Valmonte v.

De Villa

173 SCRA 211 and 185 SCRA 665 (1989 and 1990)

Topic: When is a search a “search” (in general)

FACTS:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to
Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing
an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to
the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region.

As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars
and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without
the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.

Petitioners: Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of
a search warrant and/or court order.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make
searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; and,
instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

ISSUE:

WON the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and
seizures?

RULING:

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures.

Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been
presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed,
committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by
those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting
up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue
its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public.

Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the gov’t, in the interest
of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner
that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.

NOTES:

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by
those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved.

Guanzon vs. De Villa

181 SCRA 623 (1990)

Topic: When is a search a “search” (in general)

FACTS:

The petitioners, who are of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila, and taxpayers and leaders in
their respective communities, sought to prohibit the military and police officers from conducting “Areal
Target Zonings” or “saturation drives” in Metro Manila.

Petitioners claim that on various dates from March 5, 1987 till November 3 of the same year, various
saturation drives were conducted by the respondents. Added by the petitioners, that these “saturation
drives” are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are
hiding. The arrests ranged from 7 persons (July 20, Bankusay, Tondo) to 1,500 (November 3, Lower
Maricaban, Pasay City) and that same followed a common pattern of human rights abuses like police and
military units, without any search warrant or warrant of arrest, cordon an area of more than one residence
and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila, from the dead of the night or early
morning hours and residents are herded as cows with men ordered to strip down to their briefs and
examined for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the saturation drives are unconstitutional.

HELD:

NO. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which
would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed
as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State.

However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. There appears to have
been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched
or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to
be attained by the “areal zoning” could not be achieved as the rights of the squatter and low income
families are fully protected. Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution
is involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power
of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the individual.

Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the combat
areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny
or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.
A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated.
A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police power to one on one
confrontation where search warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are easily
procured.

The military and police officers conducted “Areal Target Zonings” or “saturation drives” in Metro Manila,
specifically on places where the subversives, as pinpointed by said authorities, were hiding. During these
saturation drives, police and military units cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes the
whole barangay or areas of barangays, without any search warrant or warrant of arrest. Petitioners
claimed that said saturation drives followed a common pattern of human rights abuses, as such, sought
for its stoppage.

Petition is REMANDED to the trial court where petitioner may present evidence supporting their
allegations and where specific erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.

DOCTRINE:

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge,
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all
these drives, it is alleged that the following were committed:

1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police and
military units without any search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence
and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian clothes
and without nameplates or identification cards.

2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their
homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in the process), and then ordering the
residents within to come out of their respective residences.

3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the men are ordered to strip
down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.

4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by the raiders, some of the
members of the raiding team force their way into each and every house within the cordoned off area and
then proceed to conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from the neighborhood.

5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders ransack their homes, tossing about
the residents' belongings without total regard for their value. In several instances, walls are destroyed,
ceilings are damaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating evidence.

6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing frequency that their money
and valuables have disappeared after the said operations.

7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome intrusions are arrested on the
spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are interrogated
and 'verified.' These arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor
under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded men are used to fingerpoint
suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of the period wherein they can be
legally detained without any charge at all. In other instances, some arrested persons are released without
charge after a few days of arbitrary detention.

9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the residents during these illegal
operations.

10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spotbeatings, maulings and maltreatment.

11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are subjected to mental and physical
torture to extract confessions and tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)

THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESS THIS PETITION:

The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderly procedure ascertains
their truth, not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions would immediately issue as a matter
of course. A persistent pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties, as alleged in the petition,
has no place in civilized society.

According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by
the petition. No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz
Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several
thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a
petitioner or has come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice.
Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in
addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been charged
and none of those affected has apparently complained.

The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of
the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to submit themselves voluntarily
for character and personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in
the petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers
and policemen committing certain abuses.

DEFENDANTS:

A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is the statement that local and foreign
co-respondents actually joined the saturation drives and witnessed and recorded the events. In other
words, the activities sought to be completely proscribed were in full view of media.

Supreme Court:

It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no rebellion
or criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no
impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or
individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be
attained by the "areal zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income families
are fully protected.

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

133 SCRA 800 (1984)

Topic: When is a search a “search” (in general)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Existence of Probable Cause)

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus on the validity of the search warrants issued by
respondent judge Cruz-Pano to the two businesses “ Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers
under premises No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively, on the ground that they possess or in control of printing equipment and other
paraphernalia used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as
amended.

Consequently, the premises were searched, and seized the office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature.

The content of one of the assailed search warrant are as follows:

1. All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, Dictaphone and the like used and/or connected
in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2. Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the objectives and
purposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement
and April 6 Movement; and, 3. Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM"
and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,

a. Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

b. DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

c. A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

d. TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

e. TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

HELD:

The 2 search warrants were null and void because:

a. they were issued without satisfying the requirement of probable cause.

b. They are general warrant.

c. It is a violation of freedom of the press.

A. Probable Cause

When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection
with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being
used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the
joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by
our unit clearly shows that the premises above-mentioned and the articles and things above-described
were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote
the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines,
and April 6 Movement."

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ...
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the
Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this
Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge
hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

B. General Warrant

The directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of ..." have been held to be a general
warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

C. Violation of freedom of the press

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

Petitioners questioned the warrants because of the following deficiency:

a. for the lack of probable cause

b. respondent judge did not conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and his witnesses

c. two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly
keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City

d. although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his
co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.

e. real properties were seized under the disputed warrants.

DEFENDANTS:

1. Respondents said that SC should dismiss this case because petitioners should have sought the quashal
of the warrant from Judge Cruz-Pano itself.

2. Respondents also said that it should be dismissed on the ground of laches (“negligence for a long
amount of time, doing something that could have been done earlier”) because petitioners only filed the
case 6 months after the event. Dec 1982-June1983.

SUPREME COURT:

1. SC said that yes there was a procedural flaw but they still take cognizance of the case because of the
urgency of the constitutional issues as well as how “We Forum” garnered public interest because it was
shown on Channel 7 and widely publicized in metropolitan dailies.

2. Petitioners said this was because they exhausted other remedies, i.e. writing a letter to Pres Marcos.
When nothing turned up they went to Court. SC said ok (the extrajudicial efforts exerted by them quite
evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized
property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them).
 Alvero vs. Dizon

76 Phil 637 (1946)

Topic: When is a search a “search” (Importance of the Right)

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari with injunction. While the battle of Manila was raging, Aurelio Alvero
(petitioner) was arrested, having been suspected of collaboration with the enemy. Thereafter, his house
was subjected for search where certain papers and documents were seized. Consequently, petitioner was
charged of treason before the People’s Court. Afterwhich, he filed a petition demanding the return of the
papers allegedly seized and taken from his house. The petitioner also filed a petition for bail, but it was
denied. In the course of hearing on this petition for bail and at the trial of the case on the merits, the
petitioner did not insist on the question of the legality of the search and seizure of said papers and
documents.

However, at the commencement of the trial of Criminal Case No. 3, the prosecution presented again the
same documents, but this time, the petitioner renewed his objection and asked for the return of seized
documents.

The petitioner argued that the documents in question had been obtained by means of force and
intimidation or through coercion; and that certain soldiers of the American Army took certain personal
properties, at the time the search was made; and that the acquisition of said documents was manifestly
a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights and that their admission, as evidence for the prosecution,
would be tantamount to compelling petitioner, as accused, to testify against himself.

The respondents, in their part, countered, among others, that petitioner himself has admitted the legality
of the seizure of the documents in question in his motion for reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946;
and that that said seizure was effected lawfully under the terms of the proclamation of the Commander
in Chief of the United States Liberation Forces, dated December 29, 1944, in which he declared his purpose
to remove alleged collaborators, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic
influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is now estopped from questioning admissibility of the seized documents?

RULING:

(YES) The petitioner is now estopped. When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found in
his possession or in his control may be seized and used in evidence against him; and an officer has the
right to make an arrest without a warrant of a person believed by the officer upon reasonable grounds to
have committed a felony. The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and
seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy
against such usurpations when attempted.

Herein petitioner filed a petition, demanding the return of certain papers and documents allegedly seized
and taken from his house at the time of his arrest; but when he consented to their presentation, as part
of the evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing on his petition for bail and at the trial of the case on
the merits, without having insisted that the question of the alleged illegality of the search and seizure of
said papers and documents should first have been directly litigated and established by a motion, made
before the trial, for their return, he was and should be deemed to have waived his objection to their
admissibility as part of the evidence for the prosecution; since the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination may be waived.
DOCTRINE: —The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the
home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted. But it does not prohibit the Federal Government from taking advantage of
unlawful searches made by a private person or under authority of state law.

People vs. Andre Marti

193 SCRA 57 (1991)

Topic: When is a search a “search” (To Whom it is Directed)

FACTS:

The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift
wrapped packages.

The appellant (Andre Marti) informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland'' Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine
and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant’s representation, Anita
Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. Before delivery of the appellant's box to the Bureau
of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened the appellant's
box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a
letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of the appellant's shipment
to the Narcotics Section of the NBI and informed them that the rest of the shipment was still in his office.

Therefore, Job Reyes and three NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes’ office at Ermita. The
package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked
underneath the cigars. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects.

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

ISSUE:

Whether the search and seizure committed by the private individual inviolate the constitutional right of
the accused against unlawful searches and seizures?

RULING:

No. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant
that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the
State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution. That
the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection.

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER: petitioner now claims that the respondent judges, in denying the petition
for the return of said documents, acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse in the exercise
of their discretion, alleging that even the seizure of documents by means of a search warrant legally
issued, constitutes a violation of the rights guaranteed in paragraphs 3 and 18 of section 1 of Article III of
the Constitution, and, consequently, when their seizure cannot be justified by the corresponding search
warrant, the court should order their immediate return that the petitioner has no other speedy and
adequate remedy for the protection of his rights guaranteed by the Constitution, other than this petition
for certiorari, as the right of appeal granted by law to a person accused of a crime, is costly and highly
prejudicial to the petitioner, as it presupposes that the prosecution has established the guilt of the
accused by means of legal and competent evidence, as alleged in the last three (3) paragraphs of the
petition.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS: Respondents allege (1) that petitioner himself has admitted the legality
of the seizure of the documents in question in his motion for reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946;
(2) that petitioner has not proven that said documents had been illegally seized for him; (3) that the
seizure of the documents in question took place, on February 12, 1945, in Pasay, Rizal, which was then
still a combat zone, and that the seizure of certain papers in the house of the petitioner was made by
soldiers of the United States Army of Liberation or its instrumentalities; (4) that said seizure was effected
lawfully under the terms of the proclamation of the Commander in Chief of the United States Liberation
Forces, dated December 29, 1944, in which he declared his purpose to remove alleged collaborators,
when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold
them in restraint for the duration of the war; (5) that the documents in question had been properly
admitted as evidence for the prosecution in criminal case No. 3, as herein petitioner, as accused in said
case, had expressly waived his right to object to their admissibility, particularly Exhibits A, FF, HH and P;
(6) that petitioner's evidence of alleged ownership, relative to Exhibits C, G, H, K, I, P, R, R-1 and R-2, is
altogether insufficient, and petitioner himself has expressly admitted that said documents are not his
personal papers but part of the files of the New Leaders' Association, which was proven to be an
organization created, for the purpose of collaborating with the enemy; (7) and that none of the exhibits
referred to in the petition has been satisfactorily identified by the petitioner as included among the papers
allegedly wrongfully seized from his house and belonging to him.

Bache and Co. vs. Ruiz

37 SCRA 323 (1971)

Topic: When is a search a “search” (Who May Invoke)

FACTS:

Respondent Commissioner, wrote a letter to respondent Judge Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search
warrant against petitioners for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code and authorizing a Revenue
Examiner to make and file the application for search warrant.

The following day, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Logronio, went to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal bringing the following papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application
for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent
Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio
already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already
accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.

At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter,
respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was
found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.

Search Warrant was then signed by the respondent Judge and issued. Three days later, BIR agents served
the search warrant to petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation.

Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of
testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which
yielded six boxes of documents.

Petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant be
quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued,
that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners,
jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees.

On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After
hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the
petition for dissolution of the search warrant. Hence, Petitioners came to this Court.

ISSUE:

Won the petitioner corporations can invoke the right against illegal search and seizure.

HELD:

Yes. The Court cited several precedents as to the right of corporations against illegal search and seizure:

A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct
legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to
such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due
process of law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . . (Hale v
Henkel)

But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same
result might have been achieved in a lawful way (Silverthorne v US)

But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same
result might have been achieved in a lawful way (Stonehill Case)

Stonehill vs. Diokno

20 SCRA 383 (1967)

Topic: When is a search a “search” (Who May Invoke)

FACTS:

The petitioners challenged the validity of search warrants and seizures.

There were 42 search warrants secured by the respondents from Regional Trial Court to search and seize
personal properties belonging to the petitioner and/or the corporations of which they were officers.

The search reads, in portion:

Book of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).

as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications
adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and the Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner argued that null and void as it contravenes the Constitution and the Rule of Court – inter
alia, (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

The respondents, in their part, countered (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners’
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners can invoke their right insofar as those documents found and seized in the
offices of the corporation.

RULING:

No. The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of contested warrants and of the seizures
made in the offices of the corporation for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.

In the case of Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, it has been held:

…that the Government’s action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate
to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights
of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure, if unlawful, could
not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. It follows, therefore,
that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was
taken…

Simply put that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties.

Here, the petitioners may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity.

World Wide Web vs. People

GR 161106 (January 13, 2014)

Topic: When is a search a “search” (Online Searches)

FACTS:

Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the RISOO of the PNP filed applications for warrants before the RTC of
Quezon City to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation and Planet Internet
Corporation. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations,
which amounted to theft and violation of PD No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of xxx
Electrical or Telephone Connections xxx), to the damage and prejudice of the PLDT. This scheme
constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines,
cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the originating country or the country where the call is originated. PLDT computed a monthly
revenue loss of ₱764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange
revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.

RTC granted the application for search warrants against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing
police officers to seize various items. Over a hundred items were seized.

Petitioners a motions to quash the search warrants grounds the search on the ground that the search
warrants were general warrants because the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so broad
and all-encompassing as to give the implementing officers wide discretion over which articles to seize.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of
general warrants. Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to
petitioners.

PLDT appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the
search warrants valid and effective. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the search warrant issued were in the nature of general warrant

RULING:

NO, SC ruled that the requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled when
the items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
sought.

A general warrant is defined as "a search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be
arrested or the property to be seized." It gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which
items to take. Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued,
vulnerable to abuses.1âwphi1 Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched
only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.

For a search warrant to be valid it must comply with all the requisites, otherwise, no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall be issued. The Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement
officers in describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are technical in nature, and
when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to them.

Accordingly, the scheme was a case of electronic theft, and that the items sought to be seized could NOT
be described with calibrated precision. Assuming that the seized items could also be used for other
legitimate businesses, the fact remains that the items were used in the commission of an offense.

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is NOT
required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the
property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed,
the law does NOT require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as
to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be
virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of
things to look for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making
the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. In this case, considering
that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts
to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were required to
pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision.
[An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. A warrant such as a warrant of arrest or a
search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant
is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic
in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity]

Disini vs. Secretary of Justice

GR 203335 (February 11, 2014)

Topic: When is a search a “search” (Online Searches)

FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions seeking to declare several provisions of R.A. No. 10175 (The Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012), unconstitutional and void.

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of cyberspace. Petitioners claim that the means
adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not certain provisions of the cybercrime prevention act are constitutional insofar as they
regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as enable the government
to track down and penalize violators.

RULING:

Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access is NOT unconstitutional.

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that
interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.

The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this
standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right
or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden
is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest
and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard was
used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights, as an expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.

Strict Scrutiny Standard is not applicable in Illegal Access provision.

The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since
no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act –
accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.

Engagement of ethical hackers requires an agreement, therefore, insulating them from the coverage of
Section 4(a)(1).

Petitioners fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals who employ
tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor steal
information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target system’s security and report back to the owners the
vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are
the equivalent of independent auditors who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records.

Besides, the client’s engagement with an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the
extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the “get
out of jail free card.” Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such
permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).

Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference is NOT unconstitutional.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent
effect on these guaranteed freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply
punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things
that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message.
Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s
computer systems and private documents.

Petitioners fail to discharge the burden of proving that the provision is invalid under the Overbreadth
Doctrine.

All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect or
the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the
boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill
such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.
Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil
that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional
rights.

Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set
of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid. Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

No Equal Protection violation under Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in that, not
being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use
aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing
there exists a well-known billionaire philanthropist named “Julio Gandolfo,” the law would punish for
cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and
another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that considering
the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference.

But there is no real difference whether he uses “Julio Gandolfo” which happens to be his real name or
uses it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The
law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on the ground of denial of equal protection is
baseless.

Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft is NOT unconstitutional

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

The right to privacy

The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet
of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. But the Court
acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to privacy exists
independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself deserving of constitutional protection.
Zones of Privacy

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
“constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,” but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy” and “every has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication
and correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones
of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy
and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

No showing how the provision violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due
process of the law.

The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence
address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation,
and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without right,
implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-
related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process
of the law.

Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since
the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this
section regulates are specific actions, the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data
of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal data.

Section does not violate freedom of the press

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be
hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information
about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that the law seeks to
prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate
purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be
regarded as a form of theft.

The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of
the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another,
unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As such, the press,
whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance
is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.

Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex does NOT violate freedom of expression Petitioners claim that the section
violates freedom of expression

They express fear that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or
consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as
crimes when done “for favor” in cyberspace. In common usage, the term “favor” includes “gracious
kindness,” “a special privilege or right granted or conceded,” or “a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn
conspicuously.” This meaning given to the term “favor” embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as
written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting
individuals.

The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of “engaging in a
business” is necessary to constitute illegal cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution,
the white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution
and pornography, i.e., by webcam.

Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography committed through a computer system is NOT unconstitutional

The section merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) to cover identical
activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when
prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system.

The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one
can complain since the intensity or duration of the penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a
rational basis for such a higher penalty. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece
of child pornography, when uploaded in cyberspace, is incalculable.

Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications or SPAM is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for

violating freedom of expression

The section penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as “spam.”
The term “spam” surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats
the same sentence or comment was said to be making a “spam.” The term referred to a Monty Python’s
Flying Circus scene in which actors would keep saying “Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam” when reading
options from a menu.

The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet
service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the owner’s
peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the
person sending out spams enters the recipient’s domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that
commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the
“efficiency of computers.” Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, had already been
receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as a nuisance since people might
have an interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading
these mail ads. That is true with spam. Their recipient always has the option to delete or not to read them.

Commercial speech is still entitled to protection.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech that is
not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.

Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber-Libel insofar as it penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article is
NOT unconstitutional

Petitioner laments that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest
jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction.
Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of
Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as
unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring “actual malice” could easily be overturned as
the Court has done in Fermin v. People even where the offended parties happened to be public figures.

Elements of libel: (a) allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of
the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
There is “actual malice” or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with
knowledge that is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard
standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.

Prosecution bears the burden of proving actual malice in instances where such element is required to
establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is
available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a
barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation).
Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the
Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the author of a
defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance
of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.

Where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice.
The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed
statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory
statement even if it was in fact true.

Cybercrime Prevention Act does not violate the Philippines’ obligations under the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

General Comment 34 of ICCPR does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute
an all-encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the
condition that the accused has been prompted to make the statement by good motives and for justifiable
ends.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted
unless the imputation shall have been made against government employees with respect to facts related
to the discharge of their official duties.

In such cases, if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.

Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting the Commission of Cybercrime should be permitted to apply to Section
4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-
Squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes.
It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.

Aiding and abetting certain cybercrimes must be distinguished between the actors

In the cyber world, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed statement; b) the
blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the
internet café that may have provided the computer used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a
favorable comment on the blog; and f)the person who posts a link to the blog site.

The question is: Are online postings such as “Liking” an openly defamatory statement, “Commenting” on
it, or “Sharing” it with others, to be regarded as “aiding or abetting?” In libel in the physical world, if Nestor
places on the office bulletin board a small poster that says, “Armand is a thief,” he could certainly be
charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, “I like this!” that could not be libel since he did
not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, “Correct,” would that be
libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author.
Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, “Armand is a thief!” on a social networking site. Would a reader and
his Friends or Followers, availing themselves of the “Like,” “Comment,” and “Share” reactions, be guilty
of aiding or abetting libel? And, in the complex world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will
one be liable for aiding or abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?

Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment, and
Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their
response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And, considering the inherent
impossibility of joining hundreds of thousands of responding “Friends” or “Followers” in the criminal
charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the
challenged posting?

Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” cyber-libel, unsolicited commercial
communications and child pornography is a nullity for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends,
evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use
of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot
adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms.

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users
will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all
liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of
facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute a
broad sweep that generates a chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts,
comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting”
libel on cyberspace is a nullity.

When void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-
for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. Generally, the overbreadth and vagueness doctrine are inapplicable
in ‘facial” challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech. In an “as applied” challenge, the
petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right must assert his own right, not that of third
persons. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.

But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a “facial” challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own right under the assailed statute
where it involves free speech on the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.

The rationale for this exception is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech that comes from
statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under
an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged with
a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part
of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the
crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as
the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the
absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other
countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

Section 6, which imposes a higher penalty on crimes penalized under the Revised Penal Code if
committed through information and communication technologies, is NOT unconstitutional.

Section 6 merely makes the commission of existing crimes through the Internet a qualifying circumstance.
As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed
through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other
means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach
far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for
cybercrimes.

Section 7, which allows prosecution both under the Cybercrime Law and the Revised Penal Code, is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as cyber-libel and cyber child pornography are concerned.

There should be no question that if the published material in print, said to be libelous, is again posted
online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses,
one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A.
10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG
itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under
Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.
Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy.

The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s
scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child
pornography in fact already covers the use of “electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any
other means.” Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Section 8 which imposes penalties for cybercrimes is NOT unconstitutional

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the
legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They
appear appropriate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is
not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an
element of another offense or might just have been connected with another crime. Judges and
magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as
determined by the legislative department.

Section 12, authorizing law enforcement to collect real-time traffic data, is TOO SWEEPING AND LACKS
RESTRAINT

Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in
real-time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that
data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need
not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the
right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into messages or
information that they send to one another.

The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law may require
the disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only upon showing that such requirement
has a rational relation to the purpose of the law, that there is compelling State interest behind the law,
and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn. In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts
should balance the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees.

Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put
order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. To do this, it is within the realm of reason
that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of
cybercrimes.

Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is part, aims to provide
the law enforcement authorities with the power they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating
crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business.

Those who commit the crimes of accessing a computer system without right, transmitting viruses,
lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration, and producing child
pornography could easily evade detection and prosecution by simply moving the physical location of their
computers or laptops from day to day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually
anywhere: from internet cafes, from kindred places that provide free internet services, and from
unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and
with unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither be located nor identified. There
are many ways the cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child pornography
could use relays of computers to mislead law enforcement authorities regarding their places of
operations. Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to
court-issued search and seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.

Two categories of right to privacy

In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court classified privacy in two categories: decisional privacy
and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain
important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters. It is the latter right – the right to informational privacy – that those who oppose government
collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.

Informational privacy and its two aspects

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right
to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the
right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming
the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an
objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable.

Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact Computer data –
messages of all kinds – travel across the internet in packets and in a way that may be likened to parcels of
letters or things that are sent through the posts. When data is sent from any one source, the content is
broken up into packets and around each of these packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains
the traffic data: information that tells computers where the packet originated, what kind of data is in the
packet (SMS, voice call, video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the
packet is going, and how the packet fits together with other packets. The difference is that traffic data
sent through the internet at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names and addresses
(residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded internet protocol (IP) addresses.
The packets travel from one computer system to another where their contents are pieced back together.

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and
uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.

ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another over cyberspace
except through some service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed for
a successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance of this data takes them out of the private sphere,
making the expectation of privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is not prepared to
recognize as reasonable.

“Due Cause” under Section 12 has no precedent in law or jurisprudence

Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, “with due cause,” to collect or record by technical or
electronic means traffic data in real time. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel situation, fails to
hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase “due cause.” Section 12 does not even bother to relate the
collection of data to the probable commission of a particular crime. It just says, “with due cause,” thus
justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution
prohibits.

The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While
it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an
illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from
looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily
expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these
agencies.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those “associated with specified
communications.” But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in a “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions to
monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have previously been impractical or
even impossible. “All the forces of technological age x x x operates to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private
life marks the difference between a democratic and totalitarian society.” The Court must ensure that laws
seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure
respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.

Section 13 on the preservation of computer data and Section 17 on the destruction of computer data do
not constitute undue deprivation of the right to property

The contents of materials sent or received through the Internet belong to their authors or recipients and
are to be considered private communications. The data that service providers preserve on orders of law
enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The
process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.

It is unclear that the user has the demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of
the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have
saved them on his computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service
provider for a copy before it is deleted.

Section 14 on disclosure of computer data does not violate the privacy of communications and
correspondence

The process envisioned in Section 14 is likened to the issuance of subpoena. Executive agencies have the
power to issue subpoenas as an adjunct to their investigatory powers. Besides, what Section 14 envisions
is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law
enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure
would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications
and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

Section 15 on search, seizure, and examination of computer data does not supersede existing search
and seizure rules

On its face, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure
the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer systems or data that have been seized by virtue
of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties does not pose any threat to the rights of the person from
whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but
merely supplements them.

Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data is UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files that
contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of
property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their
writers or authors may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service
provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data
under its control and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute
for judicial search warrant.

The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a
restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected.
Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an
executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough
for him to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury,
and executioner all rolled into one.

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential
guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are
generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely requires
that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking
Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does
not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.

Section 20, punishing non-compliance with any order issued by law enforcement agencies under Chapter
IV, is NOT unconstitutional

Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that mere failure to
comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would
be reasonable or valid.

But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of P.D. 1829, Section 20 necessarily
incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. Thus, there must still be judicial
determination of guilt, during which, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus,
Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck by the Court.

Sections 24 and 26, which provide the creation and powers of the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordination Center, are VALID

Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without
any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two
tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a
national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient
standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to “prevent and
combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the
domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international
cooperation.” This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered
as sufficient standard.

Roberts vs. CA
 254 SCRA 307 (1996)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Existence of Probable Cause)

FACTS:

In 1992, Pepsi held its Number Fever Promotion enticing consumers to purchase Pepsi, Mirinda, Mountain
Dew, and Seven Up to win the full amount of the prize on the crowns. In May 25, 1992, Pepsi announced
that the winning number for the next day was “349” but after such TV announcement, in violation of its
own mechanics, Pepsi refused to pay the holder of “349” crowns. Thus, thousands of holders of “349”
Pepsi crowns sued petitioner Roberts and his co-accused, in their capacities as high-ranking officials of
Pepsi for estafa, violation of the consumer act, violation of act relative to untrue, deceptive, and
misleading advertisements, and violation of EO 913 or strengthening the rule-making powers of the
minister of trade and industry.

Investigating prosecutor Ramon Gerona recommended, through a Joint Resolution, the filing of an
information against petitioners and many others for estafa and the dismissal of the complaints for other
alleged crimes. The Chief of the Prosecution Division, upon authority of the City Prosecutor of QC, filed an
information for estafa against petitioners.

In return, petitioners filed 3 motions/petitions:

1. A motion for reconsideration of the information charged, alleging that there was no fraud in their
promotion with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that the complainants made no specific allegation of
acts or omissions, compromise agreement entered by Pepsi was not an admission of guilt, and that the
promo was carried with utmost good faith.

2. A petition for review with the DOJ under the same grounds and that the approval by the City Prosecutor
was the result of grave threats, intimidation, and actual violence the complainants inflicted on him and
his assistant prosecutors.

3. Lastly, a motion to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest with the
RTC.

Despite the motion to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance issuance of warrants and arrest and the
cognizance of the DOJ of petitioners’ petition for review, private prosecutor filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
the issuance of warrants of arrest.

RTC of QC Judge Asuncion issued an order advising parties that his court would be guided by Crespo vs.
Mogul and not by the resolution of DOJ. Counsel for different accused and private complainants issued
motions to defer arraignment and objections and oppositions to suspend proceedings with even the trial
prosecutor Tirso Gavero filing a motion to defer arraignment vis-à-vis the review of DOJ. Respondent RTC
Judge Asuncion then issued the challenged order denying motion to suspend proceedings and to hold in
abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest and motions to defer arraignment while directing issuance of
warrants.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for a TRO and a petition
for preliminary injunction alleging that no copy of the Joint Resolution recommending the filing of the
information was forwarded to RTC Judge Asuncion, thus, he had no basis to determine probable cause.

The CA, however, found that a copy of the Joint Resolution was indeed forwarded to Judge Asuncion and
reliance by the Judge in said Joint Resolution was sufficient to determine probable cause, hence CA denied
application for preliminary injunction.

DOJ, on the other hand, dismissed the petition for review filed by Pepsi officers with the CA also dismissing
the special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition by Pepsi officers with both the DOJ and CA denying
Motions for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
WON the Supreme Court may determine existence of probable cause either for issuance of warrants of
arrest or for prosecution of estafa

HELD:

No. Determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants rests in the Judge while determination
of probable cause for trial is a function of the prosecutor. Supreme Court only determines whether there
was a grave abuse of discretion in the abovementioned determinations. In this case, the finding of
probable cause to hold trial would lead to filing of thousands of cases, expose petitioners to harassments
of warrants of arrests, and clog dockets of the judiciary. However, the Supreme Court did not determine
the existence of probable cause as respondent Judge Asuncion has not even found such, or at least not in
accordance with the Constitutional mandate of personal determination.

DOCTRINE:

DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE NOT LODGED WITH SC; EXCEPTIONS

In criminal prosecutions, the determination of probable cause may either be an executive or a judicial
prerogative. XXX preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for
the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind is executive in
nature. It is part of the prosecution’s job. The second kind which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate
case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.

In exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause
by examining the records of the preliminary investigation

Exceptions are enumerated in Brocka vs. Enrile as follows:

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions

c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
been denied

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest
of petitioners

Note: CASE FALLS UNDER EXCEPTION => COURT MAY MAKE FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE BUT SUPREME
COURT REFUSED TO MAKE FINDING

People vs. Molina

 GR 133917 (2001)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Existence of Probable Cause)

FACTS:

Sometime in June 1996, SP01 Paguidopon received an information regarding the presence of an alleged
marijuana pusher in Davao City. He was with his informer who pointed to a motorcycle driver, accused-
appellant Mula, as the pusher. SP01 Paguidopon has not seen accused-appellant Molina before the arrest.
Moreover, he only knew the names of the accused-appellants after the arrest.

In the morning of August 8, 1996, SP01 Paguidopon received an information that an alleged pusher will
be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City. He called for an assistance at the precinct and the team of SP04
Cloribel were immediately dispatched to the house of SP01 Paguidopon, where they would wait for the
alleged pusher to pass by. While the team were waiting, a “trisikad” carrying accused-appellants passed
by. At that occurrence, SP01 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. The team
boarded their vehicle, overtook the “trisikad” and ordered it to stop. Mula was holding a black bag and
handed it to Molina. SP01 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the
bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants were handcuffed by
the police officers.

Accused-appellants filed a Demurer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from
them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. The RTC found accused-
appellants Molina and Mula guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 8, 3 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the case fall within the recognized exceptions
to the warrant requirement resulting to the admissibility of the seized marijuana as evidence.

HELD:

No. The marijuana seized is inadmissible as evidence. The court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants
does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules for warrantless arrests.

The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a
probable cause (Art. III, Sec. 2 of 1987 Constitution). Complementary to Art. III, Sec. 2 is the exclusionary
rule enshrined under Article III, Sec. 3, Par. 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

This constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:

1. Search incident to a lawful arrest

2. Search of a moving motor vehicle

3. Search in violation of customs laws

4. Seizure of evidence in plain view

5. When the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures

6. Stop and frisk situations

In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless
arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid
because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.

Clearly, to constitute a valid flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:
1. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and

2. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to
commit or have committed a crime. Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their
right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the
rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana
seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court
is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants and reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellants Molina and Mula were acquitted and ordered released from confinement unless they are
validly detained for other offenses.

Microsoft Corp. vs. Maxicorp

GR 140946 (2004)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Existence of Probable Cause)

FACTS:

NBI Agent Samiano filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for
committing Copyright Infringement. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his
witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants. Armed with the search warrants, NBI seized
property fitting the description stated in the search warrants. Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search
warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the
form of “general warrants.”

The RTC denied Maxicorp’s motion. The RTC also denied Maxicorp’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC
found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano, Sacriz, and
computer technician Pante. The three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to
Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized
Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using petitioners’ products.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the search warrants.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examination
conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals
pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products
from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain “Joel Diaz.”

ISSUES:

WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS; and

WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE “GENERAL WARRANTS

RULING:

1. YES. There was a probable cause. The judge determining probable cause must do so only after
personally examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to "the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses.--- Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement
and unfair competition. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display and offer for sale
counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw how the counterfeit software were produced and
packaged within Maxicorp’s premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated that he was certain the
products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its customers without giving the accompanying
ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates of authenticity.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that
a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable
cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty.— The testimonies of these
two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to
establish the existence of probable cause. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. Probable
cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.

For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the sale of
petitioners’ software occurred. During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano
presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit
Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners’ software. Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent Samiano
purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit. Pante, the
computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners’ software on the same
computer unit. There was a comparison between petitioners’ genuine software and Maxicorp’s software
preinstalled in the computer unit that NBI Agent Samiano purchased. Even if we disregard the sales receipt
issued in the name of “Joel Diaz,” which petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in
the operation, there still remains more than sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrants.

2. PARTLY. There is no existing provision of law which requires that a warrant, partially defective in
specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be
nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in
the warrant. --- It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow. The description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or precise.
The nature of the description should vary according to whether the identity of the property or its character
is a matter of concern. Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant.

e) Computer hardware, including central processing units including hard disks, CD-ROM
drives, keyboards, monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying machines and other
equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal and unauthorized
copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and their manuals, or which contain,
display or otherwise exhibit, without the authority of MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any
and all Microsoft trademarks and copyrights;

The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified physically, they were also specifically
identified by stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles
used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners’ software.

However, the Court find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity. Paragraph (c) states:

c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles,

advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION

The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or other purposes
not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition.

Soliven v. Makasiar

167 SCRA 394 (1988)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Personal determination by judge, examination of witnesses)

FACTS:
On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld
the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case
against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they
have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

Petitioner Beltran also said that the issuance of the warrant of arrest is not valid because the judge did
not personally examined the complainant and witnesses.

On the other hand, Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity
from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by
virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for
the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would
be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. So, the petitioners’ raised 3 questions to
contend if there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the public respondents, respectively:

(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause; and

(3) Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint affidavit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice
and, subsequently, by the President;

Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause; and

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint affidavit.

RULING:

The first question was rendered moot and academic. The allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed
a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing
counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file
his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that
the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter affidavits if he is so minded.

The second question, court interpreted the provision under Article III, sec 2, which states that, no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The court said
that, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

The third question, court said that, the rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention. The petitions fail to establish
that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack
of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

Lim v. Felix

G.R. No. 94054-7 (February 19,1991)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Personal determination by judge, examination of witnesses)

FACTS:

The petitioners were alleged to be behind the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder of Masbate
Congressman Moises Espinosa Sr. and his security escorts. The latter was said to be attacked and killed by
a lone assassin at the airport vicinity in the province. One of the security escorts, Dante Siblante, survived
the assassination pot but was inflicted with a gunshot wound. The Court issued an order for a probable
cause as to the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the petitioners after conducting the preliminary
investigation. Fiscal Antonio Alfante, who was designated to review the case, affirmed the finding of a
prima facie case against the petitioners but altered the designation of the crime from multiple murder
with frustrated murder charged to all of the accused to a case of murder for each of the killing of the four
victims and physical injuries case for the gunshot wound on the buttocks of Siblante. Four separate
information of murder against the 12 accused was filed by the fiscal to the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
with a recommendation of no bail.

The petitioners, in response, filed a petition for change of venue from Masbate to Makati RTC and was
granted for the purpose of preventing miscarriage of justice. The petitioners further questioned the
validity of the warrant of arrest on the ground that it was not personally determined by the respondent
Judge Nemesio Felix since according to the contention of the former, said Judge relied solely on the
recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists.

The petition was dismissed and the validity of the arrest warrants upheld.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a warrant of arrest may be issued by a judge even without bail through merely relying on
the recommendation that a probable cause exists.

RULING:

No. Merely relying on the recommendation of the prosecutor is not sufficient to personally determine
probable cause. Since the determination was made by the provincial prosecutor, the judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion. The warrant of arrest was issued during the time when the records reviewed
by the respondent Fiscal was still in Masbate. The judge, in this case, had no first-hand information to
make his own personal determination regarding the existence of the probable cause. The petitioner’s
motion for the transmittal of records was denied by the judge contending that the fiscal’s
recommendation was sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

It was held that the judge must go beyond the recommendation of the prosecutor whenever necessary.
He should call for the complainant and witness themselves when the circumstances of the case so require
in answering the court’s probing questions.
 Alvarez v. CFI

64 Phil.33 (1937)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Personal determination by judge, examination of witnesses)

FACTS:

On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice,
presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an
affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta,
Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as a moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the
end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct
to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own
knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.

Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition,
ordering the search of the Alvarez’s house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and
documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With
said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered Alvarez’s store and residence at 7:00 p.m.
of 4 June 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the
years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2
memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles
of bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, 2 packages of
correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14 bundles of invoices and other papers,
many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and
stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC).

The search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of Alvarez who stated his protest
below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the
articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, Alvarez, through
his attorney, filed a motion on 8 June 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent,
be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said
agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the court
issued an order directing Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within 24 hours from the receipt of
notice thereof and giving him a period of 5 days within which to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of court.

On 10 June, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that
the order of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the
articles seized for a period of 30 days for the necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an
order requiring agent Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together
with the proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles
seized. On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner filed a petition alleging that the search warrant issued
was illegal and that it had not yet been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in
connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the
return of all the articles seized to Alvarez, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt
of court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority.

On September 10, the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in
accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled,
and that agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and
ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show cause, if any, within the unextendible period
of 2 days from the date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory should
not be returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed
a motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the
purpose of conducting an investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by Alvarez. On
October 10, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed 60 days to examine the
documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16,
23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of 60 days. In an order of
October 16, the court granted him the period of 60 days to investigate said 19 documents. Alvarez, herein,
asks that the search warrant as well as the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain
the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned
to him.

Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the
affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which
were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere
information secured from a person whom he considered reliable, and that it is illegal as it was not
supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant.

Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require
that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant
must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce.
In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound
in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge
given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge
of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause.

The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and
the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in
this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is
admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit
made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither
the Constitution nor General Orders 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions
of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter.
The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.

Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that
of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the
facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or
more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance
of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within
his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause;
when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having
a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was
based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

Mata v. Bayona

128 SCRA 388 (1984)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Personal determination by judge, examination of witnesses)

FACTS:

The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged by
petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information
against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling
illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.”

Petitioner discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant
and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same. This led Mata to file a motion to quash
and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge, stating that the
court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath by the members of the Intelligence
Section of Police and that the fact that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached
to the records. Mata came to the Supreme Court and prayed that the search warrant be declared invalid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

RULING:

NO. We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and
the Rules of Court. Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce".

More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule
126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and
attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine
the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will
be found later that his declarations are false.

The Court, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform to the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.

The judge's insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by petitioner's
claim that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance
of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not
attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the
complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return
of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the
Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise
claims that his photocopy copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show
also the certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge's
own admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not take the
deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding which
will be open and public", such that, according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just
disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.

Respondent Judge impresses the Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures every man,
woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her
action. She claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal “masiao" lottery, she thought it
more prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court room.
Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe
any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of
the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance
of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in
writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to
interlocutory and cross interlocutory and usually subscribed by the witnesses. The searching questions
propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon
the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers
particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The
examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the
secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely
routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath
and must be in writing.

Prudente v. Judge Dayrit

180 SCRA 69 (1989)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Particularity of description)

FACTS:

P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, filed with the (RTC) an application for the issuance of a search warrant.

In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged, among others, as follows:

1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that Nemesio Prudente has
in his control or possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally
possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which the said Nemesio
Prudente is keeping and concealing at the following premises of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines;

2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and therefore, believes that a
Search Warrant should be issued

Respondent Judge issued Search Warrant which was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives.

Petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that:

1. The complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which
formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant;

2. The examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers;

3. The search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place
to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and

4. The search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the
complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.

Respondent Judge issued an order, denying the petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 10 was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was probable cause to satisfy the issuance of a search warrant.
RULING:

No. For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be PROBABLE CAUSE, which is to be determined
personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

Probable cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as “such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."

This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed"
that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives described therein,
and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact."

On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their
continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered information from verified sources" that the
holders of the said firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them.

In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only
through information from other sources or persons.

Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short.
Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers."
On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer.

Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant."

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION

The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended.

In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to
be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines.

The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that
a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at
the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.

20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. CA

164 SCRA 655 (1988)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Particularity of description)

FACTS:

A letter-complaint by petitioner 20thCentury Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought the National
Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the
latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets
all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in
videotape form which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49(otherwise known as
the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property).

Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants.

The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents,
raided the video outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was
made and left with the private respondents. The lower court later on lifted the 3 search warrants and
ordered the NBI to return the properties that were seized.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it lifted the
search warrants it earlier issued against the private respondents?

RULING:

No. In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private
respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said search warrants
and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of
copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed

As found out by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of
the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private
respondents.

Only the petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the
search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the
lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the
allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the
copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to
determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant.

Search warrant must contain a specific description of the articles to be seized. General warrants are
constitutionally objectionable.

Nolasco v. Cruz Pano

132 SCRA 152 (1985)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Particularity of description)

FACTS:

One of the petitioners (Aguilar-Roque) was accused of the Rebellion of Military Commission No. 25. She
was arrested on August 6, 1984, 11:30 AM by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Arrested with
Roque was Nolasco. 30 minutes later, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon St.,
Quezon City. During the said search, one of the petitioners Tolentino, who was the person in-charge of
the premises, was arrested. 428 documents and written materials were seized, together with a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
Three hours prior to the search, Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG applied for a search warrant
from Judge Paño to be served on 239-B Mayon St., Quezon City. Said place was determined to be the
leased residence of Aguilar-Roque after almost a month of “round the clock surveillance.” Said warrant
was issued in proceedings entiled “PP v. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80-84 for
rebellion.” This is known to be the Search Warrant Case.

Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque and Tolentino wre charged for subversion/rebellion and/or conspiracy to
commit rebellion/subversion.

Petitioners, on December 12, prayed in a Motion to Suppress filed with MTC Judge Santos that the items
(total of 431) be returned to them. Such motion was denied by Judge Santos on the ground that the
validity of the Search Warrant had to be litigated in the Search Warrant Case.

Petitioners assert that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it did not
sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure and that probable
cause had not been properly established for lack of searching questions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant issued was of general warrant and illegal?

RULING:

NO. The search warrant is of General, thus, it was hereby annulled by set aside.

The items enumerated in the search warrant were vaguely described and not particularized. There is
absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized this giving
the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize. Therefore, it is in the nature
of a general warrant and thus infringes the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of
the things to be seized.

Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the search warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized
under an invalid search should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar, for
some searches may be made without warrant. As declared in Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
a person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the crime. Said provision is confined to search, without a search
warrant of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the
place or premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without a search warrant. In the
latter case, “the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and
circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in
the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. What
must be considered is the balancing of the individual’s right to privacy and the public’s interest in the
prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals.”

Roque –charged with rebellion which is a crime against public order, a warrant for her arrest had not
been served for a considerable period of time, arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling, and
search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest – did not need a search warrant for the
possible effective results in the interest of public order.

PICOP v. Asuncion

307 SCRA 253 (1999)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (Particularity of description)

FACTS:

Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant from the RTC of Quezon City. The
search warrant was for the alleged possession of high powered firearms, ammunitions and explosives by
the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines management at PICOP compound in Brgy. Tabon,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
The sought search warrant would enable law enforcers to take possession the following:

1. 'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2)
UZI submachine gun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal.40mm, ten

2. (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted
ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.'

Attached to the application were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T.
Morito, as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and
Felipe Moreno. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Asuncion issued the assailed
search warrant. On February 4, 1994, the police enforced the search warrant and was able to seize
firearms.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the RTC on the ground that the search warrant was invalid and
the search was unenforceable. The petitioners also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash
and Motion to Suppress Evidence.

RTC: Denied the petitioner’s motions and likewise denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition to the Supreme Court for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for (1) the
nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995,
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; and (2) the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist
from proceeding with IS No. 95-167.

SC: prior to the resolution of the case it issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.

ISSUES:

1. WON there was a valid search warrant.

2. WON there was personal examination of the witnesses.

3. WON Witness Bacolod’s testimony pertained to facts PERSONALLY KNOWN to him.

4. WON the search warrant stated with particularity the place to be searched.

5. WON the firearms seized admissible in court.

RULING:

1. NO.

In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally
the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for
the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to
possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.

The requisites for a valid search warrant are the following: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence
is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place
to be searched and the things to be seized. (For more explanation, refer to the sub-issues below.)

2. NO.

The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application
While Chief Inspector Pascua’s application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint Deposition
of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary of information and (3) supplementary
statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno, however, except for Pascua and Bacolod none of the
aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover, Pascua’s
participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness
Bacolod: Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he failed even
to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone
probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod. Judge Asuncion relied mainly
on their affidavits which has been frowned upon by the Court.

3. NO.

His testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD
1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. The facts and circumstances that
would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances.
The introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative
ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present
case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the
same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must
show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.

Witness Bacolod, during his deposition, failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP
compound was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guards were not
licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before
the trial court that PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse,
Pascua and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application for search warrant a copy of the
no license certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to present it during
the hearing. Such certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in
Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based.

4. NO.

The requirement that the warrant has to state with particularity the place to be searched is important for
two reasons: (1) the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional
protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his
privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards; and (2) related to the probable cause requirement in that the lack of a more
specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate
that the described items are to be found in a particular place.

The assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. It simply authorizes a search of
only one place which is the PICOP compound located at Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, but it did
not specify the particular places within the compound that are to be searched. The PICOP compound,
however, is made up of 200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23
warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are
spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares.The warrant gives the police officers unbridled and
thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound.

While the Police stated that they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied
for the warrant and that the housing units were not searched, the Supreme Court was not convinced by
this argument. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not made integral parts of the search
warrant issued by Judge Asuncion. Moreover, the fact that the raiding police team knew which of the
buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack
of particulars of the place to be searched. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the
place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the
proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. This is because no less than the Constitution
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized.

5. NO.

Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the
firearms, explosives and other materials seized were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. As
the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. This
exclusionary rule not only protects the constitutional right against illegal searches and seizures but it also
prevents coercing of evidence.

As a result of the seizure of the firearms, the PNP filed with the DOJ against petitioners for illegal
possession of firearms. SInce the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the illegally
obtained pieces of evidence which have been held to be inadmissible, the complaint and the proceedings
have no more leg to stand on.

NOTES:

RULE 126. Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him
to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)

ARTICLE iii,, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

Unilab v. Isip

G.R. No. 163858 (June 28, 2005)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (What may be seized or searched?)

FACTS:

UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB
products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine
manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed
an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the
court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB,
particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where
seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were
brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion.

The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that
the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were
seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

UNILAB, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI agents, for the reconsideration of the order,
contending that the ground used by the court in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the
respondents, and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The respondents
objected to the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that the latter could not appear for the
People of the Philippines.

ISSUES:
Whether the petitioner is the proper party to file the petition at bench;

Whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the Shalimar building
and the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid
under the plain view doctrine.

RULING:

On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner’s contention that a search warrant proceeding is, in no
sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any
person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect
with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings. While an application for a search warrant is
entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action.

A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State
to procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public
prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must
issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines.

However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government agency
charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file
pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant
issued by the court and the admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be
filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. The party
may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the
reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash.

From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led
to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the general
rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition
will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line
with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case
against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General.

On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and Inoflox, the Court rejects
the contention of the petitioner.

A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition
to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in
scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant.

Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be
seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant
cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law
enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from
which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently;
and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of the object
or the facts therein available to him, determine probable cause of the object’s incriminating evidence In
other words, to be immediate, probable cause must be the direct result of the officer’s instantaneous
sensory perception of the object. The object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to
connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the
course of the search, without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the
moment of seizure.

It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were seized
based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view
of the NBI agents; evidence should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential
requirements for the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the respondents’ motion to quash,
or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The
immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain view exception relied upon by the petitioner
and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence.
In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or
any of the petitioner’s representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to
prove that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their
contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI
agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their
contents.

In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential
requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.

Katz v. United States

389 US 347

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (What may be seized or searched?)

FACTS:

The petitioner, Charles Katz, was charged with conducting illegal gambling operations across state lines in
violation of federal law. In order to collect evidence against Katz, federal agents placed a warrantless
wiretap on the public phone booth that he used to conduct these operations. The agents listened only to
Katz's conversations, and only to the parts of his conversations dealing with illegal gambling transactions.

In the case of Olmstead v. United States (1928), the Supreme Court held that the warrantless wiretapping
of phone lines did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. According to the
Court, physical intrusion (a trespass) into a given area, and not mere voice amplification (the normal result
of a wiretap), is required for an action to constitute a Fourth Amendment search. This is known as the
"trespass doctrine." Partly in response to this decision, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act
of 1933. This Act required, among other things, federal authorities to obtain a warrant before wiretapping
private phone lines. In the case of Silverman v. United States (1961), the Supreme Court refined the
Olmstead trespass doctrine by holding that an unreasonable search occurs only if a "constitutionally
protected area" has been intruded upon.

At his trial, Katz sought to exclude any evidence connected with these wiretaps, arguing that the
warrantless wiretapping of a public phone booth constitutes an unreasonable search of a "constitutionally
protected area" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The federal agents countered by saying that a
public phone booth was not a "constitutionally protected area," therefore, they could place a wiretap on
it without a warrant.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless wiretapping of a public phone booth violates the unreasonable search and seizure
clause of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

RULING:

By a 7-1 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Katz and held that placing of a warrantless wiretap on
a public phone booth constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Potter Stewart, however, did not address the case from the
perspective of a "constitutionally protected area." In essence, the majority argued that both sides in the
case were wrong to think that the permissibility of a warrantless wiretap depended upon the area being
placed under surveillance. "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected," the Court stated.

Building upon this reasoning, the Court held that it was the duty of the Judiciary to review petitions for
warrants in instances in which persons may be engaging in conduct that they wish to keep secret, even if
it were done in a public place. The Court held that, in the absence of a judicially authorized search warrant,
the wiretaps of the public phone booth used by Katz were illegal. Therefore, the evidence against him
gathered from his conversations should be suppressed.

Worldwide Web Corporation vs. People and PLDT

G.R. Nos. 161106 (January 13, 2014)

Topic: Conditions for a valid warrant (What may be seized or searched?)

FACTS:

FACTS: Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office of the PNP
filed applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon City to search the office premises of Worldwide
Web Corporation and Planet Internet Corporation. The applications alleged that petitioners were
conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of P.D. No. 401 (Penalizing
the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water
or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the PLDT.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicants Rivera and Gali
of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.

According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass through the local exchange
or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the international gateway
facilities (IGFs) in the Philippines. The call is then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits,
either via fiber optic submarine cable or microwave radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll
center of one of the IGFs in the destination country. The toll center would then meter the call, which will
pass through the PSTN of the called number to complete the circuit. In contrast, WWC and Planet Internet
were able to provide international long distance call services to any part of the world by using PLDT’s
telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and
completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which
connects directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the originating country or the country
where the call is originated."

On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to WWC was used
to provide a service called GlobalTalk, "an internet-based international call service, which can be availed
of via prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts." During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT
telephone number 6891135, the given access line. After a voice prompt required him to enter the user
code and PIN provided under a GlobalTalk prepaid account, he was then requested to enter the
destination number, which included the country code, phone number and a pound sign. The call was
completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the records, it showed that the call
was only directed to the local number 6891135. This indicated that the international test call using
GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.

Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to WWC. However, upon an ocular
inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant of the unit is Planet
Internet, which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC. These telephone lines are
interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC.

Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by petitioners to
a piece of equipment that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they violated P.D. No.
401 as amended, on unauthorized installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also committed theft,
because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and with clear intent to gain,
they illegally stole business and revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to
the letter and intent of R. A. No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of
access and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and
infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues from international long distance calls. Further,
petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National
Telecommunications Commission prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment without first
securing type approval license from the latter. PLDT computed a monthly revenue loss of P764,718.09.
They alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes,
license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.

During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be searched,
as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and servers that would be taken.
The RTC granted the application for search warrants. Three warrants were issued against the office
premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items in the office premises of WWC
and Planet Internet, which includes various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers,
lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, and support
equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the
illegal toll bypass operations. The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of
the NCR-PNP.

Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 CPUs, 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and
files, and a laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were
confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as the President’s Office
and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers,
were also seized. Petitioners filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically
the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained
of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants
were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.

In the hearing of the motions to quash, the test calls alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown to have
passed the IGF of Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. and of Capital Wireless. Planet Internet
explained that Eastern and Capwire both provided international direct dialing services, which Planet
Internet marketed by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the first phase
of the call; but for the second phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously
paid PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage. None of these
contentions were refuted by PLDT.

The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of
general warrants. Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to
petitioners.

PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on the ground that it had failed to get the
conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. PLDT appealed to the CA and the appellate court reversed and set aside the
RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and effective.

Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. Among the points raised was that PLDT
should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution
before the CA. The appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not conformity of the public prosecutor is necessary prior filing a motion for
reconsideration to question an order quashing search warrants

2) Whether or not an order quashing a search warrant issued independently prior to the filing of a criminal
action is deemed a final order that can be the subject of an appeal

3) Whether or not the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause, considering that the
acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft

4) Whether or not the assailed search warrants were general warrants

HELD:

1) No. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, therefore, conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary to give PLDT personality to question the motion to quash granted by the
RTC.

SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions? — All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.

The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the
prosecution of all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information. However, a search warrant
is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor.

An application for a search warrant is a special criminal process, rather than a criminal action. The
application for and the obtention of a search warrant cannot be equated with the institution and
prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal
process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction
over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. The requisites, procedure and purpose
for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal
action.

A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant
is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery.
It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

A search warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise
of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction.

Therefore, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. The Supreme Court consistently
recognizes the right of parties to question orders quashing those warrants. The CA's ruling that the
conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration
of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants is sustained.

2) Yes. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the filing of a
criminal action, is not merely an interlocutory order. It partakes of a final order and can be the proper
subject of an appeal. Therefore, PLDT was correct when they assailed the quashal orders via an appeal
rather than a petition for certiorari.

A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined;
on the other hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be done upon its merits.

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal
case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which the
search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of
determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.

Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, the quashal of a search
warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the
determination of the guilt of the accused therein.

In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be
filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the
judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.

Thus, the CA correctly ruled that is this case, the applications for search warrants were instituted as
principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued
were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the
quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken
therefrom.

3. Yes. The assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause. Trial judges determine probable
cause in the exercise of their judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant is accorded respect by reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.

The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts and circumstances that would lead
a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.

There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a
matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function.
They determine probable cause based on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the offender.

When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding
is accorded respect by reviewing courts.

It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A
magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means
that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.

Petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable cause necessitates the prior
determination of whether a crime or an offense was committed in the first place. They argue that there
is no law punishing toll bypass, the act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed that would
justify the issuance of the search warrants.

According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls and not overseas calls,
thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of access, termination or bypass charges, and accounting
rates; payment to the government of taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT
concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives legitimate telephone operators, of the
compensation which it is entitled to had the call been properly routed through its network. As such, toll
bypass operations constitute theft, because all of the elements of the crime are present therein.

Petitioners argue that there is no theft to speak of, because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT
partake of the nature of future earnings and lost business opportunities and, as such, are uncertain,
anticipative, speculative, contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of such unrealized
earnings and opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.

However, it is to be noted that the affidavits of Rivera and Gali that accompanied the applications for the
search warrants charge petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass per se, but of theft of PLDT’s
international long distance call business committed by means of the alleged toll bypass operations.

For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the taking by
petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5)
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon
things.

It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of
theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without the installation of
telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held liable for
violation of P.D. 401, to wit:

Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped gas connection without
previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric
Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas Corporation, as the case
may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby
water, electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or water,
electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered
water, electrical or gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or
piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both.

It must be noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable
cause. The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature
of general warrants, which was reversed by the CA.

4) No. The assailed search warrants are not general warrants. The requirement of particularity in the
description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search warrant bear a direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought.

A general warrant is defined as a search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be
arrested or the property to be seized. It is one that allows the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.

Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to
abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards
have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most
compelling and lawful reasons.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify
the rules regarding the following places and items to be searched under a search warrant:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:

a) Subject of the offense;

b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense;
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants, the Court has been mindful
of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers in describing the items to be searched, especially when
these items are technical in nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to
them.

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not
required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the
property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed,
the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually
impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to
look for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search
with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.

The particularity of the description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is required
wherever and whenever it is feasible. A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise
and minute detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties
to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.

A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when
the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant
is being issued.

PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants
and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search
warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and was able to confirm that
they had utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas,
modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software,
diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.

The petitions were DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision were AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

Rule 126 Search and Seizure. Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence;
where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be
filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has
been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued search warrant. However,
if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the
motion shall be resolved by the latter court.
Rule 126 Search and Seizure. Section 4. Requisites for Issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the jusdge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.

Rule 126 Search and Seizure. Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued
for the search and seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense;
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense