Concept of Science Lubov E.

in Kantian Philosophy Motorina

National Research
University, Russia

The particularity of Kantian concept of nature is that the philosopher introduces

the a priori element in science, as if attempting to reconcile empiricism and
rationalism typical of the modern era. Kant emphasizes that science always
comprises a foundation based upon experience, yet judgments themselves, which
purport to have some universal nature, exist in an a priori form. Laws of science
cannot be deduced from experience; on the contrary, experience is deduced from
them. Consequently, according to Kant, science reveals itself as the subject’s active
attitude towards the object. Kant compares it to the judge’s attitude towards the
witness. The judge asks the witness certain questions the same way a scientist asks
nature certain questions, trying to give them some experience-based substance.
In Kant’s opinion, an object is something which has a concept that amalgamates
the variety encompassed by contemplation. However, amalgamating any sort of
concepts requires the unity of consciousness represented in their synthesis. Hence,
Kant considers that unity of consciousness (synthetic unity of apperception) is
the basis of transforming concepts to knowledge. In other words, the essence of
scientific cognition is contained not in the object yet in the subject, or rather the
subject’s rational cognition. It is exactly conscious mind that has this ability to
synthesize the diversified world.
Kant compares shifting from the object to the subject in the context of
examining it as the fundamental principle in science with the breakthrough
Copernicus achieved, concluding, “What if I make the Earth rotate?” In the
preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes,

We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain

the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress
by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator,
he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the
spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the
same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition
must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know

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anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the
nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility
of such an a priori knowledge.1

Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophy still remains the focus of scientific

discussions.2
Kant stipulates that scientific cognition is not subjective, as the unity of
consciousness is not merely a certain internal feeling a subject has, yet a certain
sort of transcendental unity of apperception, due to which the entire diversity
presented in contemplation is unified forming a concept of an object. Therefore,
transcendental unity of apperception has to be distinguished from the inner feeling
a subject has. In fact, the subject’s consciousness is objective, yet this unifying
synthetic function of reason is based upon the principle of transcendental unity of
apperception – the initial unity of consciousness of the cognizing subject, which
determines the unity of experience, and this unity has an a priori transcendental
sense, as opposed to the psychological one.
Distinguishing the phenomenal world from the noumenal one, Kant turns to
the issue of the limits of science. According to Kant, all the rational judgments
can be applied only to the phenomenal world, that is, to the objects of experience:
outside it, notions have no meaning at all. Only in this sense, science can pretend
to be true. Our notions cannot have any transcendental application included in the
sphere of some other objectness – the noumenal world. A noumenon as a “thing
in itself ” cannot be an object of a scientific investigation, as we have no ability to
intellectually contemplate a “thing in itself ”. In Kant’s opinion, reason certainly
can generate its own concepts of objects. Due to the fact that a noumenon as a
“thing in itself ” is not an object of scientific research, such concepts may result in
mistaken or illusory notions which have nothing to do with reality.
At this point, Kant gives us an example of scientific correctitude typical of him
and “thoroughness” in understanding the essence of science. Kant stresses,

One can easily determine whether the knowledge used by reason for
operating is developed by means of following the right way of science
by its results. If, after thorough preparations and equipment, a certain
development reaches a deadlock as soon as it comes to the purpose, or it
is forced to go back and consider new ways to reach this goal, and various
1
Кант Иммануил. Сочинения в шести томах. М.,1964. Т. 3. СС. 87-88. (Kant Immanuel. Works
in Six Volumes. Moscow, 1964. Volume 3, pp. 87-88).
2
Гиренок Ф. И. Кант, Хайдеггер и проблема метафизики.//Вестник РУДН. Серия «Философия».
2013. №2. С.86-87. (Girenok F. Kant, Heidegger, and the Problem of Metaphysics. // Messenger of the
Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. Philosophy Series. 2013. No 2, pp. 86-87).

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researchers cannot reach unanimity while discussing the ways of reaching

the common goal, – then after all these things, one can say with certainty
that this study has not yet entered the right path of science in any aspect,
yet it only moves along gropingly.3

The problem of limits of science is being considered by Kant not only in terms
of the relations between man and nature (limits of reason), but also in terms of
relations within the structure of scientific knowledge. Kant supposes that it is
only logic that can have definite limits. According to Kant, this is the only science
where reason deals only with itself and its own form, as it is distracted from all
the objects of knowledge and the differences between them. Kant was critical of
his contemporaries’ attempts to extend logic by including psychology (studying
man’s various cognitive abilities), metaphysics (exploring the issue of origin of
cognition and its veracity), or anthropology in it. Kant writes that such attempts
are caused by ignorance of the true nature of each of the sciences. In his opinion,

Shifting the limits of different sciences leads to distorting them instead

of expanding them. As to the limits of logic, they are absolutely clearly
determined by the fact that it is a science that thoroughly expounds
and strictly proves merely formal rules of any thought (be it a priori or
empirical, no matter what its origin or object are, and whether it finds any
occasional or natural obstacles in our soul).4

Kant regards mathematics and physics as two theoretical forms of cognition

by reason, which must determine their objects in an a priori manner. Kant
emphasizes that, since the earliest times, mathematics followed the right way of
science due to the efforts of the laudable ancient Greeks.

We should not think, however, that mathematics found or, rather, created
this royal way as easily as logic, where reason deals with itself only, did;
on the contrary, I suppose it kept moving along gropingly for a long time,
yet the revolutionary change in mathematics took place due to someone’s
lucky guess, after which, it was impossible not to see the desired direction
any longer, and the right path of science was paved and marked forever
right through the infinite distance.5

3
Кант Иммануил. Сочинения в шести томах. М.,1964. Т. 3. С. 82. (Kant Immanuel. Works in
Six Volumes. Moscow, 1964. Volume 3, p. 82).
4
Ibid., p. 83.
5
Ibid., p. 84.

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Further on, Kant emphasizes that history has not preserved any record of
this revolution in the manner of thinking or the name of the lucky man who
revolutionized it. The most important point, according to Kant, is that a researcher
has realized that “he can have true a priori knowledge of something only in the
case if he attributes only the characteristics which inevitably result from what he
himself has attached to a thing according to his own concept to that thing”6.
In Kant’s opinion, natural science joined the right path of science much later.
He specifies that he implies only the natural science based on empirical processes.

For all the scientists, clarity emerged when Galileo began to roll spheres
which had the weight he had chosen in advance down inclined panes,
when Torricelli made air support the weight which, as he had foreseen
in advance, was equal to the weight of the water column known to him
[...]. Natural scientists realized that reason could only see whatever it
created according to its own plan, and it, keeping to the principles of its
judgments, had to go forward according to permanent laws and make
nature answer its questions instead of dragging behind it as if under its
girdle [...]. Reason must approach nature, on the one hand, according to
its own principles, only according to which correlating phenomena can
have the power of laws, and, on the other hand, with the experiments
preliminarily considered according to these principles, in order to draw
knowledge from nature, not like a pupil who gets the hints he needs from
his teacher, yet like a judge who interrogates a witness making him answer
the questions he asks.7

Citing this rather extensive passage, we have reached the most important issue
considered by Kant in his concept of science, i.e. the extent to which man can
ask the world “right” questions. Since the early modern period, man has been
treating the world as if the latter were created exactly for man to be cognized
and transformed by him. The world, however, has its own foundations, its goals,
and objectives, which are far from coinciding with the goals and objectives of the
cognizing subject. The world merely demonstrates the evidence of its existence
without seeking to reveal its essence (Kant). The reason is not that the world is
reluctant to show its essence, but solely that man is not always able to perceive
this essence. Man only gets answers to the questions he asks the world. Kant
was blamed for agnosticism, but, in fact, he categorically objects to limitless
possibilities of cognition, arguing that knowledge has limitless capacities only

6
Ibid., p. 85.
7
Ibid., pp. 85-86.

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potentially, not in reality.

In the presence of the total “pressure” man continuously exerts upon the
world while turning science to technoscience, Kantian ideas of necessity of man’s
focusing upon the goals and objectives of the world itself in his scientific activity
become even more relevant.

Summary

Concept of Science in Kantian Philosophy

The article considers Kantian concept of science where science is regarded as

the subject’s active attitude towards the object, in the context of interconnection
between philosophy and science in the history of ideas; the problem of the
limits of science and its possibilities is revealed; the statement that the efficiency
of science depends on the exactness of man’s “guessing” the objectives of the
world itself is emphasized. According to Kant, the world has its foundations,
its goals, and objectives, which are far from man’s goals and objectives in the
process of cognition. The harmony between the world and the cognizing subject
is a necessary provision for the development of modern science. In the presence
of the total “pressure” man continuously exerts upon the world while turning
science to technoscience, Kantian ideas of necessity of man’s focusing upon the
goals and objectives of the world itself in his scientific activity become even more
relevant.
Keywords: science – a priori element – transcendental unity of apperception –
limits of science – possibilities of science – logic – mathematics – natural science
– metaphysics – objectives of the world and objectives of cognizing man

Zhrnutie

Poňatie vedy v Kantovej filozofii

Príspevok sa v kontexte prepojenia filozofie a vedy v dejinách ideí venuje

Kantovmu poňatiu vedy, pričom veda je chápaná ako aktívny vzťah subjektu
k objektu; zaoberá sa problémom ohraničenia vedy a jej možností; zdôrazňuje
tvrdenie, že úspech vedy závisí od presnosti ľudského „odhadnutia“ cieľov
samotného sveta. Podľa Kanta má svet svoje základy, ciele a zámery, ktoré sú
vzdialené cieľom a zámerom človeka v procese poznávania. Súlad medzi svetom

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a poznávajúcim subjektom je nevyhnutným predpokladom na rozvoj modernej

vedy. V prítomnom veľkom „tlaku“, ktorý človek neustále vyvíja na svet, v ktorom
sa veda mení na technovedu, sa Kantove myšlienky nevyhnutnosti človeka
zameriavajúceho sa na ciele a zámery sveta vo svojej vedeckej aktivite stávajú
čoraz aktuálnejšími.
Kľúčové slová: veda – zložka a priori – transcendentálna jednota apercepcie –
hranice vedy – možnosti vedy – logika – matematika – prírodná veda – metafyzika
– cieľ sveta a ciele poznávajúceho človeka

Zusammenfassung

Die Konzeption der Wissenschaft in der Philosophie Kants

Im Kontext der Wechselbeziehung von Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der

Geschichte der Ideen wird im Artikel die Kants Konzeption der Wissenschaft
erörtert, wo man die Wissenschaft als ein aktives Verhalten des Subjekts
zum Objekt versteht; das Problem der Grenzen der Wissenschaft und deren
Möglichkeiten erschließt; und es wird betont, dass die Leistung der Wissenschaft
davon abhängt, wie weit der Mensch die Ziele der Welt „durchspürt“. Nach Kant
hat die Welt ihre Basis, Ziele und Aufgaben, die mit den Zielen und Aufgaben
des erkennenden Menschen nicht zusammenfallen. Die Harmonie der Welt und
des erkennenden Subjekts ist die unbedingte Voraussetzung für die Entwicklung
der modernen Wissenschaft. Unter totalem „Druck“, den der Mensch auf
die Welt weiterhin ausübt, und die Wissenschaft in die Technowissenschaft
verwandelt, wird die Kants Idee über die Notwendigkeit für den Menschen – bei
seiner wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit sich auf die Ziele und Aufgaben der Welt zu
konzentrieren – immer noch aktuell.
Schlüsselwörter: Wissenschaft – apriorischer Bestandteil – transzendentale
Einheit der Apperzeption – Wissenschaftsgrenzen – Potenzial der Wissenschaft
– Logik – Mathematik – Naturwissenschaft – Metaphysik – Ziele der Welt und
Ziele des erkennenden Menschen

Аннотация

Концепция науки в философии Канта

В контексте взаимосвязи философии и науки в истории идей в статье

рассматривается кантовская концепция науки, где наука понимается как

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активное отношение субъекта к объекту; раскрывается проблема границ

науки и ее возможностей; подчеркивается, что успешность науки зависит
от того, насколько верно человек «угадывает» цели самого мира. По Канту,
мир имеет свои основания, свои цели и задачи, далеко не совпадающими
с целями и задачами познающего человека. Гармония мира и познающего
субъекта – необходимое условие развитие современной науки. В условиях
тотального «давления», которое человек продолжает оказывать на мир,
превращая науку в технонауку, идея Канта о необходимости нацеленности
человека в своей научной деятельности на цели и задачи самого мира
становится все более актуальной.
Ключевые слова: наука, априорная составляющая, трансцентентальное
единство апперцепции, границы науки, возможности науки, логика,
математика, естествознание, метафизика, цели мира и цели познающего
человека.

L. E. Motorina Л.Е. Моторина

Professor, Chair of Philosophy Department Профессор кафедры философии
Moscow Aviation Institute Московского авиационного
National Research University института
Russian Federation Национального
lubov-motorina@yandex.ru исследовательского университета
Россия

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