Ilse Somavilla

Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and

Diaristic Remarks
Abstract: In my paper I will discuss the difference between Wittgenstein’s note-
books, personal diaries and his so called diaristic remarks scattered throughout
the Nachlass. This includes a distinction between his philosophical and his diaristic
entries. Secondly, I will outline the editing history of Wittgenstein’s Notebooks
1914–1916, his Secret Diaries (Geheime Tagebücher 1914–1916), Culture & Value
and his diaries of the 1930s (Denkbewegungen).
Finally, I will focus on Wittgenstein’s coded remarks (in the wartime note-
books and in his diaristic remarks found in the Nachlass) and then discuss their
significance not only in terms of his personal attitude toward life, ethics and reli-
gion but also in terms of their role in the context of his philosophizing. In doing so,
I will discuss the question of the extent to which Wittgenstein’s method of encod-
ing can be seen as a means for a special type of text, conceived for a sphere not
readily accessible to normal language and science – a sphere he avoided talking
about in the context of strict philosophical dispute.

1 The definition of “diary” in the case of

Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Nachlass comprises 182 manuscripts¹ and 109 typescripts which are
considered his philosophical writings. As for his personal reflections, i. e. the re-
marks that occur in the midst of his philosophical entries and are scattered
throughout the Nachlass, these should be labelled as ‘diaristic remarks’ but not
as ‘diaries’. There are only two cases in which one can speak of ‘diaries’:
1. the left-hand pages of Wittgenstein’s wartime notebooks, in which he reports
on his very personal situation in coded form – in contrast to the right-hand pages,
in which he wrote down his philosophical reflections in normal script; these are

1 In addition, Wittgenstein’s diary of the 1930s, published as Denkbewegungen, has been added to
the Nachlass by G.H. von Wright as MS 183.

Dr. Ilse Somavilla, Brenner-Archiv, Universität Innsbruck, Josef-Hirn-Straße 5, A-6020 Innsbruck,

Ilse.Somavilla@uibk.ac.at

Open Access. © 2023 with the author(s), published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under
the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2023-0010
186 Ilse Somavilla

known as Notebooks 1914–1916 and are considered the basis of his Logisch-Philos-
ophische Abhandlung or the Tractatus.
2. In the case of MS 183 (according to von Wright’s catalogue (1982) and known
as Denkbewegungen) one can speak of a diary of 243 pages containing mainly per-
sonal but also cultural and a few philosophical reflections. Most of this diary is
written in normal script, but as far as very personal remarks are concerned
(e. g. about Wittgenstein’s attitude towards religious belief or his fears of madness),
these are written in code.
Apart from these two so-called diaries, there might have been more, e. g. a
diary written in code entitled Abrechnung [Reckoning], which Wittgenstein gave
to his friend Arvid Sjögren in the 1930s. Sjögren later gave the diary to Margaret
Stonborough, but it has since been lost. According to Brian McGuinness, it is
also possible that the manuscripts Wittgenstein left in England in 1913, which he
explicitly demanded to be destroyed, contained personal notes. Furthermore, it
is possible that such entries were also to be found in “the large book” in which
Wittgenstein – according to reports from his students and neighbours – used to
write at night in the 1920s (McGuinness 1988: 332).
According to a note Wittgenstein penned in 1929, he began writing diaries in
1912 when he was in Berlin (cf. MS 107: 74). “It was an important step for me”,
he remarked (ibid.; my transl.). Reflecting on his reasons for keeping a diary, he
mentions that it was partly the desire for imitation (Gottfried Keller), partly the
wish to write down something of his own – an endeavour he condemns as “vanity”
(MS 107: 74–75; my transl.) – and partly the need to use his diary as a substitute for
a human being whom he could speak to in confidence.
In his reflections on the nature of writing diaries he states: “What cannot be
written, cannot be written” (MS 107: 75; my transl.) – an indication of his awareness
of the limits of language in writing not only on philosophical but also on personal
matters.
Wittgenstein himself makes a distinction between what he considers writing a
diary in contrast to his philosophical entries, as becomes clear in a passage in Phi-
losophische Bemerkungen, where he notes that he has accidentally left out two
pages, which he now wants to write his diary entries on.² This prompts the ques-

2 Cf. MS 124: 3–4, 6.6.1941: “Da ich aus Versehen zwei Seiten überblättert habe, so will ich den Raum
als Tagebuch benutzen. Ich hatte den Gedanken, noch jemals für mich über philosophische Probleme
nachzudenken, schon ganz aufgegeben. So war es ganz unerwartet, daß ich wieder, wenn noch so
schwach, denken konnte. Und Gott weiß wie lange es dauern wird. – Ich habe viele Herzschmerzen
gehabt. Und wäre ich stärker, könnte ich verdauen, was kommt, so wäre alles zum Guten. Unsere
größten Dummheiten können sehr weise sein.” Thus, on pp. 3 and 4, Wittgenstein reports about
his personal situation in code, whereas on p. 5 he continues to write in normal fashion about
 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks 187

tion as what kind of text/category he thus considered the various remarks on cul-
tural/ethical/religious topics that repeatedly occur amidst his philosophical inves-
tigations. In this sense, one might consider all his diaristic passages as parts of
“diaries” even if not in a comprehensive form as is the case with the coded part
of the wartime notebooks, which can clearly be attributed to the category
“diary” and thus also the 1930s “diary” mentioned above (even though the majority
of this diary is not in code and contains philosophical passages as well).
In the same year as Wittgenstein was thinking about writing a diary, he also
considered writing an autobiography with the aim of creating “clarity and truth in
all events” (MS 108: 46; my transl.) – for himself as well as for others. Thus, his
search for clarity and truthfulness as characteristic of his philosophy can also
be discerned in his coded entries dealing with personal, mostly moral problems.

2 Editions

2.1 Tagebücher 1914–1916 / Notebooks 1914–1916

The editions of Wittgenstein’s wartime notebooks released so far, published as

Notebooks 1914–1916, comprise only his philosophical entries on the right-hand
sides of MS 101, MS 102 and MS 103, beginning on August 22, 1914 and ending on
January 10, 1917, and were first published by Georg Henrik von Wright and Eliza-
beth Anscombe in 1960, in Schriften 1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1960).
A bilingual edition of the notebooks appeared in 1961, ed. by G.H. von Wright
and G.E.M. Anscombe with an English translation by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell), and a revised and partly extended edition by Basil Blackwell ap-
peared in 1979.
The philosophical parts of MS 101, 102 and 103, first published as Notebooks
1914–1916, as mentioned above, served as the basis of the Logisch-Philosophische
Abhandlung that was first published in the last issue of Oswald’s Annalen der Na-
turphilosophie in 1921 (Volume 14, Heft 3–4). As Wittgenstein was not at all happy
about the publication and called it a “Raubdruck” (IEA 2011: 5. 8.1922) (it was full of
mistakes because the logical formulae were distorted), a new and bilingual edition
entitled Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus was published by Routledge & Kegan Paul
in London in 1922, with a translation by F.P. Ramsey and C.K. Ogden and an intro-
duction by Bertrand Russell.

his philosophical reflections on mathematics. On July 11, he again writes in code about his personal
situation.
188 Ilse Somavilla

Wittgenstein corrected the German Text for a revised edition, edited by D.F.
Pears and B.F. McGuinness (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1933).
Finally, a revised version containing some more remarks was published by
Basil Blackwell in 1971.
MS 104 was found in Vienna in 1965 and published in 1971 as Prototractatus.
An early version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein. It was
edited by B.F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg, G.H. von Wright with a translation by D.F.
Pears, B.F. McGuinness, a historical introduction by G.H. von Wright and a facsim-
ile of the author’s manuscript (Routledge and K. Paul, 1971).
Wittgenstein’s personal and coded notes on the left-hand sides of the wartime
notebooks, beginning on August 9, 1914 and ending on August 19, 1916, were with-
held from the public and thus from researchers for many years. In the microfilm
versions of the Nachlass, the left-hand sides were also covered up, as decided by
the Trustees.
In 1982, parts of the coded remarks were illegally published by Wilhelm Baum
in the Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie; in 1985, the entire coded parts appeared
in the philosophical magazine Saber (in a German-Spanish-Catalanic edition). In
1990, the first German edition was published by Turia & Kant under the title Ge-
heime Tagebücher 1914–1916.
The publication of these so-called “Secret Diaries” evoked numerous discus-
sions in the field of Wittgenstein research; it led to a “scandal”. The image of Witt-
genstein as a dispassionate philosopher known for his rational way of philosophiz-
ing was shattered. On the other hand, the insight into his personal problems led to
a gradual understanding of the connection between his life and his work and to his
attitude toward ethical and religious questions. Unfortunately, it also led to an in-
crease in the number of myths surrounding Wittgenstein, sometimes even to a dis-
torted presentation of his personality.
In 2021, Marjorie Perloff edited and translated the coded part of the wartime
diaries into English under the title Ludwig Wittgenstein. Private Notebooks 1914–
1916. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation; London: W.W. Norton & Compa-
ny Ltd.).
In 2015, Sool Park edited a Korean version of the complete Notebooks 1914–
1916 – according to the original manuscripts MS 101, MS 102 and MS 103, the
recto-sides with the philosophical remarks, the verso-sides with the private and
coded remarks.
So far, a German version in book form is still missing. However, due to the ma-
chine-readable version of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, viz. the electronic edition of
WAB, researchers have access to the complete notebooks. Furthermore, Joachim
Schulte, Katia Saporiti and David Stern are currently working on a project
which will allow insights into the relations between Wittgenstein’s philosophical
 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks 189

notes and his personal coded diaries and thus the path that led to the final text of
the Tractatus.

2.2 Vermischte Bemerkungen / Culture & Value

In 1977, G.H. von Wright chose a selection of remarks from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass
which deviate from the strictly philosophical discourse and published them under
the title Vermischte Bemerkungen by Suhrkamp. In 1980 the volume was translated
into English by Peter Winch und published under the title Culture & Value.
In part, these are isolated remarks, sporadically occurring between philosoph-
ical entries. They do not appear to have anything in common with the philosoph-
ical context, but rather strike one as being something different altogether. For the
most part, they can be seen as Wittgenstein’s personal reflections on cultural is-
sues such as art, music, ethics, religion and politics.
Alois Pichler published a revision of the first edition by G.H. von Wright in
1994 and a revised and bilingual edition by Blackwell Publishing in 1998. In the
editorial note of 1994, Pichler mentions that a considerable number of these re-
marks are partly or wholly written in code. However, apart from the coded re-
marks published in Vermischte Bemerkungen, there are a great number of further
coded remarks in the Nachlass.

2.3 Denkbewegungen / Movements of Thought

In 1993, Johannes Koder, the son of Wittgenstein’s friend Rudolf Koder, informed
the Brenner-archives about a number of Wittgensteinian documents found in
the literary estate of his father. Apart from a typescript of the Tractatus, a manu-
script of the Philosophical Investigations (MS 142) and a manuscript of the Lecture
on Ethics (MS 139b), there was a diary written in the 1930s. After having tran-
scribed the text according to MECSWIT, I published the diary in book form
under the title Denkbewegungen in 1997. It has since been incorporated into the
Nachlass as MS 183 by G.H. von Wright.
MECSWIT allowed to edit the diary in two versions – a normalized, so-called
reading version and a diplomatic version, which tracks accurately Wittgenstein’s
movements of thought with all their changes and alterations including orthograph-
ic and stylistic mistakes. In the diplomatic version, the coded remarks are left in
code and are not transferred into normal script as is the case with the normalized
version; and whereas in the diplomatic version the changes can be seen according
190 Ilse Somavilla

to the place where Wittgenstein put them (over or under or after the first version),
these alternatives are placed in footnotes in the normalized version.
This diary, beginning on April 26, 1930 in Cambridge and ending on September
24 in 1937 in Skjolden, Norway, contains personal and cultural reflections and a
few philosophical reflections. Above all, the parts written in Norway consist of
Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with religious, in particular Christian questions, his
attitude toward madness and his striving for an ethical way of life. These entries
are predominantly written in code. In contrast to the wartime notebooks, philo-
sophical and personal entries are not strictly separated by the categories of
coded and not coded writing. Instead, the two different types of script alternate
again and again over the course of the text.

3 Wittgenstein’s coded remarks³

Roughly speaking, Wittgenstein’s code consists of an inversion of the alphabet: “a”
stands for “z”, “b” for “y” and so on.

a z g t m ö t g z ä
b y h s n n u f
c x hh ss/ß o m v e
d w i r p l w d
e v k q q k x c
f u l p r i/j y b
f ü m o s h z a

Chronologically speaking, the first entries in code are those from the First World
War, as mentioned before. However, the comparative ease in using the code sug-
gests that Wittgenstein had practiced it earlier. Presumably, the code was used
by his brothers and sisters during their childhood as a kind of game/play; in a let-
ter written to Max Salzer Wittgenstein writes the word “Schasian” in code and re-
fers to his sister Helene as being able to decipher this word (cf. in: McGuinness &
Schweitzer 2018: 269 f.)
Searching through the Nachlass, one finds coded remarks scattered through-
out, mostly only in the form of occasional aphoristic and fragmentary remarks,
sometimes as one or several sentences, sometimes consisting of longer passages
and occasionally even extending over a few pages. In the diplomatic version of
the Bergen Electronic Edition there are 447 different occurrences.

3 Cf. Somavilla 2010.

 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks 191

One might ask why Wittgenstein chose the device of a special form of writing
for certain thoughts. Did he want to disguise them or give them a special setting
within the context of his philosophical thoughts written in normal script? The fol-
lowing quote can serve as a starting point (or “impulse”, so to speak) for tentative
proposals concerning the “riddle” behind Wittgenstein’s coded remarks:

It is strange what a relief it is for me to write about some things in a secret script which I would
not like to have written in an easily legible way. (MS 106: 4, 1929; my transl.)

[Es ist merkwürdig welche Erleichterung es mir ist, manches in einer geheimen Schrift zu
schreiben was ich nicht gerne lesbar schreiben möchte. (MS 106: 4 [3]; 1929)]

Considering this note and further remarks by Wittgenstein as well as his refusal to
engage with certain topics in philosophy, I wonder whether Wittgenstein might
have seen a possibility in his method of encoding to write about matters about
which he actually wanted to keep silent. This concerns philosophical as well as per-
sonal, existential questions which he apparently wanted to conceal/hide from su-
perficial readers. A note penned on February 9, 1937 in MS 157a seems to confirm
my assumption:

There is a great difference between the effects of a script that one can read easily & fluently &
one which one can write but not easily decipher. One locks one’s thoughts in it as though in a
casket. (MS 157a: 58r[2]et58v[1]; 9. 2.1937; my transl.)

[Es ist ein großer Unterschied zwischen den Wirkungen einer Schrift die man leicht & flie-
ßend lesen kann & einer die man schreiben aber nicht leicht entziffern /lesen/ kann. Man
schließt in ihr die Gedanken ein, wie in einer Schatulle. (MS 157a: 58r[2]et58v[1]; 9. 2.1937]

3.1 The significance of Wittgenstein’s diaristic (and coded)

remarks within his philosophical remarks. The connection
between his life and his work
While the reception of Wittgenstein’s writings has for decades mainly focused on
his philosophical writings, the discoveries of his personal notes and letters has
now led to an increasing interest in his life and personality, and many scholars
and researchers have questioned whether one can speak of a connection between
Wittgenstein’s personal attitude to the world and his philosophical ideas.
As one can already observe in Wittgenstein’s coded entries during the First
World War, there are various thoughts which gradually found their way into the
philosophical part written in normal script. Above all, Wittgenstein’s preoccupa-
tion with ethical / moral and religious questions, which dominate his coded re-
192 Ilse Somavilla

marks, seems to have heavily influenced his philosophical reflections over the
course of time. Thus, in the philosophical part, his thoughts start to circle around
the meaning of the world, God, the I as the bearer of the ethical, death, etc. – i. e.
metaphysical questions Wittgenstein explicitly avoided to treat within his philoso-
phy; yet he obviously longed to treat them somehow. Consequently, he approached
these questions via the mystical as is also evident on the last few pages of the Trac-
tatus.
His turn to the mystical must be understood in connection with the ethical – in
the sense of a devout and respectful attitude toward the realm which transcends
the world of facts and is thus unassailable by language and by science. It is only
with an ethical attitude of wonder that one might somehow grasp the significance
of the world “that it is” (TLP 1972: 6.44). In contrast, seeing the world “how [it] is”
(TLP 1972: 6.44) means to see the world within space and time and not “sub specie
aeternitatis” (NB 1979: 7.10.1916) – the highest form of perfection according to Spi-
noza, a view that is both rational and intuitive –, an ethical and a mystical view of
what is essential but exceeds the ordinary view of humans.
In later years, Wittgenstein continued to preoccupy himself with ethical and
religious questions by frequent use of his code in his so-called diaristic remarks
scattered throughout his philosophical remarks as mentioned before.

3.1.1 Evaluation of the coded texts within Wittgenstein scholarship

Since Wittgenstein’s coded remarks have become widely accessible via the publi-
cation of Culture & Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen), Secret Diaries (Geheime Tage-
bücher) and Denkbewegungen – not to mention the Bergen Electronic Edition and
the online-resources of the WAB –, they are now frequently referred to as impor-
tant sources amongst scholars, with regard to various Wittgensteinian aspects and
in order to emphasize the connection between his life and his philosophy. Wittgen-
stein himself hints at the connection between his philosophical thought and his
personal situation with his notion of moral concepts:

The movement of thought in my philosophizing ought to be discerned in the history of my

mind, its moral concepts & the understanding of my situation (DB 1997: 125, 7.11.31; my transl.)

Given that most of Wittgenstein’s diaristic remarks – be they autobiographical, re-

ligious, or cultural – are written in code, the question arises whether these (and
some other) aspects are related to one another and whether Wittgenstein intended
them to be viewed and treated on a specific level. It seems as if they could be or-
 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks 193

dered according to a common cultural perspective and thus be described as ele-

ments of a unique form of expression.
Nevertheless, opinions differ on the possibilities of ordering the remarks sys-
tematically according to certain criteria. In other words, there is no unanimous
opinion as to whether these entries ought to be considered from a purely personal
or autobiographical point of view, from a cultural or ethical and religious perspec-
tive or even to what extent these aspects are related to one another. Moreover,
there is no consensus amongst Wittgenstein scholars as to why he wrote these par-
ticular thoughts in code. Whether this was done intentionally and deliberately –
for reasons unbeknownst to us – or without any underlying purpose (for example,
as the result of toying with different sorts of scripts) remains an open question.
The usual characteristic of “personal entry” as opposed to “philosophical
entry” cannot be applied indiscriminately to his coded entries: Wittgenstein occa-
sionally wrote both philosophical reflections in code and quite banal remarks,
such as on the weather or on his physical condition, in normal script. Additionally,
he encoded remarks on the nature of his philosophizing as well as his instructions
for the publication of his philosophical work. This suggests that he was conscious
of how easy it was to decipher his code. In this sense, it would appear inappropri-
ate to associate his code with secrecy.
Even though it is problematic to equate all of the coded entries, I daresay that
they were not written by Wittgenstein accidentally but should be regarded as a
specific type of text in his oeuvre in which they hold a special position within
the context of his philosophy. Similar to the remarks in Culture & Value, they
hold what one could call a kind of middle-position between personal and philo-
sophical problems. They combine both reflections of Wittgenstein as a person
and Wittgenstein the philosopher and a critic of culture in their own specific
way – not only through a different script but also through stylistic features and
a specific “tone”. One might draw parallels to the meaning of symbols, signs, mimi-
cry and gestures, which play an important role in the philosophy of Wittgenstein
and are basically but another form of encoding in human communication.

As to the distinction between normal and encoded writing as possible criteria for
different sorts of text in Wittgenstein’s oeuvre and to the question of whether the
coded passages bear unique characteristics, I would point out the following cate-
gories:
A) Content:
a) personal diary-like entries bearing autobiographical character;
b) remarks on ethical and religious matters;
c) reflections on culture (on art, literature, music, philosophers);
d) remarks on political issues (on Jewishness etc.).
194 Ilse Somavilla

B) Style:
a) a narrative tone, especially regarding his more or less autobiographical notes
such as his encounters with other people, his travels to different places or his
remarks on external situations such as on the weather;
b) a lyrical style, interrupting his philosophical discourse, serves to separate
philosophical entries from something poetic, related to the aspect of the unsay-
able, also as a kind of break in strenuous philosophical movements of thought,
for moments of musing on other subjects– though not always so distant from
his philosophical concern, nor from his idea of writing philosophy as a kind of
fiction. Wittgenstein’s use of images – metaphors, similes, analogies – can es-
pecially be observed in his coded entries;
c) a passionate, personal tone in contrast to the sober tone of argumentation typ-
ical of his philosophical manuscripts: This concerns in particular his personal
entries on moral and religious matters and his sufferings in times of despair;
d) a religious tone suggestive of prayers: “May God have mercy on me” (DB 1997:
157; my transl.);
e) a monologue form or a dialogue with himself as an “alter ego”: Apart from
Wittgenstein’s autobiographical notes, his reflections and aphoristic comments
on ethical, religious and cultural topics often appear as monologues, thus de-
viating from the frequent form of dialogue in his Philosophical Investigations:
addressed to a fictitious ‘you’ [Du] – the reader or his counterpart.

C) Code as a critical voice, from a meta-level perspective: Apart from reporting on

his personal matters, Wittgenstein frequently reports in code on the nature of his
philosophizing, on his personal behaviour (including his failings) as well as on his
philosophical success and failure – like a “critical voice” from outside, so to speak.

D) Time and place: A great number of Wittgenstein’s coded remarks are written
under specific conditions such as during the First World War or during his
stays in the solitude of Norway, etc.

3.1.2 Wittgenstein’s approach toward ethics and religion

Apart from his autobiographical notes on his activities and encounters with peo-
ple, often accompanied with descriptions of his emotions, such as his feelings of
loneliness, fear and despair, Wittgenstein frequently deals with ethical and reli-
gious matters. While he refuses to discuss these topics in a philosophical context,
he tries to approach them in his personal, predominantly coded entries. This can
 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks 195

clearly be seen in his wartime notebooks but also in later years, e. g., in the diary of
the 1930s and amidst his philosophical manuscripts.
Still, the way he tries to approach these problematic questions is never that of
an attempt at explaining or even establishing a theory. On the contrary, he renoun-
ces any form of rational argumentation but speaks from his personal experience
as he also emphasizes in his Lecture on Ethics and in his conversations with mem-
bers of the Vienna Circle. In his discussion with Moritz Schlick on the concept of
“value” he declares: “I would reply that whatever I was told, I would reject, and
that not because the explanation was false but because it was an explanation.”
(WWK 1979: 116) And he continues: “What is ethical cannot be taught.” (WWK
1979: 117) In addition, he emphasizes the importance of speaking in the first person
at the end of his Lecture on Ethics. This “stepping forth as an individual” instead of
providing a theory can be seen as characteristic of his personal approach to ethics.
The questions he deemed essential should be touched on but not made the
subject of philosophical dispute. Instead, they should be relegated to a separate
part of his work – to the aspect he decided not to address explicitly in the written
part of his philosophical work. For if such matters were expressed in everyday lan-
guage or in the context of philosophical argumentation, their nonsensicality would
be revealed / displayed. Their encoding is thus a means to emphasize the distinc-
tion between meaningful and nonsensical propositions, i. e. between the sayable
and the unsayable, accentuated by a specific kind of script.
Wittgenstein’s frequent engagement with ethics and religion being expressed
in code seems to suggest that he did not want to treat these topics within philos-
ophy, but on a different level – the level of what can be shown, not said and expli-
cated. Therefore, the method of encoding particular remarks, according to this line
of interpretation, would have been a way of differentiating ethical and religious
matters from those of philosophy.
In connection with this point, I would like to draw attention to the fact that he
wrote the remark, “What is Good is Divine too. That, strangely enough, sums up my
ethics. Only something supernatural can express the Supernatural” (MS 107: 192;
10.11.1929, CV 1998: 5e) in code, whereas the remark written only four days later,
“You cannot lead people to the good; you can only lead them to some place or
other; the good lies outside the space of facts” (MS 107: 196; CV 1998: 5e), is written
in normal script.
The reason for writing the first remark in code is obviously connected to the
fact that it reveals an evaluation or notion of ethics in a way that almost amounts
to a theory. Therefore he concealed it, so to speak, by means of his code. The later
remark, however, does not contain a theoretical tone or evaluation but simply the
resigned acknowledgement of the impossibility of prescribing ethical rules within
the world of facts. And as we know from the Tractatus, values like “the good” lie
196 Ilse Somavilla

outside the world of facts, i. e. they are outside the sphere of rational analysis (cf.
TLP 1972: 6.4 ff.).

3.2 The Notebooks 1914–1916

The separation between personal and philosophical entries by different types of

text is particularly obvious in Wittgenstein’s wartime notebooks. However, this
separation cannot be applied to all of his entries, for there are a few exceptions.
In the first manuscript Wittgenstein begins to report on personal matters in nor-
mal writing, starting on August 9, 1914; on August 15, in the middle of a sentence
written in normal script, he switches to writing in code. It is not before August
22, 1914 that he begins to write his philosophical entries (in a normal fashion)
on the right-hand side of his manuscripts, whilst he now puts his coded remarks
on the left-hand side.
Wittgenstein’s gradual preoccupation with existential problems of life, and
thus universal questions of philosophy, and his tendency toward a mystical ap-
proach is observable as early as 1915, at a time when his future role in the war
was uncertain and his fears began to mount. On May 25, 1915, he writes that the
“drive toward the mystical comes from the dissatisfaction of our wishes by the sci-
ences”⁴, and he adds the following sentence, which he later slightly alters in the
Tractatus: “We feel that even if all of the possible questions of science were an-
swered, our problem is still left untouched. Of course, then no question remains;
and this is exactly the answer” (cf. TLP 1972: 6.52).
Thus, concerning ethical and religious matters – the sphere of the “ineffable” –,
a gradual mingling can be observed in some passages. That is to say we can also
find philosophical reflections in the personal, coded part of the notebooks –
even essential thoughts that are then further developed in the philosophical
part before they attain their final, concentrated and precise form in the Tractatus:
For example, Wittgenstein first writes the sentence, “What cannot be said, cannot
be said!” (MS 103: 7.7.1916; my transl.) in its determinate tone in code.⁵ On the same
day we find the following entry in the philosophical part of the notebooks: “Isn’t
this the reason why men to whom the meaning of life had become clear after

4 Translation by James Thompson 2008: 46; fn. 51.

5 Even though Wittgenstein had previously made entries in the philosophical part concerning the
difficulty of adequate expression, this was above all with respect to his analysis of propositions. Cf.:
“At this point I am again trying to express something that cannot be expressed” (NB 1979: 22.11.
1914). Cf. also: “What cannot be expressed we do not express –” (NB 1979: 27. 5.1915).
 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks 197

long doubting could not say what this meaning consisted in?” (NB 1979: 7.7.1916; cf.
also TLP 1972: 6.521)
Thus, on the same day that he reflects on the meaning of life which he sees
outside the world of facts – in the sphere of the ineffable – in recognition of
the problems that cannot to be grasped in words, he formulates this sentence
about the impossibility of saying what cannot be said. One day later, on July 8,
he writes: “To believe in a God means to understand the question about the mean-
ing of life” (NB 1979: 8.7.1916).
In the preceding passages of the philosophical part, we find further reflections
on the meaning of life, on God, the Will, on conscience, fate, death, on time and
eternity in the philosophical part. These entries reveal Wittgenstein’s gradual ap-
proach toward a personal God, one he had already often addressed in the coded
remarks, presumably shaped by his wartime experiences, above all by the proxim-
ity of death as well as by Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief. Still, there are also pantheistic
and panentheistic tendencies which can apparently be related to the philosophies
of Spinoza and Schopenhauer. But while these tendencies characterize the philo-
sophical part of the notebooks, the coded parts reveal a religious attitude toward
a personal God in a Christian sense.
The impression that Wittgenstein’s philosophical movements of thought were
rooted in his personal experience is particularly relevant for the idea of a life in
the present. On July 8, 1916 he noted in his philosophical notebook: “Only a man
who lives not in time but in the present is happy. For life in the present there is
no death” (NB 1979: 8.7.1916).
Reading Wittgenstein’s coded diaries from the same time one finds very sim-
ilar thoughts that obviously originated in the extreme borderline situation of the
war when he was confronted with death on a daily basis: On May 4 of the same
year, i. e. two months before his philosophical preoccupation with life in the pre-
sent, he notes: “[…] then war will finally begin for me. And – maybe – life, as
well! Perhaps the nearness of death will bring me the light of life! […]” (MS 103:
4. 5.1916; my transl.). And a few days later he notes that life gets its meaning
through death (cf. MS 103: 9. 5.1916; my transl.).
As is already clear in 1914, he continues to urge the pursuance of a happy life,
which, in an idealistic sense, he sees as living “in the good and in the beautiful until
life ends itself” (MS 101: 7.10.1914; my transl.). Conversely, fear of the future and fear
in the face of death is the best sign of a false, i. e. a bad life (cf. NB 1979: 8.7.1916). As
a consequence, we can observe a tendency toward a kind of stoic attitude regard-
ing the hardships of life, which Wittgenstein hoped to reach by an increasing in-
clination toward the spiritual – a “life in the spirit”, not unlike the Spinozian un-
derstanding of surrender to one’s fate as being God’s plan. All these aspects
characterize both the coded diary entries and the philosophical notes, which he
198 Ilse Somavilla

regards as the “work” that paved the way for the Tractatus. It must be mentioned
that these thoughts first occur in the coded part of the Notebooks and are only later
– in MS 103 (1916) – introduced into the philosophical part. Thus, it becomes obvi-
ous what kind of philosophy Wittgenstein himself seemed to need for his life – in
borderline situations such as those of the war – and how these thoughts eventually
influenced his philosophical work. While in earlier years he was mainly preoccu-
pied with the problems of language and its correct logical analysis (distinguishing
between meaningful and meaningless propositions), his reflections on language
problems gradually turned to a sphere that lies beyond the issues to be treated
in the world: to put it in Wittgenstein’s terms, a sphere which lies outside the
world of facts and where the philosophical urge centres on the problem of life.
However, since this sphere belongs to the metaphysical, it cannot be verbalized
and thus cannot be explained rationally: “That something about it [the world] is
problematic, which we call its meaning. That this meaning does not lie in it but
outside it” (NB 1979: 11.6.1916; cf. TLP 1972: 6.41).⁶
Feeling totally dependent on the world, Wittgenstein exhorts himself to sur-
render without trying to make himself independent. In other words, to surrender
and thus obtain freedom in the sense of Spinoza’s philosophy of determinism that
can only be escaped by its recognition and acceptance as the necessity of God’s
eternal nature – to “master it by renouncing any influence on happenings” (NB
1979: 11.6.1916), as Wittgenstein puts it. By being dependent on the outer world,
Wittgenstein lacks the inner poise and serenity he would need in order to work
– “work” in the sense of his philosophical reflections which he regularly reports
on in the coded parts.
The question arises whether he did not consider his reflections touching upon
metaphysical questions as belonging to his philosophical work – as he emphasized
in the Tractatus and other passages of his work. However, this assumption seems
to contradict the fact that he did take up these reflections on metaphysical prob-
lems in the Tractatus and thus into his philosophical work. In fact, there are sev-
eral thoughts written on the last few pages of the wartime notebooks (penned in
1916) that I contend have their beginnings or roots in the earlier coded diaries. For
example, thoughts about the dependency upon the world and that of a life in the
present – aspects upon which Wittgenstein first reflected in his personal diaries
and which later became the subject of his philosophizing – also occur in the Trac-
tatus.

6 See also his remark in the Notebooks: “My work has extended from the foundations of logic to
the nature of the world” (NB 1979: 2. 8.1916).
 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks 199

Even though these reflections – often labelled as Wittgenstein’s mystical

thoughts – stand in contrast to his analytic preoccupation with philosophical prob-
lems, Wittgenstein implicitly hints at their significance within philosophy. And, as
is well known, Wittgenstein emphasized both in his preface to the Tractatus and
on other occasions, e. g., in his letter to Ludwig von Ficker, the importance of these
thoughts.⁷
Surrounded by danger, Wittgenstein’s fears begin to intensify and with them
his willingness to surrender to God’s will. Yet his will to live remains, and he ac-
cuses himself of “a wrong view of life” (MS 103: 29.7.1916; my transl.). On the same
day, his thoughts in the philosophical part are focused on ethical questions of will-
ing and not willing, on the world of the happy in contrast to the world of the un-
happy. Personal reflections are clearly transferred into philosophical thoughts:
“For it is a fact of logic that wanting does not stand in any logical connexion
with its own fulfilment. And it is also clear that the world of the happy is a differ-
ent world from the world of the unhappy” (NB 1979: 29.7.1916; cf. also TLP 1972:
6.43).
The term “redeeming word” [erlösendes Wort] occurs several times: first in
the coded part and later again in the philosophical part. This term can be seen
in connection with Wittgenstein’s obsessive search for the right word or formula-
tion in his philosophical writings (cf. Pichler 1993: 8–26) but also in relation to his
search for an answer to his religious questions and to his personal, moral prob-
lems. In later years the term appears several times, characterizing the aim of
the philosopher to find peace in her thoughts, as it were (cf. MS 105: 46; MS 107: 44).
Wittgenstein’s remarks about his existential position written in code gradually
turn into reflections on the problem of life in general and of the philosophical “I”
in relation to the world. He now reflects on solipsism and on microcosm in macro-
cosm and formulates sentences like the following (a few of which are well known
from the Tractatus):
“The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious!” (NB 1979: 5. 8.1916) or, “The I makes
its appearance in philosophy through the world’s being my world.” (NB 1979: 12. 8.
1916; see also TLP 1972: 5.641).
“It is true: Man is the microcosm: I am my world.” (NB 1979: 12.10.1916; see also
TLP 1972: 5.63).
Even though in the reception most scholars focus on the Tractatus, assuming
that Wittgenstein has selected what he considered the essence of his thoughts, one

7 In two letters to Ludwig von Ficker, written presumably in November 1919, Wittgenstein tries to
explain the deeper meaning of his work which he considers to be the ethical meaning. And he em-
phasizes the significance of keeping silent about ethics in order to limit the “Ethical from within”
(cf. CLF 1969: 33–35).
200 Ilse Somavilla

must not neglect the importance of the Notebooks as preliminary steps to the Trac-
tatus. According to Joachim Schulte, the spirit of the Tractatus is closer to the Note-
books than it is to later writings (cf. Schulte 2001: 211). Similarly, I daresay that the
spirit of Wittgenstein’s thoughts as found in the Notebooks contains several aspects
that have been developed from remarks encoded in the personal diaries of that
time. These remarks illuminate his personal view on various matters, predomi-
nantly on existential questions with respect to both mankind in general and the
individual in his or her social and cultural environment. In this sense, they reflect
the importance of the “uniqueness” of the individual’s consciousness and appre-
hension of the world which Wittgenstein himself emphasized: “Only from the con-
sciousness of the uniqueness of my life arises religion – science – and art” (NB 1979:
1.8.1916).
Therefore, it would be tremendously important to also have a German version
of the complete wartime notebooks in book form according to the original manu-
scripts with the coded remarks on the left-hand side and the scientific part on the
right-hand side.

3.3 Denkbewegungen / Movements of Thought

As mentioned above, there are also coded remarks in Wittgenstein’s diary of the
1930s (DB 1997). These coded entries contain predominantly personal reflections
on moral and religious questions, whereas other entries, for instance autobio-
graphical ones about his relation to Marguerite Respinger, are not in code. Apart
from cultural issues, there are a few philosophical entries on the “idea” [Idee]
or “archetype/prototype” [Urbild], the “sign” [Zeichen], etc. – entries occurring
in a similar form in the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein also handles
metaphysical questions – questions transcending the phenomenal world – in
these diaries, although not coded and in a more general tone. However, when it
comes to his intensely personal struggles with ethics and religion, he makes use
of his code. He quite possibly considered these problems too precious and sublime
for the superficial reader to easily gain access to. The metaphor of the casket men-
tioned above would support this reading. There are also remarks about his lack of
seriousness and love for truth in his philosophical work, about his doubts in his
search for God, his wavering between religious devotion and scepticism, some-
times even rebellion. These entries have a striking resemblance to those of the
coded diaries of the First World War – in several cases, the content and wording
are almost identical. These involve his prayers written in a passionate tone: “May
God help!” (DB 1997: 144; 20.11.1936; my transl.); “May God have mercy on me” (DB
1997: 157; 28.1.1937; my transl.), etc.
 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks 201

Similarly, there are coded entries on his fear of losing his sanity and succumb-
ing to a kind of madness. Caught between philosophical knowledge and failure in
achieving certainty, he thus often finds himself on the borderline between sanity
and madness. Wittgenstein tries to endure his spiritual torments by means of his
prayers for spiritual enlightenment.

3.4 (Coded) remarks scattered throughout the Nachlass

Although a great number of these remarks are published in Culture & Value (Ver-
mischte Bemerkungen), they have been chosen predominantly according to their
treatment of cultural questions. Thus, Culture & Value also contains many remarks
that are not coded. The volume does contain coded remarks on ethical and reli-
gious but not on autobiographical matters.
The question arises whether the coded remarks interspersed within the philo-
sophical texts have some special value or significance and whether there might be
a connection between them and the philosophical entries. As mentioned above, it
is reasonable to ask whether these remarks might be seen as an example of Witt-
genstein’s philosophy of language – in so far as he regarded them as having a spe-
cific kind of function within language which could not be attained by normal usage
and not by scholarly disputes. Perhaps they should serve as a special way of dem-
onstrating different language games and, as previously mentioned, as a means of
separating what can be shown from what can be said: for example, the use of a
language related more to literature as a counterpart to strict philosophical dis-
course – in other words, a poetic, intuitive approach instead of a rational, discur-
sive approach to the objects of his philosophizing. In this context, I want to hint at
the importance of the “impression” phenomena of nature or other objects in the
world might leave on us: In MS 110, 180, Wittgenstein writes that he actually want-
ed to give his book the following motto: “Do you see the moon over there? It is only
half to see, & yet it is round & beautiful.” (my transl.)⁸
And in his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Wittgenstein states: “Here we
can only describe and say: such is human life. An explanation compared with
the impression a description renders, is too insecure. For every explanation is
but a hypothesis” (MS 110: 180; my transl.).
To give another example of Wittgenstein’s intuitive approach is the following
remark, written in code: “O why do I feel as if I wrote a poem when I write philos-

8 Cf.: “Ein Motto für dieses Buch: ‘Seht ihr den Mond dort stehn? Er ist nur halb zu sehn, & ist doch
rund & schön’” (MS 110: 180).
202 Ilse Somavilla

ophy? It is here as if there was something small that has a wonderful meaning. Like
a leaf, or a flower.” (MS 133: 31.10.1946; my transl.)
This remark seems to me to be a striking example of Wittgenstein’s poetic ap-
proach toward philosophy – his attitude of wonder at the world thus implying not
only an aesthetic, but also an ethical component. By way of encoding, though, Witt-
genstein still wanted to mark the difference between philosophizing in a rational
and discursive sense and philosophizing in an act of aesthetic, even poetic expres-
sion. Wittgenstein placed this passage in between normal script passages about the
meaning of names in language games. This passage quoted earlier and further re-
marks on the nature of his philosophizing suggest that he occasionally seemed to
pause in the middle of strenuous movements of thought on philosophy in order to
catch his breath, so to speak. Probably as a result of the difficulty involved in solv-
ing the problems analytically, he became aware of other forms of treating language
and philosophy – forms that are closer to showing than explaining. However, as
these remarks interrupt his philosophical discourse in the same way in which
his reflections on cultural topics or his personal entries now and again throughout
his manuscripts, Wittgenstein clearly separates them from the strictly philosoph-
ical discourse by means of a special kind of script.
Yet it is not only the different type of writing but also the tone and style that
help distinguish these entries from the more dispassionate tone of his philosoph-
ical discourse. One might speak of two different voices of Wittgenstein: the pas-
sionate voice of Wittgenstein as a person and the sober voice of the philosopher,
in other words, the voice of “heart” versus that of “mind”. In addition, there is
a third voice, the one giving comments on his writings from a meta-level.
The coded remarks hold what one could call a middle-position between Witt-
genstein’s philosophical reflections and his personal view on the world. They touch
both “spheres”, although in their own specific way which is not only to be seen in
the peculiar script but also in the difference of style and content.
Whereas the relatively strict distinction between philosophical and personal,
ethical and religious entries according to normal writing on the one hand and
coded on the other is, as previously mentioned, particularly relevant to Wittgen-
stein’s wartime notebooks, we find an intermingling of the two different types
of text in later years, i. e. in the various entries spread across his philosophical
works. There are numerous reflections on cultural, ethical and religious matters,
sometimes written in code, sometimes not.
This is especially evident in the years 1931, 1936 and 1937, the years in which
Wittgenstein tended more towards writing diaries and was even considering writ-
ing an autobiography. This was also the time when he considered making a confes-
sion (according to a diary entry and a report by Drury), which he in fact (according
 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks 203

to written sources) did not do until the end of 1936.⁹ That his writing on personal
matters at that time is not coded seems to confirm my assumption that with regard
to autobiographical remarks, such as a confessional report, he no longer wanted to
hide these notes via code. In accordance with his self-imposed standard of utmost
honesty, he left personal notes which included all of the negative or ugly sides of
his character out in the open for general inspection, i. e. not coded.
The encoded entries predominantly involve highly personal remarks concern-
ing God, e. g. prayers written in a passionate and at the same time devout tone,
often with the formulation “may” [möge], as also found in his wartime diaries:
“May God forbid!” (MS 108: 38; 25.12.1929); “May God send me purity & truth”
(MS 108: 47; 28.12.1929); “May God hold my ideal up!” (MS 107: 161; 11.10.1929; my
transl.)
It thus seems that the code was a means of expressing his awe and his distant
approach toward God – a relationship too profound and precious to be laid bare
for others to see.
So, even if many of his reflections on religious belief are written in a normal
script, Wittgenstein switches to code whenever the matter is more personal, and
thus his tone is more passionate and obviously rooted in utmost despair:

But if I am to be REALLY redeemed, I need certainty – not wisdom, dreams, speculation – and
this certainty is faith. And faith is faith in what my heart, my soul needs, not my speculative
intellect. For my soul, with its passions, as it were with its flesh & blood, must be redeemed, not
my abstract mind. Perhaps one may say: Only love can believe the Resurrection. Or: It is love
that believes the Resurrection. (MS 120: 108; 12.12.1937, CV 1998: 38e–39e.)

During his long stay in Norway, when he spent a great deal of time in solitude, he
wrote longer passages in code. These passages were mainly about his personal sit-
uation and thus prove one of the reasons he gave for writing diaries, i. e. to use his
diaries as a kind of substitute for a confidant: He reports on his fears of madness,
illness and death – on his feelings of loneliness that reveal his deep desperation.
And he tends to give himself up to the hands of fate or God and write in a devout
and resigned tone:
“God, in your hands I give myself! […]” (MS 118: 10; 25. 8.1937; my transl.); “I am
in the hand of fate & have to find myself in it somehow” (MS 118: 37; 29. 8.1937; my
transl.); “But if it is so, you have to accept it” (MS 118: 37; 29.8.37; my transl.).

Similar to his writings during the First World War, Wittgenstein often reports on
his philosophical work in code, although in later years in much greater detail. He

9 Cf. his letters to Ludwig Hänsel in CLH 1994: 136 ff.

204 Ilse Somavilla

does not consider most of his writings mature enough for a book and thus wants to
re-work them. Thus, his coded entries provide us with a vivid picture of the rea-
sons and methods for his numerous alterations, deletions, etc. in his philosophical
manuscripts.

4 Conclusion
When reading Wittgenstein’s coded remarks in the context of his philosophizing, it
seems obvious that he used code (even if not always consistently) in order to keep
apart strict philosophical questions and those concerning his personal life as well
as the sphere of ethics and religion. Evidence for this reading is not only to be
found in distinctions in the content and style of his writing but also in the fact
that before transferring his notebooks to volumes starting in Cambridge in 1929,
he had written the coded remarks in normal script but in brackets (cf. Pichler
1997: 68 f.). This suggests that he used his code as a special kind of script for the
problems that were not meant to be treated within philosophy but rather in
other forms of expression. Wittgenstein’s code marks out problems that transcend
the limits of language – the sphere lying outside the world of facts. Since these top-
ics cannot be grasped by normal language but only shown by different means, the
mere attempt to express them in words would prove their nonsensicality. Thus,
Wittgenstein used the code to conceal or disguise these special topics, which he
nevertheless longed to speak and write about.
As I have attempted to show, the use of normal and encoded writing as criteria
for distinguishing philosophical from personal matters as well as the sayable from
the unsayable can be observed in most but not all of the Nachlass passages. Wheth-
er this inconsistency is the result of carelessness, negligence, etc. – due to the flow
of writing or temporary weakening of resolve in pursuing his purpose – is still un-
clear. However, despite these inconsistencies – and in view of his remark “The lim-
its of my language mean the limits of my world” (TLP 1972: 5.6) – the method of
encoding seems to have served him as a means of transgressing the limits of his
language in the sense of what can be verbalized – a venture through which, how-
ever, he became aware of the nonsensicality of what he tried to put in words and
thus chose the form of concealment.
In view of his remark on the propositions in the scientific part of the Tractatus
– which we would recognize as nonsense after having understood them (cf. TLP
1972: 6.54) – Wittgenstein’s coded remarks on ethical and religious questions
 Wittgenstein’s Notebooks, Diaries and Diaristic Remarks 205

might be considered as belonging to the “essential, but not written part”¹⁰ of his
work.

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10 Cf. Wittgenstein’s letter to Ludwig von Ficker [presumably written in November 1919], in which
he wrote that his work consisted of two parts – “of the one presented here and of all that I have not
written. And just this second part is the essential one” (CLF 1969: 35: my transl.).