THE PLACE OF THE TYRANT IN MACHIAVELLI'S: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE LITERARY GENRE OF THE PRINCE Giovanni Giorgini! Abstract: Contrary to the common interpretation, Machiavelli's notion of tyranny is quite elusive, for itis not based on moral or legal considerations, Machiavelli does not obliterate the difference between tyranny and principality, but he judges regimes and political behaviour according to the circumstances and to the end pursued by the statesman. His major political writings can be construed as aiming at the permanent education of the real statesman, to furnish him with a vision of the correct aim to pur- sue and, at the same time, to enable him to master “the quality of the times’, Machiavelli's political works thus belong to the classic tradition of political treatises in the fashion of Aristatle’s Politics and Cicero's De Offcits. Introduction One of Machiavelli's early readers, the French author Innocent Gentillet, commented that Machiavelli devised "des Maximes tous meschanies, et basty sur icelles non une science politique mais tyrannique’. Interestingly enough, he wrote this sentence in a treatise on how to rule a regime properly and peacefully, i.e. ‘politically’, a book known as the Anti-Machiavel.’ Even more interesting to me is the fact that this comment repeats the classical oppo- sition between ‘politics’ and ‘tyranny’ that appeared in Greek polities in the ! Dept. of Ancient History, University of Bologna, Via Zamboni 38, 40126 Bologna, Italy, Email: giovanni giorgini@unibo.it 2 This is the revised text of a lecture delivered at the Columbia Seminar in Political Theory on 20 November 2003. wish to thank David Johnston and Melvin Richter for the invitation and all the participants for their helpful criticism. It was subsequently pre~ sented for a ‘lunch seminar’ at the Italian Academy for Advanced Studies at Columbia University, where I was a fellow in 20034, I would like to thank the Director, David Freedberg, and all the fellows for their comments. Many thanks also to Riccardo Caporafi and Doug Rasmussen who read a subsequent draft and gave me useful sugges- tions. A very grateful thanks to Janet Coleman and an anonymous reader for HPT for their painstaking reading of the essay and their insightful comments, Finally, a very spe~ cial thanks to Laura J. Snyder for her encouragement and careful comments at all stages of the manuscript. I have always found inspiration in the writings of my former teacher, and Machiavelli scholar, Nicola Matteucci (1926-2006), to whose memory this article is dedicated. 3 [Machiavelli] devised a number of absolutely evil recommendations, and built upon those not a political but a tyrannical science’: 1. Gentillet, Anti-Machiavel (Discours sur les mayens de bien gouverner et maintenir en bonne paix un royaume ou autre principauté .. .) (1576), ed. A. d’ Andrea and P.D. Stewart (Florence, 1974), p. 20, ‘emphasis mine. We hardly need to be reminded that ‘Anti-Machiavellism' represents a conspicuous trend in modern political thought HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XXIX. No. 2. Summer 2008MACHIAVELLI AND TYRANNY 231 sixth century BCE, when the Pisisteatid tyrants were chased from Athens and a democratic government was created, an opposition then bequeathed to the long tradition of Western political thought. The great event of 508 BCE marks the birth both of democracy and of the ideological figure of the tyrant, who bore only a pale resemblance to the actual tyrants who ruled Greek cities. The tyrant then became the city’s public enemy and tyranny was viewed as the ‘obverse of democracy and politics itself.“ The vision of equal participation in political rule under the law that characterizes democracy and ‘political’ regimes was contrasted with the arbitrary and sole rulership of the tyrant, in a movement that goes from chaos to order — from the whirhsical unpredictabil- ity of the tyrant’s conduct to the regularity of the fixed law.’ This ideological figure of the tyrant was deseribed by Greek authors in his psychological pro- file as well as in his moral, legal and economic features and, being the coun- lerpart of the prevailing view of politics, survived the disappearance of ancient tyrannies and resurfaced in different epochs with same constant traits and some features peculiar to the historical circumstances. The original tyr- anny disappeared but the ‘icon of evil’ remained. When Machiavelli put in writing his thoughts on government, he was the heir of this long-established tradition of reflection on, and condemnation of, tyranny — a tradition that spanned from Solon to contemporary Florentine civic humanists, passing through Roman republican authors, Roman [aw and medieval juridical classifications. Machiavelli's great novelty does not con- sist in the obliteration of the difference between tyranny and kingdom or prin- cipality (this will be Hobbes’s contribution); it rather consists in evaluating political behaviour according to the circumstances and the end pursued by the statesman, The focus of both of Machiavelli's most important political works, the Prince and the Discourses, is on the permanent education of the real statesman; for this reason, they both belong to the literary genre of Aristotle’s Politics and Cicero's De Offieiis, because they aim at creating 2 prudent statesman who knows the authentic goal of polities but, at the same time. is able torecognize ‘the quality of the times’ and face the ‘accidents’ of political * Onthe development of the tyrant’s “ideological figure’ see G. Giorgini, La citta eiltiranno: Il concettodi tirannide nella Grecia del VIF-IV secolo (Milan, 1993). On the Athenian politico-cultura! Stimmung in the fifth century BCE one may refer to ALF. McGilew, Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece (Ithaca, 1993); and M, Vegetti et af,, L'ideologia della citta (Naples, 1977). 5 Tyranny and law seem to be opposed right from ancient times; noticeably, law- ‘givers and jurists never tried to “rationalize” this form of governtnen Juridical frame, and tyranny always retained this feature of transience and exceptionality. “Medieval political thought, too, in general seems to be more interested in the question of who the tyrant is rather than whar is tyranny. An exception is John of Salisbury, Policraticus VIN) 17, where both questions are discussed, See also Ptalemy of Lucea, Gn the Government of Relers De regnine princi, rans. ames M. Blythe (Philadelphia, 997)232 G. GIORGINI life. Machiavelli's lasting contribution to this classical tradition rests in his dramatic emphasis on the ‘serioustiess of politics’, that may force a statesman to ‘damn his own soul’ in order to save the State (and his fellow-citizens). This is also the permanent lesson he has to teach to contemporary readers, namely how to be a good citizen and a wise statesman so as to be able to coun- sel well one’s own State and even be able to save it in times of trouble. Machiavelli's importance for the contemporary reader does not lie so much in the republican values he can infuse into liberal theory and in its allegedly nar- tow vision of liberty; rather, it lies in his emphasis on the all-importance of political education for the citizens of a healthy political community. Machiavelli’s Phenomenology of Tyranny Contrary to our intuitive belief, an investigation of Machiavelli's notion of tyranny is an engaging task, for this notion appears to be elusive and some- what blurry, as compared to the Florentine secretary's usual ability to give us astoundingly clear-cut definitions.® This does not mean that Machiavelli's ideas were confused on this topic, but simply that he used this concept in two different ways, descriptively and presctiptively, just like the classic Greek authors. In his work, the word ‘tyranny’ identifies, on the one hand, a form of monarchieal regime and has therefore a neutral meaning: on the other hand, it can have a clearly negative pathos and connotation, which neatly marks its difference from ‘principality’ and other words used by Machiavelli to describe 4 one-person government. In this dual usage Machiavelli, the discoverer of “new modes and orders’, appears to be the heir of classical Greck political thought, which always showed a remarkable ambivalence towards tyranny. An investigation of the notion of tyranny in his work thus requires attention 10 the detail without losing sight of the general picture. ‘This statement seems, however, to be immediately refuted by the very opening sentences of Machiavelli's two major theoretical works, At the beginning of the Prince, where Machiavelli seems to adopt.a clear and rigor- ous categorization of the forms of government, he writes: ‘All the states, all the dominions that have held or now hold power over men, have been and now are either republics ot principalities... The dominions gained in this way are either accustomed to living under a prince, or used to being free.'” © This elusiveness leads M. Turchetti, Tyrannie et tyrannicide de |"Antiquité d nos _jours (Paris, 2001), to: say that Machiavelli does not try to define tyranny, he simply ‘describes it(p. 351) andalsoto.comment ‘latyrannie....demeure une tendence’ (p. 352) 7 Prince 1. emphasis mine, The Malian text 1 use is Hl Principe € Discorsi, ed. S. Bertelli (Milan, 1981), Por the English translation 1 used as a reference Machiavelli The Chief Works and Others, rans. A. Gilbert (3 vols., Durham and London, 1989); also The Discourses of N. Machiavelli, ed. LJ. Walker (London, 1950), making occasional changes. A similar contrast between principality and republic, and between servitude and free life, informs Machiavelli's account in Prince $ and in Discourses Tl, 2.MACHIAVELLI AND TYRANNY 233 Machiavelli seems to reduce the elaborate classical theory of political regimes — developed in the age of Herodotus, refined by Plato, Aristotle and Polybius, and then passed on to Roman and medieval political thought —toa clear-cut opposition between two regimes, republic and principality, and to two corresponding ways of living, either ‘free’ or ‘under a prince’ (a condi- tion that evidently involves some restriction to freedom and some form of ser- vitude).' If we compare this famous beginning with the equally quick categorization of Chapter 9, dedicated to ‘civil principality’, we find three mutually exclusive conditions that are possible in political regimes, namely “either principality, or liberty or licence’,’ where the last alternative equals anarchy and therefore a lack of political form. More accurately, ‘licence’ identifies the situation existing in a bad regime, usually a popular gover ment'® where there is unresolved strife between the nobles and the people: here the citizens think only of their private, selfish interest, instead of the common good, thus paving the way to a possible tyranny. Secondly, in Discourses 1, 2, where he follows closely the Polybian vision of the origins of political society and forms of government, Machiavelli states clearly that tyranny results from the decaying of principality. More specitfi- cally, when in ancient times principality ceased to be elective and became hereditary, princes began to compete with each other for luxuries and surren- dered to ll sorts of vices, thus becoming hateful to the people, but above all to the aristocrats. Being aware of their subjects’ hate, and fearing conspiracies ‘on the part of the aristocrats, the princes started to offend their subjects, and this perverse interaction between the prince and ‘the universal’ quickly tumed principality into tyranny."' In the general scheme of Machiavelli’s thought, however, this appears to be an isolated, classical reminiscence, which remains theoretically undeveloped and fruitless. ‘The apparent, unequivocal clarity of these quotes might induce us to think that tyranny is a species of the kind ‘principality’, just like kingdom and des- potism, although a degenerate species, We could therefore expect to find the classic contrast between ‘good king’ and ‘bad tyrant’, elaborated by fourth- century Greek political thought; or the similarly classic medieval description * On the evolution of the theory of political regimes see N. Matteucci, ‘Governa, Forme di’,in Encicfopedia delle Scienze Sociali (Rome, 1994), Vol.4, pp. 41424, who ‘observes that Machiavelli does not elaborate his conceptualization of tyranny. 1am per ssuaded that Machiavelli intended to make a statement with this peremptory beginning and suggest an opposition between the two terms ° Prince 9. '° CF. Discourses |, 2 where, following closely Polybius” account, Machiavelli says that Popular [government] is without difficulty converted into licence’ and then, “in order to avoid such licence, principality is once again restored’. '" Discourses I, 2, On the interpretation of this chapter, and on Machiavelli’ critical revival of Polybius, 1 agree with the fine analysis of G. Sasso, Niccol Machiavelli ‘Bologna, 1995). Vol, 1, pp. 481-6.234 G. GIORGINI of tyranny as perversio ordinis, brought about either by an arbitrary and vio- lent exercise of power (ab exercitio) or by lack of entitlement to rule (ex defectu tineli). However, as soon as we delve into Machiavelli's works, we sce that the name ‘tyrant’ is used to describe diverse and unexpected figures, not all of whom would seem to fit into the usual portrait of the tyrant according to classical and medieval authors. On the other hand, the term is not applied in some instances that would seem to demand it. This is the case with some tyrants of the classical tradition and with some figures bearing obviously ‘tyrannical’ traits: Hiero is described as ‘the prince of Syracuse’,'* while Agathocles is even called both ‘prince’ and ‘king’ ;!’ Oliverotto from Fermo, incestuous murderer of relatives, receives the title of ‘prince’." At first sight, then, neither cruelty nor lack of legitimacy (not to mention moral baseness) seem to be sufficient reasons to be called a ‘tyrant’ by Machiavelli, Yet, we find he uses the word in a derogatory sense for some statesmen, such as Caesar and the Roman Church as a whole, We cannot but conclude that in Machiavelli we find a complex phenomenology of monarchic gavernment, which goes far beyond the simple contrast republic/principality or principality/tyranny, and the distinctive features of each form of monarchic government can be revealed only by a careful hermeneutical exercise. One last preliminary observation, concerning the intended readers of Machiavelli's two major theoretical works is here in place. In the Prince Machiavelli never uses the word tyrant, although he depicts many characters as substantially tyrannical and, at times, he calls them tyrants in the account of their deeds in the Discourses or in other works. Notwithstanding its icono- clastic content, the Prince, dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici, has a rhetorical form that traces back to the tradition of the specula principis. In it Machiavelli employs the rhetorical devices of this literary genre and, moreover, adopts a prudent writing style, suited to the people there addressed. This does not mean, of course, that Machiavelli obliterates the distinction between princi- pality, kingdom and tyranny in the Prince, but shows us his attentiveness 10 style and literary genre: one had better not use such words as ‘tyranny’ ina work dedicated to.a prince... ."* In orderto make our investigation easier, let us state right from the start that ‘Machiavelli accepts the classical vision according to which despotism differs, '? Prince 6: *Hiero Siracusan ... from private condition became prince of Siracusa’, '3 bid., 8; ef. Discourses Il, 13, \4 Prince 8. More gencrally.one could see Discourses 1,25, where Machiavelli states that in the following chapter he will discuss the establishment of ‘absolute power, which is called tyranny by the authors’, but in Ch. 26 he never uses the term “tyrant” and only writes of ‘a new prince’ 9 J awe the observation that Machiavelli never usesthe word ‘tyrant’ in the Prince to L. Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago and London, 1958), p. 26: ‘the term “tyrant” never occurs in the Prince: “tyrant” is too harsh a word (0 use Wi of the prince".MACHIAVELLI AND TYRANNY 235 from tyranny in that despotism is a typically oriental occurrence and, as such, foreign to European political culture (and practice). He subscribes to the notion of ‘oriental despotism’ elaborated by Greek thought, characterized by the rule of a Jord who keeps all subjects alike in a condition of servitude."* To quote the very effective account of the Prince, there are two different ways to govem a principality: ‘either with one prince, and all the others ser- vants ... or with one Prince and many barons’; ‘the Turk’ and the French king, respectively, are their modern instances."” We find another interesting characterization of despotism in Discourses Il, 2, where Machiavelli speaks of the oriental princes and calls them ‘barbarians" and ‘destroyers of countries and dissipaters of all that man has done For civilization’. According to a clas sical stereotype, originating in the fifth century BCE and present in Herodotus and in the Corpus Hippocraticum, which then became canonical with Aris- totle, the servility typical of despotism prevents the Asians from excelling in Virtue and from accomplishing any great deed. It is for this political reason, which is devoid of moralistic judgment, that Machiavelli shows himself unin- terested in the despotic form of government. ‘The lesson of classical political thought on the subject of monarchical regimes has an undeniably strong influence on other aspects of Machiavelli's thought. Greek political thought attributed the instauration of tyrannies in the cities to stasis, to factional strife within the civic body; such strife was there- fore considered a deadly disease for the political community. Roman and medieval political authors also warmed against factional strife and civil war for their ability to generate tyranny. Machiavelli takes up this classic conclu- sion on the dangers of factional strife but introduces a fundamental innova tion, well aware of its novelty, For he sees in social conflict (or ‘tumults*) the core ingredient of Rome’s greatness and liberty. He is persuaded that the con- flict between patricians and plebeians, correctly institutionalized by the good Roman laws, contributed to the well-being of the entire city; by allowing the Plebs and the Nobles alike to ‘release their humours’, the good laws and insti- tutions of Rome kept the city free and enabled her to become great and power- ful.” When, on the other hand, there are no good laws or institutions, social conflict is like a deadly disease for the political community, because it leads to the pursuit of selfish ends, the loss of liberty and, eventually, tyranny: {In the incidents here related it should, therefore, be noticed first of all that the inconvenience involycd in the establishment of this tyranny was due to '® Prince 4. The notion thal despotisin is a regime especially suited to peoples that are ‘slaves by nature’ can already be found in the Corpus Hippocraticum and in Herodotus, and is given a full-fledged theoretical elaboration in Aristotle's Politics (see, for instance, ITI 17, 1287h39-41). "7 Prince 19: Discourses I, | * Discourses Il, 2 '9 See especially ibid. 1, 4.236 G. GIORGINI the same causes that generally produce tyrannies in cities, namely to the excessive demand of the people for freedom and to the excessive demand to dominate on the part of the nobles, For, when they fail to agree in making a law conducive to liberty, and, instead, one or other of the parties uses its weight to support one particular person, tyranny at once arises.” What is manifest here is the contrast between the liberty guaranteed to every- body by the law, and the arbitrary power of one person under a tyrant, Machiavelli's notion of tyranny is part and parcel of his essentially naturalis- tic”! complex conception of the inner dynamics of political regimes. Machia- velli is persuaded that ‘since all the things of men are in motion and cannot remain fixed, they must either go up or go down";” in addition, in all political ‘communities the ‘humours’ of the people and of the nobles must necessarily conflict: the ambition of the nobles is to dominate; the people, on the other ‘hand, just want to be free.” Where these ‘humours’ are channelled by good laws and institutions, together with good customs and good luck, the State flourishes; otherwise, social conflict paves the way to tyranny, which is ‘therefore the negi outcome of factional strife. In this situation, what often happens is that a citizen comes to such great fame that he aspires to go beyond that equal access to (and under) the law that characterizes republics (equity). With presents and munificence, or by winning the favour of his soldiers, he exeates a following for himself, blinds the people with ‘some kind of false good’ and becomes the tyrant of the city.” 20 oid. 1, 40. emphasis mine. 21 fpid., 6. Similar statements in Discourses I, Proem; Discourses Il, 1: Florentine Histories V, 1.On Machiavelli's ‘naturalism’ see A.J. Parel, The Machiavellian Cosmos «New Haven, 1992), esp. pp, 101 ff, 22 Discourses I, 6. P.A. Rohe. In the Shadow of Lucretius: The Epicurean Founda- tions of Machiavelli's Political Thought’. History of Political Thought, XXVUIL (2007), pp. 30-55, very persuasively argues for an Epicurean influence on this view of Machia- velli as, more generally, on his entire Weltanschauung. 2 Prince 9; Discourses I, 5. B. Fontaita, ‘Sallust and the Politics of Machiavelli’, History of Political Thought, XXIV (2003), pp. 86-108, convincingly shows the influ- ‘ence of Sallust's “antithesis between the cura domination of the noble and the cura litertatis of the commons’ on this famous Machiavellian notion (see p. 98), and more generally on Machiavelli's vision of polities. 24 Discourses 1, 48. 2S Phid., IM], 28. See also Machiavelli's reservations towards the extremely humane behaviour displayed by Valerius Corvinus toward his soldiers: this behaviour is ‘advan- tageaus in the case of a prince but harmful inthe case of a private citizen’ ,because it pre- pares the way for tyranny": Discourses TM, 22. T cannot agree, therefore, with Gennaro ‘Sasso, who thinks that the tyrant in Machiavelli is identified by adouble enmity, towards the people as well as towards the magistrates and the nobles. Sasso accordingly main- tains that the tyrants power lacks any specific social support and is necessarily weak. See G. Sasso, “Principato civile ¢ tirannide”, in Machiavelli e glé antichi ¢ altri saggi (Milan and Naples, 1988), Vol. 2, p. 386,MACHIAVELLI AND TYRANNY 237 Following literally a Herodotean suggestion, Machiavelli considers free- dom conducive to power, indeed, the basic ingredient of success and flourish- ing for a political community, Only free peoples can accomplish ‘great deeds’; free peoples Flourish because they do not pursue their private interest but the common good. Again, echoing Sallust, he maintains that it is only the common good that makes cities great and ‘this is pursued only in republics."** ‘The political arenais for Machiavelli the stage where "great deeds’ are accom- plished and the tyrant — as Aristotle had already maintained by describing tyranny as the ‘farthest removed from a form of government’. because it is against men’s natural and political ends — prevents citizens from accom- plishing anything great.” These classical suggestions, together with contem- porary republican arguments, led Machiavelli to espouse the superiority of republican ‘vivere libero’ ax compared to tyranny: even if a ‘virtuous tyrant” arose ina community, he comments, there would follow no advantage to the peaple™ because every increase in the State would be to the advantage of the tyrant, who cannot even recognize the merit of valuable citizens, Using argu- ments that seem drawn from Aristotle's Politics or from Xenophon’s Hiero {as well as Plato’s Republic), Machiavelli concludes his portrait of the tyrant by saying that the tyrant cannot bestow honours on good citizens, is sur- rounded by flatterees, lives in continuous suspicion and turns ‘what is public’ into a private possession.” We are at this point puzzled. What is the differ- ence, we may ask, between the person who takes advantage of factional strife in order to become a tyrant and the “prudent man’ who assumes power in order ta become prince and restore order in a corrupt city? Machiavelli’ Concept of Tyranny ‘Let us now face the difficult problem of identifying Machiavelli's concept of tyranny from a dual perspective, the one vaguely deductive, the other more specifically inductive, Let us consider, on the one hand, Machiavelli vision of good government and of the best regime consists, in order to see if, this enables us to identify per contrarium his concept of tyranny; let us exam- ine, on the other hand, some instances of people described as ‘tyrants’ by ‘Machiavelli, in order to elicit the features that make them tyrants, % piscourses II, 2. Cf 1, 1. Forthe classical examples see Herodotus V, 66; V,78; V, 91; Sallust VII 3 7 Aristotle, Politics V 11, 1313a34-1314a25, 2 Interestingly enough, what I have translated as ‘people’ reads “republica’ in ‘Machiavelli's text, for he ishere using the word in its original, classical meaning of ‘gov. lemment”, ‘State": Discourses Il, 2 > Ibid 1, 2. For this teason in Prince 23 Machiavelli recommends that the prince avoid flatterers and resort instead toa few faithfut men for counselling, men who may tell im the truth on any question. For the classical examples see Xenophon, Hiero TI, 10~ ‘V. 1; VIL. 8: Plato, Republic Book IX; Aristotle, Politics V 10, 1310a40-13 1127.238 G. GIORGINI ‘What is, then, the positive counterpart totyranny in Machiavelli, what is his notion of good government? This is mixed, orderly government, where laws and institutions prompt citizens to display the greatest ‘virtue’ in polities internal to the city. The “vivere libero’ is characterized by the participation of all citizens, to some degree, not in the formation of the law but in its mainte- nance: liberty is equated with equity and self-government. This is obviously an ideal, one that can nonetheless be approximated in reality by aiming at the participation of most or an increasing number of citizens in the maintenance. of the political institutions; to be sure, something very different from an ideal of participatory democracy: a mixed regime where citizens of diverse rank and with different aims nonetheless contribute to the common good. Machia- velli is a realist and his observation of the way's of the world taught him that only a small segment of the people actually ‘desires to be free in order to rule, while all the others, who are countless, desire freedom te live in security’. In any case, ‘vivere civile’ and ‘vivere libero’ are possible only in a community based on the rule of law and aimed at the common good (which includes cit zens’ freedom), Following in the republican tradition of civic humanism, this kind of community is called ‘republie” and identified with a regime generally speaking different from monarchy." Furthermore, like Cicero and classical 30 Discourses I, 16, Interestingly, the idea that the many are not so much annoyed at being excluded from holding office, because they are glad to mind their own affairs, cam be found in Aristotle, Politics V 8, 1308034-37. This passage, extremely realistic in identifying in a few citizens those who really desire freedom in order to participate in political power, makes more complex the republican image of Machiavelli depicted, for instance, by Quentin Skinner. See Q. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1997), As a counterpart to Skinner's idealizing portrait see J. Coleman, A History of Political Thought from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance (Oxford. 2000), esp. pp. 266-71; also J. Hankins, “De Republica; Civic Humanism in Renaissance Milan (and Other Renaissance Signaries)', in J Decembrio ¢ la Tradizione delta Repubblica di Platome tra Medioevoe Umanesimo,ed. M. Vegetti and P. Pissavino (Naples, 2005), pp. 485-508, 31 Fora good summary ofthis view seeQ, Skinner. “The Republican Idea!of Political Liberty’, in Liberty before Liberalism; Q. Skinner, ‘Political Philosophy’, in The Carm- bridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 387-452; Q. Skinner, “The Rediscovery of Republican Values’, in Visions of Politics (Cambridge, 2002), Vol. 2, pp. 10-38. Coleman, A History of Political Thought frome the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, pp. 239-40, reminds us of the ideological character of civic humanism, ‘which represents ‘a normative discourse rather than historical description’. The Floren- tine debate on government was in effect between a narrower or a wider “oligarchy”. In addition, J. Coleman, "The Concept of the Republic: Mythic Continuity and Real Canti- nity’, forthcoming in European Journat of Political Though, points aut and demon- strates that ‘the post-Roman, European use of the term “republic” did not necessarily imply a particular constitution at all, and it could and frequently did apply to a monar- chy’. Itis therefore more correct to say that the republic as a concept was apposed to the concept of tyranny. See also D. Wootton, “The True Origins of Republicanism, orde vera respublica’, in Il Repubblicanesimo moderno: Liidea di repubblica nella riflessioneMACHIAVELLI AND TYRANNY 239 republican authors, Machiavelli sees ‘vivere civile’ as based on equality before the laws (aequum ius) and on equal access to magistracies according to virtue (aequa libertas). An essential feature of civil and political life is for him the rule of law, centred on the generality and impartiality of the law. As it is well shown by Horatius’ example in Discourses 1, 24, in a well-ordered government laws apply equally to everyone, without considerations of social statas; prizes and punishments arc determined by the laws, which embody the deliberation of the political community, and not by the whimsical will of one person. ‘Tyranny is the complete obverse of all this; itis the denial of liberty and the rule of law. Machiavelli explicitly contrasts ‘civil and free living’ with ‘abso- lute and tyrannical living’."” More specifically, the danger lies in the situation when someone ‘assumes extraordinary authority and introduces laws disrup- live of ality’. This easily leads to a condition that is the opposite of the *vivere libero’ regulated by laws, where the tyrant’s whim is itself the law.” Tyranny is based on armed violence — which is the contrary to ‘civil modes and customs” — and on the necessity to introduce all sorts of innova- tions in the State in order to subdue the old powers and shatter ancient loyal- ties. “Such methods’, Machiavelli notes, ‘are exceedingly cruel and are repugnant to any community, not only toa Christian one, but to any composed of men. It behoves, therefore, every man to shun them, and ta prefer rather to live as a private citizen than as a king with such ruination of men to his storica di Franco Venturi, ed. M. Albertone (Naples, 2006), who points out some irk- some problems in Skinner's understanding of “republic’. Wootton states, giving good evidence, that ‘republicanism was invented in late-fifteenth-century Florence’ and iden- tifies only in Prolemy of Lucea’s De regimine principum this antagonistic — and not always consistent — usage of ‘republic’ and ‘monarchy’. He also persuasively argues that respublica acquired a new ‘republican’ meaning (namely, in opposition to monarchy: an actual ‘linguistic revolution’) following the rediscovery of Tacitus with, possibly, Leonardo Bruni’s Funeral Ration on Nanni degli Sirozzi (1428) and, certainly, with Bartolomeo Scala’s Defense Against the Critics of Florence (1496), Last but not least we have to keep in mind tht the transition from Latin into the vernacular national languages generated many ambiguities: C, Canni, Alla ricerca del “governo litera” (Plarence, 2006). p. 9. 22 Cicero, De Opficiis 1, 34, 124; Livy Il, 3. Far this ‘republican’ characterization of Machiavelli see M. Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford, 1998) and, more nuanced, Q. Skinner, ‘Machiavelli an virtie and the Maintenance of Liberty’, in Visions af Potitics, Vol. 2, pp. 160-85. This, logether with Q. Skinner, "The Idea of Negative Liberty: Machiavel- lianand Moder Perspectives’, in Visions of Politées, Vol. 2. pp. 186-212, are illuminat- ing essays in order to identify Skinner's contemporary political, as well as scholarly, agenda, 33 Discourses I, 9. See also ibid., II, 3, and Ill, 7, on the ‘changes from freedom to {yranny or the other way about 34 bid TH, 3. 3 ibid. 1, 25-6. Cf. Florentine Histories VIN, L, where ‘vivere civile’ is contrasted with ‘Sole authority’.240 G. GIORGINI score,” Tyranny originates from corruption, from sedition and disorder and is nourished by them, being therefore the perfect obverse to ‘vivere politico';” this, in turn, is identified with ‘the possibility of enjoying what one has, freely, and without incurring suspicion, for instance, the assurance that one’s wife and children will be respected, the absence of fear for one-seli'.* The contrast could not be more hard and fast. Liberty essentially consists in living safely in a condition of legal equality; tyranny, on the con- trary, stems from inequality that leads to factional strife unregulated by the laws.” The political art consists in unifying, or keeping together, a State and in giving common laws to it; the tyrant keeps ‘the state disjoined’ and only thinks of his own private interest," Now, let us examine some instances of tyrants described by Machiavelli, recalling that he never uses the word in the Prince. As we have previously noted, we find in his work a neutral usage of the word ‘tyrant’, where it means simply ‘monarch’: the Spartan Nabis, for instance, is interchangeably called ‘prince’ (Prince 9) and ‘tyrant’ (Discourses 1, 40 and III, 6).” This ‘weak’ use is less interesting for our purposes. It is to the pregnant use of the word that we must look for theoretical clarification, The presence of the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus among his examples of tyrants should not surprise us; what is inter- esting, however, is the reason. Pisistratus took away the freedom in which Athens had previously lived thanks to Solon’s reforms, and this is why Machiavelli brands him a ‘tyrant’.*” The situation of Clearchus is identical He became ruler of Braclea by taking advantage of factional strife, and then stripped the people of their freedom.** A similar case is that of Tarquin ‘the Proud’, He aequired “extraordinary” power and ruled like a tyrant from his palace, keeping public debate out of politics and relegating it to a private affaire, trampling on the laws and on the senate’s power. Caesar was Rome's first tyrant because he acquired an ‘extraordinary authority’ that destroyed the republican freedom. Caesar is guilty of putting himself beyond the law, just like the decemvirs, who are also labelled as tyrants for ‘occupying Rome's 38 Discourses 1, 26, 37 Ibid. M8. 38 jid, 1, 16. The whole chapter focuses on the difference between ‘tyrannical state’ and ‘vivere libero’. 39 Ibid 1, 16; 1, 17. 49 foie 1,40: U1, 28. 41 bid. H, 2 42 See alsa the cases of Annon of Carthage and of Pandolfo Petrucci of Siena in Dis courses Ill, 6, where ‘prince’ and ‘tyrant’ are used! indifferently. Pandolfo Petrucel is described as ‘prince of Siena’ in Prince 20, 43 piscourses 1, 28. CF. 11, 2: IIL 6. 4 Ibid. 1,16.MACHIAVELLI AND TYRANNY 241 liberty’ © We may infer that ruling against the ancient laws, modes and cus- toms, thus destroying the liberty of the citizens, transforms the prince into a tyrant and endangers the State itself. This is the outright political guilt of the tyrants, not the fact that they obtained their power in an ‘extraordinary and hateful way’. ‘There is one passage in which Machiavelli's republican pathos prompts him to say that changes in political regimes happen only “from republic into tyranny or from tyranny into republic* and there is no mention of principality ‘or of any other regime.” We may recall that in Machiavelli's works the ‘jstraordinari’ are means outside the law, linked to an exceptional situation and lethal to republican equality. Accordingly, Machiavelli praises the Roman institution of dictatorship because, though it is an exceptional form of power, it is regulated by the laws.“ Similarly, Oliverotto from Fermo is not called a tyrant because he killed his uncle in order to reach the throne, but because he tured a city whose citizens used to live free into a principality, and, in the end, was not even able to keep his power.” Machiavelli observes that the people of Fermo who helped him gain his power ‘cherished servitude more than the freedom of their country’."" On the other hand, Remulus, who killed his brother Remus in the very act of founding Rome, is not called a tyrant. Machiavelli comments that ‘it is convenient to conclude that, although the fact is against him, the effect justifies him’. For Romulus acted to defend the ‘common good” and not ‘out of his own ambition’. After founding Rome, he did not set up an ephemeral personal rulership but kept for himself only the kind of authority typical of a goad king, leading the army and convoking the Senate, and thus started ‘uno vivere civile e libero’. In the case of Giovampagolo Baglioni of Perugia, Machiavelli's negative judgment is motivated by Giovampagolo’s incapacity to be completely evil, with the consequence that he lost his power. Giovampagolo, who had killed cousins and nephews in order to grab power, and who had an incestuous 45 Joie 1,35: 1, 40; AL 6 Ibid IHL. 5. 47 Ibid. IM 3, where we also find a contrast between tyranny and “free state” Tam persuaded that the ‘istraordinari refer tothe political and legal realm, and not tothe sphere of morality, as Quentin Skinner seems to believe: see Q. Skinner, “The lca of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives’, in Philosophy in His- tory, ed. R. Rotty. J.B, Sehneewind and Q. Skinner (Cambridge, 1984), pp, 193-221, see p.205 25. Discourses, 34cf.1.29:1,34.0n Cacsaras the firsttyrant of Rome see ibid. 1,37. © Similaralsoisthe case of Francesco Valor: in Floreace:he lives like a prince in the city and is presumed to be able (o set up his personal rule, going beyond the “vivere Civile’. Tn order to counteract him the Florentines had to have recourse to fextraordinary ways’ | Prince 8, 2 Discourses 1.9.242 G, GIORGINI relationship with his sister, did not dare oppose Pope Julius II because of his cowardice.” In his case, moral sordidness becomes political ineffectiveness, and this prompts Machiavelli’s reproach. ‘This is exemplified on a bigger scale by Machiavelli's treatment of the Roman Church, which also shows his bold, independent capacity of judg- ment, The “nefarious examples’ of the Church led Italy to lose ‘all devotion and all religion; which causes innumerable inconveniences and innumerable disorders’ because, as Machiavelli has previously shown, where there is no religion only fear of the prince can save the State, But the Church is even more the cause of the ruin of the Italian people for a political reason: it kept, and continues to keep, Italy divided, thus preventing the Italians from enjoy- ing the advantages of the *vivere civite’: “Certainly, no country has ever been united and happy unless the whole of it has been under the jurisdiction of one republic or one prince, as has happened to France and Spain’ — Machiavelli ‘concludes. It is for such political reasons that Machiavelli goes on to say that the Roman Church is the tyrant of Italy."* ‘Another case is that of Gualtieri of Brienne, the Duke of Athens. Machia- velli describes his pompous manner, the continuous presence of armed ‘cronies at his side, his violence against women and his arbitrariness towards other citizens, against all laws. Under his ‘tyrannical modes" ‘the citizens lived full of indignation, seeing the majesty of the State ruined, the orders cor- rupted, the laws cancelled, all honourable living rotten, all civil modesty desiroyed".” Tyranny determines not only the end of geriuine political life (the Duke had ‘bound the hands and gagged the mouth’ of the city, Mach velli observes), but also the corruption of morality. No moral life is possible where there are no good institutions and laws valid for everyone; briefly, where there is no ‘majesty of the State’. ‘We can now more clearly understand why Machiavelli does not use the term ‘tyrant’ nor passes a negative judgment on some classical tyrants or on some morally debatable people — namely, for their political merits in found- ing or keeping in existence a political community. Such merits are obviously 33 bid. 1, 27 54 hid. 1. 11. 5 Poid. 1, 12. $8 Which does not mean that we should get rid ofthe tyrant, in this ease: the impor- tance of religion and the necessity of a regeneration, not a destruction, of the Roman Church is well emphasized by D. Pellerin, ‘Machiavelli's Best Fiend’ History of Politi cal Thought, XXVI1 (2006), pp. 423-53. For a different view, to the extent that Machiavelli suggested to Lorenzo de’ Medici to act like Romulusandkill his uncle (Pope Leo X), the college of eardinals and then reorder the Church and reunify Ttaly, see J.M. Parent, "Machiavelli's Missing Romulus and the Murderous Intent of the Prince’, His- tary of Political Thought, XXVI (2005), pp. 625-45. Ido not subscribe to Parent's view, which is nonetheless subtly argued. 57 Floremine Histories T, 36.MACHIAVELLI AND TYRANNY 243 Judged according to Machiavelli's standards of good political life and states- ‘manship, which include the ability of unifying, or keeping together, the State, getting rid of factions and confronting external enemies, relying only on a civic, non-mercenary army; all this together with the desire to do ‘great things’, to aggrandize the State and acquire personal glory. Hiero of Syracuse is an example of a good prince because he had virtue also in private matters and took the necessary actions to keep his power once he got it, including not relying on a mercenary army.” Similarly, Agathocles of Syracuse is praised because he acquired his power thanks to his own merits and without relying on fortune, and kept the city free from inner conflicts, ruling it ‘without any civil coniroversy’. He was able to ‘use well’ cruelty, although so conspicu- ously as to lead Machiavelli to comment that his qualities enabled him to ‘ac- quire power but not glory’. The same applies to Cesare Borgia, who found Romagna in disunion and full of thefts and problems and wanted to give it a good government in order to render it ‘peaceful and obedient to the kingly arm’. Moreover, Machiavelli's famous statement that ‘Cesare Borgia was considered a cruel person; however, his cruelty had mended Romagna, put it together, reduced it toa peaceful and faithful condition’ sheds light on what are for him the goods a real statesman should pursue: unity of the State through law, peace and faith, where the last word refers to Faithfulness to the ruler, the recognition of his authority.“' Rulers who attain these goods are not ‘tyrants’ even if they are cruel and immoral. ‘We may conclude that the main reason for Machiavelli's condemnation of tyranny is of a pofitical, rather than a moral or legal, nature. In this respect, he. 10 the so-called ‘republican tradition’,”’ where we find a pedagogical- al use of the tyrant's figure. Conversely, he appears to be distant from | accounts that found the typical features of tyranny either in a cruel 88 Prince 6; snd 13. 2? tid. 8. © tei. 6. © dhid, 17; ¢f.7, where itis said that Romagna was reduced into a ‘peaceful and uni- fied condition’. That unity, peace and obedience inside the State were the goods that legitimized the ruthless action of the new prince was already perceived by A. Passerin d'Entreves, The Notion of the State (London, 1967). © This was already noticed by Raymond Aron in an essay written in 1940 but pub- lished in 1993: ‘La vrai condamnation de la “tyrannic” est politique’, he says in his Machiavel et les tyrannies modernes (Paris, 1993), p. 76. Observing the political nature of the condemnation of tyranny, he adds that ‘tous les crimes du tyran sort méprisables, parce qu'avant tout ils sont-vains’, Tt was.a popular belief among fifteenth-century Florentine republican authors that “vivere politica ecivile” isthe opposite of tyranny because the tyrant is above the law and his rule violates the basic requirements of political life. To quote just a few examples: Coluecio Salutati, De Tyranno |, 6; Giovanni Cavalcanti, istorée fiorentine, Ul, 1; Girolamo Savonarola, Traitato circa il reggimento e él governo della clud di Firenze; Alamanno Rinuccini, Diatogus de libertate.244 G. GIORGINI exercise of power or in a lack of legitimacy, on the basis of rigorously legal considcrations."* Neither cruelty nor illegitimacy is necessary, or sufficient, to identify a tyrant according to Machiavelli." Rather, the tyrant is the person who destroys the existing liberty of a political community, prompting its regress from “vivere ci vile” to an inferior form of life, and/or one who is inef- fective in saving the State. He is therefore the perfect negative counterpart to that ‘prudent man’ so often evoked and extolled in Machiavelli's works. This confers 9 unique trait on Machiavelli's republicanism, Principality, Politics and Status Necessitatis Dolf Sternberger remarked that Machiavelli never uses the word ‘political’ or its equivalents, in the Prince. Maurizio Viroli went on to argue that the vocabulary of politics is only appropriate to the discourse on the city and therefore there is no reason to use it in the Prince, because the Prince is not a book on politics in this meaning of the word.” Viroli is right, but I would qualify his statement: the Prince deals, as it were, with the “zero degree’ of politics, namely the situation in which it is necessary to set up the conditions for the possibility of politics, creating ex move or saving the political commu- nity, Machiavelli leamt well Thucydides’ lesson (the sateria poleas is the foremost consideration for a statesman) as well as the lesson of Roman politi- cal thought (salus reipublicae suprema lex este).™ 1 believe that the Prince should be read as a variation on the theme of the status necessitaris, namely on & See D, Quaglioni, “Tirannide © democrazia: 11 “momento savonarotiano™ nel pensiero giuridieo € politico del Quattrocento’, in Savonarola: Demoerazia tirannide profezia, ed. G.C. Garfagnini (Florence, 1998). pp. 3-16, especially where Quaglioni notes how “tyrant” and ‘tyranny’ are always, in the fifteenth century, momina iuris, “wordiconcepts of public common law not yet devoid of their technical legal meaning and not yet reduced to the status of a pec gogical-political paradigm &S Here Machiavelli differs also from many contemporary authors, stich as his friend and correspondent Francesco Vettori, who still saw the legal origin, or legitimacy, of political power as defining the netion of tyranny. See F. Vettori, Sammaria della storia @Kalia, in Scriti storici e politici (Bari, 1972), pp. 145-6: "If we want to examine cor- recily what were the origins of kingdoms, we will find thatall were taken cither by force ‘or by art... freely speaking, all governments are tyrannical.” 8 D, Stemberger, Machiavellis Prince” und der Begriff des Politischen (Wiesbaden, 1974), p. 35. © M, Viroli, ‘Machiavelli and the Republican Idea of Politics’, in Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed, G, Bock, Q, Skinner and M. Viroli (Cambridge, 1990), p. 161 M. Viroli, Fram Palities to Reason of State (Cambridge, 1992). Viroli, however, contra- dicts himself when he says that the Prince ‘isan integration of the language of politics’, because in Machiavelli's times politics was identified with legislative activity, govern- ‘ment and administration of justice inspired by the ideal eivil community based om the rule of law: Viroli, Machiavelli, p. 35. & See the dialogue between the Athenian ambassadors and the Melians in Thucydides V, 85-113.MACHIAVELLI AND TYRANNY 245 the extreme and exceptional condition in the life of a political community. 1t is not a matter of chance that, in his dedication to Lorenzo de’ Medici, Machiavelli writes that the only two qualities of his work that may appeal to Lorenzo are ‘the variety of the matter and the gravity of the subjeet’. think these words have been carefully chosen and should be taken literally: the gravity of certain political situations requires a prince to adopt means that have grave moral consequences for his soul. The prince, especially the new prince, is often forced to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, against religion, in order ta preserve the State; to quote Machiavelli's famous statement, he must “not depart from the good if he can, but be able to do evil, when forced’.”* Evil is especially necessary when there is corruption in the State or when the political community faces destruction from the outside."* There is corruption where laws favour only a segment of the community and feed the ambition of the powerful, thus unleashing men’s natural selfishness. In such a situation, the vocabulary of politics is perverted: ‘noxious” men are extolled as “industrious”, whereas good citizens are considered fools.” ‘agree with Nicola Matteucci’ s observation that Machiavelli's most impor- tant lesson was to show his readers “the seriousness of politics” and to teach them the troubling uth thata statesman must be ready to ‘damn his awn soul” in order to save the State.” We should trust the sincerity of this statement and remember that Machiavelli’s teaching, as he tells us time and again, stems from ‘a long experience of modern things and a continuous reading of the ancients’.* More specifically, I believe that, in order to correctly appreciate © | am not unaware of the possible rhetorical nuances, since these two qualities should be present in any public speech according to Cicera’s recommendation in De Gratore and Rhetorica ad Herennium. See B. Richardson, “The Prince and its Early Ital- ian Readers’, in Niceold Machiavelli's The Prince: New Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. M. Coyle (Manchester and New York, 1995), pp. 18-39. ® Prince 18: 19. Lagree with 1, Berlin, ‘The Originality of Mackiavelli’.in Against the Currens (Oxford, 1979), pp. 43-79, that this docs not amount toa defence of raison d'état, because Machiavelli's system of values is pagan and not that of Christianity. Prince 19. Diseourses I, 8; UL, 43. 7? Florentine Hisiories U1), 5. In this shifting evaluation of human agency according ‘opolitical circumstances one can detectonce again aclassical suggestion and, more spe- cifically, a resemblance with Thucydides Ill, 824, where the Athenian historian says war even changes the meaning of the words people use to evaluate human behaviour (clearly echoed in Plato, Repubfic VITL, 360e-561a}. Machiavelli was familiar with this Thueydidean narration, as is proved by Discourses TI, 2. See L. Canfora, nT ¢ Machiavelli’, Rinascimento, 37 (1997), pp. 29-44; and M. Simonetta, "Machiavelli lettore di Tucidide’, Experienze Letrerarie, 22 (1997), pp. 53-68. 7N, Matteucci, ‘Niceold Machiavelli’, in Alfa ricerca dell’ordine politico (Bologna, 1984), pp. 57-65. "4 Prince, Epistota dedicatoria,246 G. GIORGINI the teaching of the Prince and the Discourses, we ought to recall the lesson of the Florentine Histories, a work that revolves around ‘civit struggles and inner enmities’,” where we can better witness, and appreciate, his ‘experi- ence of modern things’. Here, in cold dry prose, Machiavelli describes the horrors, massacres and devastations that inner or outer wars, and theit accor panying ‘lack of civility’, produce: *We cannot yet call wars those in which men are not killed, cities are not ravaged, principalities are not destroyed.” Here he reveals his contempt for the sordidness of Italian princes, who have only scifish aims, such as riches and self-protection, and who believe that they are able to clude the seriousness of polities through a clever answer or a pol- ished letter.” The condition of war and the absence of civility must be avoided atall costs and, in Machiavelli’s view, the only solution is to have recourse to the power of the ‘kingly hand” of the prince, orto the wisdom of a ‘prudent ‘man’.’ ‘There are thus situations in which principality is preferable to any other form of government, The different evaluation of monarchical government according to political circumstances is similar to the different evaluation of human agency in war or in peace: what is ignominious in peaceful times, such as breaking pacts and using fraud and deceit, is admissible in war, because ‘it is good to defend one's country in whatever way it be dane, whether it entails ignominy or glory’.” In the fight against the external foe, and in order to save one's own political community, there are different standards than those exist- ing inside the city and in ordinary situations: For when the safety of one’s country depends wholly on the decision to be: taken, no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness of cruelty, of to its being praiseworthy or ignominious, On the contrary, every consideration being set aside, that alternative should be 75 Florentine Histories, Proem. 78 Ibid. Vs 1. 77 Ibid. VMN, 19, See also Artof War WM in Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others. trans. Gilbert, Vol. 2, p. 724. 78 Discourses I, 49, For a good analysis of the possible ‘accidents’ that a statesman may face see 1.P, McCormick, ‘Addressing the Political Exception; Machiavelli's “Accidents” and the Mixed Regime’. American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), pp. 888-900. T agree with McCormick that Machiavelli strongly prefers the legal over the extra-legal means of defending a regime. 79 Discourses I, 41. This isalsothe reason why Hannibal is praised forhis ‘inhuman cruelty’ ut war (Prince 17), while Agathocfes and Oliverotto are considered bad rulers: they were unnecessarily cruel in times of peace and within their political communities, without there being any real political necessity. This is confirmed with utmost clarity by ‘scathing remark about the Duke of athens. who, although he did not happen torule inan extraordinary situation, ‘wanted the servitude, not the benevolence of men; he therefore desired more to be feared than to be loved”MACHIAVELLI AND TYRANNY 247 wholeheartedly adopted which will save the lite and preserve the freedom of one’s country. Ruling and law-giving according to reason and justice thus presuppose the existence of the State, of political structure capable of exercising its jurisdic- tion over a people situated in a certain land. It is in the starus necessitaris that the truth emerges: before we can have politics and the rule of law, we need the strong hand of the prince, in order to create or preserve the State." ‘The existence of a prince, of a ‘kingly or quasi-kingly hand” that has recourse to ‘straordinari’, to extra-legal means, is suited to exceptional cir- cumstances only: when what is at stake is to found a political community or to save it either from a civil war or from possible servitude imposed from o side. The clarity of vision and the effectiveness in making decisions of a“ tuous prince’ are in these cases unsurpassable.'* As Machiavelli put final section of the Prince, the most honourable thing for a man is to bring order to a political community," because orderly conduct on the citizens’ part is the guarantor of the community's freedom; people can live in freedom, we may infer, under a prince, where there are laws, but never under a tyrant.” Indeed, as he adds in the Discourses, *should a good prince seek worldly renown, he should most certainly covet possession of a city that has become comupt, not, with Caesar, to complete its spoliation, but, with Romulus, to reform it”. The reason is that the founders of a republic or a kingdom acquire the glory of historical remembrance by future ages whereas tyrants are despised.'* However, Machiavelli shows himself ta be well aware of the di culties and ambiguity inherent in ‘having recourse to the extraordinary, thatis, *° Discourses ItL.41. This applies to the extraordinary situation, Normal times, ord nary life are different. Machiavelli himself wrote La Mandragola and knew art and ‘humour, but only the existence of the State enables men to enjoy these common pleas- ures. 8! This consideration may stem froma classical influence, not Aristotelian but rather Ciceronian. In Cicero's De Inventions I, 2-3, we read that ‘a system of equal law" (ius aequabileis required in ordcr to have reverence for the gods, morality and anything con nected to a truly human way of life, In Civero, however, this is the result of the wisdom and eloquence (rationen atque orationenn) of a great man whereas in Machiavelli there is an emphasis on power. ® Discourses, 17; 1, 18:1, 45. Accordingly, Machiavelli says that the funda- mem sk ofthe prince to make preparations for war Prince 14. C1. Discourses, 6. ® Prince 26, * Discourses 1,7. (bid. 1, 10. therefore disagree with H. Butterfield, The Statecraft of Machiavelli (London, 1960), who states that Machiavelli's work is ‘a handbook of ready-made strata- ‘gems, that was specially adapted to the purposes of a tyrant’ (p. 78). On the theme af ‘glory and immortality see the excellent article by H. Zmora, "A World Without a Saving Grace: Glory and Immortality in Machiavelli, History of Political Though, XVII (2007), pp. 449-68 and the bibliography there cited,