolerant Muslim regime.
Religion, in sum, mattered greatly in the postclassical centuries. It did not
define the whole period, and its impact varied regionally. But it was a
leading factor in shaping a variety of activities, and its influence would
extend beyond the postclassical period itself.
Trade: A Hint of Globalization?

Trade and religion could go hand in hand. Particularly for Islam, which
held merchant activity in particular esteem, merchants frequently helped
spread the religion – notably in Southeast Asia and Africa – while Islam’s
huge impact around the Indian Ocean created a favorable environment for
trade. However, commercial expansion had its own causes. The collapse of
the classical empires, by reducing security for overland trade, drew unpre-
cedented attention to the seas, and especially the Indian Ocean, which
became the center of expanding interregional connections.
Arabs quickly took the lead. Arab traders set up regular exchanges
between the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, reaching southern
China. A small colony of Arab merchants settled in the port city of
Quanzhou, establishing a durable Muslim minority presence. Arabs also
traded down the Indian Ocean coast of Africa, interacting with African
merchants and creating a new Swahili language which mixed Arab and
mainly African components.
Other trade was also drawn to the Middle East. Scandinavian merchants
set up trade routes running southward through western Russia and Ukraine,
reaching the Byzantine Empire and the Arab centers; and Arab merchants
also traveled northward along the same paths. In West Africa, where the
establishment of regional kingdoms south of the Sahara created greater
political stability, trade began to cross the Sahara, connecting with North
Africa and the Mediterranean; here too, merchants moved in both direc-
tions, with North African Arabs and West Africa merchants actively
involved, relying on horses and camels. Slightly later, West European trade
with the Mediterranean also began to accelerate, linking with more north-
erly commercial centers such as the Low Countries. Finally, Japanese gov-
ernments and merchants began to organize regular expeditions to Korea and
China, for trade and study.
The overall result was an unprecedented network of connections,
involving more parts of the world than ever before – well beyond the
confines of the earlier classical map (Map 5.1). The effort was quickly
enhanced by improvements in ships and navigation. The Arabs pioneered
the use of a triangular sail that proved ideal for travel along the Indian
Ocean coast. The ships were fairly small, too small to carry military
forces – and, indeed, this trade system was notable for the absence of
much military force. Arabs also became skilled at mapmaking; Arab maps
and navigational guides were unprecedentedly accurate, and this of course
could spur further activity.
Map 5.1 Postclassical trade routes

From China came the invention of the compass, possibly initially intro-
duced to help organize balanced household arrangements according to
principles of feng shui. By the end of the postclassical period, use of the
compass was spreading quickly to merchant seamen in Southeast Asia and to
the Arabs, with various improvements added along the way, and from these
sources to the Europeans.
The Impact of Trade

The goods exchanged along the network of routes still consisted principally
of luxury items, but amid growing diversity. Chinese manufacturing gained
ground in producing not only silks but porcelains; China was also the main
source of tea. Craftsmen around the Indian Ocean began to specialize in
making religious items for sale elsewhere. Colorful printed cloth from India
became widely popular, ultimately catching on among upper-class custo-
mers as far away as Japan. Africans traded gold and some timber products,
and a significant slave trade developed between East Africa and the Middle
East. Spices were in great demand, particularly pepper, mainly from South
and Southeast Asia, and perfumes were produced in several centers.
Revealingly, some products were now so popular that manufacturing
spread beyond initial centers. Manufacturers in the Byzantine Empire set up
some silk production; the story is that some Orthodox monks traveled to
China and smuggled out enough silkworms to establish the industry. Arab
traders, learning about sugar from India and attracted to the taste, helped
organize sugar production in the Middle East. Here was a significant indi-
cation both of the popularity of some international items – always primarily
among the upper classes – and the potential for wider impact on the econ-
omy. Pepper was not a new product – the Romans had actively traded for it
with southern India – but it gained new importance, particularly as a huge
Chinese import market developed – a new spur to Chinese trade more
generally.
The range of activity also boosted the importance of merchants in many
societies, though local trading activities remained more important than the
long-distance routes. Some merchants grew rich from their role in inter-
regional trade. Trade expansion also provided new importance for many
cities; a more robust urban culture arose in China, for example. Timbuktu,
a trading and Islamic religious center in West Africa, began to expand,
though its biggest growth occurred after 1200.
Denser and more regular trade activity also promoted the transfer of
knowledge, to a far greater extent than ever before. Information about
useful technologies accelerated, as the example of the compass already sug-
gests. Arabs learned about Chinese paper during military activity in Central
Asia, on China’s western border; Arab armies captured two Chinese who
knew the technology, and took them back to Baghdad where they set up
the first paper factory in the Middle East. A bit later, Europeans would learn
about paper from the Arabs. This was not lightning-fast technology
exchange, but it went well beyond what had previously occurred.
The development and dissemination of printing centered on East Asia.
The first use of printing probably arose in China, perhaps before the 8th
century, focused on production of Buddhist texts. From there the technique
would spread, along with Buddhism, to Korea and Japan.
The same pattern of interregional connection applies to knowledge
exchange. Arab leaders sent students to India to learn about science and
mathematics, and their findings helped spur work in the Middle East,
including the further development of algebra. From India, the Arabs also
imported the numbering system. Again, Europeans would learn of this from
interaction with the Arabs – labeling the numbers “Arabic” as a result –
though full European conversion away from more cumbersome traditional
systems occurred only slowly.
All of this, finally, contributed to somewhat greater knowledge of the world
outside one’s own region, and could promote enthusiasm for wider contact.
The great age of expanded interregional travel was still to come (see Chapters 6
and 7), but increased activity was already apparent. Both trade and religion, and
simple curiosity, were involved. The hadj was an obvious example of how
religion promoted new travel; but so were Buddhist interactions from China
and Japan to India; and the Crusades would stimulate new European interest in
commercial interactions with the Middle East.
The main points are twofold: first, interregional exchange became so well
established that its further growth was almost inevitable. Though only a
small minority were directly involved, the chance to make profits and gain
knowledge from wider contacts would prove increasingly attractive.
Second, the ramifications of the various connections were becoming
increasingly dense, well beyond the transfer of goods. This is why some
scholars refer to this period as the inception point of globalization, while
granting the obvious, that the linkages were far slower and less intricate than
when modern globalization took shape – quite apart from the huge fact that
the Americas and Oceania were not yet involved at all. Here, however, was
a legacy arguably as significant as the heritage of the new religious map.
One world historian in fact has argued that the postclassical centuries
should be seen as a turning point in world history as a whole. Before about
1000 BCE, as we have seen, the basic historical dynamics were largely
regional; connections were an afterthought. After this point, however,
contacts and mutual influences begin to seize center stage – though not to
the exclusion of regional influences. Both interregional trade and the
ambitions of missionary religions were reshaping the global framework.
A Regional and Comparative Directory

One way to chart the impact of innovations in religion and trade involves
updating the summary of regional characteristics, in comparison with the
features of the classical period – including each region’s role in the larger
connections that were being formed by this point. Various combinations of
change and continuity were involved. A revised regional chart also offers a
vital way to summarize and integrate the third basic feature of the period:
the expansion of the structures of civilization to additional areas.
For the postclassical period really served as a second formative seedbed for
many durable regional cultures, particularly but not exclusively because of
the enhanced role of religion – and above all because the roster of regional
civilizations itself now covered more global geography. Spaces remained:
Central Asia was still a center of nomadic groups, with recurrent influence
on adjacent territory. Parts of the Americas and Africa as well as Oceania did
not feature all the structures of complex societies. But the range was far
more extensive than ever before.
Finally, a quick summary of regional characteristics also provides the
opportunity to highlight the varied reactions to the two driving forces of
the period: the expansion of missionary religion and the surge of trade. A
number of emerging civilization centers – parts of Africa; Japan; Russia;
Western Europe; and, to an extent, Southeast Asia – depended heavily on
new trading connections to facilitate imitation of technologies and cultural
systems from better-established neighbors.
East Asia
Highlights
Buddhism reaches Japan from Korea, 538; Tang dynasty in China, 618–
907; beginnings of persecution of Buddhists in China, 841; rise of feudal
lords, or daimyo, in Japan, 10th century; Chinese use of compass for
navigation, 10th century; Chinese use of explosives in war, 1161.
The central development in China during the postclassical period involved

the revival and consolidation of the imperial dynasties – the Tang dynasty
was most important – the expansion of bureaucracy and the elaboration of
education and examinations for bureaucratic recruitment. Scholar-gentry
remained the dominant group. Urban populations expanded to about 12%
of the total. Major technological developments included printing, the
adaptation of the compass, and the introduction of explosives both for
military and entertainment purposes (fireworks). Gender inequality dee-
pened with the introduction of footbinding for women, mainly in the
upper classes and urban sector; small bones in the foot were broken to
inhibit growth and produce a halting walk that was regarded as a sign of
beauty and refinement. This was an extraordinary extension of Chinese
patriarchy.
Religious change was important but ultimately more limited in China
than elsewhere. Buddhism gained many converts, but the later Tang gov-
ernment turned against it and restricted its growth – though a strong Bud-
dhist minority continues to exist today. This kind of tension, between state
demands and religious impulses, would recur in Chinese history. Tang
expansion to the west, along with Islamic gains in central Asia, created
interaction between China and Islamic peoples, another feature that persists
today. Chinese trading activities expanded to the south (and there were also
northern exchanges, providing horses and silver); but Chinese merchants did
not venture as widely as the Arabs, who provided linkages that brought
Chinese goods into the wider Indian Ocean region. Here was another pat-
tern, of interregional exports but limited direct outreach, that would be
important for the future. Some scholars speculate that Confucian hostility to
merchants and their mercenary motives may have provided a constraint –
though again, commercial activity expanded considerably. Indeed at the end
of the period, Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean was growing, often
superseding the role of Arab merchants in parts of Southeast Asia.
The other big development in the period was the extension of Chinese
influence to other parts of East Asia. Direct conquest of northern Vietnam
had occurred earlier but resumed under the Tang. Influence also extended
in Korea and now Japan. Japan’s deliberate imitation of Chinese culture,
from the writing system to a variety of literary and artistic forms as well as
Buddhism, was a huge development. On the other hand, Japan did not
accept the entire Chinese model; for example, while the status of women
deteriorated, footbinding was not introduced. In the 8th century a major
effort sought to create a centralized Japanese imperial government along
Chinese lines, but this failed. During most of the postclassical period and
beyond, Japan was governed by regional military leaders, or daimyo with
their samurai troops, with considerable internal warfare. This system had
some similarities with patterns of aristocratic power in Western Europe – in
both cases, the noble class dominated military activity; but the Japanese
system emphasized group loyalty more strongly.
Whether the range of Chinese influence justifies defining a new, wider
East Asian civilization zone, with important shared characteristics even
though divided into several separate and somewhat distinctive countries, is a
matter of debate – at this point and subsequently.
South and Southeast Asia
Highlights
Spread of Hinduism to south India, 700ff; beginning of Islamic raids into
India, 711ff; Islamic invasion begin to establish a regional Islamic empire,
the Delhi sultanate, 13th century.
Following the collapse of the Gupta Empire, Hindu leaders in India worked
to popularize the religion and spread it to the entire subcontinent. This
development was complicated by a recurring series of Islamic raids into
India, including the creation of several regional governments and ultimately
a considerable empire, which brought the in-migration of Islamic believers
and substantial conversions, particularly in the west. Hindu-Muslim relations
varied, with important periods when Islamic leaders attacked Hindu temples
(and also Buddhist remnants), contributing to a complex relationship that
continues today.
Islamic linkages facilitated Indian participation in expanding interregional
trade, which also involved Southeast Asia. Indeed, by the end of the post-
classical period, initiatives from Muslim merchants from both India and
Southeast Asia put growing competitive pressures on Arab traders. In
Southeast Asia proper, a variety of regional kingdoms developed – there was
never a period of political unity – and influences from Buddhism, Hindu-
ism, and Islam created a durable religious mixture.
Islamic influence in India contributed to new efforts to isolate respectable
women from wider public contacts, in a system called purdah, that was
widely accepted by upper-class Hindus as well. It was also in this period that
some Hindu regions (not all), introduced a practice called sati, in which a
wife would die on the funeral pyre of a husband on the grounds that a
widow had no purpose in life. Along with footbinding in China and
increased veiling in the Middle East, this was part of a general deterioration
in the status of some women during the postclassical period – alongside the
complex impact of the major religions on gender.
The Middle East and North Africa
Highlights
Muhammad and the establishment of Islam, 570–632; first Caliph, 632;
Baghdad becomes political and cultural center, 813ff; attacks by Chris-
tian Crusaders in the Holy Land 1095ff; fall of the Arab Caliphate 1258.
There is no question that the rise of Islam and the expansion of the Arabs
were the most dynamic regional developments in the postclassical period.
Military conquests across the Middle East brought widespread conversion to
the Arab language and culture as well as to Islam, creating a new regional
civilization zone through the Middle East and North Africa, capped by the
rule of the Caliphate. This was a huge empire, administered fairly loosely
from the center by leaders who were at least in principle vowed to uphold
Islam. Yet the period was marked also by considerable tolerance, not only
for many religious minorities but also for the diverse secular culture in
literature and science. The region was fully engaged both in the larger pattern
of religious change and in the rapid expansion of trade and interregional con-
tact. Muhammad had urged Muslims to learn from the advances of other
societies, and Arabs proved eager to import not only goods but ideas. The new
Sufi movement at the end of the period signaled a new intensity of Islamic
piety for some groups; Sufi followers also provided new missionary vigor for
the spread of Islam elsewhere.
Gender relations were complicated. Muhammad worked to improve
women’s conditions over traditional Arab patterns, and a number of new
gains resulted – as in the protection of property ownership. Over time,
earlier regional customs that had encouraged the veiling of women in
public also became more common, and some saw this as an extension of
Islamic piety. The complexities surrounding patriarchal gender relations
were redefined.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Highlights
Conversion of Ethiopia to Christianity, 316ff; Arab traders begin to settle
on East African coast, mid-8th century; Empire of Ghana (West Africa) at
its height, 800–1200; rise of the Mali Empire, 1210ff.
Long before the postclassical period, the Bantu people from central Africa
had migrated to many parts of southern and eastern Africa, bringing agri-
culture and also creating a shared linguistic base. A number of organized
states had previously developed south of Egypt. Major changes in the
postclassical period itself centered on the spread of Islam south of Egypt
(except for Ethiopia) and down the Indian Ocean coast; extensive trade
connections between East Africa and the Middle East and development of a
common trading language, Swahili, mainly from Bantu roots but with
Arabic and also some Hindustani loan words; and the emergence of exten-
sive, though loosely organized, empires in West Africa beginning with
Ghana, along with trans-Saharan trade between these centers and North
Africa. Some other regional kingdoms arose as well, as organized states
spread more widely.
The influence of Islam in Africa was vital but complex. Most Africans except
on the eastern coast remained polytheist. But some conversions occurred in
Western Africa, and many kings – particularly in the empire of Mali – used lit-
erate Muslims as bureaucrats. Africa contributed a variety of products to inter-
regional trade, and an important merchant class arose in several regions. West
Africa also developed distinctive artistic styles, particularly in wood and metal
sculptures. Except on the eastern coast, Africans did not develop a major
shipping tradition, in part because of limits on the navigability of major rivers.
Overland trade predominated in the west, on the part of African and North
African Muslim merchants alike.
Eastern Europe
Highlights
Consolidation of the Byzantine Empire, 6th century; defeat of Arab attack
on Constantinople, 718; first Russian kingdom, 9th century around Kyiv;
Byzantine missionaries work among Slavs, development of Cyrillic alpha-
bet, later 9th century; conversion of Vladimir around 1000; Great Schism,
1054; Byzantine decline, 1100ff.
Several decisions are unavoidable in dealing with East European history.

First, should it be treated separately from Western Europe? Probable
answer yes: in the postclassical period most trade ran north to south, from
what is now western Russia and Ukraine to Constantinople, without
much link to the West; and during early postclassical centuries much of
eastern Europe was more prosperous than the West. Also the split
between eastern and western Christian churches, along with considerable
mutual intolerance, long complicated interactions. While Christian leaders
in both regions interacted with the state, connections were tighter in the
Orthodox areas, with government responsibility for naming top religious
officials.
Next: how much attention should be paid to the Byzantine Empire?
During much of the postclassical period, this was a major political and
economic unit, and its influence on the Balkans and Russia was crucial,
not only in trade and religion but in characteristic artistic forms. The
Byzantine Empire boasted an advanced legal structure, derived from
Rome; a variety of scholarly activities; and a complex bureaucracy. At the
same time, it did begin to decline around 1100; in 1203, West European
Crusaders briefly captured Constantinople in order to cripple its trading
competition; and the Byzantine Empire would disappear entirely in the
15th century.
In the long run, the more important development centered on the rise of
political structures and the other apparatus of civilization in largely Slavic
lands in the Balkans and to the north, including Russia. Byzantine mis-
sionaries carried Orthodox Christianity to much of the region and also
adapted the Greek alphabet to Slavic languages (Cyrillic). The Russian
kingdom, centered around what is now the Ukrainian city of Kyiv, was a
loosely organized structure, though it did take the lead in promoting con-
versions to Christianity.
Western Europe
Highlights
Charlemagne’s (brief) empire in much of western Europe, 800–814;
Norman conquest and monarchy in England, 1066; calling of Crusades,
1096; Gothic style, 12th century ff; Magna Carta, 1215; beginnings of
parliamentary tradition in England, 13th century.
Several characteristics defined Western (European) civilization during the

postclassical period: the spread of Catholic Christianity and Christian art and
architecture; persistent political disunity and frequent warfare; heavy reliance
on serfdom as the main form of agricultural labor; revival of trade and some
urban activity by the 10th century; revival of selected aspects of classical
Mediterranean culture, including science and philosophy. Some scholars
have argued that, mainly because of Christianity, other Western character-
istics began to emerge: for example, the Church tried to limit marriages
among close kin (in contrast to many other societies), and this may have
promoted greater individualism, less intense family control. On the other
hand, Christian beliefs had to compete with older cultural forms, such as a
belief in magic; church authorities recognized that magic was not compa-
tible with faith in God’s power but they did not actively try to interfere at
this point.
Briefly, around 800, the Emperor Charlemagne established an empire
running from Spain and north Italy through the Low Countries and western
Germany. But this soon disintegrated and during most of the period Wes-
tern Europe was organized mainly around the power of local lords, with
warrior vassals rather like the samurai in Japan and control over the pea-
santry through serfdom. By the 11th century, monarchs in France and
England had developed slightly greater powers. In the 13th century, aristo-
cratic resistance to the expansion of royal power created the first parliaments,
dominated by the nobility and claiming the right to approve any new
taxation. These would become an important tradition in many parts of
Europe, limiting the power of the royal executive; at this early point,
however, the assemblies met only sporadically and were dominated by the
aristocracy, plus leading church officials and a few wealthy townsman – not
to be confused with the more modern version.
Economic revival promoted slightly larger cities after the 9th century,
though they remained far smaller than their counterparts in Asia, plus the
formation of the first European universities, under Church control. Italian
and some other merchants began operating more widely in the Mediterra-
nean, interacting with the Middle East. Throughout the period, Europeans
borrowed extensively from the Middle East, in science and mathematics, in
commercial law, and in technology (as in importing the numbering system
and the compass).
The Americas
Highlights
Several regional political units, cultures, and urban centers in the northern
Andes, 500–1000; rise of Mayan culture in central America, 7th century ff,
interaction with Toltecs, 900ff; early Inca civilization, 12th century; decline
of the Mayans, 1200.
American history before 1492 presents a dilemma in world history gen-

erally. A host of important developments occurred, and during the post-
classical period major civilization centers expanded and innovated, both in
the Andes and in Central America. Mayan civilization was particularly
creative, devising a number of advanced mathematical and astronomical
calculations, including an exceptionally detailed calendar. While the Andes
groups did not develop writing, the Mayans did, along with intricate artistic
styles. American civilizations, in other words, offer a rich history, and
established important cultural traditions, including a polytheistic religion,
that would combine with European and African influences from the 16th
century onward.
At the same time, during the postclassical period, American cultures and
civilizations had no connection with the interregional exchanges that were
so vital in Africa, Asia, and Europe. As a result, the societies lacked the wide
array of domesticated animals, plus technologies, such as metal use and the
wheel, that had become commonplace elsewhere. This did not prevent the
development of important structures, including religious monuments and
substantial cities. But it did describe a distinctive path, and it underscored
several limitations that would become apparent once Europeans presented
themselves in force.
The Legacies of the Postclassical Period

The new regional configurations constituted one obvious factor in later
world history. The regional map obviously maintained some features of the
classical world, but there were important changes and additions. While the
Middle East/North Africa region was never entirely unified after the fall of
the Arab Caliphate, and while political forms have differed and do differ
within the region, the role of Islam and the considerable heritage of Arab
culture have provided some ongoing coherence to the region from that
point onward. The split between Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, and
their differences in church-state relations, constitute one of the factors
that have separated the experiences of eastern and western Europe –
though there were additional complexities to come. African history
would be affected by the memory of the great western kingdoms, which
is why their names were revived for new nations in the later 20th
century.
The spread of missionary religions would leave a lasting mark, within
a number of regions. Only rarely, once one of the major religions was
accepted, would it be dislodged by another; we will see partial excep-
tions to this later on in the Balkans and Korea, but the formula holds
true for the most part. Of course, other vital cultural changes have
occurred since the basic religious map was defined during the post-
classical period, but that map is still influential. The idea of active legacy
applies also to new relationships among the major religions that began to
take shape, most obviously in the recurrent religious tensions in South
Asia – where Hindu-Muslim relations are back in the headlines today –
but also in Southeast Asia; in western China; in the treatment of reli-
gious minorities in the Middle East; even in questions about the limits of
Christian tolerance in Western Europe. The memory of the Crusades has
also played at least a public relations role in response to contemporary
Western interference in the Middle East, even though the incursions
were only briefly important in the Middle East at the time. China’s
distinctive political reaction to Buddhism has been replicated, even
recently, through reassertions of the state’s interest in religious oversight.
Continuity is not a matter of religious identities alone. While the influ-
ence of religion on philosophy and art has declined in many regions since
the postclassical period, it has not disappeared. Architectural styles created
during the period are often recalled in new mosques and churches built in
more recent centuries. The religious festivals that were created or redefined
in the period, like Ramadan or Easter, still play a major role in ordinary life.
The impact of religion on gender is another contemporary topic heavily
shaped by patterns set during the postclassical period.
The legacy of the expansion of interregional trade is a bit harder to trace,
simply because there have been so many changes since the postclassical
period, including basic revolutions in relevant transportation technology.
Yet the kinds of connections, motivations, and appetites defined in the
postclassical period clearly helped stimulate further efforts after the post-
classical period drew to a close – and these would flow into more intense
globalization.
Thus, China’s role as a manufacturing export center would continue well
after the postclassical period; interrupted during the 19th century, it has
clearly resumed today – and Chinese leaders often refer to the earlier pre-
cedent, arguing that their nation is simply resuming a traditional place in the
international economy. The merchant tradition in the Middle East has also
persisted.
Some of the consumer habits established in the postclassical centuries also
remain important – always remembering, however, that upper-class tastes
and budgets predominated at this point. It was during the postclassical
period that tea drinking became a key custom in China, while the taste
for tea also began to establish a durable market in Southeast Asia and the
Middle East – as is still true today. The attraction of sugar has an even
wider legacy. Arab interest in sugar was one of the interesting new con-
nections between the Middle East and India. Europeans learned about
sugar from the Arabs – the product first appeared in Europe in the 11th
century, and the experience of the Crusades spread awareness. However,
the product remained extremely expensive in Europe – and it could
only be imported. This turned out to be one of the key motives driving
European expansion from the 15th century onward, but is had its roots
earlier on.
Other effects of new connections are even more obvious, as the con-
tinued international reliance on the “Arabic” numerals suggests. Scientific
and philosophical knowledge gained from exchanges in this period played
an ongoing role in European, Indian, and Middle Eastern cultures.
The postclassical period thus added a number of vital components to the
framework inherited from the classical societies, and while there was far
more change to come, a grasp of the postclassical legacy contributes directly
to assessing some of the key features of the world today – including some of
the thorniest tensions.
But the postclassical framework was itself partially eroding by the 13th
century. The growing weakness of the Byzantine Empire affected both
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Even more important were signs of
weakness in the Arab world. Arab merchants were encountering new
competition both in the Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean. The
Caliphate was losing its grip, and parts of the empire, including Egypt,
began to split away. More subtly, the kind of cultural mix that had defined
the Arab Golden Age was gradually altered in favor of a more fervent
commitment to the Islamic religion itself. Given the importance of the Arab
role in the postclassical period as a whole, these developments suggested that
wider changes might be imminent.
Further Reading
Roy Amore, Amir Hussain, and Willard Oxtoby, A Concise Introduction to
the World Religions, 4th edn. (2019); Stephen Bumbacher and Ann Heir-
man, eds., The Spread of Buddhism (2012); Karen Armstrong, Islam: A
Short History (2002); Cemil Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global
Intellectual History (2017); Earle E. Cairns, Christianity Through the Cen-
turies (1996). On the idea of an “archaic” globalization, A.G. Hopkins,
ed., Globalization in World History 1st edn. (2002); see also Peter Stearns,
Globalization in World History, 3rd edn. (2019).
On key regions: Charles Mann, 1491: New Revelation of the Americas Before
Columbus (2006); Kevin Shillington, History of Africa, 3rd edn. (2012); F.
W. Mote, Imperial China 900–1800 (2000); Michael Pearson, “Muslims
in the Indian Ocean,” in Michael Pearson, The Indian Ocean (2003); Milo
Kearney, The Indian Ocean in World History (2003).
6 The Mongol Period, 1200–1450
Early in the 13th century, the Mongols, a nomadic herding people from
Central Asia, began pushing into China. This began a decades-long process
of expansion that would bring conquests not only in all of China, but also
Russia, the rest of Central Asia, the western portion of the Middle East –
plus important pressure on East-Central Europe and Japan. Mongol con-
quests were almost certainly the biggest single event in world history to that
point, simply because they covered such an unprecedentedly large area.
Only toward the end of the 14th century would the Mongol hold begin to
relax.
The result was a new period in world history that would make its own
contributions to developments later on. This was not a formative stage, like
the classical or postclassical periods had been. Indeed, we will need to pick
up on several trends that simply continued the postclassical dynamic – like
the continued process of Islamic conversion in places like Indonesia (today
the world’s largest Muslim nation) and the southern Philippines. The
Mongol period saw the launch of no new religions or major cultural trends.
No really new durable political institutions emerged either, for the Mongols
did not create lasting structures and would gradually be forced back into the
medium-sized region covered by Mongolia today where they resumed
(until recently) a largely nomadic way of life. In 2008, a huge statue to the
first great Mongol leader was built east of the capital, a sign that the
memory has not been entirely lost.
What the Mongols did do, however, was accelerate and amplify the
process of interregional exchange, with some durable results particularly
through the dissemination of explosive powder. The Mongol experience
also altered the diplomatic orientation of China, Russia, and Japan, with
traces that in some cases can still be discerned today and that certainly lasted
well into the 19th century. This legacy, and how it was formed, constitute
the main point of this brief chapter.
Mongol contact did not affect the whole world, and we will begin with a
brief summary of developments outside the Mongol orbit. We then turn to
the Mongol achievements, their effects on several major regional players,
and the aftermath.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-7
Outside the Orbit
Highlights
Africa: Mansa Musa pilgrimage to Mecca and height of Mali Empire in
Africa, 1324; Zimbabwe at its height, 1400; Songhay Empire flourishes,
1500. Americas: rise of Aztecs, foundation of Tenochtitlan, 1325; great Inca
expansion, 1434–71. India: formation of Delhi sultanate, 1206; sultanate
resists Mongol attacks, 1290s.
Africa
African emphasis on regional kingdoms and extensive trade with North Africa
and the Middle East continued, along with the links to Islam. The wealth of
the Mali Empire was highlighted during the famous pilgrimage of Mansa
Musa, its ruler, to Mecca; he brought so much gold with him that he briefly
disrupted the Egyptian banking system. Mali did decline later in the century,
but another regional unit, Songhay, began its rise; a major new kingdom,
Zimbabwe, emerged in the southeast. African art flourished, particularly in the
region of Benin. Timbuktu expanded as a center of Islamic scholarship and
trade. Ibn Battuta, the great traveler from Morocco, visited West Africa where
he praised Islamic piety but lamented that women’s behavior and costume
were not regulated according to Middle Eastern standards.
The Americas
The great developments in the Americas centered on the rise and expansion
of a massive Inca Empire in the Andes, overseeing a complex agricultural
and commercial economy and an elaborate polytheistic religion. In Central
America, the Aztecs conquered many smaller kingdoms, exacting harsh tri-
bute. The Aztec capital, in Tenochtitlan (now the location of Mexico City)
was a marvellous achievement, the largest city in the Americas by far; its
population and that of the surrounding region may have reached 25 million,
with an elaborate system of trade and agriculture, all the more impressive
given the absence of key technologies, like metal implements and the
wheel. Discontent with Aztec exactions was, however, rising by the end of
the 15th century.
India and Southeast Asia

India and Southeast Asia were spared Mongol rule. The rising Delhi Sulta-
nate in India successfully defeated an invasion attempt. Consolidation of the
The Mongol Period, 1200–1450 73
Muslim minority continued. By the late 15th century, however, the Sulta-
nate began to decline, and a number of regional Hindu leaders were able to
take back some territory.
The Mongols
Highlights
Rise of Chingiss Khan and formation of the Mongol state, 1206; conquest
of China begins, 1215; invasions of Russia and the Middle East start,
1219; conquest of Russia complete, and brief push farther into central
Europe, 1240; destruction of Baghdad, 1258; conquest of China com-
plete, 1274; reign of Kubilai Khan, 1280–94; first use of guns, 1290s.
It is not entirely clear why the Mongols burst forth in so many directions.
One theory contends that a brief warming period improved the fertility of
the Central Asian grasslands, which increased the horse supply and galva-
nized new military ambition. Unquestionably the first Mongol leader,
Chingiss Khan, was unusually ambitious and a truly gifted, if often cruel,
military strategist. Mongols benefited as well from the decline of the pre-
vailing Chinese dynasty, greater political weakness in Russia amid the fading
fortunes of its Byzantine ally, and the decline of the Arab Caliphate (which
collapsed entirely in 1258, under the Mongol assault).
There were failures, to be sure, though some of these had consequences
also. Mongols briefly pressed into Central Europe where they did quite a bit
of damage, setting the region back economically, but they did not stay
because of a political crisis in Asia. Their attempts in South Asia failed. An
Egyptian force prevented conquest of the western Middle East. A Mongol
invasion of Vietnam won some territory but was partially repelled. Mongols
twice sought to conquer Japan (1274–80) (after the Japanese had killed
Mongol emissaries), but did not succeed, once because of a major typhoon
that the grateful Japanese labeled the “divine wind.”
Still, what they did achieve, in terms of territorial dominance, was
unprecedented. By the later 13th century, interlocking Mongol states,
or khanates, stretched from Eastern Europe and the eastern Middle East
all the way to China’s Pacific coast (Map 6.1). And from this, the main
point from a world history standpoint: the sheer size of this linked
territory, combined with tolerant Mongol policies post-conquest,
established more robust connections between Asia and Europe than had
ever existed before.
For the Mongols sought a prosperous rule. They encouraged commerce
and manufacture, and while they exacted tribute, they did not press their
subjects too harshly. Nor were they limited by earlier bureaucratic
74
The Mongol Period, 1200–1450
Map 6.1 Map of the world in 1350: Mongol Empires and beyond
hesitations, as in China. Mongols tried (without great success) to conciliate
Confucian officials in China but they were not bound by them, and recruited a
diverse staff including Muslims, Buddhists, and even some Christians.
The result was a surge of travel and trade, reaching from Europe and
Persia to China. The Catholic Pope sent missionaries. Jewish as well as
Christian merchants began to reach China directly from Europe. Even
some European entertainers tried to win fame and fortune by traveling
east. In the process, knowledge of Chinese technology spread more
widely and rapidly than ever before, with major consequences later in
world history. And while the Mongols began to be pushed back by the
later 14th century – China regained independence, after bitter fighting,
by 1368 – the impact of the exchanges they had facilitated would only
grow with time.
Guns
One major consequence, in several regions, was the beginnings of a trans-
formation of warfare through the use of explosives and the development of
cannon and guns. This formed part of several of the regional changes dis-
cussed in the next section, but it has proved so significant that it deserves a
brief specific note.
Knowledge of explosive power had developed gradually in China, prob-
ably for several centuries; by the 12th century, use of explosives was a fairly
standard part of Chinese military and naval strategies. Not surprisingly, the
technology was quickly deployed as part of the resistance to Mongol inva-
sions; several besieged cities tried to dispel the Mongols by detonating
bombs, sometimes thrown from city walls.
And the Mongols were quick learners. By the 1270s, they were routinely
using explosives in their own attacks on Chinese cities. One observer
described the result: “the noise was like a tremendous thundering, shaking
the walls and ground … the entire population was terrified.” Between 1280
and 1300, either the Mongols or the Chinese also introduced what was first
called a “hand cannon” – the original gun. (The word “gun” itself did not
arrive in English until around 1400, probably derived from the name of an
old Norse goddess of war.)
It is not entirely clear whether Mongols used this new weaponry else-
where, but they may have done so, and also in their abortive attack on
Japan. Certainly both European and Middle Eastern armies began to incor-
porate explosives and guns in their own arsenals by the 14th century. Eur-
opean reference to “hand cannons” dates to between 1280 and 1300, and
regular use of guns and cannon surged forward from the 1320s onward. By
the 14th century, both Middle Eastern (Ottoman) and some Russian troops
began to be equipped with guns. Here, obviously, was a huge legacy to the
course of world history from the end of the Mongol period onward.
Regional Results of the Mongol Experience
East Asia
The Japanese drew a sense of superiority from their ability to withstand the
Mongol efforts. Attachment to the links with China had been declining
anyway, but now the Japanese realized that their erstwhile mentor had
failed to accomplish what Japan had achieved: continued independence.
Interest in defining Japanese identity increased as a result, and this would
affect later policy.
China had never come to terms with the Mongol conquest, partly of
course because it had initially been so violent but also because it put the
Middle Kingdom under the sway of “barbarians.” Once the Mongols had
been expelled in the later 14th century, a key goal for the new dynasty that
came to power, the Ming, was making sure that the Mongol episode would
not be repeated. New forms of defense – soon including the massive
rebuilding of the previously earthen Great Wall – would warrant hugely
expensive public investment.
The Middle East

As in China, the Mongol hold in Persia and the eastern part of the Middle
East began to weaken by the middle of the 14th century, However, the
upheaval the Mongols had helped promote in the region, including the
disappearance of the Caliphate, left the way open for new forces; so did the
weakness of the Byzantine Empire. (Mongols did not conquer the Byzan-
tines, indeed there were mutual peace treaties at several points; but the
Mongols did raid in the 14th century which added to the Empire’s turmoil.)
One new force began to take shape in the Black Sea region in the 14th
century, a Turkish people that had migrated from Central Asia, and would
ultimately form a new Ottoman Empire. This, plus a separate new invasion
into Persia, would reconfigure much of the region in the 15th and early
16th centuries.
Russia
Mongols ruled Russia with a fairly loose hand, mainly seeking annual tri-
bute payments. They made no effort to interfere with Russian Christianity.
Their arrival did, however, prompt many peasants to seek the protection of
local landlords, setting the basis for a long-lasting system of serfdom in the
region. Mongols also relocated the Russian center eastward, to the Moscow
area. Here, by 1400, Russian nobles began to push for greater authority
against their overlords, winning independence by 1450. Thereafter, the new
Russian state continued its military effort against the Mongols, pushing well
into Central Asia. While Russian leaders also claimed that they had
inherited an imperial mission from Byzantium, it was undoubtedly the
Mongol experience and Russian reaction that helped set the new state on a
path of recurrent military expansion. And this in turn would be a durable
feature of Russian policy, with remnants still visible in the 21st century.
(Russia’s military seizure of Crimea, in 2014, ironically brought Russian
control back to a region that had been seized from a surviving Mongol
Khanate, in 1783.)
Western Europe
Western Europe was undoubtedly the greatest single regional beneficiary of
the Mongol period, profiting from the new opportunities to learn from Asia
without the burden of outright Mongol control. Contacts with China
brought knowledge not only of guns but also printing, which various Eur-
opean inventors would adapt toward establishing the first European press in
1450. The interest in guns, of course, developed even earlier. Travel stories
about China and other parts of Asia, some of them invented, gained con-
siderable popularity. The most famous European traveler, Marco Polo, who
may well have met Kubilai Khan in the later 13th century, wrote an
account that – while carefully lamenting the fact that China was not
Christian – highlighted China’s advanced technologies and its urban con-
sumer standards. Work of this sort inevitably stimulated further interest in
travel and exploration. An adaptation of Polo’s Travels was one of the books
Columbus took with him on his own famous trip in 1492.
Opportunities for trade and imitation were not the only key develop-
ments in Europe during the 13th and 14th centuries. Central monarchs
continued to gain new powers in England and France, though political
systems were still quite loose, while it was at this point that the parliamen-
tary tradition began as well. Spain established a single monarchy in the 15th
century, and would complete the forcible expulsion of Muslims in 1492; a
new kingdom also formed in Portugal. In Italy, a novel cultural movement
known as the Renaissance took shape in the 14th century, amid the com-
mercially active city-states that dotted the peninsula. Classical Mediterranean
styles and themes were widely revived, though alongside continued Chris-
tian belief. The combination of internal change and borrowed ideas and
technologies was significant.
Disease – and Labor

One other outgrowth of the new exchanges was devastating. A new round
of bubonic plague emerged in western China in the early 14th century.
Within a few decades, thanks to the heightened contacts, including Mongol
military activities, it had spread to the Middle East, and soon reached
Europe, where it became known as the Black Death. Up to a third of the
population died, both in the Middle East and Europe, and the episode
opened a series of plagues that would continue to burden Europe for several
centuries.
The disease, along with greater commercial activity, did encourage a
relaxation of serfdom in key parts of Europe, in favor of more independent
farming or wage labor. Lower population increased the value of labor, and
opportunities for market sales gave some peasants new bargaining power.
The trend was an interesting contrast to the expansion of serfdom in Russia.
The Mongol Aftermath

The decline of the Mongols by the 15th century signaled renewed problems
for overland travel, as there was no overall government protection; bri-
gandage increased along many of the established routes. But the taste for
trade and contact was not clearly dimmed, so attention to maritime oppor-
tunities returned. And an implicit question loomed: with Arabs in partial
eclipse, and the Mongols fading, what power might take the lead in spear-
heading new kinds of contact?
East Asia
China was the first to respond, in a fascinating global interlude. The new Ming
dynasty, established on the heels of the Mongol defeat, sponsored an unpre-
cedented series of great expeditions in the first decades of the 15th century.
The Chinese by this point were capable of building the largest wooden ships in
the world, watertight, and they sent several fleets through the Indian Ocean
under command of a Muslim admiral. The aim was solicitation of tribute from
far-flung regions plus new opportunities for trade. The ventures reached not
only Southeast Asia and India, but also the Arabian peninsula and the East
African coast. Here might have been the basis for a new pattern of exchange.
But the Ming government reversed itself in 1433 and called the initiative
off. China began to concentrate more on internal development, though
export manufacturing and active trade with Southeast Asia continued. A
new emperor wanted to build a fancy new capital in Beijing, and even
more the government sought to invest in the dramatic new Great Wall to
deal with China’s most obvious threat. There may also have been some
resistance in the Confucian bureaucracy to so much emphasis on commerce
and military activity. The result did not damage China’s economic position
but it did – though quite unintentionally – result in ceding opportunities for
greater initiative to other powers.
The Middle East

During the 14th century as the Mongols began to falter in the Middle East,
Ottoman Turks began to build their own empire, first east of Byzantine
holdings, and then through conquests in the Balkans. The great city of
Constantinople was increasingly squeezed, and then in 1453 an Ottoman
force, using a siege cannon, actually conquered the capital, making it the
center of the new Ottoman Empire. This effectively ended Byzantine
sway, and then in ensuing decades the Ottomans defeated an Egyptian
force, taking over the Mediterranean section of the Middle East and into a
portion of Central Asia, part of North Africa, as well as the Balkans. The
Ottomans had already converted to Islam, so the result was a major new
Islamic empire, controlling a variety of specific peoples, including many
Arabs.
This was a major reconfiguration, that would last into the early 20th
century. Its implications were not exactly global, but they would bear not
only on the Middle East but on Russia and other parts of Europe as well.
Western Europe
By the first half of the 15th century, monarchs in both Spain and Portugal
were sponsoring naval expeditions down the Atlantic coast of Africa. They
were eager to find gold – which never really materialized – and scout other
opportunities for trade. Religion may have entered in: certainly, the notion
of spreading Catholicism ultimately had powerful appeal, particularly to
regimes that were just completing the expulsion of Muslims from their own
territory.
The early voyages provided greater knowledge of West African geo-
graphy. The monarchs seized several island groups – the Azores and the
Canaries – and quickly installed European-run sugar plantations, displacing
native populations and importing African slave labor. (This, of course,
proved to be a dress rehearsal of what would later happen in the Americas.)
And, obviously, the expeditions paved the way for the great ventures of the
late 15th century: the westward voyage of Christopher Columbus for Spain,
seeking direct connection with India and accidentally finding the Americas;
and the Portuguese mission of Vasco da Gama, 1498–99, which sailed
around the southern coast of Africa and did reach India. Western Europe
was gaining a new role in global trade, ultimately with huge consequences
both for the region and for the world at large.
Causation
Figuring out why these new initiatives occurred, and keeping them in per-
spective, is no easy assignment. Borrowed technology was crucial, which is
why this development sits squarely in the context of Mongol heritage.
European ships, though far smaller than the Chinese ones, benefited from
adapting Arab sailing technology, but added a sail that facilitated maneuvers
in the open ocean. Navigational devices came from Asia as well. Above all,
these ships carried cannon, the result of the enthusiastic adoption and
extension of Chinese and Mongol technology.
Serious economic and political challenges help explain why European
leaders moved in this direction – it was not just a matter of new naval
capacity. The rise of the Ottoman Empire made it clear that there was a
new Islamic power to contend with, and while West Europeans had not
really supported the Byzantine Empire, the fall of the Christian bastion was
a blow. There was new reason to seek trading connections that would avoid
dependence on the Middle East.
The cost of desired Asian items was a factor as well. The Portuguese king,
for example, was eager to find a way to reduce the price of pepper – and a
direct link to India, the production source, might do the trick. More generally,
the Europeans had a balance of payment problem. They had little to offer
Asian merchants in exchange for their goods: Europe, still a less-developed
economy, was simply not producing much that the rest of the world wanted.
So when Vasco da Gama made a second trip to India, early in the 16th century,
he armed his ships with cannon and used force to compel Indian merchants to
trade with him. The formula was clear, and the same held true for the seizure
of Africans to work the new estates of the South Atlantic islands. Guns and sails
were the instruments of European expansion.
Finally, rivalries among leading monarchs – initially Spain and Portugal,
soon Britain and France as well – encouraged competitive ventures. Some
historians have long argued that a new “Renaissance spirit,” as well as
somewhat more effective governments, played a role in this new chapter,
giving some Europeans a new sense of confidence and secular ambition.
Even if this factor is considered, it is important to realize that Western
Europe was beginning to reach out at this point not because of global
economic leadership but because of new capacities for force and the moti-
vations to use them. This unusual situation would prove crucial in explain-
ing developments in the new period that was opening up by the 16th
century.
Legacy
The legacy of this brief world history period was in some ways rather
modest. No great new cultures or durable political institutions directly
emerged from the Mongol empires. Regional characteristics and balances
were, however, adjusted in important ways, and some of these adjustments
would last well into the 20th century and cast a shadow even today.
Thus, the Chinese leadership made some important decisions about
regional focus and merchant ambition. Russian initiatives, just emerging by
1450, pointed in new directions, and the country would also be durably
affected both by the collapse of its Byzantine partner and the rise of serf-
dom. Western Europe gained new naval and military capacities and a
greater interest in outreach. African kingdoms, still going strong, were
indirectly affected by their lack of involvement in Mongol exchanges, par-
ticularly when faced with new European initiatives.
Finally, the arrival of guns – a complicated story – proved to be a per-
manent change in the world’s military context.
Further Reading
David Morgan, The Mongols, 2nd edn. (2007); Monica Green, ed., Pandemic
Disease in the Medieval World: Rethinking the Black Death (2015); Charles
Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval
Russian History (1987); Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and
Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence (2003); Ira Lapidus, A History of
Islamic Societies, 2nd edn. (2002); Judith Bennett, Medieval Europe: A Short
History, 11th edn. (2010); Robert Collins and James Burns, A History of
Sub-Saharan Africa (2007); Michael Neiberg, Warfare in World History
(2001).
7 The Early Modern Period,
1450–1750
The Global Framework
The idea of an early modern period, and the term itself, are standard in
European history, and they are routinely used in world history as well –
though as we will see in this chapter and Chapter 8, the danger of “over-
Westernizing” the period is quite real. The period’s label captures some of
its flavor: it was quite different from the previous eras, and the changes
brought many trends closer to modern patterns. But it was not fully
modern, and the differences really matter.
Societies in the period remained part of the structures of the Agricultural
Age. They strained against some of these structures, particularly through
widespread efforts to promote more commerce and more production for
the market, but they did not yet transcend them. Hence, among other
things, the continued importance of rural life and the dominance of land-
based elites. It is fair to see hints in the period of greater changes to come.
Some historians, dealing both with Europe and with Japan, even talk about
an “industrious revolution” in the period, centered on more intense work,
that would lead to the real industrial revolution that followed. But nobody
knew that was to come at the time. While there were important shifts in
technology, particularly involving ships and navigation but also some sig-
nificant manufacturing innovations in the period’s final decades, there was
no revolution. Hand power, supplemented by animals and some water mills
or windmills, predominated.
This said, one of the huge changes that did occur in the period was the
emergence of systematic, if still fairly slow, global interconnections for the first
time. The inclusion of the Americas in interregional linkages was a major
development, both for the American continents and for the world. At the end
of the period, further expeditions began the process of incorporating Australia
and Pacific Oceania as well. Sails were redesigned to permit voyages across the
Atlantic and Pacific alike, with unprecedented maneuverability in mid-ocean.
Navigational devices were further developed, and in the 18th century, after a
major scientific competition, Europeans figured out how to calculate long-
itude, a huge improvement in naval positioning and safety. Volumes of trade
increased steadily. New kinds of organizations, capable of greater commercial
coordination across distances, were also introduced.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-8
The Early Modern Period, 1450–1750 83
As a result, many historians refer to the period in terms of a major
intensification – at least; if not a real inception – of premodern globaliza-
tion. “Proto-globalization” is a term often used to show that this was a
direct precursor of globalization, one of the period’s most important lega-
cies – though also not quite, yet, full globalization if only because of the
limitations of transportation and communications technology, plus some
regional resistance to too much contact.
This chapter centers on this expanding global framework, and some of its
implications for the regions involved – and most regions were in fact
involved at least to some degree. Chapter 8 then focuses on regional
developments, diverse and often significant in their own right, as well as
putting the major features of the early modern period in overall perspective
by assessing comparative legacies.
The early modern period occurred only a few centuries ago, which is
why a fuller treatment becomes essential in setting the historical framework
for our own world. The immediacy of the legacy was vividly highlighted in
the movements for racial justice in 2020, when huge controversy sur-
rounded efforts to tear down statues of erstwhile early modern heroes like
Christopher Columbus. Many contemporary features, some arguably good,
some truly bad, took shape from the late 15th century onward, as a number
of developments moved many societies away from the framework of the
postclassical world or the Mongol age.
The Role of the West

There is no question that Western Europeans became the most active agents
in the new global linkages – in a way, replacing Arabs or Mongols, but on
an even wider scale. This in turn raises two issues best identified in advance.
First, Western power, though real and expanding during the period, had
some clear limits. Western naval superiority gave Europeans a decided
advantage in some island and coastal areas, seizing pockets of territory in
western and southern Africa and India and major parts of Indonesia and the
Philippines. Western intrusion into the Americas was the only case where
significant Western movement inland occurred, for here naval guns were
supplemented by use of a wider array of animals – horses – and weapons
and even more by the devastating spread of contagious disease. Elsewhere,
in the Middle East and most of Africa, most of Asia, Eastern Europe – the
West did promote some new interactions but with no real control. In other
words, a variety of regions shaped the early modern period, and not the
West alone. Major developments in several societies – Japan, the Ottoman
Empire – had little or nothing to do with the West. One historian has
argued that the main global role of the West in this period was transporting
American silver to Asia, and there is some truth to the claim.
Even at the end of the 18th century, with Western power undeniably
increasing, a British mission appealed to the Chinese emperor to open
84 The Early Modern Period, 1450–1750
markets more fully to Western goods. And the rebuff was clear: the
emperor noted that China had no need for Western imports, and sent the
mission packing. Indeed, it was only in the 1840s that the West would
finally gain a favorable balance of trade with China, and while this was an
important, and, as we will see, rather nasty, development it would last only
about a hundred years.
Second, Western responsibility. There is no question that the West made
its mark in the world through violence (in contrast, for example, to the
ways the Arabs had promoted their trading interests earlier). By the 16th
century, for example, Portugal was sending armed vessels into the Indian
Ocean to attack Asian competitors, using force to compensate for the fact
that the West was still not producing many attractive export products.
Through policies of this sort European companies took over about half of
all Indian Ocean trade, carrying Asian spices and manufactures to many parts
of the world – including other parts of Asia, and not just back and forth
with Europe.
Force also described European entry in the Americas and the gradual
expansion of European colonial holdings. Along with negotiations with
African governments and merchants, it supported the new Atlantic slave
trade. And while there were some objections to all this – Catholic mis-
sionaries, particularly, occasionally tried to resist some of the mistreatment of
indigenous Americans – there were few hesitations overall. Many Europeans
thought they were justified in taking what they could, and, as we will see,
began to develop a larger sense of global superiority as well.
Generalizations of this sort can be troubling in the 21st-century world –
as the controversies over Christopher Columbus suggest. Several Western
countries, like Britain and France (and also Australia, New Zealand, and
Canada), have recently apologized for some of their actions in the past. It is
up to each reader to decide how much blame remains useful today – and it
is fair to note that other societies, too, have sinned in their past. Evaluation
is further complicated by the fact that – as we will see in Chapter 8 – other
key changes in the early modern West look “good” by many contemporary
standards, and some would turn out to benefit other regions as well, at least
in the long run. Still, the downsides of the Western advance are glaring by
current standards, even though some in the West cling to claims of moral
superiority even today.
Key Global Trends
Highlights
Columbus reaches the Caribbean, 1492; Vasco da Gama’s first voyage to
India, 1498–99; Spanish begin conquest of American mainland, 1509
(defeat of Aztecs, 1519–24; defeat of Incas, 1533); Portugal conquers
Goa in western India, 1510–11; Magellan circumnavigates the globe, 1519–

21; Portugal launches Atlantic slave trade to Brazil, 1526; Portuguese gov-
ernment in Brazil, 1548; Spain sets up government in the Philippines, 1556;
Portuguese colony in Angola in Africa, 1570; Japan limits European activities,
1580sff; British and French colonies in North America, 1607–08; first African
slaves imported to British North America (Virginia), 1619; Dutch colonies
in Indonesia, 1641, and South Africa, 1652; Chinese attacks on Catholic
missionaries, early 18th century; Seven Years War, 1756–63.
The combination of the European entry into the Americas and the almost
simultaneous arrival in the Indian Ocean had several effects which in turn
set much of the framework for the global exchanges that followed – in
addition to the gradual establishment of some new European colonies.
1 Portuguese and particularly Spanish contacts with the Americas, later

supplemented by the activities of the other European powers, quickly
launched a series of biological interactions often called the Columbian
exchange. A variety of European diseases spread to the Americas, headed
by smallpox and measles; previous American isolation from inter-
regional contacts meant there was no established immune resistance. At
the same time, Europeans brought new foods and animals to the
Americas, and in turn helped spread the use of a number of American
plants. New foods and new diseases combined to have major global
demographic results – literally around the world.
2 The terrible inroads of disease in the Americas, gradually killing off up to
85% of the indigenous population, created a massive labor shortage, just as
European colonists sought to make their new land holdings profitable.
The quick response – prepared by earlier experience in the South Atlantic
islands – was the unprecedented Atlantic slave trade, bringing enslaved
workers from Africa. The result had a deep impact on parts of Africa as
well as in the Americas – and above all on the enslaved people themselves.
3 The activities of European merchants created new incentives for the
production of a variety of goods – again, with global results. Discovery
and rapid expansion of silver mining in the Andes provided Europeans,
for the first time, with massive supplies of a good widely attractive in
Asia and Africa, a huge boost to commerce and production alike.
China and India gained the greatest amount of American silver
(through European merchant intermediaries), because of their capacity
in manufactured goods and spices. Russia and Eastern Europe became
involved as well, in this case, boosting production of furs and grains.
4 The combined impact of these various developments in trade and demo-
graphy created a new and complex pattern of regional economic inequality
that would long persist – with measurable residue in the 21st century.
5 Finally, new levels of production began to increase the environmental
impact of human activity, more extensively than ever before. Agri-
culture and even excessive hunting had affected the environment in
previous periods, but arguably the modern pattern of environmental
change began in the early modern centuries – to be continued and
vastly accelerated later on.
All of this added up to an unprecedented level of global interaction,

launching a number of trends that directly connect to contemporary glo-
balization and its mixed effects on the human condition,
The Columbian Exchange

The new patterns of disease were stark. Millions of Native Americans were
exposed to diseases with which they had no prior experience, and the death
rates began to soar quickly after European arrival. Imported Africans
brought unfamiliar diseases as well, particularly malaria. Whole island
populations in the Caribbean were virtually wiped out. Ravages continued
in many parts of South and North America through the 17th century, after
which the remaining populations had sufficient immunity to reverse the
pattern and begin to generate some compensatory demographic growth. By
that point, however, 50–85% of the total Native American population had
been wiped out, a huge factor in facilitating expanded European occupation
of American land.
Then, in the 18th century, as European contact with Pacific Oceania and
the American Northwest increased, much the same pattern recurred. The
Native Hawaiian population, for example, declined from several hundred
thousand in the late 18th century, to about 50,000 by the mid-19th.
Most of this kind of decline was simply the accidental result of contact
among populations with very different disease experience; it had happened
before in world history, though not on this scale. However, in the 18th
century, some Europeans, eager to facilitate their access to land, deliberately
gave smallpox-infected blankets to some native groups, fully aware that
many would die.
Contact with the Americas may have brought syphilis to Europe, or at
least a new strain; a major outbreak occurred in the 1490s soon after
Columbus’ return. On the whole, however, European demography was not
significantly affected.
In the longer run, the Americas would now be included in larger global pat-
terns of disease transmission, even after the Columbian exchange had run its
course. Plagues recurrently spread from South Asia or the Middle East to Europe
and thence to the Americas, throughout the 19th century; sometimes the direc-
tions were reversed as with the so-called Spanish flu of 1918–19, which may
have begun in Kansas before leading to a worldwide contagion. But it was the
Columbian exchange that had the sharpest effects on the Americas.
The Slave Trade
Slavery was not, of course, a new labor system. By 1500, it was extensively
utilized not only in the Middle East but also in parts of Africa, and the
Aztecs also had a slave system using conquered peoples. However, no slave
system had ever transported people such long distances, and under such
systematically harsh conditions, as would occur with the Atlantic slave trade.
Following the Portuguese lead, all the major European colonial powers
actively engaged in the African slave trade, including Spain, Britain, Hol-
land, France, and Denmark. Many individuals and trading companies gained
huge profits, which became part of the overall global economic pattern in
which Europeans won disproportionate earnings. Some slave traders, like
Edward Colston in Bristol, England, became known as local philanthropists
as they contributed a small part of their profits to local charity; a statue of
Colston was one of the targets of racial justice protests in 2020. (Overall,
merchants in Bristol alone may have traded as many as 500,000 Africans.)
Most of the slaves were purchased from African merchants, who were the
ones who actually seized the individuals. Europeans occasionally participated
in slave raids, but their susceptibility to African diseases limited direct parti-
cipation. Several African monarchs directly negotiated sales arrangements, in
return for profits that they used to buy guns, alcohol, or decorative items
from the Europeans (including colorful cotton cloth that the Europeans
brought from India). Only a few kingdoms pointedly, and successfully, held
back. Most slaves were seized in western and central Africa, including Por-
tuguese Angola; most were polytheists, though some Muslims were taken as
well. The Europeans involved were quite clear about the economic
importance of their activities: as one English trader noted, “what a glorious
and advantageous trade this is, it is the hinge on which all of the trade of the
globe moves.”
Estimates on the human size of the trade vary, but from the 16th century
to the trade’s decline early in the 19th, more than 12 million individuals
may have been shipped. Probably a million died during the crossing, for
slave traders, eager for profit and low costs, provided scant protection. Brazil
and the Caribbean were the primary destinations, but other parts of Latin
America, including Mexico, participated, and up to half a million Africans
were shipped to British North America.
Wherever they ended up, enslaved Africans were most widely used for
export agriculture – on plantations growing sugar or tobacco or later cotton
–and they were driven hard. Death rates were high, and slave families were
not infrequently disrupted by the sale of some members to other owners.
Sexual exploitation by owners was also widespread.
In contrast to slave traditions in Africa itself, slave status in the Americas
quickly became hereditary. A mid-17th-century law in Virginia, for exam-
ple, stipulated that a child born of a slave mother was itself a slave, regardless
of paternity. And only rarely did individual owners decide to free one or
more of their slaves. This process quickly imbued Atlantic slavery with a
fierce racist component (in contrast to more traditional slave systems in the
classical world or the Middle East where racial mixing commonly occurred).
Whereas Europeans sometimes described Africans as particularly “clever”
early in the 16th century, references became increasingly derogatory as the
slave system deepened, furthered as well by the fact that the Africans seized
were not Christians. The belief that Africans were by nature inferior dee-
pened as the slave system took further hold. Racism became a key element
in justifying the system.
Finally, the slave trade strongly affected West Africa as well. Some African
traders made considerable profits, and interest in acquiring goods brought by
the European merchants ran deep among many in the ruling and upper
classes. Massive population loss was compounded by the fact that the
greatest percentage of enslaved individuals were young and male, depriving
the region of people of childbearing age. A resultant surplus of females also
promoted greater use of polygamy. Overall, the African population stag-
nated during the early modern period. While food supply increased, thanks
in part to the incorporation of New World foods like corn and pumpkins,
the slave trade nullified any gains.
The slave trade was not a fully global experience, but it had a massive
impact on the regions involved. The European use of profits from the trade,
and some of the racial attitudes the trade promoted, could have wider
results.
Foods
Exchange of foods was the final main feature of the Columbian exchange,
and the one that had the widest global results. Outright exports of food
remained rare, except for specialty items like sugar; only in the 18th century
did grain shipments from Eastern Europe begin to suggest wider exchange.
Far more important was the incorporation of plants and animals from other
regions, a long tradition which now took on greater significance with the
inclusion of the Americas. Key results included some major modifications of
regional diets – though there were as yet no fully global food tastes – and,
above all, a basis for rapid overall population growth, more than reversing
the effects of the 14th-century bubonic plague. Exchanges of domestic
animals would also have some wider consequences in lifestyles and envir-
onmental conditions.
The list is fairly straightforward. Europeans quickly brought in horses,
sheep, cattle, hogs and chickens to the Americas. They also introduced
wheat, oats, and a variety of fruits. Native Americans did not take to all of
these goods immediately; they continued, for example, to prefer corn to
wheat products. But they adapted to some of the new animals, particularly
the use of horses. Europeans who settled in the Americas ultimately devel-
oped a mixed diet, using corn products, for example, along with foods
familiar in the “Old World.” Some of the animal imports, particularly
sheep, had an adverse effect on some grasslands.
From Africa – brought by slaves or by slave traders feeding their captives
on shipboard – came yams, watermelon, okra, black-eyed peas, and some
peppers, all of which became part of Afro-American cuisine and some of
which caught on more widely.
Turkeys began to be adopted in parts of Eurasia – otherwise the Americas
had little to contribute in the animal line. Plants were another matter. Corn
and potatoes, including sweet potatoes, were particularly important because
of their caloric value. But chili peppers would catch on in parts of China
and in India. Peanuts and pumpkins also became important in several
regions, as did several varieties of American beans. Chocolate was an early
favorite. Much later – after an enduring belief that they were poisonous –
tomatoes would be added to the list. Overall it is estimated that about 30%
of the vegetables consumed globally today are of American origin.
Patterns of adoption were intriguing. Europeans – outside of the settlers –
long hesitated, believing that since American foods were not mentioned in
the Bible, they might cause disease. But corn and pumpkins spread to Africa
far more quickly. Chinese merchants learned of some of the new foods
through trade with the Philippines – the Spanish had imported American
plants in hopes of expanding the population and labor supply. Corn and
sweet potatoes caught on fairly quickly. Indian diets were also affected.
And the great global result, beginning in the 17th century, was an
increasingly rapid rate of population increase – despite the demographic
situation in Africa and the Americas. The Chinese population, for example,
about 81 million in 1400, had soared to 225 million in 1750 – due to
improved rice cultivation as well as the influx of American foods. Global
estimates are trickier, but calculations suggest about a 100% increase during
the early modern period, a far more rapid rate than in earlier centuries.
Europe would ultimately join the parade – though corn never caught on
except as a food for animals. Adoption of the potato was particularly important,
from the late 17th century onward. By the 1680s, street vendors were selling
fried potatoes in Paris – the origin of the French fry. By the 18th century, the
European population began to grow very rapidly – doubling in some cases
simply in the last half-century after 1750. Obviously, in food supply and
demography, the “Columbian exchange” proved to be a global phenomenon.
A World Economy
Interregional trade long antedated the early modern period, and many pat-
terns persisted. Established routes in the Indian Ocean, for example,
remained important, and while the Europeans muscled in, Middle Eastern,
Indian, and Southeast Asian merchants retained a considerable role. Russian
trade with Central Asia, another existing exchange, remained regionally
important. While Europeans gained a small role in East African commerce,
most of this, including the slave trade with the Middle East, followed a
familiar course.
Still, European merchants, buoyed by New World silver and improved
shipping, unquestionably stirred the pot, actively disseminating Asian goods
and some European products to a wide territory. European trading compa-
nies helped expand the market for goods like printed cotton cloth from
India (sold from Japan to Africa to Britain) or Chinese porcelains (which
became so popular in Europe that they began simply to be called “china” in
the 17th century). Huge markets developed for sugar, chocolate, and tea.
One historian has plausibly noted that sugar, dropping rapidly in price as
production expanded in the colonies, really became the first mass consumer
item dependent on international trade. Production of other traditional spices
expanded as well – the Dutch, for example, used slave labor on plantations
in Indonesia to grow nutmeg.
While Asian manufacturing continued to lead the popularity lists, some
European goods won markets as well. Guns and ammunition sold widely in
Africa and the Americas. Europe had world leadership in clock technology,
and exported both clocks and watches to Asia and the Middle East.
Russian participation in the world economy involved almost exclusive reli-
ance on Western merchants to carry goods more widely; clusters of English and
other merchants began locating in Moscow as early as the 16th century. Furs
and timber products headed the list, and then in the 18th century grain exports
began to increase (from Poland as well), aimed at helping to feed the growing
numbers of manufacturing workers in the West. From the Americas came
sugar, tobacco, timber products, and, of course, silver; the North American fur
trade actively competed with Russia, particularly after the Russian government
slapped a tax on exports early in the 18th century.
World trade levels had never been higher, and they expanded fairly
steadily. More people, and more land areas, were now involved in produ-
cing for commercial export than ever before. In some regions, like China,
India, and Western Europe, commercial prosperity also encouraged market
expansion internally as well. By the 18th century, hundreds of thousands of
workers in Europe were involved in what was called domestic manu-
facturing: working at home, usually in the countryside, producing goods
like cloth, shoes, and tools using simple, hand-powered equipment, for sale
to other parts of Europe. Even manufactured toys gained a market share:
English families, for example, could buy toy soldiers made in Holland by
the 17th century. Furniture and decorative items for the home were
another big category, but in this case produced by more skilled craftsmen.
Never before had agricultural economies generated so much commercial
activity. While many fairly self-sufficient villages still existed, even in regions
like Europe, more and more people were spending at least part of their time
producing items for sale to others; involvement with money increased from
China to New England. Several features of this global commercial activity
warrant particular attention.
Business Organization
By the 16th century, the leading European trading countries – Holland,
France, Britain – were beginning to form commercial companies – private,
but with state support – that developed unprecedented power and structure.
Here was a major first step in the kind of international business organization
that would become a standard part of the globalization process.
The focus was on managing trade not just to new colonies in North
America, like the Hudson’s Bay Company in Britain, but also with Russia
and particularly the major centers of Asia. The European big three all
developed East Indies companies, for example, each with thousands of
employees both in the home country and overseas. Previously, interregional
trade had depended heavily on kinship networks among merchants; this was
a common pattern among venturesome Arab traders, for example. But the
European model developed both greater size and a more impersonal
administration than these earlier precedents.
The size was a serious matter. The largest companies not only had con-
siderable bureaucracies and extensive shipping, but also their own military
force. The Dutch East India company took on the task of directly organiz-
ing the spice plantations in Indonesia. By the later 17th century it was also
running the Dutch stronghold around Cape Town, South Africa. Because it
sought to avoid tension with the African population, it did not depend on
local slave labor, but instead imported tens of thousands of slaves from the
Malay peninsula and other parts of Southeast Asia. These groups would
become a durable part of the South Africa population; while the Dutch
tried to forbid these workers from practicing their Islamic faith, in fact, their
religious commitment persisted.
Companies like the East India organizations developed new kinds of
bureaucratic procedures, sending out standardized instructions to coordinate
the far-flung offerings. Recruitment was in principle by merit, rather than
family ties. This was a new, rationalized business structure, and a major
innovation in global trade.
Consumerism
In the 17th century, an unusual tulip craze seized many Dutch families. The
flower had been imported from the Ottoman Empire, and for a few decades
it seemed that everyone had to have the latest fancy variety. And when
tulips were not in season, people bought paintings of them. Arguably, this
was one of the first examples of a new kind of faddish consumer passion.
Many people, even in the wealthiest regions, remained distant from
consumerism. About half the population of Western Europe depended on
meager wages or largely subsistence farming, and their buying habits did not
change; in some cases, poverty deepened. But for a growing group well
below the aristocracy, capacity and interest in acquiring attractive goods that
were not strictly necessary for survival increased steadily. Something like an
early version of modern consumerism was taking shape.
The process probably began with the market for imported exotic food pro-
ducts. In the Middle East, an unprecedented attachment to coffee first emerged
in the mid-15th century, and would spread rapidly in the new Ottoman
Empire. Coffee was native to Ethiopia. It was first imported into Yemen, just
across the sea, for religious purposes: Sufi devotees used coffee to help stay
awake at night for prayer and religious exercises. But the product soon spilled
beyond. Coffee houses sprang up in many Middle Eastern cities, where men
combined a passion for the new beverage with wide-ranging conversation.
From the Middle East, by the 17th century, the coffee house craze reached
Western Europe (and from there soon to the North American colonies);
tobacco products were often consumed in the venues as well. Interestingly,
both the Ottoman government and European officials tried to limit this new
outlet, eager to promote more local products and worried also about the
potential for spreading new political ideas. But repression failed, and consumer
commitment to coffee spread increasingly widely.
In Europe, consumer interest in tea, chocolate, and coffee served as a base
for the growing enthusiasm for chinaware – for serving implements whose
beauty would provide pleasure in their own right. By the 17th century, Eur-
opean merchants met regularly with Chinese providers – mainly in trading
centers in Southeast Asia – to agree on new designs that would best appeal to
consumer taste. By the 18th century, companies like Wedgewood, in Britain,
were producing their own china and doing careful market research to see what
new designs caught on. Women’s involvement became an interesting part of
this process as well: at least in the West, family occasions, like the evening meal,
because somewhat more elaborate and structured, giving women an additional
family role (though also an additional set of tasks).
The new kind of consumerism was probably most advanced in Western
Europe, but it had offshoots not only in the Middle East but also in urban
China, where growing profits in silver generated new spending money for
some. The Chinese government did continue to try to limit consumer
excess, punishing undue display by fines or worse. While Russia, largely
rural, was not a consumerist leader, many Russians as well as many other
Europeans eagerly seized on opportunities to buy furs, seeking winter
warmth. There was no question that, in a number of parts of the world, a
new component of popular culture was taking shape, as many people
sought new goods and new levels of comfort.
Work
A final feature of this new world economy was a growing pressure on work,
particularly for those groups involved with export production. Change here
is harder to measure than consumerism or business organization, but it is at
least highly probable, and again in a number of different regions.
The Atlantic slave system constituted an unprecedented effort to use
slavery as the main source of labor for export production of goods like
sugar. The plantation economy that spread in many parts of Latin
America, the Caribbean, and the southern colonies of British North
America emphasized driving workers hard for maximum output.
Russian serfdom became increasingly rigorous, particularly by the 18th
century, and the same was true in Poland. Landowners were given
wide powers to discipline serfs, even to execute some for misbehavior.
These changes partly represented government efforts to win aristocratic
favor, but the exactions on serfs unquestionably increased when Rus-
sian and Polish estates began producing grains for export.
In Latin America, Spanish and Portuguese landowners and mine owners
developed the equivalent of serfdom to help organize production from
indigenous American workers, tying them to estates and seizing part of
their produce. The silver mines in the Andes depended on conscripted
labor (the Spanish actually revived an Inca system here), with about one-
seventh of the male population forced into service each year.
The influx of New World silver into China allowed the government,
in the 17th century, to require that tax payments be made in this metal.
This in turn forced peasants to seek more sales on the market – the
only way they could earn silver – and, essentially, to work harder.
In the Protestant parts of Western Europe the number of festival days
declined by about 50%. The direct reason was religious: Protestants did
not believe in the power of Catholic saints and tried to cut ritual in
general. But the effect was striking: more days at work. Also in Wes-
tern Europe at least by the early 18th century, a growing number of
urban craftsmen found that their “master” artisan was treating them less
like colleagues and more like employees – and this included efforts to
press them to work harder.
Though this final example is harder to prove, a number of historians
believe that pressures on child labor began to increase in the early
modern period, in a number of regions. This would be consistent with
the larger pattern.
For more and more people were drawn into harder work because of attrac-
tive opportunities to earn more money and, perhaps, participate more fully in
consumerism. Even more widely, more and more people worked under the
direction of bosses – slave owners, landowners, even wealthier peasants or
craftsmen – who were pushing them to greater rigor in order to increase their
own profits. Here was a final facet of the emerging global economy.
Regional Inequality
One of the most important results of the world economy, and one of the
most durable – with features that remain abundantly visible today – was a
new and more extensive pattern of regional differentiation. While the
economy was truly global – only a few organized societies explicitly opted
out, with Japan the most important example – different areas faced huge
distinctions in the mixture of opportunity and constraint. Sometimes partly
by choice, often by compulsion, regional economic patterns began to vary
widely. Simply put, the rich regions tended to get richer, the poor poorer,
and it would prove very difficult to change position.
The region whose wealth increased most rapidly was undoubtedly Wes-
tern Europe. Again, this should not obscure the fact that within Europe
itself, great inequality existed; but from a regional standpoint, the case was
clear. Europeans were making money handling a fair amount of global
commerce, building and running the leading shipping systems, and increas-
ingly manufacturing some of the goods that could be sold internationally.
The slave trade itself was a huge source of profit. In turn, the Europeans
imported a range of cheaper goods, like East European grains, West Indian
sugar, and so on. The balance of trade was very much in their favor.
At the other extreme were regions that depended heavily on selling cheap
goods on the world market, often relying on coerced labor – slaves or serfs – to
keep costs down. There was money to be made in these regions too –
enriching the African merchants who sold slaves, or the American plantation
owners, or the top Russian aristocrats – but overall these areas exported more
wealth than they earned. These regions also depended on the West to provide
the ships that carried their exports, and even more to send out the merchants
and the trading companies that organized the process. Local merchant activity
was limited, and no large middle class developed. Finally, governments in these
areas tended to be weak, which meant there was little interference with foreign
merchants or the exploitation of labor. On the other hand, dependent econo-
mies could develop both in regions held as colonies – like Latin America – or
in places that were politically independent. Thus, while most of West Africa
preserved its own independent regional kingdoms, reliance on European
merchants and export profits increased steadily (among other things, breaking
the earlier focus mainly on the trans-Saharan trade with North Africa in favor
of transatlantic connections).
The stark division between profitable and dependent regions was very real,
but it does not fully describe the complex map of the early modern version of
the world economy, nor does it capture some important changes during the
period itself. Several other regional patterns require attention. Japan’s decision
around 1600 largely to isolate itself from world trade made it a special case –
even as commercial activity within Japan increased substantially. As noted ear-
lier, East African patterns were not substantially redefined.
Within Western Europe, Spanish and Portuguese economies took an
unexpected turn after the dynamism of the 16th century. The countries
simply did not develop the kind of economic range that would allow them
to take fullest advantage of their colonial position. Greater dynamism passed
northward.
North America, though not very important yet in world trade – certainly
not compared to places like the Caribbean – was an interesting case. The
southern colonies on the Atlantic coast became heavily dependent on the
production of relatively cheap goods based on the labor of enslaved people.
But the northern colonies began to develop their own merchant class and
shipbuilding capacity, making them somewhat more independent of Eur-
opean economic dominance.
Russia had its own dynamic. During most of the early modern period, it
was not heavily reliant on exports, though connections with Western mer-
chants did expand. However, there was only a small native middle class, and
in the 18th century the appetite for Western imports increased. Here the
focus was mainly on luxury goods for the wealthier segment of the aris-
tocracy – paintings, fine furniture, as well as regular trips to France or Italy.
This is turn provided the spur for increased grain exports to pay for the new
acquisitions; the nation’s involvement with the world economy began to
increase substantially, but at an overall disadvantage.
This left the great Asian empires. The Middle East retained a lively trade
tradition, with a variety of exports. However, its global position weakened
slightly, partly because so much focus shifted to transatlantic trade. In the
late 16th century, the Ottomans also lost a naval battle to Spain, weakening
though not eliminating their position in the Mediterranean. Western mer-
chants gained an increasing role, even allowed to regulate their own com-
munities. The Safavid Empire in Persia had a somewhat similar position,
and it worked actively to increase connections with Western traders.
The Chinese situation was different. The empire sought to balance an
interest in export earnings with careful control of foreign activities. China
was certainly one of the big winners in global profits, as the import of silver
demonstrated, though since the empire had been relatively prosperous
before, the impact was less noticeable than in Western Europe. The gov-
ernment granted control of the port of Macau to Portugal, and direct
Western trade was channeled through this one entry. However, Chinese
merchants also exchanged actively with their Western counterparts in
Southeast Asia. The overall policy was distinctive, and certainly ceded
greater global commercial dynamism to the Europeans, but there was no
increased dependence. By the terms of the time, the empire remained a
manufacturing powerhouse, and a profitable one.
During most of the early modern period, India’s situation resembled that
of China in many ways. Specific policies were different: traditions of gov-
ernment control were absent, and the extensive coastline made regulation of
foreign entry more difficult in any event. First Portugal, then Britain, Hol-
land, and France mounted extensive merchant operations. However, the
manufacturing base was strong, and India was second to China in overall
earnings in silver.
The tide began to turn somewhat in the 18th century. The authority of
the subcontinent’s leading empire, the Mughals, began to slip. Britain,
suddenly eager to develop its own cotton manufacturing, imposed steep
tariffs on Indian imports, hoping to force India to focus more on the export
of spices, gold, and other essentially raw materials. Then, in the Seven Years
War between Britain and France, 1756–63, Britain managed to unseat their
French rivals on the subcontinent, and its East India Company began to
gain greater control. Though overall activity remained varied – this was not
a simple case of dependence; in 1800, the region still had a 23% share of the
world economy, though down from 27% in 1700 – India’s economic sta-
ture suffered in the process.
The global economic map, even at the end of the early modern period,
was clearly complicated. It is important not to oversimplify, particularly in
dealing with Asia. On the whole, however, inequalities among regions were
increasing, and this proved to be a powerful legacy for the future.
The Environment
Both population increase and the growing appetite for commercial exploita-
tion accelerated various kinds of environmental change. Some critics argue that
Western attitudes were particularly heedless; others simply note that many
societies developed interests in increasing output, often with scant attention to
environmental consequences. Changes in the early modern period were far
more modest than those that would result from industrialization from the 19th
century onward, but they may have set the trend in motion.
Thus, the pace of clearing traditional forests accelerated, to make room
for more agriculture and, in some places, to provide timber for shipbuilding
and household heating. In Britain, a supply problem actually developed by
the 18th century because of the depletion of woodlands. Worldwide,
whereas in 1700 about 25% of the world’s forests had been cut down, by
1850 this had advanced to a full 50%. In Latin America alone, forest clear-
ances increased fivefold between 1650 and 1750. Introduction of sheep to
places like Mexico reduced grasslands and caused new problems of erosion.
Many animal species were reduced, by the quest for furs and also heavy
fishing. Cod supplies in the North Atlantic began to dwindle; the fish, once
salted, was widely sought as a cheap food for enslaved people in the
Americas, as well as for other uses. More efficient whaling cut into existing
numbers, as new forms of deep-sea whaling developed. Russian fur harvests
actually threatened supplies, forcing trappers to push farther east in Siberia
and then even cross into Alaska seeking game. Populations of animals like
beavers suffered greatly in North America.
At least two species were eliminated altogether. The dodo bird, a land-
based fowl on the island of Mauritius, in the Indian Ocean, breathed its last
in the later 17th century. Sailors had killed it for food, and also the intro-
duction of cats to the island – another results of European contact – added
to the problem. Then in the mid-18th century a key species of sea cow
disappeared, in this case, because of over-hunting for fur and oils.
These were important developments. They did not yet affect atmospheric
quality except around a few cities, like London (popularly called “the
Smoke”), where wood-burning fireplaces proliferated. But a new pattern
was set in motion, without yet provoking widespread concern.
Legacy
Some of the key developments in the global exchanges of the early modern
period sit firmly in the past. The phenomenon of contact between groups
of people with very different disease experience no longer occurs, because
interactions have become so extensive. In a broader sense some results are
still with us, in the reduced position of indigenous peoples in the Americas,
but the direct connection is gone.
Slavery is another matter. Widespread institutional slavery is also gone,
but the experiences and deep prejudices it generated form a deep set of
problems in many contemporary societies.
Other contemporary configurations show how the early modern period is
world history’s day before yesterday. The various patterns of adaptation to
the food exchanges are fundamental to current regional diets, though there
have been further changes since. Consumerism is far different today than it
was three hundred years ago, but the links are palpable, including the
popularity of modern equivalents to the coffee house.
The world economy itself leaves abundant trace, though some of the
continuities are beginning to yield. Any list of richest nations includes the
European societies that took clearest advantage of new opportunities during
the early modern centuries. Conversely, some of the regions pressed into
the more dependent position a few centuries ago are still struggling. The
dependence of the Russian economy on a limited category of exports
remains visible, though oil and gas have largely replaced furs and grains. As
with all big continuities, it is important to be careful: legacies mix with
significant change. But the direct precedents are clear enough – including
the acceleration of global connections but also the fact that regional eco-
nomic inequalities prove very difficult to correct.
Further Reading
A classic statement on the Columbian exchange is Alfred Crosby, The
Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (2003);
see also Jeffrey Pilcher, Food in World History, 2nd edn. (2017). On the
slave trade, David Eltis, Stanley Engerman, David Richardson, and Craig
Perry, The Cambridge World History of Slavery, vol. 2 (2021).
On trade patterns, Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World That
Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present
(2012); Carlo Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires: Technological Innovation
and the Early Phases of European Expansion, 1400–1700 (1985); Jane
Hooper, Feeding Globalization: Madagascar and Provisioning Trade, 1600–
1800 (2017). On regional inequalities, see Immanuel Wallerstein, who
has a summary book that came out in 2004: World-Systems Analysis: An
Introduction. For a vivid statement of China’s economic power, André
Gunder Frank, ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age (1998).
On consumerism, Peter Stearns, Consumerism in World History, 2nd edn. (2006).
On environmental change, Stephen Mosley, The Environment in World History
(2010); Elinor Melville, A Plague of Sheep (1997); Immanuel Wallerstein
World Inequality (1975); Mark Kurlansky, Cod: A Biography of the Fish that
Changed the World (1998); Laurent Testot, Cataclysms: An Environmental
History of Humanity (2020).
8 New Empires, New Ideas
Regional Developments in the Early
Modern Period
Changes in the world’s major regions during the early modern period were
closely connected to the global interactions. But separate dynamics were
involved as well. Among other things, the growing global linkages did not,
with a few important exceptions, carry direct cultural baggage. The kinds of
cultural extensions that had been such a key part of the postclassical cen-
turies now yielded to a number of vigorous efforts to maintain separate
profiles. The spread of Christianity to the Americas was an important
exception, but it also stood apart from basic trends in much of Africa, Asia,
and Europe, where a combination of continuities from the past and more
strictly regional developments predominated in the domain of core beliefs
and styles.
This was also an age of new empires – not just the European overseas
ventures, but a vital set of expansions in India, in both eastern and western
sections of the Middle East, and in Russia. The use of gunpowder under-
wrote the new territorial regimes, but in other respects they varied
considerably.
The early modern period also provides an opportunity to update key
regional profiles on the eve of the more decisive changes associated with
industrialization – again, in association with different positions in the world
economy (Map 8.1). Regional differences also drive home the important
point that Western influence and example by no means predominated in
the world as a whole, despite the West’s military surge and commercial
dynamism.
The Latin American civilization that took shape in this period was largely
new, though with significant heritage from earlier societies. Other regions
were more recognizable from the past. But this was a period of major
changes in the characteristics of both Eastern and Western Europe, and also
Japan. The European colonies on the Atlantic coast of North America also
need to be fitted into the civilization roster. Continuities were in some ways
more decisive in much of Asia and Africa, with the obvious exception of
the impact of global trade; but considerable political change occurred, and
there were interesting new developments and questions. All of this
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-9
100 New Empires: Regional Developments
Map 8.1 The world in 1763

New Empires: Regional Developments 101
generates further opportunities for comparison as well, beyond the patterns
suggested in the different positions in the world economy.
We will begin with developments in Western Europe, which were sub-
stantial against the backdrop of prior traditions in the region; Latin America
and Russia, other centers of major change, also had significant interactions
with Western Europe that went beyond the trade connections. Asian and
African developments were more self-contained, though some decisions
about managing the West were involved.
The West
Highlights
Gutenberg printing press, 1455; Protestant Reformation, 1517ff; religious
wars, Treaty of Westphalia, 1550–1648; Copernicus’ discoveries, rise of
science, 1543ff; Louis XIV and absolute monarchy in France, 1643–1715;
parliamentary monarchy in Britain, 1688–89; the Enlightenment, 1730ff;
invention of flying shuttle for weaving, 1733.
As a regional civilization, the West had previously been defined by the role
of Catholic Christianity, by decentralized and often belligerent political
structures, and (during the Mongol era) by an unusual eagerness to learn
from other societies.
These characteristics shifted considerably between 1450 and 1750. Chris-
tianity was still vital but somewhat less so, and it had split within the West.
Political centralization had increased in many individual countries, though
the West was still deeply divided among frequently warring states. The old
parliamentary tradition had revived in two countries, Britain and Holland,
but it was atypical. Finally, eagerness to learn from other places had been
replaced by a growing sense of superiority over the rest of the world. It was
still possible to define a Western civilization, but on rather different terms.
Cultural parameters had been substantially redefined.
Change built gradually, increasingly linked to growing wealth from
global and internal trade. Serfdom had been declining before and this con-
tinued. The labor system still survived in some rural areas by 1750, but
peasants in many regions gained greater independence. Growing numbers of
people worked for a money payment. The expanding ranks of domestic
manufacturing workers, for example, typically were paid by commercial
agents who picked up their product – woollen cloth, for example – to take
it for sale or distribution from an urban center. At the same time the ranks
of the poor probably increased – people who had little or no land of their
own. But it was a sign of changing values that attitudes toward the poor
stiffened, with growing resentment against any need for charity; many
people now argued that the poor had only themselves to blame, for not
working hard enough. This was a new attitude, and it lingers today.
City growth was another symptom of economic change, and though the
majority of the population still lived in the countryside, the influence of
urban centers expanded. Paris, with over half a million residents by the 18th
century, had doubled its size during the early modern period. London grew
even more substantially; with about 750,000 people by 1760, it had passed
Constantinople (700,000), though it was still short of Beijing, China’s lar-
gest agglomeration, which had over 900,000.
Western Culture
Over the early modern centuries as a whole, cultural change was probably
the most striking feature of the Western experience – along with economic
change – though the path was complicated.
In the later 15th century, the implications of the Renaissance continued
to develop, reaching beyond Italy. Artistic styles emphasized more classical
themes, and moved away from strictly religious subject matter. Literature in
vernacular languages saw a huge boost, and some of the founding figures
would emerge from this trend in the ensuing decades: Shakespeare in Eng-
land, for example, or Cervantes in Spain.
The advent of printing was a major development, adapted from the inno-
vations previously imported from East Asia. Most early output continued to be
devoted to religious materials, including the Bible, but other works were
published, including a growing number of manuals aimed at teaching about
production techniques. European literacy gradually increased, and, by the 18th
century, Western Europe had one of the highest rates in the world, though
with a substantial gender imbalance favoring men.
The Protestant Reformation, launched by the German monk Martin
Luther in 1517, was a huge disruption, with diverse results. Reformation
leaders believed that the Catholic Church had drifted from the true Chris-
tian doctrine, with too many rituals and too much papal control and wealth.
They attacked the notion that priests should be celibate or served as vessels
of divine grace, instead urging that ordinary people must cultivate their
faith. Promotion of Bible reading was another spur to literacy among Pro-
testant groups. Monasteries were another target of attack. Protestant leaders
insisted that theirs was the true doctrine – there was no initial movement
away from the idea that there should be one true Christianity – but they
refused to make concessions to the Church.
The Protestant rebellion caught on in many areas, both because many
ordinary people found the doctrines compelling and because some regional
leaders adopted the new doctrines, sometimes eager for greater indepen-
dence from Church control. However, several major Protestant groups
developed: Luther’s followers prevailed largely in parts of Germany and
Scandinavia, but another, even more radical leader, Jean Calvin, inspired
many followers in parts of Switzerland, France, the Low Countries, and
Britain. Yet another denomination, the Church of England, won royal
support. At the same time Catholic leaders resisted fiercely, working as well
to reform some practices within the Church. A new monastic, order, the
Jesuits, sponsored a vigorous Catholic educational effort while also sup-
porting political leaders who defended the Church. Catholicism continued
to prevail in many parts of Western Europe.
During the 16th century and beyond, the Reformation and the Catholic
response had many results, not all of them anticipated by reformers them-
selves. A series of brutal religious wars engulfed many parts of Europe,
showing the intensity of the various camps. These ultimately confirmed the
fact that Europe was no longer religiously united: no single group could
claim Christian primacy. In the long run, the religious wars and divisions
convinced some people that religion itself needed to be reconsidered, given
lower priority in the interests of greater peace and some grudging tolerance.
Deep commitments remained, but some groups pulled back a bit. This
could also create more space for renewed attention to the more secular
interests of the Renaissance tradition.
Other consequences went beyond the purely religious realm, including
the potentially diverse results of greater literacy. Protestant regions cut back
religious festival days, contributing to the greater intensity of work. Family
life gained greater attention. Protestants vigorously contested the idea that
celibacy was a higher spiritual state: Luther himself pointedly married a
former nun. This meant that the family gained new prestige; many Protes-
tants regarded it, under the leadership of pious husbands and fathers, as the
source of basic moral training. By the 17th century, Protestant writers were
stressing the importance of a positive family life, which meant that husbands
should pay some attention to the needs of their wives.
Traditional beliefs in magic began to crumble. Both Catholic and Pro-
testant leaders took advantage of religious ferment finally to attack ideas of
magic and witchcraft as un-Christian. The effort took time; indeed, during
much of the early modern period religious turmoil helped promote a new
series of vicious attacks on accused witches. By the 18th century, however,
official support for witchcraft trials had ended, and many people – though
not all – turned away from older superstitions.
The collapse of religious unity in Western Europe was a major turning
point, with political and social as well as cultural implications. Catholic as
well as Protestant regions were involved in many of the changes.
Science
From the later postclassical centuries onward, interest in science had been
increasing in many parts of Western Europe, inspired in part by interactions with
the Arab world. As early as the 13th century, several scholars advanced the sci-
ence of optics, with a very practical result in the development of reading glasses.
In the mid-16th century a Polish monk, Nicolaus Copernicus, used
careful geometric calculations to claim that the Earth revolved around the
sun, rather than vice versa – as the Western scientific tradition had long
contended. Scientists in other places had known this for a long time –
including Mayan scholars. And Arab mathematicians had advanced similar
geometric formulas just a century before, which Copernicus may have been
aware of. But in European science his claim was a bombshell, as it became
more widely known by around 1600. It seemed to demonstrate that new
knowledge could be superior to old – even that of the revered ancient
Greeks. And it certainly encouraged further observation and experiment in
physics and astronomy. This would be aided by technical advances in tele-
scopes (and also microscopes).
The result, by the 17th century, was a steady series of discoveries, from
Poland to England, Denmark to Italy. Principles of gravity were demon-
strated. The circulation of blood in the human body was explored, with the
heart as central pumping station. Chemical research yielded important
findings about the circulation of gasses. Much of this work was capped in
1687 when Isaac Newton, in England, issued decisive findings about the
behavior of objects in motion, on Earth and in the universe alike.
All this was accompanied by sweeping claims about the power of human
reason – the French philosopher Descartes boldly proclaimed, “I think,
therefore I am” – and others touted the capacity of scientific research to
promote better technology.
The accumulation added up to a Scientific Revolution. The principles
were these: physical nature is orderly, and can be understood by careful
thought and experiment, without a requirement of faith; individual scien-
tists like Newton were in fact pious Christians, but they largely separated
their religion from their scientific research. And some other scholars, less
respectful, busily went to work attacking religious “superstitions,” such as a
belief in miracles (which, after all, were random and disorderly). Next,
much old knowledge is inaccurate; new thinking may be better. And,
finally, science is progressing rapidly and has come to be the primary source
of understanding. This approach was truly revolutionary in Western culture,
and it elevated science to a position it had never maintained in other cul-
tures as well.
The new work was widely hailed. It was promoted and propagated
through a host of new scientific organizations established in most Western
countries – like the British Royal Society. Findings were quickly popular-
ized – printing and literacy again – and many eager readers also discussed
the findings in places like the coffee shops. This was not an intellectual
movement alone, and would help reshape many popular attitudes.
Finally, the ideas began to be extended to other areas, beyond the phy-
sical sciences. At the end of the 17th century, John Locke, who also wrote
about political reform, issued a book On Human Understanding in which he
extolled the power of human reason. Children, in his view, were born as
“blank slates”; they were not tainted by sin as Protestants maintained. They
could learn, and education should be a prime responsibility of society and
family alike. Through reason and education, individuals and humanity at
large might steadily progress.
The result of this kind of thinking, along with the steady growth of sci-
entific research, marked the beginning of a considerable remaking of Wes-
tern culture. Many people did not participate; despite attacks on magic, for
example, it continued to attract adherents. Some religious leaders objected
strongly to the new work, and their voices could still count. Indeed, debates
over science and its authority continue in the West even today. On balance,
however, orientations began to shift.
The Enlightenment
The final early modern phase of the restructuring of Western culture took
shape in the Enlightenment of the 18th century, another Western-wide
movement that reached well beyond intellectuals alone. One symptom: for
the first time some authors, furthering Enlightenment values, began to be
able to support themselves by selling their books to the public, rather than
depending on patronage from aristocrats or kings.
Enlightenment writers built on the Scientific Revolution in many ways –
aided by the fact that additional scientific discoveries continued, in areas like
chemistry with work on the properties of oxygen. They actively disseminated
scientific findings. New projects included encyclopedias, on the principle that
human learning could be summed up and made widely available.
In all their work, Enlightenment writers insisted that science and human
reason were the source of all necessary knowledge; there might still be a
God, but elaborate faith was not needed. Through use of reason, humanity
could steadily advance; Enlightenment thinkers promoted an often fervent
belief in progress. Not only knowledge but human well-being in turn were
the measures of progress: people could and should aspire to better lives on
this earth, and comforts and pleasures were both valid and desirable. A
striking interest arose in studying human longevity, with wide belief that
science should be able to push back the boundaries of death.
Enlightenment assumptions encouraged the new study of human and
social behavior, and most of what are now called the social sciences took
shape in the 18th century. Human psychology, but also the principles of
economic activity, could be researched and calculated, with results that
would promote knowledge and progress alike.
Finally, Enlightenment writers and popularizers devoted great attention to
political reform, though with diverse results. Some pinned hopes on pro-
gressive rule from the top, with “enlightened despots” cutting back the
powers of churches and promoting economic and social advance. Others
began to think about the importance of a popular voice in politics, some-
times urging revolution and democracy. Intellectual liberty was widely
supported; religious intolerance must be replaced by wide freedoms for press
and speech. Aristocracies were condemned as parasites on the hard work of
the middle classes and even ordinary people. Traditional punishments must
also be reviewed, in favor of limiting cruelty and even attacking the use of
shame for its damage to human dignity. Here, clearly – the enlightened
despot theme aside – was the intellectual basis for what would later be
called liberalism.
The Enlightenment message and the calls for sweeping reform were not
the only game in town. Religious belief pulled many Westerners in other
directions, and indeed new and passionate versions of Christianity devel-
oped in the 18th century, as in the emergence of Methodism. Romantic
novels became popular at this time as well – another sign of literacy – and
while they did not necessarily dispute the Enlightenment, they pulled
readers into a greater interest in emotions like love. And many rural people,
often still illiterate, simply remained outside the orbit of cultural change.
But thanks to the Enlightenment and science, but also greater con-
sumerism and commercial activity, many cultural habits began to change by
the later 18th century. Individualism advanced: families began to seek more
distinctive individual names for their offspring, rather than simply using
ancestors or the Bible as guides. A movement arose to locate cemeteries
farther from the center of town, both because of a new belief that they
might spread disease – in a progressive society, death should be pushed
back – and because people should not be routinely reminded of death. The
traditional use of shame in social discipline was attacked; one American
doctor even proclaimed that shaming someone was “worse than death.”
Many young couples began to insist that they should choose their romantic
partners, rather than bowing to arrangements their parents made; and law
courts in places like Switzerland began ruling that if a young man or
woman could show that they could never love a partner their parents had
picked out, they should not have to marry. All of this suggested far more
than a change of styles and themes at the top of the cultural ladder, but a
considerable recasting of basic assumptions.
Finally, it was this recasting, plus the widespread acceptance of Enlight-
enment themes, that now, along with some elements of Christianity, pro-
vided cultural definition for “the West.” This definition differed from the
past, and also from the cultural underpinnings of many other regional civi-
lizations at the time.
Political Change
Political change in Western society during the early modern centuries was
considerable, though less important ultimately than what was going on in
the economy and cultural life. Furthermore, several key changes essentially
involved efforts to generate political capacities that other societies, like
China, had introduced far earlier – most obviously in efforts to expand state
functions and develop more effective bureaucracies. It is important to keep
in mind that many innovations, though vital in the Western context, were
not really original.
Finally, the Western experience continued to be marked by frequent
warfare, in a society that not only remained divided but whose leaders often
delighted at seizing opportunities for aggression, Religious change added to
this mix for over a century as well, while colonial rivalries contributed over
an even longer span. France, Spain, and Britain were the major players,
along with the Habsburg Empire that combined Austrian, Hungarian, and
Slavic territories. Germany and Italy remained disunited, more attacked than
attackers. Sweden and the Netherlands played some role.
One key theme, already developing, involved attempts to strengthen
royal power at the expense of aristocracies, though nowhere had this pro-
cess been completed even by the 18th century. Kings began to build
showier palaces and other monuments to display their strength. They
worked to recruit some bureaucrats who would depend on them, rather
than aristocratic birth. By the 17th century this process began to include
tapping some businessmen with relevant expertise in areas like finance; and
some training was established for engineers who could oversee public works
and even military activities like fort-building. Growing use of gunpowder
helped kings reduce aristocratic strongholds; castles no longer counted for as
much as they had in the past. Aristocrats still maintained large estates and
social prestige, but the balance shifted to some extent.
By the 1520s, political attention in much of Europe shifted to the intense
conflict between Protestants and Catholics, where both monarchs and aris-
tocrats often eagerly took sides. Bitter fighting broke out in Germany,
France, and elsewhere; Holland, largely Protestant, faced off against Catho-
lic Spain which controlled the territory. Millions of people died – two
million in the French religious wars alone.
The conflicts came to a head in the Thirty Years War in Germany, 1618–
48. German Protestants were backed by Sweden and Britain; Catholics
drew support from Spain and the Habsburg Empire. France, showing that
religion wasn’t everything and bitterly hostile to Spanish power, sided with
the Protestants. About a quarter of the German population died during the
war. Finally, exhausted, the parties agreed to cease fighting in 1648 and
signed the Treaty of Westphalia, which installed a principle of limited tol-
erance. German states could choose to be either Protestant or Catholic, and
minorities were given safe passage to leave. Holland won independence.
This important treaty ended major religious wars in Europe – though kings
soon found other reasons to fight – and boosted the idea of tolerance more
generally.
Britain had its own internal conflicts, involving Protestants vs. Catholics but
also parliamentary backers against the king. Civil war raged in mid-century,
and then a later settlement was reached in 1688–89. Parliament gained major
authority over royal power, while various Protestant groups – though not yet
Catholics – won considerable tolerance. Britain, along with Holland, served as
major examples of a parliamentary monarchy – parliamentary membership
decided by voters who were still a minority of the population; but while
Enlightenment writers praised the model, it remained exceptional at the time.
Absolute Monarchy
The more characteristic development in the 17th century, as religious
strife eased, was the idea of a strong monarchy, best exemplified by pow-
erful France. The French king further reduced aristocratic power, without
eliminating it. The central government began to send bureaucrats into
outlying regions to enforce the rules of the French state. The state itself
become more active, undertaking more public works like roads and canals,
supporting the arts, even trying to standardize the French language. Bor-
ders with other countries, now enforced by state officials, became more
significant. More and more bureaucrats were recruited among talented
commoners, who would owe their loyalty to the king. The idea that the
king was absolute was promoted by statements from leading exemplars
like Louis XIV, who proclaimed “the state is me” – though this was an
exaggeration. But the model did spread to other states, particularly in
central Europe.
A key purpose of this state centered on war. A doctrine called mercantilism
arose that saw the major European states in permanent competition, arguing
that economic rivalry as well as military conflict was central to the effort.
Governments should try to promote their national economies, through
measures like public works and regulations, seeking to export as much as
possible while importing little. Support for acquiring and maintaining
colonies followed from this doctrine. But so did recurrent warfare, though
now less bloody than when religion was involved. France and Britain
became perennial rivals – with Britain finally winning out as a colonial
power in the Seven Years War (1756–63) – and several central European
states squared off as well.
Political changes like a larger bureaucracy, more central control and more
state functions put Western Europe on a path already established in parts of
Asia. One feature was more distinctive, linked to the widespread royal
appetite for war. Several European countries, headed by France and Britain,
were beginning to take on characteristics that would later feed into the idea
of the nation state. That is, the boundaries of the state overlapped with cul-
tural features like a shared majority language, a majority religion, a common
history – with both politics and culture differentiated from other, neigh-
boring nation states. The cultural-political mix could be a powerful one,
particularly in a civilization that was so divided and so belligerent. An out-
growth of the nation state – insistence on nationalism or national loyalty –
was not yet in play, and much of Europe was still not organized on nation
state principles. But a model was emerging.
What about North America?
Was Western civilization beginning to spread beyond Western Europe?
This would become a vital question in world history – it is a valid question
still today – and it began to be posed in the early modern period.
The British colonies of North America were the key case in point. They
were not very important in global terms: even by 1750, the population was
small, and while economic activities were interesting, the region did not yet
play a major role in global exports. But the majority of European colonials
eagerly installed Protestantism and then embraced many of the values of the
Enlightenment during the 18th century, including a growing interest in
science. Ideas of religious tolerance began to circulate, though as in Europe
they were still tentative. Colonial legislatures also provided parliamentary
experience.
Important distinctions existed as well. Some of the colonies depended
heavily on slavery. Interactions with Native Americans, and frequent con-
flict, influenced both political and cultural experience. Racist attitudes were
arguably stronger than in Western Europe itself, where contacts were more
remote. Also the region did not yet afford major artistic activity, depending
on European imports. And no legally privileged aristocracy emerged,
though there was a landed upper class in several colonies. So was this a
distinctive outpost of Western civilization, or the beginnings of something
different amid undeniable Western influence?
Latin America
Highlights
Treaty of Tordesillas divides South America between Spain and Portugal,
1494; conquest of Mexico, 1519–24; fall of the Incas in Peru, 1533;
Bourbon political reforms, 1759ff.
Latin American civilization fused elements from Spain and Portugal, parti-
cularly with Catholic missionary activity, with Native American heritage.
Politically the big news was the decapitation of the Native American
empires, the Aztecs and Incas, and the establishment of Spanish and Portu-
guese colonial regimes. The economy was increasingly shaped by export
production, in agriculture and mining, and the imposition of systems of
forced labor, including the importation of millions of enslaved people from
Africa.
Within these contours, however, a number of other developments took
place. Demography was reshaped through the intermingling of different
population segments. Culture reflected European influence, not only in
religion, but also its own intriguing mixture with artistic styles and religious
beliefs from the region itself.
Colonial conquest was not an overnight affair, despite surprising early
success in toppling the existing imperial governments in Central America
and the Andes. Spanish and Portuguese penetration into the interior took
many decades. Outright rebellion by Native Americans was a recurrent
problem in several areas; there was also a major rising in Peru much later, at
the end of the 18th century, though it was put down. In contrast to colo-
nial efforts in some other places – including North America – great power
rivalry was not a major issue on the Latin American continent. Anticipating
colonial expansion and eager to promote Catholicism, the Pope facilitated a
mutual treaty (the Treaty of Tordesillas) in 1496 that gave Brazil to Portu-
gal, the rest to Spain. Inter-state warfare has never been a major feature of
Latin American history.
The situation was different in the Caribbean, where Britain, France, and
Holland wrested major holdings away from Spain after the 16th century,
along with a few coastal areas in Latin America proper.
Political and Social Change

Quickly aware of the economic promise of the Americas, Spain sketched a
government structure quite early on, sending a variety of officials under
royal control. Spain also early established a court system, and developed
legal codes based on Spanish precedent. Over time, separate vice-royalties
were set up to cover the major holdings on the continent, with centers in
Mexico (covering territory that included major sections of what is now the
southeast in the United States), plus four large regional units in South
America.
Colonial administrations paid great attention to taxes and revenues,
eager to promote profitable trade while supporting the administrative
functions. Actual government outreach was often limited, however, par-
ticularly beyond the scattered cities in which European settlers often
concentrated. This resulted in considerable autonomy for many local vil-
lages; for the new colonial landlords; and for activities by the Catholic
Church. Colonial administration was further complicated in the 17th
century, as direct Spanish control weakened and many Creoles – native-
born people of European origin – took over many functions. Government
deterioration, including substantial corruption, sparked reform efforts in
the later 18th century, called the Bourbon reforms after the name of
Spain’s new royal house: leading posts were now confined to personnel
sent directly from Spain. (A similar current developed in Portuguese
Brazil.) Many abuses were corrected, and the reforms increased profit-
ability for Spain but also for a growing commercial middle class in some
Latin American cities. However, the changes angered many Creoles, now
excluded from political power.
Economy and Population
The core of the societies taking shape in Latin America did not depend on
political systems, but on economic arrangements, the evolving population
structure, and changes and continuities in culture.
With the exception of some government officials, and Catholic mis-
sionaries, many of the Europeans who poured into Latin America from the
early 16th century onward – this would involve about 1.8 million Spaniards
up through the 18th century, not a huge number given the size of the ter-
ritory involved – were adventurers, eager to make their fortune. While
there were various specific ways to do this, the leading opportunities
involved seizure of land from native populations; reliance on coerced labor,
either outright slavery or, for Native Americans, a variant of serfdom; and
development of low-cost items for export.
Specific opportunities varied. Brazilian plantations long specialized in
sugar production, though they had competition from the Caribbean. Then
in the late 17th century gold was discovered, and a major gold rush exten-
ded well into the next century – also stimulating the development of Rio
de Janeiro, which became the colonial capital. In the Andes, sheep were
introduced – at some cost to the environment – and a local woolen industry
developed. Silver was discovered both in Mexico and in the Andes at Potosi
(in what is now Bolivia), and the Spanish set up elaborate shipping
arrangements to export the product to other parts of the world. Many sec-
tors of the colonies continued to concentrate on subsistence, village-based
agriculture, and Latin America remained a predominantly agrarian society
overall. But the most intense colonial interest centered on the expanding
estates and the mines.
This was where, in turn, various systems of labor developed, spurred by
Spanish and Portuguese need to compensate for rapid population decline.
At first, the conquerors forced many Native Americans to work while also
taxing them; and forced labor was a vital source for the silver mines. The
colonial government did ban outright slavery for the natives, and curbed
some other abuses. Over time, many colonists concentrated on developing
large estates, or haciendas, relying on low-paid native or mixed-blood
workers. The estates among other things provided supplies to the huge
mining industry, in both the major locations, while supporting an affluent
and powerful landlord class. Monasteries, as they fanned out with Spanish
missionary efforts, also forced workers into service for construction and
farming.
A complex population structure played a considerable role in under-
pinning Latin American society. Despite disease, clusters of native peoples
persisted, particularly in Central America and the Andes. But increasingly
the largest single population segment – about 40% by 1750 – consisted of
people of mixed European and native ancestry, or mestizos. Atop them were
the Creoles, proud of their pure (or fairly pure) European blood, as well as
the officials sent out from Spain and Portugal. A significant African slave
population formed the final component, particularly in the Caribbean and
Brazil but with scatterings elsewhere; and a sizable number of freed people
of color emerged as well, the result of slaves who had been liberated or who
had been able to purchase their freedom. Race would continue to factor
into social position, and while this did not prevent mobility, as one visitor
noted (with some exaggeration), “In Latin America, every white is a
gentleman.”
Latin American civilization has changed greatly since the early modern
period, but even today the society is noteworthy for a comparatively high
level of social and economic inequality, along with the racial component.
The basis was clearly set in the colonial period.
Family structure divided just as the population did, and here was another
durable component of Latin American society. Spaniards criticized many
indigenous family practices, and did modify some habits. Upper-class families
imported many European standards directly. But one of the big impacts of
the colonists on family structures involved high rates of illegitimate births – a
third or more in some cases. Spanish immigrants were disproportionately
male, and often took advantage of indigenous women – one of the sources of
the mestizo population. In turn, many mothers, in villages and cities alike,
provided some mutual assistance in raising children – another legacy that
would persist into the 20th century.
Culture
As Spanish and Portuguese conquest undermined indigenous political and
social structures, it was hardly surprising that cultural styles and beliefs
changed as well. Many Europeans justified their conquests by claiming cul-
tural superiority over native peoples, and while the mission of spreading
Catholic Christianity was sometimes partly a veneer over economic exploi-
tation, sincere commitment was involved as well.
One clear result, as colonial control deepened, was an upper-class culture
that was essentially European. Colonial cities were built in the reigning
styles back home, including both churches and government buildings. Some
religious art also emerged. Printing presses were introduced in the 16th
century and poured out Catholic treatises along with some scientific and
literary work. Catholic clergy also established a number of schools and sev-
eral universities. Further, the Church set up a court system designed to
assure religious orthodoxy, and while indigenous people were exempt, the
effort did limit opportunities for dissent – including Protestantism.
Efforts at religious conversion proved to be more complicated. Many
parts of Latin America became something of a case study in the process
known as syncretism, where two cultural systems generate a blending of ideas
and symbols. Missionaries and priests were spread thinly over a large area,
and compromise was almost inevitable. The result proved to be a vital
feature of Latin American culture and identity, particularly beneath the
upper-class level, and a source of considerable creativity as well. Where
there was a large population of African origin, as in Brazil or the Caribbean,
another set of beliefs and traditions added to the mix.
Both Mexico and the Andes region provided vivid examples of syncret-
ism, though it is important to remember that these were areas with a par-
ticularly large surviving indigenous population with vivid memories of
previous beliefs and practices. To be sure, as early as 1513, the Spanish king
proclaimed: “With the help of God we will use force against you, declaring
war from all sides and with all possible measures, and we shall bind you to the
yoke of the Church … unless you freely convert.” And indeed whenever a
village was conquered, a priest would read out basic “Requirements” to the
population, laying out the core principles of Christianity. Local shrines were
often destroyed, and some torture was used on local leaders.
Other local officials, called fiscales, were appointed to assist local priests, again
to extend meager personnel resources. And the fiscales, predictably enough,
proved adept at using Catholic practices to preserve many religious customs. For
their part, Spanish authorities were reluctant to press orthodoxy too far, for fear
of popular resistance or worse. And indeed there were some cases of rebellion
when the government pushed too far against what it called “idolatry.”
Compromise, and often very gradual change, provided the more
common pattern. In the Andes, religious symbols from the past were simply
incorporated into Catholicism, with religious processions winding around
earlier holy sites – a practice that continues to the present day. Inca customs
of periodically parading mummified figures to attract crowds of the faithful
were blended into worship of Catholic saints.
In Central America, the cross had already been used as a religious symbol,
which facilitated transitions to Catholicism. Deep beliefs in a goddess of
fertility, Tonantzin, connected fairly readily with worship of Mary, the
mother of Jesus. Stories of miracles associated with Mary merged with older
beliefs about the powers of Tonantzin. Worship at one site, for Our Lady of
Guadalupe, inspired some of the largest pilgrimages in the Catholic world,
again because of the combined ideas involved. Accounts of miraculous cures
by Our Lady began to circulate in the Aztec languages as early as the 16th
century (and some Spanish critics noted that many people continued to
refer to Mary as Tonantzin). Clearly, it became difficult to sort out where
old faith ended and the new began.
Compromises of this sort also provided considerable room for applying
local artistic traditions to the new faith, not primarily in the great urban
churches, but in village and neighborhood settings. Designs and colors often
preserved earlier tastes. The same blending applied to ordinary styles of dress
and food choices. Men were required to wear pants rather than customary
loincloths, but otherwise old habits often persevered.
Syncretism of this sort requires some careful balance. Europeanized upper
classes and religious authorities periodically lamented the cultural
backwardness and traditionalism of ordinary people – another tension that
would last, along with race and class – but the combination of continuity
and change could be productive as well.
****
The importance of Western influence and Western interaction with Latin
America raises challenging questions about defining civilization boundary lines:
was Latin America becoming essentially Western? Latin American historians have
debated this as a serious issue, where a final decision could go either way. A similar
question of course applies to British North America, where the overlap may have
been even more significant. For Latin America, the question may become more
complicated after the colonial period, for conditions would change further; but
the early modern centuries at least created a basis for discussion.
Russia
Highlights
Moscow territory free from Mongol control, 1462; Ivan the Terrible, first to
use title as tsar, 1533–84; Russian pioneers reach Pacific, 1637; Peter the
Great and westernization, 1789–1825; Catherine the Great, 1762–96;
Pugachev revolt, 1773–75.
The early modern period was foundational in many respects for Russia and
some other areas of Eastern Europe, though East European culture built on
earlier characteristics, most notably in the religious realm. Russia was deeply
affected not only by the Mongol period, which generated a fierce desire to
gain and preserve independence, but also by the disappearance of the
Byzantine Empire, which left the country as a leader in Orthodox Chris-
tianity and also disrupted traditional trading links.
The region was not united, though Russia’s position became increasingly
important. Significant kingdoms arose in places like Poland, while the
Ottoman Empire pressed through the Balkans and into Hungary. Several
areas, again including Poland and Hungary, were Catholic rather than
Orthodox, while under the Ottomans a Muslim minority emerged in the
Balkans. Poland also became noteworthy for a tolerant policy toward Jews,
with a substantial Jewish minority developing as a result. On the other
hand, some broad commonalities emerged in social and economic struc-
tures, particularly a continued emphasis on agriculture – rather than the
kind of rapid commercial development that was occurring in Western
Europe – and on large estates controlled by the aristocracy.
Religious continuity in Russia showed in the continued hold of Ortho-
dox Christianity, despite a few disruptions around reform efforts in the 17th
century. Russia experienced nothing like the religious rift caused by the
Reformation in the West. Religious art remained a key cultural expression.
Russia maintained and extended the Byzantine tradition of religious icons,
usually small, stylized paintings on wood depicting Christ or revered saints.
Through the 16th century icon painters carefully avoided stylistic innova-
tion, though after that some influence from Western religious art altered
patterns to a degree. Independence from the Mongols was followed by a
surge in church building in many cities, usually surmounted by distinctive
domes. Here too traditional styles predominated though, as early as the 15th
century, Moscow’s rulers imported Italian designers to help plan the
Kremlin – the mix of religious and government buildings which constitute a
vivid landmark still today. Later, in the 16th century, a striking cathedral, St.
Basil’s, was built adjacent to the Kremlin; legend holds that the Russian
ruler blinded the architect so that he could not create such beauty else-
where, though this is almost certainly untrue.
Expansion
One of the most notable, and lasting, features of Russian development during
the early modern period was territorial expansion. The desire to push the
Mongols back helped spur a recurrent drive into Central Asia. Expansive
policies overall mixed an interesting combination of ambition – leading rulers
undoubtedly believed that gaining more territory was a vital measure of poli-
tical success – and defensive vulnerability. While unusual growth was the most
obvious long-term result, it was punctuated in the initial decades by external
invasions, some of which briefly captured and pillaged Moscow itself. Twice
Mongol descendants who still ruled a khanate in the Crimean region – Rus-
sians called them Tatars – poured through. Invasions also came from Polish and
Lithuanian forces from East-Central Europe.
The result raises a question about diplomatic and military legacy. The
early modern period unquestionably generated a huge Russian Empire –
ultimately, the most durable of all the empires created during these cen-
turies. It also established a sense of imperial mission: during the period itself,
Russian rulers liked to refer to their country as the “Third Rome,” heir to
the Romans and then the Byzantines, even though operating in a different
region. Military aggression seemed amply justified. On the other hand,
Russian leaders also reflected a concern about their vulnerability to external
invasion – in a territory that posed few natural barriers. This would yield in
more recent centuries to a fear of “encirclement,” which could be justified
by the fact of periodic invasion. Figuring out the balance of motives was,
and is, no easy task.
Russian expansion was also fueled by eager settlers, some from regions
north of the Black Sea, most of them Slavic and Orthodox Christian in
origin but also skilled horsemen, who pushed for more land in loose alliance
with the Russian rulers. This was a pioneering period in Russian history,
not totally unlike what developed later in the American West, that ulti-
mately produced loose Russian dominance not only over the northern coast
of the Black Sea, but into western Siberia as well.
Ultimately, over several centuries, Russian expansion moved in three
directions: into Central Asia to the south, to Siberia to the east (ultimately
to Alaska as well), and to the Baltic regions to the west. Westward expan-
sion was in many ways capped in the 18th century when the Russian ruler,
Peter the Great, moved the capital to a new site directly on the Baltic,
named St. Petersburg. Expansion was not a steady process, and there were
setbacks even during the 18th century. But there was no question about the
overall result – which moved Russia into a leading role in world history
from that point onward, if only on the basis of size and geographic position.
For the expanded Russian empire had several historic consequences.
Along with growth from China and the Ottoman Empire, it essentially
eliminated the independent position of Central Asia and its nomadic tradi-
tions. This was an area that had played a decisive, if recurrent, role in Eur-
asian history even before the classical period, but was now seemingly
curbed; only after 1989 would part of the region return to political inde-
pendence, results of which are still to be determined.
By 1750, Russia bordered the Ottoman Empire, China, and central Europe,
and was in a position to play a role in military and diplomatic decisions in all
three regions – another world history factor that persists today. An initial
border agreement was reached with China in the late 17th century, after some
military clashes, which facilitated mutual trade in eastern Asia. And while
Russia’s main focus was elsewhere, the country did begin to build some capa-
city in the Pacific Ocean – leading among other things to expeditions as far
afield as Hawaii (where the ruins of small Russian forts can still be seen today).
The posture on the border of the Middle East drew even more attention,
and here recurrent warfare continued into the 19th century (and, some
would argue, again in the early 21st). Russia successfully pushed Ottoman
borders back. It retained a great interest in fuller access to the Black Sea and,
through it, the Mediterranean, as a country that otherwise lacked warm
water ports. And it claimed a religious mission as well, as the leader of
Orthodox Christianity, in trying to make sure Christians had adequate
access to the Holy Land. None of these goals actually led to direct control
in the Middle East itself, but they created durable interest.
Finally, there was Europe itself. By the late 17th century, Russia was fully
engaged in military and diplomatic activity that made it a player in European
affairs – first, in central Europe, but ultimately more widely. This, too, proved
to be a durable outcome, part of a complex history of Russian-Western rela-
tionships. Russia’s explicit stake in East-Central Europe would be furthered,
later in the 18th century, by the acquisition of a large section of Poland.
By the 18th century, Russia’s expansion made it a multicultural empire,
another legacy result still important three centuries later – though the role
of Orthodox Slavic peoples predominated. It loosely governed a number of
tribal peoples in the east. There were pockets of Catholics and Germans in the
west, and control over Poland produced a substantial Jewish minority for the
first time. Particularly important was a large Muslim population, primarily in
Central Asia, which was overseen by the Russian government but not –
usually – pressed to integrate culturally. Russian rulers indeed harked back to
traditions of the Mongol khans in seeking loyalty in the region.
Politics and the Economy

Russian expansion raised obvious issues of governance and economic
orientation. Initial military efforts against the Mongols were led by aristo-
cratic landlords from the Moscow region, and the vital role of the aris-
tocracy would remain a key component of Russian history until 1917. But
by the late 15th century one leader began to call himself tsar, or Caesar (the
term had already been used by Balkan rulers during the postclassical period),
and by the 16th century the title became formally recognized both in
Russia and by diplomats from other regions.
In fact, however, tsarist imperial rule was often a fairly loose affair. Rus-
sian control depended crucially on administration provided by noble land-
lords – some quite wealthy, others more modest – who were given
increasing powers over the peasant majority. Serfdom spread in part because
of the need for political organization. Recurrent tensions between the tsar
and the nobility became part of the Russian fabric through the early
modern centuries, but there was no question that nobles continued to pro-
vide both control over large blocks of land and the source of many tsarist
officials, particularly in the military.
Russia’s growing territory opened access to a variety of agricultural regions
and natural resources. It also generated several opportunities for interregional
trade, as in East Asia. The country remained predominantly agricultural, how-
ever, with a relatively small merchant class. Cities were small for the most part.
Moscow at its height – before the transfer of the capital to St. Petersburg – had
at most 200,000 people as the largest urban center. Overall, less than 10% of
the Russian population was urban, and urban manufacturing activity was lim-
ited. In contrast to many other societies, including Western Europe, Russia did
not develop a vigorous urban craft tradition. Social structure emphasized the
divide between aristocracy and serf, and there was also some slavery.
“Westernization”
Russian interest in closer links with Western Europe emerged quickly,
given the disappearance of the Byzantine connection. Early tsars promoted
limited cultural contacts, including the invitation to the Italian designers of
the Kremlin. Trade links developed, as in the appearance of the British
merchant colony, orchestrating the import of Western manufactured pro-
ducts in return for raw materials – particularly furs.
Relationships took a more decisive turn with the rule of Peter the Great
at the turn of the 18th century. Peter had visited Holland directly, going
incognito, and he was eager to import a number of Western patterns with
the goal of strengthening tsarist rule within Russia and improving military
capabilities. He also sought to make Russia somewhat more palatable to
Western observers, a move that had broader implications.
Peter’s Westernization provides the first example in world history of a
society not in the Western tradition deliberately trying to imitate the West,
and it is useful ultimately to compare this effort with more recent cases –
like Japan at the end of the 19th century. (British North America, in con-
trast, was a more organic extension of many Western patterns, and less an
imitation – though here too a comparison might be informative.)
A Westernization process – such as Russia’s – will always raise two
questions: (1) What is being copied, and why, and with what degree of
success?; and (2) What is deliberately not being Westernized, and why, and
what continuing differences result?
What Peter sought to introduce was revealing both of his sense of Wes-
tern achievement and his goals for Russia. He wanted to copy some of the
political features of absolute monarchy. So he began to hire more bureau-
crats who were not nobles and he worked hard to improve the training of
officials, noble and non-noble alike. He sent sweeping decrees insisting that
sons of nobles be schooled in mathematics, lest they would not be allowed
to marry. He set up a science academy and created Russia’s first universities
(Moscow and St. Petersburg still argue over which was first). He also
developed a secret police force – its heir still operates today – to try to
prevent dissent and supervise the bureaucracy. He also systematized Russian
law codes and improved tax collection.
Second, he sought military improvements and enough economic change
to support them. He created a navy, importing Western artisans to train in
shipbuilding. He encouraged the growth of heavy industry – Russia had
excellent holdings in coal and iron – to provide support for armaments
production. Nobles were given permission to use serf labor – even to sell
whole villages – in order to expand metallurgical production. He also
improved the training of military officers.
Cultural efforts were designed to make Russia more civilized in the eyes of
Western visitors but also to demonstrate tsarist power over the nobility. Many
nobles had retained Mongol styles of dress: Peter insisted on Western fashions,
including haircuts – famous pictures from the time show the tsar himself
wielding the scissors. Upper-class women gained new latitude, for example,
being allowed to attend theater performances; and an old tradition, where at a
wedding ceremony the bride’s father would hand the groom a small whip as a
symbol of transfer of power, was simply banned. Western art forms were pro-
moted, as in the importation of ballet – a genre in which Russia would ulti-
mately excel. Even the German custom of Christmas trees was imported (over
a century before the tradition reached the United States).
This was a major effort overall, which many Russian historians call a first
“modernization” move in the nation’s history. It did not entirely succeed:
the army remained relatively ill-trained, by Western standards; dependence
on the aristocracy for political control continued.
But what was equally interesting was what Peter did not attempt at all: he
did not try to modify serfdom, and indeed aristocratic powers were increased.
He did not try to educate ordinary Russians or disrupt the Orthodox faith. He
did not really attempt to make Russia a more active player in world com-
merce – among other things, this would have required promotion of a business
class which would have displeased the aristocracy. Dependence on Western
merchants, for much of Russia’s world trade, continued. This was, in other
words, a major substantial program, which really did change Russian history –
but, deliberately, not an attempt to make Russia Western.
Peter’s policies would be largely maintained later in the 18th century by
Catherine, also the Great, who imported many Western intellectuals and
encouraged upper-class education. She also vigorously retained the tradition
of Russian expansion, with new campaigns against the Ottoman Empire,
plus the successful acquisition of Polish territory. But Catherine also clarified
new limits to Westernization: there was to be no import of subversive
political ideas, and the government set up new censorship of foreign books.
And a major rebellion by serfs seeking greater freedom, under a leader
named Pugachev, was brutally put down.
By the 18th century it became increasingly clear that Russia’s Westernization
was having three additional effects, not fully anticipated by leaders of the effort.
First, some nobles became so thoroughly Westernized – even speaking French
instead of Russian – that they further antagonized their serfs. Second, interest
in Western imports, including extended trips abroad, had economic con-
sequences, making Russia more dependent on cheap exports – now including
grain – to pay for the new tastes. And, third, an anti-Western opposition arose,
particularly among some Orthodox clergy and conservative nobles, arguing
that Westernization was a mistake, that Russian values and social forms –
including religion and spirituality – were actually preferable. Here was another
durable theme in Russian history – right now, the anti-Westerners have the
upper hand, but as recently as the 1990s, it was the other way around – that has
proved truly important for Russian and world history alike.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Highlights
Portuguese slave trade station at el Mina (present-day Ghana), 1481;
Portuguese colony in Angola, 1570; Dutch colony in South Africa, 1652;
Usman Dan Fodio, 1804; British take over South Africa, 1815; new Zulu
kingdom, 1818ff.
Despite the overwhelming impact of the slave trade on many Africans and
African regions, a number of traditions strongly persisted throughout the early
modern period. Christian Ethiopia continued to hold off Muslim rivals. Islam
consolidated its hold both in the Sudan, north of Ethiopia, and down the
Indian Ocean coast. A variety of regional kingdoms formed and flourished, and
older artistic styles continued to inspire work, particularly in West Africa.
Indeed, the growth of several large kingdoms was an important overall theme,
with slavery and its results – including importation of guns – a component in
some cases. The period saw a complex interaction between devastating change
and impressive persistence – often depending on the specific area involved.
The huge impact of Western demands on the African economy and on
social and family arrangements did not generate much wider influence.
Coastal colonies in Angola and South Africa were significant, and the West
seized and operated a few ports in West Africa. Some limited conversions to
Christianity occurred, but there was no major thrust. European suscept-
ibility to tropical disease but also continued political independence and the
strong Western focus on economic exploitation limited other interactions.
Portugal did sponsor some missionary efforts to convert West African rulers,
but even where they succeeded, the rising slave trade often soured the lea-
ders on further contact.
Several kingdoms did expand on the strength of the slave trade and new
weaponry; this was particularly true for the Asante state, that dominated part
of West Africa into the early 19th century. On the other hand, other rulers
rejected the slave trade and concentrated on products like pepper and ivory.
Not surprisingly, recurrent warfare was a feature in several regions, as dif-
ferent states sought further expansion. At the same time, a number of states
managed to expand bureaucracies and extend political controls, beyond
what had been common in the postclassical period. Remarkable artistic
creativity continued in many regions as well, sometimes incorporating fig-
ures of Western soldiers into wood or ivory carvings.
Two other developments occurred in the late 18th and early 19th cen-
turies, after the early modern period but linked to earlier changes. First,
Islam became a more vigorous player in several parts of Africa. In the
Sudan, south of Egypt, a reform movement took shape in the 1770s that
highlighted greater piety, including a new role for the Sufi variant, and that
expanded missionary efforts, affecting a number of new groups in the wes-
tern Sahara. Then, in 1804, a pious scholar and political leader, Usman dan
Fodio, began to preach Islamic reform in parts of West Africa. He urged
attacks on some existing Muslim rulers, arguing that they were not follow-
ing Islamic teachings, and also promoted wider conversions. New political
units worked to enforce Islamic law, and Islamic missionaries sponsored
more vigorous efforts to uproot polytheism. The result was a larger and
more activated religious community and an expanded literacy rate. Areas of
important Islamic commitment today, as in northern Nigeria, were estab-
lished at this point.
The second new current centered on southern Africa. Britain took over
control of what had been the Dutch colony, early in the 19th century. This
prompted Dutch farmers – called Boers – to move northward, creating new
conflicts with African groups. At almost the same time a new leader arose
among the Zulu people in south-eastern Africa; Shaka was a brilliant mili-
tary leader, who established unprecedented discipline and utilized a number
of new tactics in expanding a Zulu state. An extensive and bloody series of
wars ensued, with heavy casualties, as some groups sought to resist Zulu
power. Turmoil would persist in the region until the later 19th century,
when further British colonization began to change the dynamic.
The early modern period did not usher in a set of sweeping new
experiences in African society, beyond the huge regional impact of the slave
trade. The expansion of Islam was the development that leaves the most
lasting mark today – aside from the persistence of important artistic crea-
tivity in several areas. A surprising degree of continuity with the past,
including extensive polytheism and the importance of monarchy, coexisted
with the rapid shifts in the role of Africa in the world economy.
The Muslim Empires: the Middle East and India

The early modern period was a major stage in the political history of Islam, with
three new empires emerging; at the same time, the empires also figure in the
larger political patterns of the period, in which gunpowder facilitated the rise
and consolidation of extensive holdings. None of the new Islamic empires still
exists today, and two began to fade during the early modern period itself. The
result, among other things, is an interesting tension between striking historical
change during the period itself, and a somewhat more complicated legacy.
Two empires essentially divided much of the Middle East, and their
mutual conflict did in fact establish issues still important today. The third
empire, rather separate, flourished on the Indian subcontinent, with some
results that contribute to political dispute in and between contemporary
India and Pakistan.
The Ottomans
Highlights
Capture of Constantinople, 1453; capture of Syria and Egypt, 1517; last
siege of Vienna, 1683; first printing presses, early 18th century; estab-
lishment of Western-modeled military schools in Istanbul, 1730s.
The Ottoman Empire took shape amid the flux caused by the Mongol
withdrawal from the Middle East and the decline of the Byzantine Empire.
Ambitious leadership and the use of guns gave it control over much of the
Balkans, Constantinople itself in 1453 (which was renamed Istanbul), and
part of the Mediterranean coast. Further victories extended control over
more of the Middle East plus part of North Africa, including Egypt and
Syria. This was long a militant empire, eager for additional conquest; sys-
tems of recruitment, even in the Christian Balkans, gave it a vigorous
fighting force. Ambition persisted until the late 17th century, when a
second attempt to capture the Austrian city of Vienna failed. Russian
encroachments also caused some gradual loss of territory, and the Ottoman
Empire entered a period of retrenchment until its final collapse early in the
20th century. By that point, despite some troubled final decades, it had
outdone the Roman Empire in terms of sheer longevity.
This was a multi-ethnic empire. The Ottomans themselves were Turkish,
and their rule, plus earlier in-migration from Central Asia, gave ethnic Turks a
growing role south of the Black Sea – as is the case today. But Greeks, Slavs,
and Arabs all commanded sizeable populations and enjoyed substantial inde-
pendence in culture and language. The Turkish language did gradually gain
greater importance, but Arabic and Persian were widely used in government
and intellectual life. Considerable religious tolerance prevailed as well, in some
contrast to more recent patterns in parts of the region. Though some conver-
sions occurred in the Balkans, sometimes under pressure, Christianity retained a
strong hold. Christian and Jewish merchants had great latitude, as the old Isla-
mic tolerance for “people of the Book” prevailed.
Great effort went into the enhancement of Istanbul (which Europeans
stubbornly insisted on calling Constantinople until the 20th century).
Ottoman rulers supported many palaces and religious buildings, including
magnificent mosques, utilizing both Arab and Byzantine architectural pre-
cedents. Commerce thrived, with goods from many parts of the world in
the great markets.
Politically, the Empire’s achievements were somewhat mixed, though
obviously there was considerable success. The ruler, or Sultan, claimed great
power, and the Ottoman state generated a substantial bureaucracy. In fact,
sultans had to negotiate among several influential groups: military leaders,
Islamic scholars and legal experts, even wealthy merchants. After the 17th
century, many sultans became less effective, and arrangements for hereditary
succession were often contentious.
Relations with Western Europe were complicated. There was the military
rivalry. Naval and commercial competition combined with the strong role of
Western merchants in connecting the Empire to larger trade patterns. Eur-
ope’s cultural changes were of little interest. Sultans did install some Western
doctors by the 17th century, which was slightly ironic given the region’s rich
legacy of medical knowledge. Until the 18th century, even the importation
of Western printing techniques was restricted, for fear of disrupting the Isla-
mic faith. Many Ottoman travelers were aware of other developments in the
West, and some lamented the lack of wider interactions.
The Safavids
Highlights
Safavid conquest of Persia, 1501–10; Battle of Chaldiran, 1514; reign of
Abbas the Great, 1588–1629; fall of the dynasty, 1722.
Early in the 16th century, a second group of Turkic peoples began to

invade the northeastern part of the Middle East – historic Persia, now Iran –
quickly establishing a new Safavid Empire. They were taking advantage of
the region’s flux after the retreat of the Mongols. Fairly quickly they
established a considerable regional empire all the way to the Persian Gulf
and extending into present-day Afghanistan. Efforts to push farther west
were blocked early on, in 1514, in a major defeat at the hands of the
Ottoman Empire.
The Safavid Empire flourished for two centuries, with a high point early
in the 1600s. Successful rulers, called shahs, sponsored major artistic devel-
opments, particularly in the capital of Istafan. Trade was active, relying in
part on British intermediaries; considerable tolerance was extended to
Christian and Jewish minorities. Military forces were bolstered by slaves
seized from Russia and converted to Islam.
The Safavids contributed two durable features to the region, and to an
extent to the Middle East more generally. In Persia itself, they promoted
Farsi as the standard language, which essentially continued the earlier Per-
sian language and separated the region from other areas where Turkish or
Arabic predominated. Second, eager to use religion to bolster political sup-
port, Safavid rulers early on committed to the Shi’a version of Islam. Reli-
gious leaders, or Mullahs, were given considerable authority but also
required to attack the Sunni strand of the faith. A Sunni minority of the
population was restricted in many ways.
The Safavids collapsed rather suddenly, weakened by leadership struggles
and then attacked by an Afghan force. The area fell victim to recurrent
disorder for many decades.
Sunni, Shi’a, and Wahabi Islam

Safavid-Ottoman rivalry quickly took on a sectarian dimension. The Sunni-
Shi’a split went back to the early days of Islam, but it had never before been
fully linked to inter-state warfare. Just as the Safavids tried to contain Sunnis
internally, so the Ottomans worked to restrict their Shi’ite minority. In both
cases, this intolerance contrasted with the latitude accorded non-Islamic
religious groups. At the level of inter-state relations, Ottoman-Safavid riv-
alry did not prevent periods of negotiated peace, but the basic tension was
not eliminated. The focus helps explain why both regimes paid less atten-
tion to other issues, such as the expansion of Western power.
A third religious factor began to emerge in the 18th century. Neither the
Ottomans nor the Safavids controlled the southern part of the Arabian
peninsula, though the Ottomans periodically asserted sovereignty over the
holy city of Mecca. In the first half of the century a major religious reform
movement took shape in part of this region, often called Wahabism, after
the founder, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab (1703–92). Wahabi leaders
were Sunni Muslims, bitterly opposed to the Shi’a version, but they argued
that Sunnis elsewhere – including the Ottoman Empire – had deviated from
the true faith. They accused other Muslims of being “idolators,” urging
among other things strict adherence to Islamic law. In 1744, Abd al-Wahab
formed an alliance with a local leader, Ibn Saud, providing religious support
for what became a regional monarchy in return for political protection.
Over the later 18th century an initial Saudi state came to extend over much
of the Arabian peninsula, usually including Mecca.
The heightened divisions in the Islamic Middle East should not be exag-
gerated. In many areas, Sunni and Shi’a relations continued to be peaceful.
But the early modern period did see a sharpening of disputes, and increas-
ingly linked them to inter-state rivalries and even military conflict. In some
ways the pattern paralleled what happened in Europe with the Reforma-
tion, but – as many observers have noted – the Middle East did not produce
a Treaty of Westphalia. Clearly, the new patterns of politicized division
form one of the legacies of the early modern period for the region today,
when similar sectarian-political rivalries have emerged in force.
The Mughals
Highlights
Beginnings of Mughal conquest in India, 1526; reign of Akbar, 1556–
1605; reign of Aurangzeb, 1658–1707; rapid Mughal decline, 1739ff.
A final Islamic empire formed in India in the early 16th century: here too, the
impulse came from leaders of Turkic origin, commanding a mixed force of
nomadic background. The Mughals and their legacy were, however, centered
on the Indian subcontinent. While there were some tensions with the Safavids,
this final imperial dynasty had no role in Middle Eastern history.
During the 16th century, Mughal conquerors quickly constructed a
multi-cultural empire. Though Muslim, they not only tolerated the Hindu
majority but often actively contributed to Hindu activities, using state funds,
for example, to subsidize temple building. Hindus were incorporated into
the state bureaucracy. The empire centered in northern India, and never
embraced the whole subcontinent, but its holdings expanded fairly steadily
after some initial setbacks.
The high point of the empire in most respects occurred under the long
rule of Akbar (1556–1605). Though the new emperor enjoyed some mili-
tary success, his vision centered on building a united and durable empire.
He elaborated the administrative system, while also sponsoring a wide range
of artistic activities. He was eager not only to promote religious tolerance,
but actively to learn from scholars from Islamic, Hindu, and Christian
backgrounds, ultimately sketching a new, unified religion that would
incorporate elements from all relevant faiths. Akbar also encouraged inter-
marriage between Hindus and Muslims. He even sought to reform gender
relations, trying to discourage child marriage while also outlawing the
Hindu practice of sati. He even sought to modify the isolation of women in
purdah, encouraging merchants to set up some market days just for women,
so they could leave their homes.
The Mughal period contributed a number of new cultural components
on the subcontinent. New genres of painting and portraiture incorporated
Persian and even some European influences. New styles of cuisine were
introduced. Impressive architectural ventures included the famous Taj
Mahal, but also a variety of other royal tombs and public buildings. It was
also under the Mughals that Western merchants began to play a growing
role, promoting the export of Indian products while bringing in goods from
a variety of regions.
Akbar’s religious experiment did not catch on, to his great disappointment,
rejected by Hindus and Muslims alike. (His efforts at gender reform also largely
collapsed, including the attempt to ban the practice of sati.) But Akbar’s heirs
retained his traditions of tolerance for several decades, while benefiting from
the solid administrative structure he had established. Later in the 17th century,
however, and particularly under Aurangzeb (1658–1707), the Mughals pushed
their efforts at territorial expansion too far, draining state resources amid an
increasingly ineffective, corrupt bureaucracy. Tolerance for Hindus faded, for
Aurangzeb believed he had a mission to promote and purify Islam. Hindus
continued to serve in the bureaucracy, but they were now barred from the top
posts. The emperor prohibited the construction of new temples and ended
Hindu festivals at the royal court. He even tried to tax Hindu peasants more
heavily, hoping to drive them to Islam.
The result was near-collapse, though Mughals would retain some local
power into the 19th century. Internal rebellions and external invasions cre-
ated growing disruption, and into this mix French and British forces from
the respective East India companies, each allied with various regional prin-
ces, would gain increasing control, finally battling directly for ascendancy in
the Seven Years War, with British forces prevailing. After 1763, British
officials oversaw growing portions of the subcontinent, focused mainly on
limiting Indian competition for growing British manufacturing while seek-
ing profits from the export of gold and spices.
Not surprisingly, the Mughal legacy on the Indian subcontinent con-
tinues to provoke dispute. Its achievements and limitations can feed both
efforts at Hindu and Islamic harmony – it is no accident that the Taj Mahal
remains India’s most visible symbol – and claims of mutual intolerance and
cruelty.
Finally, the Mughals shared with the other great Islamic Empires an ulti-
mate preoccupation with religious rivalries and the strain of political con-
solidation that arguably prevented adequate attention to the growth of
Western commercial and military power. This would have immediate con-
sequences on the Indian subcontinent, but it would also condition sub-
sequent developments in the Middle East.
East Asia
Highlights
Ming dynasty established, 1368; end of great trading expeditions, 1433;
Jesuits arrive in China, 1580s; Hideyoshi unifies Japan, 1590; second
invasion of Korea fails, 1597; Tokugawa shogunate established, 1603;
Christianity banned in Japan, 1614; end of Ming dynasty, rise of Qing-
Manchu, 1644.
Patterns in East Asia paint yet another regional picture, conditioned of course
by developments in global trade but clearly distinctive. Another empire is
involved, but in this case – China – not a new one, simply the latest version of
a much older tradition. The early modern period also proved vital in the his-
tory of Japan, again building on tradition but establishing some distinctive new
politics that were impressively successful. Japan and China would share a desire
to limit Western influence – more explicit than in many other parts of the
world – but they implemented this desire in different ways. Japan, smaller and
as an island nation more open to naval pressure, faced problems that Chinese
leaders did not feel to the same degree.
China
The early modern period represents a success story in Chinese history in
many ways, though some contemporary Chinese leaders look back on some
missed opportunities as well. The period was partly defined by two dynas-
ties: the Ming and the Qing.
The Ming rulers, after abandoning their great foreign expeditions, con-
centrated heavily on defense and on reviving political and cultural traditions
that had been partly eclipsed under Mongol rule. The economy long pros-
pered, aided ultimately by grater food security thanks to the use of new
plants and better strains of rice. Manufacturing flourished, with the
expanding export earnings an obvious result. Ming emperors restored the
position of scholar-gentry atop the bureaucracy and social structure, though
the power of rural landlords also increased. The examination system for
bureaucratic recruitment became more rigorous and competitive. Training
emphasized Confucian values, with no dissent or questioning tolerated.
Chinese culture flourished under the Ming, and whereas traditional styles
predominated in the fine arts, there was greater innovation in literature.
New groups of Confucian scholars refined the main philosophical systems.
Under the later Ming, however, conditions deteriorated: public works were
less well maintained and bureaucratic corruption increased. Peasant rebel-
lions added to the challenge. This led in 1644 to the ascent of a new
dynasty. Manchu people from the north had been moving into China for
several decades, and they provided the new emperor – the first in the Qing
line, quickly claiming the mantle of “Mandate from Heaven” – though four
decades of fighting ensued before the dynasty was fully established. Though
foreign, the Qing were careful to preserve the Confucian bureaucracy and
undertook no significant cultural changes. The Qing would prove to be
China’s last dynasty, falling only in the early 20th century.
Qing initiatives did push out in one important direction: westward con-
quests, extending Chinese control over territories where efforts at full inte-
gration continue even today. Attacks from the outside led to expeditions
into Mongolia, and the Qing formulated a new agreement with Russia to
the north as well. China solidified control over Muslim-majority territory in
the northwest, and the Qing also responded to what they saw as an invasion
threat by taking over Tibet in 1720. Qing rulers had a real interest in
Tibetan Buddhism, and granted the new area considerable autonomy. At
the high point of Qing rule, China controlled more territory than it ever
had before (including the island of Taiwan), which proved to be an
important precedent for Chinese leaders in more recent times.
Interactions with the West under the Ming involved a mixture of flirta-
tion and control. Trade policies were clear, as the activities of Western
merchants within China were strictly limited. Christian mission efforts were,
for a time, another matter. Catholic missionaries began to arrive in southern
China in the 16th century, but ultimately Jesuit emissaries took the lead in
trying to negotiate directly with the emperor, seeking space for efforts at
conversion. Under the leadership of Matteo Ricci, the Jesuits adopted
Chinese styles of dress and habits. They intrigued the emperor and some
Confucian scholars with their scientific knowledge, including a superior
ability to predict eclipses, and also with new technologies such as European
clocks. They also helped construct cannon. Efforts at conversion were less
successful, and the missionaries also offended many Confucian scholars by
criticizing the inaccuracy of Chinese calendars and time-keeping. And even
sympathizers tended to regard European knowledge primarily as a source of
entertainment. Emperors thus often gave imported clocks to their children
as toys, or simply kept them around as decoration. This was not a serious
cultural interaction.
The situation deteriorated further in the early 18th century, despite the
fact that the early Qing had maintained the kinds of contacts granted by the
Ming. Catholic rivals of the Jesuits called into question the practice of
allowing Christian converts to maintain traditional family rituals, including
ancestor worship. The papacy finally ruled against these adaptations, and the
Qing emperor responded to this intolerance by turning against any contacts
with Christianity: many converts were attacked in the early 18th century.
Import of European items like clocks continued, but there was no sig-
nificant cultural exchange until the later 19th century – when the power
equation had changed considerably.
In the terms important to them, Chinese rulers could point to consider-
able success into the 19th century. Political stability was normally achieved,
with the Ming decline and replacement the principal rough spot. The
economy flourished for the most part, though peasant conditions could be a
problem, particularly when the level of population increase began to cut
into available land. The cultural combination of tradition with selective
innovation, as with new literary themes, continued to be successful. The
outside world beyond the immediate frontiers, never a deep Chinese inter-
est in any event, seemed to pose no threat.
Japan
Despite extensive imitation of China, Japan’s patterns had already diverged
from those of their giant neighbor, and the divergence in many ways
increased during the early modern centuries. The question of whether a
larger “East Asian” civilization zone can be defined remained valid by the
end of the early modern period, but without an easy answer.
The big news in the mid-16th century was the arrival of European ships,
initially Portuguese, as part of the naval and commercial expansion. Mis-
sionaries soon followed. Many Japanese were quite receptive to some
Western products, particularly guns, which made sense in a militaristic
upper-class culture. (Clocks were less interesting; one feudal lord, offered a
clock as a gift, politely rejected it, saying, “I would have no use for this.”)
Christianity won a fair number of converts as well. Some Japanese leaders
began to hang pictures of Christian figures and even wear Western-style
clothing. Politically divided, Japanese governments at first offered no clear
response.
Political developments actually held center stage, after a long period of
warfare among the samurai elite. A new leader established a unified state,
called the shogunate, ultimately under the Tokugawa dynasty. The feudal
order, and feudal military values, were preserved In principle, but the cen-
tral government began to develop its own bureaucracy. Under the Toku-
gawa shogunate, feudal lords were required to spend half their time in the
capital city of Edo (later called Tokyo), where the government could keep
an eye on them. A new military leader of peasant origin, Hideyoshi, con-
solidated the new system. Unusual in Japanese tradition, Hideyoshi actually
dreamed of foreign conquest, contemplating ruling China and India, though
he knew little about either place. And he did mount two invasions of
Korea – the only Japanese external aggression until the late 19th century –
both of which failed.
Hideyoshi had grave concerns about Western penetration. Use of guns
and cannon directly threatened the feudal order, which depended on other
kinds of warfare. The example of the Philippines, where Spanish Catholi-
cism was rapidly taking over, raised even graver issues about Japanese inde-
pendence. There was active concern about the possibility of outright
invasion, given Western aggressiveness.
So the leader began to chart a new course. Christian missionaries were
first limited in number, then banned outright, several were killed, along
with some of the Japanese converts. By the 1630s, the religion was reduced
to small, secret operations, with no significant impact. These moves were
followed by larger efforts to isolate Japan. Japanese ships were forbidden to
sail or trade overseas. Most European merchants were banned altogether,
and by the 1640s only limited numbers of Chinese and Dutch ships were
allowed each year, and only in the port of Nagasaki. (The Dutch seemed
relatively safe, as Europeans went, since they were Protestant rather than
Catholic and not avid missionaries, and had at that point no big empire.)
Very few foreigners were allowed in at all – not just Europeans – and in
only a small number of places.
With these policies in place, Japan entered a period of considerable
internal consolidation. The advent of the Tokugawa and stronger govern-
ment initially encouraged greater interest in forms of Confucianism, which
had been imported earlier; Confucian emphasis on political stability and
orderly hierarchy made increasing sense in the new political system. Then in
the 18th century greater emphasis was placed on trying to promote Japanese
values. The process did encourage greater secularism overall, and interest in
education also expanded, with rising rates of literacy. Considerable com-
mercial development took place, centered on internal trade; there was no
short-term damage from the policy of isolation. Urban culture expanded as
well, with some new kinds of drama and a variety of artistic activities. As in
China, some women were employed as geishas to provide entertainment for
wealthy men in “pleasure quarters,” gaining skills in a variety of forms of
dance and music, extending a tradition that would later confuse Westerners
who tended to equate the practice with prostitution.
By the mid-18th century, a new interest arose among some intellectuals
in selected aspects of Western scientific culture. Japanese translators who
served the Dutch traders were able to keep up with some Western devel-
opments, and they realized that some greater openness might pay off. Pro-
hibitions of translations of Western works in science and medicine were
relaxed, though not in other subjects. The contrast with the simultaneous
decline of Chinese interest in Western scholarship was interesting, and
potentially significant for the longer run.
Comparisons and Legacies

The early modern period was a busy one, regionally as well as globally, and
while new trading relationships and inequalities anchored the overall legacy,
regional innovations were vital as well. A variety of areas, from the West
through Russia to Mughal India, Japan, and Latin America, developed drama-
tically new patterns, which still leave abundant traces in regional distinctions
today. New kinds of tensions arose between global connections and regional
emphases. These were most dramatic in Japan, but they can certainly be iden-
tified in China, the Islamic empires, and Africa as well, and some of them at
least have implications today. Japan, for example, though long past its period of
isolation, continues to hesitate in the treatment of foreign immigrants or even
the children of mixed marriages, an echo and not a very subtle one.
It is tempting to focus comparison on the different patterns of reaction to
the West, which was unquestionably the most dynamic player at the global
level – despite some technologies and political structures that lagged behind
some other regions. It is not unreasonable in looking at the world of 1750
to ask which “non-Western” areas were best prepared to deal with even
greater Western pressure, which areas had made moves that would make
reactions more difficult later on.
Certainly, Westerners themselves, when they looked at the world in the
18th century, were increasingly convinced of their own unique capacities.
To be sure, there was some admiration for orderly Chinese government,
and some envy of hypothetical “noble savages” that were not burdened by
the trappings of civilized life. The Enlightenment in principle talked about
the rational capacity and rights of humans, not just Europeans. And there
was a new movement brewing in opposition to slavery on the grounds that
humans should not be owned by other humans – a portent for the future.
For the most part, though, there was confidence in the racial superiority
of Europeans over Africans and Native Americans. Visitors to China as early
as the 17th century criticized Chinese traditionalism, their failure to latch on
to technological innovations; the fact that this was not systematically true
did not matter. By the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire was increasingly
characterized as “decadent,” another inaccurate but pervasive gibe that
would simply get worse in the 19th century.
With the advantage of hindsight, we also know that Western power was
about to increase further thanks to industrialization. So comparisons around
adjustments or lack of adjustment to the West can organize some valid
analysis for the early modern period.
But there are other angles as well, at a time when, for most societies, the
West did not pose the region’s leading problem – whatever the future
would hold. It is useful to compare the various regions in terms of domi-
nant political forms, extent of dependence on military expansion, protection
of religious traditions or openness to cultural innovation – and the West
does not have to play a role in this kind of comparative analysis. Gender is
another theme to keep in mind. No global patterns of change in gender
relations developed in the early modern period – patriarchal systems applied
almost everywhere. But there were new features in some areas, including
cases in which exploitation of women further increased.
Finally it is important to remember that, along with the surge of new
trade levels and innovation in science, this was still, for better or worse, part
of the Agricultural Age. A number of developments helped pave the way
for further change – including population growth – but older technologies,
social forms, and cultural attachments still prevailed in many ways; gender
relations themselves, though not unchanging, were a prime example. And
when more fundamental change did come, with industrialization, there was
much that might be missed about some of the patterns of early modern life.
Further Reading
On Western Europe, Merry Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, 1450–
1789 (2006), with many additional references; on cultural change, Keith
Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, new edn. (2003). For the rise of
science, James Trefil, Science in World History (2011); William Burns, The
Scientific Revolution in Global Perspective (2016).
On Latin America, Jose Moya, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Latin American
History (2011) contains many essays on the colonial period, with addi-
tional references; see also Susan Socolow, Women in Colonial Latin
America (2000) and Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and
Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517–1570, 2nd edn. (2003).
On Russia, Nicholas Riasnovsky, A History of Russia, 8th edn. (2010). See
also Timothy Dowling, Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to
Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond 2 vols (2014); Stephen Lee, Peter the
Great (1993); Richard Stites, Serfdom, Society, and the Arts in Imperial
Russia: The Pleasure and the Power (2008).
On Africa, Robert Harms, Africa in Global History (2018) provides a major
overview. See also Toby Green, The Rise of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade in
Western Africa, 1300–1589 (2011); Elizabeth Eldredge, The Creation of the
Zulu Kingdom, 1815–1828:War, Shaka, and the Consolidation of Power (2014).
On the Islamic empires, Douglas Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder: Ottomans,
Safavids, and Mughals (2010) and Stephen Dale, The Muslim Empires of the
Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals (2010). See also Giancarlo Goffman, The
Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (2002) and Annemarie Schim-
mel, The Empire of the Great Mughals: History, Art and Culture (2006).
On East Asia, Louis Perez, The History of Japan, 2nd edn. (2009) and Chie
Nakane and Shinzaburo Oishi, Tokugawa Japan: The Social and Economic
Antecedents of Modern Japan (1991); John Dardess, Ming China, 1368–
1644: A Concise History of a Resilient Empire (2011) and Jonathan Porter,
Imperial China, 1350–1900 (2016); See also Rhoads Murphy, East Asia:
A New History (2009). For a vital comparative study, Kenneth Pomeranz,
The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World
Economy (2001).
For an important overview of Western attitudes, Michael Adas, Machines as
the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance
(1990).
Part II
The Industrial Age
9 The Nature of Industrial Society
There is little question that the most important single development in world
history over the past 300 years was, and is, the industrial revolution and its
ramifications, both within major societies and in the relationships among
these societies. This chapter focuses on what this was all about, and how
industrialization is still requiring adaptations even today.
A tension exists between the importance of the industrial revolution
and the challenge of fitting it into a historical survey. For while indus-
trialization begins at an identifiable time and place – Britain, late 18th
century – it ultimately became a global phenomenon, spread out over
more than two centuries. This complicates placement in a chronological
narrative, which is why it is useful to extract industrialization for separate
examination before returning to a more standard account, beginning
with the late 18th-/19th-century period itself.
A sense of regional stages may help clarify the global angle: initial indus-
trialization centered on Britain, then the West more generally, including the
United States. Stage two opened by the end of the 19th century, embracing
Russia and Japan. A further expansion involved the Pacific Rim, by the
1960s. Then the end of the 20th century saw the process clearly extend to
China – quickly one of the great contemporary industrial powerhouses,
India, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico: the recent list is a long one.
The main point, ultimately, is the global involvement in industrial trans-
formation. For what is involved here is a major alteration of a host of
human behaviors, comparable only to the replacement of hunting and
gathering with agriculture so many centuries in the past. (There’s an
obvious invitation here to compare the patterns discussed in this chapter
with those described in Chapter 2.) Just as the nature of agricultural society
powerfully shaped human history through many subsequent developments,
so industrial society has been exercising the same effect for the past three
hundred years. The result has not defined every twist and turn – as with
agriculture, different regions have worked out their own approaches to the
demands of industry, and a number of other important changes have added
in. But a sense of the basic contours of the Industrial Age is a vital starting
point.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-11
Highlights
James Watt’s steam engine, 1770; British industrialization, 1770sff;
industrialization in much of Western Europe, the United States, 1820sff;
industrialization in Russia, Japan, 1890sff; industrialization in South Korea
and the Pacific Rim, 1950sff; industrialization in China, Mexico, Turkey,
India, Brazil, etc., 1980sff.
Here are some vital preliminaries (and complications) before offering a

basic definition of the phenomenon:
1 Wherever it began, the industrial revolution took at least 60 years

before fundamentally transforming the economy (and even then, some
sectors remained largely untouched). Britain’s process thus took about
80 years, Japan’s about 60. The word revolution is appropriate – big
changes were unquestionably involved – but the process took time.
2 Once Britain and the West industrialized, other parts of the world at
various times sought to imitate – as Japan did beginning in the 1870s.
This means that they often introduced some of the changes involved
with industrialization before launching the full process. For example,
most societies began to expand education as a means of preparing a
better-trained labor force. In the West this was partly a consequence of
industrialization, but elsewhere it might serve as preparation. This
means that some aspects of industrial society began to spread globally
earlier than others. Ultimately the end results would be similar, but the
staging varied.
3 Partly because of the variations in timing, different regions defined
different specific approaches to industrialization. Some, for example,
would emphasize the direct role of government more strongly than
others. And regional styles, some inherited from earlier characteristics,
would affect other aspects of the industrialization process and its impact.
This had been true with the assimilation of agriculture, but the varia-
tions are more important to the world today if only because they are
closer in time. Adding to the complexity, later industrializations used
different specific technologies from those that had predominated early
on. The steam engine, fundamental to industrial revolutions before the
later 19th century, took a back seat to electricity and petroleum-fueled
equipment by 1900. Figuring out the balance between the common
features of industrialization and regional variants is a vital aspect of
contemporary world history.
4 By the 21st century, most people in the world were involved in
industrial societies. (This had not been true in 1900, when only about
20% were directly engaged.) A vital index was urbanization: it was by
the initial decade of the 21st century that the majority of the world’s
The Nature of Industrial Society 137
population was living in cities, for the first time in human history. This
kind of sweeping change shows why looking at industrialization as a
fundamental global process is essential, rather than thinking of it as
primarily Western. At the same time, differences in chronology con-
tinue to make a difference. China, a newer industrial society though a
very vigorous one, remains poorer per capita than Japan by a large
margin. The distinction may not last, but it is important today. At any
point in industrial history, from the 1770s onward, the gaps in wealth
and power between those societies well along in the process, and those
yet to engage or in an earlier phase, matter a lot. This is another factor
to juggle in the world history of the past 250 years – though it would
be particularly glaring before the late 20th century.
5 Finally, the creation of industrial societies is still very recent. Indeed, a
few societies have yet to launch the full process, though every region
has been affected to some degree. But even what are sometimes called
the “advanced industrial societies,” like Britain or the United States or
Japan, are still working on adjustments, for example, in the area of
gender relations or the role of the elderly. Recognizing ongoing adap-
tations and unresolved issues in the great transformation of modern
times is not a bad way to think about the contemporary world, along
with the various regional differences.
These caveats and complexities may seem like a lot to handle, and it is
actually not easy to juggle the relationship between a really important and
sweeping basic process and the variations by place and chronology. But the
basics were and are fairly clear-cut, and an initial definition may seem
deceptively simple. From this starting point, it becomes possible to move
out to the various ways that industrialization changed so many of the con-
tours of the Agricultural Age.
Definition and Causation

The essence of the industrialization was the application of nonhuman,
nonanimal power to the process of production, but also to transportation
and other areas. This is why the steam engine was so fundamental, despite
the fact it would later be displaced by other engines. To apply power to
manufacturing – which was where initial innovation clustered – it was also
necessary to invent transmission devices that would translate power into
actual operations. Some of this initial technology had been introduced in
Western Europe earlier in the 18th century, for example, in efforts to make
manual weavers or spinners more productive. Thus, what was called the
flying shuttle (invented in 1733) moved thread automatically across a loom,
allowing a weaver to produce almost twice as much as before, even with a
foot-powered treadle. It was in the 1770s and 1780s, first in Britain, that the
invention of a usable steam engine was married to production processes,
initially particularly in cotton textiles, and the industrial revolution was off
and running.
Several other features attach to this basic definition. First, the industrial
revolution assumes more productive agriculture – or the importation of
some foods in return for manufactured exports. The old formula of 8
farmers for every 10 people has to be broken, in order to free up more
industrial and urban labor. Food production did rise in places like Britain
before outright industrialization – even adopting the humble potato helped
a lot here. Later, using more mechanized equipment would contribute,
along with improved seeds and fertilizers.
More productive manufacturing combined with more efficient agri-
culture meant that, with industrialization, the economic importance of
agriculture steadily declined – one of the obvious shifts from the Agri-
cultural Age. The sheer size of the rural population dropped – a process still
ongoing today – while the wealth and importance of urban activities
increased.
Changes both in manufacturing and in agriculture required more effective
transportation – larger quantities of goods, including foods, needed to be
moved over longer distances. Initial British industrialization depended
mainly on improvements in roads and canals, but in every industrialization
after 1830 railroads would play a crucial role, as steam engines (and, later,
other engines) were applied to transportation.
Finally, industrial revolutions required a dramatic new organization of
work – initially enshrined in the rise of a factory system. Steam power could
not be transmitted widely: equipment had to be located near the engine
itself. And there were other advantages to organizing workers in larger
units. Skills could be subdivided; supervisors could assure both coordination
and efficiency. The benefits and stresses of larger, more formal organization
soon spread to other areas. The rise of the department store was an obvious
example: having more goods to sell and distribute required major changes in
marketing; the first department store blossomed initially in Paris in the
1830s, and the institution would become a global phenomenon over the
next several decades.
So: industrialization centers on dramatic new sources of power and
transmission, coupled with a new organization of work and fundamental
shifts in agriculture and transportation; plus a rapid increase in manufactur-
ing and the wealth associated with manufacturing. Each of these features
represented a basic recasting of the economic and technological core of
agricultural societies – which is why the concept of revolution is entirely
appropriate.
Causation
Why did this happen? Chapter 2 noted how we can only guess about the
origins of the agricultural economy, because there are simply no direct
records. We can assume some new problems with the supply of game for
hunting and/or a population increase that prompted innovation, but details
are lacking.
This is not the case with the industrial revolution, where there is if any-
thing an overabundance of possible factors. Government encouragement is
vital, even in industrializations that seemed to depend largely on private
enterprise. Commitment to better transportation is a case in point; nowhere
was railway development possible without some help from the state.
Population balance is an intriguing variable. Rapid population growth in
18th-century Europe helped supply workers for the growing factories. But
population levels that are too dense require so many resources for sub-
sistence that they impede more basic change: thus, by the later 20th century
industrializations often occurred only when population growth had been
brought under control.
Some explanations of British industrialization – and since it was the first,
it required the fullest stimulus – focus on very specific new problems. Most
notably, the supply of timber began to decline, as a result of the build-up of
the British navy, urban construction, and burning wood or charcoal for fuel.
This made opportunities to substitute coal as a fuel increasingly attractive. In
turn, the expansion of coal mining encouraged other industries, like metal-
lurgy, where coal could be used to spur production; even the first crude
steam engine (1712) was invented to pump water out of the mines.
More generally, location of crucial raw materials could be an important
factor. Britain and some other parts of Western Europe had excellent sources of
coal and iron, often located in close proximity. Obviously these resources had
been there for a long time, so they did not cause industrialization by them-
selves; but they could facilitate, once other factors entered in.
Recently – and this is one of the beneficial results of growing interest in a
world-historical approach – historians have been addressing the causation
question in a slightly different way. Previously, it was often assumed that
Western leadership in industrialization was a no-brainer. The West was long
thought of (at least by most Western historians) as a natural leader in tech-
nology, political efficiency, and entrepreneurial drive. The rise of the study
of economics, and particularly the publication of Adam Smith’s influential
book, The Wealth of Nations, in 1776 which urged governments to give free
play to competition and the profit motive, was often folded into causation
analysis, though it may have occurred a bit late to explain the initial British
industrial launch.
The new approach has not questioned Western industrial leadership –
that is a matter of fact. But several historians began to argue that China, or
perhaps India, might have birthed the process just as readily. They noted
that China had a long tradition of technological innovation; its businessmen
were quite dynamic in the 18th century, and the government was favorable
to economic growth as well; China’s tax policies were more favorable to
business than Britain’s were. And there was a prosperous domestic market.
So what was different about Britain or the West? Debate continues, but
there are three probable factors operating in combination:
1 Some Western business leaders were quite aware that they still had
some catching up to do at the international level. Throughout the early
modern centuries, Western merchants had been transporting Asian
manufactured products; but it was quite reasonable to ask whether
Western manufacturing could not enter the competition. Thus, by the
late 17th century several European entrepreneurs began to set up
operations to compete with Indian cloth manufacture, using printing
machines to provide greater efficiency; it was not too hard later to link
this to steam power. In other words, active global trade and opportu-
nities for innovation may have seemed particularly appealing, given the
West’s overall aspiring competitive position.
2 The Enlightenment helped promote a greater interest in changes that
could lead to material progress. New scientific research, particularly on
the behavior of gasses, might contribute to developments like the steam
engine, but it was a wider set of attitudes, open to innovation, that
counted even more. A number of early entrepreneurs reflected a
commitment to the idea of advancing knowledge and prosperity. This
distinctive cultural factor is hard to pin down, but it warrants attention.
3 The West had colonies, and the great Asian economies did not. Colo-
nies in turn supplied many relatively cheap raw materials. They brought
profits, as from the slave trade, that helped generate capital for industrial
investment. This was the most obvious factor that the leading Asian
economies lacked.
Explaining later industrial revolutions, after the initial surge in Britain and
the West, is in one sense less difficult. Western industrial success, translated
into greater economic but also military power, gave leaders in many other
places abundant reason to seek to imitate the process, if only to try to limit
Western interference in their own space. This competitive dynamic clearly
served as a basic reason for the industrial push in places like Japan.
Even here, however, a causation challenge remains. Seeing the Western
example, and successfully launching an industrialization process elsewhere,
were two different matters. In some cases access to vital materials like coal
might be lacking. Population growth was overwhelming in some places, at
least until more recently. Conservative forces might actively oppose new
initiatives. Aristocracies, their power based in land, were often actively sus-
picious; religious leaders, worried about undue secular interest, might join
them. A number of societies needed to introduce some basic social and
cultural changes, in some cases major revolutions, before serious indus-
trialization became possible.
Always, also, there was active competition from established industrial
regions. By the 18th century, Western business already depended heavily on
cheap raw materials production from a number of areas. This made it par-
ticularly difficult, in places like Africa or Latin America, to assemble local
sources of capital or skilled labor to push the economy in a new direction;
often, a strong local merchant class was lacking as well. There are many
examples – even an early one, from Egypt in the first part of the 19th
century – where a vigorous leader tried to copy Europe’s industrial example
only to end up only with a further intensification of raw materials produc-
tion and dependence on Western merchants. Thus, even actively wanting
industrialization did not necessarily make it happen, and here the heritage of
regional inequality from the early modern period counted heavily.
In other words, industrialization was never an automatic process, even
when its advantages seemed quite clear on the basis of European or Japanese
example. It is always essential to look for other factors, including focused
leadership, often some degree of population control, sometimes even larger
social and cultural change. Industrialization did spread more widely over
time – far more rapidly than agriculture had done at the dawn of the
Agricultural Age. But precisely because it had such a sweeping impact, it
required some special combination of factors to set the process in motion.
The Impact of Industrialization: Building Industrial Societies

The industrial revolution generated a wide range of fairly standard changes
outside the strictly economic sphere. In some cases, a number of important
shifts were introduced as prior reforms, designed to facilitate industrialization
itself. And always, particular regional styles and traditions could shape the
changes in particular ways. But the essential features were widely shared,
and help explain the contrasts between the new society and the agricultural
patterns it replaced.
Social Structure
From the outset, industrialization was deeply linked to rapid urban growth,
and a relative, sometimes absolute decline of the rural population. Industrial
urbanism has also favored large cities over the previous scattering of smaller
centers (railroad hubs, initially, had a lot to do with this). With indus-
trialization, at least after initial decades, urban populations actually became
healthier than rural – another huge reversal of traditional patterns – if only
because of greater access to medical care. The urban-rural relationship
changed in all sorts of ways. This is glaringly true today in relatively new
industrializers like China or India, but it still affects conditions and attitudes
in places like Britain or the United States. Rural resentment is a lingering
feature of the industrialization process.
The upheaval in social structure was just as pronounced. Industrialization
challenged the pre-eminence of an aristocratic landlord class. Aristocrats
might hold on for a while, and individuals could even prosper, but the class
as a whole was doomed – and other legal and political changes often added
in. The peasantry shrank, and many authorities argue that the farmers who
remained increasingly took on more commercial attitudes and behaviors
than peasants had maintained, further weakening this core segment of agri-
cultural society. These changes could generate some backlash, as traditional
sectors claimed a loss of core values; even today, rural groups have outsized
political importance in some industrial societies partly because of their links
with tradition. But the basic change was incontestable.
In turn, the upper class (no matter what the political system) was
increasingly composed of top business managers and their professional allies;
these might be business owners outright, or leaders in the government
management sector. Unless it was accompanied by some other change, like
a major social revolution, industrialization did not really reduce inequality at
the top – and this is an important caveat in any claims about modern human
progress; but it did redefine its participants and the economic base.
In terms of sheer numbers, industrialization promoted the growth of the
urban working classes, including factory workers outright. Fairly soon, these
were joined by urban white-collar workers – clerks, teachers, nurses, sales-
people – who might have slightly different interests and backgrounds. The
overall change in social structure from the Agricultural Age was a sweeping
process, forcing many individuals to redefine their sense of social place.
Finally, if only because of the decline of the aristocracy and beliefs in
privilege at birth, most industrial societies begin to place somewhat more
emphasis on the possibility of social mobility. Caution is needed here: it
remains difficult in most industrial societies to rise from “rags to riches,” and
many inherited prejudices complicate opportunities in practice. But the
belief that social position is determined by birth softens somewhat, in con-
trast to agricultural norms, and this change starts early in the industrialization
process.
Work and Leisure

Shading off from the fundamental changes in population location and social
structure were some equally fundamental shifts in what most people did
with their time. Time itself became more clock-based, and this could
involve some agonizing transitions for people accustomed to a looser pat-
tern. Industrial work started and ended at defined times – later in the 19th
century the invention of the time clock drove this home directly. But so did
most urban leisure: people had to learn the schedules of entertainment or
sports events. Schools began to play a growing role in the effort to teach
children the importance of more precise time.
Work increasingly differed from agricultural patterns in three other
respects: More and more people were supervised, during their entire
working lives, by someone higher-up, like a foreman on the factory floor.
This contrasted dramatically with most agricultural situations, except for
some forms of slavery. And the pace of work was far more intense, often
driven directly by the speed of machines. Many industrial societies, as a
result, generated new kinds of work-related stress. Finally, a good bit of
work became more specialized, requiring a smaller range of activities in
favor of greater efficiency; for many, skill levels dropped, though this was
not uniformly the case.
At the same time, at least after initial, hard-driving decades, the hours of
work declined, and a clearer distinction arose between work and leisure
periods in the day – instead of greater intermingling, which the more
relaxed pace of agricultural work had often permitted. To take a clear
example, it became harder to alternate work and napping during the
ordinary day. Early in the 20th century one German employer, worried that
clerks were taking too much time on bathroom breaks, put steam jets in the
toilets, timed to go off after two minutes – a particularly dramatic example
of how respites were squeezed out of the working day. But the working
day, itself, was reduced. Shorter hours were supplemented by the for-
malization of the weekend as a time normally free from ordinary work.
Britain first introduced the two-day weekend later in the 19th century, and
it was widely copied – sometimes even called the “English week” until it
became a more standard experience.
Changes in work –the pace, the greater lack of daily independence –
inevitably impinged on leisure, another contrast with the Agricultural Age.
In the early decades of industrialization – and there are signs of this in early
industrializers like China today – leisure opportunities simply diminished.
Long hours of work were sometimes compounded by the time required to
walk or commute to the job (the idea of commuting, and the term itself,
were the product of growing industrial cities; another innovation). Tradi-
tional festivals also declined. Employers did not like them because their
scheduling was irregular, interfering with structured work routines; and
many migrants to the cities found them hard to maintain in their new sur-
roundings. Some festivals were preserved, often depending on a region’s
religious traditions, but the frequency tended to drop.
Two related outlets gained new priority, in response to both the pressures of
industrial work and the decline of traditional leisure forms. First, most industrial
societies saw a considerable increase in consumer interests and behaviors,
moving well beyond the patterns that had developed in the early modern
period. In good times, at least, many urban sectors now had a bit of money to
spend, as a result of rising per capita production and the money wage. New
outlets like the department store both reflected and facilitated the new interest
in buying more goods. From the later 19th century onward, new forms of
professional advertising also furthered the process. Levels of consumerism
varied from one region to the next, and of course not everyone had disposable
income. But the general pattern, of growing interest in acquiring a wider range
of goods – from clothing to appliances, ultimately often to automobiles –
became a standard feature of industrial life.
The purchase of entertainment most directly responded to the new needs and
opportunities for leisure, and this was the second key change. Opportunities
evolved. Attendance at popular theater, the rise of the amusement park as a new
phenomenon (led in this case by the United States), and increasingly avid
interest in sports spectatorship spread widely from the later 19th century
onward, on an increasingly global scale. Soon, movies and later television would
provide even more abundant fare. Here too, the contrast with preindustrial
patterns was considerable: never before, outside the upper class, had people
gained, or perhaps needed, as much regular diversion. In the process the status
and earnings of top entertainers, including professional athletes, began to soar –
another major contrast with agricultural societies where actors, for example, had
usually been scorned, and where professional athletes did not exist.
The quality of the new work-leisure combination, compared to older pat-
terns, can be debated. The constraints of many factory or white-collar jobs and
the shallowness of some mass leisure interests have drawn criticism for over a
century, in many societies. Whatever the evaluation, the extent of change was
clear enough. Industrial people worked and played differently from their agri-
cultural ancestors. And conditions of industrial society made it relatively easy to
spread many innovations from one region to the next. Russian communists
were busily importing the latest work efficiency methods from the West
during the 1920s; Chinese urbanites were avidly consuming leisure items from
the United States or South Korea by the early 21st century, and beginning to
introduce their own consumer innovations for other areas to copy.
Family Life
The industrial family was dramatically different from its agricultural coun-
terpart. Changes might require several decades. But as with work and lei-
sure, some of them could be copied from one new industrial society to the
next. It was not always easy to determine how much the changes flowed
inevitably from industrialization, how much from deliberate imitation by
governments and family experts. The shifts could reach deep into personal
life – much as agriculture had done, in its contrasts with hunting and gath-
ering patterns. At the same time, important regional variants could also add
to the mix, sometimes reflecting deeply held traditional values.
Several crucial changes were involved. The economic role of the family
shifted, and new decisions had to be made about children. The importance
of the extended family tended to decline, and the basis for marriage also
altered. The family survived as an important unit, but with some new
challenges and a different set of structures and functions.
Economics
The first interaction was fundamental, though it became so commonplace
that many easily forgot that it was a change: work, for the most part, moved
out of the home and out of the family context. The family had served as a
basic production unit for centuries, but now that was replaced by larger,
more specialized operations. The family could still serve as an economic
unit in the sense of depending on the pooled earnings of several members.
And it could actually add functions in the area of consumerism, sharing the
pleasures of purchases of household items and, once radio and television
arrived, even providing a domestic audience for regular entertainment. But
the core had changed, and on balance, over time, the economic importance
of the family usually declined.
As work moved outside the home, decisions had to be made about the
responsibilities of key family members, no longer working directly as a unit.
In some societies, women were designated the domestic specialists, caring
for children and household without, usually, holding a job outside the
home at least after marriage; this was a common pattern in the West, until
the 1960s, with brief interruptions in wartime emergencies. The same pat-
tern would emerge in Japan, only now beginning to change. In other
societies, however, such as Russia, married women usually remained in the
labor force, their lives complicated by combining this with domestic
responsibility.
Demography
The second ultimately inevitable change involved children directly, though
it related to the exodus of family production functions. Child labor had
been a standard part of agricultural society, and it continued to figure
strongly in the early stages of industrialization. Even today, though it has
declined everywhere, it persists – particularly in South and Southeast Asia.
At least in the early stages of industrialization, many parents and employers
alike found child labor absolutely normal, as well as (for employers) a con-
venient source of low-wage assistance. However, with advancing indus-
trialization, machines began to take over some of the simpler operations
children once performed. This was true not only in factories, but also in
services: think of the decline of “messenger boys,” now replaced by other,
faster forms of communication. In some cases, the safety hazards of work also
increased for children, and some parents – where they had any latitude – often
had second thoughts about allowing their children to work under the direction
of strangers, as the family economy unraveled.
There was a strong trend, as a result, to reduce the use of children, par-
ticularly in the lower ages. This was then compounded, everywhere, by a
growing belief that children should be able to, indeed be required to, go to
school, at least for a few years. Modern economies and modern states both
needed more people who were literate and numerate (white-collar jobs
particularly required these skills), and it was also increasingly desirable to
have a pool from which at least a minority could be drawn for further
training. So: in response to early industrialization or to prepare for
industrialization, many governments began to insist on some schooling, and
a growing number of parents agreed. In some cases schooling was combined
with work, but increasingly schooling won out. Childhood, as a result, was
redefined: from work obligations to those of education.
And these trends raised fundamental issues for families: in contrast to
agricultural patterns, children gradually stopped being economic assets.
Instead, since schooling imposed some costs for clothes, books, and so on,
they turned into economic liabilities. In one sense, this was another com-
ponent of the decline of the family as an economic unit, but it had more
precise consequences: parents in various groups increasingly decided that
they simply could not have as many children as had traditionally been
common. Birth rates dropped, and families became smaller. The changes
were difficult, particularly when birth control devices were not readily
available. In general, wealthier families made the conversion more quickly
than others. In industrial societies, in contrast to agricultural ones, poorer
people often have higher birth rates than the average, rather than the other
way around – an important development in its own right.
One final factor added in: industrialization, or even preparatory reforms, also
facilitated reduction of the infant mortality rate, particularly through improve-
ments in the public health structure and sanitation. In many cases, as in Japan,
this actually happened before a significant birth rate drop. With more children
surviving to maturity, parents had yet a further motive to cut birth rates below
the customary 6–8 per family. The two trends together added up to what is
called the demographic transition, that is, again in marked contrast to agricultural
patterns, a low birth rate, low death rate combination.
These changes, like industrialization itself, occurred at different times in
different places. Sub-Saharan Africa is just now making a more decisive turn
to lowering birth rates. Agencies varied as well. Parental decisions were
always involved, but the state had a role, particularly in the public health
arrangements. In China, with its strong government tradition, the state was
also unusually involved (from 1978 onward) in compelling a lower birth
rate.
Whatever the precise mix, many results were widely shared. The popu-
lation age structure began to change. With fewer children born (even with
greater survival), the percentage of children in the total society dropped
markedly. In contrast, the percentage of older people began to rise, raising
interesting issues about their role, and their costs. This shift is not new –
Western societies began to encounter the change by the early 20th cen-
tury – but it is becoming increasingly visible as industrial society becomes
the predominant global pattern.
More important at least in the short run, lower birth rates and the need
to prepare for school attendance challenged traditional family priorities.
Having a large brood of children was no longer a sign of success. With less
time committed to frequent pregnancies and the care of infants, women in
particular might reconsider some of their own priorities.
Other Common Changes
In most societies the early stirrings of industrialization raised new challenges
for the extended family. Urbanization drew younger people into the cities,
leaving older relatives behind. For a generation at least, ties between young
urban adults and their parents were disrupted. Furthermore, movement of
work outside the family context reduced the economic utility of the
extended family – though it could still be helpful in finding jobs. Extended
families did not disappear; they could be reconstituted even in the cities.
And there were important regional differences: India, for example,
remained more attached to extended family ties than some other societies in
comparable stages of industrialization. But there were some general shifts,
making nuclear family relationships more important, reducing the intensity
of wider relationships.
The role of young adults in making their own decisions about partner
choice correspondingly increased. Parentally-arranged marriages that would
distribute property to a young couple became less significant when the
couple itself could earn wages independently and access to landed property
less fundamental to family success. Non-economic criteria could play a
greater role in family formation.
On the whole – though as always at very different levels depending on
region – family stability declined with industrialization. Divorce rates and
abandonments rose. Throughout the industrialization process, and still today,
observers worried about the collapse of the family. Yet in many ways the
institution has proved surprisingly resilient. For some, in fact, it may have
increased in emotional importance: parents with fewer children, for example,
may become more deeply attached to them as individuals. The attraction that is
commonly called love may play a greater role in marriage expectations.
At the same time, many of the deep changes in family life have been very
painful – requiring people to consider decisions and behaviors different from
those of their parents and grandparents. Here is one vital area where crucial
adjustments have been occurring over the past two centuries, beneath the
surface of the more obvious events in politics or intellectual life.
Gender
Industrialization generates new and sometimes bitter debates about gender
roles. Two standard factors are involved, and others often add in. First,
mechanization, on the whole, reduces strength requirements at work,
making traditional gender distinctions less compelling. Second, the declining
birth rate raises questions about whether women want or need additional
functions – though many industrial societies try to insist that mothers should
be paying even more attention to the children they have.
In most cases industrial societies also generate new educational opportu-
nities and requirements for women, though not without debate. This was
not inevitable, and it is still controversial in some societies today, where
traditionalists continue to block school attendance for girls. Generally,
however, access opens as part of the general expansion of educational
requirements. In some cases, the move is first justified on grounds that
modern societies require educated mothers to raise useful children. What-
ever the rationale, when girls gain education, further changes result –
among other things, an acceleration of birth rate reduction. Other interests
in opportunities for women may gain ground as well.
In other words, industrialization, or serious preparations for industrializa-
tion, almost inevitably raised questions about patriarchal relationships –
another challenge to agricultural patterns. Results vary, not only by stage of
industrialization but also by regional culture. Nowhere has a fully agreed-
upon alternative been installed. But some changes have become common,
and debate and tension are even more widespread – constituting another
key feature of industrial societies in the making.
Other Changes
Sketching the links between industrialization and wider changes in politics
and culture is more challenging than dealing with social or family structure.
There are more regional variables. At the same time, these are the domains
most commonly emphasized in survey history, and while there are fewer
definitive patterns, there are some limited trends and shared issues. These
can then be tested in dealing with the major periods of recent history, in the
chapters that follow.
Culture
Industrialization, along with inter-regional imitations, has some impact on the
arts. Most obviously, new architectural styles become possible with greater use
of structural steel and concrete, and new technologies like elevators and air
conditioners. Most cityscapes have changed markedly as a result, whatever a
region’s prior urban traditions. The changes in popular culture associated with
consumerism and the growing interest in professional entertainment may have
larger implications for intellectual and artistic life.
Industrialization requires more attention to science than was common in
the Agricultural Age. Scientific research helps generate new technologies
and public health measures. Engineering itself becomes a new and essential
profession – it first emerged as a professional category in the West in the
19th century. Schooling in industrial societies invariably includes some
introduction to science, and while this is not always brand new, it goes well
beyond what was usually offered in agricultural societies – in addition to the
fact that education itself becomes more widespread.
East Asian societies in the Confucian tradition all began to adjust to the
importance of science from the later 19th century onward – without
necessarily abandoning other aspects of Confucian thought, including the
importance of community values. Japanese educational reformers by the
1860s were urging that Confucian priorities had to be amended – first, to
take into account the validity of new knowledge as opposed to primary
reliance on the classics, and, second, to extend greater recognition to sci-
entific thinking. Here was a clear case in which the new priority of science
adjusted a major traditional culture.
The larger question of the impact of industrialization on religion is harder
to handle. There is no question that, here too, industrialization can be dis-
ruptive. Many migrants from the countryside to the city find it difficult to
recognize their familiar religious habits in the larger, more impersonal urban
outlets. Other factors, including political tensions with conservative religious
leaders, can also complicate traditional loyalties. To the extent that indus-
trialization elevates the importance of the material or secular side of life, it
can pose a religious challenge. As a result, religion measurably declines in
importance in a number of industrial societies. And there is no question as
well that many religious leaders, in many different places, have worried
about some of the priorities in industrial life, and this can be a significant
cultural factor as well.
However, there are important counterexamples. Religion can be a crucial
support for many people as they adjust to the other strains of industrializa-
tion, providing spiritual solace, an attachment to valued traditions, and even
a sense of community amid so many unfamiliar adjustments. A number of
industrial societies, such as the United States or Turkey, remain highly
religious.
In sum: industrialization changes culture in several standard ways, and it
also raises some general new issues for traditional values. At the same time,
no homogeneous “industrial culture” emerges as a result. Regional specifics
remain essential.
Politics
Here too, generalization is complicated. The fact is that industrialization has
proved compatible both with authoritarian and with more liberal, demo-
cratic political systems: this depends on time and place, and the choice of
political structure is a vital variable as world history has unfolded from the
later 18th century until today. The current debate between China and the
West about which political system best facilitates productive industrial
growth is just the latest phase in a long and often contentious discussion.
Along with this vital distinction, however, there are some common
trends In the political category as well. Most obviously, the functions of the
state change with industrialization, or preparations for industrialization.
Only in two cases, both in the 19th century – Britain and Norway – did the
size of government decrease systematically, and in these two instances the
change was short-lived. For industrial governments virtually everywhere
take on new responsibilities for education – which had never been a sub-
stantial state function before. They spearhead changes in public health,
particularly in the growing cities. They take on some responsibility for
inspecting safety conditions in places like factories. None of this contradicts
the important differences among particular types of industrial government:
some industrial states reach a lot farther than others. But there are some
common trends, responding to a variety of new needs.
Industrial technology also facilitates extensions of state activities. One of the
reasons many governments were initially enthusiastic about railroad develop-
ment was not because of economic impact, but because it made it easier to
move troops and officials to every corner of society, Communications tech-
nology, beginning with the telegraph, had the same effect. New functions and
new outreach, in combination, means that the government has more frequent
interactions with ordinary people than was true during the Agricultural Age.
Some observers have tried to press further in defining how industrializa-
tion changes the contours of political life. They argue that as urban societies
become more predominant, governments either have to develop new
methods of authoritarian control or they have to give people a genuine
sense of participation in political life through some kind of effective
democracy. More traditional and remote systems of relationships between
state and people simply will not work. Industrialization can facilitate more
aggressive authoritarianism through new kinds of mass propaganda and
police surveillance. But, as noted, industrialization is also compatible,
depending on circumstance and regional tradition, with active political
debate and open voting; and industrial technologies can facilitate democratic
participation over wider geographic areas than ever before – remember that,
in the Agricultural Age, democracy had never operated beyond the regional
city-state level. The point in the argument is not that industrialization dic-
tates a uniform choice between one and the other – this remains unre-
solved – but that both systems involve substantial innovation.
Two possible corroborations of this argument are worth keeping in mind.
First, only in a very few countries have active monarchies (as opposed to
figureheads) been able to survive into the full Industrial Age. Most fell by
the wayside, unable to meet the demands of an industrial society. The
incompatibility between monarchy and industrialization is not perhaps
inevitable, but it has become a substantial reality in modern world history –
and it is another big change.
The second point to note is that along with the decline of monarchy,
virtually all modern societies install some system of suffrage in which most
people have the opportunity to vote. They may have little choice in their
vote – that is the authoritarian pattern – but there is a widespread assump-
tion that governments in industrial societies should be able to claim that
they spring from the people, not from divine will or inherited privilege.
Again, industrialization has not determined modern political history, but it
has introduced some standard parameters.
War
Industrialization unquestionably changes military technology, making war
more deadly. This first became obvious in the American Civil War, in the
early 1860s. The most bloody wars in history occurred in the Agricultural
Age, in terms of millions killed, though the two 20th-century world wars
are close; but the old wars stretched over decades. Industrialization allows
more bloodshed in a shorter period of time than ever before, and this is a
huge factor in modern world history.
At the same time, partly because war can become more devastating,
optimists have wondered, from the outset of industrialization, whether wars
might also decline in the Industrial Age. Many Western businessmen argued
in the 19th century that, with industrialization, societies would turn their
attention to economic development and business competition, and away
from actual combat. More recently some experts have contended that
societies that concentrate on economic growth, where consumers value
continued access to a profusion of goods and services, would become more
reluctant to accept war.
Actual modern historical experience suggests that this is at best a maybe.
Wars at various levels have continued in the Industrial Age. It is nevertheless
worth considering whether some of the traditional reasons for war have been
changing. However, this is a clear case where it would be unrealistic to press
generalization too far.
The Environment
Industrialization greatly accelerated human impact on the environment, and
this began quite early. The change was most obvious around the growing
industrial cities – no matter what the region. Factories poured more pollu-
tants into waterways, and urban growth added its own pressure. Smoke
changed the local atmosphere, to the point that some people claimed that
smoke was a sign of prosperity, seeking for a while to bypass the impact on
health.
But this was only the most glaring result. We now know that a process of
global warming began, though gradually, in the 19th century as a result of
the growing use of fossil fuels. Equally important was regional damage well
outside the industrial centers. The spread of rubber plantations in parts of
Brazil, for example, to feed industrial markets, accelerated soil erosion.
European colonial regimes pressed several areas in Africa to expand cotton
production, again with great harm to the soil. Even more obviously, rates of
deforestation greatly accelerated in many parts of the world, with damage as
well to species variety.
Only in the 20th century would industrial societies begin to generate
more systematic kinds of environmental concern, with movements to pro-
tect certain areas from economic exploitation or, a bit later, to reverse some
of the patterns of urban pollution. At the global level, however, effective
action remained difficult, though the problem did generate growing atten-
tion. For some, environmental degradation, ultimately on a global scale,
represented the most important of all the changes involved in the Industrial
Age – and by far the most unfortunate.
Legacy
The whole point of devoting a chapter to the overall characteristic of
industrial societies is to sketch some of the common parameters that have
emerged over the past 250 years, on an increasingly global basis, and that
continue to shape contemporary life. In the process, much – though not
all – of the heritage of the Agricultural Age has been altered or modified.
The world today continues to be substantially defined by the characteristics
generated by industrialization, and indeed is busily extending many of them.
At the same time, the gradual unfolding of industrialization did not write
a full script for modern history. Other specifics must be folded in – as in the
impact of some of the major wars. The role of different regional cultures
and political forms in generating distinctive versions of some of the features
of industrial society – like gender roles – adds another kind of complexity,
as had been the case during the Agricultural Age. Modern world history
does in part involve simply tracing the emergence of key components of
industrial society in somewhat greater detail, attached to more specific
regions and chronologies. But additional factors must be explored as well.
One other point, by way of anticipation. Different regions of the world
not only engaged the industrialization process at various points in time,
amid specific regional traditions. Their reactions were also profoundly con-
ditioned by the power disparities that industrialization also enhanced – par-
ticularly before the later 20th century.
For the fact was that industrialization greatly increased regional differences for
many decades. Societies that industrialized relatively early had richer economies;
they were in a position to export more finished goods, while seeking a growing
range of cheap foods and raw materials. They also had more military power:
industrialization immediately increased capacities to produce armaments, while
further technical innovations steadily increased the lethality of weapons as well.
The West was the first beneficiary of these new advantages, but by the end of
the 19th century Japan was too – hence able surprisingly to defeat both China
and Russia in regional wars. Chapters 10–12 must trace the implications of these
new or enhanced power dynamics, as well as the broader processes of indus-
trialization and other major developments: here too a legacy lingers today.
Further Reading
For the big picture, Frederic Pryor, “Happiness and Economic Systems,”
Comparative Economic Studies, 51(3) (2009); Emma Griffin, Liberty’s Dawn:
A People’s History of the Industrial Revolution (2014); Peter N. Stearns,
Industrial Revolution in World History, 5th edn. (2020). On causation,
Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of
the Modern World Economy (2001); Robert Allen, The British Industrial
Revolution in Global Perspective (2009). See also Rudra Sil, Managing
“Modernity”: Work, Community, and Authority in Late-Industrializing Japan
and Russia; Linda Calabrese, “China and Global Development,” ODI
blog (2009); Peter N. Stearns, The Industrial Turn in World History (2016);
J.R. McNeill, Something New Under the Sun (2001).
10 Global Dynamics
Imperialism and Globalization before 1914
This chapter and Chapter 11 deal with what is often called the “long” 19th
century, running from the late 1700s until World War I in 1914. It was an
eventful period, featuring not only the launch of industrialization and the
first phase of its global impact, but also major political and social revolutions
in the West, successful independence wars in the Americas, the spread of
the abolition of slavery and formal serfdom, and the (temporary but painful)
collapse of China – to name a few highlights. The period ended with a new
surge of revolution in key societies outside the West, the first indications
that additional societies were mastering the industrialization process, and the
failure of the West itself to prevent a crippling world war.
This chapter, on changes in global interactions during these decades,
embraces three related themes: (1) the acceleration of the world economy
under clear Western dominance; (2) the new and final surge of Western
global imperialism; and (3) the first stage of essentially contemporary glo-
balization. We also offer a first step in introducing nationalism as a new
force. Major changes in the world’s labor systems fit within this framework,
which also constricted the results. In some ways, globalization offered
opportunities to major regions that might modify Western power – as in the
new idea that international conventions should reduce the worst excesses of
war; but in fact Western control of the process diluted its international
impact.
The World Economy

Patterns of trade and economic interaction in some ways simply intensified
trends already visible in the early modern period, including ongoing accel-
eration. But Western industrialization and new transportation technologies
introduced major innovations into the process.
A partial list of the goods carried in world trade, by the later 19th cen-
tury, gives an idea of the magnitude of change – though there were some
familiar staples from the early modern period. Thus, Western Europe,
increasingly joined by the United States, continued to export guns and
clocks. The United States became a bigtime arms exporter after the Civil
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-12
Imperialism and Globalization before 1914 155
War; the West largely monopolized clock and watch exports until Japan
jumped in after World War II.
But now, also, there was mass-produced cloth from the rising factories.
There were metallurgical products, soon including railroad engines and
rolling stock; Japan would rely on imports here until the early 20th century,
when it began to produce its own; but other countries depended on Wes-
tern capital equipment for an even longer period. Products of this kind
generated payment challenges for many societies, some of which had to go
into debt to cover the costs of the new imports. Even more important,
some of the products began to compete directly with traditional local
manufacturing: British textile exports were driving literally tens of thousands
of traditional cloth producers out of work in places like India and Latin
America by the early 19th century; many of these were women, and all had
been relying on traditional manual methods. This massive diversification
increased the West’s economic edge over the rest of the world for many
decades. Late in the period another round of factory products won global
attention, such as bicycles and even, for the more affluent, automobiles.
In return, the range and volume of cheap imports from other regions
steadily increased – it had to, to pay for the new imports; at the same time
Western industry needed more raw materials and Western consumers could
increasingly afford imported delights. Many areas greatly expanded their
focus on existing items. Thus, coffee production, and exports, grew in Latin
America and Africa, with forests cleared in the interior to make room.
African merchants, faced with a declining transatlantic slave trade, turned to
other products like vegetable oils. In many cases the production surge
tended to depress commodity prices, weakening the position of many of
these export ventures. Raw cotton also became a hot export item, with
many regions participating.
Other products entered the market. Rugs and other furnishings from the
Middle East became widely popular. This encouraged expansion of low-
cost craft manufacture, with many women workers, but also prompted the
creation of some factories that relied on low wages. Mineral exports soared,
as the West sought copper, diamonds, as well as precious metals; again,
various regions were involved. By the later 19th century, food products like
bananas and pineapples had gained wide popularity among Western con-
sumers. Also at the end of the century, oil resources, in places like Russia
and the United States, entered the export list, in Russia’s case, supple-
menting the expanding export of grain.
Overall, this pattern greatly extended the regional imbalance that had
already developed in the early modern period. Regional merchants and estate
owners in some of the commodity zones could make good money – though
some of the most profitable operations, like Chilean copper mines or South
African diamonds, were owned directly by Westerners. But the regions as a
whole suffered from the gap between the cost of desirable Western goods and
the prices and wages available in commodities production. A stark comparison
156 Imperialism and Globalization before 1914
highlights the gap: in 1800, the average Mexican had a standard of living about
2/3 that of a person in the United States; in 1900, it was 1/3, because of
divergent trends in both places.
Some significant new twists emerged. British merchants in the 1830s
finally found a way to break into the Chinese market, by importing opium
grown in the Indian colony. The Chinese government understandably
resisted, but British and other Western troops forced compliance, in the first
Opium War (1839). China’s balance of trade with the rest of the world
became unfavorable, probably for the first time in history. By the later 19th
century, other factory products poured into the Chinese market, including
clothing, again beating back competition from local manufacture.
Other countries that had previously held back were now compelled to enter
this dynamic but unbalanced world market. Japan and Korea, most notably, were
forced under the threat of Western naval attack to end their commercial isola-
tion – though the move quickly inspired a more dynamic economic response.
Particularly from the 1870s onward, improved shipping allowed several
regions to expand the export of grains and even meats without necessarily
depending on depressed wages. The United States, Argentina, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand took advantage of vast lands and mechanized
equipment to ship vast quantities overseas, particularly to Western Europe.
This was an important new component, and a durable one.
Finally, growing interconnections created one other new phenomenon:
global economic fluctuations. Briefly, in the 1850s, then more substantially
in the 1870s and at several later points, economic activity crashed. Often the
villain was speculative investment from banks (often in the United States);
bank failures triggered a more general decline in manufacturing in the West,
and this in turn caused a collapse in commodities imports, spreading pain
around the world. Economic oscillation was not new in human history, but
it had never before been global. Here again, a pattern was being set that
would continue, recurrently, into our own time.
Overall, this was a dynamic period in world economic history, and new
specific developments – some of them extremely important for particular
regions – kept crowding the field. The main point, however, was clear
enough: The volume of trade was greater than ever before and, despite
fluctuations, kept rising rapidly overall; but thanks to the huge indus-
trialization gap, it also increased regional inequality and, for many decades,
made it very difficult for many parts of the world to improve their chances.
Tariffs and Transportation

Basic developments in the world economy encouraged major innovations in
trade policies and, more important, transportation, that in turn fed the
unprecedented growth.
Amid expanding trade, tariffs became an important policy issue – and
they have remained so in the global economy. Decisions varied, but for the
most part Western countries tended to reduce tariff levels in the interest of
promoting commerce; Britain set the pace here, as the early industrial leader
was eager to export its goods and increasingly dependent on imported
foods. Outside the West, many countries were simply forced to keep bar-
riers low. Europe’s many colonies were obviously open to trade from the
home country. Defeat in the Opium War forced Chinese tariffs down, and
Western military pressure prevented the Japanese from setting their own
tariffs for several decades.
Changes in transportation were more fundamental, as they supported the
steady growth of trade. Transcontinental railroads in the United States,
Canada, and Russia, all largely completed during the late 19th century,
played a role here. Many Latin American and African countries developed
short routes, mainly to connect the production of commodities to the sea-
ports. Steamships were the real global staple, improving both speed and
volume of goods exchange. Pilot versions emerged in several Western
countries early in the century, but they needed so much fuel that they could
not go far beyond the coasts; the first steamship to try to cross the Atlantic
ran out of fuel midway and had to finish with sails. By the 1840s, however,
capacity had improved, and regular transatlantic lines developed, soon
complemented by other routes. Shipping companies also began to develop
timetables for their voyages, instead of making passengers and goods wait,
sometimes weeks, until a full load was available.
Improvements in technology and shipping organization were furthered
by two pioneering canals, which greatly shortened travel time, first between
Europe and Asia, second, between the American East Coast and the Pacific.
While the idea of connecting the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean
through Egypt had been discussed even in the classical period and again
amid France’s colonial expansion, it was only in the 1860s that the Suez
Canal actually came to pass, under British sponsorship though with French
engineering. This one change cut the travel time between India and Europe
by half, from China to Europe by 25%. The United States spurred the
completion of the Panama Canal early in the 20th century, prying off a
piece of territory from Colombia to do so.
The effective revolution in transportation was matched in communica-
tion by the invention of the telegraph, in 1837. This seems a humble system
today, compared with contemporary linkages, but it was huge at the time,
in allowing unprecedented and fast, if usually brief, communications over
vast distances. It facilitated new kinds of contacts between immigrants and
families back home. It transformed the global transmissions of news. It
obviously spurred trade, by allowing links among merchants and within
international business firms. While telegraph systems first spread in indivi-
dual countries, by the 1860s, links were set up between Europe and India,
and, in 1871, Australia and Europe were connected. The poet Rudyard
Kipling suggested the implications of this kind of transmission: “Men talk
today o’er the oceans. And a new word runs among them: ‘Let us be one’.”
With these new opportunities, a novel kind of commercial gathering
took shape, beginning with an exhibition in London in 1851: the interna-
tional trade fair. Here was an opportunity for the home country to show off
its industrial progress; for countries from around the world to display their
wares; and for tourists, mostly local but some from abroad, to marvel at the
profusion of goods now at their fingertips. World’s fairs provided both a
symbol and an encouragement for further exchange.
And the fact was, despite some crises, world trade grew at an unprece-
dented rate. Between 1870 and 1890 alone, shipping tonnage tripled. The
total value of all imports and exports rose fivefold between 1850 and 1900,
and almost doubled again by 1914. British exports continued to increase but
now at a slower rate because of competition from places like Germany and
the United States: American exports rose 200% in the final decades of the
century. Less valuable but even more voluminous, shipments from Africa
and Latin America soared as well.
Several historians have concluded in fact that the contemporary patterns
of rising global trade, and widespread dependence on imports and exports,
essentially began by the later 19th century. What has happened since,
though even more extensive and involving a host of new technologies,
merely builds on this precedent. The downside, of course, was equally stark:
the system at that point generated growing inequality among regions and a
huge dependence on cheap labor; deep traces of that remain today as well.
Labor, Migration, and Population

The labor aspect of the world economy deserves separate attention, because an
unexpected mixture of components emerged. The basic point, of widespread
exploitation, stands firm: commodity sales, particularly, required low costs to
remain competitive. But the 19th century also saw a major revolution in labor
systems, in which two of the most common arrangements from the Agri-
cultural Age were officially discarded. This was a huge development in its own
right in world history terms. But some of the results were disappointing at the
time and since, and the transformation did not systematically boost the material
position of workers on a global level – which will bring us back to the down-
sides of the world economy. On its face, the new emancipation of labor con-
tradicted the general exploitative trend, but in fact, for fairly obvious reasons,
exploitation ultimately won out.
Abolitionism
Highlights
Beginnings of the abolitionist movement, 1750s ff; Haitian revolution,
1791–1804; French Revolution bans slavery, 1793 (later modified); Britain
bans slave trade, 1807; Mexico bans slavery, 1820; Britain outlaws slav-
ery, 1833; first World Antislavery Conference, London, 1840; Ottoman
Empire bans slave trade from Africa, 1846; 1848 revolutions end serfdom
in central Europe; Russia emancipates serfs, 1861; Emancipation Procla-
mation in United States, 1863; Cuba abolishes slavery, 1886; Brazil
abolishes slavery, 1888; many Persian Gulf states abolish slavery, 1920s.
Slavery and serfdom were old institutions. They had not gone unchallenged
before modern times. Peasants frequently rose against serfdom, sometimes
with success – though the system persisted in many places. Individual
countries had banned internal slavery: Korea did so in the 10th century
(though slavery later returned); several European countries made the move
during the postclassical period. But there never had been a systematic
movement to abolish, and of course the institution expanded massively in
the early modern centuries.
The notion that slavery was immoral and evil, wherever it occurred –
what became known as abolitionism – began to take shape in places like
Britain and Scandinavia in the late 17th and 18th centuries. There were two
sources: deeply committed Protestant minorities like Quakers and Metho-
dists, and the new Enlightenment belief that all humans had what would
soon be called “inalienable rights” – beginning with the right not to be the
property of someone else. This was no mere intellectual exercise. Aboli-
tionists began to distribute pamphlets and books dramatizing the horrors of
slavery; a bit later the widely popular novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, became part
of this genre. Marches were held in British cities protesting the evils of the
institution. Massive petitions, with tens of thousands of signatures, urged
governments to take action. This was, essentially, the first big human rights
movement in world history.
Cynics have noted the irony of anti-slavery protests in places where fac-
tory workers were being exploited massively, and some businessmen may
indeed have encouraged attention to distant evils that might distract from
those next door. But there is no doubting the fervor and, ultimately, the
political power of the movement. What would come to be called “public
opinion” was just taking hold in the West, and slaveholding was one of its
first targets.
Along with this, enslaved people in some places took matters in their
own hands – partly inspired by Enlightenment ideals and the French
Revolution of 1789. Slave revolts occurred periodically, along with massive
escapes. In 1791, a literal revolution broke out in French-controlled Haiti,
ultimately headed by an inspirational former slave, Toussaint l’Ouverture –
the largest slave revolt in recent history. After years of fierce fighting, the
revolutionaries finally won out, gaining both national independence and the
end of the institution, declared contrary to basic human rights.
How much the Haitian revolution influenced anti-slavery efforts else-
where has been the subject of debate; in the short run, it led to new
defensiveness by slave owners in places like the American South. Also
debated is the extent to which people were beginning to believe that slav-
ery was economically inefficient in the dawning industrial age, by inhibiting
flexibility and motivation for workers. While it is certainly true that indus-
trialization advanced most quickly under a system of wage labor, slave
owners did set up factories directly in a few places.
What is indisputable is the fact that the moral and political arguments
against slavery made increasing headway. Britain effectively abolished most
of the Atlantic slave trade early in the 19th century, and then ended the
institution in its colonies in 1833. Many American states and several Latin
American nations took similar steps even earlier (Vermont, in fact, back in
the 1770s). The American Civil War was fought over slavery, and ended
with emancipation, beginning in 1863. Major landmarks after that involved
Cuba and Brazil, and the somewhat piecemeal, and later, end to the old
slave system in the eastern Middle East. European imperialist conquests in
Africa largely abolished the official slave systems there as well.
Anti-serfdom followed a somewhat similar trajectory. The French
Revolution abolished it outright; central European revolutions did the
same after 1848. Russians long debated. Some nobles who visited the
West wrote movingly that serfdom was both immoral and unproductive,
though many of their writings were banned. But Russia’s defeat by
France and Britain in the Crimean War in the 1850s convinced many
leaders that the nation needed a more flexible labor force that could
advance industrialization, and the result was the historic Emancipation of
the Serfs, proclaimed in 1861.
These were huge changes, in principle and in reality alike, adding up to
one of the great transformations in the course of world history. Yet their
effects were not as sweeping as the most ardent abolitionists had hoped:
many former slaves and serfs faced a variety of barriers that prevented their
full assimilation into the societies and economies around them.
Racism and Greed

Two problems were central. First, most emancipations left their beneficiaries
without the tools needed for full economic independence, and indeed new
semi-slave systems were quickly invented. Some of these developments fit
into the exploitative aspects of the world economy. Second, in many parts
of the Americas, particularly, racism generated political retaliation as well.
Russia’s emancipation of the serfs did not provide full access to land or
full mobility. Serfs had to pay an annual fee unless they bought themselves
out: the Russian government wanted to preserve the landed aristocracy
even amid major reform. This led to perpetual peasant discontent that ulti-
mately fed into outright revolution.
In the Americas, most emancipations gave ex-slaves even less access to
land, forcing them into low-paid labor or various kinds of sharecropping
arrangements that limited their bargaining power. Only in a very few places
in the American South did freed slaves get some land without great effort
on their part. The same problem arose earlier in British colonies like
Jamaica. The fact was that many abolitionists, though sincerely opposed to
slavery, did not pay much attention to the more complex problems that
ensued.
In many places also, people found ways to reconstitute forced labor
without calling it slavery. Belgian colonists in the Congo notoriously used
force, even torture, to compel Africans to work in the mines. Brazilian
estate owners for a while conscripted orphans to work at their pleasure, to
compensate for the loss of official slavery. And the problem continues into
the 21st century: it is estimated that up to 60 million people are held as
slaves in the world today, including some in places like the United States. In
sum, the abolition of the institution really mattered, but all sorts of remnants
and reinventions survived.
In the Americas, this was compounded by racist prejudice against people
of African origin. This already existed as an outgrowth of the early modern
slave system, but now it actually increased as a new way to defend White
privilege now that the divisive institution of slavery was gone. Beginning in
the 1870s, Southern states in the United States began imposing legal
restrictions on African Americans, effectively banning them from political
life and segregating a host of institutions; this was supplemented by direct
violence and intimidation by new groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. In the
United States North, and in Cuba and Brazil, racial barriers were slightly
more subtle, but people of African origin were largely relegated to the least
paid and least stable economic slots, and were also the most likely victims of
police intimidation. In Brazil, where overt racist attitudes were less blatant
than in the United States, a clear hierarchy emerged based on degrees of
skin darkness, which largely persists today.
There is no question, in sum, that the spread of abolition during the 19th
century was a major moment in world history, but no question either that
its effects, at least for many decades, were restricted in many ways. This in
turn helps explain why abolition had less effect on the overall world econ-
omy than might have been imagined.
Population and Immigration

For the need for cheap labor, particularly in the commodities-export regions,
persisted strongly, and there were various ways, despite the abolitions, in which
it could be met. One of the reasons, in other words, that abolition was accep-
ted as easily as it was – and there was often huge dispute – was because global
population conditions steadily expanded the supply of workers. Of course, the
reinvention of compulsion, as in the Congo, fit within that picture. So did the
extensive use of sharecropping and company stores that kept workers in the
American South or Central America in debt to their bosses, effectively still
unfree. But the underlying factor was labor supply. In many places – Brazil was
a prime example – when slavery ended, employers turned to a new source of
labor by encouraging immigration from regions like southern Europe.
Table 10.1 makes the obvious point: rates of global population growth
had been accelerating during the early modern centuries, thanks in part to
the new foods available; but the explosion during the long 19th century was
unprecedented: more than doubling human numbers in less than 150 years.
Better food production was clearly involved. So was improved distribu-
tion: one of the results of trains and steamships was the ability to move food
into areas of local famine more quickly than ever before. There were still
parts of the world where this network had not yet developed, but it spread
steadily. Finally, at least by the later 19th century, new public health mea-
sures began to have results in some regions, beginning with the West:
reductions in child mortality not only boosted the population directly, but
meant that more people lived to childbearing age – in other words,
increasing the pool of available parents even if the per capita birth rate itself
dropped a bit.
Most regions were involved. West European population soared during
the 18th century, and while birth rate reduction slowed the process in the
19th century there was still considerable growth. Rates in southern and
eastern Europe began to take off. Most Asian countries participated strongly.
There were simply more available workers, in more places, than ever
before.
The result was a new wave of migration, innovative and important in its
own right, that explains why the wheels of the world economy kept
churning – with cheap labor where needed – despite the concomitant
efforts to ban slavery and outright serfdom. Steamships contributed strongly,
carrying greater numbers over longer distances – with the exception of the
earlier Atlantic slave trade – than ever before.
Several features were particularly striking: sheer numbers; the mixing of
peoples from different parts of the world and especially the rise of new
migration from Asia; and, for some, the opportunity to return home.
Table 10.1 World population growth

Year Number of people
600 CE 200,000,000
1000 275,000,000
1500 450,000,000
1760 770,000,000
1900 1,600,000,000
Source: Worldometer: www.Worldometers.info
About 50 million Europeans went to the Americas (both North and
South) plus Australia and New Zealand from 1850 to 1914, increasingly
involving southern and eastern Europeans, including many Jews fleeing new
Russian persecution. About the same number of Chinese traveled, some to
Southeast Asia, but others to the Pacific coasts of both American continents.
Thirty million Indians went to various places, particularly in Southeast Asia,
the Caribbean, and southern Africa. The Japanese and Filipino exodus was
also considerable. Movement from the Middle East was less substantial, but
some merchants fanned out to Africa and some Arab and Turkish workers
reached North America.
Most of these immigrants entered the working class, mainly in the cities,
though some set up small shops, and after the first generation chances for
upward mobility improved. American companies directly recruited, some-
times paying for passage, to meet rapid growth and to relieve pressure on
wages: steel companies reached out to Slavic workers, the railroads brought
in Chinese for construction. In some cases, as with Indians going to the
Caribbean, many workers signed contracts of indenture, pledging work for
seven years, an interesting adjustment to the decline of slavery.
Most of the immigrants stayed. But steamships allowed a surprising
number to return home, if they judged they had made enough money to
establish themselves or if they simply didn’t like their new environment. Up
to half of all the Italians who came to the United States thus packed up,
often in some disgust. This was an interesting development because it could
bring new influences to their regions of origin. Many returnees were in fact
thoroughly disliked, showing off some money and talking about American
ways; but they could have some impact even so.
Population growth and new patterns of immigration must be assessed
beyond their service in supplying cheap labor. Immigrants often played a
creative role in their new societies. Over time, wages would go up in many
countries; even at the time, in places like Canada or the United States,
though immigrants were deliberately recruited to reduce wage pressure,
industrialization allowed some improvements in living standards. Culture
was affected as well, though immigration could also provoke new pre-
judices. Thus, the Chinese influx to the United States brought the arrival of
the Chinese restaurant, initially designed to serve railway laborers but later,
adapted to American taste, a staple of American dining. But racial bias and
fears of competition prompted laws banning further Chinese arrivals, from
1881 onward until after World War II. Complexities of this sort must be
folded into evaluation of the world economy by 1900, and would become
even more important in what is a much more challenging analysis of the
economic and cultural impact of globalization later on.
By 1900, the overall world trade package was already intriguing. Trade
was up massively, as the new transportation technologies solidified and as
Western industrialization created new products and new resource needs.
Literal slavery was mostly gone, and the geographic mobility of labor
increased as never before. But the process was also marked by the inequal-
ities, both among major regions and among social groups within each
region, affected as well by prejudices both new and old. Benefits could be
found for some, but they were unevenly distributed.
Western Imperialism
The long 19th century was the great age of European imperialism on a
global scale – indeed, it turned out to be a final burst, before becoming
more widely challenged after World War I. To be sure, the period opened
with the American Revolution and then the Latin American wars of inde-
pendence, which pushed colonial control out of much of North America
and virtually all of the Southern continent. Only Canada and the Caribbean
remained as major holdings. These were vital developments – as discussed in
Chapter 11 – and they could certainly help inspire later independence
movements elsewhere. But they turned out to be atypical for the rest of the
century.
There is no particular mystery about why Western nations were able to
take over territories that had previously escaped them. Better shipping
allowed more rapid movement of larger numbers of troops; steamships also
allowed Western forces to move upriver in places like Africa and China,
which facilitated penetration.
Weaponry was crucial. New factory methods greatly accelerated the
manufacture of handguns. One of the first applications of the idea of
developing interchangeable parts – taking shape both in Britain and the
United States early in the 19th century – was to facilitate the production of
rifles and pistols. Several historians have recently argued that the desire for
more weapons was a major reason for the commitment to industrialization
in the first place. Technical improvements added in. More mobile cannon
allowed use in land warfare – something the great French general Napoleon
seized on in his conquests in Egypt and Europe. Repeating rifles allowed
more rapid fire and loading, compared to the clumsy muskets of the early
modern period. By mid-century early versions of the machine gun con-
tributed as well. And of course steamships could develop more massive
artillery – culminating in the battleship, the pride of major Western fleets by
1900.
All of this meant not only that Western troops could reach more places
more quickly, but they could also defeat local forces that massively out-
numbered them. Here was the secret to the success of small handfuls of
Western forces against the Chinese, or in Africa, or in the westward
expansion of the United States and Canada. The early modern period had
established Western naval superiority. This was now further enhanced, but
superiority in land warfare was the more decisive change.
And the same weapons edge explains – frequently along with some
careful internal alliances – why small groups of Westerners could rule vast
territories with relatively limited European personnel – only two or three
thousand in some large African colonies.
Two other developments factored in. Improvements in medicine helped
Westerners better withstand tropical diseases, crucial in Africa or even for
the building of the Panama Canal. And, as before, Western advances were
often facilitated by local divisions and opportunities for alliance.
Aside from occasional temporary setbacks, Western forces were rarely
defeated. British efforts to exert some control in Afghanistan simply failed.
Ethiopian troops defeated Italian invaders in 1896 (the Italians returned in
the 1930s). Otherwise there was some hard fighting – French advance in
Algeria took time, beginning in the late 1820s; a French-British alliance
defeated the Russians trying to expand toward the Middle East in the 1850s
but at cost to both sides; the British bogged down a bit fighting Dutch
settler opposition in South Africa early in the 20th century. And Westerners
simply did not try to conquer some places outright: they put military pres-
sure on Japan and there were a few clashes, but made no attempt at inva-
sion; there was no effort to conquer the Chinese interior; and there was no
campaign to tackle the Ottoman Empire or Russia head on. And despite a
bit of interference, there were no frontal challenges to the newly indepen-
dent Americas. Otherwise – in Africa, Southeast Asia, Oceania – where the
West wanted to go, it went (Map 10.1).
Motivations
The question of why the West wanted this kind of expansion is more
challenging, and it occasions considerable debate.
Here’s the problem. The dynamics of the world economy were such that
it is no mystery why the West wanted access to wider markets and raw
materials sources. But Western nations did not actually have to control
regions politically and militarily to obtain this access. Latin America after
independence showed that economic dominance of commodity-producing
areas was fully possible even when they were politically independent. To be
sure, Europeans occasionally sent a few gunboats into Latin American har-
bors, for example, to insist on the payment of debts, but this was the
exception.
This said, there is no question that many Western leaders believed that
their industrial economies needed new colonies and careful protection of
those already in hand. Remnants of older mercantilist ideas entered in here.
There were three overlapping arguments, and all of them could inspire
great passion. First was the notion that, since growing industry needed vital
raw materials, some unavailable in the West itself at least in adequate
quantity, individual nations must control the sources of supply. And of
course it was true that many colonies, old and new, were exporting grow-
ing amounts of copper and other minerals, as well as textile components like
cotton. And Western management of colonies in the 19th century placed a
Map 10.1 Empires by 1914

premium on expanding supply, as in the Portuguese effort to use its hold-
ings in Mozambique to increase the growth of raw cotton.
The second was a markets argument. Growing industry needed secure
outlets for its rapidly expanding production, and there was real concern that
internal demand would not suffice. Colonial powers often tried to surround
their colonies with tariffs that would prevent easy import of goods made in
other industrial nations; here was where older mercantilist ideas entered in
most strongly.
The third economic argument was new: With expanding wealth, Wes-
tern countries needed secure locations for further investment, where they
could win higher interest rates than were available domestically.
The problem is that it is not clear that any of these arguments was really
correct, requiring imperialist control instead of more competitive transac-
tions – of the sort that now occurred in Latin America. The investment
argument, particularly, has been shot down: Western countries actually
invested more in other industrial or industrializing countries – the United
States drew massive European investment in the 19th century – than in the
actual colonies. Many historians believe that managing the colonies actually
cost more than the territories returned, though this is really hard to
calculate.
Adding to the economic motivation was the fact that individual advocates
of imperialism could make a lot of money with government backing. Cecil
Rhodes in southern Africa, for example, made a huge fortune in diamond
mines and other ventures, and was a staunch advocate of the economic
importance of British colonial expansion. (Rhodes is one of the imperialist
giants whose statues have recently been torn down amid student protests in
South Africa.) Somewhat ironically, imperialism also provided opportunities
for some Westerners who were actually beginning to feel uncomfortable
back home, like aristocrats who were increasingly being crowded out by
middle-class strivers but could wield new power overseas.
Again, there is no question that the colonies were exploited to serve
Western industry and as a venue for direct operations by Western business-
men. Thus, Western-owned diamond mines in Africa were complemented
by more modest operations such as sugar refineries. The debate centers on
whether outright imperialism was essential to the process; Western owners
were also making good profits in places like Russia, where direct foreign
imperialism played no role.
Racism factored in. We have seen that many Europeans gained a sense of
superiority over the rest of the world in the early modern period, and this
was greatly enhanced in the 19th century, when the West really did dom-
inate militarily and economically. Many Westerners took to regarding some
Asians and Africans, for example, as “effeminate,” probably because they
had been defeated, and often rather easily defeated, in war.
Racism was given a further extension, and pseudo-scientific backing, after
the 1859 publication of Charles Darwin’s great study, On the Origin of
Species. Here was the first full exposition of the theory of evolution, a major
scientific advance though one that caused great religious controversy, espe-
cially for faiths like Protestantism or the more literal forms of Islam that
depended heavily on a close reading of scripture (whether the Bible or the
Qur’an). But Darwin’s work was quickly distorted by others, who applied
his ideas about species competition and survival of the fittest to what they
claimed were the different races of humankind (despite the fact that, of
course, they were all part of a single species). Superior races had the right
and obligation to defend their superiority (as well as their racial purity), not
only by outcompeting but by dominating inferior rivals. Detailed taxo-
nomies were issued of the rank order of racial standing: Nordic Whites
tended to be first, followed by other European groups like the Irish, Latins,
and Slavs, followed by literally all people of color. Jews were also low down
the list.
This kind of thinking, still alive today, was used to justify massive dis-
crimination within Western societies, concerning immigrants, for example.
But it actively spilled over into imperialism as well. For it seemed to follow
that racially superior Westerners had such an obvious right to dominate
inferior races that imperialist expansion needed no further justification. But
some added that Westerners had a racial duty – the famous “white man’s
burden” – to rule over others, to prevent them from causing harm and,
possibly, gradually to elevate them to more civilized ways. The “burden”
argument was bolstered by claims that Western imperial control would end
local wars and even halt slavery – as imperialists insisted they were doing in
Africa.
Racism not only justified imperial expansion. It could underwrite
exceptionally cruel methods once control was established. Thus, it was a
German colonial government in southwest Africa that punished a rebellion
by the Herero people by forcing thousands of them into the desert where
they would die – an early case of modern genocide. Even aside from this
kind of violence, racism could justify riding roughshod over local tradi-
tions – by definition, inferior – as well as pressing workers into low-paying
jobs.
A distinctive gender component contributed to imperialist discrimination
as well. Early colonial expansions had been staffed by largely male officials,
who often developed sexual liaisons in their new setting – some casual,
some more intense. Later in the 19th century, however, the expansion of
colonial staffs, plus the medical improvements that made it easier for Wes-
terners to live in the tropics, brought a growing group of colonial wives to
join their husbands. These were in turn eager to make sure their husbands
toed the line, encouraging greater separation from the “natives” and
encouraging beliefs that, if not supervised, local populations were sexually
unrestrained and immoral – another sign of inferiority.
One final factor – and it may actually have been the most decisive one –
explains why Western nations pressed forward with imperialism so rapidly.
Weapons made it relatively easy in many cases; economic arguments and
opportunities for personal profit clearly played a role; racist thinking, with
varying degrees of harshness, was a constant backdrop. But atop it all was
the fierce nationalist rivalry among Western nations themselves, now trans-
ferred more fully than ever to the world stage. Many Western leaders had
long assumed it was obvious that governments should expect frequent war
against neighboring countries, and global implications had already been clear
in the early modern period. But now there was an even bigger playing field.
The competitive situation was exacerbated toward the end of the 19th
century by the entry of ambitious new players: Germany, newly unified and
increasingly industrial, was the clearest entrant; many German leaders clearly
believed that a great power as Germany now was must be graced by colo-
nies. But the United States also entered, and by 1900 Japan was knocking at
the door. Italy, another newly unified European country, was also a player,
though their ambitions surpassed their results.
In this context, one imperial move seemed to require countermoves by
all relevant rivals. If France got a new part of Africa, Britain must match it
(the popular press, rabidly nationalistic, made this a matter of national
honor) – and vice versa. Britain became increasingly concerned as well with
matching Germany. China was another place where if one nation got
something, others (in this case, including Russia) must gain a match (the
United States, however, found itself a bit late in the China game, so it cri-
ticized European aggression instead). A variant of the competitive rationale
held that getting a new colony was vital to protect the old ones. Britain
devoted much energy to trying to make sure that no one else’s holdings
would jeopardize their stake in India. Competition exacerbated by nation-
alism played a huge role in the imperialist scramble. Only after 1900 was it
clear that there was no new territory to grab, which began to turn the
competition back to Europe – with devastating effects.
Before this, however, for almost a century, Europe’s traditional belligerent
jockeying had moved to a global level, where it seemed relatively safe – less
likely to provoke major war now that Europe itself had filled with so many
ambitious rivals. It was true that, from a Western standpoint, major war did
largely disappear for decades after 1815. This would not have been the view,
however, of many of the people in the newly-conquered holdings.
Who Got What Where

By the late 18th century, even as Spain and Portugal were about to lose
their main Latin American colonies and Britain had forfeited part of North
America, European holdings remained extensive. Britain had India, and
would tighten its controls in the 19th century amid some pushback; the
Dutch had Indonesia; Spain retained the Philippines; Portugal had Angola;
Britain had Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and was about to get
South Africa from the Dutch; and so on.
France got the new round of imperialism going in the late 1820s, by
invading Algeria. The French king wanted to put an end to Mediterranean
piracy and he also wanted glory and popularity back home (this didn’t
work; the king was soon displaced by a new revolution, but the French
pressed on in Algeria). Over the next century, North Africa would be
carved up by the French, Italians, and British, with French Morocco one of
the last acquisitions of the imperialist era.
Sub-Saharan Africa saw the greatest scramble, mainly in the second half
of the 19th century. This is where the European powers really outdid each
other in rivalry. France and Britain took over major holdings in West
Africa; Belgium got the Congo; Britain and Germany competed for
expansion in southern Africa. Except for Ethiopia and Liberia, the whole
subcontinent was carved up. And it was important for later that the new
colonial boundaries were almost always arbitrary, with no correspondence
to traditional ethnic or religious alignments.
Southeast Asia was another focus. The French took over Indochina
(today, Vietnam and its neighbors); Britain, always worried about India’s
flanks, acquired Malaysia, Borneo, and Burma, and exercised influence in
the Thai kingdom. The Dutch, no longer expansionist, held on tightly in
Indonesia.
Pacific Oceania seemed fair game. Germany as well as France and Britain
acquired new island holdings, and here the United States moved out at the
end of the 19th century, taking over Hawaii and several other island groups
and, in a war with Spain, seizing the Philippines. (The Spanish War also
brought the United States control over Puerto Rico.)
China was a different story, remaining technically independent though amid
growing European interference. But in another late 19th-century scramble,
Britain, France, Germany, and Russia all acquired long-term leases over various
regions along the Pacific coast (in the British case, including the city of Hong
Kong), which they administered for a time in an essentially colonial fashion.
China was thus deprived of some of its most important territory, raising an
interesting question – particularly compared to British India – as to whether it
actually fared worse than some of the outright colonies.
Early in the 20th century, Japan began to flex its new muscles, taking
over Korea. Japan’s rise was one of the reasons the German emperor, not
exactly subtle in his racial phrasing, began talking about a new “Yellow
Peril.”
The Middle Eastern core of the Ottoman Empire was untouched, partly
because, so close to home, European rivals could not agree on how to carve
it up. But various countries, including Germany, gained growing influence.
Russia, though challenged in international competition, was regarded as a
European power for military and diplomatic purposes. And of course the
independence of the Americas complicated the global map. Overall, how-
ever, this was an unprecedented disruption of established regional patterns
and relationships, in favor of direct Western control.
Consequences
Many of the consequences of imperialism must be dealt with in terms of
individual regions – in Chapter 11. The expansion of colonies indeed raises
a new set of comparative questions: how did the experience of colonies in
Africa, for example, differ from that in India, and with what implications
even for the present day?
This said, a few general points are possible, and relevant to the wider
discussion of global change.
In the first place, it is important to remember that imperialism affected
the West itself. It could deepen rivalries – French-British antagonism was
not new but it certainly gained new targets; Britain’s resentment of the
German challenge had a lot to do with colonies. Like slavery earlier,
imperialism in part resulted from racial attitudes but it also extended them,
combining with the new pseudo-science. More prosaically, many con-
sumers in the West became accustomed to easy access to some of the pro-
ducts the colonies produced.
In the colonies themselves, Western motivations and policies varied a bit.
The French prided themselves on being more racially tolerant than the
British. They were eager to recognize colonials as equals if they acquired a
fully French education. The British were slightly less inclined to move
native residents into the higher reaches of government service, though they
used them widely in the lower ranks. Unusually, in Morocco, the French
installed a general who was really appreciative of regional culture, eager to
make sure it was not trampled by outside interference.
This said, it is important to remember that in virtually all the colonies the
Europeans were bent on economic profit. They supported those elements
of colonial agriculture and manufacturing that made commercial sense in
the global economy. They provided major opportunities for Western busi-
nessmen directly. This did not mean that there were no local opportunities.
Significant new Indian-owned companies, for example, in metallurgy,
emerged during the period of British control in the 19th and 20th centuries.
But the economic angle loomed large.
A second general feature involved the care that colonial officials usually
took not to offend local sensibilities too deeply. There was a clear tension in
many places between Westerners’ belief in their own superiority and the
obvious fact that, with Western personnel stretched thin, it was important
not to provoke resistance unnecessarily. The result, in many cases, was far
less cultural change than might have been imagined. Nowhere – in contrast
to Latin America earlier, where depopulation due to disease created a partial
vacuum – was a brand new regional culture created as a result of the new
imperialism. Novel influences were really important, and there were some
important culture clashes, but so was a degree of caution. Many traditional
practices that Westerners found offensive were largely ignored, for example,
India’s caste system.
Another aspect of the nature of imperial rule was a need to exploit divi-
sions in the local population, often by recruiting allies that would win pri-
vileges over other groups. This was important at the time, and it could
breed huge resentments that would pour out later. Tensions among ethnic
groups within several African colonies were a case in point. The British hold
in India frequently involved treating Hindus and Muslims as separate
groups, again with important implications for the future.
While the period of Western rule limited local opportunities for political
or governmental experience in many cases – though there were variations
in the degree of exclusion – opportunities for military service were impor-
tant. Everywhere, colonial regimes recruited local troops to help keep
order. This meant that a number of men were exposed to new kinds of
training and weaponry. They often took real pride in their service, but later
on some would be in a position to provide, or insist on, new leadership
when the colonial overlords were displaced.
Finally, in almost all the new colonies or near-colonies, imperial control
provided opportunities for various kinds of Western reformers, as well as
businessmen and officials. Christian missionaries fanned out everywhere,
now (in contrast to the early modern period) including Protestants as well as
Catholics. These had varying degrees of success in converting local people –
little in India, for example, but much more in parts of Africa or Oceania –
but they had other offerings as well. Many sought to import new medical
procedures. Others sought to reform key local practices even beyond out-
right conversion: Christian missionaries in China, for example, helped gen-
erate opposition to the old practice of footbinding. Many founded local
schools or even small universities, sometimes deliberately seeking to include
female students. In some cases, the do-gooders actually annoyed colonial
officials, who sought to avoid challenging too many local habits; in some
cases as well, they worked hand in hand with Western business interests, as
in mission schools in Africa that enlisted students to work in sugar cane
processing or other export industries. But without exaggerating their influ-
ence, they could be a source of some change.
The new imperial period left a complex legacy. It altered political
boundaries. It introduced some new cultural components. It certainly
extended regional economic inequalities, to the advantage of the West. It
also created new resentments, sometimes even a sense of humiliation, amid
the loss of local power and the unavoidable signs of the Western sense of
superiority.
Globalization
Historians debate when the framework for contemporary globalization
really began. Important precursors had taken shape earlier, in the post-
classical and Mongol periods and certainly with the trade patterns of the
early modern centuries. But all of these precedents also featured limitations,
including technological constraints, that separate them from the full phe-
nomenon. This said, a good case can be made that the real change from
“older” to “modern” globalization emerged during the long 19th century –
partly because of the first phase of industrialization – and particularly after
1850. This in turn is one of the central features of the global history of the
same era, alongside imperialism and interacting with it in various ways.
The revolutionary developments in transportation and communication
provided the basis for a fuller process of globalization. So did the new pat-
terns of immigration and, even more, of trade.
Travel changed, even aside from the wider migrations. Though still lim-
ited, a growing number of individuals – mainly Western – began to travel
to different parts of the world simply for pleasure and tourism. Beginning in
the 1840s, new travel organizations, first in Britain, began to provide orga-
nization for international trips.
Popular culture began to be more widely shared. For the first time, sports
interests became international. American baseball caught on in parts of the
Caribbean and Latin America, and also in Japan; an amateur Japanese team
beat a US navy squad in the 1890s, causing great joy locally. Even more
important was the dissemination of soccer football. British businessmen
started playing in Argentina in the 1860s, and fashionable Argentine units
soon sprang up in imitation. Russians brought the first knowledge of soccer
to China around 1900, from contacts around the city of Harbin (they also
imported the first movies). The international soccer federation was set up
soon after 1900 as well, a sign of the growing global interest and the need
to assure standards across borders, though the process of dissemination
would not reach regions like the Middle East until the 1920s.
The revival of the Greek Olympic Games in 1896 was another crucial
marker – but with limitations that were also revealing. The French founder
of the modern games really believed that global sports competition could
promote greater understanding and inhibit wars. But for several decades
essentially the only participants were Western. And overall, the global-
Western imbalance would remain an important feature of international
sports for quite a while.
Artistic globalization was a more limited development, mainly involving
greater Western awareness of other regional styles with incorporation into new
work. Both African and Japanese traditions, displayed in museum exhibits,
inspired Western painters from the group known as Impressionists onward.
Imitation of clothing, on the other hand, went from the West to other
regions – a process already begun in the Russian upper class. Japanese poli-
ticians carefully dressed in Western suits. So did Hawaiian royalty by the
end of the 19th century. The spread of department stores to Moscow, and
then to Tokyo or Shanghai, again before 1900, brought greater upper-class
awareness of Western products, though there were many locals who simply
found this uninteresting, even aside from barriers of cost. Still, the process of
globalizing dress and other consumer tastes was at least underway.
Beyond trade itself, the most important indication of advancing globali-
zation – and a more innovative category – centered on what might be
called organizational globalization, as governments and professional groups
began to form regular interactions that either downplayed regional bound-
aries or explicitly negotiated mutual understandings. The list here is con-
siderable, reaching into a range of activities, and many of the new steps both
expressed the expanding ties and promoted even more exchange. There was
literally no historical precedent for the types of institutions and range of
effort involved.
A number of arrangements focused on trade issues or business arrange-
ments more generally. Thus, in 1883, the Paris Convention on Intellectual
Property established a system whereby an inventor or author could file for
an international patent or copyright protection. In a world where copying
technologies was increasingly easy, this was a vital move – not always
enforced everywhere in subsequent decades, but important nevertheless. A
number of detailed agreements also sought to clarify rights at sea, to limit a
classic source of disputes.
An intriguing innovation, important for business but personal life as well,
facilitated what amounted to an international postal service. Previously, the
only way to mail a letter across borders was to entrust it to a traveler. In an
age of mass migration, global transactions, and growing literacy, this clearly
made no sense. Both the United States and Germany began making noises
about a new system in the 1860s, and this led to what became the Universal
Postal Union in 1878. Each signatory country agreed to honor the postage
of the sending country, so a letter or package could pass seamlessly from one
place to the next. This was a vital change, particularly for the growing
number of immigrants (and immigrants’ letters back home are one of our
best sources for their history around 1900).
Time was another issue amid faster ocean travel and growing reliance on
shipping schedules. By the later 19th century, many individual countries
were agreeing on time zones, so that railway users would have the ability to
calculate arrivals and departures even on east-west cross-country trips,
through many different phases of the sun. International negotiations sought
to extend this arrangement to the whole world. Several proposals were
floated in the 1870s, and there were nagging disputes – particularly between
Britain and France – about whose capital would have the privilege of being
global time zone number 1. Ultimately the Brits won, and a Washington
Prime Meridian conference in 1884 agreed that Greenwich, England,
would set the standard on which other zones were based. The conference
did not have the authority to define zones in other parts of the world, and
these actually emerged gradually, with some regional variations (China and
India, for example, ultimately decided on single zones despite their huge
size). India under British rule signed on fairly quickly, and so did New
Zealand and Australia. The conference also agreed that, everywhere, the
day would begin at midnight: previously different regions had varying
customs, some starting at dawn, others at noon. But in a globalizing world,
it was important to have a single system.
Time arrangements also highlighted the unspoken tension in this impor-
tant stage of negotiations: all the action centered on Western initiatives and
privileged Western systems, though it was interesting that the United States
was now a full partner with Western Europe.
Along with trade and travel, science offered an inviting global focus.
More and more conferences grouped scientific specialists from many coun-
tries – particularly the West, but not always exclusively. The idea of pooling
statistical data across national lines was appealing. A US naval officer spurred
a meeting of meteorologists in the 1850s, and this led two decades later to
the formation of the International Meteorological Association, which
actively shared weather information and generated more accurate forecasts.
Use of the telegraph was vital in this sort of coordination. Researchers in
medicine, public health, and criminology also met frequently, for here again
pooled data could greatly improve analysis.
The interest in global coordination in the health field went further. The
19th century was still afflicted with frequent epidemics – cholera was a key
villain, but not the only one. Growing trade and travel increased the risk of
imported disease. Purely national responses were inadequate. New attention
was devoted to the possibility of coordinating quarantines, particularly
against the typical disease transmission from India to the Middle East to
points west. Quarantining was not new – the term derives from the idea of
making ships wait 40 days to unload, when a plague was spreading – but it
had always applied only to local restrictions. But in the 1830s, an Egyptian
reform leader, Muhammad Ali, convened the first international quarantine
conference to discuss wider arrangements for ships in transit. Regular
meetings began in the 1850s, on the initiative of French public health offi-
cials, and they continued into the 20th century. Here there were no deci-
sive agreements. A lot of time was spent wrangling over national preferences
and particularly a Western complaint that societies like the Ottoman Empire
were hopelessly backward compared to the centers of real civilization. Still,
the fact that countries like Russia and the Ottomans were actively involved
was a step forward, and during plague years some interim quarantine
arrangements were agreed upon. A new, international Red Sea Sanitary
Service was set up to try to assist Muslim pilgrims to Mecca with sanitary
precautions. And all of this was in addition to regular conferences that dis-
cussed research findings on diseases like cholera, or the latest in urban public
health measures.
An obvious target in an age of growing global coordination was the issue
of war, though here there was admittedly more talk than action. From the
late 18th century onward, a variety of intellectuals and pacifist groups dis-
cussed the need for an international governing body to handle disputes
peacefully – though there was some revealing disagreement about whether
governments outside the West were “civilized” enough to participate.
More concrete steps resulted from the tireless initiatives of a Swiss engi-
neer, Henry Drumont, to reduce the suffering of war itself. Dumont had
visited troops injured in the wars for Italian unification in the late 1850s,
and he was appalled at the treatment of injured soldiers and prisoners of
war. He mounted a vigorous publicity campaign aimed at international
protections, and enlisted the support of many government leaders and also a
host of prominent intellectuals. The result was the first Geneva Convention,
in 1864, that set standards for the treatment of wounded soldiers, even from
enemy ranks, and of captured troops. Many nations signed on over time,
initially from Europe but the pool steadily widened; Japan, for example,
joined in the 1890s. These agreements would be periodically expanded and
renewed and are still in force today.
Closely associated with these agreements was the foundation, in 1863, of
the International Red Cross (and, soon, a sister Red Crescent group from
the Islamic regions), designed to provide medical assistance and other relief
across borders in times of war or natural disaster. The idea of extending
humanitarian aid internationally, even outside the efforts of formal religion,
gained ground as well.
More ambitious moves not only to regulate the conduct of war but to
make war itself less likely did not make great progress. Various countries
talked about the possibility of agreements to limit weaponry – Russia took a
lead here, partly because it had difficulty keeping up with the cost of the
arms race – but nothing happened. Russian and United States leaders did,
however, help trigger the formation, in 1899, of a new Permanent Court of
Arbitration, located in The Hague. The aim was to provide a regular
mechanism to facilitate resolution of international disputes without resort to
war. In the years before 1914, the Court focused mainly on quarrels over
property or debt payments among European and Latin American coun-
tries – an important step, but obviously short of a major change in interna-
tional relations. Two interventions, however, helped resolve quarrels
between France and Germany (over Morocco) and France and Italy, so
there was some hope that even the great powers could take advantage of new
global facilities to reduce the potential for war. Many optimists believed that a
corner had been turned, after a century of considerable peace within Europe.
They were soon proved wrong, but this did not mean that the more limited,
concrete measures that had been achieved were meaningless.
A final area of global political activity, broadly construed, involved efforts
at international coordination for various human rights campaigns. This
would lead to the formation of what, today, would be called international
non-government organizations (INGOs), a major part of contemporary
globalization, though the term itself is more recent.
The initial target was slavery. Western reformers wanted to attack the
institution wherever it existed, not content with legal abolition in their own
country alone. Thus, a first “World Congress” was held in London in 1840,
and a new international anti-slavery society was established – the first global
human rights organization in world history, still operating, though with a
different name, today. Later in the century other groups formed with more
specific targets, like the forced labor system in the Congo, but with inter-
national membership and support.
Two other rights areas sought global traction before 1914. Both tried to
enlist the force of international opinion behind their goals, and both
recognized that some of the problems they were tackling went beyond a
purely national level.
This last was particularly true for labor, where international competition
as well as local conditions affected matters like pay levels and hours of work.
Several kinds of international labor organizations emerged, including the
first Workingmen’s International formed by Karl Marx in 1864. A later,
Second International (1889) focused in part on shared trade union issues,
such as working hours, with particular attention to groups like longshore-
men directly involved in global trade.
Feminist internationalism emerged seriously in the 1880s, when several
groups were formed beyond informal collaborations, as had occurred with
American and British feminists for several decades. Even in 1864, a
Swedish feminist, Marie Gregg, organized an International Association of
Women, which held several congresses. The later groups made an even
more explicit effort to recruit at least token delegations from places like
China and Iran. One proclaimed a goal of mobilizing public opinion to
“produce the necessary revolutions in the minds of people, the people of
the whole civilized world.” And while goals like national voting rights
were high on the agenda, there was a directly global issue as well, in
mounting concern about sex trafficking of Western women – called the
“white slave trade.” Governments in many regions were pressed to take
action.
The global rights initiatives were truly important, as a recognition that
some problems were human, and not just local or national. And they made
genuine headway: slavery was widely abolished, partly because of moral
pressure; many Latin American governments, accused of harboring sex traf-
fic, tightened laws on prostitution; China’s moves against footbinding
reflected global influences. International labor had a bit less to show, though
the effort to coordinate campaigns for 10- or 8-hour days played a role in
national reforms. The idea of influencing policy through “world opinion”
was not entirely hollow.
However, most of the actual efforts were disproportionately Western,
with at best a smattering of representatives from other areas. Further, many
Western advocates themselves looked down on other societies: thus Mex-
ican feminists at the end of the19th century complained that their American
sisters, dropping down to advise, while fully engaged in women’s rights also
commented abundantly on the inferiority of Mexican conditions and the
need for US women’s leadership to get anything done – including advice
on how to do feminism properly.
And this in turn was indicative of the standard limitation of all the glo-
balization moves at this point – important as they were. They did not
challenge Western supremacy and they often assumed it in relations with
other societies. The intermingling of Western dominance and genuine glo-
balization would be hard to sort out, and some issues still linger today.
****
A minor innovation that emerged in the 19th century and would persist
to some degree shows the new importance of the world at large but also the
assumptions of Western dominance. It became increasingly fashionable in
the West to use the “world” label to designate activities that were really, or
at least primarily, Western, as if the two terms intermingled. Thus there
were world conferences that included no one outside the West, world’s fairs
that at most had a smattering of wider representation. One of the more
durable results was the term “World Series” for baseball, coined in 1903 for
an event that, at that point, was not just American alone, but White.
Nationalism
One final global development during the long 19th century must be intro-
duced, into what is admittedly a rather complicated set of simultaneous
developments. The period saw the beginnings of nationalist loyalties, and
their expansion to most major regions in the world. The idea of a “globa-
lization of nationalism” is more than a bit ironic, but it actually happened.
Fuller details of the rise of nationalism can be left to regional accounts,
and the implications for globalization would become much more important
in the next world history period than they were in the 19th century itself.
Still, a trend should be noted.
A few preliminaries attach to the introduction of nationalism:
1 It was a new loyalty. The idea of group identity, and differentiation

from others, was not at all novel: we have seen it in attitudes to “bar-
barians” or religious attachments that identified nonmembers as infidels
or heretics, and the list could be extended. But most nationalism
combined a belief in belonging to a distinct cultural group, sharing
history and often language, with a fervent political bent, a conviction
that one’s culture should have its own state and that one’s state should
be reinforced by cultural cohesion. Traditionally, most states before
modern times were either “sub-national,” city-states or princedoms
smaller than the cultural unit; or they were “multinational,” embracing
a variety of cultures. The nation-state form began to emerge most
clearly in early modern Western Europe, and nationalism as a loyalty
followed on.
2 Nationalists do not have to believe that their state and culture are better
than others. In the 19th century, many liberal nationalists, deeply
attached to their own country, also argued that everyone should have a
nation, and this idea cropped up again later. But there is a temptation
for nationalists not only to identify “others” but to sneer a bit; this can
be particularly pronounced when nationalism becomes attached to
racial beliefs. But there is a variable here to keep in mind.
3 Purists note, quite correctly, that nationalism is almost always partly
“invented”: the idea of a clearly defined national culture does not
spring forth automatically. Nationalists always have to decide if internal
minorities – like Jews – belong in the national culture or not. They
usually create some national historical memories that are part fabrica-
tion. A good US example is the partial myth of the origin of Thanks-
giving (which became a national holiday during the Civil War, in an
effort to beef up national loyalty). This does not mean that nationalism
is wrong or bad, just that it invites critical appraisal.
Full-blown nationalism first emerged in Western Europe in the 18th

century, alongside Enlightenment faith in humanity, and it had nothing
initially to do with global alignments. Some intellectuals began to argue that
there was something distinctive about, say, German culture that deserved
attention. The French Revolution after 1789 both focused and expanded
nationalism – it was no accident the revolutionary France produced the first
national anthem. Revolutionaries argued that since the state now belonged
to the people, rather than king, church or aristocracy, the people in turn
owed active loyalty. The idea could catch on elsewhere. Then French
armies invaded places like Italy and Spain, and local resistance was often
framed in terms of nationalism. The idea began to solidify. More generally,
nationalism served a rising middle class by providing a loyalty that was dif-
ferent from aristocratic beliefs, and it might also help people moving from
countryside to city find a comforting sense of identity now that local tradi-
tions had faded.
During the first decades of the 19th century proper, many European
nationalists focused on issues like trying to figure out how to unite Italy or
Germany, still divided into subunits, and this would provide powerful
motivation for several protest movements and regional wars.
It was at this point also, however, that nationalism began to spill beyond
Western Europe and add more global implications in the 19th-century
context. Most immediately Americans, both North and South, began to
import nationalism to justify their rebellions against colonial control. It is
not clear that there was much American nationalism in what became the
United States before the revolution of 1776; many White colonists regarded
themselves as English. But once independence was achieved, it seemed vital
to create a more active sense of separate national identity – distinguishing
the United States from “Old World” habits, and this became a major pro-
ject. Then, by the early 19th century, some Creole leaders in Latin America,
fully versed in the latest European ideas and inspired as well from the
North, used nationalism to explain why Spanish colonial control must be
cast aside and then to try to shape loyalties to the newly-independent states.
In other words, nationalism began to be a global cultural-political export.
This use of nationalism to explain why multinational boundaries or colonial
controls were unacceptable became a major theme from the 19th century
onward. Greeks and south Slavs sought their own nations against the con-
trol of the multinational Ottoman state. Japan, as it entered its reform
period after 1868 but worried about Western influence, used nationalism to
keep its identity separate and to instill greater loyalty to state and emperor.
By the 1880s, nationalism emerged in India, rather mild at first, but begin-
ning a process of using this new identity to claim the need for new rights
under British control, and ultimately for national independence.
For nationalism proved to be a great argument, and often a passionate
one, in the century of imperialism – and beyond. It could create fervent
emotion and potentially unite groups otherwise divided by religion or social
position (a big issue in India) or even gender. And in principle it was
recognized by Westerners themselves, though they did not always readily
admit it. If you could remind a French or British overlord that you were
simply asking for something they already believed in, it might be a little
hard to ignore your claims entirely.
The interaction between nationalism and imperialism became a major
world history theme from this point until the later 20th century, with
echoes beyond. Implications for globalization were initially less apparent.
But there was implicit tension. It was more than a bit ironic that the same
century that birthed modern globalization also created new attachments to
the idea that the world should be splintered into all sorts of smaller units
with deep, separate loyalties, and sometimes mutual suspicions, attached. A
dance between nationalism and globalization began in the 19th century and
continues vigorously to the present day. More specifically, the 19th-century
version of globalization, clearly Western-dominated, invited nationalist
pushback, and this would become clear soon after 1900.
Legacies
Global patterns during the long 19th century changed a great deal, though they
did not obliterate earlier continuities, including regional inequalities. Almost all
the new developments would leave a durable mark. New global links and
institutions would persist and amplify in succeeding decades: there is a straight
line, for example, from the international health conferences of the 1850s and
the World Health Organization today, both bent on trying to find new ways
to limit global contagions. The new imperialism was shorter-lived, but rem-
nants persist directly, and the memory of past indignities at the hands of the
West burns bright. Racist pseudo-science took a hit after the disasters of the
1930s but it is not gone, and racism itself certainly remains an issue, globally as
well as domestically. Nationalism certainly proved durable.
Most intriguing perhaps is the extent to which the contradictions or
tensions among the 19th-century global trends are still recognizable today.
The mixture was and is not impossibly complex, but it is not harmonious.
So the world still debates where nationalism stops and globalization begins,
or if they can coexist at all. Concern about the memories of imperialism
remains an active force. Globalization and world economic inequalities
continue to complicate the international scene. Major changes since the
long 19th century are hugely important, but they build on an active
heritage.
Further Reading
Michael Graff, A.G. Kenwood, and A.L. Lougheed, Growth of the Interna-
tional Economy (2013); John McCusker, ed., History of World Trade since
1450 (2005); Stephen Fox, Transatlantic: Samuel Cunard, Isambard Brunel,
and the Great Atlantic Steamships (2004).
On abolitionism, William Mulligan and Maurice Bric, eds., A Global History
of Anti-Slavery Politics in the Nineteenth Century (2013) and Seymour
Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery (2009). See also
Peter Kolchin, Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom (1990).
On migration, Patrick Manning, Migration in World History, 3rd edn. (2020).
On imperialism, Priya Satia, Empire of Guns: The Violent Making of the
Industrial Revolution (2018); A.G. Hopkins, American Empire: A Global
History (2018); Krishan Kumar, Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial
Regimes Shaped the World (2019). On racism, George Frederickson,
Racism: A Short History (2002); Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin Isaac, and
Joseph Ziegler, The Origins of Racism in the West (2009).
On globalization, Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A
Global History of the Nineteenth Century (2015); Kevin O’Rourke and
Jeffrey Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nine-
teenth-Century Atlantic Economy (2001). On nationalism, Florian Bieber,
Debating Nationalism: The Global Spread of Nations (2020). See also Peter
Stearns, Human Rights in World History (2012).
11 Regional Patterns and
Comparisons in the “Long”
19th Century
There is a temptation, turning to the major regions during the decades that
run from the late 18th century to 1914, to assume that the only differ-
entiations that count were those between the industrializing West and the
hapless rest of the world. Unquestionably, Western influence and inter-
ference and the pressure of global economic change reached every area. But
impacts and responses varied greatly, depending both on precise relation-
ships to the West and the ongoing impact of earlier traditions. Comparative
challenges changed, but they did not disappear beneath some homogeniz-
ing Western pressure.
Every region had a story to tell. The West itself, though heavily focused
on the industrialization process, also experienced an unprecedented series of
political revolutions and introduced some major cultural innovations as well.
A group of kindred “settler societies” matured during this period, largely
within the Western orbit. Latin America, newly independent thanks to
campaigns early in the 19th century, worked to define political and cultural
styles. Imperialism affected Africa beyond redefining political boundaries
and economic focus; even the end of the Atlantic slave trade was a new
challenge to this region.
Russia and Eastern Europe danced intriguingly between efforts to assim-
ilate some new Western influences, particularly after 1850, and attempts to
maintain separate values and institutions. In the Middle East, the Ottoman
Empire was buffeted by a rising tide of separate nationalisms, while under-
taking some major reforms without undermining the sultan’s political con-
trols. South and Southeast Asia were certainly in the imperialist grip, but
managed to carve out greater cultural autonomy than might have been
imagined. This was a tumultuous period in East Asia: Japan unexpectedly
proved to be quite vigorous in addressing a forced return to the world
economy, while China experienced one of the great collapses of its long
history. Finally, a number of regional developments coalesced in setting the
stage for an unprecedented world war.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-13
Regional Patterns in the “Long” 19th Century 183
The West
Highlights
Revolutions, 1776–1849; British settlement of Australia begins, 1788;
reign of Napoleon, 1799–1815; European colonization of New Zealand,
1826ff; Union Act reorganizes Canada, 1840; writings of Karl Marx,
1848ff; unification of Italy, 1859–60; unification of Germany, 1864–71;
American Civil War, 1861–65; spread of compulsory education laws,
1870ff; new European alliance system, 1879ff; height of Impressionism in
art, 1880s; German social insurance laws, 1881–89; women’s suffrage in
New Zealand, 1893.
For many observers at the time, and historians since, the long 19th century
in the West kicked off not with industrialization but with the wave of
uprisings sometimes collectively called the “Atlantic revolutions.” The
American War of Independence launched the process. It was followed in
1789 by the French Revolution, one of the great risings in world history in
what was then Europe’s leading nation. French revolutionary armies spread
revolutionary changes to adjoining parts of Western Europe. Subsequent
though smaller revolts occurred in several Western countries in 1830 and
again in 1848. Amid this ferment other societies introduced major changes,
like the British Reform Act of 1832 that gave the vote to most middle-class
males. The revolutionary tide ended by 1849, and a period of greater con-
solidation followed.
This unprecedented wave featured a variety of issues. Americans sought
freedom from colonial control, and in 1830, Belgians won independence
from Dutch control: so nationalism was involved. Many groups attacked the
aristocracy. Germans and Italians in 1848 sought national unity, and Hun-
garians wanted a state of their own. Middle-class people demanded greater
voice, peasants in many countries sought more access to land and a full end
to serfdom. These were not, in the main, fully democratic risings, because
middle-class people feared an unchecked popular vote – even in the United
States, suffrage fully expanded only later, even for White males. And while
the revolutions prompted some women to ask for new rights, gender issues
were not deeply involved.
Amid this diversity, the common thread was the power of new ideas
about the state and society. From the Enlightenment came new claims
about human rights, and almost all the revolutions pressed forward toward
greater religious freedom, in some cases reducing the power of the estab-
lished church, plus freedoms of the press, speech, and assembly. Repre-
sentation was a big issue: the revolutions generally led to a more consistent
emphasis on the power of parliaments (elected usually with limited suffrage)
184 Regional Patterns in the “Long” 19th Century
to check the executive – usually still a king, but not always, as the idea of
“republics” gained ground as well. Legal equality was crucial: all people
should have basic rights, and the aristocracy as a legally privileged group
essentially disappeared in much of Western Europe.
Levels of social change varied: the United States, for example, resolutely
ignored the issue of slavery, though some northern states began to abolish
the institution. But serfdom was eliminated through most of Western
Europe. So were the old artisanal guilds, which opened the way both for
more rapid technological change and for greater exploitation of the artisans
themselves. Here was a key connection between the revolutionary wave
and the advance of industrialization, particularly on the European continent.
Revolutions offered high drama, often over several years. The French
uprising, particularly, was marked by fierce internal resistance and the use of
political violence – the famous “Terror,” complete with ample deployment
of the new device, the guillotine, to execute opponents, including the king
and queen. Opposition to revolution helped galvanize conservatives in
Europe for over a half century – which helps explain why additional revo-
lutions kept cropping up. But the revolutionary legacy also inspired liberals,
who continued to press for basic political freedoms plus other reforms,
including an expansion of state education and, often, wider voting rights.
The age of revolution was also marked by cultural change, as writers and
artists sought new styles and themes against older classical conventions.
Novelists were able to appeal to a wider readership. Stylistic innovation
became a hallmark of Western art, particularly when the new technology of
photography reduced the need for literal reproduction of objective visual
reality.
Finally, the most intense disruption, around the French Revolution, also
brought a new round of European war. Several European monarchs inva-
ded France to try to beat back the revolution, and in return the French
revolutionary government organized a powerful army, based on universal
military conscription of able-bodied young men, which not only chased
them back but invaded several neighboring territories. This was followed by
the rise of Napoleon, as a post-revolutionary leader, who consolidated
aspects of the revolution in France but also embarked on massive invasions
which would take French armies as far east as Russia, in 1812. A coalition
of most European leaders finally defeated Napoleon, but the European map
had been significantly disrupted – and the power of nationalism had been
enhanced in response.
A major peace conference in 1815 concluded the Treaty of Vienna,
which restored most French borders but led to new powers for some lead-
ing states within Germany and Italy. Careful diplomats followed a principle
of balance of power, trying to make sure that no one country could again
threaten the rest of Europe. The various trade-offs of the Treaty did help
keep the peace in Europe for many decades, but they deeply disappointed
nationalists in central Europe. Their wishes were finally realized later
through brief wars, which first united most of the Italian states and then, by
1870, finally birthed a unified Germany. Hungary, though not fully inde-
pendent, gained greater recognition as well. The overall result displaced
France as the continent’s leading power, capped by a brief but nasty war in
1870–71 that forced the French to yield some territory to Germany. A
German-French rivalry was born that would last for 80 years, while Britain
looked nervously at the German upstart as well.
Developments after 1848 and the national unifications mainly featured
consolidation of some of the earlier political and social changes plus the
increasing impact of ongoing industrialization. Though specific structures
varied from one country to the next, most Western societies had function-
ing parliaments by the later 19th century, with considerable protection for
civil liberties. Religious freedom increasingly included full rights for the
Jewish minority. Voting rights expanded, ultimately including most adult
males. Liberals dropped some of their reservations about mass voting, while
conservatives learned how to compete in political campaigns, sometimes by
using strongly nationalist arguments. These developments built on the
demands of the revolutionary era, and at the same time reduced the need
for that kind of protest going forward.
The later 19th century featured some new challenges for Western Chris-
tianity, though religious commitments remained important for many, and
missionary activity actually expanded in the wider world. Some Protestants
felt newly challenged by the rise of science, and particularly by the sweep-
ing theory of evolution, which seemed to run counter to a literal reading of
the Bible; heated debates ensued. Catholic leadership had trouble coming to
terms with the more liberal political structures, including full religious free-
dom; in 1867, the Pope issued a sweeping condemnation of many modern
trends. In several countries quarrels over religion spilled into educational
policy, where the role of the state increased steadily – along with greater
emphasis on science.
The late 19th century also witnessed important new scientific discoveries
relevant to daily life. Farmers benefited from new research on fertilizers and
crop yields. Public health research and advocacy prompted massive reforms
in urban sanitation, including the development of underground sewers to
handle waste. The discovery of the germ theory by Louis Pasteur in the
1880s gradually changed the practice of medicine, with huge benefits for
child and maternal mortality. Discovery of anesthesia opened a new chapter
in the practice of surgery. Not surprisingly, many Westerners increasingly
equated science with progress.
Nationalist competition and industrialization itself prompted changes in
military policies, though again there was variety from one country to the
next. The high casualty rate of the American Civil War – as many as
750,000 troops killed – showed how the use of industrial armaments was
changing the nature of warfare, though ironically this message was not
picked up clearly by European observers. As tensions increased in Europe
after German unification, more countries expanded their armies by mass
conscription. Armaments expenditures increased. Heavy industrialists – most
obviously in Germany – encouraged governments to buy more sophisti-
cated weapons. An outright arms race emerged between Germany and
Britain over building more battleships.
On the internal political scene, the rise of what was called the “social
question” became the most pressing issue overall. Urban workers, rapidly
growing in numbers and now blessed with a vote, increasingly sought
government support in dealing with issues like hours of work or job safety.
At the same time, the rapid expansion of large corporations, particularly in
banking and heavy industry, raised new concerns about protecting the
ordinary citizen. Trade unions expanded everywhere, and massive industrial
strikes punctuated every decade after 1870, on both sides of the Atlantic. In
Western Europe – though less in the United States – strong socialist parties
also developed. In many countries, the writings of Karl Marx helped inspire
a particularly aggressive socialist movement. Marx saw a growing clash
between rising capitalism and the growing working class; the only resolution
was revolution, which would create a new and just society where rough
equality and full political freedom would prevail. Most Marxist parties in fact
proved willing to work for major reforms, rather than holding out for revolu-
tion alone, but their doctrines and the passions they inspired put further pres-
sure on established governments. The rise even of reformist socialism
complicated the political spectrum in most European countries, along with the
older competition between liberal and conservative elements.
The response – to measurable working-class problems and to new socia-
list demands – was a growing commitment to novel kinds of limited social
reforms. Germany took the clearest lead in the 1880s, hoping to deflect
socialism by offering new welfare programs that provided some insurance
protections against accident, illness and old age, an interesting first step in
what would later become a fairly standard set of social measures. More
generally, factory inspections improved, while enforcement of child labor
restrictions became more systematic. All of this represented a significant
change in the standard political agenda. The role of governments expanded
substantially.
In fact, the continued extension of industrialization was bringing a greater
measure of prosperity to many factory and white-collar workers, though
huge problems of poverty remained. The later 19th century saw the inten-
sification of mass consumerism in the West, yielding more varied diets as
well as better health conditions. A new mass press developed, often with
screaming headlines about the crisis of the day, taking advantage of wider
literacy and the ability to afford a daily paper. Attendance at popular thea-
trical shows and sports events soared, while new distractions like amusement
parks and, by 1900, silent movies drew excited audiences as well.
One final issue commanded growing attention: the rise of political fem-
inism. Women’s advocates, drawn disproportionately from the middle class,
increasingly demanded new economic rights, including protection of prop-
erty; new access to higher education and the professions; greater protection
for female workers and some regulation of prostitution; and – increasingly –
the vote. Their arguments built on the older Enlightenment goals of legal
equality – now expanded to gender – but also on claims that women had
special moral qualities that, if given political voice, would uplift society as a
whole. Feminist agitation became increasingly pressing in places in Britain
and the United States, sometimes involving selective acts of violence.
On top of the changes established during the age of revolution, the var-
ious pressures of the late 19th century – arguably, expressing key implica-
tions of an industrial society for the first time – set a durable agenda for the
future, along lines that still resonate today. Western societies were estab-
lishing standards through which governments would be evaluated, at least in
part, by their response to economic and social problems, and in which
gender issues became increasingly prominent.
The Settler Societies

Even in the early modern period, Western institutions and cultures were
beginning to extend to other parts of the world, most obviously the British
colonies of North America. During the long 19th century, thanks to further
European imperialism but particularly the high rate of emigration from
Western Europe, the list of societies with large, European-origin popula-
tions grew. Argentina and Brazil, for example, received growing numbers of
Italians as well as Spaniards and Portuguese. New settlers joined existing
European clusters in South Africa and what is now Zimbabwe; Italian and
French émigrés established enclaves in parts of North Africa. To some
extent, these groups extended the reach of some key Western values,
though in Africa they formed only a minority of the population as a whole.
In several major cases, however, the European presence was so exten-
sive – thanks to the decimation of native populations as well as continued
immigration and close interaction with Western Europe – that Western
civilization itself simply expanded geographically. Former and existing Brit-
ish holdings in North America remained a key case in point, but so now did
Australia and New Zealand, as major settlements began to be established
from the late 18th century onward.
There were of course important distinctions between these settler socie-
ties and the European West, and it remains fruitful to discuss whether a
Western civilization umbrella fully fits. The United States was now politi-
cally independent, and its specific patterns diverged somewhat from those in
Western Europe – among other things, there was less socialism; religion, in
contrast, remained a more vigorous force, as American faiths arguably
benefited from an early separation between church and state – another
contrast with much of Europe during the 19th century – and a greater
continued attachment to religious values. All of these settler societies, unlike
Europe, were deeply affected by their continued expansion into indigenous
territories, and their heavy-handed treatment of the native populations that
remained. All, again in contrast to Europe itself, were immigrant-receiving
societies, mixing distinctive cultures and ethnic groups. And all depended
heavily on agricultural and mineral exports, though they industrialized as
well. None – again, in contrast to Europe – had an entrenched aristocracy.
Further, each settler society had its own distinctive profile. The United
States had its deep legacy of slavery and attendant racism. In New Zealand,
European settlers battled the Native Maori population in several bitter wars,
but after a final Maori defeat in the 1860s somewhat better relations were
established, with Maoris winning some representation in parliament – a
somewhat distinctive twist on the larger challenge of setting policies toward
the original peoples.
Despite these real complexities, these settler societies clearly participated
in common Western patterns during the 19th century and beyond, in sev-
eral ways. In the case of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the overlap
was enhanced by their special status among British colonies overall. Eager to
avoid additional colonist rebellions, the British granted increasing measures
of political autonomy to all three countries; Australia’s proclamation of a
unified federal nation, on the first day of the 20th century, capped what was
a basically similar process in all three British dominions.
Participation in common patterns showed in political and social dynamics
alike. Along with Western Europe, for example, these settler societies
established similar demographic profiles during the 19th century, with
slowing birth rates but also, between 1880 and 1920, a dramatically falling
rate of infant mortality. They all had some variant of a parliamentary system.
They shared with Europe the leading technologies in transportation and
industry alike. They participated in similar artistic and literary styles; many
writers, for example, spent considerable time in Europe, enhancing the
borrowing process. The settler societies also eagerly shared in many of the
Western-dominated features of globalization, such as the Olympic Games.
Again, these overlaps must not ignore special features, such as the African
American contribution to artistic culture in the United States.
In a few domains, finally, the settler societies were providing some lea-
dership for innovations that soon became more general in the West, by the
end of the 19th century. This was particularly true in the area of women’s
rights. The settler societies shared with much of West a rising feminist
movement, but some responses came first in the more fluid conditions of
these frontier regions. Thus, the US territory of Wyoming pioneered in
granting women’s suffrage, in 1868; New Zealand became one of the first
whole nations to do the same, in 1893. By 1900 also, the United States,
now the largest industrialized consumer society in the world, was also
beginning to export products and styles that strongly influenced patterns in
Western Europe itself, with Hollywood soon on the way to becoming the
movie capital of the world.
Latin America
Highlights
Wars of independence from Spain, 1800–25; Brazilian independence,
1822; Mexican-American War, 1846–48; beginnings of railroad construc-
tion, 1850s; War of Triple Alliance (against Paraguay), 1865–70; Cuba and
Brazil abolish slavery, 1886–88; republic in Brazil, 1889; beginnings of
Panama Canal, 1903.
Just as the long 19th century in the West began with a burst of revolutions,
so Latin American history in the period effectively starts with the wars for
independence – and some of the key causes overlapped. The most specific
spur came from widespread grievances of the Creole class, largely excluded
from political power from the mid-18th century onward. But Creole dis-
sidents were also powerfully inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment and
the example of US independence and the stirring French Revolution. Lea-
ders like Simón de Bolívar deeply believed both in the justice of national
independence and the opportunity to set up a liberal, parliamentary state to
replace colonial rule. Finally, early in the 19th century, the Spanish regime
itself was disrupted by Napoleon’s invasion, and unable to respond effec-
tively until it was too late.
The wars were just that, primarily military actions against Spanish forces.
Though there were ambitious political goals, this was not outright revolu-
tion: most ordinary people, including the enslaved, the indigenous groups,
and the mestizo populations, were not actively involved, and there was little
appetite for social change. The political results, however, were substantial:
most of Latin America emerged independent from Spain, and most of the
new nations decided on a republican form of government. Mexico briefly
considered setting up its own monarchy, but decided against it. The process
of Brazilian independence was slightly different, and an imperial structure
was set up; here too, by the 1880s, the nation transitioned to a republic.
The triumph of republican government through most of the Americas was
an important change, the first step in what would become later an interna-
tional trend away from monarchy.
Many of the new nations in Latin America, having achieved indepen-
dence, faced serious difficulties in establishing political stability (Map 11.1).
In several cases ambitious plans for a large federation disintegrated because
of internal disputes. Thus, a proposed “United States of Central America”
collapsed into smaller units – still the pattern today. Bolívar had hoped for
an entity that would embrace present-day Colombia, Venezuela, and part of
the Andes region, but this too fell apart. The lack of deep national traditions
within the initial boundaries was a problem that would take time to resolve.
Map 11.1 Latin America after independence
There were other issues, and some of them turned out to be typical of
the challenges that new nations would face in other parts of the world later
on, when decolonization became a global phenomenon:
1 Many of the new states lacked experienced leadership, precisely because

the Spanish had kept most Creoles out of power.
2 Independence disrupted economic patterns. Most specifically, Spanish
retreat left markets open for the penetration of British factory goods, at
the expense of local manufacturing.
3 Deep social problems were unresolved, including inequalities between
Creoles and other groups. This contributed to wide disagreements
between liberals and conservatives about what kinds of policies should
replace colonial rule. Liberals, though not ardent social reformers,
wanted to expand secular education, reduce the power of the Catholic
Church in favor of religious freedom, and defend other freedoms
through constitutional, parliamentary government. Arrayed against
them were powerful forces centered on landed estate owners, Church
leaders, and military groups. Many countries faced a seesaw situation
through the 19th century and beyond, where liberals would hold
power for a decade or so, only to be forced out by conservatives, who
in turn would have to yield a few years later. The fact that Latin
American liberals were more hesitant than their Western counterparts
to extend the vote to lower-class groups, remaining suspicious of mes-
tizos and indigenous populations, added to the tension.
Besides recurrent instability, a frequent result of this situation was the

advent of one-man rule, called caudillismo after the Spanish word for leader.
Caudillos sometimes imposed order at least for a while. Bolivar himself,
though a sincere liberal, fell back to a more authoritarian approach toward
the end of his political career because of the instability caused by opposing
factions and the impossibility of winning wide agreement on a liberal
agenda. An authoritarian leader in Argentina in the 1830s provided some
aid to the urban poor, while also favoring ranchers and brutally crushing any
political opponents. Toward the end of the century another strongman,
Porfirio Díaz, took the helm in Mexico for several decades.
The gloomy political picture should not be pressed too far. Regimes in
several places worked to improve conditions for indigenous peoples. Under
liberal rule, Mexico extended its educational system, and, in general, Latin
America expanded education more rapidly than did many other countries
outside the West. Several regimes sponsored railroad development and
encouraged some factory industry, and some overall economic growth
occurred particularly later in the 19th century. After the authoritarian period
in Argentina, a new liberal government sponsored considerable prosperity,
based particularly on new opportunities to export meat and other animal
products to Western Europe; this is turn allowed rapid expansion of the city
of Buenos Aires as a major urban hub.
The region’s position in the wider world was complicated. On the one
hand, there were relatively few attempts to reassert some kind of colonial
power. Early in the 1820s, the United States issued the “Monroe doctrine,”
warning Europeans to stay out of the New World (the Caribbean aside).
This was probably less important than the role of the British navy in
enforcing freedom of trade and access. France briefly interfered in Mexico
during the US Civil War, but was expelled by Mexican forces. European
gunships periodically threatened action to make sure debts were paid. The
biggest problem, however, turned out to be the rising United States. Ter-
ritorial quarrels brought war with Mexico in the 1840s, which stripped
Mexico of Texas and other holdings in the southwest. After 1900, Amer-
ican military intervention periodically affected Central America as well as
the Caribbean. A Mexican president described the power imbalance
poignantly: “Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United
States.”
On the other hand, despite the role the military played in the internal
affairs of many countries, there was very little classic inter-state warfare. A
nasty clash involving Paraguay in the late 1860s was an exception, but
overall the modern history of Latin America was and is remarkably free of
the kind of mutual belligerence that was a standard feature in Western
Europe.
Liberated from Spanish and Portuguese control, Latin America developed
more elaborate cultural expression, often in close interaction with intellec-
tuals in Europe – particularly France. A number of novelists emphasized
themes involving native peoples and local cultural styles. Important work in
Cuba after 1850 dramatized the plight of enslaved Afro-Cubans. Argenti-
nian writers glorified the life of the gaucho, the Argentinian cowboy. Con-
siderable scholarship was devoted to writing Latin American histories, again
as a means of establishing a distinctive cultural identity. Much of this work
reflected larger Western styles, while reflecting the more regional themes.
A constant tension divided elite tastes from those of ordinary people.
Many urban elites, mainly Creoles, patronized European musical and artistic
styles. The city of Buenos Aires was expanded expressly on a European
(particularly Parisian) model of city planning and architecture. Elites also
emphasized their official adherence to Western moral standards and family
values, criticizing the lower classes and indigenous groups for their failure to
measure up.
At the same time, popular arts and music and dance styles often flour-
ished, demonstrating great creative vitality. Family patterns reflected older
patterns, including relatively high rates of illegitimacy but also some com-
munity oversight over children, whether legitimate or not. In Brazil, along
with the strength of Catholicism, interesting religious fusions developed
mixing Catholic, African, and indigenous themes.
Larger social patterns tended to be less flexible. Basic conditions for
women changed little, in upper and lower classes alike. The power of hus-
bands and fathers remained considerable; legal structures remained highly
traditional. When change did occur, it often disadvantaged ordinary
women: in Mexico, for example, law courts during most of the 19th cen-
tury did not harshly punish women who killed an infant, recognizing that
they were frequently victims of sexual violence; but later reforms on a more
European model began to increase the penalties. The expansion of educa-
tion did begin to advance female literacy; Mexico City, for example, began
requiring girls as well as boys to go to school in 1842. New opportunities
for women teachers resulted, and, in general, women played important roles
in the urban labor force. More generally, even after the abolition of slavery,
pronounced economic inequalities and deep gradations according to skin
color persisted strongly; while a large, mostly mestizo peasantry saw little
change in material conditions or even agricultural technologies.
Continued dependence on the Western-dominated world economy was
a persistent constraint – and the growing shadow of US business added to
this framework. Periods of prosperity were quite real, particularly in the dec-
ades around 1900 and featuring a major expansion of exports and significant
urban growth – particularly but not exclusively in the port cities. Variations
among regions were important: the smaller nations of Central America, for
example, were far more vulnerable to external pressure than larger units like
Mexico. Still, no country broke through to full industrialization. Many were
heavily dependent on the activities of Western companies, not only to handle
foreign trade but also in direct ownership of mines and landed estates. Many
countries, seeking investment funds to expand ports or railroads, went heavily
into debt to Western banks. Growing amounts of land and labor were devoted
to producing commodities like coffee or rubber, amid frequently falling prices
as well as considerable environmental damage.
Strengths and weaknesses added up to a Latin American civilization that
was changing rapidly in some respects. Connections with the West were
close, in culture as well as economic dependence. Shared liberal values were
not insignificant. On the other hand, economic and social conditions were
distinctive in many ways. Religion remained more important than was
characteristic of much of Western Europe, and while intellectuals were
linked to Western science and social science, these elements were less fully
developed. In several regions, including Mexico, the continued strength of
indigenous communities, and their ability to resist (sometime violently) too
much external pressure were another distinctive feature. Overall political
patterns, though reflecting Western influence, remained distinctive as well.
Russia and Eastern Europe
Highlights
Napoleon’s failed invasion of Russia, 1812; growing Serbian nationalism,
1829ff; Greek independence, 1831; Crimean War, 1854–56; Romanian
virtual independence, 1856; Emancipation of Serfs, 1861; Bulgarian
independence, 1878; anarchist assassination of tsar and end of reform
period, 1881; Russo-Japanese war, 1904–05; Russian revolution of 1905;
Balkan wars, 1912–13.
The long 19th century saw a distinctive blend of change and continuity in
Russia and Eastern Europe. Defining the boundary lines of this civilization
region was – and is – complicated by political divisions. In addition to
Russia itself, Poland was clearly part of the region; the Poles briefly gained
independence during the Napoleonic Wars but the Congress of Vienna
restored control of most Polish territory to Russia, though Polish national-
ism surged as well. Hungary and the Czech regions were held by the
Hapsburg (then the Austro-Hungarian) monarchy, again amid growing
Hungarian and Slavic nationalism. Crucial political changes occurred in
the Balkans as more and more of the region won independence from
the Ottoman Empire, thanks to revolts, wars, and Western and Russian
pressure.
This was the period, in fact, when outside of Russia itself, East-Central
Europe began to be chopped up among smaller and often rivalrous political
entities, making much of the region a potential trouble spot amid the jos-
tling of larger European powers.
The political divisions were serious, and divisions also continued between
Orthodox and Catholic Christianity. There were, however, some common
themes. First, Russia, the giant of the region, frequently claimed leadership
over the whole Slavic territory, looking at the smaller Slavic nations, parti-
cularly in the Balkans, as “little brother Slavs” (another impulse that still
shows up sometimes today).
Second, nationalism developed in the region early in the 19th century
and it burned bright –which of course also divided the individual countries,
often bitterly resentful of each other.
Third, the region remained heavily agricultural, with a strong landed
aristocracy. Russian industrialization was a serious matter, including factory
growth in Poland; and the Czech region developed significant heavy
industry. But even here, and certainly in Eastern Europe as a whole, agri-
culture and the importance of large estates persisted, marking also an often
bitter division between peasant and landlord. Agricultural exports continued
to form one of the key links between the region and the larger world
economy.
Finally, though there was some imitation of Western parliaments in the
Balkans and Hungary, the region remained heavily monarchical. Russia
strongly emphasized the power of the tsar. Amid many tensions in Austria-
Hungary, loyalty to the emperor and his family was often surprisingly
strong. Each of the new Balkan nations was given a new king – usually
drawn from a German princely family. Liberal political forces existed, but
they usually took a back seat to monarchy and nationalism.
Within Russia itself, two continuities were particularly noteworthy. First,
Russia remained an expansionist society, but primarily overland; except in
pressure on China it did not participate in wider imperialist rivalries. Wars
in Central Asia continued. Several conflicts pitted Russia against the Otto-
man Empire. Here Western powers sometimes intervened, nervous about
Russia penetration of the Middle East and, in the British case, worried
about pressure on India (Britain and Russia also competed, inconclusively,
for influence in Afghanistan). The Crimean War, most notably, forced the
Russians to back down from some of their gains. On the other hand,
Russian influence in northern China increased steadily, ultimately bringing
Russia and Japan into conflict. Only Russia’s sale of Alaska to the United
States was a retreat of sorts, which later regimes surely regretted. This was
not a quiet century for Russian foreign or military policy.
Russia’s ambiguous cultural relationship with the West was the second
persistent theme. On the one hand, Russian intellectuals interacted exten-
sively with their Western counterparts. In turn, Russia now contributed
actively to what might be regarded as a common culture: major novelists
and musical composers were extraordinarily productive. Liberal and other
dissident politicians kept close Western contacts – many were in fact exiled
to the West – and this ultimately included the embrace of Marxism by one
of the leading socialist groups. Russian feminist leaders also interacted
widely with their Western counterparts. Yet conservatives, many of them
now Russian nationalists, fervently insisted that Russia was different – and
better. It was more spiritual. It fostered greater political stability. It empha-
sized shared community values, as against Western selfish individualism. The
argument continued through the period and beyond.
And one gap persisted particularly clearly, though it had been suggested
in the 18th century: Russian rulers wanted nothing to do with liberal
Western political forms. Parliaments or major experiments with suffrage or
significant extensions of freedom of the press were simply not relevant, even
during what was otherwise a genuine reform period after 1861. At several
points, both during the West’s revolutionary years and again at the end of
the century, efforts at active repression of political dissent, including abun-
dant use of the secret police, were more vivid than ever before.
Conservative defense of the established order was in fact the principal
Russian political story during the first half of the 19th century – and this
included periodic efforts to put down political unrest elsewhere, as when
Russian troops moved against Hungarian revolutionaries after 1848. A few
liberal nobles tried a rebellion in the 1820s – again, the tension between an
attraction to Western values and a Russian alternative – but they were easily
put down. Police repression and tight supervision of schools and news-
papers – few in number – increased. (A Polish nationalist rising was also
defeated.) Ironically Russia did back the Greek revolution for indepen-
dence – sticking it to the Ottomans was irresistible – but otherwise Russian
leaders viewed themselves as the saviors of the conservative order in Europe.
This situation changed after the defeat in the Crimean War, which in
turn opened the more meaningful and complicated chapter in Russian
development during the long 19th century. Russia’s harsh serfdom had long
been a subject of humanitarian debate, and now the realization that Russia
was falling behind the West militarily tipped the scales. Something had to
be done to promote more economic innovation, and creating more flex-
ibility for peasants and workers was a way to start. At the same time, Rus-
sian leaders tried to couple reform with preservation of the aristocratic
landlord class. So the great Emancipation of the Serfs (1861) did end serf-
dom, but tied peasants to their villages unless they could pay off the land
they were given. The result severely burdened the peasantry and created
new sources of discontent, a recurrent theme from this point until the
revolution of 1917.
The reform did introduce further change. Along with population growth,
which began to accelerate, it helped create a growing urban labor force.
Now that aristocrats no longer controlled the peasants directly, new insti-
tutions had to be created for local government, and this included some new
councils which gave more people a voice in setting policies about roads and
other regional matters.
Other innovations included a revamping of the legal code, reducing the
severity of many punishments – partially in line with the standards now
common in the West. State-sponsored schools expanded, and while they
did not reach everyone, literacy rates began to rise rapidly. Key changes
targeted the army, an obvious source of concern after the Crimean War.
The training of officers was improved and new efforts sought to tie pro-
motion to merit; military recruitment expanded, and many peasants learned
new skills through their military service.
Some of these developments promoted changes broadly similar to those
that had occurred earlier in the West. A reading public expanded. Some
women took on new roles, even gaining access to professions, such as
medicine. Scientific research advanced, and Russians took the lead in a
number of experiments in fields like psychology. Even family habits chan-
ged in some cases, with more sexual activity before marriage and somewhat
looser insistence on patriarchal control.
The reform context also promoted the first moves toward genuine
industrialization. Pilot factories had been set up earlier, sometimes by Wes-
terners, and there had been some railway development. After 1870, the
government supported more extensive railway construction, including the
beginnings of the trans-Siberian line intended to link the whole giant
country. This in turn spurred further development in metallurgy and
mining. It also expanded the transportation of grain for export, earning
foreign currency that could be used to import new equipment from the
West. Still in its early stages, Russian industrial development was off and
running.
Because Russia had only a small business class, government planning and
investment played a greater role in the expansion process than had been the
case in the West. Western involvement was also crucial: by the early 20th
century, about half of Russia’s factory industry was foreign-owned –
including a branch of the American Singer Sewing Machine company. This
was a source of grievance for many Russians, but it provided vital capital
and expertise. At the same time, a group of Russian entrepreneurs emerged
as well, including some former peasants.
The overall result by the 1880s and 1890s was rapid economic growth,
including the development of many large-scale factories. Russia’s size and
resource strength supported major change. Cities grew extensively, along
with a large urban working class and including a skilled artisanal segment in
trades like printing. Many Russians expressed genuine excitement as
expanding cities sported street lights and department stores – though there
were also those who grumbled that foreign values were undermining the
true national spirit.
The process of change was delicately balanced, since the basic social
structure was only slightly modified, given the power of the aristocracy, and
the tsar and his officials resolutely insisted on full power at the top. There
were no legal opportunities to express significant protest. Yet peasant grie-
vances still ran high, and many factory workers suffered from long hours,
low pay, and safety hazards – the familiar downsides of early industrializa-
tion. An illegal anarchist movement developed among disaffected youth,
eager to use violence to tear down existing institutions. Expanding uni-
versities created what was called the intelligentsia, including many students
and not a few women, who sought greater freedom for intellectual expres-
sion and urged a variety of reforms. New demands also arose from Russia’s
many minority nationalities, seeking more opportunities to express their
cultural traditions; a new kind of Ukrainian nationalism was a case in point.
This varied ferment led to an end of the tsar’s reform experiments. An
anarchist bomb killed the reformist tsar himself in 1881, and the govern-
ment began to try to clamp down. Many dissidents were arrested, some
exiled. Censorship expanded. The state began to emphasize a conservative
version of Russian nationalism, which included promoting use of the Rus-
sian in the schools, instead of local languages, and a more general glorifica-
tion of the special virtues of the Russian tradition. A new movement
attacked the Jewish minority; many were killed, many others driven into
exile – often to the United States.
This sharp conservative turn did not stop the industrialization process.
In 1892, a new minister of finance, Sergei Witte, began to promote new
measures to spur economic growth. High tariffs protected Russian industry
against foreign competition, while at the same time Westerners and their
investment capital were invited in. Heavy industry continued to grow, and
factory textiles prospered. A new petroleum industry began to develop as
well. Russian industrialization still lagged behind that of the West –
changes in balance take time – but there was no question about rapid
change.
Protest continued as well, despite and often because of the policies of
repression. Illegal labor unions formed in many cities. Anarchist agitation
continued, and peasant unrest cropped up recurrently. A new socialist
movement sprang up, inspired by Marxist doctrine and advocating work-
ing-class revolution. A key leader, Vladimir Lenin, modified Marxism to
argue that the power of international capitalism made even an early indus-
trial country like Russia prime for revolution; and he also insisted on the
importance of tightly organized revolutionary cells, a key tactic in a heavily
policed state. Lenin’s group became known as Bolsheviks, or majority party,
even though they were initially only a minority of the Marxist movement as
a whole: tight discipline and ideological zeal maintained Lenin’s vision, even
though the leader himself was frequently in exile.
By the early 20th century Russia was a tinderbox, and many historians
believe that a major revolution was becoming inevitable. A foretaste
occurred in 1905. Russia – constantly active in foreign policy – had wat-
ched the rise of Japan with dismay. Not only was Japan expanding its navy
in Russia’s Pacific neighborhood, it also had designs on Korea, on Russia’s
back door. War broke out in 1904. Russia’s military, huge but not always
well trained, suffered also from the fact that the bulk of the fleet was cen-
tered in the Baltic and the Black Sea, reaching the Pacific too late. Japan
won, moving quickly to take over Korea; a peace treaty was brokered by
the President of the United States.
Unexpected defeat in war, from a country that prided itself on military
strength, unleashed a variety of protest forces in the revolution of 1905.
Urban workers mounted general strikes; peasants rebelled in several areas;
middle-class liberals stirred. The regime first tried police repression, but this
simply infuriated the urban crowds. So the tsar briefly backed down, calling
a new national parliament, the Duma, as a means of appeasing the middle
class. Some rural reforms also allowed a minority of enterprising peasants to
acquire more land outright. Unrest quieted.
But the pause was short-lived. Little had been done to meet workers’
demands, and many of their organizations were still outlawed. The bulk of
the peasantry was unappeased. The Duma itself was quickly stripped of any
real power. Commitment to defense of the political and social status quo
forced the tsar and his circle to rely on new measures of repression. The
crisis also forced the regime to pin new hopes on a successful foreign policy,
with little wiggle room after the failure against Japan. This focus, along with
Russia’s genuine industrial advance, would soon have global effects.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Highlights
British annex the Cape Town region, 1815; Dutch settlers (Boers) form
states north of the Cape region, 1850s; diamonds discovered in South
Africa, 1867; partition of West Africa, 1879ff; gold discovered in South
Africa, 1885; partition of East Africa, 1890s; British war with the Boers,
1899–1902.
Even before the imperialist scramble, many changes in Africa were closely
linked to developments in the wider world economy. The decline of the
transatlantic slave trade prompted many African leaders and merchants to
seek replacement goods for export. Commodity production expanded for
products like vegetable oil. Use of slavery within Africa actually expanded
for a time. East Africa, including the island of Madagascar, was increasingly
affected by Western trading activities, including the needs of Western ships
operating in the Indian Ocean for supplies and other exchanges.
Important themes persisted from the early modern centuries. Several
well-organized kingdoms retained strength well into the 19th century,
including the Zulu state in the south; these would mount particularly
intense opposition to Western encroachment, though they were all ulti-
mately defeated. Fervent Islamic missionary activity in West Africa expan-
ded the rate of conversions, another durable pattern. For some Africans, as
imperialism accelerated, Islam also provided an alternative to Western cul-
tural influences, though it challenged many traditional beliefs and practices.
But it was imperialism and its accompaniments that introduced the most
sweeping changes in the 19th century, many of them continuing into the
first half of the 20th. The results resonated in the political and economic
realm, and in popular culture as well.
Despite superior Western weaponry, conquests were often bitterly con-
tested. The British faced major fighting in the Sudan, south of Egypt, where
resistance was spurred by Muslim religious fervor. In the south, conflict
with Zulu armies ended only at the end of the century. (The British also
faced bitter opposition from the Dutch farmers in southern Africa, leading
to a major local war, the Boer War, at the beginning of the 20th century.)
Despite some effort to avoid antagonism, European rulers were frequently
clumsy and insensitive. One British emissary, for example, provoked a local
war when he tried to seize the traditional Golden Stool of the Ashanti king,
to send to his own royal family as a gift.
Ultimately, of course, the various imperialist powers substantially remade
the African map, with artificial units and boundaries often formed as a result
of deals among the Europeans themselves, with no reference to tradition or
local wishes. The British colony of Nigeria, for example, combined vigor-
ously Muslim regions with others uninterested in Islam, and a number of
very different ethnic groups. Conquest also had the effect of undermining
traditional local rule, which had often been anchored in beliefs about sup-
port from the gods. Building new political beliefs and loyalties could be a
challenge.
In Africa, as in most other holdings, Europeans eagerly seized major
works of African art, and sent them back home. This ultimately turned out
to be a non-trivial cultural issue, which governments in places like France
are currently grappling with in efforts to improve relations with former
colonies.
Overall economic consequences were huge, for the profit motive always
loomed large in imperialist acquisitions. Great emphasis rested on expanding
commodity and mining output, and recruiting labor for these purposes. Tax
policies pressed many villagers to produce more for the market, cutting into
local subsistence agriculture. The overall result, of course, extended African
participation in world trade, but with disproportionate profits benefiting
Western business interest both locally and back home. These wider changes
could have deeply personal consequences for many Africans. In many cases,
male workers were particularly drawn to, or forced into, jobs in the cities
and the mines, leaving the village economy increasingly in the hands of
women. Yet young men returning to the village, with some money to
spend, could periodically disrupt traditional behaviors and community
controls.
Africans who worked directly for Western employers or overseers faced
potential cultural challenges. Africans, for example, traditionally thought in
terms of lunar months. They did not initially understand the European
calendar that, most months, denied them full pay after only four weeks.
Working under a clock-based time schedule was also a new experience (as it
had been in the West, a bit earlier). Increasingly colonial authorities set up
public clocks and bells in city centers, to try to promote new discipline, but
inevitably there were clashes, leaving Westerners convinced that many
Africans were simply lazy. As one official noted in British Kenya, it was vital
to make Africans “useful citizens,” and the best way to do this was “to
induce the African to work for a period of his life for the European.”
Another clash developed around night work, which Africans traditionally
disliked. Here, however, the spread of street lighting in the cities helped
ease tensions.
Under the imperialist umbrella, Christian missionary activity increased
substantially. Conversions did not always come rapidly, but significant, often
fervent, Christian populations developed in many regions, including parts of
Nigeria as well as southern Africa. Sometimes women and young people
took the lead, valuing a religion that gave them alternatives to traditional
patriarchal control – though this could generate severe local tensions for a
time. Conversion might also help some young people get jobs in colonial
administrations or Western businesses. Some Africans were also recruited
into colonial armies. Missionaries also brought education for a growing
minority, including knowledge of a European language (in the Belgian
Congo authorities resolutely taught Flemish as well as French because that
was what was done back home, despite the fact that Flemish had little wider
use). Finally, missionaries brought new medical techniques which could
improve survival rates for some Africans.
Western influence should not be overdone. It did not reach deeply into
the countryside. Many Africans maintained traditional polytheistic beliefs,
and of course Islam continued to gain ground as well. Many people still
largely avoided the larger market economy. But changes were significant,
and they tended to accelerate as colonial rule persisted into the second half
of the 20th century.
One final impact began to take shape around 1900: a new kind of African
nationalism. A number of Western-educated Africans, some of whom were
trained in part in Europe directly, began to use nationalist arguments to
claim that colonial rule was unjustified and illegal. Some spearheaded efforts
to cite traditional African law to defend land ownership rights against
European claims. This was an early stage of African nationalism – resistance
to imperialism still depended more on traditional values – but it began to
connect African history to this larger global force.
India and Southeast Asia
Highlights
British introduce political changes in India, 1786–90; Singapore founded,
1819; expansion of British influence in Malaysia, 1824; beginning of Brit-
ish rule in Burma, 1824; support for education in English and use of
English in law courts in India, 1835; first railway in India, 1853; the “Indian
Mutiny” or great rebellion in India, 1857–58; French begin conquests in
Indochina, 1862; Indian National Congress Party founded, 1885.
European imperialism in southern Asia had many of the same effects as in

Africa. However, in many cases imperial control had started earlier – as was
obviously the case in India. It also interacted with a different set of cultural
traditions, including the force of major religions like Hinduism. The result
was a somewhat distinctive set of patterns, and arguably a different mix of
changes and continuities.
A number of British policies in India had already been foreshadowed in
the later 18th century, as the East India Company extended its control,
often in a patchwork of alliances with local princes. Promotion of the pro-
duction of teas and spices was accompanied, frequently, by outright cheat-
ing of local workers, on the part of British agents eager to make a quick
killing. A series of political reforms later in the 18th century introduced new
controls over the behavior of British officials, as the government began to
take more direct responsibility for administering the giant colony.
Early in the 19th century, spurred in part by eager Protestant missionaries,
the British also began a program of major reform, aimed at trying to bring
India up to what was regarded as more civilized standards. Missionary schools
taught English and Western values along with Christianity. Reformers
actively attacked the practice of sati, and they were joined by some Western-
educated Indian leaders as well; the practice was outlawed. Other efforts
sought to curb child marriage, while Hindus who converted to Christianity
gained preference in government jobs. A number of legal reforms were
introduced, and many British procedures, including the use of English, altered
practices in the courts of law. By mid-century, the British were also intro-
ducing railroads and telegraph systems, primarily for economic and military
purposes but with significant impact on Indian habits as well.
Much debate focuses on how much all this really changed India, and
whether any real benefits resulted to Indians themselves. It’s not an easy call.
Some new protection for women must be balanced against the cost of loss
of tradition and often crude British assertions of racial superiority: one
British official said outright that one shelf of the library of a British gentle-
man was worth all the knowledge of Asia. Some results took time to ger-
minate: in the long run, for example, it was people exposed to Western
education, often educated in Britain, who would take the lead in nationalist
opposition.
Even at the time, some new Indian industry developed, under local
ownership, including a growing metallurgical sector. Many Indians strug-
gled to maintain older manual methods, for example, in textiles, often suf-
fering a steady decline in wages; but a growing minority directly entered the
factory workforce, where efforts were made to teach new kinds of work
discipline and a new sense of time.
The most dramatic result of the reform period was a major rebellion in
1857, the so-called Indian Mutiny. It was triggered by Indian soldiers who
believed the British were violating their religion by using pig fat (offensive
to Muslim troops) and cow fat (offensive to Hindus) to grease bullets for a
new form of repeating rifle. The rebels took over a number of cities. Some
troops remained loyal, however, and the British sent reinforcements, ulti-
mately restoring order.
As a result, however, the British massively scaled back their reform efforts,
though private missionary work and some feminist educational efforts con-
tinued. The British Queen Victoria proclaimed “equality between Eur-
opeans and Natives” while vowing no desire to “impose (Western)
convictions on any of our subjects.” While real equality hardly ensued,
pressure on Indian cultural traditions – including the caste system and
common gender patterns – undoubtedly eased.
Yet changes continued, in the economy and beyond. The impact of
exposure to Western education, though affecting a small minority, gener-
ated new interests, not only in nationalism but in recent discoveries on sci-
ence – where there was the important tradition of Indian science to build
upon. A growing number of Indians also served directly in the civil service,
under British direction but with opportunities to gain further political
experience; reaction to the 1857 rebellion also induced the British to set up
local advisory councils, another important if limited change. Urban middle-
class men, including those in government, began to alter their clothing
styles, always a revealing index, adopting British-style jackets while retaining
traditional trousers and headgear.
From this group in turn came the active stirring of nationalism. In 1876,
Surendranath Banerjee founded the Indian Association to mobilize a new
kind of public opinion, across caste and religion. Banerjee had been partly
educated in Britain, but colonial policy prevented him from rising very high
in the civil service. His effort was followed in 1885 by the Indian National
Congress, which began to press for a greater role in governance while also
promoting the study and dissemination of older cultural traditions. For their
part, some educated women began to found new clubs and journals, oper-
ating both in Hindi and English. All of this set an active backdrop for the
larger agitation that would emerge after World War I.
European imperialism in Southeast Asia followed fairly familiar lines,
again with economic exploitation at the forefront – as in the rapid growth
of rubber plantations both in Malaysia and Vietnam. The Dutch and others
continued to press for expansion of spice production. Missionary efforts in
Vietnam generated a new Christian minority, though in other parts of the
region there was little religious change. Vietnamese leaders also began to
adopt a Roman alphabet for their language – unique in East Asia. Oppor-
tunities for some Western education generated results similar to those in
India; in 1900, for example, local civil servants in Indonesia pressed,
unsuccessfully, for equal status with their Dutch counterparts. Peasant pro-
tests recurrently attacked the new forms of tax collection European regimes
imposed, and in Indonesia a surge of Muslim fervor provided another outlet
for discontent.
The mixture of grievance, traditionalism, and some attempt to use certain
Western values and opportunities to local advantage was both complicated
and intriguing, forming an evolving legacy for later developments.
The Ottoman Empire and the Middle East/North Africa
Highlights
Napoleon briefly invades Egypt, 1798; Muhammad Ali rules Egypt, 1805–
49; Ottomans establish postal system, 1834; Tanzimat reforms in Otto-
man Empire, 1839–76; first Ottoman railway, 1866; Suez Canal opened,
1869; Treaty of San Stefano completes removal of Ottoman control in
Balkans, 1877; British occupy Egypt, 1882; Young Turks seize power in
Istanbul.
The Middle East and North Africa continued to be joined through Islam as
the majority religion and the importance of Arab culture. But political
experiences increasingly diverged, as North Africa – gradually – became
another imperialist playground while the Ottoman Empire, beleaguered,
experimented with reform.
Egypt provided the first pressure point. A French force under Napoleon
invaded the country in 1798; the defeat of the Egyptian military was a clear
sign that the balance of military power was shifting in the West’s favor – a
warning to the whole region. Egyptian leaders had simply ignored the
economic and military changes in Europe, and assumed they could easily
dismiss the incursion; they were rapidly proved wrong. British pressure
helped get the French out fairly quickly, but the problem was clear. Since
Egypt was loosely part of the Ottoman Empire, the threat had wider
applicability.
The first response – a major reform effort – came from an upstart ruler in
Egypt itself. A new leader, Muhammad Ali, emerged, vowing to attempt a
major overhaul of the social and economic framework in order to compete
with the West on its own terms. He hired French officers to train his
troops, and expanded recruitment among the peasantry; he imported up-to-
date Western weaponry. He improved the Egyptian infrastructure, and
expanded the production of export goods like cotton and indigo in order to
earn more foreign exchange. He sent some Egyptians directly to Europe for
training in subjects like engineering. The Westernization program was truly
impressive.
However, ambitious plans to reform Egyptian education led to few
results. And, critically, an attempt to set up competitive textile factories
simply failed, because of European opposition and the import of cheap
manufactured goods, especially from Britain. Ali also complicated his own
program by major military campaigns against the Ottomans; these were
briefly successful – Egypt’s revamped military was the strongest in the
region – but they consumed important resources. Ultimately the new
regime went bankrupt. Its main long-term consequence was heavy depen-
dence on cotton exports, where prices frequently fluctuated, and greater
poverty among the peasantry; indebtedness to European banks increased.
European interference soon intensified further with the building of the Suez
Canal, a vital strategic resource. By the 1880s, amid internal unrest, the
British seized fundamental control of Egypt though it was never made an
outright colony.
Egypt was a major traditional center of Islamic scholarship, so it was
hardly surprising that growing Western intervention provoked anxious
debate among intellectuals. Some believed that a return to the basic princi-
ples of Islam was a vital response, supporting a new jihad aimed at driving
the infidels out of Muslim lands. Other thinkers urged a reformist effort,
aimed at reviving an ability to innovate while borrowing Western scientific
and technological advances (noting correctly that Europeans themselves had
earlier benefited from imitating advances in the Middle East). Some of these
reformers also floated the idea of Arab nationalism as a loyalty that might
serve better than reliance on religion alone. Here was an important divide,
about the role of Islam in response to new pressures, that in some ways
continues today.
Islamic reactions also entered into another major conflict center, the
Sudan, at the end of the 19th century. This region, south of Egypt, had
long resented Egyptian interference, and hostility increased as the British
effectively took over the northern neighbor. A new leader, Muhammad
Ahmad, the son of a boat builder and educated in Sufi schools, claimed a
religious mission to drive out Egyptian heretics and British infidels alike. For
over a decade, guerrilla military forces attacked neighboring territory, while
establishing rigorous Islamic rule that banned smoking, drinking, and dan-
cing and sought strict regulation of sexual behavior. Finally, the British sent
a new force, in 1896, which used its superior weaponry to mow down
thousands of cavalry, taking over the Sudan directly.
The final imperialist burst in North Africa saw France gain control of
Tunisia and Morocco, along with its earlier colony in Algeria, while the
Italians claimed Libya. The setback not only to regional independence, but
to the political power of Islam, was obvious.
Conditions in the Ottoman heartland took a somewhat different course.
The Ottoman Empire was severely battered even before the long 19th
century, particularly by Russian victories on the northern border. Loss of
territory was compounded, from the 1820s onward, by the rise of Greek,
Slavic, and Romanian nationalism in the Balkans, which along with pres-
sure from Russia and the West, gradually stripped away virtually all Otto-
man control. Within the territory that remained, Western businessmen
gained new concessions, and Western pressure also forced greater tolerance
of Christian minorities and even some new missionary efforts. But while the
European powers grimly referred to the Ottoman Empire as the “sick man
of Europe,” they could not agree on how to carve it up directly.
So the Ottoman leaders had a chance to attempt their own efforts at
reform, trying to reduce Western pressure while injecting new vitality into
the Empire itself. A new military force was built up, and dependence on
earlier methods of recruitment ended; the sultan imported a bevy of Eur-
opean advisors to train his officers. Then, in 1839, the government laun-
ched a broader effort, labeled the Tanzimat reforms. This included a variety
of improvements in the legal system; new railway and telegraph lines;
newspapers in the major cities; revamping university education to improve
training in science and engineering; and finally a new Constitution along
Western lines, issued in 1876.
This was a major attempt, with some durable results, particularly in
introducing new economic and intellectual patterns in the region. But it
had serious limits: for example, despite much discussion, little was done to
change conditions for women. And key groups either opposed the chan-
ges – including many religious leaders, concerned about the new rights for
religious minorities – or found that they brought little clear benefit. Many
ordinary people experienced no economic gains, and traditional artisans in
fact suffered from the new competition from factory goods. Tensions
between Western-educated groups and the conservative forces mounted,
and finally, in 1878, a new sultan decided to rescind key changes, like the
Constitution, and rely on authoritarian repression instead. Even here,
dependence on Western assistance continued, with a new alignment with
Germany bringing additional railway development – the famous Berlin to
Baghdad railway project – and military training.
Repression also prompted new response. A group of exiled Turkish
intellectuals, soon labeled the “Young Turks,” formed an Ottoman reform
society in 1889, outlining a new reform program to modernize Ottoman
society and introducing yet another serious version of nationalism in what
had been a multinational empire. Backed by elements in the military, the
Young Turks effectively took over in 1908, relegating the sultan to a fig-
urehead role. The new regime made little headway, however, distracted by
efforts to regain territory in the Balkans and hold on to Libya; and they lost
support among their Arab subjects who had initially hoped they would gain
greater autonomy. The region’s future was a massive question mark on the
eve of World War I – which would introduce even greater disarray into this
vital region of the world.
East Asia
Highlights
The Opium War, 1839; Taiping Rebellion, 1850–64; Perry expedition to
Edo Bay, 1853; Meiji period in Japan, 1868–1912; Japan Education Act,
1872; Sino-Japanese War, 1894–95; Boxer Rebellion, 1898–1901; Russo-
Japanese War, 1904–05; Japan annexes Korea, 1910; revolution in China,
1911.
The long 19th century introduced huge new division in East Asia, and
while contemporary patterns have changed greatly, they still reflect the
legacy of the different responses to challenge. Quite simply, China suffered
as rarely before in its history – easily surpassing the woes of the Ottoman
Empire as well, while Japan, unexpectedly, provided a model of successful
response without loss of identity to the Western behemoth.
China’s first problem was simply a massive deterioration of the quality of
imperial rule under the Qing dynasty, from the late 18th century onward.
Corruption increased, as did cheating on the exams for entry into the bureau-
cracy – which meant that Confucian standards slipped badly as well. Public
works suffered; peasant conditions worsened, and exactions from landlords
increased. In broad outline, this pattern had occurred before in Chinese history,
and was usually remedied by a change in dynasty. This time, however, the
global situation was very different, and far more threatening.
For this was the context in which British merchants increasingly pene-
trated Chinese markets, and the opium trade began, based on British
imports from India. China’s balance of trade flipped, quite apart from the
problems of expanding drug use. The government tried hard to respond,
ordering imported opium confiscated; but this infuriated Western mer-
chants, and British military response forced the emperor to back down,
Economic and social collapse also prompted a series of internal rebellions,
one of which, the Taiping, seized vital territory for several years and,
although ultimately put down, cost millions of lives. Nevertheless, while
some regional leaders offered new initiatives, including some industrial and
railway development, the central government seemed paralyzed – even
tearing up one railway line because it represented a challenge to the estab-
lished order. This continuing disarray was what made it relatively easy for
the various foreign powers to seize coastal territory in the one-sided leases.
A brief attempt to remove the foreigners, the Boxer Rebellion backed by
the government, was once more put down by the imperialist powers. It was
open season on the great empire.
From the mid-19th century onward, however, some scholar-gentry and
merchants began organizing groups aiming at more constructive reforms. A
growing number received a Western-style education, either at the hands of
missionaries or by traveling directly to the United States or Europe (or
Japan). These reformers, eager to promote not only a more effective gov-
ernment to replace the Qing, but also measures to aid peasants and urban
workers, espoused many Western political and scientific ideas, but they
were resolutely opposed to the imperialist inroads in China; nationalism
flourished increasingly as the basis for resistance. Then, in 1911, as the
dynasty was further weakened by the fact that the reigning emperor was
only 6 years old, a major rising prompted the end of the Qing dynasty –
and with it the end of a political tradition that stretched back thousands of
years.
Japanese responses to the Western threat were quite different, and it is
not entirely clear why, since the Japanese had been even more thoroughly
isolated from the world economy than the Chinese and might have seemed
more vulnerable to external challenge. In fact, however, the Tokugawa
regime, though not without troubles, was in a better shape than its Qing
counterpart; the Dutch school of translators had provided some earlier
knowledge of Western developments; and a higher percentage of the Japa-
nese had gained some education before the crisis hit. The fact that Japan
(like Russia) had prior experience with imitating another society, without
losing identity, may also have eased the response.
The challenge was considerable nevertheless, and led to near civil war.
The visit by the American fleet in 1853, threatening bombardment if the
Japanese did not open for trade, was followed by British pressure as well –
causing a crisis not entirely dissimilar to the shock of the Opium War in
China. The government and feudal upper class hesitated, some wanting to
defend the status quo, others urging reform – including unseating the ruling
shogunate itself. Many on the reform side appealed to the emperor, who
long had been largely a religious figurehead. During the 1860s, opposing
samurai fought directly, with the end result that the reform group won and
proclaimed a new emperor, Mutsuhito, whose regime was commonly
dubbed “Meiji,” or Enlightened, because of its commitment to change.
During this transition, a number of Japanese had also visited Europe and
the United States, bringing back a series of new ideas, along with
considerable distaste for what they saw as the privileged position of women
and the amount of bickering involved in Western politics. One leading
reformer, Fukuzawa Yukichi, concluded that it was essential to alter the
reigning Confucian culture, by introducing a greater willingness to accept
new knowledge in place of reliance on the classics alone and above all by
valuing scientific training and discovery.
Explicit reforms came fast. The new regime abolished feudalism, estab-
lishing the principle of equality under the law. Over time, a new upper class
emerged that combined some of the more flexible former samurai but also a
new group of big business leaders. A 1872 decree mandated compulsory
primary education, for girls as well as boys; another order insisted that the
Japanese adopt Western clock time – the only system, the order said, that
was really “civilized.” Military reform came quickly as well, with new kinds
of training, organization, and weaponry; the government also expanded
efforts in public health, which helped prompt rapid population growth. The
bureaucracy expanded – from 29,000 officials in 1890 to 72,000 by 1908,
with recruitment in principle founded on merit. A new Constitution in
1884 established a parliament, based on limited voting rights and with
mainly advisory power.
The pattern offered an interesting contrast to Russia in the same period,
in that far more was changed at the top; the old social and political order
was not defended intact, and there was room for new voices. Even family
patterns changed to some extent, with new advice about the treatment of
children. At the same time, the government set some clear limits. The
power of the emperor was extolled, as against a purely Western-style poli-
tical system. Enthusiasm for Western science and technical training intro-
duced substantial cultural change, but the regime also made it clear that
older community values and deference were vital as well. Fukuzawa himself
was pressed to acknowledge that Confucian-style social and political ideas
were clearly preferable to any Western model. Gender relations were also
monitored. The rise of education for girls was a real change, but the regime
emphasized that the key purpose of training was to raise “wise mothers”
who would be able to instill appropriate standards, including political loy-
alty, in their offspring. A distinctive version of nationalism, blended with
emperor-worship and new support for Japan’s traditional Shinto religion,
was meant to provide cultural support amid rapid, often unsettling change.
Protests did occur, but they were forcibly repressed; arguably, the Japanese
combination of new flexibility with insistence on older habits of group
loyalty explained the contrast with the greater ferment in Russia.
From the outset, reform clearly aimed at industrialization. The govern-
ment took a leading role, setting up railway lines and new port facilities and
operating a number of factories directly, though a new business class also
took part. While dependent on Western loans and advice, the Japanese
were more careful than their Russian counterparts to limit foreign owner-
ship and to develop domestic capacity as quickly as possible. To earn foreign
investment funds, the Japanese depended heavily on exports in silk and
other products, often made by young women, who were tightly supervised
and poorly paid.
By 1900, an industrial revolution was well underway, though the Japa-
nese economy remained well below Western levels. The achievement was
all the more impressive in that the nation was in many ways resource-poor,
needing to import energy supplies as well as materials like cotton, along
with foreign-made equipment.
Despite the limitations, Japan clearly moved into a position to venture new
initiatives in diplomacy and military policy – another breach of prior national
tradition. Leaders were eager to show that the new regime could play the
Western game of imperialist expansion and also to distract the samurai through
military adventures, and there was a specific interest in seeking territories that
could help supply resources. A quick victory over China, around efforts to
expand influence in Korea, led to a more ambitious attempt to curb Russia’s
growing involvement in northeast Asia. Victory over the Russians in 1905 led
to the annexation of Korea five years later, as Japan officially joined the ranks of
imperialist powers. The Japanese also developed a loose alliance with Britain,
another sign that the nation had become a great power. And all this, for better
or worse, in only four decades.
Comparative Legacies
The shadow of Western economic and military power, and assumptions of
superiority, hangs over most regional histories during the long 19th century.
The combination of Western pressure and inadequate local response created
massive problems in a number of regions, some of which would be reme-
died at some point in the 20th century, some of which arguably still linger
today. The global situation in 1914 was temporary. Positive changes in the
later 19th century, most obviously Japan’s industrial launch, already set the
basis for new initiatives that would flourish more fully later on. But there is
no question that the long 19th century left a challenging legacy for many
regions, including active memories of humiliation at the hands of the West.
The question of why reforms so often failed to match the new challenge
invites comparative analysis – always recognizing that Western interference
raised huge constraints. Some regions – colonies as well as independent
areas – proved particularly unable to dislodge existing power structures,
with often desperate leaders hoping that enhanced repression would keep
the lid on. The tension between innovation and established beliefs and
values was something every region had to contend with. In some cases –
Russia and China most obviously – the looming question for the early 20th
century was what kind of new jolt could generate a more positive response
to the need for change.
Uncertainty was hardly the only legacy, even outside the West. Changes
in Japan and Latin America, some of the developments under or in response
to colonial rule, established patterns that successfully persisted later on –
including the new force of nationalism but also the beginnings of techno-
logical and educational change. The long 19th century raised the issue of
industrialization, on a global basis. It provoked new kinds of regional
inequalities in response. It also established new bases for constructive
reaction.
Clouds of War
The period left one other legacy: the first global industrial war, that would
in turn play a huge role in shaping the next period of world history. This
proved to be a truly international conflict – of the major regions, only Latin
America was not seriously enmeshed – but its causation stemmed mainly
from the various parts of Europe, with the Ottoman Empire chiming in as
well. The world was involved mainly to the extent that global imperialism
had given Western governments, and their publics, a taste for steady
expansion. By 1914, the easy pickings were gone, however, and nationalist
appetites turned back to Europe itself.
The strains of industrialization may have contributed. The connections
between heavy industry and national armaments provided one factor. Social
tensions, and particularly the rise of socialism, caused some government
leaders to wonder actively if a war would not help in restoring a greater
sense of national unity, distracting from challenges to the established order.
Some historians have even speculated that industrial routines were promot-
ing a new sense of boredom, and without question there was great excite-
ment about the prospects for military glory when the conflict began.
Diplomatic tensions provided the immediate spark, though they occurred
at several levels. After Germany’s unification, its leaders had tried to form
protective alliances to defend the new European order: ties with Austria-
Hungary were particularly important. In response, France had organized its
own set, notably with Russia and (despite centuries of tension) the British.
This unprecedented peacetime alliance system was coupled with steady
military build-up, though it survived for several decades without outright
war.
Problems in the Balkans were the tinderbox. The newly independent and
nationalistic small states jostled for further gains. Two local wars occurred in
1912–13, with the Ottoman Empire joining in to see if it could recover
some ground. Serbia, one of the most ambitious new states, also harbored
grievances against Austria-Hungary, which controlled some south Slavic
territory. Russia was also somewhat involved because of its patronage of
Slavic causes, and the Russians were desperate to avoid any further foreign
policy setbacks amid the instability at home after the loss to Japan. The
region’s tensions created a classic domino effect.
In 1914, a Serbian nationalist murdered a member of the Austrian royal
family. Austria thought it had to respond, given its own vulnerability to
nationalist unrest. A localized punitive war was probably inevitable. But
Russia could not stand idly by without defending Serbia, and there was also
some hope that war might yield territorial gains in the Black Sea region.
Then the dominos. France, always worried about a threat from Germany,
believed it had to stand by its Russian ally; Germany felt the same about
Austria-Hungary. The alliance system caused decisions to be motivated by
its weakest members. The Germans also worried about a two-front war
with Russia on one side, France on the other; so its plans called for quick
mobilization in hopes of knocking the French off fairly swiftly. Britain
hesitated, and if it had stayed out, its restraining role might have prevented a
Balkan conflict from turning into a full-scale European bloodbath. But it
decided it had to stand with France; ultimately, its unresolved military and
economic competition with Germany tipped the scales. Then as war
loomed, the Ottoman Empire decided to join the German side: its exten-
sive ties to Germany combined with some hope for retaliatory gains against
Russia. This of course brought the Middle East as well as Europe into play.
Many observers, at the time and since, have wondered how much of this
could reasonably have been avoided, and whether there are lessons to be
learned. The inflexible tension between Germany, as a new power, and
Britain, trying to hang on to dominance, may offer lessons for today, parti-
cularly amid growing tensions between China and the United States. Here
is a really interesting, and arguably urgent, opportunity to test the utility of
historical analogy. In retrospect, it seems that compromise might have been
possible around specific issues like how many battleships each nation could
have.
The outbreak of war certainly showed the limits of the recurrent global
attempts to provide new mechanisms for resolving dispute, or the wider
hopes that in a new, industrial world, war itself could become less necessary.
Tragically, however, the kind of optimism that had built up in the West
during the 19th century had one final implication: many people were con-
vinced that war would be short and painless. It was not.
Further Reading
On Western Europe, John Merriman, A History of Modern Europe: From the
Renaissance to the Present, 2nd edn. (2004); on revolution, Jack Censer,
Debating Modern Revolution: The Evolution of Revolutionary Ideas (2016); on
gender, Linda L. Clark, Women and Achievement in Nineteenth-Century
Europe (2008). See also Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations:
America’s Place in World History (2006); R.D. Francis, Richard Jones, and
Donald Smith, Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation, 6th edn.
(2008).
For Latin America, David Bushnell and Neil MacAuley, The Emergence of
Latin America in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd edn. (1995); on indepen-
dence movements, Jeremy Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution in the
Iberian Atlantic (2009). For conditions of women, Catherine Davies,
Hilary Owen, and Claire Brewster, South American Independence: Gender,
Politics, Text (2007).
For Russia, Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution,
1881–1917 (1983); R. Bolton, Russia and Europe in the Nineteenth Century
(2008); Alexander Pulanov, Russia in the Nineteenth Century: Autocracy,
Reform, and Social Change, 1814–1914 (2005). On the Balkans, L.S.
Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (2000).
On Africa, Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of
Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930 (1997); M.E. Chamberlain,
The Scramble for Africa, 3rd edn. (2011); Paul Lovejoy, Transformations in
Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa, 3rd edn. (2011); Joseph Adjaye,
Time in the Black Experience (1994). On gender issues, Ann McClintock,
Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (1995).
For South and Southeast Asia, Jan Morris and Simon Winchester, Stones of
Empire: The Buildings of the Raj (1984); Ian Kerr, ed., Building the Railways
of the Raj, 1850–1900 (1995); Shashi Tharoor, Inglorious Empire: What the
British Did to India (2017), attacks the idea that British rule was good for
India; A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism (2011); Norman
Owen, The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia (2004).
On the Middle East, Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The History of the
Ottoman Empire (2007); Meliha Altunış ık, Turkey: Challenges of Continuity
and Change (2005); Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 3rd edn.
(2014); P.J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt (1988).
On East Asia, Michael Gasster, China’s Struggle to Modernize, 2nd edn.
(1982); Joseph W. Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising (1988); Ian
Inkster, Japanese Industrialization: Historical and Cultural Perspectives (2001);
Janet Hunger, Women and the Labour Market in Japan’s Industrialising
Economy: The Textile Industry before the Pacific War (2009); Masayuki
Tanimoto, ed., The Role of Tradition in Japan’s Industrialization (2006).
12 A Troubled Transition
Global Developments, 1914–1945
The three decades that started with World War I left a complicated heritage.
The period is well known for the unusual number of bad decisions that were
made, and a part of its aftermath – after 1945 – involved a series of innovations
designed to prevent many of these mistakes in future, whether the issue was
peace settlements or economic policy or racism. Even today, some active
memory of the lessons remains, which is a legacy of sorts.
The period was dominated by striking events: two unprecedented World
Wars; an unusually severe global Depression; major revolutions in three leading
countries; the appearance of new kinds of authoritarian government; and
through both wars and state action, the killing of an unusually large number of
innocent civilians. There is no way to avoid approaching the period through
discussion of these markers, and also no way of glossing over the catastrophes.
There were a number of positive developments as well, attached to some
of the great events or running alongside them. The period saw widespread
advancement of women’s rights, for example, though by the standards of
contemporary feminism, it was a first installment at best. Consumerism
advanced in many places, as the radio and movies brought new forms of
entertainment, some of them across regional lines; late in the 1930s, the
British even set the basis for yet another new outlet, television, setting up
transmissions in southern England. Sulfa drugs were introduced in the 1930s
as well, the first drugs ever developed to fight a variety of bacterial infec-
tions. In another world’s first, major powers got together at several dis-
armament conferences in the 1920s and actually agreed on limits on the
numbers of naval warships, hoping to avoid the kind of competition that
had help cause World War I – though unfortunately there were no moves
to regulate airpower, which was the problem for the future.
It is also vital to recognize the important continuities that persisted from
the 19th century or even earlier, beneath the drumbeat of gripping events:
There were no huge changes in the world’s religious map, though

Christian and Muslim missionary activity continued to expand in
Africa, while the Soviet Union and, to an extent, Nazi Germany tried
to roll back religion altogether.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-14
214 Global Developments, 1914–1945
Global population growth continued at about the same pace as in the
19th century, though with some acceleration.
Imperialist expansion was largely halted, though there was an extension
of British and French control in the Middle East, while Germany lost
its holdings to other European powers and Japan. But there was no
major movement yet to relax imperial controls over existing colonies.
Britain took some steps under pressure toward greater latitude for
Egypt, and the United States was preparing for Philippine indepen-
dence; but these were exceptions, and the West was not yet ready to
give up its hold.
There were no major new industrializations. The Soviet Union and
Japan rapidly extended the industrial developments that had already
taken root, so there was some shakeup among existing industrial
powers. And we will see that several countries took a few new steps to
increase their economic independence. But there was as yet no huge
reshuffling of regional economic inequalities.
In other words, the period’s turmoil should not be exaggerated in what

was, after all, the span of merely three decades. Several regions of the world
were not deeply altered by the course of events. In some ways, it was the
period’s many failures that would open the door to more systematic change.
World War I
The four-year conflict, 1914–18, undoubtedly the deadliest in world history
up to that point in such a short time span, did not proceed as the major
powers had planned. Germany struck into France, ignoring the official
neutrality of Belgium, but it could not win through against French and
British forces. A hideous trench warfare emerged, in which efforts to
advance less than a mile might cost 100,000 casualties in a single day. Var-
ious new weapons were introduced, including tanks and poison gas, but the
stalemate persisted. There was also major naval action, including the first
widespread use of submarines. The front between Germany and Russia was
more porous, as the Germans advanced into some Russian territory. Italy,
which joined Britain and France hoping to seize territory, had an active
front against Austria; the Austrians also invaded Serbia. Ottoman entry into
the war led to bitter fighting in parts of the Middle East.
Wartime privations helped cause a major revolution in Russia in 1917,
and after briefly trying to continue the fight, the revolutionaries agreed to
an interim settlement with Germany. On the Western Front, the entry of
the United States into the war in 1917 brought a batch of new troops, and
the Western armies gradually turned the tide, forcing the Germans to agree
to an armistice in 1918. Austria-Hungary also collapsed. The Western allies
had held out for unconditional victory against their enemies, resisting any
compromise, and they now proceeded to discuss a unilateral settlement.
Global Developments, 1914–1945 215
Several features of the war stand out, beyond the ebb and flow of cam-
paigns. First, it was global. Japan entered the war on the side of the Western
allies, and seized some German territory in the Pacific. Some fighting
occurred in Africa, mainly between British and German colonies; but Africa
was more affected by the use of African troops in Europe, particularly by
France. The British called up large numbers of troops from India. Huge
resources were summoned by the imperial powers to support the war effort:
Britain, for example, pulled most available donkeys out of Egypt, needed to
carry supplies to the troops in Europe. The conflict with the Ottoman
Empire brought British and French agents into the Middle East, trying to
stoke Arab nationalism against the Ottoman overlords and also holding out
hopes for a new Jewish state to appeal to yet another powerful group in the
region. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand quickly joined Britain’s side,
sending large numbers of troops. Even China, though not directly a belli-
gerent, was affected, as over a million Chinese briefly migrated to Europe to
take advantage of available jobs, where some could also pick up new ideas
such as Marxist socialism.
The war’s devastation was massive, particularly within Europe itself.
Huge amounts of property were destroyed, most notably in France and
Serbia. The cost of the war had been heavily financed through loans; many
European countries became indebted, especially to the United States – a
reversal of the 19th-century relationship. Europe’s focus on war production
had also created new opportunities for economic expansion in the United
States and Japan, another blow to European vitality going forward. Most
important was the human cost. France lost 1.3 million troops; Britain,
almost a million; Russia, 1.7 million; Germany 1.8 million – the total was
over 10 million dead. An additional 20 million were wounded, many per-
manently crippled. Losses were particularly great among younger army
officers, and this arguably weakened Europe’s leadership potential going
forward.
Blows to morale were another problem, particularly in the defeated
countries but to some extent generally. The beliefs in progress that had
surfaced so strongly in the 19th century could not be sustained, and some
intellectuals wrote darkly about the imminent collapse of Western civiliza-
tion. Many veterans were psychologically damaged – “shell shock” was the
diagnosis for what would now be called PTSD. Many believed that civilians
had grown fat as they suffered on the front lines, and a distaste for politicians
led some to argue that new kinds of leadership and political organization
were essential.
The war also introduced dramatic extensions of government power in all
the combatant nations, including the United States. This was the first of
what some scholars call a “total war,” where the implications of indus-
trialization were fully harnessed to the war effort. Governments comman-
deered all available resources to spur military production. They took over
factories; they rationed goods; they allocated labor. This led to some efforts
to integrate labor leaders into coordination discussions, which held some
promise for the future; but the main emphasis was simply on the display of
organizational power. Here was a key basis for the authoritarian movements
that sprang up later on, which sought to extend a command economy into
peacetime. It was not surprising that the Russian revolutionary Lenin, eager
to use government to reorder Russian society, was a great admirer of Ger-
many’s wartime organization – though not its purposes.
Government control extended into propaganda and policing. All the
governments, even those with a strong liberal tradition, censored news-
papers and arrested presumed subversives. Britain even imposed harsh mea-
sures on conscientious objectors, who refused military service on religious
grounds; many were arrested and some died as result of mistreatment. Fears
of spying were widespread. From the outset of the war, manipulation of
public opinion soared. The British were told that German soldiers were
bayonetting Belgian babies as they marched toward France. German mili-
tary leaders at the end of the war, trying to salvage prestige amid loss,
argued that Jews, communists, and liberals had “stabbed the nation in the
back,” which was the only reason the nation had failed. Lies of this sort had
a long shelf life, influencing political behavior and diplomatic policy long
after the war was over.
Finally, a war partly built on nationalism inflamed it further. Propaganda
played a huge role here; so did the suffering involved, on the part of troops
and civilians alike – civilians because of major wartime shortages. It was hard
not to believe that all this sacrifice would not lead to huge national gains.
This was the atmosphere in which victorious allies insisted on an unrealis-
tically punitive approach to Germany. This was the atmosphere in which
virtually every victorious nation ended up feeling disappointed that even
further gains had not materialized. Italy and Japan, both of which had
entered the war primarily in hopes of spoils, were particularly frustrated.
The surge of nationalism spread beyond Europe. Western allies had pro-
moted both Arab and Jewish hopes in the Middle East, helping among
other things to establish a collision course still visible in present-day Israel.
Indian and African troops, serving in Europe, learned lessons about the
importance of national independence and vitality that they took back home
with them (Map 12.1).
The Versailles Settlements

Almost all observers agree – and some realized at the time – that the peace
settlements worked out by diplomats at the postwar Versailles conference
and related meetings were badly flawed (Map 12.1). Excessive nationalism
combined with serious disagreements among the allies. The contrast with
the more successful Vienna settlement, just a century before, was marked.
Among other things, Germany was treated as a pariah, its representatives
given no voice. Russia was also pushed aside, as the leading states refused to
Map 12.1 Europe and the Middle East after World War I
grant recognition to the new – and to them, scary – revolutionary regime.
Even Japanese representatives were largely snubbed, on unacknowledged
racist grounds. France, Britain, and the United States ran the show. The
result was a set of bad decisions – though many of them well-intentioned –
that made lasting peace almost impossible.
Germany’s punishment, in addition to a treaty clause that expressly
established its war guilt, was a huge reparations payment, that seriously
burdened its economy for years as well as causing nationalist resentment;
loss of territory both to new East European nations and to France; loss of
colonies; and significant restrictions on postwar rearmament, enforced in
part by military occupation of key sections of the country. The German
emperor was deposed, and the country became a republic whose new lea-
ders, however, faced major domestic headwinds because they had to accept
so many unfavorable peace terms.
Austria-Hungary was dismantled, another empire destroyed. Austria itself
became a republic, losing a bit of territory to Italy. Other former holdings
were joined with parts of what had been Russia and Germany to form a
series of relatively small nations, running from the Baltic states and Poland
to Hungary itself. Hoping to reduce south Slavic friction, a new Yugoslavia
was established in the Balkans. The settlement reflected nationalist aspira-
tions and also the deep beliefs of the American president, Woodrow
Wilson, that each European nationality should have its own expression. The
result, however, was a series of rather weak states, often mutually hostile
and heavily agrarian, now sandwiched between the larger powers of Ger-
many and the Soviet Union.
French leaders had insisted on the punitive approach to Germany yet
were understandably nervous about the future, given even a weakened
Germany’s larger population and industrial strength. The French hoped that
the United States would remain an active ally in assuring European peace
going forward. But American politics turned sour after the war, amid loud
laments that the nation should not have been ensnared into European
struggles in the first place. While the United States remained actively
engaged in the world economy and in postwar humanitarian efforts, it
turned its back on other involvement, espousing an isolationist policy that
would last for more than 20 years. And even the British pulled back from
aligning themselves with the French too closely. All of this reflected a
considerable consensus that the prewar alliance system had been a mistake,
but no clear organizing principle replaced the system.
The settlement imposed on the Ottoman Empire, now defunct, was at
least as flawed as the arrangements in Europe, and its effects have lasted even
longer – directly linked to issues today. France, Britain, and Italy had plan-
ned to divide the empire into quasi-colonies. They agreed to call their
holdings “mandates,” implying that after a period of civilizing influence the
regions might be ready for independence. The plans were partially spoiled
because Turkish leaders, heirs to the Young Turk movement, took matters
into their own hands, and created a new, separate Turkish state – a major
innovation. Over other parts of the old empire, however, Britain and
France arbitrarily decided on the boundaries of several new countries – with
no more attention to traditional ethnic or religious alignments than
imperialists had observed earlier in Africa. Iraq and Palestine fell under
British control, Lebanon and Syria under the French. (The Italians were
squeezed out, given the Turkish move.) There was no attempt to resolve
conflicting Arab and Jewish claims in the Holy Land – Britain simply tried
to keep a lid on the area. Most obviously, what had long been a somewhat
unified, frequently peaceful region under a multinational empire was now
rather arbitrarily subdivided, with a number of local aspirations simply
ignored.
The settlement left a variety of minority peoples in the new settings, and
as a result, despite the hope of lessening ethnic quarrels, a number of new
flashpoints emerged. It was fine to seek the realization of nationalist aspira-
tions, but in fact the nations were not homogeneous. Czechoslovakia had a
German minority. Not all ethnic Hungarians were in Hungary. The Turk-
ish national push led to massive confrontations with ethnic Greeks; the
problem began when the Greek nation tried to invade Turkey, hoping for
territory. After initial Greek gains, the Turks rallied, and the Western powers
decided that the new nation had to be recognized. Greece and Turkey agreed
to exchange minority populations; but during the conflict itself many Greek
villages in Turkey were deliberately burned and several hundred thousand
Greeks were killed, while Greek armies had also killed many Turkish civilians.
Even earlier, the Ottoman Empire had turned against its Armenian minority,
again with many deaths. Here were initial signs of what later became known as
ethnic cleansing, in which reactions to minority populations turned from tra-
ditionally tolerant to literally murderous.
Poking holes in the various peacetime arrangements, from a perch in the
21st century, is hardly difficult, because subsequent developments would
show – and in some cases, continue to show – their inadequacy. This was not
inspired statesmanship. Some disappointments came early. The new Eastern
European states, for example, all started with liberal and democratic constitu-
tions, but except in Czechoslovakia these rather quickly collapsed, replaced
with more authoritarian rule. It was true that republics now seemed preferred
to monarchy: almost none of the new states opted for royal rule, and the col-
lapse of once-great empires in Russia, the Middle East, Germany, and Austria-
Hungary was a further huge blow, leaving only a few places in the world with
active monarchs. Overall, however, the immediate political results of the
peacetime arrangements were mixed at best.
The whole peace settlement was capped with one other ambitious inno-
vation, which turned out to be another noble experiment that partly mis-
fired. Building on global ideas from the 19th century, a new League of
Nations was established, to provide a format in which frictions could be
discussed and resolved without going to war. The League legitimately stands
as a major step in the history of globalization; many of its agencies were
quite effective. And the League itself did manage to settle some lesser dis-
putes. But it did not meet regularly, and above all it had no enforcement
power; existing states refused to provide any policing or military authority.
Furthermore, the isolationist United States refused to join at all, and the
Soviet Union was long sidelined. When nationalist aggressions resumed in
the 1930s, the League issued votes of censure that were simply ignored.
The greatest weaknesses of the peace settlements did not emerge imme-
diately, though there were many grievances. France and Germany actually
improved relations in the mid-1920s. Several disarmament conferences
produced the agreements among Britain, the United States and Japan on
naval levels, while chemical warfare was outlawed. In 1928, diplomats from
France and the United States spearheaded an agreement, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact or Pact of Paris, in which signatory nations agreed to reject war as a
means of resolving disputes. The Pact can be ridiculed because there were
no enforcement mechanisms and major war resumed so soon, but in fact it
introduced a new principle into international law – that wars of aggression
are illegal – that has some impact even today. Hopeful signs of collaboration
of this sort soon turned sour, mainly because of the economic collapse that
began in 1929, which is when the most glaring flaws in the peace arrange-
ments came home to roost.
The Great Revolutions

Partially independent of the great issues of war and peace, three major
revolutions also began in the early 20th century, setting another chain of
events in motion. Risings in Mexico and China before the war were then
joined by the great Russian revolution inspired in part by the hardships of
war itself. For some key parts of the world, a revolutionary age opened that
warrants comparison with the Atlantic surge of the late 18th century.
The three risings had little direct connection, though links between
Russia and China developed later on. They did share some context. They
all involved hopes for greater popular representation, against regimes that
were trying to maintain their authority at all costs. Peasant unrest against
landlord control was another common component, spurred also by popu-
lation growth. All three countries had reason to resent foreign interference
and economic encroachment, adding a nationalist component.
Mexico’s revolt occurred against the backdrop of a long period of
authoritarian rule, with a now-ageing dictator. Urban intellectuals began to
agitate against the regime, seeking democracy and greater restriction of the
powers of the Church. Urban workers and many peasants joined, with their
own grievances. Fighting broke out in 1910, as the dictator fled. Liberals
tried to set up a new regime, but their goals did not satisfy the peasantry,
which sought major land reform. The United States also interfered against
the revolution, seeking to protect American property interests. A partial
resolution was reached in 1917, with new limits on the Church and a
break-up of some of the landed estates. Then, in 1920, a more durable
regime was set up, with the establishment of a single political party, the
National Revolutionary Party, that would rule the country until the 1990s.
The new regime repressed most independent political activity, but it did
restrict the presidency to a single, six-year term – hoping to avoid corrupt
dictatorship. The government rapidly extended secular education, further
reducing the political role of the Church. Major land reform was confined,
however, to a single region. The regime emphasized a popular Mexican
nationalism, paying great attention to the traditions of indigenous and pea-
sant peoples; a dazzling array of new artists also emphasized the voices of
ordinary Mexicans. And while the Mexican revolution did not inspire other
risings in Latin America immediately, it did introduce important new social
and political themes.
China’s revolution toppled the imperial regime in 1911, a major devel-
opment, but it had trouble gaining traction in the nation as a whole. For a
time, the Western-educated leader Sun Yat-sen worked to set up a liberal,
democratic state which aimed also at curbing rampant foreign political and
economic interference. The aim was a series of modernizing reforms that
would at the same time allow China to avoid the worst social problems that
had bedevilled Western industrialization. While the movement won ardent
student support, it had trouble setting up an actual administration. Most
Western powers did give up their lease claims – a huge achievement, leav-
ing only British Hong Kong and Portuguese Macao. Other reforms, like the
abolition of footbinding, moved forward. But a number of regional war-
lords surfaced, and the liberal-nationalist government never gained control
of the whole country. Additionally, another internal movement sprang up,
under the Marxist leader Mao Zedong, that competed for loyalty and ter-
ritory, gaining control of one key region. Then, in the 1930s, the whole
revolutionary effort was convulsed by a series of Japanese invasions. The
battle against the invaders would carry through World War II, leaving the
real direction of the revolution, and the major revolutionary achievements,
until the later 1940s.
Russia’s revolution took hold more quickly, and it went much farther
than its Mexican counterpart. Major ferment predated World War I, but
wartime privations added fuel to the fire. Strikes and riots broke out in
Moscow in March, 1917, backed by well-organized workers who took over
the city government and fired the ministers of the tsar. The tsar abdicated,
and yet another historic imperial rule was brought down. For several
months liberals tried to set up a government, but they were unwilling to
press for social or land reforms and they also made the mistake of trying to
stay in the war. A second revolution in November chased them out and
brought the Bolshevik wing of the Communist Party, under Lenin, to
power. (The German government had facilitated Lenin’s return from his
Swiss exile, correctly believing that he would pull Russia out of the war.)
Lenin quickly moved to abolish most rival political parties, installing a
system of one-party rule that would last into the 1980s. He had to accept
the loss of some territory in a deal with the Germans; he faced major
counter-revolutionary efforts from aristocrats and church leaders that would
last for several years; and he briefly contended with outside military inter-
vention from nations like France, the United States, and Japan that feared
the potential of this revolutionary surge. All of this delayed a full effort at
communist reform and encouraged its effort to establish firm government
control. However, the regime quickly moved to abolish the aristocracy and
give peasants access to the land. It began rapidly to expand education at all
levels, and it introduced a series of public health measures that quickly cut
into traditional rates of high infant mortality. A new, loyal Red Army was
established, and many former workers and peasants were propelled into
political power, usually through positions within the powerful Communist
Party. Foreign ownership was banned.
As it consolidated power in the 1920s, and particularly under Joseph
Stalin who came to power in 1928, a few years after Lenin’s death, the
revolutionary regime emphasized a number of major themes. Rapid indus-
trialization was one. Stalin introduced a series of five-year plans that placed a
premium on the growth of factory industry, under the direction of gov-
ernment ministries rather than private ownership. Peasants were increasingly
organized into a series of collective farms, that spurred the use of new
agricultural equipment but also generated considerable resistance, which was
put down by force. Cultural change was another key theme. The position
of the Orthodox Church was greatly reduced, and both education and
propaganda urged devotion to secular communist values and the importance
of science. The Party sponsored youth groups that pushed the new loyalties,
even encouraging young people to report on laggard parents. The regime
sponsored a new artistic movement, called Socialist Realism, glorifying
workers and peasants and at the same time avoiding what was seen as a
more decadent Western art (the old Russian quarrel about Western values
in new form). Propaganda and abundant reliance on the secret police,
including use of Siberian labor camps for dissidents, combined with the mass
execution of dissident peasants and others. At the same time, the regime
carefully offered a number of benefits to ordinary workers, including med-
ical care and vacation opportunities in resorts organized along the Black Sea
coast.
The impact of the revolution on gender was mixed. Women gained the
vote and full access to education. Communists touted the benefits for
women, in contrast to the discrimination still rampant in the West. Eager
for labor, women’s work was welcomed. On the other hand, women’s pay
lagged, and professions that were heavily female, like medicine, did not
always prosper. Many women faced the burden of combining jobs with
primary domestic obligations, sometimes including long lines at stores in a
society that did not prioritize consumers. Communist propaganda, bent on
showing the dramatic benefits of the new system, also concealed ongoing
problems like prostitution.
This was a major revolutionary effort, that also served as a major spur for
Russian industrial growth, though at cost to environmental quality. Many
of the standard features of industrial society accelerated: smaller family size,
more attention to education, significant health gains, more commitment to
science. Communists even encouraged their own version of the industrial
work ethic, praising workers who exceeded their production quotas. The
combination of Soviet success and loud foreign propaganda won adherents
to communism in other countries, though an earlier goal of international
revolution had to be toned down. Soviet efforts and example became one
of the key forces in world history during most of the 20th century.
The Great Depression

Here was another key development in this challenging period, with a pro-
found impact on the 1930s and the lead-up to World War II. Global
depressions dated back to the 19th century, but this new collapse was par-
ticularly severe, and exacerbated by a number of further bad decisions.
The world economy faced a number of structural weaknesses in the 1920s,
despite considerable superficial prosperity. The old problem of regional eco-
nomic inequality grew worse, as regions competed for commodity exports and
drove prices down. Several regions, including parts of the United States, had
accelerated food production during the war, and now suffered from falling
prices as well. New weaknesses developed within the industrial countries:
many coal mining regions lost employment as the use of petroleum increased.
Older textile centers suffered from foreign competition or even industrial
relocations into low-wage areas like the American South. Germany’s repara-
tions burden complicated financial markets. Lacking solid investment oppor-
tunities, many banks turned to unproductive speculative investments – like
fancy town halls in Germany, or Florida real estate.
The bubble burst in 1929, with a series of bank failures, initially in the
United States, in a collapse that quickly spread to Western Europe. Indus-
trial production fell rapidly, and millions of workers lost their jobs. Many
middle-class families suffered as well, with lost employment and investment
and, for students, difficulty in finding work in the first place. Misery and
outright hunger spread widely. And the crisis was hard to shake off. The
worst downturn eased by 1933, but unemployment stayed high in many
countries and there was a smaller crisis later in the decade.
International repercussions came quickly. Commodity exports, already
weak, suffered further when the rich countries could no longer afford to
sustain imports. Economies in Latin America and Africa were hard hit. Japan
suffered initially, as the market for products like silk collapsed. The Soviet
Union, with its separate economy, was alone immune, as communist leaders
proudly noted.
Many policy responses worsened the crisis. A number of countries, faced
with declining tax revenue, tried to cut expenses, including government
employment, which made matters worse. Many politicians had little knowl-
edge of economics, and economists in turn had not yet established a major
government role. Internationally, the first impulse was to reduce collaboration,
with every nation seeking its own advantage. Many countries raised tariffs,
which simply curtailed international trade overall to no one’s benefit.
The crisis raised a massive political and social challenge. Protest move-
ments escalated. Voting levels for communist parties, for example, began to
swell rapidly in France and Germany – which provoked greater extremism
on the right. Massive partisan divisions prevented decisive action in France
and Britain. Political responses in Germany and Japan reduced the brunt of
the Depression but at great cost in other areas of policy.
With time, more constructive approaches emerged in parts of the West.
Governments in Scandinavia began to expand government spending to
provide greater welfare services, foreshadowing the full welfare state.
American policies under the New Deal did not go that far, but managed to
provide greater government assistance and established a social security
system to provide some protection against unemployment and retirement.
Several Latin American countries began to set up tariffs to protect their own
industrial development, in a policy known as import substitution: the idea
was to make it more costly to buy basic factory goods like clothing or even
automobiles from the industrialized nations, so that local industrialization
could gain a greater foothold. This in turn became one of the measures that,
very slowly, began to create new opportunities for economic growth in
regions that had depended on commodity exports.
Overall, however, the Depression had a massive destructive impact, on
individual lives as well as economies and political systems. Globally, and in
many individual countries, the crisis was fully resolved only when another
crisis hit, and attention turned to mobilizing for another major war.
Authoritarian Regimes
The interwar years were not kind to democracy. Hopes surged right after
World War I, as new regimes in East-Central Europe and also in Germany
set up liberal democratic systems and Italy and Japan extended the right to
vote. Voting rights for women in several Western countries added to the
excitement. But all the new regimes ultimately collapsed, except in Cze-
choslovakia, many of them quite quickly. Italy and later Japan also turned
away from open political life. Finally, within many of the democracies that
did survive, political extremism included large groups opposed to the system
itself – this was a particular problem in France, with large communist and
neo-fascist movements. And, with rare exceptions, the leaders of the
democracies themselves showed scant vigor or imagination. Greater success
seemed to lie with other political systems.
At the same time, the decline of the monarchy, which was abundantly
clear in the aftermath of World War I, raised the crucial question: if not
democracy or a system based on at least some kind of competition for
votes – then what?
Latin America had already provided examples of one-man rule, and a
number of fairly conventional authoritarian systems simply continued in this
region during the interwar period. Some of the strongman governments set
up in Eastern Europe when democracy collapsed relied similarly on the
support of groups like landlords and the established church, along with a
police presence. The Mexican Revolution tossed up a different option: tight
single party rule whose legitimacy, however, was bolstered by regular
elections.
World War I itself had provided a template for new kinds of authoritarian
alternatives, with the rapid extension of state power and control. The Soviet
Union soon provided a model of effective action, though also massive
repression, that offered one example of the possibility of extending author-
itarian systems.
Turkey provided another fascinating model after establishing its inde-
pendence, in what has sometimes been called a revolution from above. The
new leader, Kemal Atatürk, was determined to make Turkey a modern
nation, embarking on an ambitious program of reform and considerable
Westernization. Atatürk vigorously attacked the hold of Islam, by establish-
ing a new system of obligatory state education and making the state itself
secular. Expansion of primary education cut illiteracy from 85% in 1914 to
43% in 1932, and women were actively included in the educational pro-
gram. Atatürk rapidly furthered advanced education in science and engi-
neering, trying to reduce dependence on foreign expertise, and he switched
the Turkish language to a Latin alphabet. He attacked old symbols, such as
traditional clothing styles for men, urging the wearing of hats – “the cus-
tomary head-dress of the entire civilized world.” More cautiously, he also
discouraged veiling for women. He further modernized the army, though
was careful to avoid risky foreign ventures. He vigorously promoted indus-
trialization, directly establishing a number of factories under state guidance
while also limiting trade union activity. His agenda was huge, and partly
successful, though Islamic resistance remained considerable and industrial
growth did not proceed as rapidly as the leader had hoped. But the political
system was entirely clear. Atatürk set up a parliament and established uni-
versal suffrage, granting women the right to vote in 1927 – a first in the
Middle East. But a single party, the People’s Party, excluded any political
opposition. Here was another major alternative to the liberal democratic
model, combining strong authority with a democratic veneer.
But it was Italy and then Germany that developed the most blatant model
of new authoritarianism, elements of which were picked up in other East-
Central European countries, in Japan, and in Spain; and the model turned
out to offer some legacy for political movements after World War II. Fascist
authoritarianism went beyond developing a police state: its talk of social
reform could appeal to many voters without alienating big business while
also suggesting an alternative to communism; and its mobilization of
aggressive nationalism around a dynamic leader gave many a sense of pur-
pose and community.
The rise of fascism in Italy built on the nationalist frustrations of World
War I, conservative fear of the communist movement, and a sense that
earlier liberal regimes had been incapable of decisive action. A new leader,
Benito Mussolini, called his movement fascism, based on the Roman sym-
bols his party used. He excoriated liberalism as worthless, urging individuals
to commit themselves to the state and to devotion to himself as Leader.
Military virtues and praise of action rather than rational thought were
paramount. Mussolini urged a variety of social reforms, but carefully pro-
tected the power of landlords and industrialists. Gaining power in 1923, he
gradually eliminated opposition parties and established control of the press.
Later, in the 1930s, his regime would embark on aggressive foreign policy
initiatives, including a new invasion of Ethiopia.
Adolf Hitler, organizing the National Socialist or Nazi movement in
Germany after the debacle of World War I, added virulent anti-Semitism
and a more blatant expansionist policy to the fascist mix. Not very successful
until the Depression hit Germany hard, Nazism then began to pick up
votes – though never a majority. Desperate for more effective action and,
often, redress of the indignities of the Versailles Treaty, many Germans
agreed on the need for a decisive Leader. Here too, fear of growing com-
munism not only motivated voters but induced big business and landlords
to lend support. Though the Nazis, like the fascists, combined vote-seeking
with strong-arm intimidation of other political parties, Hitler came to
power legally, in 1933. He then quickly established the Nazis as the only
political party, not only controlling the press but demonstrating rare mastery
of using mass meetings and radio broadcasts to mobilize passionate support.
Competing groups like the socialists were outlawed, with many leaders sent
to concentration camps. Trade unions were placed under state control. In
principle, all organizations in the nation were to be “leveled” under Nazi
rule. Political police enforced orthodoxy; schools and youth groups pitched
the new truths. Modern artistic styles were banned in favor of older German
forms; women were urged to devote themselves to bearing and raising loyal
Nordic children. A quick military build-up, violating the provisions of
Versailles, provided economic stimulus and full employment, and Hitler also
introduced a number of other benefits to ordinary Germans, including
group vacations. Attacks on the Jews mounted steadily, as yet another
means of rousing emotional support for the regime.
Fascist tactics, including stirring propaganda, strong-arm methods and
loyalty to a Leader and a single party, were used by a new regime in Spain
in the later 1930s, though without quite such a militaristic tone and with
greater willingness to conciliate conservative forces like the Catholic
Church. An authoritarian regime in Hungary imported elements of fascism
as well.
The turn to authoritarianism in Japan in the 1930s was a major develop-
ment, though largely under control by the military. The shock of the
Depression gave military leaders, allied with conservative business and agri-
cultural interests, a chance to regain the upper hand in politics, rejecting the
caution of the liberal politicians who had prevailed during most of the
1920s. The military either manipulated the political leaders or, like General
Hideki Tojo, held office directly. Parliamentary rule was largely bypassed
and political parties were compelled to support an aggressive foreign policy;
ultimately a single united national party was formed. Many dissidents,
including pacifist Buddhist leaders, were jailed. The figure of the emperor
was used to promote nationalist loyalties as well. At the same time, spurred
by state support, Japan bounced back from the Depression and resumed
rapid industrial growth. This was not a full fascist state, but it had many of
the trappings, and it was no surprise that the Japanese allied directly with
Nazi Germany through an anti-communist treaty in 1936.
Fascist regimes were ultimately defeated in World War II, and their
political model was in many ways discredited. Elements of the mixture of
popular appeal and rigid authoritarianism have surfaced at many points since
then – as in the Peronist movement in Argentina in the late 1940s but also
in the rise of certain kinds of populism in the early 21st century. The legacy
is complicated, but key elements clearly persist in several parts of the world.
Descent into World War II

The path to another world war was set by Hitler and the Japanese military
amid the ongoing economic disruption of the 1930s, abetted by the disarray
of the Western democracies.
Japan made the first moves, invading parts of China in 1931. The goal was
territorial acquisition, aimed at supporting Japan’s industrial strength. Japan left
the League of Nations in 1933, in order to bypass international criticism. Fur-
ther offensives in China included the brutal bombardment of the city of
Nanjing, in which tens of thousands of civilians were killed, along with wide-
spread rape and looting. Both the Chinese Nationalist Party and the commu-
nists vigorously resisted the attacks, and the Japanese were unable to press
through to final victory. Once war began in Europe, however, the Japanese
quickly aimed at other targets, conquering French Indochina, attacking British
holdings in Burma and Malaysia, and ultimately taking on the United States
with the bombing of Pearl Harbor, then seizing the Philippines and other
Pacific territory. The Japanese trumpeted the idea of a Pacific “co-prosperity”
scheme, which really meant a Japanese economic and political empire separate
from the Western-dominated world economy.
The march toward war in Europe was equally steady. Military strength
was a core feature of Nazism, and Hitler made no bones about his desire to
undo the humiliating Versailles Treaty and create a new German empire in
eastern Europe over what he saw as the racially inferior Slavs. He quickly
began to rearm Germany, defying treaty provisions in the process. In 1936,
both Hitler and Mussolini intervened in a civil war in Spain, backing the
neo-fascist side and gaining military experience particularly through bomb-
ing raids against civilian targets. In 1938, Germany annexed Austria and
then seized part, then all of Czechoslovakia.
Amid this steady escalation, the response of the Western democracies was
feeble at best. The League denounced some moves, and several countries
levied economic sanctions. But the United States remained uninvolved –
though some Americans joined others in trying to fight the fascists in Spain.
Britain and France, mutually suspicious, were paralyzed by internal political
divisions – including real debate over whether Germany or the Soviet
Union was the bigger enemy. The Soviets were deeply concerned about
the new German menace, but ultimately gave up on any hope of coop-
erating with the West. For their part, the Western nations even failed to
respond to the growing threat by beefing up their own military, though
there were voices that urged action. For several years, Western democracy
seemed virtually paralyzed.
Crunch time occurred when Hitler moved against Czechoslovakia –
claiming he was protecting a German minority there. Britain and France
triggered a conference in Munich – they had promised to protect the
smaller East European states – where they accepted Hitler’s promise that he
would stop with this final acquisition. The British leader returned home
proudly proclaiming that he had achieved “peace in our time.” The tragedy
of Munich would play a powerful role in world history later on, used as an
analogy to claim that aggressors must be met with force and that any effort
at appeasement was doomed to failure.
For the spiral simply accelerated after Munich, given the apparent weak-
ness of the Western powers. Hitler quickly seized the rest of Czechoslova-
kia, ignoring his pledge, and began to invade Poland. He struck a deal with
the Soviet leaders – who decided that they needed time to prepare for war
and might in the interim regain some territory themselves. Britain and
France finally realized they had to act, and war was declared in September,
1939.
Until 1942, both Germany (with its Italian ally) and Japan fared well in
the new fighting, for they were far better prepared than their adversaries.
Japan advanced steadily in the Pacific, with bombing raids that went as far as
Australia. German forces quickly conquered virtually the whole of Europe
outside the Soviet Union, respecting only a few neutral countries (Sweden
and Switzerland). Puppet governments were formed in part of France, and
also in Norway, but there was no question about Nazi control. The Ger-
mans also used the war to undertake what Hitler called “the Final Solution”
against the Jews – throughout all the conquered territory. Six million Jews
were transported to concentration camps and then killed, making the
Holocaust the worst case of genocide in history. The Nazis also forced
workers from various occupied countries to labor in German factories,
effectively reviving slavery.
The tide began to turn in 1942. Japan’s attack on Hawaii brought the
United States into the war, after its long isolationist hesitation. Germany’s
invasion of the Soviet Union penetrated deeply, but could not overcome
heroic Soviet resistance, supplemented by some armaments supplied by the
United States. American and British forces wrested North Africa from
German control, invaded Italy, and then in 1944 attacked occupied France
directly. Soviet forces pushed the Germans back and entered East-Central
Europe, and in 1944 Germany was directly invaded from both directions.
Hitler committed suicide, and the European war ended. Fighting in the
Pacific lasted a bit longer. The United States began to regain Pacific terri-
tory amid tough fighting, while the British as well as the Chinese forces
helped challenge Japan on the Asian mainland. Japan finally surrendered in
1945.
The war was marked not only by the various invasions by land and
considerable naval action, but by unprecedented use of air power. Hitler
believed that bombing civilian targets in Britain would undermine morale
and bring British collapse. He was wrong, but as soon as they could, both
Britain and the United States began firebombing Germany cities, aiming to
cripple the economy but also, particularly in the British case, exact revenge.
Bombing raids on Japan began in 1942, again often hitting civilian targets.
Then, in 1945, eager to hasten an end to the war while minimizing the loss
of American lives and concerned also about pre-empting Soviet action in
Asia, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japanese targets –
bypassing advice that the Japanese might have been given warnings first.
Like World War I, this second war caused massive economic devastation,
and even superficial recovery required several years. A great deal of infra-
structure had to be replaced. Up to 85 million people died – 3% of the
world’s total population. This included up to 55 million civilian deaths. On
top of the totals, another 25 million civilians deaths resulted from war-
related disease and famine. The Soviet Union alone lost 26 million people.
As with World War I, the new conflict drew in most of the world one way
or the other. African colonies again sent troops; several French colonies
actively joined the effort against the German threat. India was heavily
involved, close to the Asian war zone; the British imposed new controls to
try to assure stability. While Latin America, again, was not directly engaged,
the United States worked hard to prevent any flirtations with Germany,
even promoting development of a modern steel industry in Brazil in return
for logistical support.
Coming on top of the other challenges since 1914, World War II led to a
decisive break with many previous trends, setting up a number of new
patterns in world history. Some key changes responded to inescapable facts:
Western Europe, for example, simply could not retain the place in the
world that it had commanded for over a century. Other changes, however,
resulted from deliberate reforms, from leaders in various parts of the world
who were eager to try to assure that some of the worst mistakes of the
previous three decades would not be repeated. Even for slow learners, the
war was a brutal lesson.
Global Trends
The events of the 1914–45 period still burn bright in memory. The
Depression serves as a classic measure of economic collapse, offering
opportunities for comparison with more recent crises like the Recession of
2008 – at least it wasn’t as bad as the Depression. Wartime heroics loom
large. Americans are urged to remember the troops and workers who
helped defeat the Nazis as the “greatest generation,” and wartime re-
enactments play frequently in movies and on television. The Russians
mount elaborate ceremonies to memorialize their massive resistance to Nazi
invasion. German policy is still partly shaped by recollections of Nazi atro-
cities. Japan’s relations with Korea and China are deeply colored by wartime
actions and disagreements about apologies and redress.
But events, unquestionably vivid, are not the whole story of these trou-
bling transition decades. Several more general themes deserve attention –
some closely connected to the events, others a bit less obvious.
For example, the interwar years saw a blatant and tragic escalation of
racism, though basic trends were already in place. New kinds of prejudice
against Jews had developed in the 19th century, claiming an odd combina-
tion of great secret economic and political power and racial inferiority.
Obviously, anti-Semitism blossomed after World War I. It was central to
Hitler’s message, and ultimately to his policies, but it also surged in France,
East-Central Europe, and elsewhere, contributing to collaborations with the
Holocaust that went beyond Germany. Pseudo-science claims about race
were not confined to attacks on Jews. Sober scholars in places like the
United States debated the need to sterilize people from “inferior” races, to
protect the future for superior Whites. Attacks on African Americans and
Latino groups continued, including frequent lynchings –at least 450 Black
Americans were lynched in the 1920s and 1930s alone. Racial bias also
contributed to new efforts to restrict immigration, again in places like the
United States, where a 1923 law severely limited entrance to peoples other
than northern Europeans. Race also entered the struggle with Japan, a
nation that strongly resented racist aspersions. American stereotypes of the
Japanese before and during World War II built on racist bias and may have
contributed to the decision to deploy the atomic bomb.
Other themes can be singled out, some of them less negative. The
expansion of women’s suffrage also built on earlier trends, but became a
major thrust in these decades, a clear rejection of traditional patriarchal
assumptions in the political sphere. By the 1920s, all the European countries
with a Protestant background had opened the vote, including Britain and
Germany. (Nations with more Catholic backgrounds would join in after
World War II.) The United States and the other settler societies amplified
the trend, but so did the Soviet Union and Turkey. Feminist agitation in
Mexico intensified with the Mexican Revolution, with many petitions and
meetings, though full success would come only in 1953. International
feminist groups pressed the League of Nations for formal support for
women’s rights, with some success. Haltingly, some women began to gain
political office; for example, a woman held a cabinet position in the United
States for the first time during the New Deal. A host of gender issues
remained, even in countries that had extended voting rights, but there was a
hint of a global trend. Beyond the political sphere, women’s labor force
participation began to inch up in several countries (even apart from a tem-
porary surge during World War I), while changes in fashion and dance
styles brought some sense of new freedoms in the consumer arena.
Major changes in the nature of war warrant attention, including the
application of industrial technology and the advent of conflict in the air.
The innovations of total war, with the mobilization of the economy and
public opinion, represented a huge shift, applicable to both World Wars;
some observers believed this would become a global standard, given the
capacities of industrial societies, but in fact no full-blown total war has
occurred since 1945 (though on a regional basis, the Iran-Iraq conflict
between 1980 and 1988 had total war qualities). The human, economic,
and emotional cost of total war may limit its frequency and even lead to
new efforts to keep the peace; the advent of nuclear weapons, another key
development, inserted another level of danger but also another motive to
avoid major conflict.
If total war did not become the norm, the increasing mixture of civilian
and military targets did, beginning with the fascist and Japanese tactics in the
1930s, and then Allied retaliation during World War II. The phenomenon
was not brand new: Roman and Mongol armies had deliberately attacked
civilian centers, for example. But modern weaponry clearly made the move
away from strictly military targets more deadly. Correspondingly, the dis-
placement of civilian refugees through modern warfare became an increas-
ing humanitarian challenge, already evident after both the World Wars.
The interwar period established a tension between democratic and
authoritarian regimes, and a certain degree of oscillation from one to the
other, that in many ways has continued to the present day. The regimes
created during this period clearly suggested the demise of monarchy as a
preferred form. Only in one case – an Arab initiative near the Holy Land,
ultimately backed by the British, that created a new monarchy in what
became known as the nation of Jordan – was a brand new kingdom estab-
lished, though the new nation of Yugoslavia also inherited a royal family
from Serbia. Elsewhere, monarchies fell to revolutions or defeat in war, and
most new nations now opted for a republican form as well. Only the
Japanese emperor stood out as a clear exception among major nations. But
with monarchy largely gone or reduced to figurehead status, the question of
what kind of replacement to choose became an obvious issue. There was no
single global preference at the time, though the innovations of many
authoritarian regimes were clearly important, and this remains true still.
The Status of Imperialism

The continuation of Western imperialism after World War I masked a
growing range of pressures, that would become steadily more important
during and after the second global conflict. European states, drained by war,
found it more difficult to maintain their hold, while nationalist agitation
increased in many places.
The most decisive move occurred in Egypt. Nationalist leaders bitterly
resented the fact that they were barred from making a case for indepen-
dence at the Versailles conference. A major rebellion ensured, which British
troops put down only with difficulty. A series of negotiations followed, and
the British agreed to pull back to the Suez Canal zone in 1936 – though
they reserved the right to reoccupy Egypt if necessary. This was a major
change, though somewhat tentative, and the Egyptians were still saddled
with a lackluster monarchy that the British helped prop up. Unrest occurred
in other parts of the Middle East during the interwar years, particularly in
the French mandates, though it was put down.
Developments in India were particularly significant. Three million Indian
troops served in World War I, while taxes and food shortages at home
created rising discontent. Hindu and Muslim leaders increasingly cooperated
for a time, calling for self-government. Britain did set up some new pro-
vincial and advisory groups, based on limited suffrage, but made no funda-
mental concessions. Police repression also increased, and the British worked
also to split Hindu and Muslim communities; a new Muslim League
formed, suspicious of Hindu good will. In this situation, Mohandas Gandhi
emerged as a key leader in nationalist agitation from the 1920s onward.
Gandhi was British-educated. A Hindu, he also hoped for nationalist unity
across religion, caste and even gender. He developed a compelling theory of
non-violent protest, building on Hindu tradition but blending other reli-
gious and ideological components as well. After some hesitation, Gandhi
also turned against the caste system, believing that it had no place in a
modern India.
Gandhi gained a significant mass following, advocating peaceful marches,
withholding of taxes and other tactics that the British found difficult to
counter. Frequently arrested, he gained additional attention by refusing food
in jail, and was always ultimately released. Britain did issue a new Con-
stitution in 1935, extending the vote to 35 million people, giving the
Congress Party an opportunity to win majorities in most states and gain
further political exposure and experience. But independence remained the
goal, and during World War II, fearing Japanese attack, and eager to pre-
vent internal unrest, the British arrested Gandhi and other Congress leaders.
At the same time the colonial government gave greater recognition to the
Muslim League, promising independence for a separate state in Pakistan
after the war’s end.
Agitation developed in other parts of South Asia as well. In Vietnam,
new riots broke out against French rule, and here too halfway measures like
advisory councils did not quiet the discontent. Hardships among the pea-
santry also created support for a new Marxist movement, headed by Ho Chi
Minh, an enthusiastic convert to Marxism while serving as a waiter in Paris.
In Indonesia, the Dutch gave half the seats in a new legislature to local
representatives, but when further unrest developed against the limited
reforms the government arrested nationalist leaders. In Siam, independent
but under British oversight, nationalists gained greater control over the
economy and celebrated by renaming the country Thailand, or land of the
free. Agitation against American rule intensified in the Philippines, as else-
where fueled as well by the hardships suffered during the Depression.
Rights to self-governance were increased in 1934, and the American Con-
gress promised independence for 1944.
In much of Southeast Asia, the Japanese invasion displaced European
control, though it created its own resentments. But it would be the effects
of the war, both on regional nationalism and on the European overlords,
that finally turned mounting discontent and half-hearted responses into full
independence.
Thanks in part to the participation of African troops in World War I,
European governments increased their expenditures in the African colonies
between the wars – though the basic pattern of economic exploitation
remained. European diplomats continued to speak of the need to educate
people “not yet able to stand by themselves in the strenuous conditions of
the modern world.” In most colonies, Africans could still not rise beyond a
certain level in the civil service or the military. Economic growth during
the 1920s enriched some African businessmen, and some new tensions arose
between urban Africans, impatient for consumer gains, and the demands of
the traditional extended family. A special situation developed in South
Africa, where Afrikaners – the settlers of Dutch origin – gained increased
political power and worked to repress the Black majority; the slogan of the
Afrikaner party was “South Africa: A White Man’s Land.” Blacks were
prevented from holding skilled jobs and, in 1936, denied participation in
voting.
Various movements developed among Black Africans themselves. In
South Africa, an African National Congress formed to promote Black rights
as early as 1912. New protests based on local versions of Christianity and on
trade union activity emerged in several places as well. Outright nationalism
spread across colonial boundaries. A Pan-African Congress first met in 1919,
urging independence. Cultural movements promoting pride in Black
culture were shared with leaders from the United States and the Caribbean.
Individual figures like Jomo Kenyatta, in Kenya, educated in part in
Europe, wrote powerful denunciations of European exploitation and urged
the strength of African traditions, which he said could be combined with
selective use of Western science and medicine. He also insisted on the need
for full independence – which would gain him some jail time at the hands
of the British. From Senegal, Leopold Senghor described the beauties of
negritude and praised African creativity, particularly in the arts. Here, as in
Asia, were important seeds for the near future.
New Limits for Globalization

Globalization faltered in many ways during the decades of war and
Depression, and while this did not prove to be permanent, it suggested
complications that in some ways would re-emerge during the early 21st
century. Contacts persisted and even accelerated in some domains, but there
was new and vociferous resistance, particularly to the extent to which prior
globalization had been European-dominated.
The fact was that a number of societies tried to pull out of global entan-
glements, in various ways. The isolationist United States deliberately shun-
ned many global political contacts, including membership in the League.
The Soviet Union removed Russia from most global economic relation-
ships – partly because other countries opposed the revolutionary experi-
ment, deciding to expand industrialization on its own: Stalin’s slogan was
“Socialism in One Country.” Japan sought to create a separate colonial
zone, in part to protect itself from fluctuations in world trade, and, in a way,
Nazi Germany hoped to do the same through expansion into Eastern
Europe. The Depression soured many countries on the global economy,
and the common response of raising tariffs also signaled an attempt as
national insulations. And even before this shock, the unwillingness even
among those nations who joined the new League to provide the organiza-
tion with much authority was a revealing sign of hesitation. Globalization
bumped up against nationalism in many ways during these challenging
decades.
New travel restrictions constituted another revealing retreat, and many of
these have persisted. Before 1914, no generalized system of passport
requirements interfered with movement from one country to the next.
Some steps had occurred in the 19th century. Several European countries
required visas of entry, though the system was not always rigorously
enforced. The United States began to try to register immigrants, though
they did not necessarily need to have official papers. The United States did
not even give the federal government sole authority to issue passports to its
own citizens until 1858, and even then many Americans traveled abroad
without formal documents. France actually abolished passports and visas in
1861, as international travel accelerated. World War I, however, decisively
altered this permissiveness and disorganization. The United States began
requiring that its citizens display passports before traveling abroad, in 1918.
Many countries introduced similar measures to make as sure as possible that
they knew who was entering and leaving. The new system did not prevent
foreign travel, but it introduced a new hurdle and suggested growing
suspicion.
There were, however, important counter-currents as well, showing that
in many respects globalization remained a vital process. International com-
munication links improved, particularly through radio transmissions. Over-
seas long distance telephone calls were expensive and the sound was not
always good, but they were possible. There were no great breakthroughs in
global technology in the period – international air travel was not yet
widespread, for example – but the previous apparatus was intact, and widely
used.
International business operations remained vigorous as well, though of
course there were new disruptions as with the Soviet withdrawal and the
Depression. Many firms operated across boundaries. Some American com-
panies would even continue to do business with branches in Japan during
World War II. The global scope of the Depression was itself a sign of the
vital economic linkages that crossed national boundaries. On another front,
the Olympic Games drew increasing attention, and though nationalist ten-
sions affected the operation, they did not paralyze it. Germany sponsored
the games in 1936 and hoped for racial triumph; but Hitler did manage to
acknowledge the victory of the Black American track star, Jesse Owens,
whatever his private feelings. The international soccer federation steadily
expanded its own activities, particularly through growing interest in the
sport in the Middle East.
The League of Nations itself was a major move. It is easy, and accurate,
to ridicule its limitations and its ultimate diplomatic failure; but its existence
was a dramatic new experiment. Furthermore, many League agencies were
quietly effective, and some of them began more actively to include partici-
pation from countries outside the West. The International Labor Office, set
up before World War I but now brought under the League, collected
important labor statistics and pressed for improvements in working condi-
tions – seeking to reduce the use of child labor, for example.
The idea of “studying abroad” gained new attention, though of course it
had occurred before. The number of Chinese students taking university
work in the United States increased notably. It was in the 1920s that several
American universities established formal programs, though primarily
emphasizing destinations in Europe.
Finally, global humanitarianism increased, though sometimes with
imperialist overtones. Several American organizations, like the Rockefeller
Foundation, began to fund development activities in other countries; a
major project with Mexico, combining American and Mexican scientists,
began work on wheat yields that would ultimately serve as the basis for
what was later called the “Green Revolution” – improving food supply
though also benefiting commercial farmers as the expense of traditional
peasants. The American business leader, Herbert Hoover worked tirelessly,
in the aftermath of World War I, to provide aid to refugees in Eastern and
Central Europe.
This was an important period for globalization precisely because of the
obvious cross-currents. A number of new initiatives provided the basis for
further expansion later on. At the same time, the retreats from globalization,
combined with the obvious disasters of Depression and renewed war, would
prompt many leaders to seek a return to constructive global initiatives after
World War I.
Legacies
The benefit of hindsight makes it obvious that this world history period,
short but dramatic, raised questions that it did not answer, which is why it
proved transitional in many ways. Most obviously, given the disarray of the
West and the rise of powerful new movements – anti-colonial nationalism
particularly, but also communism – the issue of establishing some new kind
of international power balance was clearly established but, equally clearly,
not really addressed. The ambiguities about globalization were a related
question mark: both the new steps and the limitations of some of the anti-
globalization moves left a legacy for the future – one that would be actively
addressed, in fact, in 1944–45.
For many people emerging from World War II, the burning issue was
how to undo mistakes. For nationalists in India, Vietnam, or Indonesia, the
mistakes were wrapped up in the stubborn persistence of Western imperi-
alism. For Soviet leaders, the mistakes included failure to take adequate
measures to prevent invasion from the West. The question of undoing but
also preventing fascism was a crucial challenge. For many leaders as well,
particularly but not exclusively in the West, the urgency of taking new steps
to prevent the mistakes of the immediate past – from the dreadful short-
comings of the Versailles Treaty to the failure to present a united front to
Nazism – offered a clear agenda for the future. The abrupt advent of
nuclear capacity was another clear goad to innovation, for it soon became
clear that humanity now had unprecedented self-destructive power.
One final point, that applies to current issues of the sort discussed in
Chapter 15: From the vantage point of the early 2020s, it is obvious that the
immediacy of the problems agenda of 1945 has receded, for the vast
majority of today’s world’s population did not experience the failures of the
interwar period directly. For some people, the perils of fascism no longer
seem obvious, and they are tempted to experiment again – sometimes even
praising Hitler in the process. For many, the limitations of nationalist
responses to economic and diplomatic crises have faded in memory, and it is
tempting to revive older impulses like American isolationism or British
suspicion of their European neighbors or Japanese reliance on the military.
This rethinking is not necessarily wrong – the world is a different place
from what it was in the 1930s, and yesterday’s initiatives may no longer be
applicable. But if the most obvious legacy of the interwar years – the need
to prevent a surprising series of mistakes – is to be redone, it is good to keep
historical perspective in mind in the process. It’s chastening to remember
that some of the moves that are again being touted in many places, like a
revival of narrow nationalism, really did not work well 90 years ago. At the
least, consideration of relevant historical analogies should be part of con-
temporary debate.
Further Reading
Michael Neiberg, Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I
(2013); for heated debates on the war’s causes, James Joll, The Origins of
the First World War, 3rd edn. (2006); on the war beyond Europe, John
Morrow, The Great War: An Imperial History (2013). On Versailles, Wil-
liam Keylor, The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking 1919 (1997); Louise
Slavicek, The Treaty of Versailles (2010). See also, Sally Marks, The Ebbing
of European Ascendancy: An International History of the World, 1914–1945
(2002); C.H. Feinstein, Peter Temin, and Gianni Toniolo, The World
Economy between the Wars (2008).
On the revolutions, Rex Wade, The Russian Revolution, 1917, 2nd edn.
(2005); Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propa-
ganda, and Dissent, 1934–1941 (1997), John Hart, Revolutionary Mexico:
The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution (1997); Michael Gon-
zales, The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1940 (2002); Wolfgang Franke, A
Century of Chinese Revolution, 1851–1949 (1970); Thomas Kampen, Mao
Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership
(2003).
On the Depression, Amity Shlaes, The Forgotten Man: A New History of the
Great Depression (2008); Mary McComb, Great Depression and the Middle
Class: Experts, Collegiate Youth and Business Ideology, 1929–1941 (2006).
On authoritarianism, Allan Todd, The European Dictatorships: Hitler, Stalin,
Mussolini (2002); Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (2007).
On World War II and genocide, Lisa Pine, Debating Genocide (2018); Ger-
hard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, 2nd
edn. (2005); Antony Beever, The Second World War (2013); Michael
Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security,
1919–1941 (1988); Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its
Legacies, 3rd edn. (2003).
On racism, Eric Ehrenreich, The Nazi Ancestral Proof: Genealogy, Racial Sci-
ence, and the Final Solution (2007); Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific
Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States between
the World Wars (1993).
On women’s rights, Tasha Oren, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Con-
temporary Feminism (2020).
On globalization, Robert Boyce, The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of
Globalization (2009); John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveil-
lance, Citizenship and the State (1999).
On imperialist and nationalist issues, Sumit Sarkar, Modern India; 1885–1947
(2014); Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule (1968).
13 A More Global World, 1945–2000
Not surprisingly, as technologies shrank the world in many ways, there were
more common or widely shared global patterns after 1945 than ever before.
The lessons of nationalist excess in the previous decades played some role as
well. Major regional differences still existed, in economic levels, cultural values,
and political structures; further, developments like the Cold War and, later,
novel forms of terrorism created new barriers. But some of the sharpest dis-
tinctions eased, and the list of connections and concurrences expanded steadily.
The most obvious focus must be on globalization itself, which began to
be given a clear name by the 1960s. But decolonization contributed to new
connections by reducing some of the previous power imbalances, and so did
the rapid spread of industrialization itself to new areas of the world. By the
1970s, the wider adoptions of democracy raised some expectations that
political styles themselves might increasingly coalesce. Even the acceleration
of global environmental deterioration, though a massive challenge, might
increase awareness of a single humanity.
In all this, the position of the West – such a key thread in world history
from the early modern period onward – was substantially redefined, amid
some intriguing complications. The political and military power of Western
Europe diminished substantially. But Western cultural and political influence
continued to play a role, partly because of the new power position of the
United States in the world at large. The West was no longer calling the
shots, but it may have retained a disproportionate voice on some matters.
Postwar Settlement
After all the drama of the Versailles conference, the aftermath of World War
II was confused but lower key. The main barrier to an overall agreement
centered on the tensions that emerged between the Soviet Union and the
Western powers at a series of conferences held late in the war. The Soviets
clearly wanted to use their hard-won victory to gain greater power in East-
Central Europe, both to advance communism but also to form a protective
territorial shield in the west, and the Western leaders resisted. These dis-
agreements would ultimately blossom into the Cold War.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-15
In the meantime, defeated Germany was divided into four occupation
zones (Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union) and the old
capital, Berlin, deep in the Soviet zone, was also split into East Berlin and
West Berlin, ultimately divided by the Berlin Wall. The United States
occupied Japan. The Soviets gobbled up the Baltic States directly, and soon
established pre-eminence throughout East-Central Europe, combining
military occupation with the imposition of Communist Party governments.
Only Greece escaped the net, thanks to Western support; while Yugoslavia,
though now communist, stayed out of the full Soviet orbit. On the other
hand, American influence increased greatly through most of Western
Europe, including Italy, where independent governments were quickly
restored. Austria was again split from Germany and told to remain neutral,
after a shorter period of occupation.
In Asia, European and American officials quickly returned to the areas of
Japanese occupation. Korea, freed from Japan as well, was split into Amer-
ican- and Soviet-dominated zones, i.e., South Korea and North Korea.
Pledges to avoid Versailles-type mistakes showed in careful efforts not to
blame whole nations for their role in World War II. Instead, war crimes
tribunals tried relevant individual German and Japanese leaders, some of
whom were executed for their actions. At the same time, tensions with the
Soviets prompted unexpected concern for rebuilding western Germany and
Japan, politically and militarily, as potential allies against the communist
bloc.
Other arrangements involved explicit efforts to undo the larger interwar
legacy, by establishing a variety of new global agreements, and while some
of the initiatives would also partly fall victim to the Cold War split, others
managed to survive. This in turn helped set the basis for more sweeping
changes in the postwar world.
Postwar arrangements led fairly quickly both to the tense Cold War
standoff between the West and the Soviet alliance, and to a major surge in
globalization.
The Cold War
Highlights
The Cold War heats up, 1947ff; Soviets acquire the atomic bomb, 1949;
Hungarian revolution and repression, 1956; Cuban missile crisis, 1962;
Polish protests and suppression, 1979; Gorbachev heads Soviet Union,
1985–91; fall of the Berlin Wall, 1989; collapse of Soviet Union, 1991.
To many people, particularly when tensions between the United States and
the Soviet Union and their respective allies were at a high point, during the
A More Global World, 1945–2000 241
1950s and 1960s, the Cold War loomed as an all-consuming global conflict.
There were certainly major global implications. Both sides tried to recruit
allies literally throughout the world. The United States formed a number of
alliance groups to resist Soviet encroachment. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization was the most important and durable, grouping the Americans
with Canada and most West European states, and ultimately including
Turkey. Other clusters involved a loose network among several Southeast
Asian countries, and a tight accord with Australia and New Zealand. Japan,
as it recovered, was heavily engaged, as was South Korea. On the other
side, the Soviet counterpart to NATO was the Warsaw Pact, grouping the
East European communist states. During the 1950s, collaboration with the
new communist regime in China was also involved, and later the Soviets
allied with communist Cuba. Beyond this, at various points, Soviet leaders
forged some agreements with places like Egypt and India. Both sides also
competed for alignments in Africa, lavishing considerable foreign aid and
military assistance. The competition also speeded up the process of decolo-
nization: both the major players tried to dissociate themselves from imperi-
alism, at one point helping to force France and Britain to surrender the old
European hold over the Suez Canal.
The conflict fueled a major arms race. The United States had hoped to de-
escalate after World War II: there were even plans to convert the Pentagon,
the defense hub built during the war, into a shopping mall. But Cold War
competition committed the nation to high levels of military expenditure and
steady expansion of nuclear and missile technology. The Soviets developed
their own nuclear capacity by 1949, and the expensive competition was off and
running. This included lavish military aid to other countries, which in many
regions built up armaments to an unprecedented level; defense budgets in the
Middle East, for example, often soared. Competition quickly extended as well
to rivalry in space exploration, where the Soviets got the first jump with a
manned probe. Competing propaganda was another front, and the United
States went through a period of particularly fervent anti-communism. Soviet
leaders oscillated interestingly between touting communist values and claiming
that they could beat the West as its own game of rising consumerism. At one
point, a Soviet leader, visiting the United States, claimed, “We will bury
you” – but it was not clear what he meant.
At the same time, both sides were usually fairly cautious in fact. The arms
race yielded what was called MAD, or Mutually Assured Destruction: both
sides had enough firepower and delivery systems to destroy the other many
times over. The Soviets fiercely defended their holdings in East-Central
Europe, putting down several protest movements and even sponsoring the
wall between their zones in Berlin and Western-controlled territory. But
they were less actively aggressive beyond this than the Americans claimed
(and often, truly believed). Their only outright military adventure was an
invasion of Afghanistan in the 1970s, trying to crush Islamic agitation near
their own major Muslim regions, and this went badly.
The United States was more active, partly because of greater national
wealth, plus the memory of the perils of isolation and the dreaded Munich
example of appeasement. Americans, with several allies, thus resisted a
North Korean invasion into the South, after bitter fighting establishing the
boundary where it had been. In the 1960s, the United States assisted the
French against a communist-nationalist uprising in parts of Southeast Asia,
ultimately taking the lead in what became the Vietnam War; this ended in
American defeat but did not create the expansion of Soviet power that the
United States had feared. The new Vietnamese regime, though certainly
communist, quickly went its own way.
The worst crisis of the Cold War era occurred in 1962, when the Soviets
installed missiles in Cuba, directly menacing the United States. War really
threatened, but then diplomacy took over: the Russians pulled the missiles
out, the Americans quietly did the same in Turkey (a close neighbor to the
Soviet Union). After this, while mutual rivalry continued, the worst ten-
sions abated somewhat. Various exchanges established some connections
among scholars and artists, while several important arms agreements
prompted both sides to scale back some of their most aggressive weaponry.
Even before this, in the late 1960s, the United Nations had sought to
curb nuclear weaponry with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968).
This stipulated that only existing nuclear nations – Soviet Union, the
United States, France, Britain, China – would maintain an arsenal; all other
signatories would agree to refrain. This was an interesting attempt in terms
of a changing world balance. Over time, well over a hundred nations signed
on – but several major players did not or, like North Korea, signed and
then reneged.
In terms of the Cold War itself, the next decisive change occurred in the
late 1980s. At that point, partly because of the economic burdens the Cold
War competition placed on Russia and the costly failure in Afghanistan,
partly because of other sources of domestic turmoil, the communist regime
unraveled, and a new set of politicians took over control. The nations of
East-Central Europe quickly disposed of their own communist systems, for
the most part fairly peacefully; the Berlin Wall was torn down and the two
parts of Germany reunited; and several states within what had been the
Soviet Union, both in East-Central Europe and in Central Asia, claimed
their own independence (1989–91). The Soviet Union was disbanded in
favor of a new, smaller Russian Federation, and the Cold War was over.
Even during the Cold War years, the US-Soviet tension had not pre-
empted other major developments, such as decolonization and further glo-
balization – some of them arguably more important in the long run. But the
period did leave a substantial aftermath, at least well into the 21st century.
The US military investment remained high, dipping only slightly in the
early 1990s and then rebounding – raising periodic questions about what it
was for, as the United States now stood for a time as “the world’s only
superpower.” Even the NATO alliance persisted, though again with some
questions about purpose. Many Russians were left with a sense of frustration
that their global role – and outright territory – were diminished, in a
country that had historically focused strongly on a policy of expansion. This
challenge would prompt some new adventures in the 21st century, includ-
ing a revival of considerable Russian military investment. The restoration of
some relatively small East European states also revived concerns about their
potential vulnerability to their still-large Russian neighbor. The legacy of
the Cold War, including some questions about whether its excesses could
have been avoided with more careful diplomacy, was still being worked out
well into the 21st century.
Globalization
Three factors rekindled the pace of globalization, after the setbacks of the
interwar years, and pushed it to new levels – with major impacts on every
region.
First: a new round of technological innovation accelerated the speed and
volume of communication and transportation. Commercial jet travel began
to take off – quite literally – in the late 1940s, with major routes soon
established among all major centers in the world; the first regular service, in
1948, connected London and Johannesburg. One result was the introduc-
tion in 1966 of a new term – jet lag – for a new experience. A bit later
satellite transmission allowed television programs, news, and major sports
events to be shared around the globe, while overseas phone calls dramati-
cally improved in quality and price – a development carried further as cell
phones spread widely. Then, in 1990, the introduction of the Internet for
civilian use further revolutionized global communication and facilitated
collaborations and cultural encounters as never before.
Second: diplomatic discussions that began in 1944, as World War II drew
to a close, deliberately aimed at creating international financial and eco-
nomic institutions that would reduce fluctuations in currency and banking
while promoting trade and development. The International Monetary Fund
and what became the World Bank both aimed at preventing the kind of
dislocations and nationalist distortions that had bedevilled the world econ-
omy in the interwar decades – beginning with assistance in postwar eco-
nomic recovery. Later a third institution, the World Trade Organization,
would be added to promote lower tariffs and help regulate international
economic competition. At the same time, the United Nations was created
to help resolve diplomatic disputes, with greater powers – including a full-
time executive branch and some possibility of military intervention –
designed to remedy the worst defects of the League of Nations.
Third: individual nations decided that fuller participation in globalization
was in their best interest. Most immediately, the United States abandoned
isolationism and Germany and Japan were compelled fully to re-enter the
world economy and, soon, other global organizations, abandoning their
experiments with separatism. Later, at the end of the 1970s, after three
decades of considerable isolation, Chinese leaders decided that international
participation was vital to their economic growth – and the nation launched
a program of contacts that surpassed anything previously experienced in
China’s history. Russian leaders made a similar decision in the mid-1980s.
By 2000, only North Korea and, to an extent, Myanmar deliberately held
back from global exchange.
The result of these three factors, in interaction, was an unprecedented
surge of new contacts and institutions, affecting a growing range of activ-
ities. At the same time, though gradually, Western control of the globali-
zation process was modified. Thus, while Europeans and Americans were
always selected to head the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, major United Nations agencies, such as the World Health Organiza-
tion, and even UN Secretaries-General, came largely from Asia, Africa, and
Latin America – though this sometimes provoked Western complaints,
particularly from the United States.
Range of Connections
A new level of international business emerged with the spread of what was
called multinational corporations. These firms, based mainly in the West, Japan,
and South Korea before 2000, not only exchanged goods and services across
borders; they organized production globally to take maximum advantage of
labor and environmental costs. Thus, automobiles were increasingly composed
of parts made in Indonesia, China, and Canada but assembled in Mexico for
sale primarily in the United States – a coordination that would have been
impossible before the new communications technology. (The mix of nations
varied widely, of course.) In many Southern states in the US, some of the lar-
gest industrial employers were German or Japanese automobile companies, a
French tire manufacturer, and so on. A whole set of American factories located
in northern Mexico, where they sought lower-paid labor but often actually
improved local working conditions; the permutations were complicated.
Multinationals often had tremendous economic clout, and moved activities
easily – sometimes irresponsibly – from one location to another. And the sheer
number of multinationals, rare before World War II, expanded by the thou-
sands in every decade after the 1950s.
International non-governmental organizations (INGOs), again unusual
before 1960, became another center for global growth, expanding rapidly.
These groups sought to mobilize world opinion in matters like human
rights or labor or environmental conditions, with members scattered
throughout the world. Amnesty International, founded in 1961, tried to
protect political prisoners or vulnerable women literally worldwide. Groups
of this sort could mobilize outrage that protected labor organizers in Central
America or Indonesia from attacks by local governments; or their petition
campaigns could free a woman about to be stoned to death for adultery in
northern Nigeria; or they could orchestrate blasts against the continued use
of capital punishment in the United States. Shading off from the INGOs
were specific protest campaigns. One, in the 1970s, successfully targeted
Nestlé, forcing the company to back down from selling infant formula in
Africa where impure water supplies caused widespread death when the
product was used. A spate of boycott and petition campaigns in the 1990s
attacked companies like Nike, and also celebrity American investors, for
shoddy labor practices in places like Vietnam – and elicited promises of
reform. Yet another burst persuaded McDonald’s to stop using beef from
Brazil, where ranching was cutting into the Amazon rainforest. There were
lots of failures and empty promises, but much effective action as well.
The United Nations itself, and its specialized agencies, represented another,
if imperfect, step forward from the standpoint of globalization. The new effort
featured a General Assembly, representing all members – and as the number of
new nations grew, so did this body, soon eclipsing Western representatives and
frequently criticizing Western actions. A smaller Security Council had to agree
on major matters such as military intervention to settle disputes; five permanent
members of this group, Russia, China, Britain, France, and the United States,
had veto power, which meant that the UN could not usually act in cases of
great power conflict. However, it did take action in many smaller con-
troversies, in several instances resolving civil strife in Africa, helping to enforce
agreements relating to Israel and its neighbors, and so on; troops came from a
variety of regions, including the African Union, Canada, and Pakistan.
A number of subsidiary organizations registered successes as well. The
World Health Organization helped coordinate international response to
new disease threats, such as AIDS, though it depended on cooperation and
funding from member states. Another group helped identify and protect
special cultural and natural “heritage sites” around the world. Other agen-
cies worked to reduce child labor, improve food production, or raise edu-
cational standards.
Cultural Globalization
The globalization of science was hardly a new phenomenon, but it became
steadily more important and more multifaceted. Major scientific research
teams, at universities or in corporations, routinely included Westerners,
Indians, Russians, Chinese, Mexicans. Use of the Internet furthered research
collaborations as well by the end of the century. Student exchanges expan-
ded rapidly, with India and China heading the list, but South Korea,
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia not far behind. English, for better or worse,
increasingly became the common language in scientific work (and also in
sports and air travel), and literally millions more students set to work to
learn English outside of the English-speaking countries than within.
The globalization of consumerism was at least as impressive, with grow-
ing coordination and, often, improvements in living standards. Fast food
restaurants, mainly originating in the United States, became commonplace.
McDonald’s led the way: founded in 1955, it began to expand to Canada
and Puerto Rico in 1967, and then added an average of two new countries
each year, accelerating further after the end of the Cold War. The estab-
lishment of McDonald’s in Russia in 1990 was a big deal; one Russian
woman even saved the napkin she used, to commemorate the exciting
event. Characteristically, while the chain spread one national style – not
only in food choices but in sanitation and cheerful employees – it adapted
to local conditions, adding teriyaki burgers in Japan, more vegetarian fare in
India, special meals after sundown during Ramadan in Morocco, wine and
beer in France. But other cuisines spread widely as well: not only Chinese,
but Middle Eastern or Turkish, Vietnamese, Ethiopian, Indian – with vir-
tually every major city featuring an array. Nairobi, in Kenya, became the
best place to get Mexican food in Africa, initially because of the interests of
some Mexican Catholic missionaries.
Global popular music featured American styles, but also British as well as
West Indian reggae. Many Argentinian composers shuffled from Buenos Aires
to Paris to New York and back, accumulating but also spreading a variety of
influences. Japanese and South Korean popular music scored increasingly with
global audiences, becoming a significant export from an economic as well as
cultural standpoint. Here too, the Western input was only one of many.
Television shows as well as movies were widely disseminated. Here US
influence predominated. But the massive film industry that grew up in
India, called Bollywood, mixed regional themes and styles with some Hol-
lywood influences, and gained some international attention as well as huge
national audiences. From Western Europe and the United States came
international theme parks and tourist organizations. Disney established
“worlds” in Tokyo, France, and Shanghai – in France, becoming the largest
single tourist attraction after a slow start. Global sports soared. The Olympic
Games, now far from a Western preserve, served as a center of Cold War
competitions with the Soviet Union, communist East Germany, and then
China becoming major players. Soccer football, already well established,
became a global passion, with Latin American and occasionally Korean and
Japanese teams doing well along with the Europeans. American basketball
became the fastest-growing international sport, ranking number two after
soccer in Turkey, for example; player recruitment, initially dis-
proportionately American, expanded to include various Europeans, Africans,
Chinese, Turks. and so on.
Other habits spread, some of them unexpected. Christmas, as an occasion
for consumerism, gained popularity in Islamic-majority nations like Turkey
or the United Arab Emirates. The custom of sending greeting cards spread
to Ramadan. American-style Halloween competed with local All Saints Day
customs in Mexico. Valentine’s Day and Mother’s Day won growing
attention. The song “Happy birthday” was translated into at least 30 lan-
guages, and organizations sprang up in Cairo and Beijing to help parents
organize a big bash. Western-style dress spread widely, including blue jeans.
In Vietnam, around 2000, a new word, “teen,” was introduced to the lan-
guage to describe teenagers who were avid consumers of global styles.
Beauty pageants, another Western innovation, won participation in many
countries. At the same time, however, Japanese animation and video games
gained ever more avid global audiences, while Japan and the United States
shared honors for designing the most widely shared children’s toys – often
now manufactured in China.
This range of shared tastes and styles became an important element in
many regional cultures, but always in combination with local customs.
Japanese consumers, for example, might go to Disneyland and watch inter-
national soccer or their professional baseball teams. But they also went to
communal bathhouses – where Westerners usually felt uncomfortable – and
many still watched sumo wrestling. And even on the international scene,
they paid particularly avid attention to Japanese baseball stars who made it
big in the United States, or tennis players who broke through. Some young
women in India participated eagerly in beauty contests, but there was also a
move – incompletely successful – to add a test on familiarity with local
culture, to try to make sure traditions were upheld as well. Finally, global
consumer culture drew outraged criticism in some places, and while reli-
gious objections headed the list, there were other grounds of protest as well;
in one Indian city, for example, couples celebrating Valentine’s Day in a
local restaurant were physically attacked because of concern that this kind of
romantic love might detract from the devotion owed to older parents.
Cultural globalization was a real phenomenon, but with major complexities.
One other feature of cultural globalization involved unprecedented inter-
national tourism, first mainly from Western countries but later from Japan,
China, Russia, and elsewhere. International tourists might try carefully to avoid
much contact with “natives”; a new Belgian-founded organization, Club Med,
helped tourist-residents enjoy mainly European cuisine, modified by a “local
night” once a week. Japanese visitors to Paris, usually in organized groups,
were protected by a number of shops, some Japanese-owned, that carefully
listed all items in Japanese. Many cities in Asia put up signs in English, to help
visitors avoid the stress of dealing with another language – and protect locals
from the challenge of bewildered Western tourists. Correspondingly, many
local workers in the new hotels and resorts did not try to adopt the styles and
habits tourists displayed, for example, shunning revealing vacation outfits. Over
time, however, global tourism could exercise some mutual influence, as well as
substantial revenues, and it certainly highlighted the effects of new transporta-
tion technology and an expansion of interests.
Globalization and Human Rights

The postwar years saw an unprecedented global push for human rights –
now the preferred term – in reaction to the atrocities of the interwar years.
The effort became a major part of globalization, including the agenda of the
United Nations. The rights push was intended among other things to
counter the kind of racist sentiment that had run amuck in the 1930s, and it
coincided with the rapid decline of the older racist pseudo-science. Over
time, however, the global rights program encountered a number of barriers,
and even more than global consumerism, it often failed to penetrate regio-
nal opposition.
Major countries could not agree on a full rights statement when the UN
was launched in 1945 – the Soviets worried about their prison camps, the
US about racial discrimination, the British about their imperialism. By 1948,
however, in part because of tireless efforts by the American Eleanor Roo-
sevelt and consultation of scholars from a number of different cultural tra-
ditions, the time seemed ripe. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
set forth a number of basic principles: equality under the law, regardless of
race or gender; freedom of speech and religion; abolition of slavery; fair
trials and protection from torture. Several nations at the time abstained from
this document, because of special concerns: the communist countries, Saudi
Arabia, and South Africa. Over the long haul, however, almost all nations
would sign on – ultimately, 193 – and a growing number would accept
many of the principles as legally binding.
Furthermore, the rights campaigns would press further in later decades.
Beginning in the 1960s, the United Nations began organizing special con-
ferences to promote full gender equality, calling attention to continuing
limitations on women – from property rights to coerced child marriages.
Discussions on children’s rights also advanced, though there were disagree-
ments about whether child labor should be fully abolished. In 1989, a
modified children’s rights document was agreed upon, ultimately accepted
by literally all nations, except the United States, which sought to outlaw the
most exploitative forms of child labor while insisting on a right to educa-
tion. Beyond the official efforts, INGOs like Amnesty International devoted
themselves to defense of rights and their extension into additional areas,
such as the problem of rape as a clear violation of women’s rights. And
many governments, particularly in both the West and Latin America, urged
attention to human rights in their own diplomacy, trying to use pressure to
promote greater adherence around the world.
The new framework for human rights was an important addition to the
global agenda. To be sure, reality often differed from advances on paper; as
with many aspects of contemporary globalization, there were complexities.
Many nations signed documents but then largely ignored them in defense of
authoritarian regimes or continued oppression of women or other groups.
Many nations still resented the idea of global interference – this was one
reason the United States refused adherence on children’s rights. As China
gained strength, it was particularly offended by external pressures. Particu-
larly interesting was an attempt in the 1990s, mounted by the city-state of
Singapore and some Chinese authorities, to argue that the human rights
program was simply too Western, a latter-day effort to find new reasons to
interfere with the affairs of others now that outright imperialism had
become impossible. The notion was that human rights definitions should be
more sensitive to regional traditions, that, in East Asia, the individualistic
emphasis in the Declaration and other efforts was simply misplaced, that
there should be more emphasis on community rights and collective well-
being. This was a really interesting argument from a historical perspective,
though it was also noteworthy that Japan, another country with a Con-
fucian tradition that had, however, adapted to other values, rejected this line
of argument.
Migration and Globalization

A final aspect of globalization was in some ways a familiar historical staple:
the movement of people across national lines. In this period, however, and
particularly by the 1960s and 1970s, new patterns of immigration developed
that added a dimension to the whole phenomenon of globalization – while
raising some new concerns as well.
Two ingredients shaped the context. First, an unprecedented surge in
global population growth; and, second, new labor needs in some of the
leading industrial societies.
The population explosion was important in its own right, challenging
established patterns in many regions and putting new pressure on available
resources. Growth rates had already increased a bit in the first half of the
20th century: 700,000 additional people, compared to 400,000 in the
second half of the 19th century. After 1950, however, the acceleration was
unprecedented: from 2.5 billion people worldwide to 6.1 billion by the year
2000 – almost triple. Public health improvements that reduced infant mor-
tality increased levels directly while also producing more potential parents,
and the spiral continued. Rates were slowing by 2000 – an important
change – but this did not detract from the magnitude of what had already
occurred.
The bulk of the increase took shape in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Some Western countries experienced an interesting “baby boom” right after
the war, but it was fairly modest and above all short-lived; and birth rates in
the European communist countries were relatively low. This meant that the
population surge was occurring mainly in areas that had not yet indus-
trialized, or where the process was just getting underway – which raised the
question of how these new numbers were going to be supported. In some
places – particularly parts of Africa and the Middle East – the combination
of population growth and limits on economic opportunities created massive
unemployment levels, especially among youth, even when the world
economy as a whole was fairly prosperous.
One partial response was massive out-migration. At the same time,
industrial growth and rising prosperity in Western Europe and the “settler
societies” created new needs, particularly for workers willing to take on
some of the less-skilled, lower-paying jobs that local workers increasingly
shunned. Many industrial countries became eager for new immigrants – at
least on a temporary basis, changing older policies not only to accept larger
numbers but to admit people from more distant parts of the world.
The result was that countries that had an earlier tradition of substantial
immigration, like the United States, Australia, and Canada, saw a new surge
and a significant increase of Asian, Latin American, and Caribbean migrants;
and Western Europe became a global immigrant-receiving zone for the first
time. Only Japan, of the major industrial powers, protective of a tradition of
greater separation, kept the numbers down.
Thus, from the 1960s onward, Canada experienced massive growth, but
now from Asia and the Caribbean rather than the various parts of Europe.
The United States reversed its interwar policies of substantial exclusion:
already almost 5% of the population was foreign-born in 1970, but the
percentage soared to 10.4% by 2000. While the greatest number of new
arrivals came from Latin America, the nation picked up new minorities
from India and the Philippines, and from Muslim countries as well. Rates of
immigration into Britain and France were almost as high: by the early 21st
century the British population was 7% Asian, 3% Black. The Muslim min-
ority in France, mainly from North Africa, soared to nearly 10%. Germany
received over 5 million Turks, who came to constitute at least 5% of the
population total. New immigration into Britain, France, and also the
Netherlands often came disproportionately from former colonies, which
actually gave some of the new arrivals a leg up in terms of language and
cultural facility.
This massive movement brought additional facets of globalization home
to many of the receiving countries. Turkish restaurants dotted German
cities; Indian restaurants became a British staple, sometimes complete with
British-style overcooked vegetables. Countries like Britain and Canada saw
unprecedented mixing not only of immigrants and local populations, but
among the diverse cultures of the immigrants themselves.
Of course, there were important tensions as well. Police mistreatment
combined with prejudices in the schools and among employers. Germany,
particularly, tried frequently to force migrants to go back home during
economic crises, using the term “guest worker” as a nice way to describe
their temporary status. Often poor as well as foreign, many immigrants
suffered from crowded and unsafe housing. Attacks by local gangs were a
problem in places like Germany. Race riots occurred among Blacks in
British cities, the first in 1958. Fierce debates centered on issues like how
quickly to insist that the newcomers convert to the national language. At
the same time, policies eased in some cases as well. Germany in 1990 made
it simpler for Turks to become German citizens, which many did.
As had been the case earlier in modern history, those immigrants who
returned home, even on visits – now much easier, thanks to jet travel –
brought new habits with them, creating additional sources of change that
formed part of the broader globalization process.
****
Globalization in the second half of the 20th century was a profound and
multi-faceted process, with a host of potential advantages and disadvantages
for all concerned. Measuring it against past patterns of contact and calcu-
lating its impact on regional policies and cultures and even on daily life,
must be built into any analysis of contemporary world history. And, of
course, the process was ongoing, with further changes to come after the
year 2000. Already in 1999, protests against a meeting of the World Trade
Organization in Seattle saw demonstrators from many countries argue
against globalization because of its impact on work and wages, its disruption
of traditional cultures (McDonald’s came in for explicit attention, as an
attack on local foodways), its devastation of the environment. Arguments
about globalization might take a new turn in the century that was about to
begin.
Decolonization
Highlights
Syria, 1941–44; the Philippines, 1946; India/Pakistan, 1947; Israel, 1948;
Indonesia, 1950; Suez crisis, 1956; Ghana, 1957; French West Africa,
1959; Algeria, 1962; Vietnam, 1976; Panama takes over Canal, 1977–99;
end of Apartheid in South Africa, 1994.
In 1945, there were 35 countries belonging to the new United Nations; by

1970, there were 128 (in 2021 there would be 198). This huge expansion
showed the widespread desire to join the new organization – but above all
it reflected the unprecedented creation of new or renewed nations, during
the decades of rapid decolonization (Map 13.1). This process ran parallel to
the Cold War and globalization, and connected to both, but it was extre-
mely important in its own right – particularly for Asia and Africa, but even
for established countries in other regions as well, now invited to deal with a
much wider range of independent states and participate in the end of classic
imperialism.
The basic formula was fairly simple. The major imperialist powers were
drained by two world wars, with diminishing appetite for defending empire
and shouldering the costs, as against other needs such as postwar recon-
struction. Some new leaders were skeptical of the justice of imperialism in
the first place – and new thoughts about race could contribute here, though
new thinking initially applied more clearly to Asia than to Africa.
Map 13.1 The world after decolonization and the end of the Cold War
Even more important, nationalist agitation stepped up in many places,
building on trends set earlier but now encouraged by wartime dislocations
and, in much of Asia, by European setbacks against the Japanese. Much of
the protest surge was relatively peaceful – strikes, demonstrations, petitions,
often inspired in part by Gandhi’s example of nonviolence. Leaders were
often jailed for a time, but this merely delayed the inevitable. However,
there were bitter attacks on colonial holdings and sometimes on the colonial
officials and estate owners themselves in several places. In some cases, new
military strategies, including guerrilla warfare tactics that might bypass con-
ventional military confrontations, played a role as well.
Finally, the Cold War context, with great power pressures, added to the
mix. The result, between the mid-1940s and mid-1990s, was the almost
total abolition of the classic empires. Specific patterns varied, depending
mainly on degrees of European and settler resistance, but the end result was
largely the same.
The process began in fact before the war ended. Syrian nationalists, for
example, took advantage of the French defeat in Europe to proclaim inde-
pendence in 1941, though this was not formally recognized until 1944.
Then, in 1945, Japan was stripped of its holdings with its defeat, with Korea
gaining independence in its two zones. Taiwan, freed from Japanese con-
trol, soon became the refuge of nationalist forces defeated by the commu-
nists on the Chinese mainland, who now defended a precarious new nation.
The United States had prepared for Philippine independence and granted
it in 1946. Britain was under a new government control by the Labour
Party, always opposed to imperialism and now eager to focus on building a
welfare state. It granted independence to India and Pakistan, as largely pre-
arranged, in 1947, deeply disappointing nationalists like Gandhi who had
hoped for a unified state. The transition was marred by bitter conflicts
between Muslims and Hindus and a great deal of internal migration; prob-
ably about a million people died in a tragically chaotic process.
The Dutch tried to hold onto Indonesia after returning to power fol-
lowing the Japanese defeat, and several years of intense fighting with
nationalist forces occurred, before independence in 1950. The French, stung
by inglorious defeat in World War II, tried to hold onto Vietnam and its
neighbors, amid bitter fighting against forces led by Ho Chi Minh in his
effort both to win independence and to create a Marxist society. The
United States finally took the lead in fighting for an independent but non-
communist Vietnam, but this too led to defeat; a unified Vietnamese state
won through in 1978.
Several crises marked the decolonization process in the Middle East and
North Africa. The British gave up on trying to resolve Jewish-Arab disputes
and turned the matter over to the United Nations; in the meantime, Jewish
forces simply moved ahead to proclaim the state of Israel, in 1948, seizing
considerable land from the Arabs (Palestinians) in the process. Neighboring
Arab countries attacked, in the first Arab-Israeli war, but the Israeli forces
not only held their own but expanded their territory by 50%. Hostilities
halted in 1948, but several subsequent wars occurred, all ending with Israel
intact and in one case with further expansion; and there were recurrent
risings by the Palestinians themselves.
Egypt, already technically independent, gained a vigorous nationalist
government that unseated the old monarch, and then worked to seize
control of the Suez Canal. Britain and France, alarmed at what they saw as a
threat to their trade and prestige, prepared to fight, but American and
Soviet pressure forced them to back down. Resulting Egyptian control
turned out to be even-handed and efficient.
France was particularly loath to give up on Algeria, an old and nearby
holding that also had a large minority of European settlers. War dragged on
for years, with brutality on both sides and considerable violence in France
itself, including from the embittered former settlers. In the end, however,
the French yielded.
Independence in Sub-Saharan Africa came slightly later than in most of
colonial Asia and North Africa, but after brief efforts to repress nationalist agi-
tation, it was often fairly smooth. Ghana launched the process; the colony had
been called the Gold Coast, but the new nation took the name of one of the
great earlier African empires. France sought to anticipate major ferment, after
its setbacks elsewhere, and granted independence to West Africa countries in
1959, in this case, however, retaining some important political and economic
ties, often including recurrent military intervention.
The last main struggle centered on southern Africa, where a large White
settler minority prevented a smooth transition. White conservatives pro-
claimed independence for Rhodesia in 1965, but this led to 15 years of
guerrilla warfare led by nationalist forces; the Black-ruled nation of Zim-
babwe, another classic name, won out in 1980. South Africa had been
granted independence in 1934, but this led to decades of rule under the
Afrikaner minority. Afrikaners in turn spearheaded the creation of a vicious
Apartheid system, in which Blacks were relegated to separate and inferior
areas of settlement as well as being denied access to most desirable jobs,
social events, and educational facilities – and political participation. The full
system was decreed in 1948, and led to almost half a century of brutal police
repression and recurrent rioting and protest. Leaders of the nationalist Afri-
can National Congress Party, including Nelson Mandela, were jailed for
long periods of time. The result was increasing international isolation for the
South African government, along with damaging international boycotts
particularly during the 1980s, often guided by Black groups in other coun-
tries. Finally, a new Afrikaner leader decided to yield; Mandela was freed
and soon led a new, democratically elected government, sponsoring as well
a process of careful reconciliation which avoided retaliatory violence. This
last major imperialist remnant ended in 1994.
A few anomalies remained. The United States held onto several territories
in the Pacific and Caribbean, sometimes with partial acceptance from local
residents. Several other Caribbean countries decided to remain under
French, Dutch, or British control, even when given opportunities for
independence. Similar local approval kept several major Polynesian islands as
French territory, and Hawaii gained American statehood despite opposition
from what was now a fairly small Polynesian minority. And some important
ethnic groups never gained a chance to consider their own state, most
notably the Kurds in the northern Middle East; here, however, European
control was no longer the issue as opposed to resistance from nationalist
governments in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
The end of imperialism did not signal a comparable surge toward greater
regional economic equality. As before in Latin America, economic dominance
from industrial countries and businesses continued in many cases. In several
instances, however, political independence did open the way for new eco-
nomic initiatives that gradually promoted more vigorous development.
The political and cultural results of independence fit mainly within sepa-
rate regional patterns. Many new governments began with every intention
of establishing democratic, parliamentary states. Internal disputes, and in
some cases outright civil wars, often cut these experiments short, replaced
by authoritarian strongmen or military leaders at least for a time. Women,
too, who had often played a strong role in nationalist agitation, often were
disappointed by a return to patriarchal political controls. In some cases,
however, these setbacks proved temporary, and new opportunities began to
open up in the later 20th century. And a few countries established a durable
political system from the outset – headed by India, which became and
remained the world’s largest democracy.
The former imperialist powers had their own reckoning to consider.
Their economic activity was not severely affected by decolonization, and in
most cases the end of the struggle to maintain power actually benefited
internal political stability. There was still a question, however, of how to
evaluate, and possibly apologize for, decades, sometimes centuries of dom-
ination. The question could bleed into debates over racial justice at home,
particularly because so many segments of the growing minorities of color
actually originated in one of the former colonies. This complex debate
continues.
Global Industrialization
Regional economic inequality had been a growing global issue since the
16th century, with a slightly fluctuating cast of characters, and it had accel-
erated during the 19th century. It seemed to be getting even worse in the
initial decades after World War II, as the European and Japanese economies
soared beyond previous levels and the United States prospered. The term
“Third World,” initially aimed at societies like India that tried to be neutral
during the Cold War, was now meant to designate regions that seemed
unable to escape a largely agricultural economy – and great poverty. The
“Global South” was another despairing label, but with more focus on the
ways industrial countries continued to exploit the commodities producers
south of the Equator.
Indeed, no additional societies clearly broke through to outright indus-
trialization during the 1950s and 1960s with the huge exception of the
“Pacific Rim” and the new state of Israel. South Korea and Taiwan – both
medium-sized states with close relationships to the United States – began to
accelerate industrial growth by the 1960s. At the time both had authoritar-
ian governments that focused strongly on industrial development plans, and
both received considerable foreign aid. In South Korea, several entrepre-
neurs, one of peasant origin, began to develop massive industrial combines
centered on shipbuilding, automobiles, and other heavy industrial products.
Worker loyalty and hard work were cultivated through low-cost housing
and other benefits, and regular group activities including Korean martial
arts. Here and in Taiwan, investment in education expanded rapidly. The
result in these two countries, and also in the city-states of Singapore and
Hong Kong, was very rapid economic growth that began to raise living
standards nearer those of the advanced industrial countries. This expansion,
along with Japan’s continued advance, also created new opportunities for
exports from other countries in the region, such as Malaysia and Thailand.
For a time, these breakthroughs, plus the advance of industry and export
agriculture in Israel, stood as exceptions to what otherwise seemed a gloomy
regional pattern. In hindsight, it is clear that important preparatory develop-
ments were occurring in other major areas. In India, by the 1960s and 1970s,
improved agricultural techniques linked to the “Green Revolution” reduced
the need for imports of food; now independent, the nation was also able to
enforce a policy of import substitution, creating space for local production of
automobiles and other products that reduced dependence on imports from the
West or Japan. And while substantial population growth continued, the rate
began to slow. In China, the new communist regime launched a program in the
late 1950s called the “Great Leap Forward,” hoping to benefit from the nation’s
huge population to create a massive series of small industrial operations; at the
time, the program failed, a major setback for the new communist regime; but in
fact the program did give a growing number of Chinese experience in a more
industrial economy, experience that could be put to use two decades later. For
their part, many Latin American countries began to undergo the basic demo-
graphic transition in the 1970s. Government promptings helped convince
families to cut their birth rate, but improved education for women played a
greater role; many mothers wanted a better future for their own children, which
meant having fewer of them and, sometimes against the wishes of husbands and
local priests, they began to plan family size more carefully. At the same time,
particular industrial sectors, like the Brazilian steel industry, began to compete
on a global basis – even with the United States. In other words, a host of indi-
vidual developments in particular industries, in agriculture, and in demography,
began to set the stage for a more general economic breakthrough.
Economic growth rates began to accelerate rapidly in a number of major
countries by the 1980s. China would prove to be a particularly dramatic success
story, but India, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, and other centers participated actively
as well. Annual surges of 7–10% became common, allowing these countries,
many quite populous, to begin to close the gap with the advanced industrial
economies. Specific patterns varied. China concentrated heavily on infra-
structure development, including an impressive network of fast speed trains,
and on steady expansion of manufacturing for export. India had its own heavy
industry sector, capable of exports to neighboring countries; but it excelled in
sectors like computer chip production, pharmaceuticals, and also English-
language service centers for insurance companies and other operations in
the United States and Britain. Turkey combined expanding industry with
export agriculture to neighboring Europe, and Turkish workers abroad also
remitted funds to their families back home.
Most of these rapidly-developing nations displayed a mixed economy
still. There was some traditional peasant agriculture – particularly persistent
in India. Many multinationals from advanced industrial countries set up
operations to take advantage of still-cheap labor, and considerable exploita-
tion could still be involved. In some cases, commodity exports continued to
loom large – as with Brazil. And then there were vital sectors capable of
wide competition internationally, like the Brazilian steel industry or Chinese
consumer products factories.
By 2000, it was estimated that at least 60% of the world’s population now
lived in essentially industrial countries, despite different stages of develop-
ment; the notion of an industrialization of the world was not fanciful at all.
The transformation had further global implications. Many of the new
industrial economies grew so rapidly that they required basic resources from
other areas. China became a huge consumer of coal from Australia, com-
modities from Brazil, concrete from wherever they could find sources of
supply. China and India joined the advanced industrial countries in com-
peting for resources in Africa. Several African countries, like Uganda, began
generating their own economic growth in part because of their new export
opportunities to Asia. On the other hand, the surge of Chinese manu-
facturing put new pressure on traditional sectors, just as British indus-
trialization had done two centuries before.
Advanced industrial economies felt reverberations as well. Chinese and
Mexican factories could often outcompete factory industry in Britain or the
United States, displacing many workers. Growth rates in the older industrial
countries, at 2–3% a year, simply could not keep up with the levels of these
new industrializers, and this could be a source of tension as well. On the
other hand, service industries like banking, very high tech manufacturing,
and also movies and other entertainment products gained new markets in
the rising economies.
Above all, the expansion of industrialization began to have its usual wide-
ranging effects, now on some of the largest societies in the world.
Consumerism expanded. A new, consumer-oriented middle class emerged,
embracing 80 million people or more in India alone. Cities grew rapidly, and
places like China became over half urban for the first time; and on the strength
of these changes, the whole world would become predominantly urban early
in the 21st century. Megacities, of 30 million people of more, popped up in
China, India, South Korea – an innovation within the broader pattern of
urbanization. Thanks to globalization, of course, many of the new city centers
used the same basic architectural styles, and often featured a similar array of
restaurants and coffee shops along with some local specialties.
Regional economic inequality was clearly declining by the late 20th
century, another dramatic change from the trends first associated with
industrialization. This could unsettle some of the former high achievers,
particularly in the West, accustomed to their superiority over others. But it
also carried some potential for easing tensions. For global poverty was
declining – even though a distressing number of impoverished people still
struggled to survive. Life expectancies were going up almost everywhere.
More people were gaining access to electricity, even to more sanitary
plumbing, and now also to cell phones which spread more widely than
some of the other new personal technologies. A number of governments –
again, China headed the list – took understandable pride in what their
societies had managed to achieve in just a few short decades.
The Environment
The biggest downside of all this activity, in combination with the effects of
population growth, was the damage inflicted on the environment. The
pattern had begun with Western industrialization itself, then enhanced by
other developments, such as the rise of the automobile. But there was no
question that global industrialization accelerated the process. China joined
the United States as the world’s greatest polluters. New Delhi in India,
along with some of the Chinese cities, became centers of frequently chok-
ing air pollution. Peddlers began to sell oxygen in the streets of Mexico
City to counter the effects of cars and factories.
Regional crises had occurred before, in the smoke and water pollution of
industrial centers in the 19th century. Now, however, deterioration occurred at
literally a global level, adding environmental degradation to the other facets of
contemporary globalization. Factory and automobile emissions increased stea-
dily – China became the most rapidly expanding market for automobiles, and
other rising economies like Turkey and India were not far behind. The need for
commodity production also accelerated the process of deforestation and species
destruction; steady encroachment on the Amazon rainforest threatened one of
the most important global sources of oxygen, as well as biodiversity. Even the
growing world market for beef – another facet of growing consumerism and
the food tastes associated with prosperity – increased the carbon dioxide emis-
sions into the atmosphere. New threats came from many sources.
Somewhat ironically, some of the advanced industrial societies made
important inroads against more local pollution during the later 20th century.
Cities like London were able to clean up waterways, bringing fish back to
the Thames river. After a number of air pollution crises – so bad that traffic
policemen had to wear masks – Tokyo and other Japanese cities cleaned up
their act. Air quality improved in many US cities, in part of course because
some factory industry was migrating to other countries.
The global problem, however, became increasingly severe. Some mea-
sures taken to restrain pollution in one place simply transmitted it to others:
tall smokestacks in Germany or the American Midwest sent smoke high in
the atmosphere, where it settled on beleaguered forests in Canada or Scan-
dinavia. A huge nuclear power disaster in Chernobyl, in 1986, devastated
the surrounding region in the Soviet Union and briefly sent pollutants to
other European countries. Recurrent oil spills from ocean tankers befouled
beaches and killed wildlife from Alaska to Malaysia. Carelessness by inter-
national companies helped cause accidents like an explosion by an Amer-
ican-owned chemical plant in India that killed hundreds of workers.
But the biggest challenge was global warming, which had begun as a
result of industrial activity in the 19th century but now accelerated rapidly.
By the 1970s, experts in a number of societies began to try to call urgent
attention to the problem which, they said, was altering the planet in ways
that threatened water resources, an increase in oceanic water levels, and
more severe storms. Sweden helped trigger the first United Nations con-
ference on the environment, in 1972, and concern increased steadily
thereafter. Another conference in 1987, in Montreal, did produce agree-
ment on one front: chemical production, particularly for refrigerators and
air conditioners, had been releasing hydrocarbons into the atmosphere that
were seriously damaging the ozone layer; but now a new protocol guided
the gradual phase out of these chemicals, and the layer began to recover.
The same approach was ventured more widely in another conference in
Kyoto, Japan, in 1997, which extended an earlier United Nations protocol
on cutting carbon dioxide emissions. A number of countries signed on, but
there were bitter disagreements between the advanced industrial countries
and newcomers like China, who argued they needed more leeway while
they furthered economic development. The United States, which accepted
the protocol, was unable to gain congressional approval and so dropped out.
The 20th century ended with no clear path forward, amid the welter of
disputes about national responsibilities and a widespread belief in some
places, including the United States, that there was no real problem in the
first place.
Industrial Society
The global expansion of industrialization began to generalize some of the
wider features of industrial society, beyond economic growth or even
urbanization and consumerism – though there were regional differences in
degree. The more general acceleration of globalization, including the
international discussion of human rights, pushed in the same direction.
Three related changes were particularly noteworthy; all had taken shape
before within key regions, but now they began to take root globally.
A rapid decline in the birth rate was one feature, though it was long con-
cealed by continued population growth. Most societies now agreed that tradi-
tional birth rates had to be cut back, in order to facilitate economic growth,
particularly amid public health measures that were rapidly reducing the infant
death rate almost everywhere. Several United Nations conferences targeted the
birth rate issue. As in Latin America, the Indian government actively began to
promote birth control, though direct government intervention, for example, in
trying to promote vasectomies, generated backlash. China, in a major about-
face in 1978, used its powerful government to mandate only a single child for
most families; the result led to some severe measures against individual women,
including forced sterilizations, but it had the desired overall effect: the birth rate
dropped very rapidly.
There were important outliers: several Muslim-majority countries objec-
ted to any overall birth control programs, as did the Catholic Church. In
fact, birth rates dropped anyway in places like Iran or Turkey, but initially at
a slower pace and amid greater dispute. The United States, under Repub-
lican administrations, tried to discourage abortion internationally, despite the
fact that some regional authorities regarded abortion as a valid recourse
given the expense of birth control devices. African birth rates, though
dropping gradually, remained higher than average, partly because of lower
levels of urbanization, partly because of religious concerns in a region in
which both Islam and Christianity had growing influence.
Global birth rate decline linked in turn to more general changes in the
treatment of children – one of the human rights targets as well. Rates of
child labor declined almost everywhere during the later 20th century, while
access to education expanded accordingly. Both governments and parents in
most societies now agreed that children’s main social function centered on
schooling, and that formal labor was inappropriate at least for younger
children. Here too, there was regional variation around the common trend.
In fact, in India and other parts of South Asia, child labor actually increased
for several decades, despite vigorous efforts by local reformers. Many parents
still believed that, since they had worked as children, their offspring should
as well; and global competition drove many traditional industries to seek
more cheap child labor, bucking the larger trend. But the larger transfor-
mation continued to gain ground.
Other changes added in. Many societies began to reduce criminal pun-
ishments for child offenders. Almost all societies eliminated the death pen-
alty for children, though the United States held out until after 2000. The
United Arab Emirates began to reconsider a traditional practice of using
young boys as jockeys during camel races – it looked bad internationally, in
a society trying to lure global tourists and businessmen, and it was now
possible to use robots instead. The final change in this local diversion came
early in the 21st century.
Gender was another area where global change began to take shape,
though amid many disagreements and variations. Human rights programs,
including the vigorous United Nations efforts, had results; the decline in the
birth rate raised obvious questions about women’s role; greater education
for girls – another global trend, despite some continued gender disparities in
access in parts of Africa and in a few Muslim countries like Pakistan and
Afghanistan – had wider consequences as well.
Common trends included:
The vote. Virtually every country, including the many new nations,
gave women the vote in the decades after 1945. Some, like India, soon
went further, to try to make sure that husbands and fathers would not
intimidate the voter, through measures to protect the secrecy of the
ballot. Switzerland was late on female suffrage, making the move only
in 1971; and a few places, like Saudi Arabia, held out entirely. But the
trend was clear. In some cases, women’s representation among elected
officials began to increase as well, and a number of countries – India,
Pakistan, Britain, Israel, several Scandinavian nations – had female
prime ministers. In India, a woman, Indira Gandhi, was selected in
1966 in what became a long tenure, initially in part because disputing
male politicians assumed she would be easily controlled; she was not.
Child marriage declined, though the practice continued in some Islamic
countries and in South Asia.
Rates of female participation in the formal labor force increased almost
everywhere, though some Islamic countries and also Japan lagged
behind the overall trend. Communist nations had long emphasized
female participation. Throughout the Western world, the 1960s and
1970s saw a literal revolution in the work roles of married women and
many mothers, as women quickly came to constitute over 40% of the
total labor force. Vital disparities remained, particularly in levels of pay,
but the notion that women should be confined to domestic roles
clearly declined.
Even more than with children, fierce cultural disagreements persisted. In

Afghanistan during the 1990s, the ruling Taliban, taking an extreme view of
Islam, tried to prevent education for women almost entirely. Violence
against women may have increased in some cases, as men pushed back
against patterns of change. Sexual exploitation remained a problem. The fall
of communism in Eastern Europe, and subsequent economic dislocations,
brought an increase in the sex trade in that region, plus the export of some
women as sex workers in other countries. Overall evaluation was difficult,
and for some the continued problems and regional disparities overrode the
more favorable general trends. However, it was at least fair to note that a
pressing gender question – the issue of women’s role in a modern society –
was raised in literally every society, even if answers varied still.
The Rise of Democracy?

One final global pattern deserves attention in dealing with the second half
of the 20th century, though it is even more tentative than some of the
global social changes. By the 1990s, it seemed fair to ask if the question of
the earlier 20th century – what political system should replace the old reli-
ance on monarchy – was being answered in favor of the democratic option.
The number of nations with significant voter choice, and the opportunity
to shift control from one political party to another, was growing steadily.
The results of World War II restored democracy to western Germany,
Japan, Austria, and Italy, and the new systems, fostered during postwar
occupation, were not seriously disputed thereafter. India and Israel emerged
as liberal, democratic nations by the late 1940s. The communist bloc stood
apart, with universal suffrage but little real political choice and severe police
controls. New nations in Africa initially committed to democratic systems
but almost always soon retreated, amid the challenges of new nation for-
mation, into some form of authoritarianism.
The pattern began to change in the 1970s, partly because the United States
and Western Europe actively promoted the democratic option as part of their
efforts in the Cold War (though the United States also proved willing to
compromise with non-communist authoritarian regimes when it served stra-
tegic purposes). Spain, Portugal, and Greece all turned to democratic systems in
the 1970s, rounding out the pattern in Western Europe. They all sought entry
into the increasingly successful Common Market – the forerunner of the Eur-
opean Union – where liberal democracy was a requirement.
Then the democratic wave began to hit Latin America, as a number of
nations turned against older patterns of military or strongman rule. Argen-
tina and Brazil headed the list of conversions, and by the end of the century
literally the whole region had adopted a liberal system except communist
Cuba; Mexico gave up its one-party rule structure in the 1990s. Mainly
during the 1980s, democratic regimes came to the fore in South Korea,
Indonesia, Taiwan, and the Philippines – where an authoritarian ruler was
explicitly cast aside under popular pressure. Turkey also moved more deci-
sively toward multiparty competition. Then the democratic wave captured
much of the Soviet bloc. All of the nations of East-Central Europe except
Belarus adopted a democratic system, and Russia itself seemed to be heading
in that direction during the 1990s, though amid rather feeble leadership.
Finally, the trend hit Sub-Saharan Africa. A number of leading states, such
as Kenya and Nigeria, made the turn, though authoritarian systems held on
in other countries. The triumph of democracy in South Africa in 1994, and
its careful implementation under Nelson Mandela, were a huge gain.
By 2000, only two major world regions seemed to hold out almost
entirely. China was one. A popular revolt in favor of democracy in 1989
was brutally crushed by the communist regime. A number of Muslim
countries, both in the Middle East and among the new nations of Central
Asia, formed the other holdout. Iran offered some electoral competition but
under the careful control of the overall religious leaders. Other countries,
like Iraq or Saudi Arabia, were simply authoritarian.
Despite the anomalies, and amid the excitement of the end of the Cold
War, a number of sober observers during the 1990s believed that the
imminent triumph of democracy was a global fact. The regimes that had
not shifted, like China, would surely do so as prosperity increased and
technologies like the Internet promoted more open global communication.
It was just a matter of time.
Conclusion: Legacies?
Anyone who has been awake since 2000 knows that some of the apparent
global trends of the later 20th century did not hold. Globalization itself would
become more contested. And it is vital to note that, even for the later 20th
century, a number of vital aspects of human society were not moving in a
single global direction. For example, genuine global cultural trends —like
consumerism and the increasing role of science – did not create a uniform
pattern of secularization. Many societies remained highly religious, including
the United States, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast
Asia, and most of Latin America – even while participating in other aspects of
globalization. Debates about religious and secular forces were quite different in
most of these areas from discussions in most of Western Europe, Japan, or the
communist world. Regional cultural divisions also entered into the disparities
over gender or the treatment of children. The world in 2000 had to be defined
as a combination of the global and the regional, and no analysis that centered
only on one of these two factors would fit reality.
At the same time, several of the many global trends of the later 20th
century did display real staying power – including globalization itself in
many of its aspects. The industrialization of most of the world was a settled
pattern, including the environmental challenge that resulted. A few Western
skeptics speculated that changes in places like China would not hold, but
they were clearly wrong. Literal imperialism showed no sign of resumption,
and the further repositioning of the West in the world was firmly on the
agenda for the early 21st century, Social changes that were part of the
industrialization package, from urbanization to demography to redefinitions
of the child, were not likely to lose their vigor, while the decline of regional
economic inequality seemed to be gaining momentum. For better or worse,
many of the global forces that took greater shape after 1945 seemed firmly
entrenched – even as new tensions and questions would soon emerge,
within that framework, as a new century opened.
Further Reading
David Reynolds, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the
International History of the 1940s (2007); Raymond Garthoff, The Great
Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (1994), on
the origins and course of the Cold War.
On globalization, Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Ages of Globalization (2020); Bruce
Mazlish, The New Global History (2006); Peter N. Stearns, Globalization in
World History, 3rd edn. (2019); Matthew Karush, Musicians in Transit:
Argentina and the Globalization of Popular Music (2017); Nelly Stromquist
and Karen Monkman, Globalization and Education: Integration and Con-
testation Across Cultures, 2nd edn. (2014); Walter Lafeber, Michael Jordan
and the New Global Capitalism (2002); James Watson, ed., Golden Arches
East: McDonald’s in East Asia, 2nd edn. (2021); Stephen Rees, American
Films Abroad: Hollywood’s Domination of the World’s Movie Screens from the
1890s to the Present (1997).
On migration, J. Lucassen and L. Lucassen, eds., Migration, Migration History,
History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives, 2nd edn. (2005).
On human rights and democracy, Deen K. Chatterjee, ed., Democracy in a
Global World (2007).
On industrialization, Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Con-
tours of the World Economy, 7th edn. (2015); Guillermo de la Dehesa,
What Do We Know About Globalization?: Issues of Poverty and Income Dis-
tribution (2007); Ernest Gundling and Anita Zanchettin, Global Diversity:
Winning Customers and Engaging Employees within World Markets (2006);
Lewis Solomon, Multinational Corporations and the Emerging World Order
(1978).
On environmental change, Bill McKibben, The End of Nature: Tenth Anni-
versary Edition (1997); Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergnne, Paths to a
Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment, 2nd edn.
(2011); Ramachandra Guha, Environmentalism: A Global History (2020).
14 How Regions Responded,
1945–2000
Regional initiatives were as dense as ever during the half-century after

World War II, with a number of substantial transformations. Interactions
with the larger global trends played a key role, but they were not the whole
story. At the same time, a summary of recent regional history can touch
base with the preservation of a number of key traditions – some from
sources dating back to the classical period or the postclassical religious age.
Several regions developed interesting attempts to gain greater internal
unity and coherence, at least slightly modifying purely national indepen-
dence for the sake of defining wider interests. In the process, many of them
also expressed some distinctive values.
The most ambitious effort occurred in Western Europe, where postwar
leaders were eager to prevent the kind of bitterness that had consumed the
previous half-century. An agreement to coordinate heavy industry joined
France, Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries; this was later expanded to a
wider economic agreement allowing free movement of goods and people,
followed in turn by a more ambitious European Union. This set up common
regulations in many areas; encouraged exchanges among university students
and a free movement of labor; and ultimately even developed a common
currency, the Euro, accepted by many though not all national participants. In
the process, the Union also expanded, ultimately including almost all countries
in Western Europe and, after the fall of communism, a growing number of
East-Central nations as well. A substantial bureaucracy developed in Brussels,
the Union’s capital, and there was also an elected parliament – even as each
member nation continued with its own executive and legislature. The EU
helped assure an unprecedented period of peace throughout the entire con-
tinent, marred only by nationalist warfare in the Balkans in the 1990s.
As it matured, the European Union committed members, in principle, to
a number of values and institutions, including all the basic civil liberties,
legal gender equality, democracy, even the abolition of the death penalty.
The Union also celebrated classics in Western culture, including an anthem
from one of Beethoven’s symphonies.
A new Organization of American States (OAS) was another unity venture
soon after the war, joined by most of the nations on the two continents.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-16
266 How Regions Responded, 1945–2000
Initially aimed at preventing communism in the hemisphere, the OAS also
highlighted a commitment to democracy and human rights, and worked to
resolve a number of local conflicts particularly in Central America. After the
Cold War the organization redoubled efforts to promote fair elections, and
also sought to control the hemispheric drug trade.
A third ambitious venture was the Arab League, formed initially in 1945 and
ultimately extending not only to the Arab states of the Middle East but
also to the whole of North Africa, including Sudan. The League high-
lighted the legacies of Arab culture, including Islam as majority religion
in the region. It successfully managed some local conflicts and facilitated
a degree of economic coordination, but disagreements among member
states, including disputes over the appropriate policy toward Israel, lim-
ited effectiveness.
What became the African Union first formed as the Organization for
African Unity, in 1963. It embraced many of the same goals as the other
regional groupings, including promotion of democracy and human rights as
well as peace among member nations. But it reflected the region’s dis-
tinctive history by a sharp stance against vestiges of colonialism – seeking to
“eradicate imperialism and colonialism from the continent and eventually
neo-colonialism from the globe.” The Organization’s human rights charter
included long passages against slavery and the slave trade, and also, along
with the standard list of civil liberties, referred to the importance of pro-
tecting community and family rights – a distinctive twist. The shift to the
African Union, in 2001, reflected a desire to focus more vigorously on
promotion of democracy. Both before and after this transition, the African
body organized several policing operations, often in coordination with the
United Nations, to try to enforce peace settlements following a number of
civil wars in member nations.
Finally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) first formed
in 1961. Initially this was another anti-communist grouping, but over time
it broadened its mission and, in 1995, expanded to include Vietnam and its
neighbors. Like its counterparts elsewhere the group worked for economic
coordination and smooth inter-state relations, while promoting democracy
and human rights. ASEAN claimed a distinctive tradition of peaceful con-
sensus and compromise; what it called “the ASEAN Way” centered on “a
working process or style that is informal and personal,” and ultimately urged
that its success in conflict management might usefully be adopted in dealing
with wider global problems as well. In 1995, ASEAN also resolved to keep
its zone free from all nuclear weapons.
It important to note that several key regions did not develop initiatives of
this sort, including South Asia and East Asia. But the association movement
elsewhere was an interesting response to the decline of imperialism and, in
the case of the EU, a real desire to innovate against the burdens of recent
history. The tension between common statements of political principle and
efforts to express distinctive regional problems and values was also revealing.
How Regions Responded, 1945–2000 267
The Regions: East Asia
Highlights
Ho Chi Minh launches campaign for Vietnam independence, 1945; com-
munist victory in China, 1949; Korean War, 1950–53; end of US occupa-
tion of Japan, 1952; French withdraw from Vietnam, 1954; beginnings of
China-Russia split, 1954; Great Leap Forward in China, 1958–60; Cultural
Revolution, 1965–68; US fully engaged in Vietnam War, 1965–73; com-
munist victory throughout Vietnam, 1975; death of Mao Zedong, 1976;
launch of new Chinese global and population policies, 1978ff; Tiananmen
Square massacre, 1989.
East Asia underwent a number of profound changes after 1945, and collectively
gained a rapidly growing global position, particularly in terms of economic
strength. Japan resumed its rapid industrial development, becoming the second
largest industrial economy in the world after the United States, while South
Korea boomed from the 1950s onward and then China launched its rapid
expansion. By 2000, there was much talk of an “East Asian” century to come,
though that may have downplayed important strengths in other regions. There
was no question that East Asia collectively gained an unprecedented global
position by the end of the century – though some leaders recalled the region’s
manufacturing strength in earlier periods of world history as well.
At the same time, the region seemed deeply divided between the com-
munist governments in China and North Korea, then joined by Vietnam,
and the ultimately more democratic patterns of Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan. For its part, Vietnam, once independent, sought a careful distance
from its giant communist neighbor while Japanese and Korean democracies
sparred over the bitter legacy of colonial control and wartime behavior.
With the important exception of Korea during the early 1950s, no outright
war developed among the rival powers in the region, but the level of ten-
sion was often considerable.
Amid rapid change and deep division, it was sometimes hard to locate the
legacy of earlier regional traditions. Arguably, however, East Asia continued
to be characterized by a high level of commitment to community values
and authority. Though individualism may have increased with urban
growth and consumerism, the region placed greater emphasis on social
duties; one interesting indication was a continuing acceptance of the
importance of shaming as a means of social discipline. Family stability was
also high, with a divorce rate running at only about 5% by the late 20th
century. The fact that the whole region sponsored unusually rapid eco-
nomic growth – despite different specifics – is another common feature that
may suggest some common underlying dynamics.
After defeat in war and under American occupation, Japan quickly intro-
duced a number of key changes, including the end to emperor worship and to
state-sponsored Shintoism and extension of the vote to women. Although the
Japanese majority continued to use a mix of Shinto and Buddhist rituals, for
example, in dealing with death, secular values gained ground rapidly. Military
forces with “war potential” were abolished, and Japan became unusual among
major nations in its limited military strength and outreach – though some
conservatives continued to press for change in this area. At the same time, the
nation continued to emphasize some older values, as in a law that called for
special obligations to the elderly. A 1966 law urged the preservation of com-
munal values in the schools, as against “egoistic” attitudes. Further, as Japan
developed a multi-party democracy, one party, the Liberal Democrats, long
dominated, with internal deals within the party contrasting with the more
frequent power shifts of Western systems. Finally, while Japanese artists and
intellectuals participated in a number of international styles, traditional forms,
such as Kabuki theater, persisted strongly as well.
Japan’s rapid economic recovery and growth highlighted the return of large
corporations and their tight connection to the government, which some
envious foreigners referred to as “Japan, Inc.” Japanese big business offered
many workers guaranteed employment for life in return for deep loyalty and
hard work. Growth rates of up to 10% a year brought steady improvements in
living standards, though Japanese consumers maintained a tradition of relatively
high rates of saving. Economic growth helped support increasing Japanese
influence in global consumerism, with the popularity of anime and video games
and even children’s items like Pokémon. The Japanese government also mana-
ged, after initial neglect, to reduce local pollution. In the 1990s, however, a
severe recession and some new problems for the Liberal Democrats, replaced by
some shaky political coalitions, raised some troubling questions for the future.
Japan’s economic dynamism, and its example of government-business
relations, helped propel the rapid economic growth of the smaller centers in
the Pacific Rim. In both Korea and Taiwan, the leading issue in the after-
math of war and, in Taiwan’s case, communist victory on the mainland was
simply the establishment of a stable government. North Korea quickly set
up a Stalinist-style state under its leader Kim Il-sung, and later his son on his
death in 1994. The North attacked South Korea in 1950, hoping to impose
unification; the United States joined in defense and, after a misguided effort
to invade North Korea in turn (which drew Chinese troops in defense of
the communist regime), accepted a truce in 1953 that re-established essen-
tially the same border. (North Korea then resumed its pattern of isolation
and strict authoritarianism, though fearful of new invasion.) The United
States established a permanent garrison in the South, and provided con-
siderable assistance in economic development. At the same time, the United
States offered protection to Taiwan against Chinese aggression but insisted
that the Taiwanese government – now controlled by refugees from China –
abandon any effort to attack the mainland. Both South Korea and Taiwan
long maintained authoritarian governments, and both began their own
process of rapid industrial development. By the end of the 1980s, the two
nations turned to more liberal policies, with several political parties com-
peting for political power.
Pacific Rim prosperity quickly extended to Hong Kong, the British-con-
trolled city-state that was returned to China in 1997 in exchange for a promise
of political autonomy. Singapore, gaining independence from Britain in 1965,
quickly featured both rapid economic growth and carefully-controlled, one-
party rule in a state that enforced rigid controls over popular behavior. Here, as
in the other Pacific Rim economies, the Confucian heritage promoted an
emphasis on group loyalty within factories and businesses, even as the com-
mitment to innovative scientific research and education gained ground steadily.
China, the giant of East Asia with over a billion people by the 1990s,
finally rebounded from its long period of decline. Communist control in
1949 ushered in a period of experimentation and shifting policies, before a
reassessment in the late 1970s yielded greater stability and the beginning of
sustained economic growth.
Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, the communists had gained ground
during the period of Japanese invasion through successful guerrilla warfare,
while their promises of deep social and economic reform won increasing
support from the majority of peasants, plus many students and intellectuals.
Mao attacked Confucian traditions of hierarchy and deference, in favor a new
vision for China. The new People’s Liberation Army provided military
backing for the communist takeover, as the Nationalist forces retreated to
Taiwan, and it reasserted Chinese control of areas like Tibet, despite recurring
local tensions. The border shared with India provided another occasion for
the display of new Chinese muscle, with a brief war. Taiwan itself remained a
sore spot, with the new regime claiming Chinese control and recurrently
threatening force without attempting outright invasion. Long allied with the
Soviet Union, China began to tire of playing a secondary role to Russia, and
border disputes compounded the rupture in the mid-1950s. China also soon
developed its own nuclear weaponry, in 1964, another step in asserting new
military presence in the region; concerned particularly about US pressure,
Mao noted, “If you don’t want to be bullied, you must have the bomb.”
The big focus, however, was on far-reaching domestic change. The new
regime rapidly unseated the old landlord class, a huge reform. As the Soviets
had done earlier, the government quickly expanded educational facilities at
all levels, and also worked to improve medical care and public health. New
laws sought to reduce parental controls over children, including older pat-
terns of arranged marriage. Footbinding ended once and for all, and women
were urged to move into all ranks of education and a variety of work
roles – though top power remained in men’s hands. Critics of whatever
stripe were carefully silenced, with many intellectuals jailed or banished to
hard labor on collective farms. The regime complemented police controls
by propaganda extolling the communist future and the amazing prowess of
Mao himself, while also increasing supervision over religious activity
(resuming an older Chinese political tradition).
Mao launched two special programs in the late 1950s and 1960s, one, the
Great Leap forward, designed to boost industrial production and the later
Cultural Revolution aimed at extending political controls. The first effort
failed badly in its initial purpose, partly because Mao resolutely resisted sug-
gestions that he encourage birth rate control as Chinese population continued
to soar. The later Cultural Revolution sought to break more decisively with
China’s cultural past: universities were curtailed, most students sent for work
stints in the countryside, young hooligans were encouraged to destroy ancient
monuments. For a time, instability threatened, but military leaders forced Mao
to pull back, and after further reassessment and the Leader’s death, the gov-
ernment embarked on a new and more pragmatic path.
Industrial growth, population control, and greater openness to global
contacts were the new watchwords, and they began to fuel the nation’s
economic success story. Government directives, massive public works, and
state-run companies combined with new latitude for independent business
leaders. Missions abroad combined with growing numbers of international
visitors. Marxism was not abandoned, but the emphasis subsided in favor of
greater scientific and technical training. Living standards rose rapidly,
though there were huge gaps between the coastal cities and the hinterland,
and pollution levels mounted dangerously.
The effort to combine rapid change with continued authoritarian controls
encountered one final crisis in the 20th century. Problems in the 1980s,
including economic inequality and government corruption, helped fuel a
student movement in favor of democracy and free speech. Much of the
protest used global human rights rhetoric, but many scholars believe that the
surge was also motivated by more traditional Confucian concern that the
ruling class was no longer serving the well-being of ordinary people. The
government hesitated, and then in 1989 decided on a crackdown, moving
300,000 troops into Beijing. Ultimately, the troops attacked the mass of
protesters assembled in Tiananman Square. Hundreds of protestors, and
perhaps more, were killed, and subsequent arrests ended the uprising;
international human rights outcry was simply ignored. China resumed its
march toward becoming one of the top economic powers in the world.
Western Society
Highlights
Expansion of European welfare state, 1946ff; Marshall Plan, 1947; Eur-
opean Common Market, 1957; civil rights and feminist movements in the
United States, 1960s; massive student protests in West, 1968–73; Britain
joins the Common Market, 1971; European Union, 1993.
Several developments marked a busy period in Western history after 1945.
The United States took over the dominant global position from Western
Europe, and ultimately American military growth contrasted with European
emphasis on civilian expenditures and welfare programs. Economic growth
throughout the West contrasted with the doldrums of the 1930s and fueled
growing consumerism. Commitment to political democracy was now
combined with new attention to women’s rights, greater racial justice, and a
new interest in gay rights. In the 1960s, the Catholic Church, in the Second
Vatican Council, significantly revised a number of traditional positions,
embracing tolerance, democracy and peace, though retaining older policies
on issues like women’s roles in the clergy or birth control.
Western Europe’s recovery was striking after a few difficult postwar years,
aided by financial support from the United States in the Marshall Plan.
Germany enjoyed an “economic miracle” of growth, while France and Italy
featured novel dynamism. Several governments introduced new forms of
economic planning. New welfare programs successfully reduced earlier class
tensions and political polarization: they featured a variety of national health
systems, greater protection against unemployment and old age, and new
public housing. Reduction of nationalist tensions combined with reliance
on US military protection to free up resources for other purposes.
Population growth rates declined, but this was balanced by the new
immigration. An interesting flurry of student protest in the 1960s prompted
some university reforms, while the rise of Green Parties in several countries
signaled new concern about the environment. Consumerism mounted
steadily, but in Europe – in contrast to the United States – some of the new
prosperity was also expressed in the expansion of vacations and other leisure
activities, rather than the acquisition of goods. Prosperity and the ascendant
automobile increased urban-suburban sprawl, though this was most pro-
nounced in the United States.
On both sides of the Atlantic, advances in technology steadily cut into
the size of the factory working class. Classic forms of working-class organi-
zation, like the trade unions, began to lose membership and clout. On the
other hand, employment in the service sector expanded – one of the rea-
sons that the employment of women began to rise as well. Some regions
were able to take particular advantage of the new trends – the area around
London, for example, or coastal cities in the United States; but other tra-
ditional industrial centers were suffering in what some people called a new
kind of “postindustrial society.”
On both sides of the Atlantic, a second round of feminism began to
emerge in the 1950s and 1960s, seeking greater parity with men, including
equal pay for equal work. This was matched, in popular behavior, by the
new surge of women into the workforce, particularly in white-collar and
professional jobs. Women began to match and then surpass men in the
ranks of university students – becoming better educated, as a group, for the
first time in world history. A declining birth rate, by the 1960s, was
facilitated by new birth control devices. Sexual activity became increasingly
aimed at recreational pleasure. Women’s dress became more revealing, in
Europe including a new craze for topless beaches. Divorce rates rose in
many cases. These various changes prompted new concerns from con-
servative and religious leaders. They also revealed important inconsistencies:
if the new woman was bent on political roles and business success, how did
more open sexuality fit in? By the 1970s, a novel concept of sexual harass-
ment launched a concern for a new dimension of women’s rights, as debates
continued. The term originated in the United States, but as with many
social and gender changes, it was quickly shared in Europe as well.
In the United States, the civil rights movement constituted another major
change in the political agenda. This was not irrelevant to Europe, amid the
new patterns of immigration, but the race issue in the United States did not
have a full equivalent in other parts of the West. In Canada and Australia,
however, new racial concerns prompted some new gestures toward indi-
genous populations, including revision of school history programs to include
greater attention to past injustice.
Efforts to obtain fuller rights for African Americans in the United States
were not new, but they gained new force in the 1950s and 1960s, aided by
court decisions about the need for equal access to public education. Massive
nonviolent protest movements brought African Americans into action to
protest segregated facilities and barriers to voting in the South. A number of
new laws responded in part, though even more than in the case of femin-
ism, the civil rights movement left an important agenda for the future.
Partly on the heels of civil rights activity, an unprecedented effort to win
new rights for homosexuals emerged, on both sides of the Atlantic. Gay
cultural activities had been expanding in several countries after World War
II, in reaction to Nazi persecution of homosexuals. In Britain and else-
where, new scientific work attacked older psychiatric beliefs that homo-
sexuality was a disorder. A riot against police repression in New York in
1969 kicked the movement into higher gear, and new organizations were
founded in Britain, Germany, and elsewhere within the next two years. A
number of countries began to legalize same-sex partnerships, as Denmark
did in 1989. Here was another issue gaining wide momentum by the
1990s – though amid some bitter debates.
The question of the geography of Western civilization remained some-
what difficult. A host of major trends – from politics to gender – continued
to apply on both sides of the Atlantic. Science, for example, continued to
advance steadily, with much joint research. The same held true for modern
art styles. To be sure, New York now rivaled Paris as an artistic center, but
mutual transmission continued. On the popular culture levels, some Eur-
opeans did worry about growing American influence, from blue jeans to
Coca-Cola to fast foods; one French observer lamented what he called
“coca-colonization.” On the other hand, popular music influences like the
Beatles went in the other direction. And many trends were simply shared.
For example, manners became more informal throughout the West, with
more relaxed posture, greater use of first names, and the easing of sexual
standards.
At the same time, global power politics shifted relationships in many
ways. Though France and Britain acquired nuclear capacity, they did not
pretend to rival the United States. The Americans now took the lead in
decisions like entry into the Korean War and then expansion of the conflict
in Vietnam; some European allies joined in, but at lower levels of com-
mitment. In 1990, the United States also took the initiative in a coalition
aimed at pushing Iraq out of Kuwait, after a recent invasion. Many Eur-
opeans worried about what they saw as an undue American tendency to
rely on military force. Germans, in particular, now decidedly pacifist after
the world war experiences, often protested American policies, as in the
deployment of nuclear weapons. Traditional military culture faded rapidly
in many parts of Europe, in contrast to the United States. By the 1990s, the
United States was devoting more than twice as high a percentage of its
Gross National Product to the military budget as was true in Europe.
Global realignments also affected Australia and New Zealand, which cut
back their reliance on Britain in favor of the alliance with the United States. By
the 1990s, the increase of exports to China also began to reorder policies in
Australia and New Zealand. US involvement in East Asia was also different
from that of Europe, since the nation regarded itself as a Pacific power deeply
concerned about changes in the Asian balance. A Western society could still be
defined in many important ways, amid a host of mutual contacts and traditions,
but there were some new components and tensions.
The final decades of the 20th century saw some new challenges in many
Western countries. While prosperity remained, economic growth rates
slowed and economic inequalities within several countries began to increase
(from the 1980s onward). Oil and gas prices tended to rise, and there were
concerns about undue dependence on exports from the Middle East. New
debates called some welfare policies into question, particularly in Britain and
the United States where a “new conservatism” surged under Margaret
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.
Highlights
East and West Germany separate, 1949; formation of Warsaw Pact, 1955;
Hungarian revolt, 1956; Berlin Wall, 1951; death of Stalin, 1953; revolt in
Czechoslovakia repressed, 1968; Gorbachev to power, 1985; dissolution
of Soviet bloc, 1989–91; civil wars begin in Yugoslavia, 1991; US/NATO
intervention in Bosnia, 1995;Vladimir Putin President of Russia, 1999.
The legacy of East European history since 1945 centers in many ways on
the unexpected collapse of the Soviet system in 1989–91. Many develop-
ments between the war’s end and this unraveling seem less important in
retrospect, because so many came undone. Yet the postwar decades left a
mark in many ways. They are actively remembered by Russians who took
pride in their nation’s global role, its leadership in many fields such as
manned expeditions into space. They shaped the culture of many people, in
Russia but also its satellites, who suddenly in the 1990s had to reconsider
their value system as Marxism collapsed. They affected religion and family
behavior. And of course they provided fascinating examples of why a poli-
tical and economic organization that had produced measurable benefits in
living standards and legal equality could run aground so badly.
From the late 1940s to the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union, despite its huge
losses in World War II, had all the apparatus of a superpower. It had steadily
advancing nuclear and missile technology. It competed for allies around the
world. Its close ties with communist parties in places like France and Italy
provided another potential asset. And the force of its army had won a new
empire in East-Central Europe, where communist governments installed
many features of the Soviet system, including attacks on religion and pro-
motion of heavy industry. Police-state controls were extended widely,
behind what one British statesman called an “Iron Curtain.” Travel and
other contacts with the outside world were strictly regulated, though the
Soviets actively sponsored tourism within the communist bloc.
After Stalin’s death, repression eased slightly. But the Soviet army put down
protests that cropped up within the satellite nations, and in the mid-1970s the
Soviet president proclaimed the right of intervention at any time. Industrial
growth resumed after the setbacks of the world war, with continued emphasis
on heavy industry and armaments (including a thriving export sector). Con-
sumer goods did not keep pace with overall growth, but there were some gains
here as well. At the same time, the pressure to industrialize caused major
environmental damage through pollution and waste sites; up to a quarter of all
Russian territory was affected to some degree.
Advancing industrialization and urbanization accelerated some of the
standard effects, despite the distinctive political system. Birth rates declined
(despite government efforts to promote larger families). Many parents
devoted great attention to promoting school success for their children, quite
like their middle-class counterparts in the West.
The regime continued to attack Western artistic styles, but greater intel-
lectual diversity did emerge at points on the margins of the system. The
author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, though exiled to the United States, wrote
vigorous critiques of the Soviet system of political prisons, but he also
attacked Western values as too individualistic and materialistic – reviving an
older Russian theme.
Communist emphasis on science and technology brought some major
achievements. Success in space was particularly noteworthy, a point of real
national pride, as the Soviets successfully sponsored the first manned flights,
on the famous Sputnik rocket. Sports victories provided another focus, as
the Soviets (and some of their satellites) organized major efforts at the
Olympic Games – at one point even defeating the US basketball team.
New signs of internal tension began to emerge in the 1970s, partly
because the quality of leadership at the top varied widely, with appoint-
ments controlled by the Communist Party; central economic planning
often proved too rigid, with frequent falsification of results. Worker dis-
satisfaction increased, amid rigid supervision on the job and the lack of
adequate consumer rewards. Alcoholism increased. Some young people
began to seek greater access to Western popular fashions, such as blue
jeans. On another front, growing political awareness among Muslims
caused real concern, with the large Muslim minority in the Soviet Union
itself; the 1979 Iranian revolution played a role here. This prompted the
invasion of Afghanistan, to promote a loyal puppet regime, but the effort
got bogged down amid guerrilla warfare (encouraged by the United
States), into the late 1980s. Finally, the sheer burden of military expendi-
ture, as the Soviets worked to keep up with the United States and its
larger economy, began to take its toll.
In 1985, a new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, launched some bold reforms
to instill greater life into the communist system, including new arms control
agreements with the United States and a withdrawal from Afghanistan. He
loosened political controls, calling for more open debate. And he tried to
shake up the rigid management system. Wider international contacts were
part of the package, and Gorbachev himself displayed new interest in Wes-
tern styles. In 1990, after 14 years of negotiation, a McDonald’s restaurant
was allowed to open in Moscow, an interesting symbolic change.
The basic reform moves did not, however, revive the overall economy,
and they opened the door to new kinds of protests. Both Muslims and
Armenian Christians demanded greater autonomy. Agitation accelerated in
many of the satellite states. Hungary, for example, installed a non-commu-
nist government in 1988, moving toward a free market economy. East
Germany removed its communist leadership the following year and began
negotiating the reunion with West Germany that was capped, in 1990, by
the joyful destruction of the Berlin Wall.
Amid these pressures Gorbachev reversed prior policy, proclaiming that
“any nation has the right to decide its fate by itself.” Soviet troops pulled
back, and one by one – usually with little violence – non-communist
regimes took over in the satellite countries. Communist leaders and the
military within Russia attempted a coup against Gorbachev but it was
thwarted. However, the Soviet Union itself collapsed under the various
pressures. A number of regions pulled away – Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic
States and others in Europe, and the Muslim-majority Central Asian states.
A new Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, seized power in 1991 and proclaimed
the end of the Soviet Union. An era had passed.
Throughout Eastern Europe, the fall of communism reopened the old
question of relationships to the West, amid different political and cultural
traditions as well as the experience of the postwar decades themselves. Key
legacies intertwined with new challenges.
The specific aftermath in the 1990s was predictably confused – dismantling a
system was no easy business. Most of the new or freed European nations
quickly established free market economies and parliamentary governments, and
new ties with Western Europe brought movement toward membership both
in NATO and the European Union in most cases. But these countries were
well behind the West in levels of economic development – a problem even
within reunified Germany – creating tensions that would not be easy to
resolve. Furthermore, several countries particularly close to Russia hesitated to
break away entirely – Belarus retained an authoritarian government outright.
For their part, many Russians worried not only about the loss of Soviet glory,
but about the encroachment of Western alliances too close to their borders –
an old anxiety now rekindled. The new Central Asian nations remained
authoritarian and were often still tied to the Russian economy, so for the
moment they caused less concern.
The revival of smaller states in East-Central Europe brought a revival of
some past headaches as well. Several new nations had mutual disputes over
territory. Czechoslovakia indeed split, peacefully, as the two kindred ethnicities
could not agree to stay together. The embrace of the European Union eased
some of these tensions, but not all. Two other new nations, Armenia and
Azerbaijan, had serious territorial disputes; and there were ethnic tensions
within the nation of Georgia. Echoes from the past were unmistakable.
Within Russia the Yeltsin regime seemed to be working toward a func-
tioning democracy. Controls over the press and foreign travel were loo-
sened. A group of so-called New Russians eagerly seized the opportunity to
increase their consumerism, taking pride in middle-class gains. Russia
seemed to be going through one of its periods of heightened Westerniza-
tion. At the same time, amid an obvious ideology crisis, interest in the
Orthodox religion returned. Yeltsin proved to be an unstable leader, as
corruption mounted and a new Muslim rebellion burst out in the region of
Chechnya. In 1999, a new leader, Vladimir Putin, a former secret police
agent, was named president, vowing to clean up the system; while pledging
support for democracy, he quickly installed new controls over television
stations and limited dissident political parties. Many Russians agreed that a
stronger leader was essential – traditional and current problems both pushed
in that direction, while there was deep nostalgia for the glory days of the
Soviets. Russia was about to take a new turn.
The messiest immediate aftermath of the Soviet era took place in Yugo-
slavia, which had turned communist after World War II without being
closely attached to the Soviet system. A talented leader had kept the multi-
ethnic region together, but in the wake of Soviet collapse two prosperous
areas, Slovenia and Croatia (also Catholic, in contrast to Serbian
Orthodoxy), split away, gaining independence after brief fighting with
Serbia. Conflict spread to Bosnia, involving both ethnicity and a strong
Muslim minority held over from the days of Ottoman control. Bitter war-
fare occurred, involving some brutal efforts at ethnic cleansing by several
Serbian leaders. After hesitation, NATO intervened to protect the new
nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then, at the end of the 1990s, yet another
conflict arose over the Albanian-majority region of Kosovo, again involving
acts of genocide and again settled only after Western intervention and
occupation. The northwestern portions of the Balkans were left with a
welter of hostile small states reminiscent of the situation before 1914, and in
several areas only continued external pressures kept the fragile peace. Even
the European Union, already heavily extended, could not agree to accept
all the resultant nations into its ranks.
Soviet collapse and the rise of new nations raised the old question of the
boundaries between East and West European cultures. At first glance, it
seemed that the borders of the West were expanding rapidly. Countries like
Poland and Hungary eagerly turned to Western political and economic
systems and many aspects of Western popular culture. Under the European
Union, floods of East Europeans began to move to the West directly –
causing some serious new resentments. But some parts of Eastern Europe
were not eager or not able to join the Western embrace, and the issue of
boundary lines, though clearly reopened, was not resolved – another legacy
of both recent and more remote past.
Latin America
Highlights
Peronism in Argentina, 1947ff; new regime in Costa Rica, 1948; Bolivian
revolution, 1952–64; Castro revolution in Cuba, 1959; Socialist govern-
ment in Chile, 1970–73; Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, 1979; US
invades Panama to depose dictator, 1989; Hugo Chavez President in
Venezuela, 1998.
Latin America held an interesting position in the world’s regional array

between 1945 and 2000. Sometimes dismissed as “underdeveloped,” in fact,
by a number of indices the region held an intermediate position in the
world at large – for example, with unusually high rates of education. The
region had been independent for many decades – another distinction – and
its close ties with Western culture provided another important marker.
Several of these features would contribute to active political and economic
change, particularly from the 1970s onward. At the same time, the region
faced a number of serious challenges, including significant social inequality
and an urban-rural gap, along with frequent external interference from the
United States.
World War II did not deeply affect Latin America, but if only by coin-
cidence the two decades after 1945 saw a number of interesting political
departures in several countries, though they did not point in the same
direction. Cold War competition played some role in several of these, with
new interest in radical social reform; but the Cold War also brought new
efforts at intervention by the United States.
At the same time, the region has an ongoing legacy of social tensions, as
between landlords and peasants and among different racial groups that
would continue to color major developments. Traditions of political inter-
vention by the military also remained relevant. On the other hand, the
Catholic Church, long a conservative bastion, began to shift: a new Lib-
eration Theology inspired many Catholic authorities to side with move-
ments for social justice, though tensions within the Church resulted as well.
Many countries maintained an authoritarian political structure into the
second half of the 20th century, while Mexico maintained its one-party
rule, though marred by growing corruption. A populist authoritarian leader
in Brazil resumed control in 1950. A new movement in Argentina, how-
ever, under Juan Perón, moved even further in a populist direction, with
overtones of fascism. Perón, a military leader, combined rigid repression of
political dissent with a number of welfare moves and abundant propaganda
that won substantial working-class support. Peronism would remain a strong
political force in Argentina for many decades, often alternating with military
rule.
Costa Rica took a different path in 1948. After a brief civil war, a new
government simply abolished the military and declared a policy of peace.
This ushered in a long period of stable civilian rule, which persists today,
along with some real international leadership in peaceful diplomacy and
peace education. The nation also enjoyed considerable economic develop-
ment, including a major tourist industry.
The big news, however, centered on a series of social protest movements.
In 1944, a reform government was elected in Guatemala, aiming at land
reform and welfare measures to benefit both peasants and urban workers.
Clashes with foreign-owned businesses resulted, and this in turn, along with
a professed fear of “communism,” brought US intervention; American
agencies helped organize a military force which unseated the socialist gov-
ernment and undid most of the reforms. A long period of violence and
instability resulted, as a regime backed by big business and landowners
imposed brutal military repression against popular agitation, bringing
increased hardship to the indigenous population as well.
Revolution hit Bolivia in the mid-1950s, ushering another socialist group
to power that nationalized the mines and several industries while introdu-
cing land reforms. Again, US intervention ultimately helped curb the
regime, and some reforms were pulled back.
Authoritarian rule had dominated Cuba since the mid-1930s, ultimately
generating a variety of opposition movements, including one led by a
young lawyer, Fidel Castro. Exiled, Castro organized a small military force
that entered the island in 1956, gradually building support from students,
workers, and peasants. Ultimately, the dictator was toppled; Castro laun-
ched a series of sweeping reforms, coupled with strong anti-imperialist
rhetoric. Hostility with the United States resulted, and by 1961 Castro
moved steadily toward a tight alliance with the Soviet Union and a com-
munist regime. A host of new social programs greatly improved health
conditions and educational levels, and increased racial equity. At the same
time, severe political repression reproduced that feature of the communist
state, and efforts at economic development faltered. However, the regime
easily survived various pressures and interventions from the United States.
Cuba’s example helped inspire some leftist agitation elsewhere, including
Peru. At the same time, it galvanized Latin American conservatives and, along
with some US support, led to a series of military dictatorships. Election of a
socialist in Chile in the early 1970s brought US intervention; the leader was
killed and a brutal military regime installed. Quite widely, repression of political
dissent increased, with many imprisoned and others “disappeared” without a
trace. An Argentine military regime attempted to enhance its popularity with a
war to take over the British-controlled Falkland Islands (Malvinas islands, to the
Argentines); they lost, which ironically helped lead to an end to military rule.
By the 1970s, in fact, a new wave of democratic regimes gained ground
steadily, as many Latin Americans saw this as the best path toward more
rapid economic development and, possibly, more meaningful reform. Both
the European Union and the United States, particularly under President
Jimmy Carter, backed the trend, which became almost universal in the
region with the opening of Mexico’s one-party system in the 1990s.
These political oscillations paralleled more fundamental changes in many
parts of the region. Urbanization increased steadily, along with population
growth, as many impoverished people moved to the urban outskirts, forming
networks of slum housing – called favelas in Brazil – around city centers. Several
cities expanded to populations of over ten million. Racial discrimination con-
tinued, but several countries worked to improve voting rights for indigenous
people. Women’s roles changed. A few governments had granted female suf-
frage before, beginning with Ecuador in 1929, but now the movement became
general, often as a result of increased feminist agitation. A growing number of
women also served in elected office, including a president of Nicaragua in the
1990s. The percentage of women in legislatures actually surpassed rates in the
United States. Rising educational levels and the rapid drop in the birth rate in
the 1970s both reflected and encouraged further change.
As we have seen, the pace of overall economic development quickened
toward the end of the 20th century. Chile gained greater prosperity among
other things through carefully organized fruit and produce exports to the
United States and elsewhere.
At the same time, a variety of pressures continued. Popular risings recur-
red occasionally, as in a peasant land seizure in southern Mexico in the
1990s. Crime rates and violent gang activity increased in several regions,
often around the growing illegal drug trade; Central America but also
Colombia were heavily involved. Parts of Latin America now exported a
growing number of migrants, both legal and illegal, particularly to the
United States but also within Latin America itself. At the end of the century
an election brought Hugo Chavez, a radical social reformer, to power in
Venezuela, rekindling that theme in regional politics.
The later 20th century saw a surge of creative cultural activity, accompany-
ing the political and social ferment. Between 1945 and 2010, six Latin Amer-
icans received the Nobel Prize in literature, a revealing gain. Many writers
explored social justice themes. Others worried about Latin American identity;
Garcia Marquez in Mexico wrote of how a carefully constructed culture that
mixed indigenous and Spanish themes was now menaced by globalization and
crude consumer values. At the popular level, Latin American dance and musi-
cal styles continued to have wide global influence. Latin Americans also played
a growing role in world sports, particularly in men’s soccer football but also in
some other areas like tennis. Finally, new religious currents stirred as well.
Along with Catholic Liberation Theology, but in part because of the limita-
tions of effective social reform, a growing Evangelical Protestant movement
gained ground. Often stimulated initially by well-funded missionaries from the
United States, Evangelical Protestantism became one of the most dramatic
religious currents anywhere in the world toward the end of the century, par-
ticularly in Brazil, parts of Central America, and Mexico.
Early in the 21st century, the United Nations began sponsoring annual
polls that attempted to measure levels of human happiness in each nation.
Several Latin American nations, such as Costa Rica and Panama, scored in
the top group, even though their rates of economic development were
more in the medium range. One Latin American scholar argued that a dis-
tinctive combination of Western beliefs in progress and a strong religious
commitment explained the results – another interesting legacy combination.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Highlights
Ghana independent, 1957; rapid spread of independence in West Africa,
1959–60; Kenya and Uganda independent, 1963; Organization of African
Unity, 1963; Angola and Mozambique independent from Portugal; 1975;
democracy in South Africa, 1994; Rwanda genocide, 1994; war begins in
Congo, 1998; Organization of African Unity, often called a “dictators’
club,” disbanded in favor of new African Union, 2001.
African developments in the later 20th century were heavily shaped by the
challenges of establishing new nations amid rapid population growth and
economies that remained heavily agricultural and dependent on commodity
exports. While improvements occurred in domains such as infant mortality,
except in crisis settings, the region tended toward the lower end of most
comparative rankings. Some countries also suffered from endemic civil
strife, and in southern Africa the AIDS epidemic took a massive toll from
the 1960s onward, until it began to come under greater control after the
year 2000. This was unquestionably a challenging time in African history,
though freedom from colonial control gradually yielded opportunities for
new kinds of initiatives.
Many political tensions, after independence, revolved around ethnic
conflicts, in countries that had been defined by European imperialists and
often contained several major ethnic groups, sometimes with religious divi-
sions as well. In a few cases, particularly in East Africa, disputes spilled over
into border wars. Social tensions existed as well, but they were less sys-
tematic than in Latin America where a landlord class loomed larger. But
several countries in eastern and southern Africa faced questions about deal-
ing with a White landowning minority, and disputes also arose over the role
of an Indian merchant class.
Economic development was a challenge almost everywhere. Most coun-
tries still relied heavily on commodity exports, from diamonds to copper to
cocoa – some produced by low-paid labor, often including many children.
Trade was largely in the hands of foreign firms. A few countries, like
Nigeria, had some special opportunities because of oil or other potentially
profitable resources, but even here it proved difficult to create a more
balanced economy. Several African governments also tended to neglect the
agricultural sector, despite the fact that the bulk of the population depended
on it, in hopes of spurring industrialization. Several countries worked to
displace Western ownership and promote local business growth, under
policies called “indigenization,” sometimes with mixed results.
A few countries navigated independence fairly successfully. In Senegal,
for example, Leopold Senghor, an internationally known author, served as
first president, later orchestrating a peaceful transfer of power to a former
rival as his successor. The government gradually broadened political parti-
cipation and established more open elections. Several attempts to unite with
neighboring countries failed, and there was a secessionist movement in the
south, but conditions remained reasonably stable. In southern Africa, Bots-
wana gained independence from Britain in 1986 (amusingly, just before
diamonds were discovered in the country); the government was based on
universal suffrage and offered an orderly transition of power from one pre-
sident to the next. The new nation also established careful policies for the
preservation of wildlife on extensive game preserves.
Other countries faced severe problems soon after independence but then
managed at least partial recovery. Ghana, the first new African state, was
initially headed by its nationalist leader, Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah sin-
cerely hoped to orchestrate economic development, including expanding
educational access. He was also a leader in promoting pan-African coop-
eration. But internal tensions prompted increasingly repressive moves, and
Nkrumah was finally toppled in a military coup. At one point, in the 1980s,
all political parties were suspended. In mid-decade, however, constitutional
order was restored and more open elections resumed. At this point Ghana
also began to experience significant economic growth.
Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and another former British
colony, faced serious religious as well as ethnic divisions, with the Muslim
north jostling against strongly Christian regions and also the remaining
polytheists. Soon after independence, one Christian ethnic group rebelled,
and only bitter fighting restored unity. Thereafter, democratic governments
alternated with military dictatorships, until a more stable democracy was
installed in 1999.
New convulsions hit several countries later in the 20th century. Liberia,
for example, had long been run by families descended from American
slaves, who had returned in the 19th century. Relations with indigenous
groups were tense. A rebellion in 1980 displaced the ruling families, but led
to a series of brutal dictatorships and a period of outright civil war, in which
about 8% of the population was killed amid widespread economic devasta-
tion. A peace agreement in 2003 led to the democratic election of Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf, Africa’s first female leader.
The Congo was another trouble spot, the largest country by area on the
continent. The country went through a long period of military dictatorship,
following by virtual government collapse – the situation sometimes descri-
bed as a “failed state” – with pervasive internal warfare as well as interven-
tion by several neighboring states. Millions were killed, and the instability
persisted well into the 21st century. Civil wars also affected Sudan, northern
Uganda and elsewhere. In many clashes, male children were forced into
military service as “boy soldiers.” The African Union, the United Nations,
and some European countries – particularly France – often sought to restore
order, but results varied.
Unquestionably, the most tragic single incident occurred in the former
Belgian colony of Rwanda, in the mid-1990s. Two ethnic groups, Hutus
and Tutsis, clashed bitterly; Belgian officials had promoted rivalry in a
typical colonial effort to divide and rule, and the breach was never repaired.
Hutus, the majority, resented Tutsi privilege, and a new clash led to a
genocide that left hundreds of thousands dead and many others maimed.
Political disarray, however, was hardly the only story, even before the
trend toward greater democracy that drew in a number of African states –
though not all – in the 1990s. Kenya, for example, had a rather brutal
authoritarian government for decades after independence, known for fre-
quent political arrests amid rivalries among ethnic groups. However, the
government also sponsored an expanding school system. It promoted
contraception, leading to a 40% drop in birth rates in just a quarter-century.
Many private citizens sponsored important innovations as well. Wangari
Maathai, for example, the first woman in East Africa to earn a PhD, foun-
ded the Green Belt movement in 1977, focusing on environmental reform
and women’s rights; her efforts led to significant reforestation and pro-
gressive environmental planning.
While formal Marxist movements played little role in Sub-Saharan Africa
(save for a few brief episodes, as in Ethiopia), several governments experi-
mented with different methods of social reform. In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere
sought to introduce a rural socialism, building on African village traditions
to extend economic cooperation. Several other governments actively spon-
sored land reform, sometimes trying to juggle providing greater access to
the land with allowing some continued White ownership of large estates – a
key issue in Zimbabwe, for example.
African nations also extended some exceptionally creative efforts at con-
flict resolution. Latin American democracies had introduced the idea of
“truth commissions” in the 1980s, to account for past state violence while
promoting reconciliation (though the African nation of Uganda is credited
with the first attempt, in the 1970s). But the approach was taken much
farther under Nelson Mandela in South Africa. The idea was to acknowl-
edge acts of violence committed by the White Apartheid government,
allowing victims to regain dignity while holding out the possibility of
amnesty for many Whites who confessed and repented. While racial ten-
sions remained in the new South Africa, in part because of continuing
inequality in wealth, massive bloodshed was avoided and the regime touted
its commitment to a multi-racial, multi-language “rainbow coalition.”
Similar commissions were later set up in Rwanda, as order was restored after
the genocide, again with some impressive results.
The later 20th century was a rich period for cultural development in
Africa, at several levels. Many artists and craftspeople revived and adapted
older themes in sculpture and other art forms. Several choral and dance
groups won wide audiences overseas. A number of novelists, writing in
Western languages, brought African themes to international attention,
writing of painful and revealing struggles for identity as African traditions
adjusted to new pressures from the outside – including Christian missionary
activity. As the Nigerian Chinua Achebe put it, Africans had a rich culture
before the arrival of the Europeans: “they had poetry and, above all, they
had dignity. It is this dignity … that they must now regain … The writer’s
duty is to help them regain it by showing what happened to them, what
they lost.” In the same spirit many African feminist leaders, pressing for new
rights, also emphasized their distaste for individualistic Western feminist
values: the goal was both new space for women but also recovery of some
of the family unity that had served African women well in the past.
Religion played a central role in African life, as the society indeed
became one of the centers of religious fervor in the contemporary world.
Conversions to Islam and Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant, con-
tinued, with the result that by 2000 the African population was about 40%
Muslim, 40% Christian, and 20% animist. A number of religious splinter
groups formed, sometimes under the leadership of inspired women, and
overall levels of popular piety were extremely high.
At the same time, secular education advanced as well, and while it was
limited by lack of resources and the long tradition of oral transmission of
knowledge, the gains were considerable – particularly in the growing cities.
Overall, the African population was 49% literate by 1985, and up to 57% by
the year 2000.
Urban culture advanced as well, as city growth gradually but steadily cut
into the rural majority. Many urban families chafed against some entrenched
family patterns, seeking more individual choice. Thus, there were com-
plaints about the custom of insisting that younger children must wait to
marry until their older siblings were taken care of. The tradition of paying
large dowries in cattle obviously faded amid the conditions of city life.
Other families expressed some resentment of older extended family obliga-
tions – such as the notion that a distant relative could expect sustained
hospitality whenever he or she chose: improving living standards for the
nuclear family should come first. Here was another interesting tension in a
rapidly changing society.
The kind of political changes that had first been triggered by imperialism,
displacing traditional monarchical rule, along with the substantial religious
conversions, severed many traditions from the African past. This heightened
the importance of cultural expressions and family patterns, even if these too
had to be adapted, as well as the continued pull of ethnic ties.
Highlights
India’s first Five Year Plan for development, 1951; Bandung Conference,
Nonaligned movement, 1955; Pakistan officially becomes an Islamic
Republic, 1956; authoritarian rule in the Philippines, 1963; Bangladesh
revolt, 1971 (independence, 1972); India develops nuclear bomb, 1974;
independent, unified Vietnam, 1975; Cambodia genocide, 1975–79;
democracy restored in the Philippines, 1986; Pakistan becomes a nuclear
power, 1998.
Independence came fairly soon after World War II in most of South and
Southeast Asia, so attention focused on consolidating the new states, often
amid the oscillations between authoritarian and democratic forms. Eco-
nomic development was a common challenge, here too complicated by
rapid population growth. This was a region, finally, with well-established
religions, and in some cases religious divisions, which provided some of the
context for cultural trends. Apart from Vietnam, Marxist movements made
little headway in most of the region, though Marxists gained ascendancy in
a few federal states within India and also played a role in what became the
nation of Bangladesh; a major military operation in Malaysia right after the
war ultimately defeated a Marxist guerrilla movement, and a guerrilla
movement also persisted in the southern Philippines.
During the Cold War, while some Southeast Asian nations (other than
Vietnam) sided with the West, India and Indonesia, along with states like
Egypt and Yugoslavia, took the lead in a non-aligned movement, seeking
to deal with both the Soviet Union and the United States. Even after 1990,
India sought to avoid tight relations with the United States, eager to make
sure its independence was respected.
From the 1960s onward, the “Green Revolution” benefited much of the
region, by increasing food supply – ending any dependence on imports and
allowing some export to industrial neighbors like Japan. Improved seeds,
both wheat and rice, combined with growing use of pesticides and
mechanical equipment. Ordinary peasants did not benefit, and indeed in
some cases were pressed into deeper poverty; but commercial farmers and
urban consumers both gained considerably, as did the general push toward
greater industrialization.
Southeast Asia
Political divisions continued to mark this region, as had long been the case,
but with some new characteristics. An authoritarian leader took over in the
Philippines for two decades relatively soon after independence; Indonesia’s
top nationalist leader also established strongman rule. Here, a strongly
Muslim majority clashed with ethnic Chinese business leaders; a military
regime that next took a turn in power gained popularity by attacking sev-
eral religious minorities though official commitment to Islamic law was not
enforced as rigidly as in some other Muslim countries. Only in the 1990s
was a democratic system reinstalled. Parliamentary rule fared better in
Thailand (under a ruling monarch – one of the few remaining in the world)
and Malaysia, where, however, tensions with the Chinese minority led to
the separation of the city-state of Singapore. Burma, strongly Buddhist, saw
the unexpected ascendancy of a military regime, opting for considerable
isolation from the rest of the world – and the region. A liberal leader, Suu
Kyi, was kept under house arrest from 1999 onward, despite the support she
won from human rights movements in other parts of the world.
Once the United States effectively pulled out of Vietnam, the communist
government quickly took over the whole country, as a number of non-
communists, including many Catholics, emigrated, often in difficult cir-
cumstances. Many standard communist policies were implemented, from
land reform to expansion of secular education, along with the challenging
task of rebuilding after a prolonged war. By the late 1970s, the regime
clearly turned against its erstwhile Chinese ally – a brief border war occur-
red in 1979; but at the same time it began to emulate China’s new, prag-
matic economic policy, ultimately leading to sustained industrial growth.
Neighboring countries formerly under French control suffered by com-
parison, and not only in terms of slower economic development. In Cam-
bodia, a communist movement, the Khmer Rouge, instituted forced labor
somewhat on the model of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, driving many
urbanites into the countryside where large numbers were executed, and
many more tortured. Up to 2 million people were killed in all, many from
Chinese, Vietnamese, and Muslim minorities in yet another tragic recent
genocide. A Vietnamese invasion in 1979 toppled the regime and ended the
slaughter.
By the 1990s, despite the many political and religious differences, most of
the region became increasingly peaceful – as touted in the revivified
ASEAN agreement. Considerable economic growth spread through much
of the region – including the “Little Tigers” that traded actively with the
Pacific Rim and Japan, but also Vietnam.
South Asia
On the Indian subcontinent, the paths of India and Pakistan increasingly
diverged, and mutual tensions remained high. Initially Pakistan itself
embraced two regions; the core was in the west, where Islamic devotion
combined with commitment to the Urdu language. East Pakistan, more
secular, pressed for greater recognition of Bengali culture. In the end, with
some encouragement from India, the East claimed independence as the new
nation of Bangladesh.
The basic separation of India and Pakistan left a legacy of bitterness,
making the subcontinent one of the world’s danger spots from that point
onward. The mutual border remained tense; specific dispute arose over the
largely Muslim territory of Kashmir, most of which India controlled. Cla-
shes were frequent, and outright war broke out once. (India also had to
worry about its ill-defined mountain border with China, where fighting
broke out in 1952.) Both countries devoted precious resources to the mili-
tary, a particular burden on the smaller Pakistan which by the late 1980s
was committing 7% of its Gross National Product to this sector. India also
worked to develop nuclear weaponry, mainly with an eye on China; its
breakthrough occurred in 1974, as the country simply refused to agree to
the Nonproliferation Treaty that would have left it behind. Pakistan inevi-
tably followed suit, gaining nuclear capability in 1998.
At the outset, Pakistan officially committed to religious liberty; the vast
majority of Pakistan’s population was Sunni Muslim, but there were
important pockets of Hindus, Christians, and two minority Muslim groups.
But many leaders had dreamed that Pakistan would not only become a
Muslim state, but could take the lead in creating unity in a Muslim world
that would stretch from Indonesia to Morocco. This larger vision did not
materialize, but within Pakistan itself pressure to commit to the Sunni faith
and Muslim law mounted steadily, reflecting ongoing influence from
Muslim clerics. Attacks on the various minorities occurred recurrently,
including individual efforts to force conversions.
Politically, Pakistan oscillated between attempts at democracy and more
authoritarian rule, often marked by strong influence both from Muslim
leaders and from the military. Economic development remained a huge
challenge, and efforts at land reform faltered because of the resistance of
landlords. Population pressure also remained high.
India’s course was rather different. The nation managed to retain the
democratic system established at the outset, amid many challenges. Simply
orchestrating the vote for the vast population was a huge logistical achieve-
ment. The nation adopted a federal system, reflecting the long tradition of
regional diversity. While Hindi and English served as the most widely-used
languages, a welter of other languages persisted. Elections were vigorously
contested, though the Congress Party often predominated. At one point in the
1970s, Congress leadership, faced with mounting opposition, suspended basic
freedoms, but this led to party defeat in the next election.
Religious tensions remained a recurrent problem. Pursuant to the pre-
dominant nationalist tradition, most leaders emphasized religious freedom.
But there was a strong current that sought to associate nationalism with
Hindu predominance. Informally, clashes between Hindus and the large
Muslim minority within India broke out frequently, including destruction
of religious buildings, and there were also disputes involving the Sikh min-
ority. Remnants of the caste system posed another challenge. The system
was abolished by law soon after independence, a huge innovation. Many
governments worked hard to minimize caste boundaries and promote edu-
cational and job opportunities (including government slots) for the former
Untouchables (Dalits). But it was slow going in what remained in many
ways a traditional society, and informal retention of caste identities, privi-
leges, and limitations affected many aspects of life – a situation that was
sometimes compared to the difficult struggle against racism in the United
States. Finally, the government also committed to promoting new oppor-
tunities for women: whereas only 10% of all university students were female
in 1950, the figure had risen to 38% by the end of the century.
The government devoted great efforts to economic development. Gandhi
himself had a vision of a more traditional Indian economy, featuring agri-
culture and customary crafts, but this was decidedly not the standard view.
The educational system expanded steadily, though in a heavily rural society
a substantial minority (particularly women) remained illiterate. The uni-
versity system grew more robustly, including many institutions devoted to
engineering and technology. While population pressure continued, the
government worked to guide people toward smaller families, with gradual
success beginning in the 1970s. Progress toward industrialization was slow
but steady, as India declined relative to the Pacific Rim during the 1970s
and 1980s, until the acceleration at the end of the century.
Not surprisingly, Indian culture was marked by a host of divisions,
including gaps between elites and masses, urban and rural, as well as the
religious distinctions. While a robust urban consumer culture gradually
developed, even upper-class Indians often retained important ties with
tradition, including an ongoing preference for arranged marriages that
would express the respect due to parental authority. Among the lower
classes, particularly in the countryside, child marriage remained common
for girls, and child labor also remained widespread. The important role of
religion included ongoing respect for holy men and many customary
rituals. Major Indian contributions to scientific research combined with
the retention of older themes in literature and art. In many ways, the
spectacular success of Bollywood films reflected many of the complexities
of the culture: older story lines drawn from classic epics, but with Holly-
wood staging and musicals, and film stars whose popularity earned them
wealth and attention comparable to what their counterparts enjoyed in
other modern countries.
The Middle East and North Africa
Highlights
State of Israel, 1948; end of Egyptian monarchy, 1952; nationalization of
Suez, 1956; Organization of Petroleum Producing States (OPEC), 1961;
Algerian independence, 1962; Six Day War with Israel, 1967; Iranian
Revolution, 1979; Israel-Egypt peace treaty, 1979; Iran-Iraq War, 1980–
88; Gulf War (US coalition against Iraq), 1990–91.
Several factors generated new challenges – and opportunities – for the

Middle East after 1945. Although the region had a long political history,
many of the nations that emerged in the decolonization process were fairly
new, without deep national traditions and frequently requiring interactions
among different ethnic and religious groups. Controversies around the new
state of Israel produced recurrent tensions. The growing importance of oil
exports for the world economy brought additional great power attention
and intervention in the region, but also massive new wealth and influence
for some individual countries. Decisions about the role of religion, and
particularly Islam, helped shape both personal and social responses. This was
not the only region where the political path of Islam generated growing
debate, but it was obviously a centerpiece.
The region was also divided in many ways. Differential access to oil rev-
enues, and different population growth rates, caused huge national differ-
ences in wealth. Greater political independence allowed many governments
to take control of the oil industry, displacing Western corporations, and
then in 1961 a consortium formed to protect favorable oil prices – but this
major step did not benefit the region as a whole. Old tensions between
Sunni and Shiite also took new forms. While some nations embraced strong
ties between religion and politics, others sought to be resolutely secular –
and often tolerant.
The region also participated in many common trends. All Middle Eastern
governments worked to expand education – in some cases, with a strong
religious component. University systems grew rapidly, with particular
attention to scientific and technical training. An Egyptian leader explicitly
condemned the lack of adequate attention to modern science in the past:
“we have to keep up with the new world and the new discoveries.” Cities
expanded, often quite rapidly: Istanbul, with less than a million people in
1950, had 8.2 million by 1997; Cairo, with about two million in 1950, was
nearing 15 million by 2000. This involved huge changes in infrastructure
and food supply, and at least some increased industrial development.
Liberal democracies did not spread widely. Israel installed this system,
though many Palestinians were excluded; Turkey relaxed authoritarian
controls by the end of the century and featured open competition among
political parties. But this was not the norm. Nor did Marxism gain much
ground, in part because of its hostility to religion. The region supported an
unusual number of functioning monarchies, including Jordan, Morocco,
Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and, until 1979, Iran. A revolt in Egypt,
however, displaced the monarchy, and most other states featured some kind
of one-man or one-party rule, often with considerable repression of political
opposition. Many authoritarian leaders tried to limit the influence of Islamic
political parties, seeking a more secular society, often also protecting reli-
gious minorities – as in Syria and Egypt. On the other hand, the Saudi
Arabian monarchy continued to promote the rigorous Wahabi version of
Islam, and new oil wealth greatly increased Saudi influence in other Muslim
societies. And a major revolution in Iran, in 1979, replaced a secular mon-
archy that had encouraged considerable Western cultural influence, with a
firmly Shiite state overseen by a supreme religious leader and bent on
enforcing a strict version of Islamic law; here, elections and political com-
petition did operate but only under religious supervision.
Recurrent military conflicts reflected both religious and nationalist ten-
sions. These included the several wars involving Israel. Border clashes
developed between Egypt and Libya and between Morocco and Algeria.
An ambitious Iraqi strongman tried to take advantage of the Iranian revo-
lution, prompting a bitter conflict during the 1980s that ended in Iraqi
defeat. A later initiative led to Iraq’s invasion of neighboring Kuwait, but
this was repelled by an American-led coalition in 1990. A few initiatives
attempted to bridge divides – including of course the formation of the Arab
League and OPEC. Egypt and Syria briefly attempted a union. From the
late 1970s onward relations improved between Israel and Jordan and Egypt,
leading to mutual recognition and a reduction in tension; however, other
Arab states, and Iran, continued to refuse to recognize Israel’s existence.
Several factors promoted a new kind of Islamic fundamentalism from the
1970s onward, though it won active support only from a minority. Concern
about excessive consumerism and Western influence prompted a belief that
stricter Islamic morality must be revived; this was a key motive in the Ira-
nian revolution, as it immediately took measures to regulate women’s dress
and ban the use of alcohol – and also severely limit the role of Westerners
in the country’s economy (as many as 100,000 Westerners had flourished,
often in separate enclaves, under the previous regime). Reactions to
repressive secular governments was another key factor in the fundamentalist
surge: heightened commitment to Islam could be a path toward political
expression. In some countries, sluggish economic growth and high youth
unemployment spurred a search for alternatives. Concern about the failures
to confront Israel introduced another element. Finally, Saudi Arabia had
long been committed to a strict version of Islam, and while its government
did not directly back the new fundamentalism, the religious schools it sup-
ported in many Muslim countries played a key role. Deeply committed
Muslim groups emerged in most Middle Eastern countries by the 1970s,
leading to some violent clashes with government forces in places like Egypt,
Syria, and Algeria, and prompting new Muslim political activity even in
Turkey. Scattered acts of terrorism also occurred.
Conditions for women reflected many of the complex currents sweeping
the region. Education advanced: by the early 21st century, over half of all
university students in places like Iran were female. In more secular states,
many women adopted more open, Western styles of dress – though their
rural sisters rarely agreed. Birth rates did remain higher than in some other
regions, but they began to drop. At the same time, while women took on
some new jobs, their labor force roles were limited in contrast to trends
elsewhere. Reflecting the tensions in post-revolutionary Iran, where the
educational gains were so striking: only 22% of the labor force was female.
Political activity increased – a woman served as Turkish prime minister at
one point – but it lagged overall. Restrictions were particularly tight in
Saudi Arabia, where male permission was needed for travel and where
women were not allowed to drive. Another intriguing complexity: in some
places, like Turkey or Egypt, a number of young women voluntarily
returned to head coverings and even veiling, not because they wanted a
purely traditional role but because they wanted to align with cultural tradi-
tion and defy pressures to Westernize.
The importance of Islamic tradition in the Middle East and North Africa
sometimes confused foreign observers, who failed to take into account the
huge changes associated with the rise of scientific training, urbanization, and
in some countries rapidly increasing wealth. The combination was dis-
tinctive, in a region where groups and even individuals were actively
debating what paths they should take.
Comparative Legacies
Crucial global themes applied to all the world’s regions in the decades after
1945: decisions about political structure amid decolonization and new
attention to human rights; expansion of education and the role of science;
questions about gender roles; reconsiderations of family size; improvements
in health – and the list can be extended. At the same time, regional differ-
ences loomed large. Some reflected different stages in a common process of
change – thus every region was urbanizing, but some were farther along
than others.
Even religious fundamentalism spilled across regional boundaries. The rise
of Evangelical Protestantism, particularly in the Americas, had some parallels
with Islamic fundamentalism, despite mutual disdain. Both sought to take
advantage of new technologies to spread their message widely; both dis-
played missionary zeal. Both reflected discomfort with aspects of modern
society ranging from women’s roles to excessive consumerism and sexuality.
Both believed that a return to basic religious roots was essential, and both
appealed to people concerned about key trends in the contemporary world.
Expanding the comparison, some similar sentiments also emerged in Hin-
duism. The range of overlapping trends was considerable.
Yet there were also key regional differences that did not fit a tidy schema,
because they reflected distinctive traditions – specific religious commitments
loomed large here, but so did past political or gender traditions – or because
they highlighted varied reactions to more recent developments, such as
nuclear weaponry or environmental changes. Some of the comparative
patterns that resulted were unexpectedly complicated.
Thus, recent political patterns in China and India reflect not only dif-
ferent recent experiences, but differing political legacies as well; the
contrast was vivid, for example, in the contrasting degrees of political
centralization or the influence of religion. However, both countries
ended up agreeing that they should aspire to great power status and that
this required getting the bomb. Both also displayed one similar legacy
from past patriarchal systems: thus many parents in both societies con-
tinued to prefer having boys rather than girls, sometime aborting or
abandoning the latter and producing a similar skewed gender structure
among adults – with lots of excess single men.
The Middle East and the United States differed in a host of ways, but
both generated more concerns about open displays of sexuality than
was true in Western Europe; both also used the death penalty more
often than many other societies through the 1990s; and both were
slower to develop large environmental movements than Western
Europe as well. Here too, the balance between differentiation and
overlap was complicated.
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa had very different religious tradi-
tions, and while both regions dealt with decolonization, many of their
political and economic development patterns differed considerably as
well. But both regions displayed some of the strongest attachments to
traditional family forms anywhere in the world, including unusually
high rates of child marriage in rural areas.
Clearly, major trends and continuities in the later 20th century did not
simplify the task of comparative analysis. Shared global themes and clear
regional distinctions did exist, but there were also a variety of cross-cutting
currents. Despite all the new developments, no region cast aside important
legacies from the past, and the combination of continuity and innovation
underlies any comparison of political structures or religious roles or family
values. The mixture of tradition and change played out in a number of
complicated ways.
Further Reading
On East Asia, William Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (2016); Edward
Beauchamp, ed., Women and Women’s Issues in Post World War II Japan
(1998); Shinichi Ichimura, Political Economy of Japanese and Asian Devel-
opment (1998); Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History
(2005); Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (1991).
On the West, Walter Laqueur, Europe since Hitler: The Rebirth of Europe
(1982); Robert Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century, 5th edn. (2011);
Rana Mitter and Patrick Major, eds., Across the Blocs: Exploring Compara-
tive Cold War Cultural and Social History (2004); Stephen Cohen, Modern
Capitalist Planning: The French Model (1969); Richard Maltby, ed., A
Passing Parade: A History of Popular Culture in the Twentieth Century (1989).
For the postindustrial society idea, Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-
industrial Society (1976).
On Eastern Europe, Stephen Cohen, Alexander Rabinowith, and Robert
Sharlet, eds., The Soviet Union since Stalin (1980); Jeffrey Brooks, Thank
You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War
(2001); Barbara Evans Clements, Barbara Engel, and Christine Worobec,
eds., Russia’s Women: Accommodation, Resistance, Transformation (1991);
Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central
Europe Since World War II, 4th edn. (2007); Sabrina Ramet, ed., Eastern
Europe: Politics, Culture, and Society Since 1939 (1999); David Kotz and
Fred Weir, Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System (1997);
Renee de Nevers, Comrades No More: The Seeds of Change in Eastern
Europe (2002).
On Latin America, Thomas Skidmore, Peter Smith, and James Green,
Modern Latin America, 8th edn. (2013); Peter Winn, Americas: The Chan-
ging Face of Latin America and the Caribbean, 3rd edn. (2006); Richard
Salvucci, Latin America and World Economy: Dependency and Beyond
(1996); Kurt Weyland, Raúl Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, eds., Leftist
Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings (2011); Shawn
William Miller, An Environmental History of Latin America (2007).
On Africa, Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present
(2002); Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism and New States in
Africa: From About 1935 to the Present (1984).
On South Asia, Paul Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence, 2nd edn.
(1994); Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s
Largest Democracy (2008); Marc Gilbert, South Asia in World History
(2017); Colin Brown, A Short History of Indonesia: The Unlikely Nation?
(2004).
For the Middle East, James Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History, 4th
edn. (2015); Peter Hinchcliffe, Conflicts in the Middle East Since 1945, 3rd
edn. (2007); Keith Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East: Revo-
lution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class (2012); Peter
Mandaville, Global Political Islam (2007).
15 The 21st Century
Legacies and New Questions
Does the last quarter century suggest a major new turn in world history?
What legacies from the past still help explain the world today? This is the
tall order for this final chapter.
The perils of generalizing from recent historical trends are obvious from
the miscalculations of the 1990s. This was when a number of Western
(mainly American) optimists argued that with the fall of communism the
whole world was headed for liberal democratic regimes and rising pros-
perity. The first part of this prediction obviously didn’t happen (the
second did, to some extent), and the story of the last quarter century is
much more complicated than pundits imagined. Several regions, for var-
ious reasons, chose not to alter their political traditions in a conveniently
Western direction, and even the West developed some unexpected poli-
tical hiccups.
This chapter is not primarily aimed at prediction, though there will be a
few predictive implications. The basic focus is, first, to note major devel-
opments in world history since the year 2000, both regionally and globally;
and, second, to comment on the extent to which they suggest major new
directions (again, either regionally or globally) or build in trends already at
play at least in recent world history.
Two decades plus is not a long time for evaluations of this sort – at
least beyond a short list of major events. There must be room for
uncertainty and debate. On the basic question, “are we entering a clear
new period, with defining trends different from those of the later 20th
century?,” the chapter will simply not attempt an unambiguous answer.
The combination of the elaboration of prior trends and new ingredients
is complex, and it is important to avoid the impulse to assume radical
overall innovation just because we know we’re a bit different from the
past. At the same time, it would be intellectually cowardly just to list
some recent facts and not tie them to some of the judgments offered in
previous chapters about regional characteristics or the nature of industrial
society and modern globalization. At a minimum, the aim is to provide
food for informed discussion.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003198185-17
21st Century: Legacies and New Questions 295
Highlights
2001: Terrorist attack on United States; US war in Afghanistan begins;
China joins World Trade Organization; 2002: International Criminal Court
established; East Timor independence; 2003: US invasion of Iraq; “Rose
Revolution” in nation of Georgia; 2004: expansion of NATO, European
Union to most of East-Central Europe; Facebook founded; “Orange
Revolution” in Ukraine; 2008: Great Recession; 2009: Boko Haram rebel-
lion in Nigeria; 2010–11: Arab Spring; Syrian Civil War; 2012–13: Xi Jiping
leads China, Belt and Road initiative; 2014: Russia annexes Crimea, war
in eastern Ukraine; 2015: Islamic State in parts of Iraq; 2016: Paris
Agreement on environment, Britain votes to leave European Union,
agreement on Iran nuclear program; 2020: Covid-19 pandemic; Black
Lives Matter protests, wide global response.
Major Regional Developments

While every region experienced significant events and pressures, some were
more caught up in substantially new developments than others. While no
region saw its characteristics transformed in the short span of two decades,
there were some important innovations and also some revealing reversions
to earlier traditions. Several seemingly new developments actually revived
some older regional impulses, though in new guise – but of course this
claim of historical revival or continuity must be carefully assessed.
The Middle East

Here was the clear leader in sheer number of significant events. New tur-
moil began with the radical Islamicist attack by several Middle Eastern
nationals on buildings in the United States, killing almost 3,000. This led to
the US invasion of Afghanistan, dislodging the ruling Taliban but setting off
a war that would last at least two decades. Another American invasion – for
disputed reasons – targeted Iraq, deposing the authoritarian ruler but trig-
gering prolonged instability. The situation encouraged Iran to sponsor Shiite
military forces in Lebanon and later Syria and Yemen. In complex nego-
tiations with the European powers, the United States, Russia and China,
Iran agreed for a time to halt its nuclear weapons development program,
though this resumed when the United States later pulled out of the deal.
In 2010–11, popular uprisings unseated or challenged authoritarian
regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria. This revolution – the only
event of its kind so far in the 21st century – centered initially on human
rights outrage, against police repression. But it also roused new Muslim
296 21st Century: Legacies and New Questions
demands for greater support for Islamic law. The liberal-Islamic tension was
the latest version of a debate that went back to the 19th century in the
region. The unintended result was the return of authoritarian regimes
everywhere except Tunisia – the one tentative revolutionary success – plus
a prolonged, brutal civil war in Syria as the ruler there refused concessions.
In the aftermath the leader of Libya was also unseated, leading to prolonged
political chaos there. Meanwhile the leadership of Turkey introduced new
authoritarian measures.
Israeli-Palestinian tensions led to recurrent strife, but Israel continued to
expand its settlements otherwise unopposed. Many Arab leaders pulled back
from active support of the Palestinians, preferring to focus on economic
development and eager to emphasize a Sunni united front against Iran. A
proxy war devastated Yemen, while the nation of Lebanon was bitterly
divided amid the new Arab/Sunni-Iranian/Shiite disputes. Seeking to con-
front the region’s new tensions, in 2020, several additional Arab states
recognized Israel. Saudi Arabia worked for greater international recognition,
partly because of the tensions with Iran, partly because of a need for more
balanced economic growth given the anticipated decline in the demand for
oil. The regime permitted limited local political activity and eased restric-
tions on women, allowing them to drive; but repression of opposition
continued as well.
This complex mix of developments in many ways confirmed the region’s
overall embrace of authoritarian rule, with some interesting exceptions. Oil
revenues continued to define an imbalance of wealth among the countries
of the region, though there were questions about the industry’s future. The
Sunni-Shiite split revived an older regional theme, though with new
dimensions including great power involvement and the altered position of
Israel.

Under Vladimir Putin, who ultimately extended his presidential term
essentially for life, Russia reverted to several older tendencies – but in a
vastly different global context. First, Putin progressively extended author-
itarian controls, allowing some open discussion but cracking down hard on
political opposition – including the assassination of several critics. Second,
he revived an active foreign and military policy, upgrading the military and
developing new nuclear and delivery weapons. Putin also sent Russian and
proxy forces into some of the conflicts in the Middle East (reflecting
another older Russian regional interest). Most important, he sponsored
attacks on several of the post-Soviet states, paring off some territory and
seizing the Crimea directly; Western countries retaliated with economic
sanctions but the acquisition remained, along with continued fighting in
Ukraine. Finally, supporting his disputes with the West, he held Russia up
as a cultural alternative: more religious, with close ties to the Orthodox
Church, deeply opposed to gay rights, supporting male-dominated family
law that made it very difficult to punish domestic abuse. With all this,
Russian economic development faltered, as the nation relied heavily on oil
and gas exports. Popular support continued, partly because of manipulation
of the news but partly because of pride in the more vigorous foreign policy,
including regaining the Crimea and its ethnic Russian majority. Protest
demonstrations did develop at times, but without much effect.
Patterns in neighboring states differed somewhat, which revived some
Russian fears of encirclement. Many former satellites states joined NATO
and the European Union outright. Largely peaceful revolutions in Georgia
and Ukraine led to democratic, pro-Western governments. In 2020, a major
popular movement even targeted the authoritarian regime in Belarus. Yet in
Hungary and Poland, now outside the Russian orbit, democratically-elected
rulers revived authoritarian controls over the press and the judicial courts.
Defining the East-West Europe boundary line remained challenging,
despite important new specifics.
East Asia
The leading development in East Asia was unquestionably the continued
economic growth of China, plus its increasing assertiveness and growing
authoritarianism. The region remained one of the most highly industrialized
and politically stable areas in the world, but also among the most tense.
North Korea continued to be an outlier: isolated, with a low standard of
living and Stalinist-type rule, but heavily armed, with a growing nuclear and
missile arsenal which the Leader periodically displayed in hopes of triggering
concessions, particularly from the United States.
China surpassed Japan as the second largest economy in the world. While
Japan retained the next rank, its economy was less vigorous; amid growing
strain, the old system of assured employment for key groups of workers was
largely dismantled. But there was no deep crisis, and the same applied to
South Korea, where economic performance was more robust.
China’s economic growth continued at high levels, though dipping a bit
below the previous annual 10%. Poverty continued to decline. For a time,
political controls relaxed slightly, but under Xi Jiping, who assumed the
presidency in 2012, the trend reversed. Criticism was silenced, and access to
the global Internet was blocked; many dissidents were imprisoned. In
another shift, Xi was ultimately named president for life, reversing policies
that had aimed at preventing another Mao-type leadership. Attacks on sus-
pect religious minorities increased, and strict indoctrination camps were
forced on many members of the Uighur ethnic group, largely Muslim, in
the northwest, while increasing numbers of Han Chinese were encouraged
to settle in the area. Some of these policies reflected earlier patterns, but
with dramatic new technologies: facial recognition software, for example,
was used to identify and monitor groups like the Uighurs. In 2019,
repressive measures were also applied to Hong Kong, effectively reducing its
political autonomy after a series of vigorous democratic protests. China’s
combination of economic innovation and authoritarianism was sharpened.
President Xi made it clear that China was bent on reversing the “century of
humiliation” and restoring the nation’s position as regional hegemon – though
here too with new twists. Military budgets increased, though not to US levels,
with new capacity for space warfare. China built up a number of islands in the
South China Sea, establishing bases and claiming wider territorial control –
against the maritime claims of some neighboring states. Attacks on critics were
extended to efforts to insist on ideological compliance among overseas Chinese
and on support from trading partners like Australia, provoking new disputes. In
2013, Xi initiated an ambitious Belt and Road program, offering a combina-
tion of investments and loans to countries in Central and Southeast Asia, east-
ern Africa, and even East-Central Europe. The aim was to create a new
transportation infrastructure – including direct road and rail connections with
Europe, but also port development – to facilitate trade and economic growth.
The project involved clear tensions between mutual benefits and outright
Chinese control; several countries ultimately pulled back, in part because of
potential indebtedness to China. Overall, there was little doubt that China was
clearly capitalizing on its new, or renewed, position as a great power, and
provoking varied reactions in the process. In historical terms, an interesting
question opened up, about whether China was mainly bent on regaining tra-
ditional regional dominance or was striving for a much newer global super-
power role.

Southeast Asian conditions remained relatively stable, amid continued eco-
nomic growth. There were, however, several religious conflicts. Myanmar
opened to greater democracy and international contact, but its Buddhist
leaders and military took new repressive measures against an ethnic Muslim
minority; and the military did not clearly relinquish political control. Indo-
nesian politicians debated their commitment to enforcing Islamic privilege
while also dealing with some Islamicist terrorist attacks. In 1999, under
international pressure, Indonesia did agree to the independence of a Chris-
tian-majority territory, East Timor (now, Timor-Leste), after a rather brutal
military occupation, and this new nation established a constitutional struc-
ture and gained international recognition after 2002. Despite turmoil,
Indonesia largely preserved democratic institutions and procedures. Political
disputes were more acute in the Philippines, where an election produced a
new leader with authoritarian inclinations; questions about degrees of poli-
tical openness affected Thailand.
Relations between India and Pakistan remained tense, and the turmoil in
Afghanistan after the US invasion added another distraction. Politics in
Pakistan continued to reflect the deep influence of Muslim clerics and the
military, though competitive elections occurred as well. Developments in
India took a more novel turn, influenced by the tensions with Pakistan and
a major Islamicist terror attack. In 2014, a Hindu nationalist party won a
victory in the general elections, installing Narenda Modi as prime minister.
Modi in turn highlighted an emphasis both on further economic develop-
ment and on a more assertive nationalist and Hindu-centric policy, picking
up one of the longstanding tensions within Indian nationalism more gen-
erally. Relations with China deteriorated, including another border scuffle.
Most important, Modi and his supporters took a more rigid line with
Pakistan – asserting new controls over Kashmir – and with the Muslim
minority at home. Attacks on Muslims and Muslim religious buildings
increased; the police at one point invaded a Muslim university; and new
laws discriminated against Muslim immigrants. In the process, more general
liberal traditions were imperilled, with increasing efforts to interfere with
the free press and silence critics. At least for the moment, patterns in South
Asia were in considerable flux.
The West
The early 21st century presented new challenges to the West, but arguably
without fundamental change. Islamicist terror attacks, recurrently from 2001
onward, caused disruption and fear, leading to new security measures. The
United States, France, and Britain were most affected, but there were inci-
dents elsewhere, including Australia. The US involvement in several
enduring wars, in the Middle East and Afghanistan, heightened reliance on
the military, though the lives of most ordinary Americans were not deeply
affected. The United States also experienced an important resurgence of
racial unrest, particularly around police violence against Blacks; the Black
Lives Matter movement formed in response, in 2013. Protest against police
aggression peaked again in 2020, with unprecedentedly large demonstra-
tions in many cities; this movement prompted international support and
attention as well to racial injustice in places like France and Britain.
Manufacturing employment continued to decline throughout the region,
though there were some national variations. Causes included both increas-
ing automation and growing competition from lower-wage areas like China
and Mexico. While modest overall economic growth continued, including
the spectacular gains of high-tech sectors, regional disparities and economic
inequality increased dramatically within many countries. This in turn con-
tributed to new tensions around issues like immigration and globalization,
leading in several cases to new political extremism. The most specific
result – a sharp reversal of late-20th-century trends – was a referendum vote
in Britain to leave the European Union, in the move dubbed “Brexit.” The
rupture was finalized at the end of 2020. British proponents argued that
their nation would now be free for new initiatives. Existing members of the
European Union, in reaction, actually tightened their mutual commitments,
and the Union itself began to take more vigorous measures to protect the
economies of some weaker areas. Finally, new populist movements in sev-
eral countries, from the United States to Hungary, raised questions about
the political future and the unity of the West, without yet generating sys-
tematic change. Even Canadian-American relations, long a staple, frayed
slightly.
Latin America
Economic growth in several key countries leveled off somewhat in the 21st
century, after the rapid gains of the late 20th century; Brazil was an
important case in point. On the other hand, performance in several Andean
countries accelerated. No systematic political changes swept the region, as
democratic systems persisted in the main, but there was periodic instability
in some of the Andean nations and in parts of Central America. Gang
activity, including increased murder rates, plagued much of Central America
and Mexico. On the other hand, Colombia, long disrupted by internal civil
war, managed to resolve longstanding disputes. Election of a populist and
Evangelical leader in Brazil in 2018, after several years of social reform
emphasis, raised new questions there, among other things reviving disputes
about protecting the Amazon rainforest from further environmental
damage – a cause the new president played down in favor of more rapid
economic development.
Venezuela presented the greatest drama, with implications for neighbor-
ing states. Hugo Chavez, a self-proclaimed socialist, declared a “Bolivarian
revolution” in 1999, vowing popular democracy, independence (particularly
from US influence), and social justice and winning widespread support
particularly among the urban poor. Recurrent political turmoil resulted,
ultimately with new measures to curb opposition, and the economy
sagged – despite the nation’s great oil wealth. Conditions deteriorated fur-
ther after 2010, as the government was unable to manage even the oil
industry effectively. Massive inflation and shortages increased poverty, and
hundreds of thousands of people fled to neighboring territories – particu-
larly Colombia and Brazil. Despite the crisis, the regime won support from
Cuba and also from Russia and China, eager among other things to tweak
the United States. Despite wide discussion and exchanges of threats, no
constructive action resulted – perhaps an interesting indication of a some-
what lackluster two decades for the Americas.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Two contradictory trends deserved particular attention in the early 21st
century. First, a number of countries began to enjoy rapid economic
growth – partly because of new opportunities for trade with China and
India. Kenya was a key example, with rates pushing toward 10%; Ethiopia
was another success story, where for a time a more democratic political
structure advanced as well. Thanks in part to international aid and intra-
African cooperation, the AIDs epidemic eased and other disease crises, par-
ticularly a resurgence of Ebola, were managed with some success.
On the other hand, ethnic and other tensions persisted in several areas,
including the Congo, and the rise of Islamist militant groups caused new
disruption, with recurrent attacks on civilian targets. In northern Nigeria
and neighboring states, the Boko Haram movement began in 2002. The
name meant “Western education is forbidden,” and attacks on schools were
in fact a prominent tactic of this unabashedly terrorist group. Major police
operations, backed by France and the United States, failed to end the tur-
moil, which displaced millions of people. In Somalia, another terrorist
group emerged, with bloody forays into Uganda and Kenya. In several
countries this turmoil was compounded by increasing drought and food
shortages, which along with the violence prompted new streams of migra-
tion both to neighboring countries – Kenya and Uganda alone housed huge
refugee camps – and toward the Mediterranean and Europe.
Obviously, regional disparities within Sub-Saharan Africa increased con-
siderably, complicating any generalization. The same complexity applied to
political structures. Democratic systems continued to prevail in several cen-
ters, but a number of countries continued to feature repression of political
dissent, often with presidents who simply ignored constitutional term limits
and held on for life. Even when an authoritarian ruler was unseated, as in
Zimbabwe in 2017, replacements often quickly replicated the pattern of
repression.
****
A quarter century rarely offers enough time for decisive alternations in
regional characteristics around the globe, and this seems to be the case so far
in the 21st century. Of course, this claim should be debated; furthermore, it
is ventured in 2021, and some new development may call it into question at
any point. No crystal ball magic is involved. (Treating the very recent past
as part of global history is great fun, inviting judgments about innovation
and continuity – but there is always the risk of looking very foolish the day
after one’s efforts are published.) To date, however, many regions have
largely confirmed later 20th-century patterns or – as in India or Russia –
revived an emphasis on some earlier themes. The fact that the only literal
revolutionary effort largely failed is revealing.
This said, when regional adjustments and innovations are tallied on a
more global basis, some wider themes emerge. Many observers noted a
move toward greater authoritarianism, in contrast to late-20th-century
trends; and religious toleration suffered new blows as well. New questions
about globalization unquestionably surfaced. Several developments reflected
the dramatic impact of new information technologies. More subtly, demo-
graphic shifts suggested some novel challenges as well.
Even at the global level, important continuities deserve note, including
the continued spread of some of the basic implications of industrial society.
These warrant serious consideration, before turning to some of the newer
forces – including the huge disruptions that shattered the world in 2020.
Global Trends: Continuities and Intensifications

Many observers, including a prominent New York Times columnist, began
greeting each new year after about 2010 with the dramatic statement: the
past year has been the best in human history. The claim could be justified
(until 2021), mainly because the process of global industrialization con-
tinued. Even though the pace of economic growth slowed in some of the
up-and-coming regions, and the Great Recession of 2008 introduced new
challenges, the process continued and now included the gains in several
African nations.
Poverty
Global poverty dropped steadily for several decades before 2020. In 1990, 36%
of the world’s population lived in extreme poverty (defined as earning less than
$1.90 per day); by 2019, the figure had dropped to 9.6%. This meant that in
the early 21st century, several hundred people every second were rising above
the direst levels. Correspondingly the number of children dying from the direct
effects of poverty dropped from 35,000 a day, in 1990, to 14,200.
These figures were not disputed, but their meaning was. Critics noted
that poverty had gone up in the early 20th century because of population
pressure – so how real were the gains from a longer view? They correctly
emphasized that rising out of dire poverty could still mean being very poor,
and the rates of improvement for the next poverty rung, though real, were
not as robust. They worried that the changes disproportionately reflected
developments in China and a few other populous leaders, leaving large
swaths of other regions, like parts of Africa, out of the picture. Finally,
some, taking a deeper historical perspective, even pointed out that, before
global commercialization and industrialization, most people had lived with-
out a wage at all – recalling the older argument that the human species was
best off long ago. All this was worth considering, along with other issues
like the groups in the West who, while not usually brutally poor, were
feeling increasingly left behind.
On the plus side, however, were other indices. In 1990, 71% of the
world’s population had access to electricity; by 2016, the figure was 87%.
Access to clean water and improved sanitation facilities posed a greater
problem, but here too there were gains; in India, for example, Prime Min-
ister Modi mounted a huge investment program to generalize availability of
sanitary toilets. At least compared to the mid-20th century, many basics
were improving.
Children and Women
Material gains, as well as global human rights messages, supported other
significant changes. Child labor figures dropped from 246 million, in 2000,
to 152 million by 2016; this meant that while there was huge exploitation
still, abuses were declining rapidly – with particularly important gains in
South Asia. This change also supported growing literacy: globally, rates here
improved at 4% annually from 1960 onward, involving 86% of the world’s
total population by 2016. The lives of more and more children were being
transformed toward the patterns already common in the advanced industrial
societies. The steady decline of the birth rate, despite regional variations,
created new opportunities for attention to individual children, with impli-
cations for gender roles as well.
Gender patterns were arguably more complex, for they depended not just
on material standards but cultural norms. Regional variations remained
prominent, though some of the extremes – like denying women the right
to drive – were fading away. Pushback against change continued: funda-
mentalist religious groups in many countries still disputed women’s inde-
pendence: particularly in South Asia, incidents of violence against schoolgirls
seemed to be going up, presumably in protest against educational access and
its results; while rates of domestic abuse were hard to measure, legal changes
in places like Russia raised new concerns about women’s rights to legal
defense.
Still, many indices showed continued positive change: in many societies,
women gained ground steadily in the ranks of elected legislators and other
officials; educational levels continued to rise, though disparities remained in
some areas; countries like Japan, previously rather conservative about gender
roles, saw a growing number of women enter the labor force. Declining
poverty also reduced the rates of child marriage, again with regional varia-
tions: in 1980, about a third of all women married before adulthood; by
2018, the figure had dropped to a quarter. Most important, the percentage
of girls pushed into marriage before age 15 was cut by a third.
Overall, though sometimes buried beneath one global crisis after another,
some basic changes continued to occur in the structure of human lives.
Consumerism
The early 21st century saw major innovations in the basic modern trend of
growing consumerism. Again, important caveats attached: many regions,
and particularly rural areas, did not fully participate, and there were critics
aplenty to argue that growing consumerism was not a good thing. But key
changes were noteworthy, reflecting rising prosperity, new technologies,
and probably new aspirations.
Interest in electronic gadgets spread widely, offering a new target for
many people eager to keep up to date. By 2016, about 67% of the world’s
population had cellphones. Access to automobiles, less widespread, never-
theless surged, as China became the world’s hottest market, India not too far
behind.
Shopping online, virtually nonexistent before 2000, became a global
passion, along with dramatic changes in delivery systems. The US-based
Amazon led the field here, but Chinese firms like Alibaba were not far
behind. And in African countries like Kenya, online services were popping
up strongly as well. Associated with this was the steady advance of online
banking and a declining use of cash. While a few Western countries like
Sweden changed quickly, China’s transformation was particularly striking.
And it was China that introduced the most novel opportunity to cele-
brate consumerism: Singles Day. Conceived by some university students
struck by the date 11/11, providing a visual-numerical representation for
people not in relationships, November 11 became a massive online shop-
ping orgy in China – the biggest one-day occasion in the world. And while
the custom was not yet global, by 2020, it was spreading, particularly in
parts of Southeast Asia.
Globalization and Its Discontents

Closely associated with the steady, if uneven, advance of industrialization and
industrial societies, many aspects of globalization accelerated during the early
21st century as well. At the same time, however, new warning signs popped
up, and while there was no retreat from the process comparable to develop-
ments in the early 20th century, some new complexities clearly emerged.
Growing access to and use of the Internet showed that the technological
structure for globalization was still going strong; so, until 2020, did a steady
rise in international air travel. Facebook, founded in 2004, had 2.2 billion
subscribers worldwide by 2018. A number of cultural exchanges deepened.
Hollywood producers became increasingly conscious of the Chinese market,
and adjusted some themes accordingly, but since the results largely empha-
sized adventure stories, the domestic market was not jeopardized. Firms like
Netflix went a step farther: already a global enterprise with operations in
190 countries, in 2016, the company decided to stop simply producing films
in the United States for wider distribution, but to begin making them in
many places and many languages, translating widely – including into Eng-
lish – as necessary; and global sales responded strongly. Thus, a Brazilian
series won half its audience outside Brazil, while a show about lesbians in
Australia gained viewers in India. Relying on new media, voices in many
countries gained a wide audience. Thus, a Japanese show on the importance
of tidying and limiting possessions, strongly linked to more traditional
national values, quickly became a global sensation, prompting many people
to sort through their belongings to decide which ones gave them “joy.”
Even the global reactions to Black Lives Matter protests in 2020, though
not universal, suggested new connections. Demonstrators not only
sympathized with American grievances; they also urged the need to recon-
sider the legacies of colonialism and racial injustice within many other
societies – from Europe to South Africa to Latin America and even Japan.
At the same time, new signs of hesitation abounded. On the cultural
front, several new developments in the West created adverse reactions
elsewhere. Women’s rights continued to gain, but the new Western con-
cern about sexual harassment in the workplace simply had no resonance in
places like Russia or China (though there were a few new legal efforts in
China as well as India). Even more obviously, the growing Western com-
mitment to gay rights, including acceptance of gay marriage, encountered
headwinds elsewhere. Russia’s Putin and other leaders in East-Central
Europe proudly affirmed their commitment to traditional marriage alone,
often stepping up attacks on gay groups. Most African countries did the
same, and Uganda discussed stiffer penalties; only South Africa, under
Mandela’s legacy, accepted gay marriage. Islamic societies remained vigor-
ously opposed, again sometimes intensifying anti-gay enforcement; Brunei
even introduced a new law punishing homosexual behavior by stoning,
though it did not actually enforce the measure. Some new flexibility
emerged in India, a few Latin American countries, and Taiwan. But at least
by 2021 there was simply no globalization on this issue, but rather heigh-
tened disagreement.
The popularity of economic globalization – never uniform – took a
massive hit with the Great Recession of 2008, the world’s worst economic
setback since the 1930s. The collapse of speculative bank investments in the
United States quickly led to banking crises in Britain and elsewhere, redu-
cing trade levels and causing extensive unemployment and wage loss. Some
economies, such as China’s were less hard hit, but there was a general
slowdown, and conditions did not fully rebound until 2016. In turn, this
prompted many countries to express second thoughts about aspects of eco-
nomic globalization such as financial arrangements and trade deals.
Concern about economic globalization crested particularly in parts of the
West, reflecting the decline of manufacturing employment and the rise of
competition from China and elsewhere. New nationalist leaders, such as
Donald Trump in the United States, railed against global trade arrange-
ments, and the United States actually pulled out of an ambitious new
agreement among nations around the Pacific. While British withdrawal
from the European Union was not technically anti-global – Brexit leaders
talked of freeing Britain to make wider international arrangements – the
move was widely interpreted as yet another effort to assert new national
controls.
Growing attacks on international human rights organizations formed a
third focus. The spread of authoritarian regimes, plus new technological
capacity, saw new and highly successful efforts to control the Internet, par-
ticularly in China. Countries like Egypt and Russia stepped up their hosti-
lity to human rights campaigns, arresting many leaders and expelling key
organizations. Several countries, including the Philippines, also pulled out of
the International Court, unwilling to risk global scrutiny of new policing
measures.
Overall, and in various ways, globalization was running into a new level
of nationalist resistance, on several fronts. It was not clear how extensive the
reactions would be, or how durable. Thus, while the United States pulled
out of many global arrangements under the Trump administration, includ-
ing several United Nations agencies, the next administration immediately
reversed most of these moves in 2021.
The Covid-19 Pandemic

Surely the most important single development in very recent global his-
tory, and largely unexpected save among a few neglected experts, was
the pandemic that started at the end of 2019, raged through 2020, and
continued to burden 2021. At this writing the event is still unfolding, so a
full interpretation would be hazardous, but the disease was an interesting
barometer of a number of contemporary patterns:
1 Nothing quite like this had occurred since the so-called Spanish flu
of 1918–19. The response was a partial testimony to more effective
government and public health measures, combined with some
global coordination from groups like the World Health Organization.
The AIDS epidemic was more deadly than Covid, but spread out
over a longer period of time and more concentrated in a few regions.
A few virus episodes early in the 21st century suggested new dan-
gers – including the new human-animal interactions that resulted
from the growth of cities and the decline of forested areas – but
most of them had been more quickly contained.
2 The epidemic spread rapidly and widely (though there were some
regional anomalies), which is what one would expect from acceler-
ated global contacts. Globalization also showed in the considerable
collaboration among scientists, beginning with the release by Chi-
nese experts of the virus’ genetic code.
3 The episode reflected a number of world historical changes. Almost
everywhere governments assumed unprecedented responsibility for
trying to do something to contain the ravages; results varied, but the
expansion of government action was visible around the world. Sci-
ence was called on as never before, and in fact the most striking
innovation in the whole experience was the rapidity with which many
societies – headed by Russia, China, the West, with India not far
behind – developed an effective vaccine. Finally, the massive dismay
and disruption also suggested a declining tolerance for at least this
kind of death, again on a global basis; more people expected
“something to be done,” and quickly, than had been true even a

century before.
4 Deep-seated regional cultural differences were on strong display –
along with the inequalities in regional wealth. Thus, East Asia
responded with far more discipline, fewer individualistic protests,
than the West did, though there were a few exceptional Western
performances as in New Zealand. China was able to put in place
government mandates that would have been impossible in the West.
But Taiwan and South Korea also demonstrated more social soli-
darity (the Japanese response was more oddly muddled). Populists
in the West – a newer development – also accounted for some of the
loudest resistance to social measures, including some outright
denials that a problem existed. (Some observers also noted that
several countries with female leaders did unusually well – Taiwan
and New Zealand were prime examples – but the role of gender
qualities could be debated, and being an island could help a lot in
facilitating controls.)
5 Nationalism competed strongly with globalization, as was the case
in other 21st-century developments. Efforts to blame China (and
sometimes domestic Asian minorities) were often racially tinged, and
the Chinese made some effort at claiming the disease must have
been imported with food from the West while also suggesting that
Western difficulties in containing the virus were evidence of their
inferior systems. British and European Union officials poked at each
other. Great distrust prevented quick adoption of vaccines developed
in other countries: assumptions of the inferiority of Russian and Chi-
nese work were widespread (quite inaccurately, as things turned out, in
the case of Russia particularly), while even advanced industrial coun-
tries distrusted each other; Japan was especially slow to approve
anyone else’s product. Wide differences also divided the wealthy
West, eager to buy up as much vaccine as possible for their own use
(Canada, usually generous, was noteworthy here); in contrast, China
and Russia distributed vaccines widely, from a combination of altru-
ism, foresight (the pandemic would not end until all regions were able
to reduce rates), and a desire to win diplomatic credit.
6 Finally, nationalism also caused new disputes about the World
Health Organization, the relevant global institution: some nations
sought to keep information from it, others disputed its competence
and in one case briefly pulled out. The pandemic was not a bad
barometer for a number of conflicting features of contemporary
world history.
It was unclear what durable world-historical results will develop from

this undoubted crisis. In the short run, the pandemic has reversed the
global decline of poverty, plunging as many as half a billion people into

economic retreat as jobs were furloughed and many people worked from
home, with uncertainty over ever returning to normal. Social tensions in
many countries were exacerbated – witness a widespread rise in murder
rates. On the other hand, once the disease was controlled, many experts
expected a quick return to economic growth, and China and Singapore
managed to restore some progress even as the pandemic raged else-
where. The Spanish flu – the most recent historical precedent – was
surprisingly quickly forgotten after it receded, and the same might
happen with Covid-19 – which would probably also prove to be less
severe than the flu which claimed 20–50 million lives globally. Here,
world history perspectives cannot substitute for waiting to see what
actually happens – and many people currently believe that durable
changes are likely; but there is much food for speculation.
War and Terrorism: New Disruptions

The first decades of the 21st century did not see major war: the more
peaceful conditions that had begun with the end of the Cold War largely
persisted. There were a few loud exceptions, notably the US invasions of
Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia’s incursion into Ukraine was the first major
example of new territory seized by war in some time. Border clashes
between India and Pakistan and India and China were troubling; Iran and
Saudi Arabia sponsored the brutal proxy war in Yemen. A brief war
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, over disputed territory, involved unpre-
cedented use of drones; this, along with the new arms race among Russia,
the United States, and China created concerns for the future. But the actual
incidence of inter-state war was unusually low, and some optimists won-
dered if the world had turned a corner.
Wars within nations were another matter, with the bloody, drawn-out
strife in Syria, Afghanistan, and several African countries that produced
many casualties and displaced hundreds of thousands of refugees. Gang
activities in parts of Central America added to this category as well.
For many people, new forms of terrorism created greater anxiety than
war did, at least in the near term. Terrorist activities had dotted the later
20th century, often featuring protests by individual Muslims against Western
support for Israel and other issues; hijacked planes were the most common
expression, but there were a few bombings as well. The orchestrated attack
on the United States by a group of Islamicist extremists in 2001 was another
matter, opening an extended series of individual and small group attacks that
frequently featured suicide bombing. Several groups in the Middle East,
including al-Qaeda and ISIS (a new organization that briefly seized territory
in Iraq and Syria), promoted these attacks, arguing that they served God’s
purpose. Most Western countries were hit recurrently, as were Russia,
Israel, and India. But the greatest suffering occurred in the Middle East,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan, where market bombings and attacks on religious
minorities recurrently killed thousands.
The new terrorism caused a host of new police measures and travel
restrictions – another new constraint on globalization, and clearly created
rising ethnic and sectarian tensions within many societies. American inva-
sions of Iraq and Afghanistan were joined by many Western allies, though
the result further enraged the terrorist groups themselves. The new terrorist
wave also encouraged some copycat activity by domestic extremists, mostly
on the far right, with attacks on synagogues and mosques and on minority
groups themselves. On the whole, Islamicist terrorism itself tapered off after
the initial decade, though the threat remained.
Immigration
Immigrant patterns maintained many of the features already established in the
later 20th century, including the involvement of many different cultures and
the focus on Western societies as primary recipients. But changes in specific
sources and volumes created new reactions that added immigration to the list
of disruptive changes in the 21st century. Several older sources of migration
actually dropped off, thanks to new industrialization and birth rate decline: thus
the number of Mexicans seeking entry into the United States slowed dramati-
cally. But new sources more than made up the difference.
A combination of civil wars and environmental changes added to the
basic force of population growth. Africans, mainly from regions directly
south of the Sahara, sought entry to Europe because of civil strife and new
drought conditions. Central Americans pushed toward the United States
following gang activity and, again, environmental change. Wars and chaos
in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan pushed massive numbers of refugees toward
Western Europe. Motivations were not always clear to the migrants them-
selves: deep poverty, fear of death, hopes for a better life intermingled.
Often, the combination drove migrants to take tremendous risks in seeking
a new home.
What was clear was the new resistance that responded to the new waves.
Countries closest to the influx, like Italy and Greece, sought help from the
European Union. Many people, in the United States and Europe alike,
were already worried about the size of the existing immigrant population
(legal and illegal), and balked at the new pressures. Racist beliefs, religious
prejudices, particularly against Muslims, factored into the mix. Many
receiving countries tried to respond responsibly: Canada, for example,
opened up to new entrants; Germany at one point committed to taking a
million from the Middle East. Some experts actually noted that new arrivals
could help replenish the labor force, given low native birth rates, while
providing new sources of creativity. But the numbers were hard to handle,
and in some cases fears of terrorism added another reason for resistance.
By the early 2020s, no real solution had been found. The European
Union and the United States both made some deals with neighbors like
Turkey or Mexico for help in keeping the migrants out. The EU took new
measures to block arrivals by boat; the United States built some new stret-
ches of wall. The lives of many migrants worsened amid the new hostility.
Internally, immigration became a new political flashpoint. Conservatives,
on both sides of the Atlantic, talked of the threat of crime and cultural dis-
array, as well as competition with local workers. Several European countries
seemed particularly resistant: this included the East-Central nations, with
lower standards of living, but also places like Denmark, that vigorously
tightened restrictions in a nation that had long relied on considerable ethnic
homogeneity. Britain’s Brexit vote was strongly motivated by a desire to
gain greater control over immigration (including arrivals from East-Central
Europe). In many cases, the immigration dilemmas fanned the greater
uncertainties about contemporary globalization.
Balance of Power
In 1999, 19 countries plus the European Union began discussing the for-
mation of a new “Group of 20” to discuss the issues now widely shared
among industrial nations, about global trade and other matters. Up to that
point, the global power group had been a Group of Seven – Japan, the
United States, Canada and the four top West European economies, all of
which also were democracies. But now it was clear that economic power
was more widely shared, and the 2008 Recession gave further impetus to
the need to expand the informal coordination group, to include far more
representation outside the West and to relax the insistence on democracy as
well.
The change was largely symbolic (and the Group of 7 persisted as well),
but the fact was that the 21st century has confirmed a very different power
alignment than existed before – though arguably the changes had been
brewing for some time. The West no longer sat clearly on top, even with
the inclusion of Japan. The United States was increasingly rivaled by China,
with India and other large new industrial countries clamoring for voice as
well.
Not surprisingly, it was not clear, by the 2020s, how this new balance
would play out. United States-China relations became increasingly tense.
Under Xi Jiping, China was expanding its military budget, creating new
claims for control over the South China Sea, while the United States was
torn between its engagement with many parts of the world and a sense that
it should be concentrating more on a “China threat.” For some Americans,
the combination of China’s power position plus globalization created a new
defensiveness, a desire somehow to preserve American greatness at all costs.
Some American leaders talked of building a new coalition – including India,
Japan, South Korea, and Australia – to counter Chinese ambitions. Chinese
leaders, annoyed at foreign criticism over human rights abuses and clearly
flexing their muscles in dealing with neighboring regions, including India,
easily believed that the United States was bent on blocking its legitimate
great power aspirations. Somewhat separately, Russian leaders, with their
growing military capacity, had their own national agenda, clearly impatient
with the post-Cold War status quo.
Shifts in global power balance are always difficult, inevitably raising
concerns about keeping the peace – though they do not always bring
disastrous results. As many observers pointed out, the United States and
the Soviets had managed to coexist uneasily, thanks in part to the potential
for mutual destruction; a new Cold War pattern seemed conceivable,
though China’s competitive position, thanks to industrial growth, was
somewhat different from that of the earlier Soviets. Uncertainties were not
Chinese and American alone: other major regions had to make their own
decisions about how to relate to the new power balance, including whe-
ther to take sides or to seek a different path. Here was another new ele-
ment in contemporary global history, one with many precedents but with
its own specifics.
The Rise of Authoritarianism

At least since the early 20th century, world history has involved a tension
between liberal, democratic options and a more authoritarian choice; bal-
ances frequently shifted. During the 21st century, particularly after the Great
Recession, the oscillation tilted in favor of authoritarianism – but author-
itarianism with some new features.
Regions that had previously retained an authoritarian preference saw new
kinds of controls. China under President Xi not only increased repression of
dissident political, religious, and ethnic groups. It also pioneered the
potential of new technology to heighten supervision over individual citi-
zens. Systems that had seemed to promise greater freedom were rigorously
censored but also deployed for newly vigorous propaganda. While author-
itarian regimes in the Middle East did not develop all these new measures,
they certainly tightened their grip.
At the same time, a number of countries that had introduced more
democratic systems now pulled back, often using the popular vote to legit-
imize increasingly authoritarian measures. Some observers indeed talked of a
new kind of popular authoritarianism, though there were some precedents
for this in the 20th century. Russia, Turkey, the Philippines, Venezuela,
Poland, and Hungary were the lead entrants on this new list, where popu-
larly elected officials turned to new repression. Almost none of these
regimes extended police powers as far as China was going, but they all
worked to curtail the press and stifle opposition.
Finally, in a number of Western democracies, new movements sprang up on
the right arguing that liberal democracies were not protecting core values, that
new authority was vital, in some cases that the vote itself should be restricted.
Some even looked back fondly on Nazi leaders or other authoritarian exam-
ples. Hindu Nationalist moves in India, measurably reducing freedoms of the
press, suggested new political overtones as well. Brazil’s new populist leader
also sought measures that would limit opposition.
In many cases, the extension of authoritarianism, or the new debates
about democracy’s limits, were also associated with growing religious and
sometimes racial intolerance, another important global shift that can be
traced within a number of individual regions.
Causes of the authoritarian revival were perhaps less clear than had been
the case between the wars, though comparative analysis is suggestive.
China’s economic success enhanced the draw of its political model, as Chi-
nese leaders were eager to point out. The 2008 recession caused many in
various regions, including the Western democracies, to seek new political
remedies. Many authoritarian stalwarts, championing nationalism, also
benefited from the new doubts about globalization. Authoritarian move-
ments in the West itself, as in the United States, also provided some comfort
to regimes elsewhere; the Western political model was somewhat tarnished.
Individual ambition added in of course – the new leaders were hardly shy –
but wider factors were at work.
As had been true before, there was no reason to think that the world as a
whole was headed in a single political direction. The shift in balance was
real, at least for the moment, but there were counterthrusts. Most Western
nations remained firmly attached to liberal democracy, and commitments
remained strong in much of Latin America and elsewhere as well. New
protest movements in places like Belarus and Thailand reminded that the
authoritarian map was by no means permanent.
As with many of the newer disruptive developments in the 21st century,
the question of future political direction remained open – in a modern
world that has so far never opted for a uniform political choice.
Gamechangers: The Newest Global Components

Debates about globalization, immigration, balance of power, and political
structure took new turns in the 21st century, and in combination might
well lead to major directional changes in world history. But they all also had
important precedents in earlier periods; it is possible to offer some infor-
mative comparisons and analogies, even while recognizing the newer
components.
Three other clusters of change – though largely unrelated – suggested
more novel forces at work, which might somehow shape a world history
period in the 21st century that would turn out to be more decisively dif-
ferent from what went before.
Information Technology and Social Media
By the 2020s, the effective Internet was about 30 years old, social media less
than 20; in 2020 itself, 59% of the world’s population actively used the
former, 53% the latter, with numbers growing steadily. However, the
ongoing impact of these dramatic forms of communication and information
remained unclear. Early hopes had not materialized: globalization and
democracy had not systematically advanced. Authoritarian regimes had
learned how to block access and manipulate; even where fewer restrictions
applied, many groups used the new systems only to interact with like-
minded partisans, increasing extremism and polarization.
Cultural and even psychological results were also under debate. In many
societies, intense use of social media increased reports of loneliness among
young people – reducing active human contact, while images of others’ suc-
cess and happiness promoted new levels of envy. On the other hand, many
users hoped to convey joy: the delights of taking selfies spread globally, cut-
ting across regional differences in individualism. Canadian, Japanese, and
Chinese inventors claimed credit for devising the selfie stick, adding another
component to a common global popular culture. Urban East Africans and
Chinese seemed as caught up in the selfie mania as American millennials.
Even protesters sometimes seemed to be more eager to take their own pic-
tures than to tear down the existing system. Did this suggest a major reduc-
tion of regional cultural differences, a quiet enhancement of globalization?
Was social media use opening new sources of anxiety on a global basis?
Rising international commitment to the new technologies raised a host of
issues about both the nature and the magnitude of change – a clear question
mark for the near future.
Global Ageing
Improvements in health care and longevity created a growing old age seg-
ment, even in populations still dominated by youth, as in Morocco or India.
The result was another series of questions, in this case about supporting and
caring for this population and defining the appropriate roles for the elderly
in a modern society.
But there was more. In a growing number of industrialized nations, the
rise of the elderly was coupled with the dramatic decline of the birth rate,
creating a drastically altered demographic structure in which older people
increasingly overmatched the young, in populations that were no longer
reproducing themselves. The situation was particularly dramatic in Japan,
where overall population levels began to decline rapidly after 2012 while a
full third of the population was over 60. But South Korea, many Western
European countries and the United States also had birth rates below popu-
lation reproduction needs. The Chinese government worried actively about
the declining number of young people and the rise of retirees.
This was a new situation in human history. Societies had experienced
population declines before – it had not usually been a good sign – but never
with a comparable growth in the old age sector. A number of responses
were being sketched. Some societies, like the United States, eased earlier
retirement age laws, allowing more old people to work – though the
response was not massive. Japan led the way in the use of robots to replace
human effort – even serving as hotel staff. Several Western societies com-
pensated, intentionally or not, through more immigration, and even the
Japanese increased their quotas a bit. A number of countries discussed ways
to reverse the birth rate trends. The Chinese government eased the one-
child-per family policy, but found that few families wanted to change their
behavior: housing costs, parental work commitments and other impedi-
ments would not be easily reversed. Large families no longer constituted a
widespread goal – another feature of global industrial society.
The result, again, was another set of open-ended issues for the near
future, offering interesting challenges for social innovation that were quite
different from the trends that had preoccupied industrial societies since the
early 19th century.
Environmental Change
Human impact on the environment is an old historical topic, already given
new dimensions with industrialization. But the intensity of environmental
change taking shape by the second decade of the new century had no real
precedent in the past, at the global level. Global warming, long predicted,
began to have measurable effects on daily human life, as factories, auto-
mobiles, and changes in human habits steadily shifted the balance between
carbon dioxide and oxygen in the atmosphere – the “greenhouse effect.”
Other problems threatened as well, including the massive rise in plastic
debris in the oceans – particularly the Pacific.
Several years in the second decade of the 21st century were the hottest
on record. Temperature changes made storms more severe in many places –
as in the hurricane season in the Atlantic or amid typhoons in the Pacific.
Extensive droughts afflicted parts of Africa, Australia, the United States
southwest. Rising ocean levels threatened coasts and islands, and already
began to force some population movement in places like Alaska. Melting
glaciers not only added to the oceans, but also threatened water supply to
many populations – the melting of glaciers in the Himalayas was particularly
threatening to parts of Asia.
Human response began to accelerate as well. The Netherlands, with 20% of
its land beneath sea level, introduced dramatic new experiments, using massive
basins to control tide surges. Use of solar and wind power expanded in many
areas, with costs increasingly competitive with carbon-based fuels. Regional
disparities complicated the picture, a familiar theme: industrial nations simply
had more money to spend on new energy sources and other adaptations.
International discussions continued as well, beyond the earlier Kyoto
accords. A major climate pact in Paris, in 2016, won signatures from 196
nations, suggesting greater unity among advanced industrial nations and
others; the pact hoped to limit global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees
Celsius over preindustrial levels. And regular international discussions con-
tinued thereafter.
Still, there were huge questions. The Paris accord had no enforcement
mechanism. China, serious about pollution curbs at home, continued to
export coal-burning systems to less developed countries. German leaders,
also sincere, had a hard time limiting coal use. The United States pulled out
of the agreement altogether, though later rejoined. On the other hand,
commitments to shift toward electric automobiles accelerated, with General
Motors announcing in 2021 a full conversion by 2035. Several European
countries began to install a new generation of gigantic wind turbines. A
number of nations, including China, saw new economic opportunities in
climate-friendly technologies.
Without doubt, environmental change and efforts to respond were high
on the agenda for the near future. The result was another set of vital ques-
tions: would adjustments prove adequate? How much change in lifestyles
would be required? Would regional differences in capacities and levels of
concern ease or intensify?
Conclusion
Recent world history has no conclusion; it keeps rolling along. The trends
that have taken shape over the past quarter century may well portend dra-
matic new directions for the future. On the other hand, they have also
involved some themes already familiar in modern history, including regional
responses that reflect even older traditions. World history, and its most
recent installment, suggest a variety of patterns to watch going forward,
including the further set of questions about possible disruptions and depar-
tures. The panorama continues, and it is always interesting – to watch, and
to inspire action.
Further Reading
Patrick Kingsley, The New Odyssey: The Story of the Twenty-First Century
Refugee Crisis (2017); Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Per-
formance, Political Style, and Representation (2017); John Judis, The Populist
Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Pol-
itics (2016); Barry Gills, ed., Globalization in Crisis (2011); Steven Levitsky
and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (2018); Walter Rosenbaum,
Environmental Politics and Policy, 11th edn. (2019); Jeff Goodell, The Water
Will Come: Rising Seas, Sinking Cities, and the Remaking of the Civilized
World (2017).
On terror, Daniel Sherman and Terry Nardin, eds., Terror, Culture, Politics:
Rethinking 9/11 (2006); see also Richard Antoun, Understanding Funda-
mentalism: Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements, 2nd edn. (2008).
For optimistic renderings of recent history Steven Pinker, Enlightenment
Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress (2018); Charles
Kenny, Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding—And How
We Can Improve the World Even More (2012).
Index
Note: page numbers in italic type refer to Maps; those in bold type refer to Tables.
19th century period see “long” 19th Achebe, Chinua 283

century period (1780–1914) Afghanistan 165, 194, 241, 242,
20th century period see postwar 20th 261, 275, 295, 298, 299,
century period; World War period 308, 309
(1914–1945) Africa 25
21st century period 294–295, 21st century period 298, 305, 309
301–302, 315 early modern period 83, 89,
authoritarianism 296, 301, 305, 99, 101
311–312 “long” 19th century period 155, 157,
balance of power 310–311 158, 169, 172, 182
Covid-19 pandemic 306–308 Mongol period 72, 80
environment 314–315 postclassical period 57, 59, 68
global ageing 313–314 postwar 20th century period 241,
global trends 302–304 249, 257, 260
globalization 304–306 World War period 215, 223, 233
immigration 309–310 African National Congress 233, 254
information technology and social African Union 266, 282
media 313 Afrikaners 233
regional analysis 295 ageing societies 147, 313–314
Central America region 300, Agricultural Age (3500 BCE – 500 CE)
308, 309 8, 13, 82, 131, 138
Central Asia region 298 agricultural societies 2, 7
East Asia region 297–298 and civilization 29
Eastern Europe region 296–297 common features of 19–24
Latin America region 300, 305 and industrialization 138
Middle East and North Africa nature of 13–15, 14, 16, 17–26
region 295–296, 309, 311 origins and spread of agriculture 15,
South Asia region 298–299, 303 16, 17
Southeast Asia region 298–299 parameters of 24–25
Sub-Saharan Africa region 300–301 rationale for 17–19
war and terrorism 308–309 Ahmad, Muhammad 204
AIDS epidemic 281, 301, 306
Abd al-Wahab, Muhammad ibn 124 air pollution 151–152, 258, 259
abolitionism 158–161 air travel 243
see also slavery Akhbar, Mughal emperor 125
abortion 260 Alaska 116, 194
absolute monarchy 108, 118 Alexander the Great 36, 43, 45
318 Index
Algeria: postwar 20th century period 240,
“long” 19th century period 170, 205 249, 250
postwar 20th century period 254, astronomy 104
289, 290 Atatürk, Kemal 225
Ali, Muhammad 20, 175 “Atlantic revolutions” 183
Alibaba 304 atomic warfare see nuclear weapons
al-Qaeda 308 Aurangzeb, Mughal emperor 125
Amazon (company) 304 Australia 6, 14, 17, 84
Amazon rainforest 258, 300 21st century period 299
American Civil War 151, 160, 185, 191 early modern period 82
American Revolution 164, 179 “long” 19th century period 156, 163,
American War of Independence 183 169, 187, 188
Americas, the 14 postwar 20th century period 241,
early modern period 82, 83, 84, 86 250, 272, 273
“long” 19th century period 154, World War period 215, 228
161, 163 Austria:
Mongol period 72 early modern period 122
postclassical period 67 “long” 19th century period 210–211
Amnesty International 244, 248 postwar 20th century period 240, 262
analogies, in history 2–3 World War period 214, 218, 228
anarchist movement, Russia 197 Austria-Hungary 193, 194, 210, 211,
anasthesia, discovery of 185 214, 218
Angola 120, 169 authoritarianism:
animals see domestic animals 21st century period 296, 301, 305,
animist religions 284 311–312
Arab Caliphate 63, 67, 69, 73, 76 postwar 20th century period 279
“Arab Golden Age” 50, 69 World War period 224–227, 231
Arab League 266, 290 automobiles 155, 244
Arabic language 5 Azerbaijan 276, 308
Arab-Islamic civilization 31 Aztecs 72, 87, 109
Argentina:
“long” 19th century period 156, 187, “baby boom” 249
191, 192 Bahrain 295–296
Peronism 227 balance of power, 21st century period
postwar 20th century period 262, 310–311
278, 279 Balkans:
Aristotle 31, 47 early modern period 114
Armenia 52, 219, 276, 308 “long” 19th century period 205, 210
artistic culture 148 postclassical period 52, 65
early civilization period 33 postwar 20th century period 265
early modern period 102, 120, Baltic 116, 218, 240, 275
125, 127 Banerjee, Surendranath 202
“long” 19th century 173, 192 Bangladesh 285, 286
Mongol period 72, 77 Bantu people 5, 64
postclassical period 55, 64, 68 baseball 173
postwar 20th century period basketball 246
272–273, 274, 277 beauty pageants 247
World War period 222 Beijing, China 102
Asante state 120 Belarus:
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 21st century period 297, 312
Nations) 266, 286 postwar 20th century period 262,
Asia 20–21 275, 276
early modern period 83, 99, 101 Belgium 161, 170, 183
“long” 19th century period 162 Belt and Road program, China 46, 298
Index 319
Benin 72 postwar 20th century period 285
Berlin Wall 240, 242, 275 World War period 227
birthday celebrations 246–247 see also Myanmar
Black Death 77–78 business organization 82, 91, 235, 268
Black Lives Matter movement 299, Byzantine Empire 45, 49, 76, 79, 80,
304–305 114, 121
Black Sea 15 postclassical period 52, 57, 59, 65, 69
Boer War 198 Byzantium 44
Boers, South Africa 121
Boko Haram 301 Calvin, Jean 102–103
Bolivar, Simon de 189, 191 Cambodia 286
Bolivia 278 Canada 6, 84
Bollywood 246, 288 21st century period 300, 309
Bolsheviks 197, 221 “long” 19th century period 156, 157,
Borneo 170 169, 188
Bosnia 277 postwar 20th century period 241,
Bosnia-Herzegovina 277 250, 272
Botswana 281 World War period 215
Boxer Rebellion 207 canals 138, 157
Brahmans 40, 41 cannon see military technology
Brazil 135, 151, 161 carbon dioxide emissions 259
21st century period 300, 312 Caribbean:
early modern period 111 early modern period 86, 110, 112
“long” 19th century period 160, 161, “long” 19th century period 191
162, 187, 189 postwar 20th century period 250,
262, 278, 280 Carter, Jimmy 279
World War period 229 caste system, India 41, 47, 48, 287
Brexit 299–300, 305, 310 Castro, Fidel 279
Britain 84, 87, 91, 96 Catherine the Great, of Russia 119
21st century period 299–300, 305 Catholic Christianity 5, 79
Brexit 299–300, 305, 310 early modern period 101, 102, 103,
and the Covid-19 pandemic 307 107, 109, 110, 111, 112
early modern period 87, 91, 92, “long” 19th century period 185, 194
95–96, 101, 107–108, 110, 121, 125 postclassical period 54, 66, 67–68
“long” 19th century period 135, 136, postwar 20th century period 260,
137–138, 139, 140–141, 155, 156, 271, 278, 280, 284
158, 159, 160, 161, 165, 169, 170, World War period 231
171, 172, 183, 186, 198, 205, 206, see also Christianity
210, 211 cellphones 304
postwar 20th century period 240, see also Internet
242, 250, 253, 257, 273 Central America region 15
World War period 215, 218, 219, 21st century period 300, 308, 309
220, 228 classical period 35
Brunei 305 early civilization period 32
bubonic plague 44, 77–78 early modern period 110, 113
Buddhism 36, 41 “long” 19th century period 162,
classical period 41, 42, 46 191, 193
Mongol period 75 Mongol period 72
postclassical period 51, 52, 53–54, 56, postclassical period 67
60, 62, 68 postwar 20th century period 266, 280
postwar 20th century period 268 Central Asia region 6, 15, 17, 46
Burma: 21st century period 298
“long” 19th century period 170 classical period 44
320 Index
early modern period 89, 115–116 postwar 20th century period 241, 242,
“long” 19th century period 194 244, 248–249, 256, 257, 258, 259,
Mongol period 71 260, 263, 267, 269–270, 273, 291
postclassical period 52, 53 World War period 215, 220, 227, 230
postwar 20th century period 263, 275 chinaware 92
Central Europe: Chinese Nationalist Party 227
Mongol period 73 Chingiss Khan 73
see also East-Central Europe chocolate trade 90, 92
Charlemagne 66 Christianity 33
Chavez, Hugo 280, 300 classical period 43–44, 45, 49
Chechnya 276 early modern period 99, 106, 120,
Chernobyl nuclear power disaster, 128, 129
1986 259 “long” 19th century period 172, 185,
child labor: 200, 201
21st century period 303 Mongol period 75
early modern period 93 postclassical period 51, 52, 54, 56, 65,
and industrialization 145–146 66, 67–68
postwar 20th century period 248, see also Catholic Christianity;
260, 288 Methodism; Orthodox Christianity;
child marriages: Protestant Christianity
21st century period 303 Christmas 246
early modern period 125 Church of England 103
“long” 19th century period 201 see also Christianity; Protestant
postclassical period 56 Christianity
postwar 20th century period 261, 288 cities:
children: agricultural societies 21
21st century period 303 early civilization period 29, 30
and industrialization 145–146 early modern period 102, 117
infant mortality 147, 162, 188 “long” 19th century period 196
infanticide 23, 30, 47, 56 postclassical period 59
postwar 20th century period 248, postwar 20th century period 258,
260–261 279, 289
Chile 279 see also urbanization
China 3, 5, 15, 21, 194, 221 civil liberties 185
21st century period 295, 297, 300, see also human rights; racial justice
304, 305, 308, 310–311, 312, 313, movements
314, 315 civil rights movement, US 272
classical period 7, 35, 36, 38–40, 44, civilization:
45–46 definitions and characteristics 29–32
and the Covid-19 pandemic 307, 308 emergence of 28–29
Cultural Revolution 270, 286 see also early civilization period
demography 89, 147 classical period (800 BCE to c. 500 CE)
early civilization period 32, 33 7, 8, 35, 37
early modern period 83–84, 89, 90, comparisons and legacies 46–49
92, 95, 102, 116, 126–128 decline and fall 44–45
“Great Leap Forward” 256, 270 first contact beyond the regions 45–46
industrialization 135, 137, 139, 144 highlights 38
“long” 19th century period 156, 157, overview and characteristics 35–36, 37
163, 165, 169, 172, 177, 182, regional analysis
206–207, 209 Central America region 35
Mongol period 71, 73, 75, 76, 77, 80 Central Asia region 44
postclassical period 51, 52, 57, 59, 60, Mediterranean region 7, 35,
61–62, 68, 69 42–44, 45, 49
Index 321
Middle East and North Africa Cuba:
region 35 21st century period 300
“long” 19th century period 160,
climate change 151–152, 259, 314 161, 192
clocks and timekeeping: postwar 20th century period 241,
early civilization period 32 262, 279
early modern period 90, 128 Cuban missile crisis 242
and industrialization 142
“long” 19th century period 154, Cultural Revolution, China 270, 286
155, 200 Czech regions:
coal production and trade 139, 140 “long” 19th century period 193–194
coffee production and trade 92, 155 Czechoslovakia 219, 224, 228, 276
Cold War 239, 240–243, 253, 262
Colombia 157, 280, 300 da Gama, Vasco 79, 80
Colombian exchange, early modern Daoism 38, 39, 40, 48, 51
period 85, 86, 89 Darwin, Charles 167–168
colonialism see Western imperialism decolonization 5, 9, 239, 241, 242, 251,
Colston, Edward 87 252, 253–255
Columbus, Christopher 79, 83, 84 deforestation 96, 151, 258
commercial companies see business Delhi Sultanate, India 72
organization democracy:
Common Market 262 classical period 43, 49
communications technology 150, 157, early modern period 111–112
235, 243 and industrialization 145–146, 150
see also Internet postwar 20th century period 262–263
commuting 143 World War period 224, 225, 231
Confucianism 3, 4–5, 36, 38–39, 40, demography and population:
47, 48, 56 21st century period 301, 313–314
Congo 161, 170, 282, 301 agricultural societies 18
Congress of Vienna 193 demographic transition 147, 249
Congress Party, India 232–233, 287 early modern period 89
conscientious objectors 216 and industrialization 139
Constantine, Emperor 43–44, 44–45, 54 “long” 19th century period 161–162,
Constantinople 44, 79, 122 162, 188
consumerism: postwar 20th century period 249,
21st century period 303–304 260, 270, 271–272, 290
early modern period 91–92, 97 World War period 214
and industrialization 143, 145 Denmark 87, 272, 310
“long” 19th century period 186, 188 department stores 138, 143, 173
postwar 20th century period Descartes, R. 104
245–246, 258, 271, 288 diamond production and trade 167
World War period 213 Díaz, Porfirio 191
Copernicus, Nicolaus 104 disease:
Costa Rica 278, 280 21st century period 301
cotton production and trade agricultural societies 17
137–138, 155 early modern period 85, 86
Covid-19 pandemic 306–308 “long” 19th century period 165
craft guilds 25 Mongol period 77–78
Creoles, Latin America 110, 189, see also medicine; public health
190, 192 Disney 246
Crimea 77, 296, 297 dodo bird 96
Crimean War 160, 194, 195, 196 domestic animals 14, 17, 20, 88–89
Croatia 276–277 domestic manufacturing, early modern
Crusades 56, 60, 68 period 90, 101
322 Index
drug trade 280 see also Germany
Drumont, Henry 176 East India companies 91, 96, 125, 201
Dutch East India Company 91 East Timor (Timor-Leste) 298
East-Central Europe:
early civilization period 8, 28–29 21st century period 298, 305, 310
definitions and characteristics 29–32 early modern period 116
legacies 32–33 “long” 19th century period 194
regional analysis Mongol period 71
Central America region 32 postwar 20th century period 240,
Mediterranean region 31 242, 262, 274, 276
Middle East and North Africa World War period 230
region 32 Eastern Europe region 5
early modern period (1450–1750) 8, 21st century period 296–297
82–83 early modern period 83, 85,
Colombian exchange 85, 86, 89 99, 114
comparisons and legacies 130–131 “long” 19th century period 162,
environment 86, 96–97 182, 193–198
food 88–89 postclassical period 65
key global trends 84–86 postwar 20th century period
legacy 97 273–277
regional analysis 99, 100, 101 World War period 219, 225
Central America region 110, 113 Ebola 301
Central Asia region 89, 115–116 Ecuador 279
East Asia region 126–130 Egypt:
Eastern Europe region 83, 85, 21st century period 295–296, 305
99, 114 early civilization period 30, 31, 32,
Latin America region 93, 94, 96, 33, 42
99, 101, 109–114 early modern period 122
Middle East and North Africa industrialization 141
region 83, 87, 89, 92, 95, 99, “long” 19th century period 157,
121–124 203–204
Southeast Asia region 89, 95 Mongol period 73
Sub-Saharan Africa region 119–121 postwar 20th century period 241,
regional inequality 93–96 254, 285, 289, 290
role of the West 83–84 World War period 232
slavery 84, 85, 86, 87–88, 93, 97 Emancipation of the Serfs, 1861,
world economy 89–93 Russia 195–196
East Africa: empires:
early modern period 89–90 classical period 36
“long” 19th century period 198–199 England:
postclassical period 59 monarchy 66, 77
postwar 20th century period 281 see also Britain
trade 59, 89–90 English language 245
East Asia region 5, 14 Enlightenment 5, 105–106, 109, 130,
21st century period 297–298 140, 159, 189
and the Covid-19 pandemic 307 entertainment industries 144, 246
early modern period 126–130 environment:
industrialization 148–149 21st century period 314–315
“long” 19th century period 206–209 classical period 35
Mongol period 76, 78 climate change 151–152, 259, 314
postclassical period 61–62 early modern period 86, 96–97
postwar 20th century period 249, and industrialization 151–152
267–270, 273 postwar 20th century period 239,
East Germany 275 258–259, 263, 271, 292
Index 323
Ethiopia: 21st century period 299
21st century period 300–301 early modern period 87, 91, 95, 96,
early modern period 120 107, 108, 110, 125
“long” 19th century period 165, 170 “long” 19th century period 157,
postclassical period 52 165, 169, 170, 171, 183, 185,
postwar 20th century period 283 187, 191, 192, 205, 210, 211
religion 52 postwar 20th century period 240,
ethnic cleansing 277 242, 250, 253, 254, 271, 273
EU (European Union) 262, 265, 266, World War period 214, 218, 219,
276, 279, 297, 299–300, 305 220, 224, 228, 229, 230, 234–235
21st century period 309, 310 French Revolution, 1789 159, 160,
Brexit 299–300, 305, 310 179, 183, 184
and the Covid-19 pandemic 307 fur trade 90, 92, 117
Euro currency 265
Europe 15, 18, 20–21, 77–78 Gandhi, Indira 261
early modern period 89–90 Gandhi, Mohandas 232, 233, 253, 287
see also Central Europe region; Garcia Marquez, G. 280
Eastern Europe region; EU gay rights 271, 272, 305
(European Union); Western gender relations 2, 15, 168
Europe region 21st century period 303, 305
European Union (EU) see EU Agricultural Age legacies 25–26
(European Union) agricultural societies 18, 23–24
evolution, theory of 167–168, 185 early modern period 131
explosives see military technology and industrialization 145, 147–148
extinction, of wildlife 96 “long” 19th century period 172,
183, 188, 192, 202, 208
Facebook 304 postclassical period 51, 56, 61, 63, 64
factory system 138 postwar 20th century period 248,
Falkland Islands (Malvinas islands) 279 255, 261–262, 271–272, 279, 290,
families: 291
in agricultural societies 22–23, 24 World War period 222–223, 230–231
early modern period 103, 112 General Motors 315
and industrialization 144–147 Geneva Convention 176
“long” 19th century 192 genocide:
postwar 20th century period Cambodia 286
272, 284 Herero people 168
Farsi (Persian) language 5, 123 Holocaust 226, 228–229, 230
fascism 225–227, 236 Kosovo 277
fast food restaurants 245–246 Rwanda 282, 283
feminism: Georgia 276, 297
“long” 19th century period 177, germ theory 185
186–187, 195 Germany:
postwar 20th century period 21st century period 309
271–272, 283 early modern period 107
World War period 213 environment issues 315
feudalism 20–21 “long” 19th century period 158,
fishing 96 168, 169, 170, 171, 179, 183,
flying shuttles 137 185, 186, 210, 211
food production and trade: postwar 20th century period 240,
early modern period 88–89 243, 250, 262, 271, 273
“long” 19th century period 155, 162 reunification 242, 275
footbinding of women, in China 61, World War period 214, 215, 216,
62, 172, 177, 221, 269 218, 219, 220, 224, 225–226, 229,
France 66, 77, 84, 87, 91 230, 235
324 Index
Ghana 254, 281–282 Gulf States 289
“Global South” 256 guns see military technology
global warming 151–152, 259, 314 Gupta empire, India 42, 44, 63
globalization 8, 9, 10
21st century period 301, 304–306 Habsburg Empire 107, 193
and the Covid-19 pandemic 307 Haiti 159–160
“long” 19th century period 154, Halloween 246
172–178, 181 Han dynasty, China 36, 39, 40, 44, 48
postclassical period (600–1200) handguns see military technology
50, 60 Hawaii 86, 116, 170, 255
postwar 20th century period 239, Hebrew language 5
242, 243–244, 263 Hellenistic period 43
cultural globalization 245–247 Herero people 168
and human rights 247–249, 261 Hideyoshi 129
and migration 249–251 Hinduism 4–5
“proto-globalization” 83 classical period 40–41, 42, 46, 47–48
gold trade 59, 111 early modern period 124–125, 126
Gorbachev, Mikhail 275 “long” 19th century period 201
governments and politics: postclassical period 53, 68, 73
classical period 39, 43, 47 Hitler, Adolf 226, 227–228, 229, 235
early civilization period 29, 30, Ho Chi Minh 233, 253
32, 33 Holland:
early modern period 101, 105–106, early modern period 87, 91, 95, 101,
106–108, 110, 117, 122, 128–129 107, 108, 110
and industrialization 149–150 “long” 19th century period 169, 203
“long” 19th century period 185 homo sapiens sapiens, emergence and
postclassical period 51, 56–57, 66 early migrations of 13–15, 14
postwar 20th century period 261, Hong Kong 170, 221, 256, 269, 298
262–263, 282–283 Hoover, Herbert 236
World War period 215–216, 224 Hudson’s Bay Company 91
grain crops, origins and spread of 15 human rights:
gravity 104 21st century period 305–306
“Great Leap Forward,” China 256, 270 and globalization 247–249, 261
Great Recession, 2008 305, 310, 312 “long” 19th century period 159,
Great Recession of 2008 230 176–177, 183
“great traditions” 4–5, 45 Organization for African Unity
Great Wall, China 76, 78 charter 266
Greece: postwar 20th century period
21st century period 309 244–245, 261, 270, 271
classical period 5, 7, 20, 36, 43 human species, emergence and early
early civilization period 31, 33 migrations of 13–15, 14
“long” 19th century period 180, humanitarianism 235–236
195, 205 Hungary:
postwar 20th century period 240, 21st century period 297, 300, 311
262 early modern period 114
World War period 219 “long” 19th century period 183,
Green Belt movement 283 185, 193–194
“Green Revolution” 236, 256, 285 postwar 20th century period
“greenhouse effect” 314 275, 277
see also global warming World War period 218, 219, 227
Greenwich, England 174 hunting and gathering societies 7, 15,
Gregg, Marie 177 17, 18, 28
Group of 7 310 see also emergence and early
Guatemala 278 migrations of; human species
Index 325
Ibd Saud 124 cultural changes 148–149
Ibn Battuta 72 definition 137–138
immigration see migration demography 145–146
imperialism see Western imperialism environment 151–152
Incas 29, 72, 109, 113 family life 144–147
India 3, 5 gender relations 147–148
21st century period 298–299, 300, government and politics 149–1150
302, 305, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312 legacy 152
Agricultural Age legacies 25 postwar 20th century period 239,
classical period 7, 35, 36, 40–42, 44, 255–258, 263
46–47 regional stages of 135, 136
early modern period 95–96, 99, social structure 141–142
124–126 warfare 152
industrialization 135, 139, 147 work and leisure 142–144
“long” 19th century period 163, World War period 214, 222
169, 172, 180, 194, 201–203 “industrious revolution” 82
Mongol period 72–73 infant mortality 147, 162, 188
postclassical period 52–53, 59, 68, 73 infanticide 23, 30, 47, 56
postwar 20th century period 241, information technology:
246, 247, 250, 253, 256, 257, 21st century period 313
258, 260, 261, 262, 269, 285, see also communications technology;
286, 287–288, 291 Internet
World War period 215, 229, INGOs (international non-governmental
232–233, 236 organizations) 176, 244–245, 248
see also South Asia region intellectual property 174
Indian Association 202 International Association of Women 177
Indian Mutiny 1857 202 International Court 306
Indian National Congress 202 International Labor Office 235
indigenous people: International Meteorological
early modern period 84, 85, 86, Association 174
109, 113 International Monetary Fund
“long” 19th century period 188, 243, 244
191, 193 International Red Cross/Red
postwar 20th century period Crescent 176
272, 279 international trade fairs 158
individualism 106 Internet 243, 305
Indochina 170, 227 online shopping 304
Indo-European languages 15 Iran:
Indonesia: 21st century period 296
21st century period 298 postwar 20th century period 260,
early modern period 83 275, 289, 290
“long” 19th century period 169, Iraq 28, 273
170, 203 21st century period 295, 308, 309
Mongol period 71 postwar 20th century period 263
postclassical period 53 World War period 219
postwar 20th century period 253, “Iron Curtain” 274
262, 285 ISIS 308–309
World War period 233, 236 Islam 5, 33
Indus river valley civilization 32 21st century period 295–296, 309
Industrial Age 8–9 early modern period 120, 121–126
industrialization/industrial societies 7, 8, Islamic fundamentalism 290, 291, 301
9, 135–137, 196, 208–209, 210 “long” 19th century period 200,
Agricultural Age legacies 25–26 203, 204–205
causation 138–141 Mongol period 72, 75
326 Index
postclassical period 50, 51–53, Jordan 231, 289, 290
54–55, 56, 57, 63, 64–65, 67, 68 Judaism 33, 51
postwar 20th century period 284,
288, 290–291 Kashmir 286, 299
Shiite 55, 123–124, 289, 296 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928 220
Sunni 55, 123–124, 286, 289, 296 Kenya:
Wahabism 124, 289 21st century period 301, 304
Islamic terrorism 295, 298, 299, “long” 19th century period 200
308–309 postwar 20th century period 262,
Israel 253–254, 256, 262, 288, 290, 282–283
296, 308, 309 World War period 234
Istafan, Persia 123 Kenyatta, Jomo 234
Istanbul 122, 289 Khmer Rouge 286
Italy: Kim Il-sung 268
21st century period 309 Kipling, Rudyard 157
early modern period 107 Korea 5
“long” 19th century period 165, “long” 19th century period 156,
169, 170, 176, 179, 183, 185, 159, 170, 209
187, 205 postclassical period 52, 57, 62
postwar 20th century period postwar 20th century period 240,
262, 271 253, 268
Renaissance 77 World War period 230
World War period 214, 216, 219, see also North Korea; South Korea
224, 225–226, 229 Korean War 273
Kosovo 277
Jainism 41, 42 Kremlin, Russia 115
Japan 5, 6, 194 Ku Klux Klan 161
21st century period 297, 313, 314 Kubilai Khan 77
classical period 49 Kurdish people 255
and the Covid-19 pandemic 307 Kuwait 273, 289
demographic transition 147 Kyoto environment conference, 1997
early modern period 83, 94, 99, 259, 315
128–130
industrialization 135, 136, 137, 145, labor organizations see trade unions
147, 149, 152 labor systems:
“long” 19th century period 155, agricultural societies 19–21
156, 157, 163, 165, 169, 170, early modern period 92–93, 111
176, 180, 182, 198, 207–209 emancipated slaves 160–161
Mongol period 71, 73, 75, 76 and industrialization 142–144,
postclassical period 52, 57, 62 144–145
postwar 20th century period 240, “long” 19th century period 154,
241, 243, 247, 249, 250, 253, 158–161, 162
255, 256, 259, 262, 267, 268 land, in agricultural societies 21–22
World War period 214, 215, 216, Latin America region 6
218, 220, 223, 224, 227, 228, 21st century period 300, 305
229, 230, 233, 234 early modern period 93, 94, 96, 99,
Jesuits 103 101, 109–114
Jewish communities 32 “long” 19th century period 155,
early modern period 114, 117 157, 158, 160, 164, 165, 167,
“long” 19th century period 163, 197 169, 179–180, 182, 189–193, 190
persecution of 54, 197 postwar 20th century period 249,
Holocaust 226, 228–229, 230 256, 260, 262, 277–280, 283
postclassical period 54 World War period 223, 224,
see also Israel 225, 229
Index 327
League of Nations 219–220, 227, 231, postwar 20th century period 256, 285
234, 235 World War period 227
Lebanon 295, 296 Mali 64
leisure, and industrialization 142–144 Mandarin language 39
Lenin, Vladimir 197, 216, 221–222 “Mandate from Heaven” 38, 127
Liberal Democrats, Japan 268 Mandela, Nelson 254, 262, 283, 305
liberalism 106 manorialism 20–21
Liberation Theology 278, 280 Mansa Mula 72
Liberia 170, 282 Mao Zedong 221, 269, 270
Libya 205, 289, 296 Maori people, New Zealand 188
literacy 102, 103, 106 Marco Polo 77
“Little Tigers” 286 Marshall Plan 271
Locke, John 104–105 Marx, Karl 177, 186
London, Britain 102 Marxism 195, 197, 233, 285
“long” 19th century period mathematics 42, 48, 60, 69, 104
(1780–1914) 8–9, 154 Maurya dynasty, India 42
abolitionism 158–161 Mayan civilization 32, 67
clouds of war 210–211 McDonald’s 245, 246, 275
demography 161–162, 162 medicine 42
globalization 154, 172–178 see also disease; public health
immigration 162–163 Mediterranean region:
legacies 180–181 classical period 7, 35, 42–44, 45, 49
nationalism 178–180 early civilization period 31
regional analysis 182 “great traditions” 5
Central America region 162, Meiji regime, Japan 207
191, 193 mercantilism 108, 165, 167
Central Asia region 194 Mesopotamia 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 42
East Asia region 206–209 metalworking 28, 35, 42
Eastern Europe region 162, 182, meteorology 174
193–198 Methodism 106, 159
Latin America region 155, 157, see also Christianity
158, 160, 164, 165, 167, 169, Mexico:
179–180, 182, 189–193, 190 21st century period 300, 309
South Asia region 182 early modern period 111, 113
Southeast Asia region 170, 182, 203 industrialization 135
Sub-Saharan Africa region 170, “long” 19th century period 156,
198–201 177, 189, 191, 193
Western imperialism 154, 164–165, Mexican Revolution 220–221,
166, 169–170 225, 231
consequences of 171–172 postwar 20th century period 244,
motivations for 165, 167–169 257, 262, 278, 279, 280
world economy 154–156 Middle Ages 50
Louis XIV, King of France 108 Middle East and North Africa region 5,
l’Ouverture, Toussaint 159 14, 32
Luther, Martin 102 21st century period 295–296, 309, 311
lynchings 230 classical period 35
early modern period 83, 87, 89, 92,
Maathai, Wangari 283 95, 99, 121–124
Macau 95, 221 “long” 19th century period 155,
MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) 241 160, 163, 165, 170, 182, 187,
Malay peninsula 53 203–206
Malaysia: Mongol period 71, 73, 76
“long” 19th century period 170, 203 aftermath 78–79
328 Index
postclassical period 50, 52, 56, 60, military technology 71, 75, 79, 80
63–64, 67, 68 regions outside the Mongol orbit
253–254, 263, 266, 288–291, “Monroe doctrine” 191
291–292 Morocco:
World War period 214, 216, 219, “long” 19th century period 170,
229, 232 171, 205
“Middle Kingdom, “China 39 postwar 20th century period 289
migration 309–310 Moscow, Russia 117
21st century period 301, 309–310 Mother’s Day 246
classical period 35 movies 246, 288, 304
early humans 13–15, 14 Mughal empire 95, 124–126
“long” 19th century period multinational corporations 244, 257
162–163, 173, 187 Muslim League 232, 233
postwar 20th century period Mussolini, Benito 226, 228
249–251, 280 Mutsuhito, Emperor of Japan 207
and racism 230 Mutually Assured Destruction
military power: (MAD) 241
air power, World War II 229 Myanmar 244, 298
China 39 see also Burma
classical period 39, 47
and industrialization 151, 152 Nagasaki, Japan 129
World War period 213, 220 Napoleon 164, 184, 189
military technology: Napoleonic Wars 193
early modern period 90, 99, 127 nation states 108
and industrialization 151 nationalism 169
“long” 19th century period and the Covid-19 pandemic 307
154–155, 164–165 early modern period 108
Mongol period 71, 75, 79, 80 “long” 19th century period
Ming dynasty, China 76, 78, 178–180, 181, 182, 183, 185,
126–127, 128 194, 200–201
Modi, Narendra 299, 302 postwar 20th century period 253
monarchies: NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
early modern period 107, 108 Organization) 241, 242–243, 276,
and industrialization 150 277, 297
“long” 19th century period 194 navigations technologies 20, 57, 79, 82
Mongol period 77 Nazi Germany 226, 227–228, 230,
postclassical period 66 234, 236
postwar 20th century period 289 Neanderthals 14
World War period 225, 231–232 Nestlé 245
Mongol period: Netflix 304
regional analysis Netherlands 107
Central America region 72 see also Holland
Central Asia region 71 “new conservatism” 273
East Asia region 76, 78 New Deal 224
Middle East and North Africa New Russians 276
region 71, 73, 76, 78–79 New Zealand 6, 84
South Asia region 73 and the Covid-19 pandemic 307
Southeast Asia region 72–73, 78 “long” 19th century period 156,
Mongol period (1200–1450) 8, 71, 73, 163, 169, 187, 188
74, 75, 121 postwar 20th century period 241, 273
aftermath of 78–80 World War period 215
disease and labor 77–78 Newton, Isaac 104
legacy 80–81 Nicaragua 279
Index 329
Nigeria 198, 200, 262, 281, 282, 301 World War period 214, 215, 218–219
Nike 245 Owens, Jesse 235
Nkrumah, Kwame 282 ozone layer 259
nomadic societies 17, 28
“noncivilizations” 31 Pacific Oceania region 6, 82, 86,
North America 17, 18 135, 170
early modern period 95, 99, 109 Pacific Rim 268–269
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Pact of Paris, 1928 220
(NATO) 241, 242–243, 276, 277, Pakistan 233
297 21st century period 298–299,
North Korea: 308, 309
21st century period 297 postwar 20th century period 253,
postwar 20th century period 240, 261, 286–287
242, 244, 267, 268 Palestine 219, 253–254, 296
see also Korea Pan-African Congress 233
Norway 228 Panama 280
nuclear energy 259, 297 Panama Canal 157, 165
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, paper technology 39, 59–60
1968 242, 286 Paraguay 192
nuclear weapons 229, 231, 241, 269, Paris Convention on Intellectual
273, 274, 286, 295 Property, 1883 174
numbering systems 60 Paris environment conference,
Nyerere, Julius 283 2016 315
Paris, France 102
OAS (Organization of American States) Pasteur, Louis 185
265–266 patriarchy:
oil industry 155, 289, 296, 297 in agricultural societies 23–24, 25–26
oil pollution 259 see also gender relations
Olmecs (1500–800 BCE) 32 Pax Sinica 39
Olympic Games 173, 188, 235, 275 Pearl Harbor 227
online shopping 304 People’s Liberation Army, China 269
OPEC 290 People’s Party, Turkey 225
opium trade 206 Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Opium War, 1839 156, 157 1899 176
optics, science of 103 Peronism 227, 278
Organization for African Unity 266 Persia 7, 43
Organization of American States (OAS) Persian empire 35
265–266 Peru 279
Orthodox Christianity 5 Peter the Great, of Russia 116,
21st century period 296–297 118–119
early modern period 114–115, 116 Philippines:
“long” 19th century period 194 21st century period 298, 306, 311
postclassical period 52, 54, 65, early modern period 83, 89
67–68 “long” 19th century period 163,
postwar 20th century period 276 169, 170
World War period 222 Mongol period 71
see also Christianity postclassical period 53
Ottoman Empire: postwar 20th century period 250,
early modern period 83, 95, 114, 253, 262, 285
116, 119, 121–122, 130 World War period 227, 233
“long” 19th century period 165, philosophy 55, 104
170, 180, 182, 194, 195, Phoenicia 32
203–206, 210, 211 plagues 86
Mongol period 76, 78–79, 80 Plato 36
330 Index
Poland: postwar settlement 239–240
21st century period 297, 311 regional analysis 265–266
early modern period 93, 114, 116, Central America region 266, 280
117, 119 Central Asia region 263, 275
“long” 19th century period 193, 194 East Asia region 249, 267–270, 273
postwar 20th century period 277 Eastern Europe region 273–277
World War period 218, 228 Latin America region 249, 256,
politics see governments and politics 260, 262, 277–280, 283
Polynesian societies 29 Middle East and North Africa
polytheism 33, 43, 47, 51, 200 region 249, 253–254, 263, 266,
popular music: 288–291, 291–292
postwar 20th century period South Asia region 284–285,
246, 272 286–288, 292
population see demography and Southeast Asia region 284–286
population Sub-Saharan Africa region 254,
populism: 262, 280–284, 292
21st century period 300
Portugal 77 poverty 101–102, 302
early modern period 79, 84, 85, 87, press, mass 186
94, 109, 120 printing technology 60, 102
“long” 19th century period 169, 187 Protestant Christianity:
postwar 20th century period 262 early modern period 102–103,
postal services 174 107–108, 109
postclassical period (600–1200) 50–51 Evangelical 280, 291
legacies 67–69 “long” 19th century period 185, 201
regional analysis 60–61 postwar 20th century period 284
Central America region 67 World War period 231
Central Asia region 52, 53 see also Christianity
East Asia region 61–62 “proto-globalization” 83
Eastern Europe region 65 PTSD 215
Middle East and North Africa public health 150, 213
region 50, 52, 56, 60, 63–64, “long” 19th century period 162,
67, 68 175, 180, 185
South Asia region 57, 62–63 Puerto Rico 170
Southeast Asia region 52, 53, 57, purdah 63, 125
62–63 Putin, Vladimir 3, 276, 296, 305
Sub-Saharan Africa region 64–65
Qin dynasty, China 39
“postindustrial society” 271 Qing dynasty, China 126, 128, 206,
postwar 20th century period 9, 239 207
Cold War 239, 240–243, 253, 262 Quakers 159
decolonization 239, 241, 242, 251, quarantining 175
252, 253–255
democracy 262–263 racial justice movements 83, 87
environment 239, 258–259, 263 21st century period 299
global industrialization 239, Britain 250
255–258, 263 civil rights movement, US 272
globalization 239, 242, 243–244, 263 postwar 20th century period 271
cultural globalization 245–247 racism:
and human rights 247–249, 261 and Atlantic slavery 87–88
and migration 249–251 “long” 19th century period 180
industrial society 259–262 and slave emancipation 160–161
international connections 244–245 and the treatment of indigenous
legacies 263, 291–292 people 109
Index 331
and Western imperialism 167–168 Mongol period 73, 76–77, 80, 114
World War period 230 postclassical period 52, 57, 65
railroads 138, 150, 157 postwar 20th century period 242,
Ramadan 246 243, 244, 262, 276
Reagan, Ronald 273 “Westernization” of 117–119
Red Sea Sanitary Service 175 World War period 214, 216,
Reform Act 1832, Britain 183 219, 220
Reformation 115 see also Soviet Union
religions: Russian Revolution, 1905 198
21st century period 296–297, 301 Russian Revolution, 1917 221–222
agricultural societies 18 Rwanda 282, 283
classical period 38–39, 40–41, 42, 48
early modern period 93, 102–103, Safavid Empire, Persia 95, 123
106, 107, 112–113, 114–115, 117 Samarkand 46
and industrialization 149 same-sex partnerships 272
“long” 19th century period 193, 200 Sanskrit language 42
Mongol period 75 sati 63, 125, 201
postclassical period 50, 51–57, 62, Saudi Arabia 263, 289, 290, 296, 308
63, 64–65, 66, 67–68 Scandinavia 57, 159
postwar 20th century period 263, science:
268, 278, 283–284, 286–287, 291 classical period 43
spread and impact of world religions 8 and the Covid-19 pandemic 306
syncretism 112–114 early civilization period 32–33
World War period 213 early modern period 103–105, 127,
see also Buddhism; Christianity; 128–129
Confucianism; Islam; Jainism; and industrialization 148–149
Judaism; polytheism; Shinto “long” 19th century period 174,
religion 185, 196, 202
reparations 218 postclassical period 55, 60, 66–67
representation, “long” 19th century postwar 20th century period 245,
period 183–184 272, 274–275, 288, 289
Rhodes, Cecil 167 Scientific Revolution 5
Rhodesia 254 Second International, 1889 177
roads 138 selfies 313
Rockefeller Foundation 235 Senegal 234, 281
Roman alphabet 43, 47 Senghor, Leopold 234, 281
Roman Empire 3, 7, 20, 36, 43, 44, Serbia:
46, 49, 51 “long” 19th century period 210, 211
Romania 205 postwar 20th century period 277
Roosevelt, Eleanor 248 World War period 214
Royal Society 104 serfdom:
rubber production and trade 203 agricultural societies 20–21
Russia 3, 5 early modern period 93, 94, 101,
21st century period 295, 296–297, 117, 119
300, 303, 305, 308, 309, 311 “long” 19th century period 154,
classical period 49 159, 160, 183, 184, 195–196
and the Covid-19 pandemic 307 Mongol period 78
early modern period 85, 89, 90, 92, postclassical period 51, 66
93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 101, 114–119, Seven Years War, 1756–63 96,
122, 127 108, 125
industrialization 135, 144, 145 sexual harassment 305
“long” 19th century period 155, Shaka 121
157, 160, 163, 165, 169, 170, “shell shock” 215
176, 182, 193–198, 209, 211 Shiite Islam 55, 123–124, 289, 296
332 Index
Shinto religion 208, 268 postwar 20th century period 254,
shipping: 262, 283
agricultural societies 20 World War period 233–234
China 78 South Asia region 5, 15
early modern period 82 21st century period 298–299, 303
“long” 19th century period 157, “great traditions” 4–5
162, 164, 174–175 “long” 19th century period 182
Mongol period 79 Mongol period 73
postclassical period 57 postclassical period 57, 62–63
Siam 233 postwar 20th century period
see also Thailand 284–285, 286–288, 292
Siberia 116 World War period 233
silk production and trade 59 see also India
Silk Roads 45–46 South China Sea 298, 310
silver production and trade 85, 93, 111 South Korea:
Singapore: 21st century period 297, 313
and the Covid-19 pandemic 308 and the Covid-19 pandemic 307
postwar 20th century period postwar 20th century period 240,
248–249, 256, 269, 285 241, 242, 256, 258, 262, 267,
Singles Day 304 268–269
Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson 282 see also Korea
slavery: Southeast Asia region 5
agricultural societies 20, 24 21st century period 298–299
classical period 43, 47, 48 early modern period 89, 95
early modern period 84, 85, 86, 87–88, “long” 19th century period 170,
93, 94, 97, 109, 112, 120, 121 182, 203
“long” 19th century period 154, Mongol period 72–73
155, 177, 182, 184, 188, 198 aftermath 78
abolition and emancipation 26, postclassical period 52, 53, 57, 62–63
158–161 postwar 20th century period 284–286
modern 161 World War period 233
postclassical period 51, 56, 59 Soviet Union:
Slovenia 276–277 21st century period 311
Smith, Adam 139 postwar 20th century period 239,
soccer football 173, 235, 246 240, 259, 262, 269, 273–275,
“sociability gene,” in early humans 14 279, 285
social media 304, 313 Cold War 239, 240–243, 253
social mobility 142 World War period 214, 220,
“social question” 186 221–223, 225, 228, 229,
social reforms, “long” 19th century 234, 236
period 186 see also Russia
social sciences, development of 105 space exploration 241, 298
socialism 210 Spain 77, 79
Socialist Realism 222 early modern period 85, 87, 94, 107,
Socrates 36 109, 110
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr 274 “long” 19th century period 169,
Somalia 301 180, 187, 189
Songhay 72 postclassical period 56
South Africa: postwar 20th century period 262
21st century period 305 World War period 226–227, 228
early modern period 120, 121 Spanish flu, 1918–19 86, 308
“long” 19th century period 165, spice production and trade 59, 90, 203
167, 169, 187 sports 144, 173
Index 333
postwar 20th century period 246, tea production and trade 59, 69, 90
275, 280 technologies:
St. Petersburg, Russia 116, 117 21st century period 303
Stalin, Joseph 222, 234, 274 agricultural societies 20
statues, removal of 83, 87, 167 classical period 35, 39, 43, 47
steam engines 137–138, 139 early civilization period 28–29,
Sub-Saharan Africa region 5 32–33
21st century period 300–301 and early humans 14
demographic transition 147 and industrialization 137–138, 139
early modern period 119–121 postwar 20th century period 271,
“long” 19th century period 170, 274–275
198–201 telegraph 157
postclassical period 64–65 telephones 235, 243
postwar 20th century period 254, cellphones 304
262, 280–284, 292 television 243, 246
Sudan: terrorism 295, 298, 299, 308–309
early modern period 120 textile production and trade:
“long” 19th century period 198, and industrialization 137–138
204–205 “long” 19th century period 155, 202
postwar 20th century period 266, 282 postclassical period 59
Suez Canal 157, 232, 241, 254 Thailand:
Sufism 53, 64, 120 21st century period 312
sugar production and trade 59, 69, 79, “long” 19th century period 170
90, 111 postwar 20th century period 256, 285
Sumerians 29, 30 World War period 233
sumptuary laws 25 Thatcher, Margaret 273
Sun Tzu 39 theme parks 246
Sun Yat-sen 221 “Third World” 255
Sunni Islam 55, 123–124, 286, 289, 296 Thirty Year War, 1618–1648 107
Suu Kyi, Aung Sang 285 Tiananman Square protests, China 270
Swahili language 57, 64 Tibet 52, 127, 269
Sweden 107, 259, 304 Tigris-Euphrates river valley 28
Switzerland 261 time periods:
syncretism 112–114 introduction and overview 4–6
Syria: see also 21st century period; classical
21st century period 295–296, period (800 BCE to c. 500 CE);
308, 309 early civilization period; early
early modern period 122 modern period (1450–1750);
postwar 20th century period 253, 290 Industrial Age; “long” 19th
century period; Mongol period
Taiping rebellion 206 (1200–1450); postclassical period
Taiwan: (600–1200); postwar 20th century
21st century period 305 period; World War period
and the Covid-19 pandemic 307 time zones, standardization of 174–175
postwar 20th century period 253, timekeeping see clocks and
256, 262, 267, 268–269 timekeeping
Taj Mahal 125, 126 Timor-Leste (East Timor) 298
Taliban 261 tobacco production and trade 92
Tang dynasty, China 61–62 Tojo, Hideki 227
Tanzania 283 Tokugawa dynasty, Japan 128, 129, 207
Tanzimat reforms 205 “total war” 216
tariffs, “long” 19th century period tourism 246, 247
156–157 trade:
Tatars 115 classical period 42, 45–47
334 Index
early civilization period 30, 32 “long” 19th century period
early modern period 83–84, 85, 154–155, 156, 157, 158, 160,
88–93, 95–96, 127–128 161, 169, 176, 183, 184, 187,
“long” 19th century period 188, 191
155–156, 158, 163–164, 173 postwar 20th century period 239,
Mongol period 73, 75, 79 240, 243, 248, 250, 254–255,
postclassical period 50, 57, 58, 257, 259, 260, 271, 272, 273,
59–60, 63, 66–67 see also 278, 279, 285, 291–292
globalization Cold War 239, 240–243, 253
trade unions 177, 186, 271 World War period 215, 218, 220,
transportation: 223, 224, 228, 229, 234, 235
and industrialization 138, 139 Universal Declaration of Human
“long” 19th century period 157–158 Rights 248
see also railroads; shipping Universal Postal Union, 1878 174
travel restrictions 234–235 Untouchables (Dalits) 41, 287
Treaty of Tordesillas, 1496 110 urbanization:
Treaty of Vienna, 1815 184–185 and industrialization 136–137, 141,
Treaty of Westphalia, 1648 107, 124 147 see also cities
Trump, Donald 305, 306 Usman dan Fodio 120
“truth commissions” 283
tulip craze, Holland 91 Valentine’s Day 247
Tunisia 205, 295–296 veiling, of women 63, 64, 290
Turkey: Venezuela 280, 300, 311
21st century period 296, 311 Versailles settlements, World War I
industrialization 135 216, 217, 218–220, 226, 228,
postwar 20th century period 241, 232, 236
242, 250, 257, 258, 260, 262, Vietnam 5
289, 290 “long” 19th century period 203
World War period 218–219, 225 Mongol period 73
Turkish language 5 postclassical period 62
Turkish people: postwar 20th century period 247,
early modern period 122 267, 285–286
World War period 233, 236
Uganda: Vietnam War 242, 253, 273
21st century period 301, 305
postwar 20th century period 257, Wahabism 124, 289
282, 283 war crimes tribunals, post-World War
Uighur people 297 II 240
Ukraine: warfare 17
21st century period 296, 297, 308 21st century period 308–309
postclassical period 57 classical period 39
postwar 20th century period 275 early modern period 107, 108, 120
United Arab Emirates 260–261 and industrialization 151
United Nations 243, 244, 248, 251, “long” 19th century period
253, 259, 260, 261, 266, 280, 175–176, 185–186
282, 306 “total war” 216, 231
General Assembly 245 World War period 231
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, see also World War period
1968 242, 286 (1914–1945)
Security Council 245 Warsaw Pact 241
United States 6 waterway pollution 259
21st century period 295, 299, 300, weaponry see military technology
305, 308, 310–311, 314, 315 weather see meteorology
industrialization 135, 137 Wedgewood 92
Index 335
weeks: witchcraft 103
emergence of in agricultural societies Witte, Sergei 197
18–19, 26 women:
weekends 143 21st century period 303, 305
West Africa: Agricultural Age legacies 25–26
artistic culture 64 agricultural societies 18, 23–24
early modern period 88, 94, 120 early modern period 131
“long” 19th century period 170, 198 and industrialization 145, 147–148
Mongol period 72 “long” 19th century period 172,
postclassical period 53, 57, 59, 64 183, 188, 192, 202, 208
postwar 20th century period 254 postclassical period 51, 56, 61, 63, 64
West Germany 275 see also Germany postwar 20th century period 248,
West, the 6 255, 261–262, 271–272, 279,
21st century period 299–300, 310 290, 291
early modern period 83–84, regulation of sexuality in agricultural
101–108, 130 societies 23–24
industrialization 135, 136 World War period 222–223,
“long” 19th century period 182, 230–231 see also gender relations
183–187 work see labor systems
postwar 20th century period 0, working classes, and industrialization 142
239–240, 270–273 see also Workingmen’s International, 1864 177
Western Europe region; Western World Bank 243, 244
imperialism “World Congress,” London, 1840
Western Europe region 5–6 176–177
early modern period 91–92, 94, world economy:
99, 122 early modern period 89–93
industrialization 139, 140–141 “long” 19th century period 154–156
“long” 19th century period 162 World Health Organization 180, 244,
Mongol period 77, 80 245, 306, 307
aftermath 79 world history:
postclassical period 57, 66–67 definition and overview 1–2
postwar 20th century period legacies 9–10
249–250, 255, 262, 265, 292 major regions 4–6
World War period 229–230 see also rationale for study of 2–4
Western imperialism time periods 4, 6–9
Western imperialism: World Trade Organization 243
apologies for 84 Seattle protests 251
and contemporary global relations 3 World War period (1914–1945) 8, 9,
early modern period 83 213–214
“long” 19th century period 154, authoritarian regimes 224–227, 231
164–165, 166, 169–170, 181, global trends 230–232
198, 201–202, 203 globalization 234–236
consequences of 171–172 Great Depression 223–224, 230
motivations for 165, 167–169 Great Revolutions 220–223
World War period 214 imperialism 214, 232–234
“Westernization” of Russia legacies 236–237
117–119 regional analysis
whaling 96 Eastern Europe region 219, 225
wheel, the, invention of 29 Latin America region 223, 224,
White privilege 161 225, 229
white-collar workers, and Middle East and North Africa
industrialization 142 region 214, 216, 219, 229, 232
Wilson, Woodrow 218 South Asia region 233
wind power 20, 315 Southeast Asia region 233
336 Index
World War I 214–216 Yeltsin, Boris 275, 276
Versailles settlements 216, 217, Yemen 295, 296, 308
218–220, 226, 228, 232, 236 “Young Turks” 205–206, 218
World War II 227–230 Yugoslavia 218, 231
postwar settlement 239–240 postwar 20th century period 240,
writing 29, 30, 32, 33 276–277, 285
Yukichi, Fukuzawa 208
Xi Jinping 297, 298, 310, 311
Zhou dynasty, China 38, 39
Yellow River valley civilization, Zimbabwe 72, 187, 254, 283, 301
China 32 Zulu people 121, 198

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World Past to World Present

World Past to World Present: A Sketch of Global History provides an unusually

 A “no-frills” approach to an expansive stretch of human history

Truly international in coverage, this book has been speciﬁcally designed

Peter N. Stearns is University Professor of History at George Mason Uni-

ISBN: 978-1-032-05578-7 (hbk)

List of maps vii

2.1 Origins and spread of agriculture 16

2.1 Dates of migration of modern humans 14

What Is World History?

Why Study World History?

Making World History Manageable

Conclusion: Revisiting Legacies

1 Later evolutionary developments included the capacity to speak and

The Advent of Agriculture – and Some Complications

Map 2.1 Origins and spread of agriculture

What Agricultural Societies Had, and Have, in Common

1 Though agricultural societies developed at least some manufacturing

Production, Location, and Hierarchy

Box 2.1 Labor Systems

some rent, either in money or in kind. In return, landlords were supposed

Agricultural societies often supported cities, but these never contained

The Parameters of Agricultural Societies

1 While agricultural society no longer predominates, important agricultural

This chapter centers on the emergence of more complex societies, within

The River Valley Centers and Their Legacies

The Nature of the Classical Period

Map 4.1 Map of the classical empires at their height

Decline and Fall

Beyond the Regions: A First Phase of Contact

Conclusion: Comparisons and Legacies

The Rise of Religion

A New Religious Map

The Missionary Religions Themselves

Religious Impact – and Its Limits

Trade: A Hint of Globalization?

Map 5.1 Postclassical trade routes

The Impact of Trade

A Regional and Comparative Directory

The central development in China during the postclassical period involved

South and Southeast Asia

The Middle East and North Africa

Several decisions are unavoidable in dealing with East European history.

Several characteristics deﬁned Western (European) civilization during the

American history before 1492 presents a dilemma in world history gen-

The Legacies of the Postclassical Period

India and Southeast Asia

The Middle East

Disease – and Labor

The Mongol Aftermath

The Middle East

The Role of the West

Key Global Trends

Goa in western India, 1510–11; Magellan circumnavigates the globe, 1519–

1 Portuguese and particularly Spanish contacts with the Americas, later

All of this added up to an unprecedented level of global interaction,

The Columbian Exchange

Map 8.1 The world in 1763

Political and Social Change

Politics and the Economy

The Muslim Empires: the Middle East and India

Early in the 16th century, a second group of Turkic peoples began to

Sunni, Shi’a, and Wahabi Islam

A “no-frills” approach to an expansive stretch of human history

There were no huge changes in the world’s religious map, though