Privatization and Regulation: A Review of Airport Industry Practices

Ferhan Kuyucak, Anadolu University, School of Civil Aviation, Eskisehir, Turkey

Bijan Vasigh, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL USA

ABSTRACT

While airports were seen as purely public establishments for many years, today approaches to airport governance
have been changing in many countries and private participation has become a part of many governments’ agenda.
This study aims to examine methods, incentives and outcomes of private participation in airport management and
operations and different regulation applications in different countries. Findings show that there are many
similarities between countries both in incentives and outcomes of airport privatization. On the other hand, some
country-specific reasons and results need to be examined in their contexts.

INTRODUCTION

The objective of airport management is to provide a variety of services and facilities to the travelling public and
airlines. Due to their geographical monopolistic position and high capital requirements, airport services were seen as
public utilities for many years, and airports have been governed as public institutions in many countries. Today,
airports are faced with capacity constraints, increasing operational costs, decreasing aeronautical revenues, high
customer expectations, and commercialization trends. All these factors are leading governments to transform
airports into commercially focused business enterprises and in some cases to private entities. [37] [5]

As governments have been reforming ownership policies and regulations affecting airport infrastructure, airport
privatization has become a world-wide phenomenon. However, even though their monopolistic position is arguable,
it is obvious that airports generate externalities and elements of natural monopoly can exist for the airports [16].
Therefore in many cases, control of airport charges and economic regulation of airports may be needed for the
public welfare. Otherwise, public monopolies may turn to private monopolies.

The objective of this study is to analyze different aspects of implementing various approaches for private
participation in airport governance, and to point out how privatization affects the airport management practices. It
also aims to reveal the regulatory framework of airport privatization. After a brief literature review, the study begins
with a look at the airport industry and how it affects airport management and ownership practices. Airport
privatization is described with the drivers, methods, advantages and disadvantages, and regulatory environment for
airports. Then findings are discussed about privatization implementations in several countries. Finally, some
summary conclusions are presented about how airport privatization affects the regulatory environment.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the literature, there have been several studies on airport governance structures and the managerial aspects of
airports. Carney and Mew (2003) discussed corporatization, privatization and other approaches to commercialization
in airport governance. They underlined that policy-makers need to recognize the factors that can either encourage or
discourage a strategic orientation, and that there should be a balance between the desired benefits. In their studies,
Vasigh and Haririan (1996) analyzed airport privatization with a welfare point of view. One of the recent studies
conducted by Gillen (2011) described an evolution of airport ownership and governance.

Other studies relating to the subject area that examine airport management and privatization in different countries
include Prins and Lombard (1995) in South-Africa; Humhreys, (1999) in the UK; Ohta, (1999) in Japan; Costas -
Centivany, (1999) in Spain; de Neufville (1999) in the US; Hooper, Cain and White, (2000) in Australia; Hooper,
(2002) in Asia; Forsyth (2002) in Australia and New Zealand; Lyon and Francis (2006) in New Zealand; Button
(2006) in developing countries, Yang, Tok and Su (2008) and Xiuyun and Hong (2010) in China; Lipovich (2008) in
Argentine; Galeana (2008) in Mexico; Ohri (2009) in India.

In the area of airport regulation, Starkie (2002, 2004 and 2006) examined different aspects of airport regulation in
his studies while Forsyth et al. (2004) compiled various studies on economic regulation of airports. Oum et al.
(2004) analyzed alternative forms of economic regulation and their efficiency implications for airports. Marques and
Brochado (2008) examined how major airports are regulated in Europe and proposed a European Observatory. Bel
and Fageda (2009) provided an empirical analysis of the relationship between privatization and regulation in
European airports.

AIRPORT GOVERNANCE, PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATION

Air transport shapes the global environment physically, socially, and economically and may be considered the
“blood circulatory system” on which today’s global society is built. Airports as basic infrastructure providers of the
air transportation industry operate as connection points between air transportation and different transportation modes
that enable interchanging people and cargo. Traditionally, airports have been governed by central or local
governments. It is commonly believed that airport infrastructure is a public utility that provides a public service to
communities. [3] However, a reconsideration of the airport public management model has occurred, and the private
sector has become more involved in airport operations, management, and in some cases, airport ownership.

Privatization has been occurred by changes either the management, capital, or ownership structures of the entity.
According to Poole and Fixler (1987) privatization is “the transfer of assets and service responsibility from public to
the private sector”. Savas (2000) defines it as ‘the act of reducing the role of government or increasing the role of
the private institutions of society in satisfying people’s needs”. In airport governance, the term ‘privatization’ has a
variety of meanings, but they all involve a degree of entry of private capital and entrepreneurship into the airport
business. Aviation is usually regarded as being of strategic importance to national security and to national, regional
and local economies. Because of public service concerns stemming from geographic monopoly positions,
governments usually do not prefer to transfer 100% of a public airport to private sector equity holders. For airports,
privatization involves partial or complete disposal of airports (services, lands, and assets) that have traditionally
been owned, controlled, and managed by the central or local state agencies. Airport privatization can be defined as
any transfer of the risks, responsibilities, and rewards of core airport services from the public to the private sector for
a given period or permanently. From this point of view, any ownership or control transfer to the private sector of
airport business can include some degree of privatization, and outsourcing can also be termed as such.

On the other hand, the term public-private partnership (PPP) is commonly used to describe a spectrum of
relationships between public and private actors for the provision services. [19] It is also frequently used to
characterize the new airport business models between purely public and purely private. Nowadays the range of
possibilities for private sector involvement in airports is very wide. Airport management governance practices have
a wide spectrum that is between pure public and pure private which can be seen in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1
AIRPORT MANAGEMENT AND OWNERSHIP CONTINUUM FROM
PUBLIC TO PRIVATE

Public Private Partnership Schemes

Management Overall Fully Private

Fully Public Management Leasing Project Finance
Contract/ Management Joint Venture Management and
and Ownership (Concession) Privatization
Outsourcing Contract Ownership

Low High
Extent of private participation in airport management and ownership
Airports are accepted as public utilities because their cost and demand characteristics are similar to industries such
as energy, water, and telecommunications. [29] Since these industries have extremely high sunk costs, a service can
only be provided at least cost if it is supplied by only one firm and this situation creates natural monopolies that need
to be regulated. [14, p.63] [29] The term ‘regulation’ can be defined as the employment of legal instruments for the
implementation of social-economic policy objectives. [15] Although in theory and practice, different types of
regulation exist, it is common to divide regulations into three categories: economic, social and administrative. In
fact, aviation has always been subject to technical, safety, and economic regulations. Following the trends of
commercialization and privatization of airports, governments have also begun to examine economic regulation of
airports. Economic regulation is primarily considered for markets that have limited competition and natural
monopolies. It intervenes directly in market decisions as pricing, competition, market entry, or exit. In airport
governance, economic regulations are due to the danger of monopoly power becoming even stronger after
privatization. [12] In airport governance economic regulation can be of several types.

Rate of return (ROR) regulation adjusts overall aeronautical price levels according to the airport operator’s costs and
the cost of capital. It benchmarks the profitability of regulated activities to the average of reference airports or
businesses and sets an allowed return on a defined asset base. [11] Under price cap regulation, the regulator controls
the prices charged by the firm, rather than the firm’s earnings, and determines an annual price cap formula (RPI-X
or CPI-X). A central issue is how the efficiency requirements or X-factors are to be set. Benchmarking of utilities
based on their relative efficiency is a widely favored approach. Two kinds of price cap regulation are evident for
airports: single-till and dual-till. In the single till system, both aeronautical and commercial revenues and costs are
considered in setting the price cap that determines the level of aeronautical charges. The dual till system separates
aeronautical functions from non-aeronautical ones and only considers aeronautical revenues in the determination of
airside prices for an airport. [11] Light-handed regulation has also been called price monitoring or shadow
regulation. This regulatory form monitors prices without a direct determination on aeronautical charges but with a
right to intervene if prices are judged to be too high. [11]

While ROR regulation tends to be complex, unresponsive and expensive to administer [35] as well as providing
motives for companies to over/under invest in airports, inflate costs, and cross subsidize, price cap regulation
provides companies with incentives to cut costs. [9] It also dampens the effects of cost information asymmetries
between companies and regulators. However, service quality and infrastructure development may suffer. In a dual
till system, especially at a congested airport, aeronautical charges are likely to be set at a higher level. Although a
single till system is recommended by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), it can cause airports to be
anticompetitive and unproductive [1]. Oum et al. (2004) found that single-till has more severe distortional effects on
capacity investment than the dual-till. Under the dual-till price cap, the total factor productivity (TFP) is greater than
under either the single-till price cap or the single-till ROR regulation [23] Recent regulatory reforms have tended to
move away from traditional rate-of-return regulation towards incentive-based regulation models.

METHODOLOGY
This study uses a descriptive analytical multiple case study design, employing qualitative methods of gathering
information: literature and publicly available data, including government and nongovernmental organization
websites, reports, white papers, policy statements, regulations and guidelines, and reviews. Case study methodology
is based on in-depth investigation of individuals, groups, institutions, and communities as individual or multiple
cases. [31] In case study research, the case may represent an event, a decision, a program, an organization, an
implementation process, an organizational change, a country’s economy, an industry, or a policy. [40] [13]. Case
studies are the preferred method when researchers seek answers for “what, why, and how” questions. [40]

A literature review of related research notes the studies and the other documented sources that have appeared in
recent years dealing with various aspects of airport management and different forms of airport ownership structures
in different countries. It helps to explain how different countries approach airport privatization, as well as the
incentives and outcomes of private participation in airport governance in these countries. The case study countries
(United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, China, Mexico, Argentine and Spain) were chosen to include a variety
of implementation stages of airport privatization and global perspective.
 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 summarizes the findings of the research on airport privatization implementations in term of process,
incentives, outcomes and regulation in selected case study countries.

TABLE 1
AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION IMPLEMENTATIONS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Incentives: 1985 traffic forecasts showed that double traffic increase by 2005 and this would generate a substantial burden on public sector funds and policy changes of UK
government.to overcome inefficiencies of loss-making public sector industries: to encourage business philosophy and management efficiency in the operation of major airports

Process: Pioneer of airport privatization 1986 Airports Act: Commercialization of airports: 1st part: Government owned British Airports Authority (BAA) (owner of 7
by providing for the introduction of private capital

airports) was transferred into a private company publicly quoted on the stock exchange. 2nd part: airports with a turnover of more than £1 million in two of the previous three
United Kingdom

Outcomes: Freeing government sources for other public spending and no need for raising taxes. improved financial results especially profitability maximizing commercial
years to move from local authority undertakings to Companies Act companies. 16 airports transferred financially sufficient independent companies and commercialized.

revenues increased emphasis on marketing and new retail opportunities selling management expertise to other airports around the world development of a diverse range of
new business approaches development of cost saving strategies, especially outsourcing
Anticompetitive arguments: in 2006 Ferrovial bought BAA in 2008 UK Competition Commission forced BAA to sell three airports including Gatwick (sold), Stansted and

Regulation: In 1986, designated three London airports (Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted) and Manchester airport price cap regulation according to the RPI-X formula
one of Edinburgh or Glasgow.

Competition Commission, aeronautical charges in five years period  the light-handed model applies to the UK airports whose turnover exceeds £1 million annually and which
monitoring for. BAA plc introduced price cap for Glasgow and Edinburgh airports voluntarily in January 2008, Manchester airport was de-designated. Review by CAA and

Incentives: To increase economic and managerial efficiency  financing increasing investment needs  globally competitiveness and technology infusion
are not designated for the price-cap system

Process: In 1997: Major airports Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth were privatized in 1998 another 14 airports privatized Sale of Sydney was completed in 2002 selling
Australia

different owners so create a competitive environment most privatized airports serve major cities, some locally government owned small airports

Regulation: In the beginning: Dual till profit volatility reasons, price regulation replaced by price monitoring for a period of five years: Light-handed regulation
Outcomes: Problems stemmed from capacity constraints solved

Incentives: As a part of government reform: Until 1960s central government, after Joint Venture Airport Scheme in 1961 sharing cost and revenues between central and local
governments. But by the early 1980s significant capital expenditure needs but the airports could not borrow to funds their plans. Removing heavy fiscal loads from government
Increasing their contribution to economy by being more efficient Decreasing their inefficiencies that have negative consequences for nation competitiveness Abolishing cost
New Zealand

excesses and lack of innovation (indirectly affects costumers) Preventing unnecessary investments in airports

have moved company structure. in 1990s the government began to sell its shares to private sector or local governments partners in 1998 two major airports privatized but not
Process:Policy changes and in 1985 government announced a scheme that allowed airports to become companies. Three largest airports became companies and most majors

completely, minority holdings stayed at local government

Outcomes:Finance limitations problem solved

Incentives: Reforming airport management and to create a market structure improving underdeveloped capital market, attracting foreign investment Establish links between
Regulation:No regulation or shadow regulation

Process: in 1984 Civil Aviation Administration of China established.in 1988 reforms started in three stages: 1988-1994: Separation airlines and airports and localization of
local governments and airports (investments)

some airports Three phased reform (1988-2002): Localization-private capital-joint equity investment 1994: a foreign investment policy implemented 1995-2001: Joint equity
reform, more localizations and several airports were listed on domestic and foreign stock market. 2002 - : some forms of internal governance structure established and airports
China

Outcomes:Greater autonomy in decision making more capital and cash flow new investment opportunities non-aeronautical revenue development increase operational
became joint-equity enterprises. Except Beijing all airports management and operations transferred to local governments. Private capital and foreign capital were permitted.

performance sustainable and diversified risk for revenue because of diversified revenue sources competitive environment creation (Guangzhou-Hong Kong) small or
medium sized airports have difficulties obtaining private finance not enough traffic and losses. Many airport operations still remains unprofitable
Regulation: The cost-based regulation and a simple weight-based aeronautical fee (1993-2001) Price-cap: Limited relaxation of economic regulation (since 2002)
Incentives: Changing government policies: the Master Plan for the Air Transportation National System in 1998 airlines privatized and in 1995 airport privatization came to
agenda raising demand for air transport large amounts of finance required and need for private investment in airports
Process: A special committee defined initial public-private joint ventures. 58 federal airports were regrouped into five subsets of administrative entities One of the top 3 most
profitable airports per group four of them was open to some degree of private participation the fifth formed from remaining airports, was declared not available for private
participation was managed by government body (ASA) Government is 85% principal holder, and the strategic partner owned the remaining 15% which was selected by a
Mexico

bidding 50 years concession, with a further 50 years extension option Private groups have concessions in 34 airports of the 58 federal airports, ASA has 20 and some type of

Outcomes: Steady growth of traffic across the system and favorable economic situation for all of the private groups increasing level of service and decreasing level of delay 
participation in the remaining 5.

Development of commercial services Higher airport charges

Franchises are given for a 50 year period but could be revoked at any time if the operator does not fulfill the requirements of the regulatory agency.
Regulation: Prices and tariffs may be subject to regulation depending on the opinion of the Regulatory Agency (SCT). The role of the Competence Comm ission is limited.

Incentives: Capacity constraints for both airside and landside due to exponential growth in air demand Lack of financial sources to carry out such a complex airport
modernization process ideological and political-economical context change towards privatization
Process: in 1997 establishment of National Airport System (SNA) Designated 36 airports to be granted under concession for 30 years with possible 10-year extensions.
Concessions include: government –defined investments, paying fixed annual royalty determined in the bidding process, non-discriminatory access to airport facilities and
services, protection environment the concessionaries had the rights to operate, either per se or through third parties at their sole responsibilities
Argentine

Outcomes: Modernization of passenger terminals rapid construction process and renovated capacity Political and legal problems: inappropriate contract details: although
regulator never penalized, National General Audit (AGN) reported some irregularities about the investment in the bid were partially fulfilled and even those overvalued. Further

unrealistic royalty fees in the beginning; lawsuits between government and the company More transparent agreement and ending lawsuits (because these and old contract would
investigations showed that this overvaluation of investment was approximately 30%; failure to pay the annual royalty fee and subsequent debt, possibly because they offered

have more cost than benefits): after a public consultation a new contract had been held. Instead of royalty 15% annual fee of earnings from both aeronautical and commercial

Regulation: The National Airport System Regulating Agency (ORSNA) was created and responsible for the regulation of airport charges
sources

Incentives: Terminal and runway capacity saturation and need of new and modernized airport infrastructure financial constraints to facilitate significant airport modernization
relatively low airport charges cannot cover the costs and financial losses since 2007
Process: AENA established as an independent authority in 2010: government decided privatization of AENA 2011: a complete of 49% of AENA is set to be floated on the
Spain

inventory market, the decision having been approved in Parliament in February Privatization is underway but protests have been going on

Source: The authors’ own compilation based on various sources [30 [6] [18] [17] [16),] [21] [36] [39] [20] [10] [8)] [38]
Findings of this study show that, although the type and application of privatization methods are different across the
countries, private sector involvement in airport governance has some similar reasons and results in different
countries. Table 2 shows these incentives for airport privatization:

TABLE 2
INCENTIVES OF AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION


Growing infrastructure shortfall and new investment needs


Public budget constraints,


Efficiency, accountability and quality concerns on public management,


Problems with political interference
Changing national and global business environment
 Increased public sector experience in implementing airport privatizations

Beyond these results, in some countries such as the UK, airport privatization has brought more advantages,
including selling management expertise and know-how to other airports around the world. Likewise, after
privatization it can be said that the following outcomes which can be seen on Table 3 have been obtained in the case
study countries:

TABLE 3
OUTCOMES OF AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION

Positive Negative
 Improved efficiency and productivity, 
 Reduced financial burden on the public sector and easier access to finance 
Increase in airport charges


Underinvestment or overinvestment,

 Reduced investment needs and modernization of terminals and airside 

sources, Service quality problems,
Conflicts between stakeholders

 Commercial focus and maximization of commercial revenues.

facilities,

The other results show that each country has its own methods and process for airport privatization such as group or
individual privatization, block sale or joint-ventures, and selling same owner or different companies. While some
countries have chosen single-till or dual-till regulation to overcome the current or potential problems of airport
privatization, some other countries have preferred light-handed regulation approaches. Also, findings show that
large and primary airports have been primarily considered for privatization, whereas small or medium-sized airports
have difficulty obtaining private finance.

CONCLUSIONS

This research focuses on airport privatization and the changing nature of airport management. It shows that there are
some different forms of private participation in airport governance, and each country chooses different methods of
airport privatization for its own needs. The privatization process also brings a new regulatory environment for
airports. For airports it is difficult to obtain generalizable facts. Even efficiency analysis results may depend on the
methodologies of airport performance measurement. [24] Moreover, country specific factors such as geography and
demand make it difficult to reach general results. For example, it is very difficult to reach the comparison
conclusions between the UK airports that are congested European hubs and geographically dispersed Australian
airports. Likewise developed countries and developing countries may seek different primary objectives. [26]

Since a case study research does not focus on a generalizable truth, based on the country case analysis, this study is
intended to contribute to discussions on the experiences and lessons learned from various ownership structures and
private sector participation in airports and also emerging issues associated with privatization and regulation of
airports. Diversity across the states and experiences of countries in airport privatization and regulation is expected to
be helpful for other countries and governments that need to take actions for their public airports. But it is important
to remember that airport management practices should be evaluated by their content and context.
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