ESSAY WATER CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

Name: Shonetta C. Lowe

ID no. 1090201
TOPIC: What are the benefits and limitations of institutionalized cooperation over shared
water resources in a basin?
Hypothesis: Institutionalized cooperation as an effective tool for cooperation and
management of water resources within the Senegal river basin.

INTRODUCTION
Institutional Corporation has solidified its place as one of the proven remedies for conflict

prevention and mechanism for fostering cooperation in shared river basins while facilitating

opportunities for management of shared resources in a manner that is beneficial for countries

involved. This is believed so much so that the last 50 years, we have seen the signing of 157

treaties to have been negotiated(Wolf et al.). In most cases, this takes the form of

establishment of a river basin that will serve to solidify that commitment officially among

countries, thereby providing a conflict mitigation mechanism. Having underscored what

institutional corporation is in a basin context, why is this needed for corporation important or

as some may argue, even necessary? Societies are growing and evolving everyday which

means that there are increasing needs and demands made by the population while countries

and governments face the pressures of ensuring that those needs are met. One undisputed

need is water, however while there is a growing demand for water as a necessity conversely

there is a growing depletion for water resources globally. This has resulted due to many

reasons including climate change, poor water quality, scarcity, lack of infrastructure to access

water resources or in some instances mis-management of the resource. Irrespective of where

respective countries lye in this conundrum, the demand remains and if not sustainably

managed can result in chaos and in some cases conflict and violence. It has been widely

studied and promulgated that the conflict is intensified as the rate of change within a basin

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exceeds the institutional ability to absorb that impact. Therefore, with the natural progression

of societal demands for water resources can for example see an increase in dam construction

which can be considered a large developmental and in this case a high rate of change. The

occurrence of such development in the absence of institutional capacity ie. Where there is no

treaty of formal agreement per se to govern and manage such a process or when relations

among countries are tenuous increases conflict (Wolf et al.). As such, institutional corporation

evidently becomes more critical as societies develop to not only decrease the likelihood of

conflict but in many regards foster cooperation as well. A prime example of this is depicted

in the case of the Senegal river basin authority where despite a tumultuous past between

Senegal and Mauritania countries have moved to forge regional cooperation as opposed to

unilateral development of their shared water resources which further served as a tool for

irradiation of poverty. Countries within the basin recognized that it may be much more

beneficial to acquire or benefit more from the basin through cooperation and moreover

understood its feasibility to consider taking this direction as opposed to a unilateral approach.

It is to this end that reaffirm that institutionalized cooperation is a progressive tool for

cooperation of shared water resources citing the Senegal river basin as a blueprint for the

future development of basin organizations.

The History and Genesis Of Institutional Cooperation

Institutional arrangements have continuously emerged over time in an aim to remedy issues

on water utilization among riparian states however, it is equally important to underscore the

genesis and drivers of these arrangements that ultimately provide conditions for the creation

of a River Basin Organization. It is therefore necessary to define an RBO for the purposes of

this discussion. In an academic sense they are considered to be institutionalized forms of

cooperation that are bound by international agreements, governing a specific geographic area

of a river, lake or basin characterized by rules, laws and governance mechanisms. (Schmeier

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et al. 2015, p. 4). River Basin Organizations primarily serve the purpose of overseeing the

development and management of water resources allowing them to function at both the

domestic and transboundary level. Their roles can but are not limited to, encouraging

cooperation among riparian states, foster economic development, promotion of

environmental conservation, international trade and regional integration (Global Water

Partnership, 2023). While adoption of river basin organizations has been considered

normative for many countries, this has not been the case in every country, and as such begs to

understand under what conditions these institutions created. Research conducted by

(Schmeier 2013, p.14) posits that there are two primary factors attributing to the

establishment of RBOs, the first being “The nature of the problem at stake and the

constellation of actors in the respective basins”. It appears that based on the nature of the

issue facing riparian states that the responses may vary. Some issues might see easy

compliance and cooperation where there is a direct benefit to cooperation or that the

agreement lends itself to obvious tangible benefits, however this can become complicated in

situation where zero-sum instances present itself resulting in losses rather than gains while

some benefits are more equally distributed. (Global Water Partnership, 2023)he

Constellation of riparian states on the other hand plays a major role in whether riparian states

decide to foster relations but in an ideally peaceful relationships and an environment of

regional cooperation and the absence of a hegemon are deemed to be the most suitable

environment for the development of an RBO. This was further depicted by Schmeir where

there were comparisons between the European Basins that depicted good trade relations and a

history of cooperation and in the Euphrates Tigris River Basin who shows a stark contrast

with regional instability and low levels of cooperation. However, while understandably the

researcher has used these two examples, there are many additional factors and reasons

historically that may have attributed to the current situation within the Tigris river basin that

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cannot simply be explained through judging their trade relations and history of cooperation.

In the African Region however, the first RBOs were established in the 1960s and 1970s with

the intent to fast track economic development by improving water resource infrastructure and

distribution collectively. These RBOs include the Autorite du Bassin du Niger (ABN), The

Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) all of which served to exploit resources for economic

development of the riparian nations. The second wave occurred during the 1990s and 2000s

period and were largely driven by the common understanding of regional cooperation such as

the Southern African Development Community (SADC), The Orange-Senqu River

Commission (ORASECOM) established in 2000 and the Limpopo Water Course

Commission (LIMCOM).

The year 1972 saw the creation of the OMVs as a response to years of intense drought and as

such served as a response to address technical issues among riparian states within the Senegal

river basin. In 1972 Mali, Mauritania and Senegal established the Organisation pour la Mise

en Valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), also known as l’espace OMVS or a space within

which countries could cooperate. Decisions are based on the Clé de répartition which

espouses the principles of equity, or the countries’ needs, and solidarity, or mutual support in

sharing development costsOMVs is particularly unique since its stake in cooperation over

shared river resources dates back to the year 1802. The current membership of the OMVs

include Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea who joined later in 2005. By making this step,

the countries have been able to increase their electricity and water availability. As a result,

they have been able to support economic growth by reducing the risk of investment and

poverty reduction through income generation activities. The success of the basin is not only

one of a political nature but one that saw the improvement of access to basic services as well

reducing poverty while fostering regional cooperation. By choosing to develop the Senegal

River jointly, the three countries focused on generating the services they needed and then

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sharing them equitably. Referred to as the “principle of benefit sharing,” this approach

focuses on sharing benefits rather than allocating the water itself. The Manantali dam which

is jointly owned became functional in 2002 and has been working in full capacity since 2003.

This in addition to the Dima Dam offered brought a reliable and consistent source of water to

fuel the agricultural sectors and municipal uses. Electricity on the other hand though which is

still insufficient has improved overtime and has thus aided in the transformation of the

economy. The decision of the three countries to cooperate and develop the Senegal river

basin collectively allowed for the generation of services the needed and the sharing of that

equitably. This is depicted by the issue of co-financed infrastructure in an effort to cooperate

and decrease potential tensions.

The mandate of the OMVs were created to be flexible in nature, thus maintaining a broad

mandate to allow countries to maneuver and adapt to changes which is well apt for regional

economic growth and development within the basin (Smith & Winterman, 2022). Even

though both Senegal and Mauritania has a fragmented past regarding border disputes and

matters resource utilization and migration, it has rarely affected the ability of the two

countries to make progressive decisions that are mutually beneficial for its development. This

therefore serves as a testament that even with previous and existing differences between

countries that it still is very possible to cooperate where it benefits both countries. The OMVs

have developed a Permanent Water Commission to support a council of ministers who serve

primarily as a consultative body to allow propositions based on discussions to the

governments for final approval and the Head of state level also. This is particularly useful and

effective since it mitigates the issue of lack of state level commitment (Smith & Winterman,

2022). Decisions within the OMVs are made based on consensus thereby mitigating conflict

between the riparian states. Countries within the basin also have a fairly similar amount of

power and capabilities which requires little need for capacity building, unlike other basins.

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These benefits while may be viewd in some cases as minor provides a strong basis for trust

building between riparian countries as seen in this case of the Senegal river basin.

Shared rivers globally has always been readily viewed with some degree of contention among

countries with which they are shared. It is important to recognise that the consequences of

this conflict, and the cooperative responses they evoke reaches even beyond the river. These

tensions have been compounded by many factors deepen sensitive to each respective country

and manifest in the form of history, culture, environment and economic relations dating back

to centuries. Given these complex dynamics, rivers can be a catalyst for conflict or

cooperation. It has been seen previously that it is impossible to remove water issues from

these situations and address it in isolation from the other complexities of the riparian nations.

Water inherently has rarely been the source of any war, in the similar way that we believe

that it is hardly ever likely that wars emerge as a result of one specific issue. Management of

shared water resources can be propelled for peace or war but ultimately political intentions

tend to determine which direction will be chosen conflict or cooperation. For cooperation to

be considered, there must be some tangible of intangible benefits present that encourage or

drive this spirit. As such those benefits will be explored providing relevant and useful

considerations(Grey & Sadoff, 2003). Grey et. Al have posited those benefits in four

categories, being that cooperation enables improved management of the ecosystem thereby

providing benefits to the river underscoring all other benefits that can be derived, Secondly,

rivers can yield major economic benefits if managed such as providing support to food and

energy production thereby deriving benefits from the river. Rivers have always held political

significance, however where non-cooperation exists tentions among states will be present and

will ultimately generate cost. This therefore asserts that tension is costly making it costly to

not cooperate. Therefore, benefits can be derived just by choosing to cooperate which will

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yield the benefit of reducing costs arising because of the river which was highlighted in the

case of the Sengal river basin. Rivers could serve as catalytic agents that foster cooperation

among riparian states allowing for economic integration resulting in benefits beyond the

river(Grey & Sadoff, 2003).

RBO effectiveness is defined as the ability of an RBO to contribute behavioural

changes among riparian states, to offer viable solutions towards the existing challenges that

prompted the establishment of that RBO and the promotion of joint

governance of water-related collective action issues in a river basin context. Countries reflect

their goals in the mandates assigned to EBOs and their objectives in underlying legal

documents. In other RBOs, the state entrusts RBOs with the responsibility to foster economic

development which goes far beyond a river basin mandate on water and into an economic

realm taking the functionality beyond water resources. However, even though these

differences of their functionality vary from country to country accomplishments of their goals

laid out within their mandate can be a measure of assessing the effectiveness of river basin

organizations. As such, it becomes increasingly important that RBOs create clearly defined

goals and established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to track their progression of

their efforts in fulfilment of the mandate. It must however be acknowledged that while goal

attainment is a good indicator to measure effectiveness this on its own may be an insufficient

measure to determine effectiveness since not all progress is easily quantifiable or an be easily

measured(Person et al., 2017). Furthermore, given the dynamic nature of society and its

everchanging economic and social changes those previously defined goals will have to be

changed constantly to keep up with those changing demands and may not hold overtime. In

the case of the Senegal River basin, the stringent pursuit of attaining the mandate has resulted

in harsh environmental impacts and social effects and neglected to prioritize environmental

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protection as it was not a prominent focus of their mandate which can deem their holistic

operation to be unsustainable. As mentioned previously, determining RBO effectiveness is

very complex and factors many moving parts that are at times difficult to measure. Generally,

to differentiate this is necessary to examine between exogeneous factors and endogenous

factors that point to the external reason for establishing of an RBO and the RBO itself. he

endogenous factors, on the other hand, relate to factors that

are internal to the organisation.

One crucial common impediment to effective water governance is the constellation of actors.

Having a powerful state in who demonstrates a disinterest in cooperating on core matters of

the RBO to derive unilateral benefits makes achieving the goal of the RBO difficult.

However, in instances such as the case of the OMVs there were favourable constellation of

actors that saw an equal distribution of power, mutual interests and economic investment

which significantly accommodated the work of th eOMVs thereby increasing its

effectiveness. Despite the influence of exogenous conditions on the operational success of

RBOs, RBOs can also play a major role in realizing its success. RBOs that are carefully

designed to incorporate government, management and governance mechanisms are more

adept and able to address the challenges of a basin thus increasing their effectiveness.

There are three general types of RBOs:

- River Basin Committees or Councils, which are generally characterised by little formality.

They act as advisory bodies only and do not have bodies for implementation.

- River Basin Commissions have a certain degree of independence from their member states

but have only coordination functions.

- River Basin Authorities have broad mandates covering implementation and management

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of joint infrastructure. They are relatively autonomous and independent in relation to the

riparian governments.

As such, one of the primary features of a RBO is the ability to determine decision making

capacities on the basis of reliable information, consideration for International Law principles

through its governance and procedures that are instituted to mitigate and mediate disputes

among riparian nations. RBOs that promote collective decision making in a systematic

manner specifically through effective and consistent meetings among countries allow for

increased discussions between states within that basin. This also ensures that the result of that

shared vision is continuous perceptions manifested and a continuous perception of joint

benefits is reflected in its execution. Another necessary component is the availability of

credible information that can inform sound decision making. When RBOs facilitate data

collection from respective countries within a basin overtime through reporting and

monitoring mechanisms it can serve as a very valuable tool for understanding the issues that

exist within that basin and possibly how those existing issues can be addressed while also

monitoring the progress of previously implemented measures to amend the basin

management plan accordingly (Person et al., 2017).

Determining the effectiveness of the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal

OMVS in the Senegal river basin factoring endogeneous factors, exogeneous factors and

Institutional design.

Regarding the membership structure of the OMVs, all riparian states have been signatories to

the OMVs serving as collective contributors to the development of the basin and equitably

derive its benefits as well with a well distributed power dynamic. However, within this

institutional set up, the OMVs were designed to initially remedy their water resource

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utilization form an economic position ton alleviate poverty among the countries. However, in

pursuit of this goal, over time the environment became degrades as a result of the

implementation of developmental work that did not factor in the environment as part of its

developmental strategy. Since the recognition of this flaw, the functional scope has since

changed to include the integration of socio-economic and environmental aspects to curb the

impacts of their work on both the environment and society. When considering the legal

foundations, the OMVs charter incorporated water law principles such as prior notification,

equitable use of the water resources, and obligations that include the balanced management of

the water resource, preservation of nature and mediation of arising conflict. In the realm of

the Legalisation and institutionalisation component, in 1962 the Senegal River was declared

an International River which infers that the rule of absolute sovereignty of the basin

management became null. This is also presented in their recent legislation that makes

provisions for obligations related to development and management of jointly owned

environmental, social and infrastructural concerns. The organizational structure of the OMVs

comprise of six divisions:

(i) conference of heads of state and government

(ii) council of ministers with three consultative bodies attached to it

(iii) high commission

(iv) three companies for management of joint infrastructure

(v) International coordination committees

(vi) local coordination committees

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As depicted above, the OMVs is governed by the Conference of Heads Of State and

Government. A president is typically elected from its member states on a rotational basis and

is changed biennially. The council serves as the legal representative and overseeing body that

delegates tasks to the high commissioner who is the executive body of the OMVs and serves

in a renewable term of four years. The office of the High Commissioner operates as an

implementation body that actualizes council directives and also serves as an organizing and

coordinating mechanism. The Permanent water commission in the other hand defines the

modus operandi of the water within the basin between member states and across various

sectors. Financing of the OMVs prescribes that the cost attributed to the operationalization of

the secretariat is distributed equally across members states. However, the implementation

budget differs ever so slightly where the sharing of the costs for the implementation of

developmental projects considers the extent to which the respective countries benefits and

allocates those costs accordingly. With the recent environmental focus on the continued

development of the basin, this garnered the interest of funders to support the recurring

budget. The current financing partners are The World Bank, AFDB, France, Germany Saudi

Arabia.

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In understanding the Governance Mechanisms, it was discovered that when it comes to

decision making it is done based on the consensus in both the Conference of Heads of States

and the Council Of Ministers. While this process can sometimes result in a slow result or

decision, it in many ways ensures the commitment of parties to see the implementation of the

said decisions. In the case of Management of Information while the OMVS are dedicated to

data collection, research and data sharing within the basin, gaps still exist in the area of upper

basin management of Guinea, however, such data can sometimes be difficult to manage in

these circumstances due to lack of trust and transparency. Regarding the monitoring and

compliance of the basin, unfortunately the OMVs have not yet instituted a system for

comprehensive planning and monitoring. In terms of creation of a dispute resolution

mechanism, based on 1992 convention a progressive step toward conflict resolution between

countries is through bi-lateral agreements. From that point, unresolved issues could then be

heard through the OAU arbitrage tribunal. However, no such body exists today thereby

creating a gap in conflict resolution measures that can be controlled or mediated in an

institutionalised manner. The OMVs have recently made great strides in facilitating the

inclusion of civil society representation thereby creating an opportunity for external actors to

discuss their position on issues such as socio-economic impacts and larger projects. (Gunilla

& Nilsson, 2015) has thus utilized this combined approach to attribute a subjective ranking

system to essentially measure the effectiveness of the OMVs based on their performance in

the respective areas discussed.

In assessing the effectiveness level in the dimensions of level, scope and range, the OMVs

should be considered a success in the ability to create a shift in member states to develop a

willingness to cooperate in joint projects for the development of the river basin. However,

regarding their ability to address the impact aspect, it has been relatively unsuccessful since

the absence of the inclusion of environmental and social dimensions has hampered those

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areas significantly. However, it is noteworthy that the OMVs eventually recognized how this

impact affects their ability to function sustainably and has taken measures to incorporate this

missing component. The OMVs member states still struggle with implementations given the

weak compliance measures available to see its execution.

Three scope dimension of effectiveness

Political Stability: The initial intention for the three fold plan instituted by the OMVs was

aimed at flood cessation. Traditional patterns of supervision fo use of water resources were

ceased causing both groups to compete for land and water resources in ways that elicited

violence. Two existing challenges are the interests between regional and international and

national and local actors that favour recessional agricultural practises and the state’s interest

in irrigation. These challenges are a manifestation of poor planning and implementation

specifically in the environmental and social dimension. Despite existing differences within

the basin it has been reported that the significant benefits of the OMVs take precedence over

the occasional conflicts that may arise form time to time. Another critical challenge that

exists not only in the OMVs but in many other basins is the lack of awareness of political

perception and value of the water resource. Many persons ascribe to technical backgrounds

and area rarely cognisant of this and tend to approach issues from a technical perspective

following an engineering as opposed to a governance approach. This one dimensional

perspective can impair the effectiveness of management and governance of water related

issues.

In the area of environmental sustainability unsurprisingly the OMVs would rank weakly in

this regard given the sever consequences inherited form the isolated focus on economic

growth. This saw the creation of numerous water borne diseases that attributed to a public

health issue, lowered water levels in aquifers, reduced grazing land, increased soil salinity,

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river erosion, eco-system imbalance and pollution. The creation of the PAISE has assisted in

reducing some of the aforementioned challenges but there still remains a lot to be desired to

compensate for the impacts created form the inception of the projects.

On the front of economic growth, the OMVs launched two critical projects, those being e the

Diama and Manantali Dams. They were created with the intent to prevent salt water intrusion

and to also generate hydropower, water for irrigation and stabilizing the rivers flow. The

implementation of the hydropower dam saw a ten year delay and is yet to operate at the

capacity expected by the riparians. Limited availability of transmission lines caused

disruption in the distribution of electricity among member states and disproportionately so,

where the urban centres are seen to have benefited more from the availability of these

resources while the rural communities remain underserved. This delay in power production

has resulted in the stalling of other developmental projects across sectors. As a result, Neither

SOGEM nor SOGED are financially sustainable.

While irrigation has now allowed for year round production, only a third of the lands

promised for irrigation has been made available thereby rendering the goal of rice production

of 12 tons/ha/year to have been unattainable. Unfortunately, riparian states within the Senegal

river basin still import the larger percentage of food for their populations and as such the

mandate of food security has also not yet been attained.

The OMVs are still behind on their commitments and have not been successful with regard to

the fulfilment of the three scope dimension of effectiveness particularly with the

magnanimity of their goals initially set out and lack of conflict resolution mechanisms to

navigate their issues. Even though the OMVs are clearly not without flaws, riparians still

praise the progress and work of the OMVs for its role in accelerating ecnomic growth within

the basin. Albeit they indeed have quite an ambitious mandate, there is still time readjust and

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realize those targets. Luckily, the OMVs have managed to amend their mandate in the past to

incorporate environmental and social components, this shows the flexibility of the design of

the OMVs to have introspection and to continuously adjust over time. Rome was not built in

a day, however, the OMVs have valuable lessons to be learned over the years from its poor

management. This provides an excellent opportunity to refocus, strategize and optimize the

functionality of the OMVs to realize their promise to the people. Ultimately, understanding

the complexities of determining effectiveness makes this task quite arduous to offer a black

and white answer of whether the OMVs have been effective based on the indicators

established. It is crucial to recognize that RBOs are multifaceted and complex, they vary from

the sized, governance, political and social relations, climate and the environment, and more

specifically differentiated mandates. Given this there may never be a one size fits all

approach to addressing the question of effectiveness of an RBO. However, within the

parameters of this hypothesis, that being the debate of whether “Institutionalized cooperation

is an effective tool for cooperation and management of water resources within the Senegal

river basin.” The answer for the most part would be yes. In many regards the OMVs have

managed to bring the riparian nations together and has fostered the spirit of cooperation and

while many flaws exist at the management level for water resources, they have an

opportunity to address those issues collectively to secure a sustainable future for the

respective countries through employing sustainable and economic practices collectively to

achieve their desired outcome.

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