Professional Documents
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Abstract
The Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1961 has been a pivotal legal instrument within Pakistan's
family law framework, yet its alignment with Islamic Sharia principles has been a subject of
ongoing debate. This critical analysis not only explores the historical context, objectives, and
societal impact of the ordinance but also delves deep into the provisions that are perceived to be
contrary to Sharia principles. Furthermore, the study investigates how Pakistan's judiciary has
interpreted and applied these provisions. A significant portion of the analysis focuses on the
examination of specific provisions within the ordinance, highlighting areas where legal
provisions may be in conflict with Sharia principles. These areas include polygamy, divorce,
maintenance, and inheritance rights, and their compatibility with Islamic jurisprudence is
critically assessed. The study aims to elucidate the gaps and inconsistencies that have arisen due
to the interpretation of these provisions in light of both the ordinance and Sharia. Additionally,
this research investigates how Pakistan's judicial system has grappled with the challenges posed
by provisions that are perceived as contrary to Sharia. By examining selected cases, the analysis
explores the evolving jurisprudential interpretations of these provisions within the framework of
Islamic law, shedding light on the complex and often contentious intersection between statutory
Table of Contents
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................................1
1.Introduction..............................................................................................................................................2
2. Succession under Muslim Family Law......................................................................................................3
2.1 Section 4 of the MFLO: Representational Succession or Circumventing the Islamic Law of
Inheritance..............................................................................................................................................4
2.2 Judicial Interpretations of section 4 by the Higher Courts in Pakistan...............................................6
2.3 Section 4 in the Federal Shariat Court : The Question of Islamicity...................................................7
3. Registration of Marriage under Muslim Family Law................................................................................8
3.1 Prerequisites for a Valid Marriage Under Islamic law.......................................................................8
4. Polygamy under Muslim Family Law.......................................................................................................9
4.1 Islamic Concept of Polygamy:..........................................................................................................10
5. Talaq under Muslim Family Law and Sharia...........................................................................................12
5.1 Analysis of Judicial Interpretations of Section 7 of the MFLO..........................................................14
6. Dissolution of Marriage Otherwise than by Talaq.................................................................................15
6.1 Islamic Concept of Dissolution of Marriage Otherwise than by Talaq.............................................15
7. Maintenance under MFLO.....................................................................................................................16
7.1 Islamic Concept of Maintenance.....................................................................................................17
7.2 Principles Regarding Maintenance of Wife under Fiqh....................................................................19
8. Dower under MFLO and Islamic law......................................................................................................20
8.1 Islamic Concept of Dower and Maintenance...................................................................................20
9. Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................21
4
1.Introduction
In the realm of family law in Pakistan, the Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1961 stands as a
pivotal legal framework governing matters of marriage, divorce, and family relations within the
Muslim community. This ordinance was enacted with the intention of reforming and codifying
Muslim personal law, aiming to harmonize it with modern legal principles and safeguard the
rights and interests of Muslim women in the country. However, its application and impact have
been subjects of extensive debate and scrutiny. This critical analysis endeavors to unravel the
intricate layers of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, examining its historical context, legal
provisions, societal consequences, and the ongoing discourse surrounding its implementation.
The ordinance, introduced as part of a broader series of legal reforms in the early years of
attempt to address the evolving needs of a modernizing society. By standardizing marriage and
divorce procedures, enforcing restrictions on polygamy, and ensuring financial security for
women, the law aimed to provide a more equitable legal framework within the bounds of Islamic
principles.
However, as time has passed, the Muslim Family Law Ordinance has generated substantial
controversy and debate. Critics argue that while it may have introduced progressive reforms, its
implementation has often fallen short of its intended objectives. This analysis will delve into the
practical challenges faced in applying the ordinance, the complexities surrounding the
historical roots, dating back to pre-Islamic customs in Arabia. Even the Prophet Muhammad
himself may have experienced exclusion from his grandfather's estate by his uncles. These
customary practices, particularly concerning residuary, have found their way into Sunni Islamic
law of inheritance. Under classical Islamic inheritance law, as upheld by all schools of thought,
the children of a predeceased son of a propitious are typically excluded from any share in the
inheritance in the presence of their paternal uncles. The situation is even more precarious for the
children of a daughter, as they are originally treated as distant kindred under Sunni inheritance
law. In the unfortunate event that a daughter predeceases her parent, her children are not entitled
to inherit anything from their maternal grandparent in the presence of any sharer or residuary.
However, in Pakistan, significant reforms were introduced through Section 4 of the Muslim
Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 (MFLO). These reforms sought to challenge the classical
perspective on the disinheritance of the children of predeceased children, both daughters and
sons of a propitious. The MFLO introduced the principle of representation, a departure from the
obligatory bequest as adopted by many other Muslim countries with some variations
representational succession for orphaned grandchildren, has been a subject of debate and
controversy. This provision deviates from a fundamental principle of Islamic inheritance law,
which is the principle of "a nearer in kinship excludes the remoter from inheritance." Under this
6
principle, the children of a predeceased son or daughter are excluded from inheriting their
Supporters of section 4 argue that there is no explicit Qur’an verse or authoritative hadith that
excludes orphaned grandchildren from inheriting their grandfather's property. They contend that
the application of representation in this context aligns with the principles of justice and equity.
They raise the question of why one son should inherit the entire property while the children of
the other predeceased sons are left with nothing. This perspective asserts that Islamic law should
not be irrational or inequitable, and representation serves as a means to rectify this perceived
injustice.
Furthermore, proponents of representation emphasize the Qur’an concern for the welfare of
orphans and their property. They argue that any legislation depriving orphaned grandchildren of
their inheritance rights would contradict the spirit of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet
Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him). They also engage in a semantic argument, suggesting that the
term "awlad" (children) in Verse 4:11 of the Qur'an should be extended to include grandchildren
as well, as the Arabic language uses "awlad" to refer to both sons and daughters and their
substitutes, i.e., grandchildren. This perspective views representation as a solution that adheres to
Opponents of section 4 of the MFLO 1961 have raised several arguments against
representational succession for orphaned grandchildren. They assert that this provision
contradicts the principles of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, as well as established Islamic inheritance
law.
1
Faruqi Kemal,"Orphaned Grandchildren in Islamic Succession Law: A Comparison of Modern Muslim Solutions."
Islamic Studies 4, no. 3 (September 1965): 253-274, 253.
7
First, opponents argue that the Qur'an prescribes shares for those descendants who are actually
alive at the time of the propositus's death. Section 4, on the other hand, allocates shares to the
children of predeceased sons or daughters as if they were alive at the time of the propositus's
death, only to later treat them as deceased. This approach is seen as contrary to the Qur'an's
intent.
Second, opponents question why section 4 selectively designates only grandsons and
granddaughters as eligible heirs while excluding other legal heirs. They argue that the Islamic
law of inheritance does not prioritize assisting the needy, as wealthy heirs are not automatically
Third, some opponents argue that the interpretation of the term "awl ad" (children) in Verse 4:11
of the Qur'an to include both sons and daughters, as well as grandsons and granddaughters, is
linguistically unsound. They contend that the term has real and metaphorical meanings, and
when the real meaning (sons and daughters) is applicable, it should not be extended to the
The interpretation of section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) 1961 by higher
courts in Pakistan has been a subject of legal debate and controversy. This section deals with
2
Molvi Mohammad Usmani, “Orphaned Grnadchildren‟s Right to Inheritance in Islamic Law”, Islamic and
Comparative Law Quarterly 3 (1983), 130
8
In the case of Mst. Zarina Jan v. Mst. Akbar Jan 3, the lower court initially awarded Zarina Jan
1/2 of the 2/3 of the property, while Mst. Akbar Jan received the other half. The Peshawar High
Court reversed this decision, giving Zarina Jan 2/3 and Mst. Akbar Jan 1/3, asserting that section
4 only applied to the heirs of a pre-deceased son and did not exclude the application of Shariah in
In another case, Kamal Khan v. Mst. Zainab 4, the Lahore High Court interpreted section 4
differently. It concluded that the section aimed to remedy discrimination against a grandchild
whose parent had died before the succession opened. However, the Lahore High Court believed
that the legislation was not intended to provide greater benefits to grandchildren than they would
receive if their parent were alive when the succession opened. According to their interpretation,
the grandchildren would inherit based on the assumption that their parent had died after the
The conflict between these two interpretations, as well as the appeal by Mst. Zainab against the
Lahore High Court's decision, reached the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court
upheld the interpretation of the Lahore High Court, stating that section 4 aimed to protect the
interests of orphaned grandchildren without diminishing the shares of other heirs or excluding
them from their rightful inheritance. The Supreme Court affirmed that section 4 should not be
interpreted to decrease the shares of other heirs or exclude them from their inheritance.
This decision by the Supreme Court clarified that the purpose of section 4 was to protect the
rights of orphaned grandchildren but not at the expense of other legal heirs. However, it also
raised questions about whether such significant changes to Islamic inheritance law should be
3
Mst. Zarina Jan v. Mst. Akbar Jan, PLD 1975 Peshawar 252.
4
Mst. Zainab v. Kamal Khan alias Kamla, PLD 1990 SC-1051.
9
introduced through legislation rather than judicial interpretation. This case demonstrates the
Pakistan.
declared section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) 1961 as repugnant to the
injunctions of Islam. The court criticized the way the Commission on Marriage and Family Law
had framed the question regarding representational succession, suggesting that it had misdirected
the proceedings. The court proposed an alternative framing of the question, which, if considered,
The Federal Shariat Court emphasized that the principles of Islamic inheritance are based on
nearness and close proximity of relations with the deceased, rather than financial considerations
or humane aspects. It argued against including orphaned children of predeceased children in the
list of inheritors, as it could lead to endless inclusions. The court concluded that section 4 was
incompatible with the scheme of succession outlined in the Quran and declared it nugatory.
Furthermore, the Federal Shariat Court proposed a solution to address the issue of orphaned
grandchildren. It did not favor the Council of Islamic Ideology's recommendation of obligating
uncles and aunts to provide for orphaned nephews and nieces, as it could be seen as charity and
create feelings of inferiority. Instead, the court suggested the creation of a law for mandatory
portion of their estate (1/3) in a will for their orphaned grandchildren. This proposal aimed to
5
Allah Rakha and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others, PLD 2000 FSC 1.
10
It's worth noting that the court's recommendation to propose alternative legislation goes beyond
its constitutional mandate of determining whether a law is repugnant to Islamic injunctions. The
government of Pakistan appealed the decision to the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme
registration process, the Union Council is responsible for granting licenses to individuals known
as Nikah Registrars. However, for any given Ward, only one Nikah Registrar can be licensed.
ceremony or documentation. Instead, it depends on mutual consent, the capacity of the parties
involved, and the presence of witnesses. These are the essential requirements that validate and
challenging, especially when there is no written documentation. Islamic law offers remedies,
such as presuming a valid marriage when parties have lived together as spouses for an extended
period or when one party acknowledges the marriage without dispute. However, in cases where
in the conventional manner. In such instances, any written documentation becomes invaluable.
11
In Pakistan, the Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1961 6mandates the registration of every
marriage conducted under Muslim law. Conversely, in India, there is no legal requirement for
states in India, like Assam, Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, offer provisions for 'voluntary' registration
of Muslim marriages. Moreover, Qazis maintain records of marriages they officiate, which
include details of the ceremony. Each marriage record is signed by the parties involved, their
guardians or representatives, witnesses, and the Qazi. Copies of this document, commonly
referred to as 'Nikahnama,' are issued to the parties. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of
1961 introduced reforms related to marriage registration, imposing fines and imprisonment
penalties for non-registration. However, it is essential to note that Muslim marriages remain legal
ordinance stipulates that a husband must seek permission from his existing wife or wives before
entering into a subsequent marriage. The process involves the Chairman, who, upon receiving
the application for permission, solicits the nomination of a representative from both the husband
and the existing wife or wives. Subsequently, an Arbitration Council is convened to assess the
necessity and fairness of the proposed marriage. If the council is satisfied that the proposed
marriage is indeed necessary and just, they grant the permission sought by the husband.
6
Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1961, Art. 5(1).
12
on its practice. The Quran, the holy scripture of Islam, explicitly addresses polygamy and
"Marry women of your choice, two or three or four; but if you fear that you shall not be able to
This verse establishes that a Muslim man may marry up to a maximum of four wives but with the
condition that he must treat them justly and fairly. It also underscores the principle of monogamy
as the default state of marriage, allowing for polygamy only under specific circumstances.
Islam strictly prohibits a man from marrying another woman if he cannot ensure fair and
equitable treatment of all his wives. The Prophet Muhammad emphasized the prohibition of
discrimination between wives or their children. Consequently, Islamic teachings aim to ensure
that polygamy is practiced with the utmost fairness and justice, while emphasizing the preference
Polygamy is a practice within the boundaries of Islamic injunctions. However, the requirement
for a husband to seek permission from an arbitration council before marrying another woman has
generated discussion and debate. Addressing this matter, Sheikh M. S. Al-Munajjid, a renowned
According to Islamic principles, if a man is physically and financially capable of taking a second
wife and can treat both wives with fairness and justice, he is allowed to do so. This is in
7
Surat An-Nisaa, 4: 3
13
accordance with the Quranic verse: "Then marry (other) women of your choice, two or three, or
It is important to acknowledge that women, by their nature, may feel jealousy and reluctance to
share their husband with other women. Such feelings are not condemned, as even the wives of
the Companions and the Mothers of the Believers experienced these emotions. However, women
should not allow jealousy to lead them to object to what Allah has permitted, nor should they try
to prevent it. Instead, a wife should allow her husband to marry another woman, as it is a form of
It is essential to understand that the first wife's consent is not a prerequisite for a man to take
another wife. The Standing Committee for Issuing Fatwas has clarified this, stating that it is not
obligatory for the husband to obtain the consent of his first wife. However, it is recommended
that a husband deals with the matter gently and kindly, minimizing any hurt feelings that may
arise. This includes discussing the situation with his wife in a considerate manner and being
1. If a man decides to divorce his wife, he must inform the Chairman of the relevant
authority in writing as soon as possible after pronouncing the divorce in any manner. He
8
Al_Kholy, D. J. "Ta'addud al-Zawjaat wa Hikmatuhu fil Islam (Multiple Marriages in Islam & Its Wisdom)." Journal
of the Islamic University of Madina 46 (n.d.): 222, 231.
14
2. Any individual who fails to comply with the requirements mentioned in the first
subsection may face penalties, which include imprisonment for up to one year, a fine of
3. Unless revoked earlier, either explicitly or otherwise, a divorce will not become effective
until ninety days have passed from the date when the notice mentioned in the first
4. Within thirty days of receiving the notice mentioned in the first subsection, the Chairman
between the husband and wife, and it must take all necessary steps to achieve this
reconciliation.
5. If the wife is pregnant at the time when the divorce is pronounced, the divorce will not
become effective until either the period specified in subsection (3) has passed or the
6. A wife whose marriage has been terminated by a divorce that is effective under this
section is not prohibited from remarrying the same husband without marrying another
person in between, unless this termination is the third such instance of divorce that is
effective.
Section 7 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO) carries significant implications and
administrative body for potential reconciliation efforts, altering the traditional Islamic practice of
handling divorces within families and religious circles. Secondly, it introduces a delay in the
effectiveness of divorce, requiring a waiting period of ninety days during which reconciliation is
15
attempted. Importantly, this reconciliation effort occurs after the pronouncement of talaq,
deviating from Islamic norms where reconciliation is typically sought before talaq. Furthermore,
Section 7's reference to "talaq in any form whatsoever" includes practices such as ahsan, hasan,
and talaq al-bid‘a (triple talaq), which diverges from Islamic law's reconciliation procedures,
interpreted as implicitly abolishing talaq al-bid‘a, allowing remarriage between the parties
without an intervening marriage or halala, unless it's the third such pronouncement under Section
7. This section has faced criticism, particularly in terms of delaying the effectiveness of a third
divorce, counting 'iddat (waiting period) differently from Islamic law, applying the waiting
period to both consummated and non-consummated marriages, extending 'iddat for non-pregnant
women, and determining the 'iddat period for pregnant women differently from Islamic law.
Lastly, Section 7 links the effectiveness of talaq to notice given to the Chairman and
reconciliation efforts initiated by the Chairman, which has no basis in Islamic law. Consequently,
Section 7 introduces significant deviations from Islamic legal practices, sparking criticism and
of judicial scrutiny in Pakistan, particularly concerning the consequences of not giving notice of
talaq (divorce) to the Chairman, as prescribed by the law. Initially, the Supreme Court held in
Syed Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Yusuf 9that failure to provide this notice
would imply the revocation of talaq. Subsequent cases, such as the State v Mst. Tauqir Fatima,
9
Syed Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Yousuf, PLD 1963 SC 51.
16
10
, Abdul Mannan v. Safrun Nessa11, Mst. Ghulam Fatima v. Abdul Qayyum and Others, 12
However, two exceptions to this rule emerged in unique cases. Mst. Kaneez Fatima v. Wali
Muhammad13 marked the first time the Supreme Court overruled the Gardezi rule, stating that
failure to send notice to the Chairman does not necessarily revoke talaq but may render it
ineffective. Unfortunately, in Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court 14, the Supreme Court upheld
the Gardezi rule once more, despite Kaneez Fatima's contrary decision. This inconsistency arose
because the cases were decided by different bench compositions, with Kaneez Fatima involving
In Kaneez Fatima, the parties mutually dissolved their marriage, and the court determined that
when both parties agree to divorce, and it is confirmed in writing with their undisputed
signatures, Section 7 should not be strictly enforced. They noted that the notice could be sent
In Farah Naz, the wife claimed maintenance, but the husband alleged he had orally pronounced
talaq years prior. While both lower courts accepted the oral talaq, the Supreme Court disagreed,
emphasizing that oral talaq was neither effective nor valid without proper notice to the
Chairman. However, the Court did not reference the Gardezi case or Kaneez Fatima in its
decision.
10
The State (petitioner) v. Mst. Tauqir Fatima (respondent), PLD 1964 Karachi 306.
11
Abdul Mannan v. Safrun Nessa, 1970 SCMR 845.
12
Ghulam Fatima v. Abdul Qayyum, PLD 1981 SC 460.
13
Kaneez Fatima v. Wali Muhammad, PLD 1993 SC 901.
14
Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal, PLD 2006 SC 457.
17
The Farah Naz decision seemingly reactivated the Gardezi rule, suggesting that failure to provide
notice to the Chairman results in revocation. Notably, a Divisional Bench decision like Farah
Naz cannot overturn a unanimous decision by a larger Bench, such as Kaneez Fatima.
Given the multiple objections raised against Section 7 from an Islamic law perspective, it is
imperative for the Supreme Court of Pakistan to provide clarity and a coherent interpretation of
this section to resolve the existing legal confusion surrounding divorce cases.
to exercise that right, or when any party involved in a marriage seeks to dissolve the marriage
through means other than Talaq (divorce), the provisions outlined in section 7 shall apply, with
The inherent right to divorce, is exclusively vested in the husband. However, the husband can
delegate this power of divorce to his wife. This delegation of authority can either be general or
restricted to specific circumstances agreed upon beforehand. To make it irrevocable, this clause
is included in the marriage contract, granting the wife the authority to dissolve the marriage
Since ancient times, it has been a common practice for women who have concerns about their
husband's behavior to insist on including such a clause in the marriage contract. They can then
exercise the authority delegated to them if necessary. Therefore, according to Islamic law, while
a woman does not possess the natural right of divorce, she can acquire a contractual right to
18
dissolve the marriage. Hence, it is not accurate to claim that the right of divorce is solely
(1) In the event that a husband fails to adequately support his wife, or if there are multiple wives,
fails to provide equitable support, the wife or any of the wives can seek redress by applying to
the Chairman. The Chairman will then convene an Arbitration Council to resolve the matter,
which may issue a certificate specifying the amount the husband must pay as maintenance.
(2) Both husband and wife can file an application for the revision of the maintenance certificate,
following the prescribed procedure, within the specified timeframe, and upon payment of the
required fee. The decision of the Collector in this regard will be final and not subject to challenge
in any court.
(3) Any unpaid amounts determined under Sub-sections (1) or (2) can be recovered as arrears of
land revenue.
1. Quran 2:233 states that mothers should breastfeed their offspring for two years, and it is
the father's responsibility to bear the cost of their food and clothing equitably.15
2. Quran 2:236 allows for the bestowal of a suitable gift upon divorced women, according
15
Surah Al-Baqarah Ayat,233
16
Surah Al-Baqarah,236-23
19
3. Quran 2:241 emphasizes the duty of providing reasonable maintenance for divorced
4. Quran 4:34 designates men as the protectors and maintainers of women, highlighting
5. Quran 65:1 specifies the rules for divorce, including not expelling women from their
6. Quran 65:6 instructs men to provide for women during the waiting period (Iddat),
7. Quran 65:7 emphasizes that individuals should provide maintenance according to their
Hadiths of the Prophet (PBUH) The Hadiths of the Prophet further elucidate the rights of women
regarding maintenance
1. The Prophet (PBUH) stressed the importance of treating women with kindness and
2. He emphasized that husbands have rights over their wives, such as not allowing anyone
on their beds whom they dislike, but also that wives have rights over their husbands,
3. The Prophet (PBUH) advised that husbands provide for their wives, and even a small
4. Ayesha reported that even if a husband is miserly, a wife is allowed to take what suffices
Rights in the Light of Quran and Hadith In light of the Quran and Hadith, the principles
1. The Quran and Sunnah emphasize that men are responsible for providing for their wives,
well-off.
3. Maintenance obligations extend to divorced women during the waiting period (Iddat),
and husbands must provide for them, particularly if they are pregnant or nursing.
4. The Quran and Hadith provide guidance on maintenance but do not specify fixed
amounts. Instead, they emphasize providing according to one's means and not burdening
various expenses crucial for an individual's well-being, including those related to food, clothing,
and lodging. Under Islamic law, there are specific provisions regarding the responsibility for and
entitlement to maintenance:
1. Husbands bear the obligation to provide maintenance for their wives, irrespective of the
lawful cause, the wife has the right to seek redress through legal channels. This can
designed to address such disputes and ensure the wife's rights are upheld.
3. After divorce, women are entitled to receive maintenance during the Iddah period, which
is the waiting period observed immediately after the dissolution of the marriage.
However, it's important to note that widows do not typically receive maintenance during
4. While Islamic law does not prescribe a fixed scale for maintenance, various
interpretations and guidelines exist to determine fair and reasonable amounts. When
deciding the amount of maintenance, considerations should include the financial situation
of both spouses, aiming to strike a balance that ensures the well-being of the wife. In Shia
law, for example, maintenance encompasses the wife's essential requirements, which
encompass not only food, clothing, and lodging but also other needs based on local
The concept of "nafqah" in Islamic law is rooted in principles of equity and support, ensuring
that both spouses' financial well-being is taken into account within the context of marriage and
divorce. These principles help maintain fairness and social justice within the framework of
the payment mode of dower, the entire dower amount will be presumed to be payable upon
demand.
innovation introduced by the Quran. Rather, the Quran's role was to reinstate this practice to its
original and natural form. In its beautifully elegant language, the Quran states:
This implies that the dower is the exclusive right of women, and it is a gift directly given to
In this brief sentence, the Holy Quran touches upon three fundamental aspects:
The Quran uses the term "saduqatehinna" to refer to the marriage portion or dower, signifying
truthfulness and sincerity, rather than the term "mehr." Therefore, the dower symbolizes the
sincerity of the man paying it. Several commentators of the Holy Quran, such as Zamakhshari
and the renowned philologist Raghib Isfahani, have explicitly noted that the dower is called
It is evident from the Quranic verse mentioned above that the dower is to be directly given to the
woman, and her parents have no entitlement to it. It is not compensation for the efforts they
made in raising their daughter.The dower is unequivocally portrayed as a gift, devoid of any
other connotations.
21
Surah an-Nisa, 4 : 4
23
9. Conclusion
In conclusion, a critical analysis of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance reveals both its strengths
and shortcomings in the context of family law within Muslim-majority countries. This ordinance,
On the positive side, the ordinance has introduced several significant reforms, particularly in
terms of women's rights and protections within the family. It has sought to address issues such as
child marriage, divorce, and polygamy, placing restrictions on these practices and offering legal
safeguards for women. The provisions regarding maintenance, the right to consent in marriage,
and the registration of marriages are commendable efforts aimed at ensuring fairness and equity
However, critical analysis also highlights certain limitations. Enforcement of these laws can vary
significantly across different regions and communities, and social norms and customs often play
a significant role in shaping the practical application of the ordinance. Furthermore, issues of
interpretation and implementation can arise due to varying schools of Islamic jurisprudence and
local cultural practices. Additionally, the potential for women to encounter obstacles when
seeking justice within the legal system remains a challenge, as the ordinance does not guarantee
In essence, the Muslim Family Law Ordinance represents a significant step towards aligning
Islamic family law with contemporary legal norms. However, its effectiveness and impact
depend on the willingness of governments, legal institutions, and societies to uphold its
principles and ensure that it is implemented in a manner that protects the rights and dignity of
women. While the ordinance may serve as a valuable foundation for further reforms, it also
24
highlights the importance of continuous evaluation and adaptation to address the evolving needs
and rights of Muslim women and families. In this regard, it is crucial for stakeholders to work
collaboratively in order to bridge the gap between legal provisions and their practical application,
with the aim of promoting greater gender equality and justice within the family unit.
25
10. Bibliography
Allah Rakha and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others, PLD 2000 FSC 1.
Al_Kholy, D. J. "Ta'addud al-Zawjaat wa Hikmatuhu fil Islam (Multiple Marriages in Islam &
Its Wisdom)." Journal of the Islamic University of Madina 46 (n.d.): 222, 231.
Mst. Zarina Jan v. Mst. Akbar Jan, PLD 1975 Peshawar 252.
Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal, PLD 2006 SC 457.
Surat An-Nisaa, 4: 3
Syed Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Yousuf, PLD 1963 SC 51.
Surah Al-Baqarah,236-23
Surah Al-Baqarah,2:236-242
Surah An-Nisa , 34
Surah At-Talaq. 65
Surah an-Nisa, 4 : 4
The State (petitioner) v. Mst. Tauqir Fatima (respondent), PLD 1964 Karachi 306.
27