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Reject New undisclosed affirmatives –


1. Makes neg prep impossible

2. Decks education because we have to run generics

3. Justifies severance, perf can and condo so we can get out time back
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Interp – Rez only allows the AFF to adopt basic income, jobs guarantee, or expand
social security

Violation- Green New Deal is way more than a jobs guarantee.


DEBORAH D'SOUZA 22

Deborah D'Souza is the former news editor at Investopedia. She also writes articles that bring together
information from across different financial fields; Understanding the Green New Deal & What's in the
Climate Proposal; https://www.investopedia.com/the-green-new-deal-explained-4588463

While politicians have known about climate change and the idea of a Green New Deal for years, this is the most detailed plan presented to the
American people to transform the economy, even though it is extremely vague and acts as a set of principles and goals rather than of specific policies. The text of the resolution
details how climate change affects the economy, the environment, and national security, and outlines goals and projects for a 10-year national mobilization. 11 The plan emphasizes

environmental and social justice. It acknowledges how historically oppressed groups (indigenous peoples, people of color, the poor, and migrants) are more likely to
be affected by climate change and asks that they be included and consulted. Its progressive spirit is reflected in calls for the protection of

workers’ rights, community ownership, universal healthcare, and a job guarantee. 12

Voters: Limits and Predictability - allowing the AFF to add anything to a jobs guarantee
explodes the topic to any industry or federal spending on any program – kills ground.
3
The Green New Deal ignores and perpetuates the exploitation of black and brown
communities while obscuring the parasitic nature of capitalist production.
Perry and Sealey-Huggins 23, 6/23/23, Keston K Perry is a professor of Africana Studies at Williams
College and has a PhD in Oriental and African Studies from the University of London specializing in
Caribbean economic thought, race and climate change in the Caribbean and marginalized communities.
Leon Sealey Higgins has a PhD in philosophy and Sociology from the University of Leeds and a Professor
of Global Sustainable Development at the University of Warwick, working on the social and political
dimensions of sustainability, “Racial capitalism and climate justice: White redemptive power and the
uneven geographies of eco-imperial crisis,” Geoforum Journal,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2023.103772, Orr

On redeeming whiteness at the United Nations and the allure of Green New Deals. For a long time, the writing had been on the
wall for marginalized regions and countries whose disaster profiles and vulnerability have only become
targets for asset managers like Black Rock and investors interested in making huge profits from climate
disaster (e.g. Lustgarten, 2022, Perry, 2021b). In light of this, the UNFCCC seemed to offer a rare forum, for these countries to voice and
share their experiences, albeit one lacking in serious progress. At COP 26, countries left with only an undertaking to discuss loss and damage
and a partial deal on ‘methane emissions’ with no binding and secure arrangement on fossil fuels (Jacobs, 2022). For some climate negotiators
and scholars accustomed to the pace of multilateral climate governance, or who dance well to the tune of the status quo within these
mainstream spaces, these inflection points may represent progress on longstanding issues. However, for global south communities being
destructively reconstructed and refashioned after every hurricane season or flooding event, these piecemeal shifts offer limited hope of new
avenues for life and possibility. As Patrick Bond, reflecting on the first global Climate Justice Forum and COP 26 suggests, the non-ambition of
the Paris Agreement may have inured and insulated many in the very narrow framings, (non)reformist reforms, and politically problematic
objectives that it offered (Bond, 2021). He further argues that “no matter how much debate proceeds in injecting various justice framings into
the UNFCCC, it will be impossible to generate an outcome of human endeavor, and planetary survival will be moot” (Bond, 2021, p. 338). This
series of papers may help unlock new potential principles, analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances (called PASTA) that Bond and others have
found necessary (Bond, 2021). Apprehending the material effects of race as an ordering construct of capitalism permits new investigations into
questions that affect global South communities and the equally dysselected in the global North (Wynter, 2003). Climate-related
impacts not only reinforce imperial relationships (Bonilla, 2020, Sheller, 2020) and reproduce surplus
populations (Perry, 2021a). They also offer empirical ground to reflect critically on the very material and
epistemic terms by which new and reconfigured contours of humanism are being remapped (Baldwin, 2022)
and have long been defined by proximity to European ideals. The approaches adopted in these papers
emphasizes how racialist ideas and class politics underpin climate change measures , their global
diffusion, ongoing extractive practices and the relationship between capital, land dispossession , and
transformed relationship between nature and non-human beings (Bledsoe and Wright, 2019, Davis et al., 2019,
Girvan, 1975, Girvan, 2014, Gómez-Barris, 2017, Penados et al., 2022, Rice et al., 2021, Simpson, 2017). Political responses at
different scales, from climate activism to state-level actions to ongoing climate and economic crises that
appear virtuous or well-meaning need to be analyzed and interrogated along these lines . Climate activist
groups, especially those emerging in 2019 in Northern Europe, led by Greta Thunberg, have been predominantly white and extol longstanding
views about nature and the environment and representing middle-class interests (Kalt, 2021, Rosa-Aquino and Campbell, 2020). Their
activism, often couched as “saving the environment” (see, IPPR Environmental Justice Commission, 2021), have ignored
the history of Black and brown anti-racist environmental movements and the intersectional and anti-
capitalist nature that these struggles took on, often emerging from the global Sout h during the 1980s (Rehman,
2022). These new movements have often not paid attention to the relationship between colonialism, often
perpetrated by their own states and corporations and ecological violence , and the primary role of
capitalist social relations in ecological breakdown. In this vein, widespread attention has been paid to what is perhaps
perceived as the most prominent of ‘progressive’ environmental crisis policy proposals by global North thinkers and institutions:
‘Green New Deals’ (hereafter GNDs) (Chowdhury 2022: Chomsky and Pollin, 2020, Commission, 2019, Ocasio-Cortez, 2019, Pollin, 2015,
Táíwò, 2022, Unctad, 2019). GNDs aim to decarbonize the economy and generate large-scale public investment in ‘green’ jobs and industries
but they also tend
to reinforce deep-rooted global stratifications in the process (Ajl, 2021, Paul, 2021, Perry, 2020,
Sealey-Huggins, 2021). This is because they primarily advocate
techno-fixes which would do little to nothing to address
the root causes of climate breakdown (War on Want and London Mining Network, 2019). GND interventions also tend
to obfuscate how environmental policies – including ‘net zero’ and carbon–neutral targets – treat Black
and brown places as zones for imperial clearing and remediation to be performed by the very actors
who have perpetrated these harms over decades and centuries (e.g. IPPR Environmental Justice Commission, 2021). In
other words, GNDs do little to address the ongoing legacies of racial capitalism. It is noteworthy that GNDs are not
themselves uniform in their orientation, nor do they always propose homogeneous and modernist developmental reforms. For instance, Max
Ajl’s ‘A People’s Green New Deal’ (2021) should have four integral elements: universal access to renewable energy, national political (and
worker) sovereignty, climate reparations, decommodified public spaces, and food sovereignty based on agroecological techniques of
production. Harpreet Paul similarly calls for innovative
mechanisms that raise funding for those already marginalized
“in a way that protects, respects and promotes human flourishing within our planetary boundaries ” (Paul,
2021, p. iii). She further suggests that reparative climate justice should be about fostering coalitions and cooperative action in workplaces,
communities, schools and hospitals, and embodies a vision and movement that recognizes human-nature interdependences. Leon Sealey-
Huggins (2021) also believes that dismantling harmful ownership structures precipitating the climate crisis, and harnessing community power
are important related steps in developing a truly internationalist approach. Nonetheless, GNDs appear to have fallen out of favor, even in
their inadequate neo-imperialist form in which subordinate countries’ futures are tied
to further and more violent resource
extraction and their wishes for democratic and viable alternatives for life are undermined. At the same time, a
‘cost of living crisis’ has hit countries in the global North, connected both to the aftermath of Covid-19
inflation hikes linked to supply challenges and super-profiteering, and the surge in wholesale gas prices
due to ongoing war in Ukraine. For countries with a significant debt burden, the crisis has exacerbated pre-existing hardships.
Appreciation of the hegemonic currency, the US Dollar, means that countries are facing lower export volumes, increased debt service payments
and borrowing costs linked to adjustments in interest rates in the US and Europe (Debt Justice, 2022). This means countries face sovereign
default, such as recently experienced by Ghana, Sri Lanka, and Zambia. There is also the likelihood of more forceful intervention at the hands of
their creditors or their agents. Yet these proposalshave so far marginalized the experiences of climate devastation
that are already being visited on racialized communities in the Global South. As indicated above, the geo-
physical and socio-ecological relations that are spawned in the wake of climate breakdown perpetuate
and exacerbate asymmetries that harken to longstanding colonialist relations between the global North
and South. New solutions are underpinned by processes of racialization and racialized subjectivities
germane to the colonial and modernizing development project. New formations and practices that are
anticipated under a ‘global’ GND put forward by the United Nations do not contest existing spatial
asymmetries of technologies, power, capital, and resources (Gallagher and Kozul-Wright, 2019, Unctad, 2019). Instead,
proposals often claim to offer a new ideas and approaches based on reformed multilateralism, by which
all boats rise to new green horizons. These imaginaries further discount and ignore the global racial
hierarchy that was set in motion due to colonial political and economic relations and their new mutations created
in the postwar era. While GNDs appear to have sound principles, the manner in which the most prominent discussions
and practices have emerged around them, whether in ‘progressive’ or social democratic circles is a
universal imposition in which global class struggle is downplayed. In addition to oppressed voices, positions and
aspirations of global South people and communities are silenced and deemed an afterthought. It is purported as a redeeming effort with all of
its paternalism, that (white) elites and middle classes know better and that global
South peoples need salvation from the
worst effects of the problems created by extractivist and high-carbon consuming elites and corporations
in the global North. While the work of creating new structures for labor and community-controlled
workplaces appear essential and progressive, as GND proponents proffer (Táíwò, 2022), these working
arrangements are nestled in already exploitative global commodity chains. The task of dismantling labor
arrangements arising from capitalist social relations and spatial dependencies with global North
corporations and institutions remains to be seen. In the post-Trump period, the United States presents itself as a shining light
in climate Armageddon, having just secured a climate deal in Congress, awkwardly called ‘The Inflation Reduction Act’. The Act proposes to
spend $370 billion on climate issues, yet it permits more fossil fuel exploration and licensing (Davenport and Friedman, 2022). Europe also
presents itself as a hopeful beacon of ‘carbon neutrality’ with its intention to reduce its supposed dependence on fossil fuels (from its former
colonies) (European Commission, 2018), which the Russian invasion of Ukraine has only further complicated. The climate crisis and its uneven
unfolding offers spaces for redemptive acts of nominal inclusion and violent exclusion through green capitalist utopias. The erasure,
displacement and uneven mobility of people and places accompanying such moves serve to ground new acts of purification, rebirth and
redemption (see Shilliam, 2012, Wynter, 1995). There is a possibility that ultimate “inclusion” on the COP 27 agenda and “recognition” – which
were long being vehemently denied – through statements from global North powers about loss and damage leading up to the latest climate
summit can be seen as a form of (violent) imposition (Jackson, 2020) through acts of misremembering historical erasure, misattributing
responsibility, instrumentalizing indigenous ways of knowing, misrecognizing those with the most to lose, and even tokenistic accommodation.
These redemptive acts are paralleled by ‘reformist’ and sometimes punitive policies that offer little else than structural adjustment reforms,
debt packages and so-called innovative financial instruments (Kashwan et al., 2021, Perry, 2022). Further, in this redemptive thrust, the
European Union and United States have weaponized political and economic power within global climate
policy and financial institutions to impose so-called carbon border adjustment taxes that sanction
carbon-intensive exports from the global South (Friedman, 2021, Unctad, 2021), whose societies have long
served as the extractive zones or resource reservoirs for global North corporations, states and investors.
The monumental achievement of green technologies and the green futures they are meant to realise, is to allow global North corporations to
promote, patent, and dominate this apparent form of redemption (Ajl, 2021). The public investment push of GNDs adds credence to the
rational redemption of the state as a basis for socio-ecological transformation (Wynter, 1995, p. 15) – what we argue is a new crisis
configuration that rearticulates degrees of humanness – in part supported by climate science reports, climate financial architecture, and the
mainstream of global climate governance. The
current changes in monetary and fiscal policy that increase parasitic
debt relations is another example in which the exploitation of global South workers is made worse and
entrench inequalities. Understanding and problematizing these entanglements and linkages between
connected yet distinct geographies in terms of labor surplus value extraction, commodification, and land
overexploitation would help unlock and demonstrate which human institutions need dismantling at
different scales. An analytic that promotes internationalism and appreciates labor exploitation as heterogeneous,
uneven and interconnected processes enables a broader consideration of alternatives and highlight the
ongoing struggle and legacy of global South movements. It should also eschew universal global policy fixes that can be
applied regardless of historical or political context and needs, and ideally should eliminate the straightjacket with which governments and
people in the South must currently contend in pursuing their own goals and ideas towards self-determination and ecological and social justice
by other means.

Capitalism is a protection racket—it’s the root cause of every impact---left


unaddressed, causes extinction
Robinson, PhD Sociology, 16
(William I, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara http://www.truth-
out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis )

In these mean streets of globalized capitalism in crisis, it has become profitable to turn poverty and inequality
into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort
recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe
private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for
team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to
appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for
cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing
in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized
poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation. The
"luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole . Faced with a
stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into
opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked
capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated
by capitalism become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the
opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout
North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went,
social polarization and political tensions have reached explosive dimensions. Where is the crisis headed, what are
the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural
crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares
aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I
highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into
chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-
control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that
had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62
billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its
January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the top 1% owns
more wealth than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global
power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with
just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new global social
apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent
high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating
inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class cannot find
productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world
economy. The signs of an impending depression are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The
Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to
dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing
the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. Alongside the spread of
frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the
culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies
and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-
optation is the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is
channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties
is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization
of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in
India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with
its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of
acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend to
projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction.
We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial
"planetary boundaries." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity
loss. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time
ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what
Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have
transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the
oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis
cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will
forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth
Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into
dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian
empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due
to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given
capital's implacable impulse
to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the
environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system . "Green capitalism" appears as
an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making
opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of
the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the concentrated control over the means of global
communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen
the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the
panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more
perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience
to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now,
however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global
apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new
systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US
occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that
green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through
gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail
themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite
sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In
Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City,
the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg,
a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers
and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's
elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and
shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other
cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those
that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-
to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get
to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system
monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system
and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global
green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly
at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and
violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news"
channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and
indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes,
immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and
capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in
particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the
dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism
and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of
capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over . If the
capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural
crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier
centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had
been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism.
Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that
were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify?
Where can the system now expand? With
the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation
-- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social
and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face
of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated
from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of
social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down
everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced
recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and
exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global
working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's
unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are
uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant
workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and
therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant
workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st
century megacities
become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass
repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of genocide, such as those in
Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy
and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and
do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose
regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the
G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss
such regulation. Elites
historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state
policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital
has broken free from the constraints imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the
transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in
the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from below. At the same time, the
division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories
in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of
transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for
instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned
its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The
Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism A
growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that
any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income. However, in the
viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power
structure is not enough. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and transformation
toward a system in which social need trumps private profit. A global rebellion against the transnational
capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks, there is popular,
grassroots and leftist struggle, and the rise of new cultures of resistance: the Arab Spring; the resurgence of
leftist politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe; the tenacious resistance of Mexican social
movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the
government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers'
movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; Occupy Wall Street, the immigrant rights
movement, Black Lives Matter, fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign
in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles,
moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is
viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as
politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. The systemic critique of global
capitalism must strive to influence, from this vantage point, the discourse and practice of movements
for a more just distribution of wealth and power. Our survival may depend on it.

A Materialist analysis of the welfare state is necessary to expose the institution’s


contradictions – only then may we address the virus rather than the symptoms
Kirkham 17 Dr Ksenia Kirkham is a Lecturer in Economic Warfare in the Department of War Studies. Her current research
interests are: the political economy of sanctions economic warfare strategic communications energy security and welfare states
Previously Ksenia contributed to teaching various postgraduate and undergraduate modules at King’s, including Strategic
Communications, Introduction to International Economics, Energy Security, and Integration of the European Union. Ksenia
received her PhD from the Department of European and International Studies (EIS) at King’s College London. Ksenia also holds
an MBA (British AMBA), and her work experience includes eight years in the oil and gas sector and in petroleum transportation,
with a dynamic career, from junior economist to a senior managerial position “AN OVERVIEW: FROM CONTRADICTIONS OF
CAPITAL TO THE HISTORY OF CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE” https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/an-overview-from-
contradictions-of-capitalto-the-history-of-contradictions-of-the-welfare-state 2017 ///Mgal
The period of neoliberal 'restructuring' began around 1975, when a rise in social spending was challenged by a decrease in the average annual economic growth rate
from 5% from 1965 to 1973 to 2% in 1974 (Alber 1988 a: 187). The economic slowdown – aggravated by the oil crisis of the 1970s – contributed to a continuous fall
in rates of profit and revenues, undermined investment opportunities for technological innovation, which were needed to fuel the 'heartland–contender' and
Atlantic-European competition spirals. Western socialist parties offered an alternative solution to the exhausted compromise between capital and labour that 'had
grounded capital accumulation so successfully in the post-war period' (Harvey 2007 a: 15). However, neoliberalism perceived their political victory over the Left as
the continuation of the battle against the Communist threat of the Cold War period. This socio-economic stalemate was resolved, in the first place, by temporal and
spatial fixes; among the biggest ones were the incorporation of China (1978) and the communist states after 1989 into the global capitalist system (Overbeek 2012:
32). Its second resolution was found in the internationalisation of the monetary system: financialisation and the securitisation of assets offered new profit
opportunities to capital owners and strengthened their bargaining power vis-a-vis the state and labour (Alber 1988 a: 201). The 'integral hegemony' of the US during
the years of Bretton Woods was substituted with a 'new strategy of hegemonic coordination', or the 'minimal hegemony' based on the organisation of financial
power across the globe that 'systematically favoured the US' (Cafruny, Ryner 2005: 8). Financial domination was reinforced by the imperialistic expansion of the EU
and NATO, and by military intervention in the Middle East camouflaged by the 'promotion of democracy, humanitarian aid', or the 'war on terror' .
The
neoliberal counter-revolution 'superficially restored' the primacy of the 'heartland' in the global political
economy through the 'rejection of popular aspirations for anything other than individual wealth' (Van der Pijl
2006:20). The ideology of economic 'globalisation' combined rational expectations and utility maximisations with the recognition of the supreme importance of
money supply (Crotty 2009:563). In short, neoliberalisation meant the 'financialisation' of everything , which destroyed Fordism’s
balance of mass production and mass consumption; the over-accumulation of production was no longer met by an appropriate real demand (Harvey 2007 b:33).
Late developments in securitisation
and the shift from traditional 'originate and hold' to 'originate and
distribute' banking business models led to what the IMF termed an 'arm’s length financial system' (Mizen
2008: 550). Differences between the 'real' and the financial reduced; surplus capital invested in production intensified competition, pushing down prices, which,
along with falling profits, created a 'peculiar combination' favourable for speculation (Choonara 2009:2). Financialisation internalised some contradictions of capital
in the credit system and permitted capitalists to invest in new (biological and informational) technological innovations. 'Post-Fordist' structural fragmentation of
production – decomposition of global value chains, modularity, outsourcing and the digital revolution (the ability to codify design information in digital form) –
rearranged the geography of world manufacturing, with each component functioning according to its competitive advantage. Such factors as the 'deindustrialisation
of formerly unionised core industrial regions', the consolidation of corporate power in the service sector and even the media – were all directed towards the
formation of the neoliberal consensus as 'common sense' (Harvey 2007 a: 53). By the 1980s demographic imbalances, ageing populations and the mobilisation of
women created a 'demand overload' (Alber 1988 a). Even though most Western countries introduced a series of 'legislative curtailments' in social programmes,
social expenditures still grew faster than GDP. In other words, the period of restructuring did not entail an 'unrestrained further expansion nor a dismantling' of
welfare state programmes (Alber 1988 a: 200), but increased the problem of the funding of social programmes. In the 1990s-2000s at
the centre of the
welfare state reforms were the privatisation of public services, such as education, healthcare, water and
power supplies, and the re-commodification of the labour force (McDonald 2014:119). The primacy of individual responsibility
as the solution to issues of inequality was revived, with social policies investing in individual skills and education rather than redistributing wealth directly (Schwartz,
Seabrooke 2008). The rise of individual investment in housing markets and financial products created a form of residential capitalism, overlaid with unsecured
personal debt. The traditional Keynesian welfare state was demolished by the rise of subprime mortgage markets. Social redistribution was exchanged for the 318
The Journal of Social Policy Studies 15 (2) 'asset-bubble-driven privatised' welfare state of the Third Way, which undermined the wage–consumption interplay
(Crouch 2009). The neoliberal developments that preceded the crisis exacerbated the tension between 'use value and exchange value', when the exchange value
was no longer set by the actual costs of production, completely disentangling the social value of labour from its representation in monetary terms. Privatisation and
the re-commodification of public assets aggravated the standoff between 'monopolisation and competition'. The creation of an unemployed pool of 'low-wage
surplus labour' threatened social reproduction. The situation was aggravated by two contradictions of capital that reached a global spread: that of private
appropriation as opposed to common wealth; and that of uneven geographical development and the production of space. The
response of the
welfare state to these contradictions of capital was the financialisation of social policy. In the period of credit
expansion, the creation of an underemployed pool of cheap labour provoked counter-inflationary policies that deepened unemployment and increased financial
pressures on social services. The
welfare state developed the sixth contradiction between a 'pool of cheap labour
power and financial leverage of wealth funds'; the welfare state could no longer maintain the
unemployed without increasing financial leverage. For a time, financialisation resolved this deadlock, permitting welfare states to
continue business-cycle management in liberal regimes, constraining unemployment in socio-democratic regimes and enacting moderate austerity that 'promoted
dis-employment of older workers' in conservative regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990:180). In other words, it enabled the welfare state to 'absorb
costs for which it was not financially equipped' (Ibid). The social impact of financialisation was the transfer of power from traditional
capitalist classes to key global financial centres, nourished by global disparities and uneven geographical development, which eventually led to the global financial
crisis. The welfare state after the financial crisis of 2008 The financial crisis of 2008 'was not an outcome of the stagnation of the purchasing power of wage-earners',
but rather a result of asymmetric income distribution and the long-term problems with over-accumulation and profitability (Duménil, Lévy 2011:5–13). Despite
reciprocal recognition of regulatory flaws and the imperfections of global governance (the deregulation of the financial sector), the causes of the crisis were much
deeper: global imbalances, rising inequality, genuine uncertainty and technological progress. Once again capital entered the 'dangerous' zone: the first contradiction
was the 'endless compound growth' when capital’s ability to rely on demographic growth was diminishing (Harvey 2014:242). The next one was what Harvey calls
'capital’s relation to nature', when capitalism damages its most critical inputs, such as labour power and the environmental basis. These developments awaited a
reaction from the welfare state. For a time, it felt as if the crisis was postponing the effects of the 'dangerous' contradictions and had reversed neoliberal policies,
with growing public discontent towards privatised welfare services that failed to fulfil their societal functions. In the search for alternatives to privatisation, various
nonstate actors, such as NGOs, community groups, labour unions and faith-based establishments, demanded a greater role in public services and welfare provision
(McDonald 2014:120). As
a result, a complex network of public provision appeared, in partnership with non-
state partners, such as public–private partnerships (PPPs), NGOs, not-for-profit community agencies and
profit-oriented public–public partnerships (PUPs). The financial crisis raised questions about whether social democracy could be revived
(Ryner 2010:554). The state–private form of social provision, however, symbolised another victory for the neoliberal doctrine over Keynesianism in the instalment
of the welfare state. In 2010, the seemingly formidable effectiveness of European welfare states in mitigating the bitter effects of the crisis was undermined by
'structural adjustment' to austerity measures in public social policies (Hermann 2014). The need for austerity was dictated by growing fiscal deficits, augmented by
the rescue programmes of finance capital in the aftermath of the crisis. The welfare state 'became a major target of budget consolidation' (Ibid:201). Since then, the
increasing concern among the population has been about 'corporatised' state-owned and state-operated social services, which have been 'increasingly run on
commercial principles that mimic the private sector' (Ibid:121). The Global Recession was the result of the 'unleashed' hegemony of the US, with its 'impressive
capacity to convert debt into sustainable capital accumulation and growth', privileges in utilising seigniorage, capitalised security markets and the residual welfare
state, to which European social democracy offered few alternatives (Ryner 2010:559). The EU relaunched integration, labelled 'embedded neoliberalism' (Joseph
2013), aimed at adjusting neomercantilism and sociodemocratic logics to the primacy of the neoliberal objective. The process was stuck in the asymmetry of
European governance: the 'Lisbon strategy' of the EU represented the interests of powerful transnational political forces that support the tactics of re-
commodification, therefore failing to balance between social cohesion and European competitiveness (Van Apeldoorn, Hagerb 2010:209). The US remained at the
top of the global hierarchy, trying to protect the position of USbased capital, which needed that protection more than ever. Economic growth in all industrial
countries within the heartland-contender division was stagnating or recovering too slowly to create employment. The sustainability of new 'contender' states, such
as Russia and Iran, was increasingly challenged by the inherent instability of the international financial system and by limited access to global capital markets as the
result of economic sanctions. The political fragility within the Western capitalist cluster was exacerbated by the
crisis in the Eurozone. Despite internal competition in the 'heartland', and regardless of the economic
turmoil in 320 The Journal of Social Policy Studies 15 (2) Europe, the adherence of Western capitalist states to neoliberal policies made them resistant to the
pressures for welfare state structural reforms. As a result, the welfare state’s reaction to the underlying contradictions of

capital was limited to a cosmetic 'social investment model', based on 'employment activation' strategies
and 'flexicurity' – a model for enhancing both flexibility and security in the labour market (Diamond, Lodge 2014:37). At present, Western welfare states
demonstrate 'resistance to change' in terms of reconciling 'embedded neoliberalism' with social risks, such as negative demography, structural changes in labour
markets, family instability and gender inequality (Ibid:37). 'Austerity', which entails the cutting of welfare spending, remains one of the most important instruments
of class power restoration by setting the 'conditions of profitable accumulation' and labour market deregulation (Pradella 2016). The promotion offiscal discipline
holds priority oversocial protection.Cuts in social spending, especially in healthcare and education, are particularly severe in countries hit hardest by the crisis, such
as Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Poverty, social exclusion and rising inequality are the results of welfare state retrenchment. Furthermore, the
neoliberal
response to the crisis has reinforced the 'wrong way' of redistribution, with banks becoming not only
too big to fail but also 'too politically powerful to be constrained' (Stiglitz 2010:38–40). Harvey’s contradiction of income and
wealth disparities has revealed the seventh inconsistency of the welfare state: between employment and income

security. As such, bitter material deprivation among the toiling population endangers the entire system of employment
as a security net against poverty and questions the ability of the European Social Model to serve as an
income safety cushion afterthe crisis(Hermann 2014). Moreover, the impoverishment of the employed challenge crucial inverse functions of
the welfare state: the reproduction of labour power and the maintenance of the non-working population (the eighth contradiction). Conclusion The theoretical
value of the contradictions of capital, discovered by Karl Marx, has become 'more relevant today than in the mid-to-late nineteenth century' (Jessop 2012:92). The
demand for the advancement of historical materialist settings in theorising the welfare state is
dictated by the latest developments in modern capitalist societies, which seem to be encountering political and the
transnational over the national in the theoretical visualisation of the history of humankind. This makes Marx’s legacy alive to this day, reconstructed and updated by
Gramsci, developed and extended by Van de Pijl, further augmented and generalised by Harvey. It has been suggested that research
on the welfare
state should begin with the analysis of the contradictions inherent to capitalism by placing each studied
society in a geopolitical context. In support of this argument, this article has pioneered in connecting the contradictions of capital to the
contradictions of the welfare state, focusing on the five main periods of welfare 321 Kirkham • An Overview: From Contradictions of Capital to the History... state
evolution in western capitalist societies. With
the aid of this correlation, what is demonstrated is how and why
Keynesian demand-management, universalism and de-commodification, which are aimed at social
welfare enhancement, in fact result in social repression. This repressive mechanism of social control is reinforced by the fact that
people’s ability to balance the contradictory nature of capitalism is illusory and actually increases personal insecurity. The acceleration of welfare state programs
that followed, with its further de-commodification and the empowerment of trade unions, led to a growing political, economic and social dependence on the
welfare state, to the shortage of social funds, to the decline of real wages, to the rise of unemployment and, ultimately, to the destruction of the 'class compromise'.
The demolition of the Keynesian welfare state and the privatisation and financialisation of private services has succeeded in deferring rather than resolving the
contradictions of the welfare state. Moreover,
new 'dangerous' contradictions have emerged as a result of neoliberal
policies threatening labour power reproduction and income security. In summary, by underlining the contradictions of capitalism it is
possible to better understand the dynamics of modern social policies, and by discovering the contradictions of the welfare state – to better understand why these
policies do not often meet public expectations. The study thus suggests more generally that the welfare state should be expanded further by adding a global

dimension to its conceptualisation. This will not only contribute to the comparative studies of European
welfare regimes but will also open up the possibility of developing a Comparative Welfare Studies of non-western capitalist states. Future research should
widen the analytic coverage beyond the cases of western welfare state regimes considered in this article, to the modern 'contender' states, such as China or Russia.
In this regard, further work should examine the possibility of an inclusion of the international component in the concept of the welfare state, along with the
consideration of the state’s position in global systems as a parameter of the institutional structure. Advanced
conceptualisation of the
welfare state regime within a transnational framework will contribute to multidisciplinary studies of
western and non-western societies and will make it possible to transgress the split between welfare
state comparative studies and international political economy.
4
Text: The United States Federal Government Should
- Adopt a Universal, Basic Servies program
- establish and regulate a privately funded national green infrastructure investment
bank in the United States
- expand eligibility and compensation of unemployment benefits in the United
States.
- Adopt a Border Adjusted Carbon Tax

UBS solves inequality—can reduce by 1/3 and automatically targets lower income households,
Gough, 1-19-2021, Ian Gough is Visiting Professor in CASE (Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion)
and an Associate of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change. (“Move the debate from
Universal Basic Income to Universal Basic Services,” UNESCO, 1-19-2021
https://en.unesco.org/inclusivepolicylab/analytics/move-debate-universal-basic-income-universal-basic-
services, 7-20-2023)//AAlmand

Clearly, these necessities are all very different things, so there can be no uniform formula to implement UBS. But entitlements to
certain levels of provision can be guaranteed and these can be backed up by a menu of public
interventions including regulation, standard setting and monitoring, taxation, and subsidies. This does
not necessarily entail direct government provision – a plurality of collective and communal providers will
be involved with appropriate support from government. But the unifying principle is to extend collective
solutions, as opposed to providing income support and leaving provisioning to market forces. The case for
collective provision to meet such needs can be made on two main grounds: equity and sustainability (though there
are also strong arguments for efficiency and solidarity covered elsewhere but not here). Equity. Free public
provision of necessities is always remarkably redistributive – even if the total tax system of a country is
broadly proportional to income. On average, in OECD countries, existing public services are worth the equivalent of a huge 76
percent of the post-tax income of the poorest quintile compared with just 14 percent of the richest (Table 1). Public services also
contribute to reducing income inequality by between one-fifth and one-third depending on the
inequality measure. Free provision of necessities automatically targets lower income households
without the disincentive effects that often result from money transfers. [Graph omitted]

Green banks solve better.


OECD ’15 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Green Investment Banks,”
Policy Perspectives, December 2015, https://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/Green-Investment-Banks-
POLICY-PERSPECTIVES-web.pdf)
This Policy Perspectives describes the relatively new phenomenon of publicly-capitalised green investment banks and examines why they are
being created and how they are mobilising private investment. It draws on the forthcoming OECD report Green Investment Banks: Scaling up
Private Investment in Low-carbon, Climate -resilient Infrastructure. KEY MESSAGES • Investment is growing in renewable
energy and energy efficiency, but not quickly enough to get the world on track to achieve zero net greenhouse gas
emissions globally by the end of this century. Mobilising investment from the private sector will be essential to meet
climate change goals. Governments can find ways to make efficient use of available public funding to mobilise much larger pools of private
capital. • To leverage
the impact of relatively limited public resources, 13 national and sub-national governments have created
public green investment banks (GIBs) and GIB-like entities (as of December 2015). • A GIB is a public entity
established specifically to facilitate private investment into domestic low-carbon, climate-resilient (LCR)
infrastructure. Using innovative transaction structures, risk-reduction and transaction-enabling
techniques, and local and market expertise, GIBs are channelling private investment, including from
institutional investors, into lowcarbon projects. GIBs are facilitating investment in such areas as commercial and residential
energy efficiency retrofits, rooftop solar photovoltaic systems and municipal-level, energy-efficient street lighting. • Many of the investments
GIBs mobilise are undertaken in urban areas where 54% of the world’s population lived in 2014 and where 66% is projected to live by 2050. •
GIBs are typically established in countries that do not have national development banks or other entities that are actively promoting private
investment in domestic LCR infrastructure. To mobilise more investment, governments can consider establishing a GIB or can “mainstream”
green investment objectives in existing national development banks. • Governments tailor their GIBs based on their unique national and local
contexts. GIBs
and GIB-like entities have diverse rationales and goals including meeting ambitious
emissions targets, supporting local community development, lowering energy costs, developing green
technology markets, creating jobs and lowering the cost of capital. • Using a range of metrics, GIBs are measuring and
tracking their performance. These metrics generally focus on emissions saved, job creation, leverage ratios (i.e. private investment mobilised
per unit of GIB public spending) and – for those GIBs that are required to be profitable – rate of return. • The
creation of a GIB can
send a signal to the marketplace and other countries that a country or region is seeking to become a
leader in scaling up private low-carbon investments.
5
Interest rates steady now and decreasing as market slows.
BNA 9-16
Bahrain News Agency; 16 Sep 2023; Stock market today: Wall Street closes lower, giving S&P 500
another losing week; https://www.bna.bh/en/news?
cms=q8FmFJgiscL2fwIzON1%2BDshNPmq9SnXR1Bql5hz3JyM%3D; //[TMS—GK]

New York, Sept. 16 (BNA): Wall


Street capped a choppy week of trading with a broad slide for stocks Friday, giving the
S&P 500 its second losing week in a row. The benchmark index fell 1.2%, its first loss in three days. The Dow Jones
Industrial Average dropped 0.8% and the Nasdaq composite gave back 1.6%. U.S. automaker stocks proved to be resilient after
members of the United Auto Workers union walked off the job at several plants overnight. Ford slipped 0.1% and General Motors rose 0.9%.
Shares in Stellantis gained 1.9% in trading on the Milan Stock Exchange in Italy. The market posted some gains earlier this week following
several healthy indicators on the economy. Wall Street has been watching economic updates ahead of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate policy
meeting next week. The central bank is expected to hold interest rates steady after spending much of the last two years
pushing rates higher in its bid to tame inflation. Boosting market sentiment this week was a report Thursday that said U.S. shoppers spent more
at retailers last month than economists expected. A separate report Thursday morning said fewer workers applied for unemployment benefits
last week than expected. A third report on Thursday said prices getting paid at the wholesale level rose more last month than economists
expected. That could be a discouraging signal for households if the higher-than-expected inflation gets passed on to shoppers at the consumer
level, the Associated Press (AP) reported. Meanwhile, a closely-watched survey from the University of Michigan showed consumer sentiment
slipped a bit in September. The latest reading, though, shows that overall sentiment remains strong. It also said consumers lowered their
expectations for inflation in the year ahead to 3.1%, which is the lowest reading since March 2021. "Things were fairly in line from a data
perspective," said Matthew Stucky, senior portfolio manager at Northwestern Mutual Wealth Management. "Really, the market is laser-focused
on what’s going to impact Federal Reserve activity." The
central bank raised rates aggressively through 2022 and 2023 in an effort to
tame inflation, but it maintained interest rate levels at its last meeting. Inflation has generally been easing back
to the central bank’s target of 2%. "A lot of the optimism about the Fed pausing is priced into markets,"
Stucky said. Inflation at the consumer level edged higher than expected in August, but high gasoline prices were the biggest driver. Oil prices
have been climbing over the summer after Saudi Arabia decided to maintain production cuts. That raised concerns about gasoline prices rising
and stoking inflation. Investors are overwhelmingly betting that the Fed will hold interest rates steady when it
closes a two-day meeting on Wednesday. They also expect the central bank could hold rates steady for the rest of
the year. The Fed has said it remains willing to continue raising rates if it seems necessary to continue fighting inflation.

The plan freaks out the Fed – they see full employment as inflationary – that causes a
return to rate hikes.
Popli ’23 (Nik, reporter at TIME, he covers economic policy and national politics, “It Could Be Harder to
Find a Job and Get a Pay Raise if the Fed Gets Its Way,” FEBRUARY 9, 2023,
https://time.com/6253699/federal-reserve-inflation-interest-rates-workers/)

Despite the good news, Fed officials were “probably hoping for more of a slowdown in the jobs report ,” says David
Wessel, director of the Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at the Brookings Institution. “What we’ve seen in the last couple of months
with a falling rate of inflation and slowing wage growth at a very tight and strong labor market does challenge the conventional wisdom on
which economists, including those at the Fed, generally rely,” Wessel tells TIME. In his first public comments since the jobs report, Powell
acknowledged this week that the jump in hiring was “stronger than anyone I know expected” and that the process of getting inflation back to
normal levels will require some pain for workers. “There has been an expectation that it will go away quickly and painlessly—and I don’t think
that’s at all guaranteed,” Powell said during a moderated discussion before the Economic Club of Washington, D.C. on Tuesday. “The base case
for me is that it will take some time, and we’ll have to do more rate increases, and then we’ll have to look around and see whether we’ve done
enough.” To Powell and central bankers, the hiring boom is viewed as an obstacle in its fight to corral the fastest
inflation in decades. Officials are also worried that wage growth could stop inflation from returning to their 2% target, another of the
Fed’s aims that puts its interests at odds with American wage-earners. Wessel points out, for instance, that t he Fed was likely glad to
see the pace of wage increases come down. Average hourly pay grew 4.4% in January from a year earlier, down from a peak of
5.6% in March. The Fed’s long-standing belief is that a job market with strong hiring and increased wages
typically fuels higher inflation. Under this economic model, consumers are more likely to spend freely when
they have higher incomes, and companies tend to raise their prices to help cover climbing labor costs. It
might seem odd to regard wage increases as a problem, but the Fed’s approach highlights the harsh trade-offs at the heart of the battle against
inflation: To
keep prices stable, it needs to be harder for workers to find a job and get a pay raise,
according to the Fed. The central bank has been aggressively increasing interest rates to slow the
economy and bring inflation back to around its 2% target. Last Wednesday, the Fed raised its benchmark interest rate for
an eighth time since March, although at a slower pace, and indicated that further increases were probable. Fed Chair Powell has suggested that
hard times are coming, particularly for workers. “I wish there were a completely painless way to restore price stability,” Powell said at a news
conference on Dec. 14. “There isn’t.” Reich believes that the Fed has been too focused on the dangers of a tight labor
market leading to higher wages, a stance that he says “neglects the other side of their mandate—to promote maximum
employment.” For the most part, the approach appears to be working to reduce inflation—but not without painful consequences. Price
increases are moderating, and some economists think consumers have seen the worst of it. The Consumer
Price Index, which is the government’s main inflation gauge, rose 6.5% year-over-year in December, down from a peak increase of 9.1%
recorded in June. But last month’s labor benchmarks tell a different story. The unemployment rate dropped to a new 53-year low of 3.4% as
employers added an explosive 517,000 jobs. And despite the pain of inflation, most businesses have appeared busy over the last year—from
airplanes to restaurants to stores. The Fed’s main inflation-fighting tool is its ability to move interest rates, effectively
raising the cost of borrowing money and ultimately slowing the economy. But to some economists and labor experts, this isn’t the most
effective tool. “The Fed is using the one tool it has—raising interest rates—and that’s dangerous,” says Reich,
who believes the Fed is showing callous disregard for the economic welfare of millions of Americans by pursuing policy that stunts job growth.
“The people who are most likely to lose their jobs and certainly who are no longer getting wage increases are poor and low-income people, who
are disproportionately, people of color and women,” Reich says. “They are the ones who are being drafted into the inflation fight when the
economy slows. They’re the first to lose their jobs, just as they are the last to get jobs when the economy tightens.” Most
estimates say
that unemployment will have to reach as high as 7.5%, more than double its current level, to get
inflation down to the Fed’s target of 2%. “The Fed wants more unemployment,” Wessel says. “[Chair] Jerome
Powell keeps saying that, well, maybe we can just reduce the number of unfilled jobs, the job vacancies without anybody actually losing their
job, but that’s a bit harder.”

Rate hikes spill over – they’ll collapse developing economies around the world.
Martin ’22 (Jamie is a history professor at Georgetown University, “The U.S. Wants to Tackle Inflation.
Here’s Why That Should Worry the Rest of the World,” April 28, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/28/opinion/fed-inflation-interest-rates-third-world-debt.html)
As the Federal Reserve begins to raise interest rates to tackle the highest inflation the United States has seen in decades, it confronts a growing risk that it will spark
a recession in the process. The trade-off faced by the
Fed — between price stability and employment — is usually framed in strictly domestic
terms. But aggressive efforts to quell inflation in the United States can have major, unpredictable
effects around the world, often with long-lasting, negative consequences for countries in the Global
South. And the United States will not be immune to worldwide economic trends. The inflation hawks should consider all of this as they figure out how to address
rising prices in the United States today. History is a good guide to how destructive the Fed’s policies can be for the

rest of the world. Just look back to the 1980s. After several years of rising prices, President Jimmy Carter appointed Paul Volcker to lead the Fed in 1979.
Mr. Volcker raised the federal funds rate — the interest rate that banks charge one another for short-term borrowing and which guides other interest rates —
up to nearly 20 percent. By the end of 1982, unemployment had reached 10.8 percent in the United States, but inflation slowed, and Mr. Volcker acquired a mythic
status as a farsighted leader unafraid to make tough decisions. That’s why he is
cited in so many calls for the Fed to aggressively
tackle inflation today. But the effects of Mr. Volcker’s decisions were felt beyond the United States’
borders. As interest rates rose, debts accrued by foreign countries became more difficult to service. This
led to a wave of defaults among countries that had borrowed heavily on international markets in the years
before, beginning with Mexico in 1982 and then spreading throughout Latin America and beyond. In
developing countries, the debt crisis that
followed the so-called Volcker shock was profoundly traumatic. Across Latin America, it led to a collapse in G.D.P.,

rising unemployment and skyrocketing levels of poverty, from which the region made a slow and imperfect recovery over the “lost
decade” that followed. Even those who claim Mr. Volcker made the right decision admit that he precipitated what may have been the “worst financial disaster the
world had ever seen” in Latin America — the consequences of which were even worse than those of the Great Depression. Among heavily indebted
states in Africa, the effects were similar. But American policymakers at the time did not give much attention to the global repercussions of
their decisions. As Mr. Volcker himself later admitted, “Africa was not even on my radar screen.” An even more relevant example may be from the early 20th
century. The first time that the Fed — along with other major central banks — helped spark a global recession was in 1920. By the end of World War I, two years
earlier, the world was facing a serious inflationary crisis caused by many of the same forces at work today: global supply chain disruptions, shipping shortages and
loose monetary policies. Then, as now, the price of wheat soared as Russian sources disappeared from global markets. From the Gold Coast (now Ghana) to
Argentina, food, fuel and clothing became unaffordable, at the same time that an influenza pandemic killed millions. As wages failed to keep pace with rising costs
of living, a wave of uprisings, racist mob violence and mass strikes broke out around the world. The immediate cause was the war’s effects on trade, shipping and
finance. But even after the war’s conclusion, these inflationary pressures did not subside. In early 1920 the Fed, alongside other major central banks, sharply raised
interest rates. This reined in inflation, but it came at the cost of a worldwide recession: In 1920-21, unemployment in Britain reached heights rivaling those of the
Depression; the United States saw a deep, though relatively short-lived, deflationary crisis. The longest-lasting effects of this recession were in poorer,
nonindustrialized economies throughout Europe’s colonial empires and Latin America. When commodity prices collapsed, the producers and exporters of goods like
wheat, sugar and rubber were devastated. The long-term effects of the crash of 1920-21 on these economies was similar to those of the Depression and the slump
of the 1980s. What will be the effects of the Fed’s efforts to tackle inflation today? It’s not just distant history that counsels caution. In 2013, the slightest hint by
Ben Bernanke, then the chairman of the Fed, that monetary tightening was around the corner was enough to send many emerging market economies into a tailspin.
The prospect of higher borrowing costs led to capital outflows and currency instability that battered
Indonesia, Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey with particular severity. The decade that followed saw sluggish
performance for many emerging market economies. Conditions are now ripe for the Fed to precipitate another global

crisis. Of particular concern are extremely high levels of emerging-market debt. The International Monetary Fund estimates that about 60 percent of low-income
developing countries are experiencing debt distress or are close to it. Sri Lanka’s recent default may be the first domino to fall.

Tighter monetary policy in the United States will push many other countries to raise their interests rates to prevent capital flight and currency
instability. But this will contract their economies, threatening recovery from the pandemic and delivering

another blow to their long-term growth.

Global economic insecurity will cascade and cause nuclear war.


Maavak ‘21 (Mathew, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Expert and
Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council,
“Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal
for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8)

scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been
Various

postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global
security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the
economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems

have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its
socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Once inexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth
fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for
security professionals. Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset INTRODUCTION The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system”
today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there
are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by

banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors


periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our

etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within
and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by

complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While
experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of
intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources
components from China (Owens, 2020). An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets
such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. COVID-19 represents a classic emergent
crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a
systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging
threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should
take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. METHODOLOGY An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The
transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020): • Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global
system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006); • Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012); • Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system
(Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and • Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this
paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources.ECONOMY According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global
financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown,
impacting all areas of human activity. The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a
Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute
of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a
staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. The IMF singles out widening income

inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people
(Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in
2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin,

the global middle class is facing catastrophic


2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate

debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). Economic stressors, in transcendent
VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments . Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s

security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. According to
former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which
ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a
single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program

with two global Titanics – the United States and


by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed,

China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far,
wide and for a considerable period. A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern
European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world.
The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt
jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016). In the
final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see

What happens to the


how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade. ENVIRONMENTAL

environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and
chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce
demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017)
made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the
world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a

societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a
taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade
climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of
Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately
tabulated. Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz,

2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This
will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety

standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping .
Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were
routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result,
countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic


is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications.

conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the
Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually

). The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of
resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008

economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down
incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. Environmentally-devastating industrial
sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to
dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword

of Damocles over this decade. GEOPOLITICAL The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often
repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts.
Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to
undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect
certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over
Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an
India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven
implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia.
6
Text: The fifty states and all relevant subfederal entities in the United States should
-
- adopt a policy to legalize, tax, and redistribute revenue equitably from
marijuana
- Adopt a payroll tax
-

Payroll raises $2.3 trillion.


CBO 22, 12-2022; Congressional Budget Office; "Impose a New Payroll Tax", Congressional Budget
Office, https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/58636, Accessed 6-27-2023 AQ

Payroll taxes are levied on the earnings, primarily wages and salaries, of people who work for an employer and on
the net earnings of people who are self-employed. Unlike the individual income tax, payroll taxes are not applied to
other sources of income, such as interest, dividends, or capital gains. The individual income tax also
includes many deductions, exemptions, and credits; by contrast, payroll taxes are generally more
straightforward and have few, if any, adjustments. A payroll tax can be paid by an employer or an employee, or by both. Typically,
payroll taxes are set at a single uniform rate. In the United States, payroll taxes are used to finance social insurance

programs and are the second-largest source of federal revenues after the individual income tax . The two
largest sources of payroll tax revenues are Social Security payroll taxes and Medicare payroll taxes. Social Security payroll taxes are the primary source of financing
for Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance. Only earnings up to a statutory maximum are subject to Social Security taxes. (That maximum amount
is $147,000 in calendar year 2022.) The Social Security tax rate is 12.4 percent of earnings: Employees have 6.2 percent of earnings deducted from their paychecks,
and the remaining 6.2 percent is paid by their employers. Self-employed individuals generally pay 12.4 percent of their net self-employment income. The primary
source of financing for Hospital Insurance (HI) benefits provided under Medicare Part A is HI payroll taxes. The basic Medicare payroll tax rate is 2.9 percent of
earnings. For employees, 1.45 percent is deducted from their paychecks and 1.45 percent is paid by their employers. Self-employed individuals generally pay 2.9
percent of their net self-employment income. Unlike payroll taxes for Social Security, the 2.9 percent Medicare payroll tax is levied on all earnings, and no taxable
maximum applies. Option This option consists of two alternatives. The first alternative would impose a new payroll tax of 1 percent on earnings. The second
alternative would impose a new payroll tax of 2 percent on earnings. For both alternatives, the income subject to the tax would match
that of the Medicare payroll tax, so there would be no taxable maximum. The new tax would be paid entirely by

employees. Self-employed individuals would face the same tax rates as those who work for an employer .
This option would not make any changes to existing payroll taxes . Further, unlike existing payroll taxes, the taxes

described in the option would not be tied to the financing of a specific social insurance program. Effects on
the Budget If implemented, the first alternative—imposing a new payroll tax of 1 percent—would reduce the deficit by $1.1 trillion from 2023 through 2032,
according to estimates by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). JCT estimates that the second alternative— imposing
a new payroll tax
of 2 percent—would reduce the deficit by $2.3 trillion over the same period, roughly double the effect of the first
alternative. The higher payroll tax would create an incentive for employers and employees to seek to change the composition of compensation, shifting from
taxable compensation, such as wages and salary, to forms of nontaxable compensation, such as employment-based health insurance. The estimates account for that
behavioral response.

Weed tax solves inequality and jobs.


Perez 19 [Maritza Perez, Senior Policy Analyst for CJR at Center for American Progress, "Using Marijuana
Revenue to Create Jobs," Center for American Progress, 5-20-2019,
https://www.americanprogress.org/article/using-marijuana-revenue-create-jobs/]/jsam

Correcting these injustices by using marijuana-related tax revenue to create specific opportunities for
affected communities must come first—not at some later, undefined time. Below are several proposals offered by or implemented in jurisdictions across the
These proposals include
country that provide communities most harmed by the war on marijuana with access to the benefits of creating a regulated marijuana market.

automatically clearing the records of people arrested or convicted of marijuana offenses; supporting
businesses owned and operated by people of color entering the regulated marijuana market; and
encouraging equitable licensing practices in the market. Jurisdictions, however, should also offer broader solutions that are not necessarily
connected directly to the regulated marijuana market. This issue brief, therefore, proposes using tax revenue from marijuana sales to

create public sector jobs specifically for communities affected by the war on marijuana. The proposal uses the model
laid out in CAP’s 2018 report, “Blueprint for the 21st Century: A Plan for Better Jobs and Stronger Communities,” that makes major investments in employment for long-term residents of
targeted distressed areas who want to work. Discriminatory drug enforcement created structural barriers to building economic wealth As documented in a previous CAP report, the war on
drugs created a vast network of laws that systematically excluded generations of African American and Latinx individuals from equal access to economic opportunity.8 The consequences of
unequal enforcement in these communities are still evident today, even in states where marijuana restrictions have been loosened. New York City, for example, deprioritized marijuana
prosecutions in 2018, after The New York Times reported that black and Hispanic New Yorkers were arrested on low-level marijuana charges at eight times and five times the rate of white New
Yorkers, respectively—despite continued evidence of equal usage rates of marijuana across races.9 Nonetheless, in the same year the new policy was announced, nearly 90 percent of all New
Yorkers arrested for smoking marijuana were black or Hispanic, even as overall marijuana arrests were drastically reduced.10 In addition to the overrepresentation of African Americans and
Latinx individuals in arrest rates, the war on drugs led to harsh sentencing laws that contributed to greater incarceration rates and depleted these communities of breadwinners and workers. A
2016 analysis placed the unemployment rate for black men in the United States at 11 percent but concluded that this rate would jump to 19 percent if it accounted for incarcerated
individuals.11 For those who are formerly incarcerated, a recent analysis by the Prison Policy Initiative showed that more than 27 percent are unemployed, which is higher than the overall
unemployment rate during the Great Depression.12 These results are compounded for African Americans due to existing racial discrimination present in employment practices; indeed, one
study found that white job applicants with a criminal record were more likely to be called for a job interview than black applicants without a criminal record.13 Increased incarceration rates
cycled more families and children into poverty, particularly African American and Latino children, who are seven and two times more likely than white children, respectively, to have an
incarcerated parent.14 Children who experience the incarceration of a parent tend to be socioeconomically disadvantaged prior to their parent’s incarceration, as individuals who have limited
access to resources or face structural barriers are at greater risk of becoming justice-involved. But incarceration worsens these disadvantages due to the loss of a family member and
provider.15 A 2015 research project on incarceration’s economic effect on families showed that nearly 2 in 3 families with an incarcerated loved one could not afford basic needs due to the
financial costs of losing a wage earner and paying fees associated with incarceration.16 Communities that experience high incarceration rates are left with fragmented social networks and a

Providing access to employment opportunities


smaller workforce, both of which can contribute to continued contact with the criminal justice system.

and the regulated marijuana market To begin to ameliorate these harms, lawmakers must lead with proposals that
incorporate equity and inclusivity into marijuana legalization policy, particularly around employment
and business opportunities. At the outset, states must reduce the collateral consequences that are associated with marijuana arrests and convictions; these include
prohibiting a person from obtaining an occupational license, public housing, and student loan assistance for college. The American Bar Association (ABA) has identified more than 40,000 state
and federal regulations that impose collateral consequences on criminal convictions.17 One analysis of the ABA data found that at least 84 percent of collateral consequences were related to
employment, and 82 percent did not have an end date.18 For non-U.S. citizens, the collateral consequences of a drug conviction can also include the inability to naturalize, which can exclude
people from opportunities only available to citizens.19 These hindrances make it more difficult for people with arrest or conviction records to find and maintain employment, including in the

regulated marijuana market, where past drug convictions are often used to bar people from receiving a marijuana business license.20 In order to assist people who
have been arrested or convicted of marijuana crimes with securing employment, states must provide
automatic and cost-free expungements. An expungement is a legal process by which a person’s record of arrest or conviction is erased, meaning that the
individual will not need to disclose their arrest or conviction, and a background search will not reveal a record of arrest or conviction. It provides a clean slate21 to

people with arrest and conviction records and mitigates the effects of collateral consequences. In 2018, for
example, California passed legislation requiring prosecutors to expunge certain marijuana-related convictions. And earlier this year, San Francisco District Attorney George Gascón partnered
with Code for America, a technology solutions nonprofit, to automate the cumbersome expungement process, leading to the clearing of thousands of records.22 Other major California
counties such as Los Angeles and San Joaquin have followed San Francisco’s lead.23 Jurisdictions must also consider the forces keeping low-income individuals of color from joining and
profiting from the regulated marijuana market. A 2017 survey of marijuana business owners found that only 19 percent identified as nonwhite.24 One reason for this underrepresentation is
that access to capital is a barrier for business owners of color.25 To enter the marijuana market, owners must usually pay a large fee in addition to the start-up costs associated with opening a
business.26 Thus, jurisdictions should create grant programs that support minority-owned businesses and underrepresented people who want to enter the industry. An example is included in
the Marijuana and Freedom Opportunity Act, a bill recently reintroduced by Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY).27 The bill would establish a fund from revenue collected from
regulated marijuana businesses under existing federal tax laws to support the small-business concerns of marijuana businesses owned and controlled by socioeconomically disadvantaged

states can reduce barriers to the regulated marijuana market by prioritizing people directly
people.28 Additionally,

affected by the war on drugs in receiving marijuana business licenses. An initial application fee to receive a license can cost up to
$120,000, a figure that excludes associated business costs such as legal fees, insurance, taxes, and marketing.29 Further, many jurisdictions exclude people with drug convictions from receiving

a license to sell marijuana. Some states and cities have taken steps to solve this problem such as Oakland, California, whose Equity Permit Program reserves half of its licenses for “ equity
applicants.”30 Participants in the program can have their licensing fees waived and receive technical and financial assistance. To qualify, equity applicants must earn less than 80
percent of the city’s median income and have been convicted of a marijuana offense or lived for 10 years in an area where people were disproportionately arrested for marijuana offenses.31

policymakers
Creating public sector jobs for communities affected by the war on marijuana In addition to proposals focused on providing access to the regulated marijuana market,

should use marijuana-related tax revenue to provide broader opportunities for people who have been
adversely affected by disproportionate marijuana enforcement actions over the years. O ne possibility is outlined in
Sen. Cory Booker’s (D-NJ) Marijuana Justice Act of 2019, which proposes a community reinvestment fund that would provide grants to communities most affected by the war on drugs.32 The
grants would support programming focused on job training, re-entry services, expungement of convictions, health education, and other community initiatives. This month, Illinois Gov. J.B.
Pritzker (D) included a similar proposal in his plan to legalize recreational marijuana in his state.33 The plan calls for 25 percent of all revenue from regulated marijuana sales to fund the

more direct approach, however,


Restoring Our Communities grant program, which would be used to repair communities most harmed by “discriminatory drug policies.”34 A

would be to use marijuana-related revenue to fund the creation of public sector jobs for people in
communities most affected by harsh marijuana enforcement. This proposal is based on a concept in CAP’s “Blueprint for the 21st Century,”
which calls for a nationwide investment in millions of new jobs in the country’s hardest-hit areas to meet pressing social and economic needs.35 As the Jobs Blueprint notes, certain
communities have been left especially far behind in today’s economy, including those that have experienced persistent poverty or decadeslong lack of opportunities.36 For communities in
which harsh marijuana enforcement has contributed to the enduring lack of opportunities, using marijuana revenue to create jobs would provide
a boost to the local economy as well as address broader community needs. Actual jobs created under the Jobs Blueprint and the proposal in this brief could include:
support services in schools and libraries; outreach and peer support to people struggling with substance misuse by trained and certified graduates of treatment programs; support for after-
school or summer enrichment programs; and delivery of meals to seniors and other homebound individuals.37 To determine which communities should benefit from this proposal,
policymakers could use essentially the same formula outlined in the Jobs Blueprint—a weighted index of communities’ poverty rate, median earnings, and nonemployment.38 However, they
must also determine which communities have experienced disproportionate arrest rates for marijuana offenses. This can be accomplished using historical data on marijuana arrests from data
inputted into the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) database or similar state-based data collections whereby areas that experienced high marijuana arrest rates relative to their population
will be program targets. Using the calculations in the Jobs Blueprint,39 the authors find that thousands of jobs could be created using marijuana revenue in highly distressed communities with

Colorado’s 2017–2018 excise tax revenue could have created nearly 2,000 jobs, and Washington
disproportionate rates of marijuana arrests.

state could have added almost 10,000 jobs with their 2017 excise tax revenue. Similarly, California’s tax revenue from its regulated

marijuana market in 2018 totaled $345 million, which could have created an additional 10,000 jobs in highly distressed communities. The
federal government could use this same model by taking the revenue that the U.S. Department of the Treasury currently collects from marijuana businesses and regranting it to states to
create jobs in communities that have historically been adversely affected by harsh marijuana enforcement policies. Conclusion Today, states are raking in billion-dollar profits for activity that
sent millions of African American and Latinx individuals into the criminal justice system, trapping their families and communities in poverty for generations. The movement to legalize

Creating public sector jobs and other policies


marijuana presents an opportunity both to achieve justice for and to build economic opportunity in these communities.

outlined in this issue brief acknowledge the economic impact that the war on drugs has had on low-income people

of color. With these policies, elected leaders can begin to address the structural barriers that states
must rupture so that individuals from some of their most vulnerable communities have equal access to
economic opportunity.
-
7 – PTX
CR is top of the docket. Unrelated spending fights derail, spur shutdown.
Groves & Jalonick, 23 – AP writers

[Stephen Groves, Mary Jalonick, “Health concerns, impeachment inquiry and a government shutdown:
What Congress is dealing with this month,” fox61, 9-5-2023,
https://www.fox61.com/article/news/nation-world/congress-government-shutdown/507-ed9ec6bb-
a165-4ae2-b174-50d8df5a75ff, accessed 9-14-2023]

WASHINGTON — After
months of struggling to find agreement on just about anything in a divided Congress,
lawmakers are returning to Capitol Hill to try to avert a government shutdown, even as House Republicans
consider whether to press forward with an impeachment inquiry into President Joe Biden.

A short-term funding measure to keep government offices fully functioning will dominate the
September agenda, along with emergency funding for Ukraine, federal disaster funds and the Republican-driven probe
into Hunter Biden’s overseas business dealings.

Time is running short for Congress to act. The House is scheduled to meet for just 11 days before the
government's fiscal year ends on Sept. 30, leaving little room to maneuver. And the deal-making will play
out as two top Republicans, Sen. Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Rep. Steve Scalise of Louisiana, deal with health issues.

The president and congressional leaders, including Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, are
focused on passage of a months-long funding measure, known as a continuing resolution, to keep government
offices running while lawmakers iron out a budget. It's a step Congress routinely takes to avoid stoppages, but McCarthy faces resistance from
within his own Republican ranks, including from some hardline conservatives who openly embrace the idea of a government shutdown.

“Honestly, it's a pretty big mess,” McConnell said at an event in Kentucky last week.

Here are the top issues as lawmakers return from the August break:

KEEPING THE GOVERNMENT OPEN

When Biden and McCarthy struck a deal to suspend the nation's debt ceiling in June, it included provisions for topline spending numbers. But
under pressure from the House Freedom Caucus, House Republicans have advanced spending bills that cut below that agreement.

Republicans have also tried to load their spending packages with conservative policy wins. For example, House Republicans added provisions
blocking abortion coverage, transgender care and diversity initiatives to a July defense package, turning what has traditionally been a bipartisan
effort into a sharply contested bill.

But Democrats control the Senate and are certain to reject most of the conservative proposals. Senators
are crafting their spending
bills on a bipartisan basis with an eye toward avoiding unrelated policy fights.

Top lawmakers in both chambers are now turning to a stopgap funding package, a typical strategy to give the
lawmakers time to iron out a long-term agreement.
Shutdown invites cyber attacks
Sydell, 2019 - Sydell is the Digital Culture Correspondent for NPR's All Things Considered, Morning
Edition, Weekend Edition, and NPR.org.

(Laura, “Shutdown Makes Government Websites More Vulnerable To Hackers, Experts Say,” NPR, 20
January 2019, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2019/01/20/686624330/shutdown-makes-
government-websites-more-vulnerable-to-hackers-experts-say//)

Several parts of the federal government have been shut


down for about a month now, and cybersecurity professionals say government
websites are becoming more vulnerable to security breaches each day the shutdown lasts. Visitors to manufacturing.gov, for
instance, are finding that the site has become unusable — its information about the manufacturing sector is no longer accessible. Instead, it
features this message at the top of the homepage: NOTICE: Due to a lapse in appropriations, Manufacturing.gov and all associated online
activities will be unavailable until further notice. Security certificates help keep websites secure, but last week the British security firm
Netcraft reported that more than 130 certificates used by U.S. government websites had expired. These certificates make sure users know
"this is really the government resource that I'm trying to access and not some bad guy," explains Dan Kaminsky, the chief scientist at the
security firm White Ops. The lack of a certificate makes it easier for a bad actor to trick you into going to a fake
site. Even though there's a warning when you click on a site without an updated certificate, Kaminsky says, "people might get used to ignoring
the browser warnings" because of the shutdown. "Then you think you're really walking into this site and you're really not." He offers a worst-
case scenario: Imagine if the security certificate was down for the Social Security Administration website and a bad actor set up a fake site.
Someone could go to the bogus site, enter their password, and
give the hackers access to personal information. The
shutdown also means there are fewer IT staff on hand. For instance, around 2,000 employees — down from the usual 3,500 — are
working at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, one of the agencies leading the nation's
cyberdefenses, according to the White House Office of Management and Budget's contingency plans. Rob Ragan, a partner in the
cybersecurity firm Bishop Fox, says that means a lot of important tasks may not be done, such as updating software
with the latest security patches. "You end up getting buried in a really big backlog of issues that you may
never dig yourself out of," he says. "And, at that point, one of those issues may have been an indicator of a compromise or a
breach that may go unnoticed for months or years to come." Security researchers worry that the shutdown is like
putting a red blanket in front of a bull. Nations like Russia, China and Iran could see it as a signal to
charge ahead. Meanwhile, Ragan says, think about the amount of information on government websites that's personal and even classified.

Extended shutdown magnifies cyberattack risks against the US


Kornowski 19 (Ryan, Research Director for ThinkProgress + M.S. in energy policy and climate at Johns
Hopkins University, "This is how Trump’s border wall shutdown threatens U.S. security,"
https://thinkprogress.org/government-shutdown-border-threatens-americans-security-613ee40f94d1/)
Cybersecurity The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not simply in charge of immigration and any potential wall-building activities. It
also coordinates
the government’s response to cyberattacks on critical infrastructure — something that
does not stop during a government shutdown. Advertisement “With each passing day, the impact of the
government shutdown on our nation’s security grows,” said Suzanne Spaulding, who served as under secretary for the
National Protection and Programs Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security and is now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies. “Meanwhile, our adversaries are not missing a beat and the daily attacks on our
systems continue. Cybersecurity is hard enough with a full team. Operating at less than half strength
means we are losing ground against our adversaries.” Defending against cyberattacks with only partial
staffing is difficult, and it’s even harder when your agency is in the midst of a reorganization. In November, Trump signed a law
establishing DHS’ new Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). “Getting this agency fully operational requires a lot of work and
it’s like repairing an airplane while you’re flying it,” Spaulding said. “You try to avoid disrupting the critical operational activity even while you
make changes to improve the organization. This shutdown is a disruption CISA can ill afford.” What this means for the day-to-day operations of
the agency is that 2,008 of the 3,531 staffers at CISA are excepted staff, meaning they must report to work to perform essential functions
without pay. They must staff 24/7 cybersecurity watch floors and be ready to respond to any attack. The remaining 45 percent of the agency is
furloughed without pay, providing little margin for error. [Furloughed] Allan Friedman @allanfriedman I like to think that the work that I do is
important. But a lot of real heavy lifting to secure the critical infrastructure is done by my DHS colleagues. None are being paid--including those
running the 24 hour watch at the NCCIC--and only half of them are able to do their job. Chris Bing @Bing_Chris "The Department of Homeland
Security’s newly-established Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has 45 percent of employees
furloughed"https://duo.com/decipher/government-shutdown-impacts-enterprise-security … 32 5:23 PM - Jan 7, 2019 Twitter Ads info and
privacy 18 people are talking about this Twitter Ads info and privacy On December 21, the
day the shutdown began, Trump
signed another cybersecurity law focused on U.S. supply chains and vulnerabilities. Spaulding said that
the law is important and also comes with many deadlines — many of which will slip during a shutdown ,
delaying the protections the law now requires. Advertisement “Monitoring of government systems and responding to significant incidents will
likely continue but other important
activities, for which demand already exceeds capacity, such as working with departments and
agencies to identify and secure their high-value assets, with states to improve election security, and with
businesses, including
critical infrastructure, to strengthen their resilience to cyber attacks, are almost certainly not exempt
and are therefore not happening,” Spaulding said.
Unemployment
1]. Poverty Turn – GND exacerbates energy poverty through rate increases
Loris, 19
(Nicolas, Deputy Director of the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies and Herbert and Joyce Morgan fellow at The Heritage
Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/the-green-new-deal-raw-deal-american-taxpayers-energy-consumers-and-the-
economy, 2-25)

Direct Taxpayer Costs. Regardless, the Green New Deal proposes that the federal government largely pay for the
transition, and this would come at significant cost to the taxpayer. Moreover, switching over to a 100 percent
renewable electricity grid is only a fraction of the plan. Eliminating greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation,
manufacturing, and agriculture sectors would substantially increase economic harm. Americans will pay as
taxpayers for the government borrowing and taxing to finance the Green New Deal but will also devote more money to their
energy bills. The reality is that the costs to families, businesses, and the economy would be considerably
greater than any direct cost to taxpayers. An essential reason coal, natural gas, and nuclear power provide 83 percent of
America’s electricity generation is because these resources are abundant, reliable, and affordable. A government-forced transition
to 100 percent renewables or politically determined clean energy sources would cause electricity rates to skyrocket.
In fact, 29 states, the District of Columbia, and 3 territories have a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), which mandates that a certain
percentage of a given state’s electricity generation come from politically determined renewable sources. While a number of variables impact
the price of electricity, RPSs are a
factor in driving electricity bills higher.21 Research from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in November 2018 has perhaps the most detailed model estimating the costs of deep decarbonization in the
electricity sector.22 The authors run 912 scenarios looking at a wide range of uncertainties that take into account geographical
differences in renewable potential, different technology cost assumptions, and different carbon-dioxide-emission-reduction targets. In some
scenarios they include “firm” low-carbon power sources, such as nuclear power, natural gas, and coal with carbon capture and sequestration
and high-capacity reservoirs for hydroelectric power. In
the scenario that achieves zero carbon dioxide emissions in the
power sector by using 100 percent renewable power, the study projects that average electricity prices would increase
to $150 to $300 per megawatt hour.23 (In 2017, the average was $105 per megawatt hour.24) As
calculated by Philip Rossetti at the American Action Forum, families would face electricity costs that are
between 43 percent and 286 percent higher, resulting in households paying hundreds of dollars more in their monthly
electricity bill.25 Regardless of what Green New Deal proponents ultimately accept as clean energy sources, the
reality is that 63 percent of America’s electricity needs are met by coal and natural gas . Petroleum products
account for 92 percent of the country’s transportation sector use. They make up such high percentages because they are
abundant, reliable, and affordable. Significantly restricting their use would, in turn, significantly raise the costs
of electricity bills and the price at the pump. Importantly, the policies proposed in the Green New Deal are highly regressive.
More expensive energy adversely affects low-income households disproportionately because they
spend a higher percentage of their budget on energy costs. Americans with after-tax incomes of less than $30,000 spend
23 percent of their budgets on energy, compared to just 7 percent for those earning more than $50,000, according to a report by the American
Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity.26 According
to the 2011 National Energy Assistance Survey, a poll of low-
income families, 24 percent went without food for a day, and 37 percent decided to forego medical and
dental coverage, in order to pay higher energy bills. Nearly one in five had a family member who
became sick due to the home being too cold.27
2]. Can’t solve job prerequisites or alt causes to poverty.
Bhandari 19; Ryan Bhandari- Former Senior Policy Advisor, Economic Program; March 25, 2019; What
Is the “Federal Jobs Guarantee” and What Are People Saying About It?;
https://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-
about-it; [TMS—GK]

#1: It solves a different problem. Right


now there are over seven million open jobs and six million unemployed
people. Yet, manyof these jobs are going unfilled. Why? Many people don’t have the right mix of skills or
training. New jobs are often in different places than old ones. Childcare and transportation are often prohibitively
expensive. And others struggle with opioid addiction and other conditions. And yet, a federal jobs guarantee
doesn’t address any of this. Even during economic downturns, there are better and far more efficient ways to help
workers and communities such as targeted public works programs, hiring credits for employers, temporary tax
cuts for working families, extended unemployment insurance, and money to shore up state and local
budgets.

Util is Truetil
Dennis Pamlin and Stuart Armstrong 15. Executive Project Manager Global Risks, Global Challenges
Foundation; AND James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School,
University of Oxford. February 2015. “Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization: The
case for a new risk category.” Global Challenges Foundation. p.30-93.
https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf.
**Symbols expanded in brackets

given enough time, very low probability


2. Risks with infinite impact: A new category of risks “Most risk management is really just advanced contingency planning and disciplining yourself to realise that,

events not only can happen, but they absolutely will happen Risk [equals] = .” Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman Sachs CEO, July 2013 1

Probability [times] × Impact Impacts where civilisation collapses to a state of great suffering and do not
recover, or a situation where all human life end, are defined as infinite as the result is irreversible and
lasts forever a limited number of global risks – that can be identified through a
. A new group of global risks This is a report about

scientific and transparent process – with impacts of a magnitude that pose a threat to human
civilisation, or even possibly to all human life . With such a focus it may surprise some readers to find that the report’s essential aim is to inspire action and dialogue as well as an increased use of the

The idea
methodologies used for risk assessment. The real focus is not on the almost unimaginable impacts of the risks the report outlines. Its fundamental purpose is to encourage global collaboration and to use this new category of risk as a driver for innovation.

that we face a number of global challenges threatening the very basis of our civilisation at the beginning
of the 21st century is well accepted in the scientific community , and is studied at a number of leading universities.2 But there is still no coordinated approach to address this

This created
group of challenges and turn them into opportunities for a new generation of global cooperation and the creation of a global governance system capable of addressing the greatest challenges of our time. report has, to the best of our knowledge,

the first science-based list of global risks with a potentially infinite impact and has made the first attempt to provide an initial overview of the uncertainties
related to these risks as well as rough quantifications for the probabilities of these impacts. What is risk? Risk is the potential of losing something of value, weighed against the potential to gain something of value. Every day we make different kinds of risk assessments, in more or less

uncertainty exists regarding the outcome and that we must find a


rational ways, when we weigh different options against each other. The basic idea of risk is that an

way to take the best possible decision based on our understanding of this uncertainty .3 To calculate risk the probability of an outcome is
often multiplied by the impact. The impact is in most cases measured in economic terms, but it can also be measured in anything we want to avoid, such as suffering. At the heart of a risk assessment is a probability distribution, often described by a probability density function4; see figure
X for a graphic illustration. The slightly tilted bell curve is a common probability distribution, but the shape differs and in reality is seldom as smooth as the example. The total area under the curve always represents 100 percent, i.e. all the possible outcomes fit under the curve. In this case
(A) represents the most probable impact. With a much lower probability it will be a close to zero impact, illustrated by (B). In the same way as in case B there is also a low probability that the situation will be very significant, illustrated by (C). Figure 1: Probability density function [FIGURE 1

The impacts (A), (B) and (C) all belong to the same category, [common] impacts: the impacts may
OMITTED] normal

be more or less serious, but they can be dealt with within the current system The impacts in this report .

are however of a special kind. These are impacts where everything will be lost and the situation will not
be reversible, i.e challenges with potentially infinite impact . In insurance and finance this kind of risk is called “risk of ruin”, an impact where all capital is lost.5 This impact is however

in the worst case this is when


only infinite for the company that is losing the money. From society’s perspective, that is not a special category of risk. In this report the focus is on the “risk of ruin” on a global scale and on a human level,

we risk the extinction of our own species On a probability curve the impacts in this report are usually at .
the very far right with a relatively low probability compared with other impacts , illustrated by (D) in Figure 2. Often they are so far out on the tail of

For each risk in this report the probability of an infinite impact is very low compared
the curve that they are not even included in studies.

to the most likely outcome But a significant number of peer-reviewed


. Some studies even indicate that not all risks in this report can result in an infinite impact.

reports indicate that those impacts not only can happen, but that their probability is increasing due to
unsustainable trends . The assumption for this report is that by creating a better understanding of our scientific knowledge regarding risks with a potentially infinite impact, we can inspire initiatives that can turn these risks into drivers for innovation.

Not only could a better understanding of the unique magnitude of these risks help address the risks we
face, it could also help to create a path towards more sustainable development . The group of global risks discussed in this report are so different
from most of the challenges we face that they are hard to comprehend. But that is also why they can help us to build the collaboration we need and drive the development of further solutions that benefit both people and the planet. As noted above, none of the risks in this report is likely
to result directly in an infinite impact, and some are probably even physically incapable of doing so. But all are so significant that they could reach a threshold impact able to create social and ecological instability that could trigger a process which could lead to an infinite impact. For

the way that extreme impacts are often masked by most


several reasons the potentially infinite impacts of the risks in this report are not as well known as they should be. One reason is

of the theories and models used by governments and business today . For example, the probability of extreme impacts is often below what is included in studies and

The tendency to exclude impacts below a probability of five percent is one reason for the relative
strategies.

“invisibility” of infinite impacts. The almost standard use of a 95% confidence interval is one reason
why low-probability high-impact events are often ignored .6 Figure 2: Probability density function with tail highlighted [FIGURE 2 OMITTED] Climate change is a good example, where
almost all of the focus is on the most likely scenarios and there are few studies that include the low-probability high-impact scenarios. In most reports about climate impacts, the impacts caused by warming beyond five or six degrees Celsius are even omitted from tables and graphs even
though the IPCC’s own research indicates that the probability of these impacts are often between one and five percent, and sometimes even higher.7 Other aspects that contribute to this relative invisibility include the fact that extreme impacts are difficult to translate into monetary
terms, they have a global scope, and they often require a time-horizon of a century or more. They cannot be understood simply by linear extrapolation of current trends, and they lack historical precedents. There is also the fact that the measures required to significantly reduce the
probability of infinite impacts will be radical compared to a business-as-usual scenario with a focus on incremental changes. The exact probability of a specific impact is difficult or impossible to estimate.8 However, the important thing is to establish the current magnitude of the

A failure to provide any estimate for these risks often results in


probabilities and compare them with the probabilities for such impacts we cannot accept.

strategies and priorities defined as though the probability of a totally unacceptable outcome is zero . An

uncertainty is not a
approximate number for a best estimate also makes it easier to understand that a great uncertainty means the actual probability can be both much higher and much lower than the best estimate. It should also be stressed that

weakness in science; it always exists in scientific work. It is a systematic way of understanding the
limitations of the methodology, data, etc Uncertainty is not a reason to wait to take action if the .9

impacts are serious A contrasting challenge is that our


. Increased uncertainty is something that risk experts, e.g. insurance experts and security policy experts, interpret as a signal for action.

cultural references to the threat of infinite impacts have been dominated throughout history by religious
groups seeking to scare society without any scientific backing, often as a way to discipline people and
implement unpopular measures. It should not have to be said, but this report is obviously
fundamentally different as it focuses on scientific evidence from peer-reviewed sources . Infinite impact The concept infinite impact

These are impacts


refers to two aspects in particular; the terminology is not meant to imply a literally infinite impact (with all the mathematical subtleties that would imply) but to serve as a reminder that these risks are of a different nature. Ethical

that threaten the very survival of humanity and life on Earth – and therefore can be seen as being
infinitely negative from an ethical perspective. No positive gain can outweigh even a small probability
for an infinite negative impact. Such risks require society to ensure that we eliminate these risks by
reducing the impact below an infinite impact as a top priority, or at least do everything we can to
reduce the probability of these risks . As some of these risks are impossible to eliminate today it is also important to discuss what probability can right now be accepted for risks with a possible infinite impact. Economic Infinite

The impacts are irreversible in the most fundamental way, so tools like
impacts are beyond what most traditional economic models today are able to cope with.

cost-benefit assessment seldom make sense . To use discounting that makes infinite impacts (which could take place 100 years or more from now and affect all future generations) close to invisible in
economic assessments, is another example of a challenge with current tools. So while tools like cost-benefit models and discounting can help us in some areas, they are seldom applicable in the context of infinite impacts. New tools are needed to guide the global economy in an age of
potential infinite impacts. See chapter 2.2.2 for a more detailed iscussion. Roulette and Russian roulette When probability and normal risks are discussed the example of a casino and roulette is often used. You bet something, then spin the wheel and with a certain probability you win or
lose. You can use different odds to discuss different kinds of risk taking. These kinds of thought experiment can be very useful, but when it comes to infinite risks these gaming analogies become problematic. For infinite impact a more appropriate analogy is probably Russian roulette. But
instead of “normal” Russian roulette where you only bet your own life you are now also betting everyone you know and everyone you don’t know. Everyone alive will die if you lose. There will be no second chance for anyone as there will be no future generations; humanity will end with
your loss. What probability would you accept for different sums of money if you played this version of Russian roulette? Most people would say that it is stupid and – no matter how low the probability is and no matter how big the potential win is – this kind of game should not be played,
as it is unethical. Many would also say that no person should be allowed to make such a judgment, as those who are affected do not have a say. You could add that most of those who will lose from it cannot say anything as they are not born and will never exist if you lose. The difference
between ordinary roulette and “allhumanity Russian roulette” is one way of illustrating the difference in nature between a “normal” risk that is reversible, and a risk with an infinite impact. An additional challenge in acknowledging the risks outlined in this report is that many of the
traditional risks including wars and violence have decreased, even though it might not always looks that way in media.10 So a significant number of experts today spend a substantial amount of time trying to explain that much of what is discussed as dangerous trends might not be as

The chain of events that could result in


dangerous as we think. For policy makers listening only to experts in traditional risk areas it is therefore easy to get the impression that global risks are becoming less of a problem.

infinite impacts in this report also differ from most of the traditional risks, as most of them are not
triggered by wilful acts, but accidents/mistakes . Even the probabilities related to nuclear war in this report are to a large degree related to inadvertent escalation. As many of the tools to analyse and

risks involving accidents tend to get less attention


address risks have been developed to protect nations and states from attacks, . This report emphasises the need for an open and democratic process in
addressing global challenges with potentially infinite impact. Hence, this is a scientifically based invitation to discuss how we as a global community can address what could be considered the greatest challenges of our time. The difficulty for individual scientists to communicate a scientific

Scientists who today talk about low-probability impacts, that are serious but still far
risk approach should however not be underestimated.

from infinite, are often accused of pessimism and scaremongering, even if they do nothing but highlight
scientific findings .11 To highlight infinite impacts with even lower probability can therefore be something that a scientist who cares about his/her reputation would want to avoid. In the media it is still common to contrast the most probable climate impact
with the probability that nothing, or almost nothing, will happen. The fact that almost nothing could happen is not wrong in most cases, but it is unscientific and dangerous if different levels of probability are presented as equal. The tendency to compare the most probable climate impact

with the possibility of a low or no impact also results in a situation where low-probability high-impact outcomes are often totally
ignored. An honest and scientific approach is to, whenever possible, present the whole probability
distribution and pay special attention to unacceptable outcomes The fact that we have challenges that .

with some probability might be infinite and therefore fundamentally irreversible is difficult to
comprehend, and physiologically they are something our brains are poorly equipped to respond to,
according to evolutionary psychologists .12 It is hard for us as individuals to grasp that humanity for the first time in its history now has the capacity to create such catastrophic outcomes. Professor Marianne
Frankenhaeuser, former head of the psychology division, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm, put it this way: “Part of the answer is to be found in psychological defence mechanisms. The nuclear threat is collectively denied, because to face it would force us to face some aspects of the world’s

This psychological denial may be one reason why there is a tendency among some
situation which we do not want to recognise.” 13

stakeholders to confuse “being optimistic” with denying what science is telling us, and ignoring parts of
the probability curve .14 Ignoring the fact that there is strong scientific evidence for serious impacts in different areas, and focusing only on selected sources which suggest that the problem may not be so serious, is not optimistic. It is both unscientific

A scientific approach requires us to base our decisions on the whole probability distribution
and dangerous.15 . Whether it is possible to address the challenge or not is the area

where optimism and pessimism can make people look at the same set of data and come to different conclusions. Two things are important to keep in mind: first, that there is always a probability distribution when it comes to risk; second, that there are two different kinds of impacts that are of interest for this report. The probability distribution can have different shapes but in simplified cases the shape tends to look like a slightly modified clock (remember figure 1). In the media it can sound as though experts argue whether an impact, for example a climate impact or a pandemic, will be dangerous or not. But what serious experts discuss is the probability of different oucomes. They can disagree on the shape of the curve or what curves should be studied, but not that a probability curve exists. With climate change this includes discussions about how sensitive the climate is, how much greenhouse gas will be emitted, and what impacts that different warmings will result in. Just as it is important not to ignore challenges with potentially infinite impacts, it is also important not to use them to scare people. Dramatic images and strong language
are best avoided whenever possible, as this group of risks require sophisticated strategies that benefit from rational arguments. Throughout history we have seen too many examples when threats of danger have been damagingly used to undermine important values. The history of infinite impacts: The LA-602 document The understanding of infinite impacts is very recent compared with most of our institutions and laws. It is only 70 years ago that Edward Teller, one of the greatest physicists of his time, with his back-of-the-envelope calculations, produced results that differed drastically from all that had gone before. His calculations indicated that the explosion of a nuclear bomb – a creation of some of the brightest minds on the planet, including Teller himself – could result in a chain reaction so powerful that it would ignite the world’s atmosphere, thereby ending human life on Earth.16 Robert Oppenheimer, who led the Manhattan Project to develop the nuclear bomb, halted the project to see whether Teller’s calculations were correct.17 The resulting document, LA- 602: Ignition of the Atmosphere with Nuclear Bombs, concluded that
Teller was wrong, But the sheer complexity drove them to end their assessment by writing that “further work on the subject [is] highly desirable”.18 The LA-602 document can be seen as the first scientific global risk report addressing a category of risks where the worst possible impact in all practical senses is infinite.19 Since the atomic bomb more challenges have emerged with potentially infinite impact. Allmost all of these new challenges are linked to the increased knowledge, economic and technical development that has brought so many benefits. For example, climate change is the result of the industrial revolution and development that was, and still is, based heavily on fossil fuel. The increased potential for global pandemics is the result of an integrated global economy where goods and services move quickly around the world, combined with rapid urbanisation and high population density. In parallel with the increased number of risks with possible infinite impact, our capacity to analyse and solve them has greatly increased too. Science and technology today provides us with knowledge and tools that can radically reduce the risks that
historically have been behind major extinctions, such as pandemics and asteroids. Recent challenges like climate change, and emerging challenges like synthetic biology and nanotechnology, can to a large degree be addressed by smart use of new technologies, new lifestyles and institutional structures. It will be hard as it will require collaboration of a kind that we have not seen before. It will also require us to create systems that can deal with the problems before they occur. The fact that the same knowledge and tools can be both a problem and a solution is important to understand in order to avoid polarisation. Within a few decades, or even sooner, many of the tools that can help us solve the global challenges of today will come from fields likely to provide us with the most powerful instruments we have ever had – resulting in their own sets of challenges. Synthetic biology, nanotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI) are all rapidly evolving fields with great potential. They may help solve many of today’s main challenges or, if not guided in a benign direction, may result in catastrophic outcomes. The point of departure of this report is the
fact that we now have the knowledge, economic resources and technological ability to reduce most of the greatest risks of our time. Conversely, the infinite impacts we face are almost all unintended results of human ingenuity. The reason we are in this situation is that we have made progress in many areas without addressing unintended low-probability high-impact consequences. Creating innovative and resilient systems rather than simply managing risk would let us focus more on opportunities. But the resilience needed require moving away from legacy systems is likely to be disruptive, so an open and transparent discussion is needed regarding the transformative solutions required. Figure 3: Probability density function with tail and threshold highlighted [FIGURE 3 OMITTED] 2.1 Report structure The first part of the report is an introduction where the global risks with potential infinite impact are introduced and defined. This part also includes the methodology for selecting these risks, and presents the twelve risks that meet this definition. Four goals of the report are also presented, under the headings “acknowledge”, “inspire”,
“connect” and “deliver”. The second part is an overview of the twelve global risks and key events that illustrate some of the work around the world to address them. For each challenge five important factors that influence the probability or impact are also listed. The risks are divided into four different categories depending on their characteristics. “Current challenges” is the first category and includes the risks that currently threaten humanity due to our economic and technological development - extreme climate change, for example, which depends on how much greenhouse gas we emit. “Exogenic challenges” includes risks where the basic probability of an event is beyond human control, but where the probability and magnitude of the impact can be influenced - asteroid impacts, for example, where the asteroids’ paths are beyond human control but an impact can be moderated by either changing the direction of the asteroid or preparing for an impact. “Emerging challenges” includes areas where technological development and scientific assessment indicate that they could both be a very important contribution to human welfare and
help reduce the risks associated with current challenges, but could also result in new infinite impacts.20 AI, nanotechnology and synthetic biology are examples. “Global policy challenge” is a different kind of risk. It is a probable threat arising from future global governance as it resorts to destructive policies, possibly in response to the other challenges listed above. The third part of the report discusses the relationship between the different risks. Action to reduce one risk can increase another, unless their possible links are understood. Many solutions are also able to address multiple risks, so there are significant benefits from understanding how one relates to others. Investigating these correlations could be a start, but correlation is a linear measure and non-linear techniques may be more helpful for assessing the aggregate risk. The fourth part is an overview, the first ever to our knowledge, of the uncertainties and probabilities of global risks with potentially infinite impacts. The numbers are only rough estimates and are meant to be a first step in a dialogue where methodologies are developed and estimates refined. The fifth part presents
some of the most important underlying trends that influence the global challenges, which often build up slowly until they reach a threshold and very rapid changes ensue. The sixth and final part presents an overview of possible ways forward. 2.2 Goals Goal 1: Acknowledge That key stakeholders, influencing global challenges, acknowledge the existence of the category of risks that could result in infinite impact. They should also recognice that the list of risks that belong to this category should be revised as new technologies are developed and our knowledge increases. Regardless of the risks included, the category should be given special attention in all processes and decisions of relevance. The report also seeks to demonstrate to all key stakeholders that we have the capacity to reduce, or even eliminate, most of the risks in this category. Establish a category of risks with potentially infinite impact. Before anything significant can happen regarding global risks with potentially infinite impacts, their existence must be acknowledged. Rapid technological development and economic growth have delivered unprecedented material welfare to
billions of people in a veritable tide of utopias.21 But we now face the possibility that even tools created with the best of intentions can have a darker side too, a side that may threaten human civilisation, and conceivably the continuation of human life. This is what all decision-makers need to recognise. Rather than succumbing to terror, we need to acknowledge that we can let the prospect inspire and drive us forward. Goal 2: Inspire That policy makers inspire action by explaining how the probabilities and impacts can be reduced and turned into opportunities. Concrete examples of initiatives should be communicated in different networks in order to create ripple effects, with the long-term goal that all key stakeholders should be inspired to turn these risks into opportunities for positive action. Show concrete action that is taking place today. This report seeks to show that it is not only possible to contribute to reducing these risks, but that it is perhaps the most important thing anyone can spend their time on. It does so by combining information about the risks with information about individuals and groups who has made a significant
contribution by turning challenges into opportunities. By highlighting concrete examples the report hopes to inspire a new generation of leaders. Goal 3: Connect That leaders in different sectors connect with each other to encourage collaboration. A specific focus on financial and security policy where significant risks combine to demand action beyond the incremental is required. Support new meetings between interested stakeholders. The nature of these risks spans countries and continents; they require action by governments and politicians, but also by companies, academics, NGOs, and many other groups. The magnitude of the possible impacts requires not only leaders to act but above all new models for global cooperation and decision-making to ensure delivery. The need for political leadership is therefore crucial. Even with those risks where many groups are involved, such as climate change and pandemics, very few today address the possibility of infinite impact aspects. Even fewer groups address the links between the different risks. There is also a need to connect different levels of work, so that local, regional, national and
international efforts can support each other when it comes to risks with potentially infinite impacts. Goal 4: Deliver That concrete strategies are developed that allow key stakeholders to identify, quantify and address global challenges as well as gather support for concrete steps towards a wellfunctioning global governance system. This would include tools and initiatives that can help identify, quantify and reduce risks with potentially infinite impacts. Identify and implement strategies and initiatives. Reports can acknowledge, inspire and connect, but only people can deliver actual results. The main focus of the report is to show that actual initiatives need to be taken that deliver actual results. Only when the probability of an infinite impact becomes acceptably low, very close to zero, and/or when the maximum impact is significantly reduced, should we talk about real progress. In order to deliver results it is important to remember that global governance to tackle these risks is the way we organise society in order to address our greatest challenges. It is not a question of establishing a “world government”, it is about the way we organise
ourselves on all levels, from the local to the global. The report is a first step and should be seen as an invitation to all responsible parties that can affect the probability and impact of risks with potentially infinite impacts. But its success will ultimately be measured only on how it contributes to concrete results. 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact This chapter first introduces the concept of infinite impact. It then describes the methodology used to identify challenges with an infinite impact. It then presents risks with potentially infinite impact that the methodology results in. 2.3.1 Definition of infinite impact The specific criterion for including a risk in this report is that well-sourced science shows the challenge can have the following consequences: 22 1. Infinite impact: When civilisation collapses to a state of great suffering and does not recover, or a situation where all human life ends. The existence of such threats is well attested by science.23 2. Infinite impact threshold – an impact that can trigger a chain of events that could result first in a civilisation collapse, and then later result in an infinite impact. Such thresholds are especially
important to recognise in a complex and interconnected society where resilience is decreasing.24 A collapse of civilisation is defined as a drastic decrease in human population size and political/economic/social complexity, globally for an extended time.25 The above definition means the list of challenges is not static. When new challenges emerge, or current ones fade away, the list will change. An additional criterion for including risks in this report is “human influence”. Only risks where humans can influence either the probability, the impact, or both, are included. For most risks both impact and probability can be affected, for example with nuclear war, where the number/size of weapons influences the impact and tensions between countries affects the probability. Other risks, such as a supervolcano, are included as it is possible to affect the impact through various mitigation methods, even if we currently cannot affect the probability. Risks that are susceptible to human influence are indirectly linked, because efforts to address one of them may increase or decrease the likelihood of another. 2.3.2 Why use “infinite impact” as a concept?

The report has found ample evidence that there are risks
The concept of infinity was chosen as it reflects many of the challenges, especially in economic theory, to addressing these risks as well as the need to question much of our current way of thinking. The concept of a category of risks based on their extreme impact is meant to provide a tool to distinguish one particular kind of risk from others. The benefit of this new concept should be assessed based on two things. First, does the category exist, and second, is the concept helpful in addressing these risks ?

with an impact that can end human civilisation and even all human life . The report further concludes that a new category of risk is not only meaningful but also

global risks with potentially infinite impacts increase in both number and probability
timely. We live in a society where

according to multiple studies . Looking ahead, many emerging technologies which will certainly provide beneficial results, might also result in an increased probability of infinite impacts.26 Over the last few years a greater understanding of low probability or unknown probability events has helped more people to understand the importance of looking beyond the most probable scenarios. Concepts like “black swans” and “perfect storms” are now part of mainstream policy and business language.27 Greater understanding of the technology and science of complex systems has also resulted in a new understanding of potentially disruptive events. Humans now have such an impact on the planet that the term “the anthropocene” is being used, even by mainstream media like The Economist.28 The term was introduced in the 90s by the Nobel Prize winner

Paul Crutzen to describe how humans are now the dominant force changing the Earth’s ecosystems.29 The idea to establish a well defined category of risks that focus on risks with a potentially infinite impact that can be used as a practical tool by policy makers is partly inspired by Nick Bostrom’s philosophical work and his introduction of a risk taxonomy that includes an academic category called “existential risks”.30 Introducing a category with risks that have a potentially infinite impact is not meant to be a mathematical definition; infinity is a thorny mathematical concept and nothing in reality can be infinite.31 It is meant to illustrate a singularity, when humanity is threatened, when many of the tools used to approach most challenges today become problematic, meaningless, or even counterproductive. The concept of an infinite impact highlights a unique situation where humanity itself is threatened and the very idea of value and price collapses from a human perspective, as the price of the last humans also can be seen to be infinite. This is not to say that those traditional tools cannot still be useful, but with infinite impacts we need to
add an additional set of analytical tools. Life Value The following estimates have been applied to the value of life in the US. The estimates are either for one year of additional life or for the statistical value of a single life. – $50,000 per year of quality life (international standard most private and government-run health insurance plans worldwide use to determine whether to cover a new medical procedure) – $129,000 per year of quality life (based on analysis of kidney dialysis procedures by Stefanos Zenios and colleagues at Stanford Graduate School of Business) – $7.4 million (Environmental Protection Agency) – $7.9 million (Food and Drug Administration) – $6 million (Transportation Department) – $28 million (Richard Posner based on the willingness to pay for avoiding a plane crash) Source: Wikipedia: Value of life http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_life US EPA: Frequently Asked Questions on Mortality Risk Valuation http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE%5Cepa%5Ceed.nsf/webpages/MortalityRiskValuation.html Posner, Richard A. Catastrophe: risk and response. Oxford University Press, 2004 Some of the risks, including nuclear war, climate

The basic ethical aspect of infinite impact is


change and pandemics, are often included in current risk overviews, but in many cases their possible infinite impacts are excluded. The impacts which are included are in most cases still very serious, but only the more probable parts of the probability distributions are included, and the last part of the long tail – where the infinite impact is found – is excluded.32 Most risk reports do not differentiate between challenges with a limited impact and those with a potential for infinite impact. This is dangerous, as it can mean resources are spent in ways that increase the probability of an infinite impact. Ethical aspects of infinite impact

this: a very small group alive today can take decisions that will fundamentally affect all future
generations . “All future generations” is not a concept that is often discussed, and for good reason. All through human history we have had no tools with a measurable global impact for more than a few generations. Only in the last few decades has our potential impact reached a level where all future generations can be affected, for the simple reason that we now have the technological capacity to end human civilisation. If we count human history from the time when we began to practice settled agriculture, that gives
us about 12,000 years.33 If we make a moderate assumption that humanity will live for at least 50 million more years34 our 12,000-year history so far represents 1/4200, or 0.024%, of our potential history. So our generation has the option of risking everything and annulling 99.976% of our potential history. Comparing 0.024% with the days of a person living to 100 years from the day of conception, this would equal less than nine days and is the first stage of human embryogenesis, the germinal stage.35 Two additional arguments to treat potentially infinite impacts as a

An approach to infinite impacts cannot be one of trial-and-error, because there is no opportunity


separate category are: 36 1 .

to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damage, and learn from
experience – is unworkable. Instead society must be proactive. This requires foresight to foresee new
types of threat and willingness to take decisive preventative action and to bear the costs (moral and
economic) of such actions Institutions and individuals may find it . 2. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, morality, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience of other sorts of risk. Infinite impacts are in a different category .

hard to take these risks seriously simply because they lie outside our experience. Our collective fear-
response will probably be ill-calibrated to the magnitude of threat
human extinction.37 We have to remember that the monetary values placed on a human life in most cases are not meant to suggest that we have actually assigned a specific value to a life. Assigning a value to a human life is a tool used in a society with a limited supply of resources or infrastructure (ambulances, perhaps) or skills. In such a society it is impossible to save every life, so some trade-off must be made.38 The US Environmental Protection Agency explains its use like this: “The EPA does not place a dollar value on individual lives. Rather, when conducting a benefit-
. Economic aspects of infinite impact and discounting In today’s society a monetary value is sometimes ascribed to human life. Some experts use this method to estimate risk by assigning a monetary value to
cost analysis of new environmental policies, the Agency uses estimates of how much people are willing to pay for small reductions in their risks of dying from adverse health conditions that may be caused by environmental pollution.” 39 The fact that monetary values for human lives can help to define priorities when it comes to smaller risks does not mean that they are suitable for quite different uses. Applying a monetary value to the whole human race makes little sense to most people, and from an economic perspective it makes no sense. Money helps us to prioritise,
but with no humans there would be no economy and no need for priorities. Ignoring, or discounting, future generations is actually the only way to avoid astronomical numbers for impacts that may seriously affect every generation to come. In Catastrophe: Risk and Response, Richard Posner provides a cost estimate, based on the assumption that a human life is worth $50,000, resulting in a $300 tn cost for the whole of humanity, assuming a population of six billion. He then doubles the population number to include the value of all future generations, ending up with $600
tn, while acknowledging that “without discounting, the present value of the benefits of risk-avoidance measures would often approach infinity for the type of catastrophic risk with which this book is concerned.” 40 Discounting for risks that include the possibility of an infinite impact differs from risk discounting for less serious impacts. For example the Stern Review41 prompted a discussion between its chief author, Nicholas Stern, and William Nordhaus,42 each of whom argued for different discount levels using different arguments. But neither discussed a possible infinite

Two things make infinite impacts special from a discounting perspective. First,
climate impact. An overview of the discussion by David Evans of Oxford Brookes University highlighted some of the differing assumptions.43

there is no way that future generations can compensate for the impact, as they will not exist. Second,
the impact is something that is beyond an individual preference, as society will no longer exist
most productive way. In cases that do not include infinite impacts, discounting “reflects the fact that there are many high-yield investments that would improve the quality of life for future generations. The discount rate should be set so that our investable funds are devoted to the most productive uses.” 44 When there is a potentially infinite impact, the focus is no longer on what investments have the best rate of return, it is about avoiding the ultimate end. While many economists shy away from infinite impacts, those exploring the potentially extreme impacts of global
. Discounting is undertaken to allocate resources in the
challenges often assume infinite numbers to make their point. Nordhaus for example writes that “the sum of undiscounted anxieties would be infinite (i.e. equal to 1 + 1 +1 + … = ∞). In this situation, most of us would dissolve in a sea of anxiety about all the things that could go wrong for distant generations from asteroids, wars, out-of-control robots, fat tails, smart dust and other disasters.” 45 It is interesting that Nordhaus himself provides very good graphs that show why the most important factor when determining actions is a possible threshold (see below Figure 4 and

5). Nordhaus was discussing climate change, but the role of thresholds is similar for most infinite impacts. The first figure is based on traditional economic approaches which assume that Nature has no thresholds; the second graph illustrates what happens with the curve when a threshold exists. As Nordhaus also notes, it is hard to establish thresholds, but if they are significant all other assumptions become secondary. The challenge that Nordhaus does not address, and which is important especially with climate change, is that

thresholds become invisible in calculations if they occur far into the future, even if it is current economic

actions that unbalance the system and eventually push it over the threshold .46 Note that these dramatic illustrations rest on assumptions that the thresholds are still relatively benign, not moving us beyond tipping points which result in an accelerated release of methane that could result in a temperature increase of more than 8 °C, possibly producing infinite impacts.47

Calculating illustrative numbers By including the welfare of future generations, something that is important when their very existence is threatened, economic discounting becomes difficult. In this chapter, some illustrative numbers are provided to indicate the order of magnitude of the values that calculations provide when traditional calculations also include future generations. These illustrative calculations are only illustrative as the timespans that must be used make all traditional assumptions questionable to say the least. Still, as an indicator for why infinite impact might be a good approximation they might help. As a species that can manipulate our environment it could be argued that the time the human race will be around, if we do not kill ourselves, can be estimated to be between 1-10 million years – the typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species48 – and one billion years, the inhabitable time of Earth.49 [FIGURE 4 OMITTED] [FIGURE 5 OMITTED] If we assume – 50 million years for the future of humanity as our reference, – an average life expectancy of 100 years50, and – a global population of 6 billion
people51 – all conservative estimate – , we have half a million generations ahead of us with a total of 3 quadrillion individuals. Assuming a value of $50,000 per life, the cost of losing them would then be $1.5 ×1020, or $150 quintillion. This is a very low estimate, and Posner suggests that maybe the cost of a life should be “written up $28 million” for catastrophic risks52. Posner’s calculations where only one future generation is included result in a cost of $336 quadrillion. If we include all future generations with the same value, $28 million, the result is a total cost of $86 sextillion, or $86 × 1021. This $86 sextillion is obviously a very rough number (using one billion years instead of 50 million would for example require us to multiply the results by 20), but again it is the magnitude that is interesting. As a reference there are about 1011 to 1012 stars in our galaxy, and perhaps something like the same number of galaxies. With this simple calculation you get 1022 to 1024, or 10 to 1,000 sextillion, stars in the universe to put the cost of infinite impacts when including future generations in perspective.53 These numbers can be multiplied many
times if a more philosophical and technology-optimistic scenario is assumed for how many lives we should include in future generations. The following quote is from an article by Nick Bostrom in Global Policy Journal: “However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 1034 years. Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years.” 54 Likewise the value of a life, $28 million, a value that is based on an assessment of how individuals chose when it comes to flying, can be seen as much too small. This value is based on how much we value our own lives on the margin, and it is reasonable to assume that the value would be higher than only a multiplication of our own value if we also considered the risk of losing our family, everyone we know, as well as
everyone else on the planet. In the same way as the cost increases when a certain product is in short supply, the cost of the last humans could be assumed to be very high, if not infinite. Obviously, the very idea to put a price on the survival of humanity can be questioned for good reasons, but if we still want to use a number, $28 million per life should at least be considered as a significant underestimation. For those that are reluctant or unable to use infinity in calculations and are in need of a number for their formulas, $86 sextillion could be a good initial start for the cost of infinite impacts. But it is important to note that this number might be orders of magnitude smaller than an estimate which actually took into account a more correct estimation of the number of people that should be included in future generations as well as the price that should be assigned to the loss of the last humans. 2.3.3 Infinite impact threshold (IIT) As we address very complex systems, such as human civilisation and global ecosystems, a concept as important as infinite impact in this report is that of infinity impact threshold. This is the impact level that can trigger
a chain of events that results in the end of human civilisation. The infinite impact threshold (IIT) concept represents the idea that long before an actual infinite impact is reached there is a tipping point where it (with some probability) is no longer possible to reverse events. So instead of focusing only on the ultimate impact it is important to estimate what level of impact the infinity threshold entails. The IIT is defined as an impact that can trigger a chain of events that could result first in a civilisation collapse, and then later result in an infinite impact. Such thresholds are especially important to recognise in a complex and interconnected society where resilience is decreasing. Social and ecological systems are complex, and in most complex systems there are thresholds where positive feedback loops become self-reinforcing. In a system where resilience is too low, feedback loops can result in a total system collapse. These thresholds are very difficult to estimate and in most cases it is possible only to estimate their order of magnitude. As David Orrell and Patrick McSharry wrote in A Systems Approach to Forecasting: “Complex systems have
emergent properties, qualities that cannot be predicted in advance from knowledge of systems components alone”. According to complexity scientist Stephen Wolfram’s principle of computational irreducibility, the only way to predict the evolution of such a system is to run the system itself: “There is no simple set of equations that can look into its future.” 55 Orrell and McSharry also noted that “in orthodox economics, the reductionist approach means that the economy is seen as consisting of individual, independent agents who act to maximise their own utility. It assumes that prices are driven to a state of near-equilibrium by the ‘invisible hand’ of the economy. Deviations from this state are assumed to be random and independent, so the price fluctuations are often modelled using the normal distribution or other distributions with thin tails and finite variance.” The drawbacks of an approach using the normal distribution, or other distributions with thin tails and finite variance, become obvious when the unexpected happens as in the recent credit crunch, when existing models totally failed to capture the true risks of the economy. As an
employee of Lehman Brothers put it on August 11, 2007: “Events that models predicted would happen only once in 10,000 years happened every day for three days.” 56 [FIGURE 6 OMITTED] The exact level for an infinite impact threshold should not be the focus, but rather the fact that such thresholds exists and that an order of magnitude should be estimated.57 During the process of writing the report, experts suggested that a relatively quick death of two billion people could be used as a tentative number until more research is available.58 With current trends undermining ecological and social resilience it should be noted that the threshold level is likely to become lower as time progress. 2.3.4 Global F-N curves and ALARP In the context of global risks with potentially infinite impact, the possibility of establishing global F-N curves is worth exploring. One of the most common and flexible frameworks used for risk criteria divides risks into three bands: 59 1. Upper: an unacceptable/ intolerable region, where risks are intolerable except in extraordinary circumstances and risk reduction measures are essential. 2. Middle: an ALARP (“as low as
reasonably practicable”) region, where risk reduction measures are desirable but may not be implemented if their cost is disproportionate to the benefit achieved. 3. Lower: a broadly acceptable/ negligible region, where no further risk reduction measures are needed. The bands are expressed by F-N curves. When the frequency of events which cause at least N fatalities is plotted against the number N on log–log scales, the result is called an F-N curve.60 If the frequency scale is replaced by annual probability, then the resultant curve is called an f-N curve. The concept for the middle band when using F-N curves is ALARP. It is a term often used in the area of safety-critical and safety-involved systems.62 The ALARP principle is that the residual risk should be as low as reasonably practicable. The upper band, the unacceptable/ intolerable region, is usually the area above the ALARP area (see figure 8) By using F-N curves it is also possible to establish absolute impact levels that are never acceptable, regardless of probability (Figure 7. Based on an actual F-n Curve showing an absolute impact level that is defined as unacceptable). This has been
done in some cases for local projects. The infinite threshold could be used to create an impact limit on global F-N curves used for global challenges in the future. Such an approach would help governments, companies and researchers when they develop new technical solutions and when investing in resilience. Instead of reducing risk, such an approach encourages the building of systems which cannot have negative impacts above a certain level. Pros – Clearly shows relationship between frequency and size of accident – Allows judgement on relative importance of different sizes of accident – Slope steeper than -1 provides explicit consideration of multiple fatality aversion and favours concepts with lower potential for large fatality events – Allows company to manage overall risk exposure from portfolio of all existing and future facilities Cons – Cumulative expression makes it difficult to interpret, especially by non-risk specialists – Can be awkard to derive – May be difficult to use if criterion is exceeded in one area but otherwise is well below – Much debate about criterion lines Figure 7: Example of F-n curve showing different levels of risk 61
Figure 9: Pros and cons of F-N curves 63 46 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact practical guidance that can provide defined group of risks 2.3.5 A name for a clearly 10 100 1000 10000 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10-2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 Number of Fatalities (N) Frequency (F) of Accidents with N or More Fatalities (Per Year) ALARP region Unacceptable Acceptable Today no established methodology exists that provides a constantly updated list of risks that threaten human civilisation, or even all human life. Given that such a category can help society to better understand and act to avoid such risks, and better understand the relation between these risks, it can be argued that a name for this category would be helpful.65 To name something that refers to the end of humanity is in itself a challenge, as the very idea is so far from our usual references and to many the intuitive feeling will be to dismiss any such thing. The concept used in this report is “infinity”. The reson for this is that many of the challenges relate to discussed. In one way the name
is not very important so long as people understand the impacts and risks associated with it. Still, a name is symbolic and can either help or make it more difficult to get support to establish the new category. The work to establish a list of risks with infinite impact evolved from “existential risk”, the philosophical concept that inspired much of the work to establish a clearly defined group of risks. The reason for not using the concept “existential risk and impact” for this category, beside the fact that existential impact is also used in academic contexts to refer to a personal impact, is that the infinite category is a smaller subset of “existential risk” and this new category is meant to be used as a tool, not a scientific concept. Not only should the impacts in the category potentially result in the end of all human life, it should be possible to affect the probability and/or impact of that risk. There must also exist an agreed methodology, such as the one suggested in this report, that decides what risks belong and not belong on the list. Another concept that the category relates to is “global catastrophic risk” as it is one of the most used concepts among
academics interested in infinite impacts. However it is vague enough to be used to refer to impacts from a few thousand deaths to the end of human civilisation. Already in use but not clearly defined, it includes both the academic concept existential risks and the category of risks with infinite impacts. macroeconomics and its challenges in relation to the kind of impacts that the risks in this report focus on. Further, the name clearly highlights the unique nature without any normative judgements. Still, infinity is an abstract concept and it might not be best communicate the unique group of risks that it covers to all stakeholders. In the same way as it can be hard to use singularity to describe a black hole, it can be difficult to use infinity to describe a certain risk. If people can accept that it is only from a specific perspective that the infinity concept is relevant it could be used beyond the areas of macroeconomics. Two other concepts that also have been considered during the process of writing this report are “xrisks” and “human risk of ruin”. Xrisk has the advantage, and disadvantage, of not really saying anything at all about the risk. The positive
aspect is that the name can be associated with the general concept of extinction and the philosophical concept of existential risk as both have the letter x in them. The disadvantage is the x often represents the unknown and can therefore relate to any risk. There is nothing in the name that directly relates to the kind of impacts that the category covers, so it is easy to interpret the term as just unknown risks. Human risk of ruin has the advantage of having a direct link to a concept, risk of ruin, that relates to a very specific state where all is lost. Risk of ruin is a concept in use in gambling, insurance, and finance that can all give very important contributions to the work with this new category of risk. The resemblance to an existing concept that is well established could be both a strength and a liability. Below is an overview of the process when different names were Figure 8: Example of F-n curve showing an absolute impact level that is defined as unacceptable/ infinite. i.e no level of probability is acceptable above a certain level of impact, in this case 1000 dead 64 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a
new category of risks 47 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact 3. 2. 1. 9. Unacceptable risks in different combinations, e.g. unacceptable global risks – This is probably not appropriate for two main reasons. First, it is a normative statement and the category aims to be scientific; whether these risks are unacceptable or not is up to the citizens of the world to decide. Second, the idea of risk is that it is a combination of probability times impact. If a risk is unacceptable is therefore also usually related to how easy it is to avoid. Even if a risk is small, due to relatively low probability and relatively low impact, but is very easy to address, it can be seen as unacceptable, in the same way a large risk can be seen as acceptable if it would require significant resources to reduce. There will not be a perfect concept and the question is what concept can find the best balance between being easy to understand, acceptable where policy decisions needs to be made and also acceptable for all key groups that are relevant for work in these area. During the process to find a name for this category inspiration has been found in the process when new concepts
have been introduced; from irrational numbers and genocide to sustainable development and the Human Development Index. So far “infinite risk” can be seen as the least bad concept in some areas and “xrisks” and “human risk of ruin” the least bad in others. The purpose of this report is to establish a methodology to identify a very specific group of risks as well as continue to a process where these risks will be addressed in a systematic and appropriate way. The issue of naming this group of risks will be left to others. The important is that the category gets the attention it deserves. The three concepts are very different. Global catastrophic risk is possibly the most used concept in contexts where infinite impacts are included, but it is without any clear definition. Existential risk is an academic concept used by a much smaller group and with particular focus on future technologies. The category in this report is a tool to help decision makers develop strategies that help reduce the probability that humanity will end when it can be avoided. The relation between the three concepts can be illustrated with three circles. The large circle (1)
represents global catastrophic risks, the middle one (2) existential risks and the small circle (3) the list of twelve risks in this report, i.e. risks where there are peer reviewed academic studies that estimate the probability of an infinite impact and where there are known ways to reduce the risk. A list that could be called infinite risks, xrisks, or human risk of ruin. Other concepts that are related to infinite impacts that could potentially be used to describe the same category if the above suggestions are not seen as acceptable concepts are presented below, together with the main reason why these concepts were not chosen for this report. 1. Risk of ruin – is a concept in gambling, insurance and finance relating to the likelihood of losing all one’s capital or affecting one’s bankroll beyond the point of recovery. It is used to describe individual companies rather than systems.66 2. Extinction risk – is used in biology for any species that is threatened. The concept is also used in memory/cognition research. It is a very dramatic term, to be used with care. These factors make it probably unsuitable for use by stakeholders accustomed to traditional risk
assessment. 3. Astronomical risk – is seldom used scientifically, but when it is used it is often used for asteroids and is probably best reserved for them.67 4. Apocalyptic risk – could have been suitable, as the original meaning is apocálypsis, from the Greek ἀπό and καλύπτω meaning ‘un-covering’. It is sometime used, but in a more general sense, to mean significant risks.68 But through history and today it is mainly used for a religious end of time scenario. Its strong links to unscientific doom-mongers make it probably unsuitable for a scientific concept. 5. End-of-the-world risk - belongs to the irrational doomsday narratives and so is probably unsuitable for scientific risk assessments. 6. Extreme risk – is vague enough to describe anything beyond the normal, so it is probably unsuitable for risk assessments of this magnitude. 7. Unique risk – is even vaguer, as every risk is unique in some way. Probably best avoided in risk assessments. 8. Collapse risk – is based on Jared Diamond’s thinking.69 There are many different kinds of collapse and only a few result in infinite impact. 48 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation –
The case for a new category of risks 2.3 Global challenges and infinite impact Estimations of impact Only literature where there is some estimation of impact that indicates the possibility of an infinite impact is included. Leading organisations’ priorities In order to increase the probability of covering all relevant risks an overview of leading organisations' work was conducted. This list was then compared with the initial list and subjected to the same filter regarding the possibility to affect the probability or impact. Possibility of addressing the risk Possibility of addressing the risk: From the risks gathered from literature and organisations, only those where the probability or impact can be affected by human actions are included. Expert review Qualitative assessment: Expert review in order to increase the probability of covering all relevant global risks. List of risks Result: List of risks with potentially infinite impacts. Relevant literature Identification of credible sources: search relevant literature in academic literature included in World of Knowledge and Google Scholar. 1 2 3 4 5 6 This chapter presents the methodology used to identify global risks
with potentially infinite impact. Methodology overview In order to establish a list of global risks with potentially infinite impact a methodological triangulation was used, consisting of: – A quantitative assessment of relevant literature. – A strategic selection of relevant organisations and their priorities. – A qualitative assessment with the help of expert workshops. 2.4 Methodology 70 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 49 2.4 Methodology The scientific review of literature was led by Seth Baum, Executive Director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute72 and research scientist at the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University.73 The methodology for including global risks with a potentially infinite impact is based on a scientific review of key literature, with focus on peer-reviewed academic journals, using keyword search of both World of Knowledge74 and Google Scholar75 combined with existing literature overviews in the area of global challenges. This also included a snowball methodology where references in the leading studies and books
were used to identify other scientific studies and books. In order to select words for a literature search to identify infinite impacts, a process was established to identify words in the scientific literature connected to global challenges with potentially infinite impacts. Some words generate a lot of misses, i.e. publications that use the term but are not the focus of this report. For example “existential risk” is used in business; “human extinction” is used in memory/cognition. Some search terms produced relatively few hits. For example “global catastrophic risk” is not used much. Other words are only used by people within a specific research community: few use “existential risk” in our sense unless they are using Nick Bostrom’s work. The term “global catastrophe” was identified as a phrase that referred almost exclusively to extremely negative impacts on humans, by a diversity of researchers, not just people in one research community. A list of 178 relevant books and reports was established based on what other studies have referred to, and/or which are seen as landmark studies by groups interviewed during the process. They were selected
for a closer examination regarding the challenges they include.76 The full bibliography, even with its focus on publications of general interest, is still rather long. So it is helpful to have a shorter list focused on the highlights; the most important publications based on how often they are quoted, how wellspread the content (methodology, lists, etc.) is and how often key organisations use them. The p

Mora co apse of human ty Human ty may deve op a ong a path that we


wou d current y find mora y repe ent The consequences of th s are not c ear-cut and depend on
va ue udgements that wou d be contentious and unshared such as endur ng poverty m m

Resource dep etion B od vers ty oss has often been argued


that dec n ng resources w cause ncreased confl ct Neverthe ess such confl cts wou d not be suffic ent
n themse ves to threaten human ty on a arge sca e w thout a “ System Co apse”

the potentia for de berate or acc denta nuc ear confl ct has not been
removed, with some estimates putting the risk of nuclear war in the next century at around 10% it or so 166 –

may have been mostly down to luck that such a war did not happen in the last half century A nuclear 167.

war could have a range of different impacts. At the lowest end is the most obvious and immediate
impact: destruction and death in major cities across the world, due to the explosions themselves and
the radioactive fallout . But even if the entire populations of Europe, Russia and the USA were directly wiped out in a nuclear war – an outcome that some studies have shown to be physically impossible168, given population dispersal and the

war triggered a nuclear


number of missiles in existence169 – that would not raise the war to the first level of impact, which requires > 2 billion affected.170 A larger impact would depend on whether or not the what is often called

winter that would plunge temperatures below freezing around the


or something similar.171 The term refers to the creation of a pall of smoke high in the stratosphere

globe and also destroy most of the ozone layer possibly There .172 The detonations would need to start firestorms in the targeted cities, which could lift the soot up into the stratosphere.173

are some uncertainties about both the climate models and the likelihood of devastating firestorms but ,174

the risks are severe and recent models confirmed earlier analysis Even a smaller nuclear conflict 175 have the 176 .

between India and Pakistan, for instance) could trigger a smaller nuclear winter which would place
(

billions in danger The disintegration of the global food supply make mass starvation and state .177 would

collapse likely. As the world balance of power would be dramatically shifted and previous ideological
positions called into question, large-scale war would be likely. This could lead to a civilisation collapse .

Extinction risk is possible if the aftermath of the nuclear war fragments and diminishes human society
only

to the point where recovery becomes impossible before humanity succumbs to other risks, such as 178 179

pandemics .180 Five important factors in estimating the probabilities and impacts of the challenge: 1. How relations between current and future nuclear powers develop. 2. The probability of accidental war. 3. Whether disarmament efforts will succeed in reducing the number of nuclear warheads. 4. The likelihood of a nuclear winter. 5. The long-term effects of a nuclear war on climate, infrastructure and technology. [[CHART OMITTED]] 3.1 Current risks 1. The success or failure of disarmament will determine the number of

Nuclear terrorism may be the trigger of a


nuclear warheads available for a future nuclear conflict. 2. The first step of proliferation is countries desiring to possess nuclear weapons. Various political interventions may reduce or increase this desire. 3. The second step of proliferation is countries building nuclear weapons. Various mechanisms, agreements and inspections may be relevant 4 .

larger nuclear conflict, especially if the detonation is misinterpreted as a traditional attack . 5. The security of nuclear weapons

relations between future nuclear powers will be the major


and materials affects both the probability of nuclear terrorism and the control likelihood of nuclear accidents. 6. The

determinant of whether a nuclear war breaks out. 7. The relations between current nuclear powers will be a major determinant of the relations between future nuclear powers. 8. The relations between future major nuclear powers will be the major component of determining whether a major nuclear war breaks out. 9. Relations between the USA

Aside from attacks,


and Russia (the only current major nuclear powers) will be a major determinant of the relations between future major nuclear powers. 10. Pre-war countermeasures (such as nuclear bunkers and food stores) can help mitigate the casualties of a smaller nuclear conflict. 11. A small-scale nuclear war could start with an attack by one or more nuclear powers. 12. A full-scale nuclear war could start with an attack by one or more major nuclear powers. 13 .

the other way a nuclear war could start would be through accidental firings or misinterpretations of
other incidents Even a smaller
. 14. Firestorms caused by burning cities are one of the main ways a nuclear conflict could cause major climate disruption, and hence high casualties. 15. The direct war casualties from a nuclear conflict are likely to be small compared with the potential climate effects. 16. A nuclear winter is the way in which a nuclear conflict could have the most damaging effects on the world. 17 .

nuclear conflict could trigger a smaller nuclear winter that could have major disruptive effects on
agriculture and hence human survival Any war will have a disruptive impact on the world’s politics and . 18.

economy A nuclear conflict – possibly accompanied by a nuclear winter – even more so The long term
. . 19.

impact of nuclear winter, infrastructure disruption, and possibly radiation, will determine the likelihood
of collapse and rebuilding. 20. Since a nuclear power must be one of the parties to a nuclear war, the number of the former affects the probability of the latter. 21. Since a major nuclear power must be one of the parties to a major nuclear war, the number of the former affects the probability of the latter. 22. Post-war politics will be determined by the war, the disruption it caused, and the number of casualties it inflicted. 23. Unlike other risks, nuclear

Maintaining a technology base


weapons are targeted by humans, so may take out important parts of the world’s infrastructure (and conventional weapons used in a conflict may have the same effect). 24. Unlike other risks, nuclear weapons are targeted by humans, so may take out important parts of the world’s technology and research base (and conventional weapons used in a conflict may have the same effect). 25 .

will be complicated by the possible targeting of infrastructure and the technology base during a conflict .

The further development of military technology is hard to predict. The current balance of power
26.

under MAD (mutually assured destruction) is based on certain assumptions about the effectiveness of
nuclear weapons, such as second strike capability. If this were removed (such as by effective submarine
detection, or anti-ballistic missile shields), the effect on the balance of power is hard to predict.
Climate
Fails Climate – needs impossible international coordination.
Falkner & Buzan 22
Robert, Associate Professor of International Relations and Research Director of the Grantham Research
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, UK; Barry, Professor Emeritus at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and
a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS. “Introduction.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental
Responsibilities. Pg 3. LJS

Climate change is one of the most pressing global challenges of the twenty-first century. To
avert catastrophic global warming,
international society needs to take urgent, and internationally coordinated, action. Although virtually all nations
are united in their desire to tackle the man-made causes of global warming, they have yet to reverse the long-term trend of rising greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. The Covid-19 pandemic provided temporary relief in that it led to a drop in global emissions by up to 7% in 2020 (UNEP,
2020), but the post-pandemic economic recovery seems likely to return the world to a path of rising emissions again. As
yet, states’
climate policy intentions and emission pledges have proved to be inadequate. Climate change is a truly
global problem, requiring all nations to undertake mitigation and adaptation measures. At the same time, the
responsibility for causing the problem is unequally distributed, as is the capacity to respond to the climate threat in an effective manner. Two-
thirds of current global emissions originate from just 10 major economies, and by and large it is the same countries that also have the economic
and technological clout to develop and finance the required global solutions. Climate change and international power inequality are thus closely
entwined. Indeed, if the major emitters were to act decisively and in a coordinated manner, the chances of
averting a climate catastrophe would be much improved. By the same token, even if only some of them
fail or refuse to act responsibly, the world faces a bleak future. The International Relations (IR) literature on global environmental politics (GEP) has tended to acknowledge,
implicitly at least, the important role that a few select major powers play, either as international leaders that set an example for others and shape international environmental agendas, or as veto players that block progress in multilateral environmental negotiations (Kelemen and Vogel,
2010; Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017; Eckersley, 2020). GEP scholarship has also highlighted the inherent inequalities that structure the environmental policy area, both within societies and between them, and especially with regard to unequal levels of economic development and
consumption levels (Roberts and Parks, 2007; Ciplet, Roberts, and Khan, 2015). However, questions of power asymmetry in international environmental politics, the nature of states’ environmental power, what counts as a great power in the environmental field, and whether great
environmental power comes with special responsibilities have not attracted the kind of systematic attention in GEP that they deserve. This book seeks to fill that gap. By connecting the IR literature on great powers and great power responsibility with GEP scholarship, it develops a new
analytical perspective on international power inequality and the role of environmental great powers in GEP, with a special focus on international climate politics. The contributions to this volume develop and apply a conceptual framework for the study of environmental great powers and
their special international responsibilities. They examine how individual great powers have responded to the global climate challenge and whether they have accepted a special responsibility for stabilizing the global climate. And they place emerging discourses on great power

The urgency of the climate change


responsibility in the context of wider debates about international environmental leadership and climate change securitization. Great Powers and the Global Climate Challenge

problem is now well understood. Man-made global warming, which is caused by GHG emissions from
the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) and land use changes (e.g. deforestation), has already led to a
1°C increase of average global temperatures since pre-industrial times. If current net emission trends
continue unabated, the world is likely to face a global warming trend of between 3°C and 5°C by the end
of the twenty-first century. The ecological consequences of such runaway global warming would be catastrophic. If left unchecked,
climate change is expected to result in the melting of glaciers and rising sea levels, more extreme weather patterns, heat waves and wild fires
even in arctic lands, the destruction of biologically diverse ecosystems, and changes in the amount, frequency, and intensity of precipitation.
Some of these changes are already occurring (disappearance of glaciers, coral bleaching, wildfires) while others will only kick in at a later stage.
The challenge for humanity is that the longer global warming is allowed to carry on, the stronger future
ecological stresses will be and the sooner we may reach ecological tipping points that lock in large-scale
and irreversible environmental damage (Lenton et al., 2019; Dalby, 2020). International society has recognized the
threat that global warming poses to human well-being and prosperity. What is unclear, however, is whether the UN’s multilateral climate
regime can quickly enough come up with an effective response. The
197 countries that negotiated the 2015 Paris
Agreement to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed to keep global
warming to well below 2°C. In order to stay within this temperature target, they will need to bring GHG
emissions under control, first by reaching a global emissions peak as soon as possible and then by
bringing them down to reach a balance between GHG emissions and sinks (so-called net zero) by the
second half of this century. All of this is to be achieved through a system of voluntary climate mitigation
pledges that are to be reviewed internationally. The key question is whether the Paris Agreement’s framework for ratcheting
up national climate ambitions can set the world on the path towards deep decarbonization, and within a timeframe that keeps global warming
below 2°C (Falkner, 2016b). The
past record of multilateral efforts is far from encouraging. Issue complexity,
institutional inertia, and diverging national interests have turned climate change into a ‘wicked’ global
problem that seems to exceed the problem-solving capacity of environmental multilateralism (Levin et
al., 2012; Keohane and Victor, 2016).

3]. No warming impact – we adapt, but it’s apocalyptic climate rhetoric forces the
poorest countries into endless poverty.
Shellenberger 19 - Michael Shellenberger is the best-selling author of San Fransicko (HarperCollins
2021) and Apocalypse Never (Harper Collins 2020), a Time Magazine “Hero of the Environment,” and
Green Book Award Winner. He is Founder and President of Environmental Progress, an independent and
nonprofit research organization based in Berkeley, California.’; Why Apocalyptic Claims About Climate
Change Are Wrong; Nov 25, 2019;
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2019/11/25/why-everything-they-say-about-
climate-change-is-wrong/?sh=f20b03812d6a; //[TMS—GK]

IPCC-Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change


Environmental journalists and advocates have in recent weeks made a number of apocalyptic predictions about the impact of climate change. Bill McKibben suggested climate-driven fires in Australia had made koalas “functionally extinct.” Extinction Rebellion said “Billions will die” and
“Life on Earth is dying.” Vice claimed the “collapse of civilization may have already begun.” Few have underscored the threat more than student climate activist Greta Thunberg and Green New Deal sponsor Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. The latter said, “The world is going to end in 12
years if we don't address climate change.” Says Thunberg in her new book, “Around 2030 we will be in a position to set off an irreversible chain reaction beyond human control that will lead to the end of our civilization as we know it.” Sometimes, scientists themselves make apocalyptic
claims. “It’s difficult to see how we could accommodate a billion people or even half of that,” if Earth warms four degrees, said one earlier this year. “The potential for multi-breadbasket failure is increasing,” said another. If sea levels rise as much as the Intergovernmental Panel on

Apocalyptic statements have real-world impacts


Climate Change predicts, another scientist said, “It will be an unmanageable problem.” like these . In September, a group of British

psychologists said children are increasingly suffering from anxiety from the frightening discourse around
climate change . In October, an activist with Extinction Rebellion (”XR”) — an environmental group founded in 2018 to commit civil disobedience to draw awareness to the threat its founders and supporters say climate change poses to human existence — and a
videographer, were kicked and beaten in a London Tube station by angry commuters. And last week, an XR co-founder said a genocide like the Holocaust was “happening again, on a far greater scale, and in plain sight” from climate change. Climate change is an issue I care passionately
about and have dedicated a significant portion of my life to addressing. I have been politically active on the issue for over 20 years and have researched and written about it for 17 years. Over the last four years, my organization, Environmental Progress, has worked with some of the
world’s leading climate scientists to prevent carbon emissions from rising. So far, we’ve helped prevent emissions increasing the equivalent of adding 24 million cars to the road. I also care about getting the facts and science right and have in recent months corrected inaccurate and
apocalyptic news media coverage of fires in the Amazon and fires in California, both of which have been improperly presented as resulting primarily from climate change. Journalists and activists alike have an obligation to describe environmental problems honestly and accurately, even if

catastrophist framing of climate change is self-defeating


they fear doing so will reduce their news value or salience with the public. There is good evidence that the

because it alienates and polarizes many people exaggerating climate change risks distract us from . And ing

other important issues we have more near-term control over including ones might . I feel the need to say this up-front because I want the issues I’m about to raise to be taken seriously

no credible scientific
and not dismissed by those who label as “climate deniers” or “climate delayers” anyone who pushes back against exaggeration. With that out of the way, let’s look whether the science supports what’s being said. First,

body has ever said climate change threatens the collapse of civilization much less the extinction of the
human species “‘Our children are going to die in the next 10 to 20 years.’ What’s the scientific basis for
.

these claims?” These claims have been disputed admittedly


BBC’s Andrew Neil asked a visibly uncomfortable XR spokesperson last month. “ , ,” she said. “There are some scientists who

I looked through IPCC reports and see no


are agreeing and some who are saying it’s not true. But the overall issue is that these deaths are going to happen.” “But most scientists don’t agree with this,” said Neil. “

reference to billions of people going to die, or children in 20 years. How would they die?” “Mass migration around the world

XR grossly misrepresented
already taking place due to prolonged drought in countries, particularly in South Asia. There are wildfires in Indonesia, the Amazon rainforest, Siberia, the Arctic,” she said. But in saying so, the spokesperson had

the science There is robust evidence of disasters displacing people worldwide


.“ but limited evidence ,” notes IPCC, “

that climate change or sea-level rise is the direct cause What about “mass migration ” ”? “The majority of resultant

population movements occur within the borders of affected countries tend to climate ," says IPCC. It’s not like climate doesn’t matter. It’s that

change is outweighed by other factors other drivers, such as . Earlier this year, researchers found that climate “has affected organized armed conflict within countries. However,

low socioeconomic development and low capabilities of the state are substantially more influential , judged to be .”
Last January, after climate scientists criticized Rep. Ocasio-Cortez for saying the world would end in 12 years, her spokesperson said "We can quibble about the phraseology, whether it's existential or cataclysmic.” He added, “We're seeing lots of [climate change-related] problems that are

economic development has made us less vulnerable which is why there was a
already impacting lives." That last part may be true, but it’s also true that ,

99.7% decline in the death toll from natural disasters since 1931 In 1931, 3.7 million people died its peak in .

from natural disasters In 2018, just 11,000 did . IPCC estimates sea . And that decline occurred over a period when the global population quadrupled. What about sea level rise?

level could rise two feet by 2100 Does that sound apocalyptic or even “unmanageable”?
(0.6 meters) one- . Consider that

third of the Netherlands is below sea level seven meters below the , and some areas are sea level. You might object that Netherlands is rich while Bangladesh is poor. But
Netherlands adapted to living below sea level 400 years ago Technology has improved claims . a bit since then. What about

of crop failure, famine, and mass death That’s science fiction Humans today produce enough food ? , not science.

for 10 billion 25% more than we need and scientific bodies predict increases
people, or not declines , in that share, . The United

FAO forecasts crop yields increasing 30% by 2050 the poorest parts of the world
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization ( ) . And , like sub-Saharan

are expected to see increases of 90% Nobody is suggesting climate change won’t negatively impact
Africa, 80 to .

crop yields such declines should be put in perspective. Wheat yields increased 300%
. It could. But since 100 to around the world

the 1960s while 30 models found that yields would decline by 6% for every one degree increase in
, a study of Celsius

temperature Rates of future yield growth depend far more on whether poor nations get access to
.

tractors, irrigation, and fertilizer than on climate change climate change will have a , says FAO. All of this helps explain why IPCC anticipates

modest impact on economic growth. By 2100 the global economy will be 500% larger than , IPCC projects 300 to it is

today warming of 4°C would reduce GDP by 5%


. Both IPCC and the Nobel-winning Yale economist, William Nordhaus, predict that 2.5°C and gross domestic product ( ) 2% and over that same period. Does this
mean we shouldn’t worry about climate change? Not at all. One of the reasons I work on climate change is because I worry about the impact it could have on endangered species. Climate change may threaten one million species globally and half of all mammals, reptiles, and amphibians

it’s not the case that “we’re putting our own survival in danger”
in diverse places like the Albertine Rift in central Africa, home to the endangered mountain gorilla. But

through extinctions animal extinctions do not threaten human civilization


, as Elizabeth Kolbert claimed in her book, Sixth Extinction. As tragic as are, they . If we

exaggerating the risk, and suggesting climate


want to save endangered species, we need to do so because we care about wildlife for spiritual, ethical, or aesthetic reasons, not survival ones. And

change is more important than things like habitat destruction are counterproductive Australia’s , . For example,

fires are not driving koalas extinct , as Bill McKibben suggested. The main scientific body that tracks the species, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, or IUCN, labels the koala “vulnerable,” which is one level less

they face far


threatened than “endangered,” two levels less than “critically endangered,” and three less than “extinct” in the wild. Should we worry about koalas? Absolutely! They are amazing animals and their numbers have declined to around 300,000. But

bigger threats such as the destruction of habitat disease bushfires and invasive species The , , , . Think of it this way.

climate could change dramatically and we could still save koalas the climate could change only — . Conversely,

modestly and koalas could still go extinct The monomaniacal focus on climate distracts our attention
— .

from other threats Bushfire losses can be


to koalas and opportunities for protecting them, like protecting and expanding their habitat. As for fire, one of Australia’s leading scientists on the issue says, “

explained by the increasing exposure of dwellings to fire-prone bushlands. No other influences need be invoked. So

even if climate change had some role any such effects on risk to property are
played small in modulating recent bushfires, and we cannot rule this out,

clearly swamped by the changes in exposure Climate change is .” Nor are the fires solely due to drought, which is common in Australia, and exceptional this year. “ playing its role

not the cause of these fires


here,” said Richard Thornton of the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre in Australia, “but it's ." The same is true for fires in the United States. In 2017, scientists modeled 37 different regions

humans may not only influence fire regimes but


and found “ actually swamp out, the effects of their presence can override, or

climate Of the 10 variables


.” none were as significant… as the anthropogenic variables such as
that influence fire, “ ,”

building homes near, and managing fires and wood fuel growth within, forests . Climate scientists are starting to push back against exaggerations by

climate change does not threaten human extinction I


activists, journalists, and other scientists. “While many species are threatened with extinction,” said Stanford’s Ken Caldeira, “ ...

would not like to see us motivating people by making them believe something that is false to do the right thing .” I asked the

It really does bother me because it’s wrong,” All these


Australian climate scientist Tom Wigley what he thought of the claim that climate change threatens civilization. “ he said. “

young people have been misinformed it’s Greta Thunberg’s fault she’s wrong . And partly . Not deliberately. But .” But don’t scientists and activists need to
exaggerate in order to get the public’s attention? “I’m reminded of what [late Stanford University climate scientist] Steve Schneider used to say,” Wigley replied. “He used to say that as a scientist, we shouldn’t really be concerned about the way we slant things in communicating with
people out on the street who might need a little push in a certain direction to realize that this is a serious problem. Steve didn’t have any qualms about speaking in that biased way. I don’t quite agree with that.” Wigley started working on climate science full-time in 1975 and created one
of the first climate models (MAGICC) in 1987. It remains one of the main climate models in use today. “When I talk to the general public,” he said, “I point out some of the things that might make projections of warming less and the things that might make them more. I always try to

what bothers me about the apocalyptic rhetoric by climate activists is that it is often
present both sides.” Part of

accompanied by demands that poor nations be denied the cheap sources of energy they need to
develop If you want to minimize carbon dioxide you might want to
. I have found that many scientists share my concerns. “ in the atmosphere in 2070

accelerate the burning of coal in India today it’s by burning a lot ,” MIT climate scientist Kerry Emanuel said. “It doesn’t sound like it makes sense. Coal is terrible for carbon. But

of coal that they make themselves wealthier and by making themselves wealthier they have fewer ,

children and you don’t have as many people burning carbon you might be better off
, the , in 2070.” Emanuel and Wigley say

extreme rhetoric is making political agreement on climate change harder . “You’ve got to come up with some kind of middle ground where you do reasonable

We shouldn’t be forced to choose between lifting people


things to mitigate the risk and try at the same time to lift people out of poverty and make them more resilient,” said Emanuel. “

out of poverty and doing something for the climate .” Happily, there is a plenty of middle ground between climate apocalypse and climate denial.
Heg fuels unnecessary conflict through threat-constructed tensions – allies resolve the
transition.
Kelly 19 – Dr Robert E. Kelly is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political
Science at Pusan National University, Busan, South Korea; 6 Aug 2019; US foreign policy: restraint
without retrenchment; https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-foreign-policy-restraint-
without-retrenchment; //[TMS—GK]

US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has come under growing criticism for its expansive, even
aggressive, character. Despite its name, “liberal hegemony” often seems illiberal, belligerent, even
militaristic. The US has used force regularly over the last 30 years, often with dubious results. Iraq 2003 is
the most obvious example, but Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and (through its Saudi proxy) Yemen also
spring to mind. The current US President Donald Trump has also threatened force against North Korea, Venezuela, and
Iran. In response to these excesses, a clutch of realist critics have argued variously for restraint or retrenchment – Barry Posen,
Daniel Larison, and Stephen Walt immediately spring to mind. I found this H-Diplo review of Walt’s recent book nicely summarises the issues at
hand. The primary argument is that the United States does far too much overseas, especially when it does not need
to. The US faces no existential threats. Its geography – its distance from the contentious theatres of
Eurasia – is generous. It is the wealthiest country in the world, with an unmatched military. Before the First
World War, it restricted itself mostly to the Western hemisphere. Its expansion in the 20th century was driven by threats
emanating from Eurasia, first fascism, then communism. Yet since the “end of history” and the
dissipation of those threats in 1989, there has been no pull-back. Instead, the US has been ever more
sucked into places around the world. This expansion produces unnecessary tension with China, Russia,
and the Islamic world. Worse, the US now fights more often than it did during the Cold War. These
interventions often take far longer than the public is led to expect. They kill far more people and cost far more money
than admitted. At home, a massive national security state has emerged, confirming President Dwight Eisenhower’s famous warning of the
“military-industrial complex”. The policy response to this sprawl is some mix of retrenchment and restraint. A US grand strategy of
“offshore balancing” would husband American resources at home. Intervention would only occur when
facing a genuine hegemonic challenger – most obviously China. But the “small wars” which have characterised US
intervention in recent decades would stop, for we now know that they do not stay small. Diplomacy would be
properly funded; US foreign policy would be de-militarised. Multilateralism and international organisations would
be given a chance where the US today disdains them. From an American point of view, it is hard to argue with a lot of this. The
country is pretty clearly exhausted with “forever wars” such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Trump openly ran
against “dumb wars” in America’s traditionally hawkish party and still won easily. That is a powerful signal
for change from the public. It is also hard to see wars with Iran, Venezeula, or North Korea staying
“regional contingencies”, because as with other US ground conflicts, they would almost certainly explode in
size and duration. Similarly, it is hard to argue against US allies doing more. US presidents have complained for decades about allied free-,
or more accurately cheap-, riding. Trump has unfortunately tarnished this concern with his otherwise reprehensible conduct, but the notion
of a more balanced, less hegemonic American alliance network is rather appealing. So restraint – fewer
wars, less “omni-directional belligerence”, more diplomacy – is not too controversial. I imagine most US
allies would actually like this, too. Many US partners were dismayed at getting chain-ganged into the Iraq
war, for example, agreeing to it only to retain US friendship. Similarly, Trump was nearly alone in pushing for war
with North Korea in 2017. It is important to distinguish this restraint from retrenchment though, which I do not think this literature does
well. Restraint ultimately means better US judgment – less paranoia, less worst-case-scenario thinking,
less willingness to describe every unfriendly government or far-off region as “strategic” to the US, less activism
and jumpiness. No one disagrees with greater US perspicacity, except perhaps America’s most irresponsible partners such as the Saudi royals or
Israel’s Likud party. Retrenchment is more than this though. It is actual withdrawal of US forces back to the Western
hemisphere from forward bases in Eurasia, specifically from Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia. Given China’s rise however,
retrenchment would like fall on Europe and the Middle East first. Europe, most observers would agree, has the wealth and state
strength to do far more for its own security, while US policing of the Middle East is simply beyond even
its superpower reach. Restrainers’ argument for retrenchment is temptation. It is formally possible, as I am arguing, that US forces
could stay forward – that is, in Eurasia – without fighting more unnecessary wars. But as long as they are
there, as long as there are US forces near countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, it will be
hugely tempting for US policy-makers to militarily threaten those states . This is akin to the “law of the
hammer” – give a child a hammer, and everything is an upraised nail. Give a superpower a massive
military and global basing, and threats become an easy recourse . A full-blooded restraint argument
would claim greater US foreign policy discipline is possible only when the US is physically out of the
way. Ideally though, the US could stay where it was wanted – eastern Europe, Australia, South Korea, Japan – without
actually leaping therefrom into wars. The advantages of staying forward are clear. US presence bolsters alliances. It
helps solidify liberal democracy in places which might otherwise backslide. It builds democratic solidarity around the world among
otherwise disparate states to push back concertedly on authoritarians such as Russia or China. It builds interoperability with local
partners should future military needs arise and gives the US a location from which to operate should local geopolitics worsen. Even a small
US presence can reinforce positive trends, such as democratisation or the deterrence of Sino-Russian meddling, without,
hopefully, being large enough to invoke the law of the hammer. And the financial assistance from allies could offset the
cost of US forward stationing. In South Korea and Japan, the US, Japanese, and South Korean governments frequently repeat that is
actually cheaper to keep US forces there than bring them home. Allied support, plus the costs to the US to build new facilities back in the
US, offsets the expense – although hard data to substantiate these claims is not forthcoming . Eastern Europe is
an obvious example. US retrenchment from Europe would almost certainly encourage more Russian meddling from Vladimir Putin and worsen
democratic backsliding in those new democracies. Those would be moral and strategic costs to the United States. In response, could the US
keep a small local presence that both provides the “reinforcement effects” described above without so much
combat power as to encourage unnecessary war-making? Can we have restraint without full-blown retrenchment? Or
would even small US presences encourage so much allied free-riding or intervention temptation that
they are not worth it? “Places not bases”, in which the US retains “lily pads” for possible operations in
the future without large contingents of men and material, are one possibility to square this circle.

No scenario for escalation.


Lei 20, PhD and MA in International Politics, associate research fellow with the China Institute of
International Studies. (Cui, 7-24-2020, "Despite heated talk, risk of a US-China hot war is small", South
China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3094121/why-risk-us-china-hot-
war-small-despite-heated-talk)

Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are
heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the
US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is
unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet
relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet
ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is
expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters,
including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US,
bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international
students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now
aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can
be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of
isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western
markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US
will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist
Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is
undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack
of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China,
and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological
exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The
relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third,
the
ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the
obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market
economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically,
many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks
in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, aftermany years of fighting bloody wars
overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just
wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the
Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations
of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and
the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer,
given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey
zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The
forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s
huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of
force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush
to war to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US
and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the
Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a
country needs the will to fight before going to war,
even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is
weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its
own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to
recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is
very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary
hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to
further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.

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