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Social representation and social identity in the black sheep effect

Bouchra Zouhri* & Patrick Rateau†
* Laboratory of Social Psychology, Aix-Marseille University, France
† Laboratory Chrome, University of Nimes, France

Correspondence Abstract
Bouchra Zouhri, Psychology,
Unimes/Aix-Marseille University, This study tests a new integration of central core theory with subjective group
Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale, dynamics theory. Specifically, we hypothesized that the type of opinions shared
EA 849, 30021, within a group (central vs. peripheral; i.e. central core theory) can moderate
Nimes, France. the typical processes of the black sheep effect (i.e. subjective group dynamics
E-mail: b.zouhri@gmail.com theory). Our study focused on students expressing opinions with regard to their
social representation of studying. We predicted that an in-group member
Received: 18 May 2014 expressing an opinion against central opinions of the group (but not against
Accepted: 23 June 2015
peripheral ones) would be judged more negatively than an out-group member
expressing the same opinion. In line with central core theory, the results
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2138
showed that central opinions, but not peripheral opinions, lead to the typical
processes of the black sheep effect. Our findings show that the central elements
of a social representation are key to defining the social identity of a group. Future
research should thus focus on understanding the socio-representational nature
of cognitions involved in intra-group and inter-group relations.

According to the black sheep effect, when an in-group
member adopts a behaviour that is accepted by his or
her group (i.e. he or she thinks or does something desir-
able), he or she will be positively evaluated by the other
in-group members. On the other hand, when an in-group
member adopts an unfavourable position that is not ac-
cepted by the group, he or she will be judged negatively.
In conjunction with this process, an in-group member
with a position that deviates from the group’s norms will
be judged more negatively than an out-group member
with the same behaviour. Lastly, an in-group member in
agreement with his or her group’s principles will be judged
more positively than an out-group member with the same
opinions (Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992; Marques &
Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988).
Precisely, which elements of a social representation are
unchallengeable for group members and lead to a black
sheep effect if a group member does not share them?
Conversely, which other elements shared by group
members allow more flexibility and hence do not lead
to a black sheep effect? Our study will attempt to answer
these questions, the aim being ‘to add our voices to
those who from time to time have pleaded for more
integration’ (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011) between
social representations and social identity literatures.
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SOCIAL
IDENTITY: TOWARDS A THEORETICAL
CROSSOVER
Our perspective is derived from the structural approach
to social representations (Abric, 1987; Flament, 1989,
1994), which describes social representations as being
structured around a dual set of central and peripheral
cognitions. It has been argued that if representations
situate individuals and groups socially, they also ‘facili-
tate the elaboration of gratifying social and personal
identities that are compatible with socially and histori-
cally determined norm and value systems’ (Mugny and
Carugati (1985), cited by Abric, 1994, p. 31). Therefore,
we postulate that certain cognitions (i.e. central, but not
peripheral ones) contribute to elaborating and maintain-
ing a group’s social identity.
Several authors have proposed a crossover of social
identity and social representation theories; more specifi-
cally, studies have demonstrated the role of social repre-
sentations in the construction of social identity (Bataille,
2000; Bellelli, 1987; Mugny & Carugati, 1985, 1989). As
such, social representations are considered as ‘image
reservoirs’ (Moscovici, 1976, p. 44, translated by Duveen,
2001) from which people draw to construct their social

European Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 669–677 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 669
Social representation and social identity
identities. This construction originates in a group’s action
or coaction and is thus guided by the group’s identity
goals (Breakwell, 1993; Duveen, 2001). Therefore,
according to Duveen (1993), social representations are
fully involved in creating and maintaining a group’s
social identity. This reciprocal process between social rep-
resentation and social identity enables better understand-
ing (i) of the impact of identity processes on social reality
and (ii) of the creation of identity categories (Vala, 1998).
Furthermore, it provides a clearer perspective on the
content and structure of a representation (Breakwell,
1993), and on the social contexts in which social
representations are formed (Vala, 1998). In addition,
according to Deschamps and Moliner (2008), these
representational reservoirs can be simultaneously
viewed as markers, products and regulators of identity.
The question driving our current research is as fol-
lows: what type of elements forms this representational
‘reservoir’? Which ones contribute to constructing,
maintaining and protecting social identity (Howarth,
2010)? Through Abric’s (1987) central core theory, we
find a potential answer. Indeed, according to the struc-
tural approach to social representations, the central core
is most closely linked to identity goals behind a social
representation, because central cognitions are always
described as being involved in constructing, maintaining
and developing the social identity of groups and individ-
uals. However, as noted by Abric (1994), even though
the role played by social representations in constituting
and reinforcing identity is widely assumed, it is rarely
demonstrated, especially within the strict framework
of the structural approach (Abric, 1987, 1989, 1994).
Based on this observation, this study seeks to demon-
strate how the structural organization of social repre-
sentations plays a role in maintaining and protecting
social identity. To achieve this goal, we will mobilize
both the structural approach to social representations
and the subjective group dynamics model (Marques &
Páez, 1994; Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Hogg, 2001).
STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL
REPRESENTATIONS
According to Abric (1987, p. 68), ‘all representations are
composed of three fundamental elements: a central
core; a set of information, attitudes and beliefs organized
around this central core, and a categorisation system’.
Let us also mention that the ‘central core has two essen-
tial [concomitant] functions’ (Abric, 1994, p. 22). On
the one hand, it acts as a generator of meaning, enabling
the creation, transformation and making sense of other
elements. On the other hand, it acts as an organizer in
determining the type of relationships between a
670 European Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 669–677 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
B. Zouhri & P. Rateau
representation’s elements. Thus, it ensures a represen-
tation’s uniqueness and stability, as well as being collec-
tively elaborated in a group’s social identity.
Hence, the core is common to the members of a group
and is the origin of the shared meanings that emerge
from the social representation. In other words, the core
can be considered as an in-group reference point:
something that group members share and that gives
meaning to a social object. This is why the core is stable
and changes slowly. Indeed, sudden changes to the core
could result in variations in the group’s homogeneity
with regard to the social object, and even threaten the
stability of the group’s identity.
Around the core is the peripheral system. In direct re-
lation to the core, the elements that form this system are
both prescriptive and conditional (Flament, 1994). They
prescribe practices with regard to an object, but these
practices can change depending on the context and in-
group members. Thus, they anchor a representation in
reality and allow various individualizations of the repre-
sentation. This explains why individuals who share a
representation (i.e. organized around the same central
core) are sometimes seen to have significantly different
practices. Anchoring is a classic process in the genesis of
a social representation. Indeed, ‘through anchoring, a
representation becomes social, familiar to the group, but
still dependent on anterior categorisation systems, on
existing meaning networks’ (Kalampalikis, 2010). Such
integration into the pre-existent supports the variation
of practices about the same object of representation.
In other terms, the peripheral system enables variations
in individuals’ opinions and practices within a group, and
the central core guarantees in-group homogeneity and
consensus. To challenge the central core would thus be per-
ceived as threatening the group’s identity (Moliner, 1989),
and there is every reason to believe that it would lead group
members to implement processes to protect their identity.
This would be especially true if the threat came from an
in-group member, also known as a ‘black sheep’.
Within the framework of this structural model,
researchers have developed a set of methods to identify
the dichotomous structure opposing the central core to
peripheral elements. For example, among methods for
the collection of the content of social representations
and for hypotheses about the structural status of the
elements that form this content are the free association
method (Vergès, 1992) and the hierarchized free associa-
tion method (Abric, 2003). Here, the research respondent
is provided with an inductor (i.e. the object of representa-
tion) and is asked to give three words that he or she asso-
ciates with the inductor. Following this, participants have
to class their associations in order of importance. Further-
more, according to the context independence test
B. Zouhri & P. Rateau
(LoMonaco, Lheureux, & Halimi-Falkowicz, 2008) and
the calling into question1 usually abbreviated as MEC
(Moliner, 1994), an element will be considered central if
members of a group consider it to be unconditionally
linked to the object of representation. With these methods
(Flament, 1981; Moliner, 1989, 1994; Guimelli, 1993;
Guimelli & Rateau, 2003; Guimelli & Rouquette, 1992;
Rouquette & Rateau, 1998), the structural approach
to social representations has powerful means at its dis-
posal to determine and empirically identify central and
peripheral elements that form a social representation.
In other terms, the structural approach focuses
mainly on the internal structure of a social representa-
tion. These methods are mostly based on the insepara-
bility between central elements and the object of
representation. Thus, ‘calling into question’ potentially
central elements hinders the recognition of an object
of representation. However, previous research has not
clearly demonstrated the importance of the central core
of a social representation in constructing, maintaining
and protecting a group’s social identity.
THE SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS MODEL:
THE PROCESS OF THE BLACK SHEEP EFFECT
On the basis of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel
& Turner, 1986) and self-categorization theory (Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), Marques
et al. (1988) showed that judgments of others are
largely dependent on group membership and the nor-
mative orientation of attitudes and behaviour. These
authors propose that the black sheep effect results in
judgments of in-group others being more extreme than
judgments of out-group others, depending on the
normative orientation of the attitude and the target’s
behaviour. More specifically, the black sheep effect,
which has since been further studied (Marques, 1990;
Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Marques &
Páez, 1994; Marques & Páez, 2008; Pinto & Marques,
2008), refers to the fact that individuals evaluate an
in-group member more negatively than an out-group
member if the in-group member adopts deviant behav-
iour. Contrariwise, individuals evaluate in-group mem-
bers more positively than out-group members when
their behaviour is aligned with the group’s expectations.
Thus, two types of differentiation are at work: the first is
within-groups and leads to favouritism towards the
agreeable in-group member; the second is between
groups and leads to discrimination towards the unpleas-
ant in-group member. In accordance with social identity
theory, this reaction enables groups to maintain a
1
From the original French expression, mise en cause.
European Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 669–677 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Social representation and social identity
positive social identity. Indeed, a deviant in-group
member represents a potential threat for the group’s
overall stability and cohesion (Biernat, 2003; Eidelman
& Biernat, 2003) because he or she destabilizes the
group’s norms (Marques et al., 2001). Rejecting this
member is hence a means to avoid this destabilization
or even to reinforce the norms in effect.
From a theoretical point of view, responses to deviancy
are strongly moderated by the importance (relevance)
the in-group gives to the violated norm. Authors distin-
guish between two aspects to account for a norm’s
importance to the in-group: firstly, whether the norm is
related to individual moral values that allow the evalua-
tion of others in terms of social desirability relative to
their group membership (prescriptive norms; Marques,
Páez, & Abrams, 1998), and secondly, whether or not
the norm participates in the social categorization process
(descriptive norms; Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Taboada,
1998; Marques et al., 1998). This latter aspect is associ-
ated with the level of perceived similarity between the
individual and the other in-group members (Hogg &
Abrams, 1993; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & Holzworth, 1993).
In fact, central core theory attributes these same
characteristics to central elements: on the one hand,
their shared nature enables differentiation between in-
group and out-group members who do not share the
same representation, and on the other hand, they play
a normative role that enables the evaluation of group
members’ adherence to the group’s fundamental values
(Flament, 1987). Therefore, we hypothesize that the
processes involved in the black sheep effect will appear
above all when central elements of a social representa-
tion are at stake. Moreover, from a methodological
standpoint, methods for identifying the importance of a
norm used by Marques appear relatively fuzzy. Indeed,
Marques’ initial studies dealt with norms that had been
identified as relevant for the studied group by a pre-test
(Abrams et al., 2000, Study 2). That being said, few
studies highlight the nature of these ‘norms’ and their
role in the construction of group members’ identity.
Central core theory provides a diverse and valid
methodological arsenal that enables the rigorous identi-
fication of central and peripheral elements within a
given social representation. Consequently, we argue
that both central core theory and methods can contrib-
ute to understanding a norm’s importance for subjective
group dynamics. More precisely, we hypothesize that
the processes involved in the black sheep effect will
mostly be activated by elements that constitute the cen-
tral core of a social representation. Hence, the aim of this
research is to contribute to a theoretical crossover
necessary to better understand the dynamics between
identity and representation (Howarth, 2009; Moloney
671
Social representation and social identity
& Walker, 2007). More specifically, considering central
core theory through the lens of subjective group dy-
namics will help to empirically establish the importance
of central elements in the construction and mainte-
nance of a group’s social identity.
HYPOTHESIS
We theorize that the processes involved in the black
sheep effect are specific to the central elements (vs. pe-
ripheral elements) that constitute the core of a social
representation that is shared by members of a given
group. In other words, we hypothesize that an in-group
member expressing a counter-central (vs. pro-central,
counter-peripheral or pro-peripheral) opinion will be
considered deviant. More precisely, he or she will be
evaluated more negatively than an out-group member
expressing a counter-central opinion (Marques & Páez,
1994; Marques, 1990; Marques et al., 1988). This will
be detectable through a significant three-way interac-
tion between the target’s group membership (out-group
or in-group), the position they adopted (counter or pro)
and the nature of the opinion (central or peripheral).
METHOD
Experimental Design
Participants were randomly assigned to the following
conditions: 2 (central vs. peripheral element) × 2 (pro
vs. counter) × 2 (out-group vs. in-group).
Independent Variables
In each experimental condition, participants read about
a target character, who provided an opinion about the
social representation of ‘studying’. Previous research
on psychology students’ social representation of study-
ing reveals a stable structure composed of different ele-
ments (Moliner, 1996; Guimelli & Rateau, 2003; Lo
Monaco et al., 2008). For this study, the elements cho-
sen were as follows: the fact that studying procures knowl-
edge (generally designated as a central element), and the
fact that studying paves the way to a higher social status
(generally designated as a peripheral element). A ma-
jority of students do not recognize ‘studying’ if it does
not allow the procurement of knowledge, but recognize
‘studying’ if it does not lead to a higher social status
(Moliner, 1989). Therefore, gaining knowledge appears
to be a central element of the representation of studying
(Context Independence Test; Lo Monaco et al., 2008)
shared by students, and accessing a higher social status
appears peripheral. Thus, most students agree that
672 European Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 669–677 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
B. Zouhri & P. Rateau
gaining knowledge is always, in all cases, and no matter
the situation, associated with ‘studying’, whereas very
few of them state that this is the case for accessing a
higher social status.
In each scenario, the target character (in-group vs.
out-group) expresses an opinion (counter vs. pro). In-
formation about the target character’s gender and situa-
tion (i.e. student vs. retiree) was provided to activate
participants’ group membership.
Last, participants were required to provide their im-
pression of the target character on a 28-item scale,
which is hence our dependent variable.
Participants
A sample of 267 first-year psychology students (M = 19.5;
SD = 1.85) from a French university volunteered to par-
ticipate in the study. All participants, 189 women and
78 men, were randomly assigned to eight experimental
conditions.
Procedure
Participants were asked to take part in a pseudo national
survey on the image of ‘studying’. The self-administered
questionnaire was composed of three pages.2
The first page contained a group identification scale from
1 (absolutely disagree) to 9 (absolutely agree) aimed at measur-
ing participants’ sense of belonging to the group ‘youth’
(for example, being a young person is an important part of
who I am). This scale was the French translation of that
used by Hall and Crisp (2008). Correlation and internal
consistency (Cronbach alpha: α = .86) analyses led to the
calculation of a single composite score that reflects partici-
pants’ level of identification to the group ‘youth’. This mea-
sure was included in our analyses as a continuous variable.
On the second page, participants were required to
read a scenario that introduced a fictional target charac-
ter expressing an opinion about an aspect of the social
representation of ‘studying’.
As part of a national survey on the image of studying,
several opinions were collected from various [individuals/
students from different universities]. One of those
questioned was a [70-year-old retiree called
Mary/Paul.3 The interview was conducted at a
2
The original French-language materials are available as an online
supplement.
3
We modified the target character’s name according to participants’
gender (Mary or Paul). The experimenter organized sessions to distrib-
ute the male target questionnaire to men and the female target ques-
tionnaire to women, without participants knowing that two different
targets were used.
B. Zouhri & P. Rateau
senior club/20-year-old student called Mary/Paul,
at Lyon 2 University, like you. The interview was
conducted during a meeting in which Mary/Paul
represented all psychology students at Lyon 2 Uni-
versity]. We asked Mary/Paul a few questions about
studying. In summary, [Mary/Paul thinks that the
main objective of studying is to gain knowledge.
She/he believes that students should be aware that
the procurement and construction of knowledge
are essential to characterise studying. / Mary/Paul
thinks that the main objective of studying is not to
procure knowledge. She/he believes that students
should be aware that the procurement and con-
struction of knowledge are not at all essential to
characterise studying. /Mary/Paul thinks that the
main objective of studying is to access a social status.
She/He believes that students should be aware that
by studying, they would gain a social status, which
is an essential element to characterise studying.
/Mary/Paul thinks that the main objective of study-
ing is not to access a social status. She/he believes
that students should be aware that by studying, they
would not gain a social status, which is not an essen-
tial element to characterise studying].
Now that you know this about Mary/Paul, particu-
larly her/his opinion about studying, please give us
your general impression of her/him. To do so, please
describe Mary/Paul for each trait below, by ticking
the box that best corresponds to your impression.
Finally, on the third page, participants were asked to
share their impression of the target character by answer-
ing a questionnaire containing 28 adjectives (welcoming,
aggressive, arrogant, good, warm, chauvinistic, educated,
unpleasant, boring, enthusiastic, cold, gay, kind, honest,
inactive, intelligent, disrespectful, dishonest, pessimistic,
pleasant, polite, profiteer, selfish, serious, simple,
disdainful, sociable, sly, 14 positive and 14 negative) on
a scale from 1 (not at all) to 6 (extremely). When processing
data, the scales corresponding to negative adjectives were
reversed so that a high score would indicate a positive
impression and a low score would indicate a negative
impression (Cronbach alpha: α = .85).
RESULTS
Analysis of covariance was conducted on target-induced
impressions with the target’s group (out-group vs. in-
group, between subjects), the target’s position (pro vs.
counter, between subjects), the nature of the opinion
(central vs. peripheral, between subjects) and their
European Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 669–677 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Social representation and social identity
interactions as categorical predictors. Identification with
youth was included as a continuous variable.
A test of slope homogeneity revealed no differences,
as all interactions with the continuous variable were
non-significant.
Analysis of covariance revealed the following main
effects:
– A significant effect of the target’s position (F(1, 258) =
971.84, p < .001, η2 = .79), indicating that participants
judged the target more positively when a ‘pro’
(MPro = 4.33, SD = 0.30) rather than ‘counter’ posi-
tion (MCounter = 3.37, SD = 0.41) was expressed;
– a significant effect of the type of element involved
(F(1, 258) = 64.01, p < .001, η2 = .19), according to
which opinions referring to a central element
(MCentral = 3.82, SD = 0.73) led to a more negative
impression than those referring to a peripheral ele-
ment (MPeriph = 4.00, SD = 0.39);
– in accordance with results generally obtained in stud-
ies on the black sheep effect (Marques & Yzerbyt,
1988), the effect of the target’s group membership
was non-significant (F(1, 258) = 3.55, p = .11); and
– the level of identification had no significant effect
(F(1, 258) < 1).
The analysis also revealed significant two-way
interactions between the target’s position and group
membership (F(1, 258) = 157.85, p < .001, η2 = .37),
and between the target’s position and the nature of
the element (F(1, 258) = 61.07, p < .001, η2 = .19).
Crucially, in accordance with our hypotheses,
analysis of covariance revealed a significant three-way
interaction effect of all three between-subjects variables
(Figure 1): F(1, 258) = 29.42, p < .001, η2 = .10.
This interaction corresponds to both conjoint processes
that indicate a black sheep effect. Indeed, in the case
of an in-group member expressing a counter-central
opinion, the target was judged more negatively
(MInCounterCentral = 2.88, SD = 0.25) than an
out-group member expressing the same opinion
(MOutCounterCentral = 3.42, SD = 0.43; F(1, 258)
= 71.25, p < .001). At the same time, when an in-group
member expressed a pro-central opinion, the target
was judged more positively (MInProCentral = 4.59,
SD = 0.20) than an out-group member expressing
the same opinion (MOutProCentral = 4.05, SD = 0.30;
F(1, 258) = 91.51, p < .001).
However, this data pattern, which is characteristic
of the black sheep effect, was not observed when the
target expressed a peripheral opinion. Indeed, although
the first part of the pattern was observed, that is to say,
an in-group target expressing a pro-peripheral opinion
was judged more positively than an out-group target
673
Social representation and social identity B. Zouhri & P. Rateau

Fig. 1: Interaction effect of the three variables (group × target’s position × nature) on the evaluation of the target. Error bars show 95% confidence
intervals around the mean

expressing the same opinion (MInProPeriph = 4.48, – an in-group target expressing a pro-central (M = 4.59,
SD = 0.14 vs. MOutProPeriph = 4.16, SD = 0.16; F(1, SD = 0.20) rather than a counter-central opinion
258) = 34.05, p < .01), the second part of the pattern (M = 2.88, SD = 0.25; q(8, 258) = 43.60; p < .001);
was not. In fact, an in-group target expressing a – an in-group target expressing a counter-peripheral
counter-peripheral opinion was not judged signifi- (M = 3.57, SD = 0.17) rather than a counter-central
cantly more negatively than an out-group target ex- opinion (M = 2.88, SD = 0.25; q(8, 258) = 16.35, p < .001);
pressing the same opinion (MInCounterPeriph = 3.57, and
SD = 0.17 vs. MOutCountrerPeriph = 3.67, SD = 0.15; F – an out-group target expressing a pro-central (M = 4.05,
(1, 258) = 2.45, p = .10). In other words, the black SD = 0.30) rather counter-central opinion (M = 3.42,
sheep effect only appeared when an in-group or out- SD = 0.43; q(8, 258) = 14.13, p < .001).
group member expressed an opinion involving a cen-
tral element of the in-group’s social representation.
Furthermore, pairwise comparisons (Table 1) con- DISCUSSION
firmed that participants judged significantly more
positively: Numerous studies (Marques et al., 1992; Marques &
Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques et al., 1988) have highlighted
the process that consists in rejecting an in-group mem-
Table 1. Means for each elements
ber who has violated the norms of his or her group. This
process allows the protection of a group’s social identity.
95% CI Therefore, our results allow us to highlight the types of
Condition M LL UL norms that lead to the rejection of an in-group member.
More precisely, the black sheep effect emerges when an
In-group pro peripheral 4.48 a 4.34 4.53
in-group member takes a position against a central ele-
In-group counter peripheral 3.57 cd 3.51 3.64
In-group pro central 4.59 a 4.52 4.65 ment, but not a peripheral element, of a group-defining
In-group counter central 2.88 e 2.79 2.97 social representation.
Out-group pro peripheral 4.16 b 4.11 4.21 The results of this study provide an opportunity to
Out-group counter peripheral 3.67 c 3.61 3.73 review the mutual benefits of integrating central core
Out-group pro central 4.05 b 3.94 4.16 theory and subjective group dynamics theory. On the
Out-group counter central 3.42 d 3.24 3.59
one hand, this theoretical crossover supports the
Note: Means indexed by different letters differ significantly according to predicted involvement of central elements of social
the Tukey honestly significant difference test. representations in social identity processes, and on the
CI, confidence interval; LL, lower limit, UL, upper limit. other hand, it introduces new methods that highlight

674 European Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 669–677 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
B. Zouhri & P. Rateau
and define the concept of ‘norms’ within subjective
group dynamics theory.
Seemingly, the will to maintain a social representa-
tion is strong. Indeed, no matter what the type of
element (i.e. central vs. peripheral) and the target’s
group membership (i.e. in-group vs. out-group) is, par-
ticipants tended to reject a target that expressed opinions
contrary to those that structure the object of their social
representation, whereas an individual in agreement
with the elements that compose the social representa-
tion was judged more favourably. Hence, it would seem
that regardless of group membership (out-group or
in-group), the priority is to maintain structural
cognitions regarding the social representation.
However, this necessity is even stronger in the case of
central cognitions: individuals judge an in-group target
expressing a counter-central opinion less favourably than
a target expressing a counter-peripheral opinion. Thus,
the central elements of a social representation enable
individuals to define the borders of their in-group and
to protect its social identity. As such, they play the role
of a descriptive norm and enable individuals to defend
certain aspects of their social identity (Howarth, 2002).
Therefore, the classic results of the black sheep effect
(i.e. out-group members expressing a counter-normative
opinion are evaluated more positively than in-group
members expressing the same opinion) and our results
allow us to consider new theoretical propositions.
Indeed, in all studies that have demonstrated the black
sheep effect, researchers theorize based on the concept
of ‘pro or counter-normative targets’. We propose that
a normative target adopts opinions that conform to the
central elements of a group’s social representation. In
other terms, when subjective group dynamics theory
speaks of normative and counter-normative opinions,
we consider that it is referring to pro-central or
counter-central opinions within the same representa-
tion. We suggest that these elements enable a black
sheep effect to emerge.
Beyond this hypothesis, our results provide strong
support for an important assumption in central core
theory that has rarely been empirically demonstrated:
central elements of social representations appear to be
at the core of processes for protecting and maintaining
a group’s social identity. This study should of course be
replicated on several other objects of social representa-
tion to test whether the findings generalize.
In short, although not combined often enough
(Deschamps & Moliner, 2008), the social identity and
social representations perspectives show mutuality and
an undeniable interdependence. Notably, both perspec-
tives are at the crossroads of individual and social
spheres. In the social identity perspective, the very
European Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 669–677 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Social representation and social identity
concept of social identity establishes the link between
the individual and the social. For central core theory,
the concept of representation, articulating the individ-
ual and the social, fulfils this role. Thus, the advantage
of combining these theories seems obvious. This combina-
tion is even more pertinent if we consider that social
representations allow better understanding of the context
of expression of social identity. Indeed, as suggested by
Moloney (2010), ‘the importance of understanding iden-
tity as a function of representations’ (p. 15.4) is para-
mount. Simultaneously, social identity participates in
defining the characteristics that determine social represen-
tations, in turn enabling the distinction between groups.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
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