Pakistan Nuclear Weapons, Proliferation And Security Issues

Nuclear Weapons
Responding to India?
Nuclear Weapon States- Programs And Postures: Indian-Pakistan Nuclear Doctrines
What is a Doctrine?
What is a Nuclear Doctrine?
Evolution of Indian Nuclear Program
Phase 1964- 1974 (China Dimension)
Phase 1974 to date (Pakistan Dimension)
Indian Nuclear Doctrine
Operationalisation of Nuclear Doctrine of India
Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program
Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine
Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence
Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons
National Command Authority (NCA)
Employment Control Committee (ECC)
Development Control Committee (DCC)
Strategic Plan Division (SPD)
Personnel and Transportation Security Measures
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
Pakistan - India Nuclear Postures and its Implication on South Asia
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Historical Evolution Of Nuclear Weapons
Horizontal Proliferation
Vertical Proliferation
Acquisition by Individuals or Nonstate Entities
Controlling the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear Weapon States
Nuclear Non –Proliferation Regime
International Atomic Energy Agency
Secretariat
Organizational Structure
Main Work Areas
Nuclear Non- proliferation Treaty
Provisions
 Verification and Compliance
Review Process
2015 Review Conference:
NPT and Pakistan
Nuclear Supplier Group
Organization
NSG Plenary
NSG Troika
NSG Consultative Group (CG)
NSG Information Exchange Meeting (IEM)
NSG Licensing and Enforcement Experts Meeting (LEEM)
NSG Technical Experts Group (TEG)
Participants
Partial Test Ban Treaty
Background
Treaty Obligations
Verification and Compliance
Developments
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
Background to the FMCT
Negotiations on FMCT
Scope of FMCT
Shannon Mandate
Stance of various countries
Activities of Conference on Disarmament (CD)
Critical issues of FMCT
Key players for FMCT
Nuclear Weapon Developments: Case Study Of India And Pakistan
Between 1940s-1959
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000 onwards
 Challenges of Non-Proliferation
Other factors prompting this perception include:
Is NPT effective?
Disarmament And NPT Bargain
The Program to Strengthen Safeguards
Reducing The Availability Of SNT (Senstive Nuclear Technology)
Upholding Non-Proliferation – Acting To Encourage Compliance
Nuclear Civil Deal Regime
INDO-US Nuclear Deal
Effects of INDO-US Nuclear Deal
Balance Of Power and Prospects Of Nuclear Arms Race In South Asia
China And Its Views
Implications on South Asian Security Environment
Response of Pakistan
Analysis
Missile Defense Systems and their impact on global strategic environment
Pakistan’s Ballistic missiles systems
India ballistic missile system
Similarities between India and Pakistan ballistic missiles system
Militarization and Weaponization of Space
Definitions and key issues
Militarization of outer space
Weaponization of outer space
Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
Space weapons and missile "defence"
Space debris
Effects on arms control and nuclear disarmament
Current trends in US policy

Pakistan Nuclear Weapons, Proliferation And Security Issues

The September 11, 2001 attacks reinforced the importance of efforts to stop the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. In particular, many analysts agree that some countries need
greater protection against terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on their
territories. The report of the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat
reduction assistance to keep WMD away from terrorist groups.

 Pakistan, because of its location, the nature of its relationship to the Taliban and Al
Qaeda, and its weapons of mass destruction programs, has generated particular
concern.
 Repeated assassination attempts on President Musharraf
 AQ Khan’s nuclear sales to North Korea, Iran, and Libya
 continuous battle with terrorist elements within the country

It has made Pakistan the most crucial node of the nexus of terrorism and WMD proliferation.
Moreover, a combination of doctrinal preference (for first use of nuclear weapons) and
conventional force inferiority has given Pakistan strong incentives to forward-deploy its
nuclear forces, leading many observers to conclude that assistance to secure Pakistan’s
nuclear warheads could be critical. Analysts inside and outside government have raised the
possibility of U.S. assistance to help reduce the threat of nuclear weapons losses in India and
Pakistan. Suggested measures have ranged from “guards and gates” around nuclear sites to
permissive action links (which act as locks) on nuclear weapons to prevent unauthorized use.

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could

be larger. Islamabad is producing:

 Fissile material, adding to related production facilities

 Deploying additional delivery vehicles
These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements
to its nuclear arsenal. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its
“minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military
action.

Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in
the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command
and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel
security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004
revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan,
Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further
proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives,
such as:

 Improved personnel security

 International nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s
security situation in recent years
 Strengthened export control laws

Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question.
Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or
proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a
breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in
controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact
these safeguards.

Chronic political instability in Pakistan and the current offensive against the Taliban in the
northwest of the country have called attention to the issue of the security of the country’s
nuclear weapons. Some observers fear that Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets could be
obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government

“Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist
organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan
and launch attacks.”

Nevertheless, U.S. officials have generally expressed confidence in the security of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons. President Obama addressed this issue in an April 29, 2009, press
conference, stating, “I’m confident that we can make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is
secure, primarily, initially, because the Pakistani army, I think, recognizes the hazards of
those weapons falling into the wrong hands. We've got strong military-to-military
consultation and cooperation.” He also recognized the sensitivity of the issue for Pakistan,
saying, “We want to respect their sovereignty, but we also recognize that we have huge
strategic interests, huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and
that you don't end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.” Declining to engage in
“hypothetical” when asked if the United States is ready to secure the nuclear arsenal if the
Pakistani government could not do so, President Obama said he felt “confident that that
nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands.”

Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased
attention to reducing the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. The two countries most recently
came to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and, realizing the dangers, have
developed some risk reduction measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Islamabad has
also developed its command and control systems and improved security of military and
civilian nuclear facilities. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear
proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as
possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, Islamabad has made
additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main
security challenges for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are:

 Keeping the integrity of the command structure

 Ensuring physical security
 Preventing illicit proliferation from insiders
Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and appears to be augmenting its
weapons production facilities, as well as deploying additional delivery vehicles—steps that
will enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear Weapons
Pakistan’s nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a bloody war with India that probably triggered a political
decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program.

 Deterring India’s nuclear weapons

 Augmenting Pakistan’s inferior conventional forces are widely believed to be the
primary missions for Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal.
 Observers point to India’s 1974 “peaceful” nuclear explosion as the pivotal moment
that gave additional urgency to the program.

Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based
uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched
uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other is
plutonium. The country’s main enrichment facility is a centrifuge plant located at Kahuta;
Pakistan may have other enrichment sites.

Islamabad gained technology from many sources. This extensive assistance is reported to
have included

 Uranium enrichment technology from Europe

 Blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from China
 Missile technology from China.

Similarly, Khan reportedly stated during a January 2010 speech that Pakistan “had become a
nuclear power” in 1984 or 1985. When India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 12,
1998, Pakistan’s government responded two weeks later on May 28 and May 30 with six tests
in western Pakistan. Test yields were about 10 kilotons and 5 kilotons, according to seismic
analysis. The United States imposed additional sanctions after the tests, but these were lifted
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.

According to most public estimates, Pakistan has about 60 nuclear weapons, though it could
have more; a recent public estimate from two prominent experts on the subject stated that the
country has between 70 and 90 nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s nuclear warheads use an
implosion design with a solid core of approximately 15-20 kilograms of HEU. Islamabad
reportedly continues to produce HEU for weapons at a rate of at least 100 kilograms per year.
Pakistan has also pursued plutonium-based warheads and continues to produce plutonium for
weapons.

Responding to India?
Pakistani officials have indicated that they have already determined the arsenal size needed
for a minimum nuclear deterrent and that they will not engage in an arms race with India. The
government’s National Command Authority (NCA) “expressed satisfaction” regarding “the
effectiveness of Pakistan’s strategic deterrence,” according to a January 13, 2010, statement.
Nevertheless, Pakistan appears to be increasing its fissile production capability and
improving its delivery vehicles in order to hedge against possible increases in India’s nuclear
arsenal. Islamabad may also accelerate its current nuclear weapons efforts.

India has stated that it needs only a “credible minimum deterrent,” but New Delhi has never
defined what it means by such a deterrent and has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. Furthermore, both the agreement and associated 2008 decision by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) to exempt India from some of its export guidelines will renew New
Delhi’s access to the international uranium market. This access will result in more indigenous
Indian uranium available for weapons because it will not be consumed by India’s newly
safeguarded reactors.

Pakistani officials have stated that the government may need to increase significantly its
nuclear arsenal in response to possible Indian plans to do the same. According to an April
2006 television broadcast, Pakistani officials from the government’s NCA expressed
“concern” that the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement could tilt the strategic
balance between India and Pakistan in favor of the former. The officials suggested that
Islamabad may need to increase or improve its nuclear arsenal in order to “to meet all
requirements of minimum credible defence deterrence.”28 (See the “Nuclear Doctrine”
section for more on Pakistan’s deterrence concept.) Similarly, Pakistan’s Permanent
Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wrote in July 2008 that
the agreement could cause a nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India.29 Moreover, a
Foreign Ministry spokesperson indicated during a May 21, 2009, press briefing that, despite
the government’s continued opposition to a “nuclear or conventional arms race in South
Asia,” Pakistan may need to increase its nuclear arsenal in response to Indian conventional
and nuclear arms expansion

Nuclear Weapon States- Programs And Postures: Indian-Pakistan Nuclear Doctrines

The strategic culture of South Asia is characterized by the hostility between India and
Pakistan. This enmity and hostility has further ramifications. Conventional arms race, wars,
growing insecurity and ultimately nuclearization of the region is the consequence of this
continual enmity. In order to understand the real standing of both states on issue of
nuclearization, it is important to understand the nuclear doctrine of both sides and to analyze
the implication of these doctrines on the total security of South Asian region.

What is a Doctrine?
Theoretically doctrine means a rule or principle that forms the basis of a theory or policy. In
other words doctrine is the set of principles or rules governing the employment of a
capability. There is a passive use of this concept in political, military and strategic aspects.
Political and ideological octrines encompass practice and promulgation of a political
philosophy. When the word doctrine is implemented in military matters it stands for the
environment within which armed forces operate. This word also extends to prescribe the
methods and circumstances within which army should be employed.

What is a Nuclear Doctrine?

Nuclear doctrines of the contemporary world are different from the rest of the classical
doctrines. After having nuclear capability, two things which a state had to address, first thing
is to efficient deployment and second is management of these nuclear weapons. To tackle all
these and related issues, every state needs to develop a doctrine that pertains under what
circumstances, how, and for what purposes such weapons will be used. Second thing in this
issue is the need to have a foolproof command and control to ensure specific use according to
the plans mentioned in the nuclear doctrine. Proper and efficient command and control
system may be used as a deterrent purpose while unauthorised or accidental use may result in
chaos for the mankind and humanity.

The nuclear doctrines are mainly of two basic types; aggressive or offensive nuclear doctrine,
non aggressive or defensive nuclear doctrine. It defines principles and policies about the
development, deployment and employment of nuclear forces. A doctrine is a guideline for the
policy makers and decision makers. The definition of a nuclear doctrine actually elaborates
the qualities of a perfect doctrine. A complete doctrine must be able to provide guideline for
the policy makers and direction for the arms forces for the deployment and employment of
the nuclear forces.

While discussing Pakistan and India’s nuclear doctrine it will be analyzed whether these
doctrines fulfill the required qualities and what implication they do have on both countries in
general and the region in particular. It is essential to analyze them as the changing global
scenario demands for the clear picture of the nuclear posture of both paramount states of the
South Asian region. This region casts its impact not only on the residing actors but the
neighboring region as well.
Evolution of Indian Nuclear Program
India’s first attempts to begin nuclear program published by Guarav Kampani in Nuclear
Overview: Historical Overview identifies as “India’s nuclear program was conceived in the
pre-independence era by a small group of influential scientists who grasped the significance
of nuclear energy and persuaded political leaders from the Indian National Congress to invest
resources in the nuclear sector” (Guarav Kampani, 2007). A chief promoter regarding this
program was Dr. Homi Jehanjir Bhabba, and he forwarded his proposals to Sir Dorab Tata
Trust to initiate a research institute in the area of nuclear technology. His logic to shift to the
nuclear energy was that when nuclear energy will be utilized with success for power and
production purposes, India will not dependent of foreign experts after a couple of decades
from now”(George Perkovich, 1999). During this debate related to nuclear technology the
country quietly shifted from uranium based production to plutonium based one. Initianly this
shift was because of shortage of natural uranium and so much so that plutonium case be used
as doubly beneficial as first stage and second stage fuel (unending) with the help of India’s
first reactor, the 1MW Aspara Research Reactor, a reactor that was built with British help in
1955. Canada agreed to provide the 40MW Canada-India Reactor (CIR) after long
deliberations (as first step). (M.V. Ramana, 2007).

As far as the India is concerned India followed Nehru’s declared “peaceful nuclear program,”
in the 1950s and 1960s, with an agenda that they will not develop nuclear weapons, but will
only utilize this form of energy as to provide energy for the public, but there were some
indicators that some key figures in India’s nuclear program thought differently.

Phase 1964- 1974 (China Dimension)

Evolution of the Indian nuclear weapon program traces back to its inception. As it is
discussed earlier India had mature nuclear thoughts in 50s. China-India conflict added a
serious dimension in it. There were serious discussions on the acquisition of nuclear
capability on intellectual, official and professional level. In 1964 China had done its first
atomic explosion. This incident induced a surge of tension throughout India. Dr. Bhabha
openly expressed the possibility of the development of Indian nuclear weapon at the occasion
of 12th Pugwash conference. He openly and vividly suggested ‘recourse to nuclear weapons
to redress the imbalance against the China’s military dominance.’ That was the stage when
India was in need of a decade or more for the development of a nuclear weapon but Dr.
Bhabha was of the view that it could be made possible in the span of one and a half year.
Although it was a boasted and a lofty claim yet it showed the urgency on Indian side for the
acquisition of nuclear weapon.

As compare to China India’s nuclear program is predated. India had developed CIRUS and
TRP, which offer the essential facilities of developing a nuclear weapon, before the Chinese
atomic explosion in 1964. Incidents did not stop here. Next jolt was felt severely when Chine
gave ultimatum to India during the Pak- India war of 1965. This incident actually refueled
nuclear weapon debate in India. Indian Prime Minister Shastri sanctioned the work on SNEP
(Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project). This sanction was granted on the recommendation
of Dr. Bhabha. Prime Minister Shastri and Dr. Bhabha were very much willing to develop
nuclear weapon. They wanted to acquire same nuclear capability as a weapon test without
openly going for bomb. The zeal and speed of this project was interrupted by the tragic
deaths of Dr. Bhabha and Prime Minister Shastri. It was a big loss for the development of
Indian nuclear program. Dr. Vikram Srarabhai was the next chairman of AEC. Dr. Sarabhai
had different perspective on nuclear weapon issue with that of Dr. Bhabha. From 1966 till
1972 India maintained nuclear option. Till this time there was no expression of any nuclear
doctrine on official and public level. There has been a policy regarding the nuclear program
since inception but this policy was not combined with a nuclear doctrine. As a part of
regional strategy Indian nuclear program kept on developing but without an obvious and well
declared nuclear doctrine.

Phase 1974 to date (Pakistan Dimension)

In India’s nuclear history, most significant incident was happened on May 18, 1974, when
India conducted its first nuclear explosions near Pokhran (India). According to estimates
these blasts were between 8-12 ki (less in power dropped on Hiroshima in 1945). According
to official statements the test was “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE). In the same year Indra
Gandhi had to face public unrest and she declared unpopular emergency. Because of this
emergency she lost elections in 1977. Murarji Desai had taken charge as a new Prime
Minister. His administration had shown no zest for nuclear option as compare to the
administration of Indra Gandhi. In 1980 Indra Gandhi came back as the Prime Minister of
India. The regional scenario had considerably changed in 1980. Pakistan was well on the
route to nuclearization and Russian invasion in Afghanistan had provided a golden chance to
Pakistan to develop its nuclear weapon program successfully and speedily.

India was not unaware of all these developments. India, in response, had used all possible
measures to contain Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program. India could not use the norms and
framework of nonproliferation and regional arms control measures because in this case India
itself had to face the reciprocal limitations and rules on the nuclear issue. On the other hand
Pakistan was frontline state in the Soviet Afghan war. USA and China were assisting
Pakistan on both economic and military fronts to make it more capable against Soviet
challenge. It was during this time that India had given serious thoughts to prosecute a
preventive war doctrine. This shows the height of Indian frustration regarding Pakistan’s
nuclear program. Such were the circumstances and events that kept on giving shape to the
future Indian nuclear doctrine.

India, consequently adopted a preventive war/ pre- emption doctrine. Prevention means to
attack the nuclear capabilities of an opponent before it acquires WMD. Pre-emption on the
other hand, strands for the idea of attacking an opponent before the actual use of WMD by an
adversary is visible and certain. Preventive measures are taken before the acquisition of
WMD by an adversary and pre-emption is done when WMD are acquired by an adversary
and their actual use is pre- eminent. The third term in relation with the nuclear weapon is
decapitation.

This option is taken for the complete destruction of adversary’s nuclear capability including
its nuclear infrastructure, command and control. Indian adoption of such a dangerous thinking
is the vivid example of its frustration about Pakistan’s nuclear program and its failure to
contain and halt this program. Throughout the decade of 80s India kept on threatening
Pakistan of conventional preventive strikes. It was because India was well aware of its
conventional military edge over Pakistan. In 1982 US shared this information with Pakistan
that India was well in this position to carry such preventive strike. It was a peak time of
Soviet Afghan war and Pakistan was fighting as the frontline state from US side. In such a
scenario US deemed it important to equip Pakistan army with latest F-16 aircrafts. In
response to the Indian threat General Zia ul Haq gave an ambiguous signal that in case of any
preventive strike Pakistan will use all available means.

Pakistan will even use F-16 aircrafts to strike Bombay nuclear facilities and air base. Hence
the concept of preventive strike against Pakistan’s nuclear sites was refuted by Indra Gandhi
administration. It was clearly judged by the Indian military experts that any such attack could
induce retaliatory action in Pakistan and ultimately it could be turn out as a full fledge war.
Apart from US support to Pakistan, India was well aware that Kahuta was a well defended
target. India had less chances of success in such an adventure. In this way a pre-emptive
attack to destroy or seriously degrade the adversary’s nuclear assets had finally been laid to
rest. Indian nuclear doctrinal thinking was deeply affected by this crisis. Such hostile Indian
thinking enhanced the perception of threat in Pakistan and the regional strategic scenario also
became more intense.

With these realities India entered a new turn of its nuclear doctrinal thinking. Till this time it
was an obvious fact the any kind of pre-emptive strike will earn no gain for India. In late 80s
India went for Brasstack exercises, it was an open attempt to threaten and pressurize Pakistan.
Brasstacks was the last incident when India faced only conventionally equipped Pakistan,
afterwards it was nuclear armed Pakistan which entered in the Indian strategic calculation.
During 1990 crisis India employed heavy forces in Kashmir. There was a considerable armed
deployment on the Rajisthan in the South. During this crisis it was nuclear factor on the side
of Pakistan that put restraints on the Indian ambitions. This crisis also ended in fear of
escalation of full-fledged war, nuclear deterrence and US mediation. All these incidents
contributed in the development of future Indian nuclear doctrine.

Indian Nuclear Doctrine

As a matter of fact Indian army was not given the task to design nuclear doctrine till 1980s.
There are several reasons behind it. At first place Indian nuclear program was not much
advanced in 80s that required a nuclear doctrine. Secondly, Indian threat perception was not
at that stage that required some doctrine. Lastly, Indian army was not asked to formulate a
doctrine not because a doctrine was not required but also this delay was due to Indian military
and strategic culture. Till late 70s and early 80s Indian nuclear program was not well
acknowledged as it was in 1998, that was another reason of non formulation of nuclear
doctrine.

The formulation of Indian nuclear doctrine initiated in April 1998. A task force was set and
the report of that task force was followed by Cabinet Committee on Security, National
Security Advisor and a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). The preparation of Indian
nuclear doctrine was now the task of NSAB. NSAB hurried its work on the draft after Kargil
Crisis of 1999. On 17th August 1999 NSAB presented its report titled ‘Draft Report of
National Security Advisory Board.’ This nuclear doctrine draft was published but it had yet
to obtain the approval of government and was made public in order to gather the public
opinion. Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) is a document that highligts nuclear thinking of
India. It is worth explaining that such drafts are time bound declarations and there are
chances of many changes in them with the passage of time.

India has made clear in the DND the rationale of keeping and developing nuclear weapons.
The way this rationale is presented is quite self defeating. Besides explaining the ‘gravest
threat’ to the sovereignty of India and danger to the humanity, India reserves the right of
keeping nuclear weapons. There was absolutely no need of this wolf crying. The other
important Indian stance is the rationale behind developing nuclear technology is the
economic boost of the country. Again this claim is not absolutely true and the proof is Indian
approach to acquire nuclear weapons and its failure to meet with the complete nuclear
disarmament . The DND also deals with the concept of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’.

There is no obvious estimation of Credible Minimum Deterrence. There are several

ambiguities regarding this concept and DND describes; “India’s peacetime posture aims at
convincing any potential aggressor that: (a) any threat of use of nuclear weapon against shall
invoke measures to counter the threat: and (b) any attack on India and its armed forces shall
result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the
aggressor” (Cheema, 2010).

Measures are not described in DND. It gives a wide range of options including pre- emptive
strikes and other conventional means. There is declaration of Indian intention of ‘no first use
of nuclear weapon.’ Historically India itself did not accept such declaration from China. As a
matter of fact, such declarations have no credibility unless or until they are translated into a
bilateral declaration. India published an official nuclear doctrine on January 04, 2003, which
was then made public, with the following points.

1. India’s stance will be to build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent.

2. Main punch of India’s stance will be "No First Use", but these will be used against
nuclear attack, in retaliation, on territory or on its forces. This retaliation will be
massive and effect unbearable damage.
3. Civil political leadership only can authorize these retaliation attacks, naming Nuclear
Command Authority.
4. Non-nuclear states will not be hit by nuclear weapons. But, in case of major attack
(biological or chemical), India will have the option of nuclear weapons.
5. Strict control on the export of fissile material as mentioned in Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty (FMCT) declaration will be followed.
6. India will strictly follow the guidelines for a nuclear free world on nondiscriminatory
basis on all across the globe.

This doctrine contain for the establishment of Nuclear Command Authority with organs of
political as well as executive councils. Prime Minister will be the head of chairs the Political
Council, and this is the only body, to authorize the use of nuclear weapons.
Operationalisation of Nuclear Doctrine of India
Indian Cabinet Committee on Security reviewed this document on 4 January 2003. The
principles set in DND were changed in the Operationalisation. The principle of no first use
has been modified in favor of Indian needs and necessity. Originally this principle states that
India reserves the right of using nuclear weapon in retaliation of the opponent attack. In
Operationalisation this principle was modified in the way that if Indian forces were attacked
on or outside Indian Territory, India reserved the right of nuclear attack. The aspect of
Operationalisation of this principle leaves NFU rather ineffective when it clarifies that in case
of major attack against India, India reserves the right of using all options including biological,
chemical and nuclear weapons against the opponent.

The DND describes ‘deterrence’ the purpose of Indian nuclear weapons. In the
Operationalisation aspect it is not explained that how and what kind of retaliation India would
show in case of any nuclear threat. DND also explains the concept of credible minimum
deterrence but the Operationalisation aspect does not include the development of triad of
strategic nuclear forces. There are long-term objectives of these developments. Although
India has put moratorium on the next nuclear explosions but while signing Indo-US Nuclear
Agreement India has retained its right of conducting future nuclear tests. All these aspects of
Operationalisation belie the original DND statements.

Another important clause of DND is regarding the survivalabilty of the nuclear forces. These
weapons must be deployed in such way that could survive the first use of nuclear weapons.
Article 5.4 of DND describes the link between survivalability of nuclear arsenal and C4I1
(command, control, communications, computing and information). Survivalability depends
upon the size of nuclear forces. DND provides broad spectrum of development, deployment
and employment of nuclear forces. In Operationalisation aspect, this doctrine allows India to
have
multiple redundant systems. Overall scenario prescribes unlimited space for the nuclear
development for India which again belies its other claims of peaceful use of nuclear
technology.
 Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program
According to Congressional Research Service, June 2012, USA, Nuclear program of Pakistan
was initiated in 1950s, but the incident that boosted it was the loss of East Pakistan, in war
against India, and the political leadership decided to start secretly this program just after one
month of this tragic incident of Bangladesh in 1972. Main attribute or primary mission of
going nuclear Pakistan is the deterrence of India’s nuclear power and also inferiority in the
conventional arms with relation to India. It was also evident that India’s “peaceful” nuclear
explosion of 1974 also worked for the urgency in this regard. Nuclear scientists of Pakistan
mastered to produce fissile material by using gas centrifuge based technology of uranium
enrichment in the years of 1980s. Fissile material for nuclear weapons is of two types, highly
enriched uranium and plutonium. Main enrichment facility of the country is located at Kahuta
including other sites. As far as sources to enrichment for these materials it is pertinent to
mention here that Pakistan acquired from many sources, like Europe and China as well.
Accordingly, Pakistan constructed a uranium enrichment facility in the 1970s, and according
to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan the country started uranium enrichment in 1978 and highly
enrichment uranium in 1983.

Officially it was stated that Pakistan is only producing only low enriched uranium (which is
not used in nuclear weapons), according to U.S. and Pakistan government officials in 1990 in
a meeting announced that the country decided to resume producing HEU sometime after
October 1989 (indicated in 1994). U.S. had information that Pakistan is going to be a nuclear
state but at what pace to a workable experience was not clear to her. Dr. Khan stated in an
interview published in May 1998 that the country had acquired the capability to explode
nuclear device during 1984.2 Similarly, Dr. Khan stated in a speech (in January 2010) that
Pakistan had become a nuclear power in 1984 or 1985. Moreover, in June 1998, senior
Pakistani politicians told to parliamentary committee of Canada that Pakistan had reached the
nuclear ‘threshold’ by 1984-85. Whatsoever was the case, it was the failure of President Bush
to certify in 1990 that the country did not possess any nuclear device. And due to this Pressler
Amendment was introduced to a cut-off in military and financial aid of Pakistan. When on
May 11 and May 13, 1998 India conducted nuclear tests, government Pakistan had to respond
on May 28 and May 30 with six tests in Chaghi (area in western Pakistan). According to
seismic analysis the test yields were about 10 kilotons and 5 kilotons.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine

Pakistan acquired nuclear power in order to establish a strong deterrence against India.
Initially Pakistan intended to stick with the concept of the Atom for Peace. With passage of
time and occurrence of hostile acts from Indian side Pakistan had to change its vision. It was
conventional victory of India over Pakistan when it lost its Eastern wing at the hands of India
in 1971. When India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, threat perception in Pakistan was
on peak. Keeping in view Indian nefarious designs against Pakistan, the leadership of
Pakistan resolved to get nuclear weapon in order to get reliable deterrence against India.
Infect the same vision is the basis of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine.

It is equally necessary that nuclear capability must be kept under a well devised doctrinal
concept. India announced her nuclear doctrine in August, 1999 as ‘offensive, and threatening
regional and global stability.’ Defense Committee of Cabinet, held its session under former
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in order to devise a policy regarding Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine
and strategic culture. Usually Pakistan’s policies had remained India centric mostly because
of hostile posture of the later. Pakistan’s nuclear policy has also been India centric since
1974. Bhutto described Indian nuclear tests as ‘fateful development, a threat to Pakistan’s
security’.

According to some scholars strategic doctrine of Pakistan is based upon following three
principles that includes, first is the guarantee of independence and geographical integrity
second is mutual deterrence among nuclear states and to control total war while third
principle is “offense-defense”, as these weapons made it possible for weaker states to defend
themselves effectively against aggressors and powerful countries. These perceived security
and deterrence benefits underpin Islamabad’s to stay away from the policy of no first use.
According to most authoritative sources Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is based on the following
claims:-

1. Nuclear weapons are assurance for the territorial integrity of the country as well as
national independence and sovereignty.
2. Pakistani threat perceptions (as narrated above) are only India-centric and sole aim to
having these weapons is to deter India from aggression. Such as,
a. Nuclear weapons are essential for India’s conventional superiority.
b. As conventional balance of forces between India and Pakistan, benefitted
India so nuclear use is for Balance of Power in conventional force ratios
between the two sides.
3. Deterrence strategy of Pakistan is based on threat of punishment with counter value
targets.
4. Pakistan’s strategic stance is that of minimum credible deterrence, it is minimum
because as these weapons have no other role but to deter the adversary.
5. As India has advantage in conventional army, so Pakistan cannot commit to a policy
of no first use (NFU). As this will enable India to fight conventional war with
impunity.
6. The National Command Authority (NCA), comprising the Employment Control
Committee, Development Control Committee and Strategic Plans Division, is the
center point of all decision-making regarding nuclear issue.
7. Nuclear assets are considered to be safe, secure and almost free from risks of
improper or accidental use.

These were the main attributes of the Pakistan’s undeclared nuclear doctrine. It has three
distinct policy objectives: a) deter a first nuclear use by India; b) enable Pakistan to deter
Indian conventional attack; c) allow Islamabad to “internationalize the crisis and invite
outside intervention in the unfavorable circumstance”– the external balancing factor. Some
analysts have suggested that this capability may also be used as deterrent to cover a low-
intensity war in Kashmir Pakistan principally decided to adopt the option of ‘Credible
Minimum Deterrence’. This concept had remained central to all nuclear policy and planning
of Pakistan.

Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence

Posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence has remained a principle option of Pakistan’s
nuclear policy. Many Pakistani decision makers have referred to this policy at many
occasions.This principle underlines an understood notion that Pakistan’s nuclear policy is
mainly India centric. Nuclear capability is required only to the extent that could ensure
nuclear deterrence against Indian unscrupulous posture as the country had experienced in
1971.

Pakistan has maintained only that much nuclear force that would be enough to inflict
unacceptable damage to India in case if the later intend to jeopardize the security of the
former. During the crisis situation after overt nuclearization, Pakistan had clearly signaled
India of nuclear deterrence and certainly this fact had contained India in Kargil crisis and
military confrontation of 2002. Pakistan had refrained from the term of nuclear weapons in
these confrontations instead the term of ‘unconventional weapons’ or ‘unconventional war’ is
used by the authorities.

CMD confirms Pakistan’s disinterest in any kind of nuclear arms race in the region. In
November, 1999 Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar stated while addressing in a
conference, ‘more is unnecessary while little is enough’. At the same time he made it clear
that it is required to upgrade and update nuclear technology in order to maintain meaningful
deterrence. In 2003 General Pervaiz Musharraf also stated that number did not matter
‘beyond a point.’ He further stated that Pakistan has acquired sufficient deterrence to take
care of her security.

Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons

Command and control system of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is comprised of NCA (National
Command Authority) and SPD (Strategic Plans Division) which work under the command of
NCA. Hence, a compact and coherent system was developed for the command and control of
the strategic assets. All components of the command and control system have well defined
roles and responsibilities to perform.

National Command Authority (NCA)

After nuclear explosion Pakistan had devised a well conceived and elaborated system of C3I
(Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence). This system remained informal till
1999.
In February, 2000 a formal system of command and control was established by the
Government. The purpose of NCA is development and deployment of the nuclear weapons.
This organization is comprised of highest decision makers from politics and military
leadership. This organization centrally controls all aspects of development and deployment
matters of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

Employment Control Committee (ECC)

This committee is given the task of gathering latest information on threats to the national
authority, strategic weapons program and deployment of weapons programs. It retains its
authority in both peace and war time. In the time of peace this committee makes appropriate
approvals for the development and in the time of war it has full authority to control and
deploy the tri-services strategic forces. This committee contains both military and military
leadership. This committee has eleven members. In case of requirement, professional experts
may be invited. The President of Pakistan is the chairman of this committee while prime
minister is the vice chairman and deputy chairman is the foreign minister of Pakistan. Its
members include federal ministers of defense, finance and interior, the CJCSC, three service
chiefs. DG SPD is as member secretary. This set-up is devised in order to make sure the
involvement of both political and military leadership in the process of vital decision making.

Development Control Committee (DCC)

It is a military-scientific committee. Main function of this committee is the preparation and
up-gradation of nuclear capabilities in order to keep deterrent capability in a ready and
vigorous form. This function is being performed since 1998. President of Pakistan is the
chairman of this committee and prime minister is the vice chairman while the CJCSC is the
deputy chairman of DCC. This committee has the same members as ECC. The only
difference in this committee is the affiliation of atomic bureaucracy. Head of KRL, chairman
PAEC and chairman of National
Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) are the members of this committee.
Main tasks of this committee include the formation of administrative policy about the
development of nuclear weapons, missile system, related infra structure and technologies.
Another important function of this committee is to determine the size of Pakistani deterrence.
It is also responsible for the credibility and readiness of the nuclear arsenals. The working of
this committee has great significance as far as nuclear program of Pakistan is concerned.

Strategic Plan Division (SPD)

This is a very important organization which performs multiple tasks of great significance. It
serves as secretariat of NCA. Its tasks include planning, development of weapons, arms
control, disarmament affairs, command and control, storage, safety budget etc. It covers all
dimensions of development and management of Pakistan’s nuclear capability. It performs all
tasks of great importance on the behalf of NCA. SPD is directly under the President, prime
minister and CJCSC, while DG SPD is the head of this organization. Almost seventy officers
from three services are included in SPD. They had wide range of structural and institutional
functions to perform.

Specific Functions of SPD

SPD performs multiple tasks regarding nuclear capability. The specific tasks that it performs
on the behalf of NCA are following;
1. Formulation of nuclear policy, strategy and doctrines.
2. Formulation of long and short term force development strategy. This strategy is
devised for all tri-services strategic forces. Power potential of the state and current
arms control regime is taken under consideration while formulating these policies.
Check on the proper implementation is also the responsibility of SPD.
3. Formulation of plans for the movement, deployment and employment of strategic
forces.
4. Devising measures for the long and short term safety and security of the strategic
assets.
5. To assist the president, prime minister and CJCSC in the exercise of control over
strategic organizations. It also takes-up the duty of coordinating the financial,
technical, developmental and administrative aspect of the strategic assets.
6. Coordinating and ensuring C4I2SR (Command, Control, Communication,
7. Computerization and Surveillance and Reconnaissance) system for NCA
 Personnel and Transportation Security Measures
Pakistan has devised an elaborate personnel and transportation security mechanism. This is
called PRP/HRP (The Personnel and Human Reliability Programs). These arrangements are
made to counter the threat to nuclear arsenals in meaningful ways. The scrutiny of all
personal involved in the safety, security and deployment of nuclear material is included in it.
All the personnel involved in the nuclear security arrangements have to undergo rigorous
screening program. Their backgrounds are checked, their contacts and traveling and
communication is kept under strict surveillance. Beside this there is an extensive procedure of
psychological screening as well.

Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority

PNRA was established in December, 2001. PNRA is basically responsible for the safety and
security of the peaceful aspect of Pakistan’s nuclear program. PNRA developed criteria and
checklists for the maintenance of the highest standards of security measures for nuclear
weapons. PNRA had taken great advantage and benefits from IAEA sponsored workshops
and seminars on the issues like Designed Based Threat (DBT). PNRA invited IAEA experts
to review its activities. It has also shared its reports with IAEA in order to enhance the level
of expertise in this field.

A five year plan on National Nuclear Safety is also developed by NPRA which had
undergone the necessary funding by the government. This program included the training of
personnel involved in emergency rescues in case of the release of radiation. All these
measures are taken in order to ensure a reliable security of nuclear and radioactive material in
order to avoid unauthentic use.

Pakistan - India Nuclear Postures and its Implication on South Asia

South Asian region consists of SAARC members. Pakistan and India are the paramount states
of the region. The entire politics of region revolves around these two states. After
nuclearization the responsibility of both states has enhanced in the region. Both states have
devised their nuclear doctrines. These doctrines established a reliable deterrence in the
region. There are many significant steps that are emanated out of these doctrines.

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the major challenges we face as a
global society. Given that public health is “what we, as a society, do collectively to ensure the
conditions in which people can be healthy,” controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons
—and ultimately abolishing them—must be a major global health priority. The threat posed
by the proliferation of nuclear weapons has 3 major aspects:

1. The development of the capability for producing or acquiring nuclear weapons by

countries that do not currently have nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferation).
2. The increase of weapon stockpiles by countries that currently have nuclear weapons,
the improvement of technical sophistication or reliability of these weapons, and the
development of new weapons, such as “mini-nukes” or battlefield nuclear weapons
(vertical proliferation).
 3. The acquisition of nuclear weapons or the materials and knowledge by individuals or
nonstate entities, often termed “terrorists,” to produce nuclear weapons (another form
of horizontal proliferation).

Another important component of the nuclear proliferation issue involves delivery

mechanisms. In order to pose a nuclear threat, nations or other entities not only need these
weapons but also need missiles or other methods for delivering them. Controlling
proliferation of nuclear weapons involves national governments, intergovernmental
organizations, and nongovernmental (civil-society) organizations. Governments thus far have
attempted to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons through bilateral and multilateral
treaties. Intergovernmental bodies, such as the United Nations, the International Atomic
Energy Agency, and the International Court of Justice (World Court), have also attempted to
control proliferation. Nongovernmental organizations—including professional organizations,
such as the Federation of American Scientists, the International Physicians for the Prevention
of Nuclear War (IPPNW), and Physicians for Social Responsibility (IPPNW’s US affiliate)—
have worked to control proliferation through education, information dissemination, and
advocacy aimed at governments and governmental organizations. An increasing number of
individuals and organizations, including senior US statesmen, believe that the only way to
address the danger of nuclear weapons is to eliminate them entirely.

Historical Evolution Of Nuclear Weapons

In 1939, Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard warned of developments in Nazi Germany and
urged President Franklin D. Roosevelt to begin a research program on nuclear fission for
military use.3 The Manhattan Project4 was established in 1941 to develop, produce, and test
the first “atomic bombs,” and J. Robert Oppenheimer was appointed director. 4,5 On July 16,
1945, the first “atomic bomb” was tested at Alamogordo, NM,4,6 and on August 6 and 9 of
the same year, US military aircraft dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
Japan. These bombs, based on nuclear fission, each had an explosive power equivalent to
about 20 000 tons (20 kilotons) of TNT. Together, they caused the immediate deaths of
approximately 200 000 people and the subsequent deaths of thousands more from blast and
thermal injuries, radiation sickness, and malignancies.
Despite opposition by Oppenheimer and other physicists, President Harry Truman ordered
development work on bombs based on nuclear fusion—termed “thermonuclear weapons,”
“hydrogen bombs,” or “H-bombs”—in 1951. The work was performed under the direction of
Edward Teller, who had urged the development of a fusion weapon while working on the
Manhattan Project. The first hydrogen bomb test took place in 1952 at Eniwetok Atoll in the
Marshall Islands. The blast had an explosive power equivalent to 10 400 000 tons (10.4
megatons) of TNT—500 times greater than the power of each of the bombs dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 1953, the Soviet Union, which had exploded its first fission
bomb in 1949, exploded its first fusion bomb.8 In 1961, the Soviet Union detonated a fusion
bomb with a yield equivalent to 50 megatons of TNT—over 2000 times greater than the yield
of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs and greater than the total destructive power of all the
bombs and explosives used in World War II. The development of these weapons led to the
initiation of a worldwide movement for nuclear disarmament.

After the release of information on the physical effects of thermonuclear weapons and
testimony before a Congressional committee about the effects of a possible thermonuclear
attack on the United States, a group of Boston physicians analyzed the medical consequences
of such an attack. Their papers, published in the New England Journal of Medicine, led in
1962 to the formation of Physicians for Social Responsibility in the United States and in 1980
to the establishment of IPPNW, a worldwide federation of national medical organizations.
IPPNW received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1985 in recognition of its work in easing
tensions that threatened nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Horizontal Proliferation
The United States and the Soviet Union remained the only states with nuclear weapons until
1952, when the United States provided nuclear weapons to the United Kingdom. Other
nations then began to acquire nuclear weapons: France, China, and, it is believed, Israel.
South Africa initiated, but later terminated, a nuclear weapons program. India and Pakistan
each conducted explosive tests of nuclear weapons in 1998. In 2003, The Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) unilaterally withdrew from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and expelled the international inspectors who had been
monitoring its stockpile of fissile materials. Despite attempts by a 6-nation group to get North
Korea to end its development of nuclear weapons, North Korea announced in 2006 that it had
the capability to construct nuclear weapons and apparently tested one. In the same year,
North Korea unsuccessfully tested several ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear war-
heads, and the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution demanding
that it suspend its missile program and banned all UN member states from (1) selling material
or technology for missiles or weapons of mass destruction to North Korea, and (2) receiving
missiles, banned weapons, or related technology from North Korea. North Korea immediately
rejected the Security Council’s decision. In July 2007 North Korea agreed to permanent
disabling of a nuclear reactor complex at Yongbyon.

In 2003, Iran, which is a member of the NPT, had begun to build a uranium-enrichment
facility that could have the capability to produce uranium suitable for use in nuclear weapons.
In mid-2006, a 6-nation group presented Iran with a set of proposals that called for a halt in
uranium enrichment in return for economic and diplomatic incentives and warned that if Iran
failed to respond, they would refer the case to the UN Security Council. Iran continues to
insist that its enrichment plans are purely for civilian use. Although analysts believe Iran is
still some years away from building nuclear weapons, there is concern that the United States
may stage a military attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Vertical Proliferation
Several of the nations with nuclear weapons have worked to develop new types of nuclear
weapons and to improve and maintain existing ones. The Bush administration is pursuing
development of a range of new war-heads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead program
and is implementing plans for a complete renewal of nuclear weapons complex infrastructure.
The United States has proposed development of new nuclear weapons, such as small tactical
nuclear weapons (“mini-nukes”), but Congress has blocked funding for these projects. The
United Kingdom is planning to invest £1 billion to update its Atomic Weapons Establishment
at Aldermaston and to maintain its Trident warhead stockpile. The British Parliament may be
asked to replace 1 or more of its 4 Trident submarines, each of which can carry 48-kiloton
nuclear warheads.38 Russia has also announced plans to maintain or improve its nuclear
arsenals, and Pakistan may be expanding its nuclear program.

Acquisition by Individuals or Nonstate Entities

Individuals or nonstate entities may attempt to acquire nuclear weapons or the materials and
know-how to produce them. There is considerable dispute over the use of the term terrorism,
which many believe should include actions intended to produce terror by nation-states (“state
terrorism”) as well as by nonstate entities. But we will use the terms terrorism and terrorist, as
they are commonly used, to refer only to nonstate entities. Concerns have been raised about
the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonstate entities from nation-states that
possess these weapons. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, designed to
lessen the possibility that nuclear weapons could be obtained from Russia, has been only
partially successful. In addition, there is concern about the possibility that nonstate entities
will obtain fissile materials and the technical capability for producing nuclear weapons, and
about the possibility of those entities making so-called dirty bombs—explosive or incendiary
weapons purposely contaminated with radioactive materials. Although dirty bombs are
defined as radiological rather than nuclear weapons, they could nonetheless create
widespread radioactive contamination and instill great fear in the general population.

Controlling the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Many of the physicists who worked on the Manhattan Project urged that the ready-for-use
atomic bombs be detonated as a dramatic demonstration on an uninhabited island rather than
on Japanese cities. After the bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, these physicists and
others, through the Federation of American Scientists and the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, worked to prevent proliferation and to urge the destruction of existing stockpiles.
Work to end nuclear proliferation by other civil-society organizations, including IPPNW and
its affiliates in 60 countries, has been heightened through the production of further reports on
the health and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons use.

Another concern is the possibility of the accidental firing of nuclear missiles in response to
false warnings of a nuclear attack. There have been close calls, in which nuclear missiles—
many of which are on hair-trigger alert—were being prepared for launch on the basis of
faulty reports of incoming missiles.
Nuclear Weapon States
Nuclear energy is growing around the world. About 70 new reactors are under construction
worldwide (NEI), with more than 600 others planned by mid-century. Five reactors are under
construction in the United States.

On the other hand, nuclear weapon states have declined slightly in the last twenty-five years
(see figure below). Several old players have dropped their nuclear weapons programs or
given their weapons back to Russia, including South Africa, Kazakhstan, Belarus and the
Ukraine. The latter now regrets that decision very much.

But since 1990, only two new players have succeeded in developing nuclear weapons,
Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the DPRK, formerly known as
North Korea). And only because a very clever Pakistani scientist named Abdul Qadeer Khan
who developed Pakistan’s weapons program and sold stolen nuclear secrets to Iran, the
DPRK and Libya.

While the number of countries that have commercial nuclear power has increased to 31, the
number of countries that developed nuclear weapons has not increased very much, contrary to
early fears. Presently, there are nine nuclear weapons states with about 10,000 weapons, but
there are about 430 commercial nuclear reactors in 31 countries, depending upon what finally
shakes out in Japan and Germany. Italy is the only country to completely halt its commercial
nuclear energy program, although Germany will probably be the second. But new nuclear
energy programs are emerging in many other states including countries like the United Arab
Emirates, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The only new nuclear weapons states in the
last 25 years are Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK,
formerly known as North Korea). South Africa, Kazakhstan, Belarus and the Ukraine
dropped their nuclear weapons programs when the Soviet Union dissolved, and the old Soviet
satellites gave all their nuclear weapons back to Russia. Most nuclear energy states have the
knowledge and some of the infrastructure to develop a weapons program if they decide to,
and the time required for them to do so is termed the latency period. Iran’s latency period is
about 6 months but they are not expected to pursue the final steps to a weapon.

While the number of countries that have commercial nuclear power has increased to 31, the
number of countries that developed nuclear weapons has not increased very much, contrary to
early fears. Presently, there are nine nuclear weapons states with about 10,000 weapons, but
there are about 430 commercial nuclear reactors in 31 countries, depending upon what finally
shakes out in Japan and Germany. Italy is the only country to completely halt its commercial
nuclear energy program, although Germany will probably be the second. But new nuclear
energy programs are emerging in many other states including countries like the United Arab
Emirates, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The only new nuclear weapons states in the last
25 years are Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the DPRK, formerly
known as North Korea). South Africa, Kazakhstan, Belarus and the Ukraine dropped their
nuclear weapons programs when the Soviet Union dissolved, and the old Soviet satellites
gave all their nuclear weapons back to Russia. Most nuclear energy states have the
knowledge and some of the infrastructure to develop a weapons program if they decide to,
and the time required for them to do so is termed the latency period. Iran’s latency period is
about 6 months but they are not expected to pursue the final steps to a weapon.

Iran was threatening to enter the weapons club, but they are now unlikely to complete the
final steps. Libya abandoned its weapons program under pressure from the U.S. after failing
to make real progress, and has since become a failed state. Syria tried to secretly build a
weapons reactor at al-Kibar with DPRK’s help several years ago, cleverly disguised as a 10th
century Byzantine fortress (see figure below), but the Israelis bombed it before it got started,
a fortunate move given the subsequent civil war in that country.

Presently, there are nine nuclear weapons states with about 10,000 weapons, down
dramatically from the 100,000 at the height of the Cold War:

In contrast, there are 430 commercial nuclear reactors in 31 countries, assuming 10 or so in

Japan are closed permanently and Germany permanently ends its nuclear program (see figure
above).

Participants
The Current Participating Governments (PGs) are:

ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELARUS, BELGIUM, BRAZIL, BULGARIA,

CANADA, CHINA, CROATIA, CYPRUS, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, ESTONIA,
FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND,
ITALY, JAPAN, KAZAKHSTAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA,
LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MEXICO, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY,
POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SERBIA, SLOVAKIA,
SLOVENIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY,
UKRAINE, UNITED KINGDOM, and UNITED STATES
  2015/2016 NSG Chair Country: Argentina

The European Commission and the Chair of the Zangger Committee participate as
observers.

Partial Test Ban Treaty

Opened for signature: 5 August 1963.
Entered into force: 10 October 1963.
Duration: The Treaty is of unlimited duration.
Depositories: Russia, United Kingdom, and United States.

Background
In 1954, India made the first proposal calling for an agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests.
In 1958, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom began a Conference on
the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests in Geneva, aimed at reaching agreement on an
effectively controlled test ban. The Conference did not come to fruition because the sides
could not reach an agreement on the issue of verification procedures. On 5 August 1963, the
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) — also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) —
was signed in Moscow by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

Treaty Obligations
The Treaty requires Parties to prohibit, prevent, and abstain from carrying out nuclear
weapons tests or any other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water,
or in any other environment if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside
the territorial limits of the State that conducts an explosion; to refrain from causing,
encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the
above-described environments.

Verification and Compliance

The PTBT does not provide for international verification; however, it is understood that each
party may do so by its own national technical means.

Developments
1996: With the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996,
the PTBT became redundant. However, should a PTBT party withdraw from the CTBT, or
not sign the CTBT, it would still be bound by the provisions of the PTBT.

1995: The UN General Assembly (UNGA) passed resolution 50/64 urging the conclusion of
the CTBT and urged all States not already doing so to adhere to the PTBT.

1994: The 1994 session of the UN General Assembly noted that the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) had initiated the multilateral negotiation of a universal and effectively
verifiable CTBT. It took note of the intention of the President of the Amendment Conference
to convene, after appropriate consultations, and in the light of the work carried out by the CD,
another special meeting of the States Parties to the PTBT, to review developments and assess
the situation regarding a CTBT, and to examine the feasibility of resuming the work of the
Amendment Conference.

1993: On 10 August, a special meeting of the States Parties to the PTBT was held. Broad
agreement was found for pursuing work on a CTBT in the Amendment Conference and in the
CD "in a mutually supportive and mutually complimentary manner," for holding another
special meeting early in 1994; and for promoting the universality of a CTBT by having the
President of the Amendment Conference liaise with the CD and the five nuclear weapon
States (NWS).

1991 and 1992: The Amendment Conference was held in New York from 8-18 January 1991,
but ended in deadlock. However, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas was mandated to
continue consultations. In 1991 and 1992, the UNGA called for resumption of the
negotiations as soon as possible.

1988: On 5 August, five nations asked the PTBT depository States to circulate a call for an
Amendment Conference with the aim of reaching an agreement on a CTBT.

1982: In 1982, the United States announced that it would not resume trilateral efforts, but
would pursue the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty (PNE) and discussions in the CD working group.

1977: On 3 October, the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union resumed
trilateral negotiations on a CTBT.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Condition which Pakistan demands for signing CTBT are:

 Giving up the demand that the coercive atmosphere be first removed

 Islamabad is willing to sign the CTBT before India does so

It was decided unanimously to pursue a policy of constructive engagement with the US on

the issue of the CTBT and press for

 Removal of the sanctions imposed under Pressler, Glenn and the Symington
amendments
  Removal of the G-8 sanctions
 demand equal treatment with India on nuclear-related matters

It was agreed to continue to adopt a positive attitude towards the CTBT treaty itself. This was
the continuation of a policy developed after the nuclear tests and the subsequent sanctions
that were imposed on Pakistan. However the current regime appears to be reviewing the
Nawaz Sharif policy. This includes signing the CTBT before India signs. Any decision to
rush and sign before India does will be amount to committing a strategic level blunder. After
all Islamabad's earlier decision of linking its signing of the CTBT to the Indian signing was
driven by the strategic purpose of ensuring that India will first bound down by the CTBT
thereby foreclosing to itself the option of live nuclear tests.

In considering to de-link it’s signing of the CTBT from Delhi's inking of the treaty Islamabad
runs three risks and these are:
1. First that given Delhi's commitment to develop an elaborate nuclear arsenal and its
ability to live with the impact of the sanctions that come with not signing the CTBT ,
Delhi may not sign it at all.
2. Second that once Islamabad signs, an international community which barring Japan
appears more understanding of Indian nuclear ambition, will no longer feel the
pressure to push India to sign. Thus in signing before India does Islamabad will help
India in 'getting off-the-hook.'

Those who advocate immediate signing of the CTBT obviously are also arguing for de-
linking Islamabad's signing from Delhi. They make arguments which require examination
and they are:
1. One that de-linking signing from India will make the international community
perceive us as autonomous negotiators as opposed to automatic followers of the
Indian position and compel them to negotiate with us.
2. The second argument is that if India signs first we will not get the advantages that we
may otherwise get. The list of advantages is a wish list. It includes a degree of debt
relief, some economic benefits, access to dual purpose technology, American
investment.
3. The third argument is that signing the CTBT will ease Pakistan's economic troubles
and will help to ease its international isolation. Signature on the CTBT will not
translate into a magic wand that will ease Pakistan's economic troubles. Those have to
do , as General Musharraf himself has ably articulated, with Pakistan's internal
weaknesses related to law and order, arbitration mechanisms, stable and consistent
policy, investor confidence etc. Signing the CTBT will not translate into any concrete
economic benefits.

If Pakistan signs CTBT it will be one of the favoured few under the canopy of Globalization
with no sanctions and a few billion dollars to boot for which the posterity will be cursing us
as we do our ancestors. Of course it will be a boom to the powers that be, but our sovereignty
will be at stake. If we do not sign the CTBT then what happens, our beggars bowl will not be
full to the brim and we will have to live within our own means and rely on our own strength
and resources with self-respect which has been sold for a piece of loaf and that too for the
rulers, while the masses pay the price of the loaf.
United States policies around the globe have never been stable and uniform based on
principals, it differs from country to country according to the requirements of time and place,
their policies in respect of South Asia is evident manifestation of the American interest and
that is why while they stress on Pakistan to sign the CTBT, they do not pressurize India to
that extent to sign the CTBT. American interest demands India to be their policeman in the
East and Pakistan to live under the Indian hegemony as does Bangladesh, who does consider
Indian hegemony as a scourge, yet an inevitable scourge. Can Pakistan accept this position?
The nation has to answer and not the government.

Sanctions are more a political weapon than a peaceful approach to the problems facing
the globe, when India exploded the atom bomb in 1974, the super powers approved it,
and it invited all the possible sanctions and a pressure to role back our peaceful nuclear
programme. This is how the diplomacy runs and CTBT is also a part of global
diplomacy. Let us play our diplomatic cards well on this issue, it is more a diplomatic
issue than a nuclear issue. With the American law makers not ratifying the CTBT, it was
considered that the pressure on Pakistan will subside but the professionals in the policy
making of United States still consider it imperative that Pakistan must sign CTBT. By
signing the CTBT, Pakistan would be inviting the tiger to its den and be on his mercy as is
Iraq. However, the CTBT drafted for signature in 1996 was rejected by US Senate in 1999.
In a speech the then US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, summed up the concerns of
many states adequately when she said, “If we do not accept the rules we insist that others
follow, others will not follow them either. The result will be a steady weakening of nuclear
controls." The US Senate's rejection of the CTBT brought much shame to the US which until
then was the biggest proponent of arms control and disarmament.

With the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal, the determinants and prospects of Pakistan's
signing the CTBT have become more difficult on four broad levels.

1. First, India has made it absolutely clear that it wants to retain the option of nuclear
testing. This alone leaves no room for further speculation that Pakistan's signing of
CTBT would be detrimental to its national interest. Post Indo-US nuclear deal, the
Indian stance on CTBT was reiterated quite categorically when it was stated that,
“New Delhi would not sign the CTBT even it was ratified by other countries.”
2. Second, the recent launch of Indian nuclear submarine Arihant serves as a significant
indictor of how Pakistan should respond to regional and international arms control
and disarmament arrangements. The Arihant will be armed with ballistic missiles thus
having the potential to provide India with the second strike credibility that it requires
for the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Although India has time and again stated
that its second strike capability will not be Pak-centric, Pakistan cannot be content
with mere rhetoric, it needs to look beyond semantics.
3. Third, the Indian Cold Start doctrine has a negative impact on strategic stability in
South Asia because it aims to sabotage the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence
under the cover of a conventional doctrine.
4. Fourth, coupled with an offensive conventional military doctrine, Indian ambitions for
the acquisition of a missile defense shield push Pakistan towards a recurring security
dilemma. Thus it is useful and meaningful for Pakistan to maintain a pragmatic Indo-
centric position on CTBT instead of just trying to be the good guy.
Though the Obama administration has made its intention of pushing the CTBT very clear,
pressure is expected to mount only after the US Congress ratifies the treaty. . And this is not
going to be easy as President Barack Obama does not yet have the required numbers in the
US Senate to push through the CTBT. Then there is also the Pakistan factor. Islamabad is
using the Indo-US nuclear deal in discussions to target India’s existing stockpiles. In a
position that is entirely India-centric, Pakistan at the recent disarmament conference argued
that recent nuclear deal has led to an imbalance in the region and that the FMCT should look
at existing stockpiles. India has said that the FMCT should deal with only future production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons but Pakistan has continued to argue in favour of curbs
on existing material.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

In December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution
recommending the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, which became known as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT).

Background to the FMCT

Since the signing of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a significant issue for the
disarmament and arms control community has been the continued production of fissile
materials - the fuel for nuclear weapons. Many states have long been calling for a ban on the
production of fissile materials, and the issue has been on the proposed agenda of the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) for years.

Negotiations on FMCT
In 2008, for the ninth year in a row, the CD was unable to agree on a programme of work and
was thus unable to establish a committee to begin negotiations on an FMCT.
 Early on, the issue of existing stocks blocked consensus on the negotiation of an
FMCT. Some states, such as those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, believe
that a cut-off level should include fissile materials already produced and stockpiled,
requiring the nuclear weapon states to irreversibly downblend existing stocks of
weapons-grade fissile materials so that they can never be used for nuclear weapons
again.
 Other states, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, favour a future-
production cut-off.
 Some states also think an FMCT should include management of fissile material, not
only a ban on production.
 Many states also argue that since one of the most common objectives of an FMCT is
to prevent terrorists from having access to fissile material, a strong verification
mechanism that includes present and past production will plug such leakage.

Scope of FMCT
Another contentious element to an FMCT is its scope. While a treaty would ban the
production of most fissionable materials, it would not include tritium, an element used to
amplify the explosive power of a nuclear weapon. Tritium is a radioactive isotope of
hydrogen that has a half-life of 12 years. Were it to be included in an FMCT, the decaying
tritium in existing stocks could not be replaced, in effect limiting the weapon's destructive
power. Other materials, such as depleted uranium, neptunium, natural uranium, plutonium
240 and 242, americium, curium and californium, though not fissile, are used in weapons
programs.

Shannon Mandate
On 25 January 1994, the CD appointed a Special Coordinator, Ambassador Gerald Shannon
of Canada, to seek the views of member states on the most appropriate arrangement to
negotiate the type of FMCT requested by the UN General Assembly. In March 1995, the
resulting “Shannon Mandate” proposed that an ad hoc committee, charged to pursue the
negotiations, would settle the issue of existing stocks and other issues. The committee did not
get off the ground, but many states refer to the Shannon Mandate as the basis for future
negotiations. All of states parties to the NPT endorsed the immediate commencement and
early conclusion of FMCT negotiations at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, and
the negotiation of an FMCT was agreed as one of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament
at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In 2003, Japan, a leader in the campaign for an FMCT,
held informal discussions both at home as well as in Geneva, and produced a draft text of a
potential Treaty.

Stance of various countries

China and Russia stance

For years, China and Russia insisted that starting work on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space be linked to starting work on an FMCT in the CD. In August 2003, China and
Russia broke from this position, and agreed to go forth with FMCT negotiations based on the
Shannon Mandate.
United States Stance
The United States did not announce its position on an FMCT until July 2004, when
Ambassador Sanders declared that while the US supported negotiations on an FMCT, they
did not believe that such a treaty would be verifiable. This change in US policy appears more
politically driven than scientifically sound. The US also tabled a draft treaty on 18 May 2006,
which many delegations argue is far removed from the original concept of a non-
discriminatory, verifiable treaty.
Pakistan Stance
Pakistan in particular has argued this, pointing out that if an FMCT does not include existing
stocks or verification, it will freeze or accentuate asymmetries between the nuclear weapons
possessors—especially between Pakistan and India—and thus undermine regional “strategic
balance” and international security. The US-India deal, which would allow India to import
nuclear fuel from the US for its energy reactors, freeing up its own indigenously-produced
materials for military purposes, further exacerbates Pakistan’s concerns about an FMCT.

Activities of Conference on Disarmament (CD)

The concept of a cut-off of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons has been
discussed for a long time, and the agreement on a mandate (known as the Shannon Mandate)
to begin negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) broke down in 1995. Since
then, there has been very little formal progress. There are two draft treaty texts which have
been presented as documents of the Conference on Disarmament - one, a draft treaty
presented by the United States on 18 May 2006 and the other is a model treaty text presented
by Greenpeace International . At the end of its 2007 session, the CD was near agreement on
a package deal, L.1, which would have enabled it to begin negotiations on an FMCT in 2008.
Many delegations expressed support for the package deal, including those of Canada, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, and Australia. The Netherlands and the European Union called for
commencement of negotiations without preconditions. Although the United States prefers to
proceed with the FMCT without discussion of any other of the CD’s priority issues, the US
delegation explained a conscious decision had been made this year to not block consensus on
the P6 proposal.

Critical issues of FMCT

An FMCT will require many technical issues to be resolved, from actually defining fissile
material to ensuring that the treaty is effective by developing specific procedures for
verification. There are a number of different approaches to these issues ranging from a simple
approach to a more comprehensive one.

Key players for FMCT

Whatever the scope of the eventual FMCT, most of the non-nuclear weapons states that are
parties to comprehensive safeguard agreements associated with the NPT will already satisfy
the requirements of an eventual FMCT. These states have undertaken not to produce or
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to accept International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear material to verify this.
1. The states that will be most affected by such a treaty are the nuclear weapons states:
the United States, Russian Federation, China, France, and the United Kingdom
2. The nuclear weapons possessing states that are not parties to the NPT: India, Pakistan,
and Israel.
3. Other states that also will be affected by such a treaty are the states that produce the
greatest amount of fissile material for non-military purposes, like Canada, Australia,
and Japan.
4. The 35 member states of the Zangger Committee (also known as the "NPT Exporters
Committee") also have a special interest in how the FMCT will look like, since a
comprehensive FMCT has the possibility of universalizing export control.
5. These states have different positions on the critical issues that have prevented
negotiations from starting. These critical issues include: definitions, existing stocks
and verification.

Definition of Fissile material

How fissile material is defined is important as it has direct implications on the scope of the
treaty. But it is not only fissile material that has to be defined - production, civilian use, and
military use need clarification.
1. Fissile material: Material that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction - notably
highly enriched uranium or plutonium of almost any isotopic composition.
2. Fissionable material: A heavy isotope with an atomic nucleus that can undergo fission
when struck by a neutron. Uranium-238 is a fissionable isotope, in that it can be
 fissioned by high-energy neutrons. Unlike uranium-235, which is fissile as well as
fissionable, [uranium-238] cannot sustain a fission chain reaction.
Some argue that a treaty should only include those materials most likely to be used in
nuclear weapons; others have argued that it should focus on wider range of weapons-grade
materials. "Weapon-grade" or "weapon-usable" are two different definitions often used by
states.

Existing Stocks
Differences on the question about existing stocks were one of the main reasons that
negotiations were blocked in 1995. There are still great differences between positions on this
matter.
1. The United States and the Russian Federation have the largest stockpiles, and most
other states are waiting for these two to take the lead. The nuclear weapons states
have either stated or indicated that existing stocks will not be an issue of the treaty.
The United States made this clear in their draft treaty "the term produce fissile
material does not include activities involving fissile material produced prior to entry
into force of the Treaty." Russia also stated "the scope of the treaty should not cover
existing stocks."
2. China has said, "Future FMCT negotiations should not involve the issue of
stockpiles" and the general position of France is to ban just the production of fissile
material for use as nuclear weapons. The point of the treaty is, according to those
states, to quantitatively freeze the maximum level of nuclear material around the
world.
3. On the other side, Pakistan is strongly urging this treaty to include existing stocks. Its
delegation argues that it is necessary to include past production of fissile materials,
otherwise the inequalities of power in the world will simply be further enhanced.

There is enough existing fissile material in the world to create new and more sophisticated
nuclear weapons. Many other western countries and some developed countries share this
view. Some of these states choose not to call it Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty since this
would imply only a halt in production, a cut off. Instead they use FMT, a Fissile Material
Treaty. Countries that use this term include Pakistan, South Africa, and Brazil. A FMCT
without existing stocks is seen by some as useless and weak.

Nuclear Weapon Developments: Case Study Of India And Pakistan

Between 1940s-1959
INDIA
 1948 – AEC created, Homi Bhabha
strongly supports creating a self-
sufficient nuclear infrastructure
 Building the nuclear infrastructure
and creating a large pool of trained
personnel
 China’s development of nuclear
weapons is acknowledged in internal
discussions
PAKISTAN
 1956 – Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC) created
 Late 1950s – Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
Minister for Fuel and Natural
Resources, advocates the
development of nuclear weapons
  Political establishment against nuclear
weapons
1960s
INDIA
 1960s – increased nuclear assistance
from foreign countries
 1962 - Disastrous border war with
China shifts opinion gradually in
favor of nuclear weapons
 1964 – China’s nuclear test further
strengthens the pro-bomb lobby.
 1965 – SNEPP initiated, Indo-Pak
war (China’s support for Pakistan &
U.S. refusal to supply arms)
 1966 – SNEPP halted
 Late 1967 – new effort to develop
nuclear explosives initiated
 1968-70 – India opposes the NPT
1970s
INDIA
 1971 – Indo-Pak war
 1972 – Approval given for fabricating
a nuclear explosive
 1974 – India tests a nuclear explosive,
dubbed as a PNE. Exact yield is still
unclear (between 4 – 12 kilotons)
 Post 1974 – further development of
nuclear weapons is slowed down
(halted??)
1980s
PAKISTAN
 Pakistan acquires and begins
operating Pakistan Atomic Research
Reactor (PARR)
 Mid-1960s – Bhutto’s request for
building nuclear weapons is rejected
by Gen. Ayub Khan
 1964-65 – Pakistan takes notice of
India’s reaction to China’s nuclear
test
 1965 – Indo-Pak war (U.S. refusal to
supply arms)
 Late 1960s - Bhutto writes Myth of
Independence in which he advocates
the development of nuclear weapons.
PAKISTAN
 1971 – Indo-Pak war
 January 1972 – Bhutto convenes a
meeting of scientists and announces
the decision to develop nuclear
weapons
 1973-77 – Pakistan tries to acquire
reprocessing plants from France, but
U.S. intervenes
 1974 – A.Q. Khan, working in the
Netherlands, offers his assistance
 1975 – Pakistan starts acquiring
equipment for uranium enrichment
and other components of the nuclear
fuel cycle
 Pakistan shifts from a plutonium
based nuclear arsenal to HEU based
arsenal
INDIA
 Early to mid 1980s – nuclear
weapons development proceeds in fits
and starts. 1974 design is improved
 1982 – Additional nuclear tests
planned but cancelled
 1983 – India sanctions the Integrated
Guided Missile Development
Program (IGMDP)
 1986-87 – Operation Brasstacks, first
nuclear crisis
1990s
INDIA
 1990 – crisis over Kashmir (second
nuclear crisis)
 1995 – NPT extended indefinitely
 1995 – India prepares for nuclear
test(s) but cancels after U.S. discovers
test(s) preparations
 1996 – CTBT opens for signature
 May 1998 – India conducts 5 nuclear
tests
2000 onwards
INDIA
 Formulates a nuclear doctrine –
adopts a no-first use posture and a
triad based on a minimum and
survivable deterrent force
 Constitutes a tri-service Strategic
Rocket Command to manage land-
based nuclear missiles
 Creates a Nuclear Command
Authority (NCA) to manage nuclear
forces
 1999 – Kargil conflict
 2002 – Increased tensions
PAKISTAN
 Pakistan steadily makes progress in
its nuclear weapons program
(enrichment facility operational, cold
tests conducted, nuclear test-site built)
 U.S. ignores Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program due to the Afghan
war
 1987 – Op. Brasstacks, A.Q. Khan
delivers an implicit nuclear threat to
an Indian journalist. Officially, a
Pakistani minister delivers a similar
nuclear threat
 Late 1980s – Pakistan begins
development of ballistic missiles
PAKISTAN
 1990 – crisis over Kashmir (second
nuclear crisis)
 Pakistan acquires ballistic missile
technology from North Korea
 April 1998 – Pakistan tests the Ghauri
ballistic missile
 May 1998 – Pakistan conducts 6
nuclear tests
PAKISTAN
 Creates a National Command
Authority to manage nuclear forces
 Formulates a nuclear doctrine, rejects
no-first use of nuclear weapons.
Official doctrine not released
 1999 – Kargil conflict
 2002 – Increased tensions
 Challenges of Non-Proliferation
All major powers have a responsibility to take the challenge of preventing nuclear
proliferation seriously. A common approach may be possible because what used to be called
the “great powers” have nothing to gain by military conflict with each other. And they are all
dependent on the global economic system. Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has
enjoyed considerable success, today it is facing serious threats. Recent and continuing
violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), particularly by the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran, as well as the lack of substantive outcome
from the 2005 NPT Review Conference, have led some critics to question whether the NPT
may be reaching the end of its useful life. These concerns have been heightened by the
DPRK’s conduct of a nuclear test and Iran’s defiance of the Security Council over its nuclear
activities.

Other factors prompting this perception include:

1. The frequent charges that the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) have not lived up to their
disarmament obligations
2. A major technology challenge – the emergence of a black market in centrifuge
enrichment technology and know-how, and even the sale of nuclear weapon designs
3. closely linked to the previous point – concerns about the ability of International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to detect undeclared nuclear activities,
especially centrifuge enrichment plants
4. Many are concerned about the impact on the NPT of a possible “India exception”, the
proposed exception for India from the full scope safeguards standard for nuclear
supply.

In addition, there is a broader technology challenge lead to a much wider spread of

proliferation-sensitive nuclear technology, i.e. enrichment and reprocessing? The assertions
of Iran and others that the NPT guarantees all Parties the right to develop the complete fuel
cycle pose a direct challenge to the non-proliferation regime. Further, in a largely expanded
nuclear industry, plutonium recycle will be necessary for efficient use of uranium and the
most effective management of high level waste. Can the wider use of plutonium be
compatible (friendly) with non-proliferation objectives? Today, the most important single
issue facing the non-proliferation regime is how to deal with determined proliferators.

Despite the gloomy outlook, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths, many of
which can be developed further. The most important strength is the fact that an effective
nonproliferation regime is in the interest of every state. Although it is clear that all states have
a strong interest in the non-proliferation regime, however, it is equally clear – e.g. from the
2005 NPT Review Conference and from the number of states uncritically supporting Iran’s
alleged “right” to develop proliferated technology – that not all national representatives
appreciate this. One of the great foreign policy challenges is to refocus the minds of political
leaders on the national security benefits of the NPT and the common interest in increasing the
Treaty’s effectiveness.

Is NPT effective?
In considering the present state of the non-proliferation regime and its future prospects, it is
necessary to recall the context in which the NPT was developed. In the 1960s it was thought
the proliferation of nuclear weapons was inevitable, and it was predicted there would be some
25 to 30 nuclear-armed states by the 1990s. Since the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, the
Treaty has helped to establish conditions under which proliferation, while not stopped, has
been substantially slowed. Today, in addition to the five nuclear-armed states that existed
then – the US, Russia, the UK, France and China – there are only four states that have or are
believed to have nuclear weapons: the three non-NPT parties – India, Israel and Pakistan –
and the DPRK.

There have been five cases of non-compliance with NPT safeguards reported by the IAEA
Board of Governors to the Security Council:

 Iraq (1991)
 Romania (1992)
 DPRK (1993 and again in 2003)
 Libya (2004)
 Iran (2006)

On the other side of the ledger, major successes include:

 South Africa’s decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons and join the NPT
 Argentina and Brazil joining the NPT
 the three newly independent states that had nuclear weapons on their territories at the
dissolution of the Soviet Union – Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine deciding to join
the NPT
 Libya has also become a major success.

The NPT’s success in slowing proliferation can be attributed to a combination of factors

1. the political commitment by most states to the objective of non-proliferation – most

states recognize they cannot afford the monetary and political costs of a nuclear
weapon program, and that, far from enhancing their security, possession of nuclear
weapons would only increase the risks to their national security
2. the role of IAEA safeguards as an objective technical mechanism for verifying that
non-proliferation commitments are being observed
3. The limited availability of weapons-grade fissile materials – these are not normally
found in civil nuclear programs – and restrictions on the availability of the
technologies needed to produce these materials (i.e. uranium enrichment and
reprocessing).

Many developing countries seem to regard proliferation as an issue more relevant to the
security of the developed “North” – which therefore can be useful to the less-developed
“South” as a negotiating point. In any event, the consequences of the wider spread of nuclear
weapons will be just as serious, if not more so, for the countries of the “South” as for the
“North” – not least through the negative effects that increasing security uncertainties will
have on global trade and economic development.

Disarmament And NPT Bargain

The common description of the NPT is that it is a “two-way bargain” between the nuclear
weapon states (NWS) who commit to nuclear disarmament and the non-nuclear-weapon
states (NNWS) who undertake not to seek nuclear weapons. Regarding nuclear disarmament,
critics of the NWS overlook two points.

1. First, in fact the major NWS – the US and Russia – have substantially reduced the
numbers of deployed strategic warheads from the 1991 level of 10,000 each, and
are proceeding to levels of between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. There is more to be
done, but it is not constructive to ignore that considerable progress has already
been made.
2. Second, the disarmament commitment in the NPT (Article VI) places nuclear
disarmament into the context of a commitment by all NPT Parties to work towards
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control.

The Program to Strengthen Safeguards

The traditional NPT safeguards system was primarily focused on verifying declared nuclear
materials and activities. It was assumed that development of fuel cycle capabilities
independent of declared facilities would be beyond the resources of most states, and in any
event would be readily detectable, and therefore if proliferation did occurred it was likely to
involve diversion of nuclear material from declared facilities. The discoveries made about
Iraq’s clandestine enrichment program demonstrated that these assumptions were no longer
valid.

In the Iranian case, concern about the consequences of a non-compliance finding – e.g.
whether Iran would cease all cooperation with IAEA safeguards inspectors, or even withdraw
from the NPT, and whether in any event the Security Council could agree on a response – led
to what amounted to plea-bargaining within the IAEA Board. There could be no doubt of
Iran’s non-compliance – Iran had committed a number of serious safeguards breaches over
some 20 years – but the non-compliance finding was delayed while efforts were made to
negotiate a satisfactory outcome with Iran.

Reducing The Availability Of SNT (Senstive Nuclear Technology)

Addressing the supply of SNT, in February 2004 President Bush proposed that the NSG
should refuse transfers of SNT to any state not already possessing full-scale enrichment or
reprocessing facilities. This proposal has not been taken up by the NSG. Successive G-8
Summits have agreed that SNT would not be supplied to states that may seek to use them for
weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorist hands. The G-8 agreed that the export
of such items should occur only pursuant to criteria consistent with global non-proliferation
norms and to those states rigorously committed to these norms. These criteria are to be
developed in the NSG. The NSG has been discussing possible criteria for supply of SNT but
has not yet reached agreement. Details are not publicly available, but possible criteria might
include:

1. The state’s non-proliferation and safeguards record, including whether it has an

additional protocol in place
2. Whether there is a clear rationale for the proposed project in terms of energy
requirements and economics
3. Whether the project will be wholly national or involves others, e.g. through
multination/regional arrangements
4. Whether the project has any implications for international/regional security and
stability.

Upholding Non-Proliferation – Acting To Encourage Compliance

As mentioned in the introduction, the greatest challenge to the non-proliferation regime is the
issue of how to deal with a determined proliferators. This issue is being put to the test with
Iran. Iran is defying Security Council resolutions8 and proceeding with nuclear programs
which at the least will give it a nuclear weapon capability. In addition to the uranium
enrichment program, which has received extensive international attention, Iran is also
constructing a large heavy water reactor, ideally suited as a plutonium production reactor.
Although Iran claims its nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful, the facts suggest
otherwise. These include:

1. Iran’s secrecy and long history of safeguards violations – Iran pursued undeclared
nuclear activities for 20 years, and engaged in denial and deception towards the IAEA
2. Lack of any convincing peaceful rationale for its nuclear programs – Russia has
offered a lifetime guarantee of fuel for Bushehr and future reactors, and EU countries
have made a similar offer. Iran’s lack of full cooperation with the IAEA, including
“suspension” of its additional protocol and parts of the subsidiary arrangements under
its safeguards agreement – the IAEA is still not able to say that Iran has declared all
of its nuclear activities
3. activities with possible weapons application, e.g. production of polonium-210 (used in
nuclear weapon triggers) and possession of documents on producing uranium metal
hemispheres
4. Iran’s determination to continue with its programs in defiance of the Security Council
and international concerns
5. Finally, statements by Iran’s President about the annihilation of Israel are hardly
reassuring.

How the Iranian case is resolved will have a major impact on the future of the
nonproliferation regime. If Iran succeeds in developing a break-out capability, or worse still
nuclear weapons, the regime will be under considerable strain. A two-stage approach is
needed: to persuade Iran that compliance is in its best interest, and to also reassure other
states that, whatever the outcome with Iran, their best interest is in staying within the regime.

The DPRK case illustrates the political complexities of dealing with proliferation cases. Not
only is it difficult to dissuade a state once it has decided on a nuclear weapons program, it is
also difficult to achieve unanimity of purpose within the international community It was a
serious concern in the DPRK case that the Security Council was unable to reach agreement
on how to deal with the case. This impasse led eventually led to the Six Party Talks, which
now appear to have reached the basis of a solution – but this has been a lengthy process and
the eventual outcome remains uncertain.

In addition to incentives, persuasion also requires sanctions. The Security Council has been
able to agree on a progressive approach, starting with sanctions under Resolution 1737 that
were focused on the nuclear and ballistic missile programs, but with the prospect of more
broadly-based sanctions if necessary. Under UNSCR 1747 sanctions were extended to
shipments of arms from Iranian territory and to defined arms sales to Iran. In addition, a
wider range of financial sanctions were imposed.

There is a considerable sense of pessimism felt by many that if a state is sufficiently

determined and is unconcerned about international isolation, there is little the international
community can do to prevent proliferation. This is especially the case with Iran which is
major oil and gas producer, where a number of states are reluctant to impose sanctions that
will restrict their access to these products. There is no doubt this situation is a major
challenge for diplomacy.

Ultimately, it is necessary to identify Iran’s real interests and motivations, and to try to
address these effectively. If Iran is genuinely concerned about its security, it has to be
persuaded that its security interests are best served by building relationships and alliances, not
by isolation and confrontation. Pursuing nuclear weapons is counter-productive; by becoming
a nuclear threat to others Iran will only increase the dangers to itself. If Iran’s motivation is
“prestige”, it has to be persuaded that power and influence are best based on economic
strength. Iran has to choose between two futures – currently it is on the path to becoming a
pariah state, isolated and, despite its petroleum resources, impoverished, with increasing
unemployment and lack of opportunity for its people. Alternatively, through normalizing its
relations with the world, it could become the economic powerhouse of the Middle East.
Faced with similar choices, the Libyan leadership showed true wisdom. The Iranian
leadership should reflect on this example.

Nuclear Civil Deal Regime

The post 9/11 international strategic dynamics reveal that India and the US have closed the
chapter of their traditional stances towards each other. The convergence of mutual interests in
international politics has led both the US and India to forge a strategic partnership. They are
transformed with the ever-changing strategic environment of international politics. Thus,
where policies clash with the interests of the state, interests win and policies have to be
modified. This phenomenal underpinning has produced convergence of Indo-US interests in
the 21st century. The momentous, historic and defining moments entered into the Indo-US
bilateral relations when US President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh announced to forge a civilian nuclear deal on July 18, 2005.
 INDO-US Nuclear Deal

If we carefully look into the pages of history, it becomes evident that their relationship keeps
fluctuating most of the time. However, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the fears of nuclear
China opened up the doors of US assistance to Indian nuclear programme and brought with it
assistance in:

1. Training
2. Materials
3. Technical know-how such as plutonium reprocessing facility
4. Manufacture of a limited number of plutonium fuel elements for the
Tarapur/Rajasthan nuclear reactors during their initial phase of operation.

The major collaboration between the two countries came through an agreement for nuclear
cooperation in 1963 under the ‘flawed’ US policy of “atom for peace”. According to this
pact, the US provided nuclear fuel for two US-supplied light-water reactors at the Tarapur
power station. Canada provided CIRUS reactor to India for peaceful purposes but stopped
supply of heavy water after India conducted its so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)
in 1974. Interestingly, the US started supplying heavy water to keep the CIRUS operational.
After an extensive bilateral negotiations, Indian apprehensions were eliminated and the text
of ‘123 Agreement’ was released by the US Department of State on August 3, 2007. The deal
encompasses an enhanced ‘cooperation between the governments of United States of
America and India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy’. The US administration
developed the hypothesis that the emerging Indo-US strategic relations would be based on the
assumption that it can be de-hyphenated from other regional players such as Pakistan and the
impact of US relations with one state does not necessarily affect the other. This hypothesis
needed to be analyzed in the perspective of Pakistan’s security perceptions and its likely
impacts on the deterrence stability in the region.

The following questions are considered important in the context of Indo-US ‘123
Agreement’:

1. Whether the increased Indo-US defense and strategic interactions would destabilize
deterrence in South Asia?
2. How the ‘123 Agreement’, if implemented successfully, would enable India improve
its nuclear arsenals’ quality and increase their quantity?
3. Would India be able to augment its fissile materials; if yes, then whether this would
pose strategic challenges to Pakistan resulting in nuclear arms race and possible
deployment of nuclear weapons in the region?
4. Is India aspiring for a regional and global power status and whether the advanced
nuclear technology will negate its stance of credible minimum deterrence’ or not?
5. Whether India would initiate limited war and launch preemptive/preventive strikes
against Pakistan?

Effects of INDO-US Nuclear Deal

The south Asian strategic dimensions show that India proclaims to be a regional power and is
aspiring to become a major global player too. It is evident from the US policies in South Asia
that it supports promoting India’s stature at regional and global level. The US objective of
making India global or regional military power impinges upon security interests of other
regional countries, especially Pakistan. The Indo-US nuclear deal poses grave repercussions
on the deterrence stability in South Asia. The subsequent analysis explores that how
deterrence stability could be affected if the Indo- US ‘123 Agreement’ is successfully
implemented.

Quantitative Improvement in Indian Nuclear Arsenal

Successful implementation of the Indo-US ‘123 Agreement’ would greatly enhance the
Indian capability of developing more nuclear warheads, as it provides assurances on
uninterrupted nuclear fuel supply. Well-known Indian strategic analyst Raja Mohan points
out that “after its bitter experience with the Tarapur nuclear power station, when Washington
cut off fuel supplies after the 1974 test, New Delhi has insisted on getting iron-clad
guarantees on fuel supplies. It has successfully got them written into the 123 Agreement.”
There is no doubt that the ‘123 Agreement’ envisages the assurances of nuclear fuel from the
US and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). However, proponents of the nuclear deal argue that
it would only be used for civilian purposes.

Although assurances of uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel have been made in the ‘123
Agreement’ for civilian uses, it has indirect ramifications on deterrence stability in South
Asia. Although, India has agreed to designate 14 nuclear reactors as civilian that would come
under IAEA safeguards, this would make India eligible to purchase nuclear fuel for the 14
reactors from the US and the NSG. This would free up its indigenous nuclear fuel (uranium)
for its nuclear weapons programme and other military uses and would allow a significant and
rapid expansion in India’s nuclear arsenal. India would be able to reprocess the spent fuel
from the imported nuclear reactors and would convert it into fuel for its fast breeder reactors,
which would not come under the IAEA safeguards. So the nuclear deal would indirectly
supply fuel for the existing eight and the number of planned fast breeder reactors.

Qualitative Improvement in Indian Nuclear Arsenal

The Indo-US agreement will improve India’s nuclear arsenal qualitatively as well. Though
the US would provide nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the IAEA safeguards,
the integrity of India’s nuclear programme for military purposes would not be affected.
Furthermore, the ‘123 Agreement’ does not have any provision according to which India will
give up its right to nuclear testing. Similarly, India has not agreed to sign the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all nuclear testing. This agreement is unfair and
discriminatory in the sense that it has bestowed India with all the benefits of a nuclear
weapons state without imposition of any restraining obligations. It is evident from the Indian
nuclear track record that they got nuclear technology under the guise of civilian use and then
diverted it for military purposes.

The same engineers and scientists made India nuclear powers who were supposed to work for
civilian purposes in the Canadian-supplied nuclear power reactor, CIRUS. Vertical nuclear
proliferation occurs when a country diverts knowledge and/or items from its safeguarded
programmes for its military purposes, so India is responsible of vertical nuclear proliferation.
But the IAEA safeguards would not be able to stop the flow of valuable scientific, technical
information and expertise from civilian nuclear facilities to military facilities. Keeping in
view Indian nuclear track record, India may shift trained personnel from civilian nuclear
facilities to military facilities which would result in the production of more qualitative and
sophisticated nuclear warheads and delivery systems. The above scenario would alarm the
bells of insecurity for other regional countries especially for Pakistan. Thus, the qualitative
improvement of India’s nuclear arsenal would affect the fragile deterrence stability in South
Asia.

Indian Policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence

Many strategic thinkers have tried to explain minimum deterrence. One of the definitions can
be “an attempt to prevent enemy attack through reliance on a small nuclear retaliatory force
capable of destroying a limited number of key targets.”It means a small force of survivable
nuclear weapons would deter an adversary from initiating military action that would threaten
a nation’s vital interests. India’s draft nuclear doctrine, announced on August 17, 1999 by its
National Security Advisory Board constituted by the BJP government, proclaims that the
development and maintenance of credible minimum deterrence is based upon a strategic triad
of nuclear forces (land-, air- and sea-based), second strike capability, and punitive retaliation
with nuclear weapons if deterrence were to fail. It is understood that only those states follow
the policy of ‘minimum deterrence’ that do not possess adequate resources to compete with
their adversary in nuclear arms race quantitatively. Such states restrain from building nuclear
weapons at massive scale. However, they continuously strive for making qualitative
improvement in their nuclear arsenal with a view to make the minimum deterrence credible.

India is responsible for nuclearisation in South Asia because it is obsessed with its yearning
for a great power status. It is axiomatic that if Indo-US nuclear agreement is implemented
with all the provisions envisaged in ‘123 Agreement’, India would certainly go for
developing more and technologically improved nuclear warheads.

Prospects of Pre-emption by India

A pre-emptive attack is a first strike designed to destroy or neutralize strategic assets of the
adversary. Nuclear states with adverse and hostile relations can look for the option of
preemption aiming at eliminating the strategic capability of the opponent. In the South Asian
strategic environment both India and Pakistan perceive threat from each other one way or the
other. Because conventional asymmetries, short early warning time, geographical proximity,
mistrust, misperceptions and Indian concepts of ‘limited war’ and ‘cold start’ make
deterrence stability fragile between India and Pakistan.

Delicate deterrence stability further deteriorates by the new version for the operationalisation
of India’s nuclear doctrine, which was announced on January 4, 2003 by the Indian Cabinet
Committee on Security. The operationalisation nuclear doctrine renders the ‘no-first-use’
declaration invalid by stating: “However, in the event of a major attack against India, or
Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of
retaliating with nuclear weapons.”

Although, in the current South Asian strategic environment, the chances of preemptive or
decapitating strike are very low; however, in the event of crisis, which may escalate into a
major conventional war, the prospect of preemption increases. This kind of dangerous
development would lead towards nuclear exchange which would be catastrophic for the
whole region. Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth means many of its airfields and strategic
assets are close to India. There are far fewer Pakistani aircraft and units able to perform the
nuclear delivery role as compared to India. However, Pakistan has offset this disadvantage by
vigorously pursuing ballistic missiles

On the other hand, India has all of the advantages of strategic depth. This allows India to
disperse strategic forces widely among numerous sites, installations and airfields. India may
still rely on aircraft for nuclear delivery, but this may be a workable solution for a secure
second strike capability due to India’s comparatively large number of aircraft and units
capable of performing nuclear deliveries. It is axiomatic that if Indo-US nuclear agreement
implements with all its provisions, India would certainly go for developing more and
technologically improved nuclear warheads. Kashmir is considered a ‘nuclear flashpoint’ and
India claims to get back Azad Kashmir from Pakistan. In foreseeable future India might think
that the cost of preemptive strike is low than potential benefits. India might perceive that it
has achieved sufficient strategic potential to destroy all of Pakistan’s strategic assets. This
kind of perception would encourage India launch a first or preemptive strike against Pakistan.

Ballistic Missile Defenses

India has been trying to develop and procure BMDs for the last many years. Since July 1983,
the Indian scientists have been engaged in fusing the foreign and domestic research and
components for the development of the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). India’s other
preference for augmenting its TMD potential is to buy these missiles from the friendly states.
Russia and Israel have signed agreements with India, under which it has been receiving TMD
components and technology from these states. The Indo-US new strategic partnership is
Supportive of such development. India is enthusiastically pursuing the acquisition of BMDs
under a three-pronged strategy, aimed at:

 Neutralizing the deterrence value of Pakistan’s missile arsenal and engaging it in a

costly missile race, which will have deeper political and economic implications
 To ensure a credible second strike capability
 To secure international political clout on the basis of missile strength

Balance Of Power and Prospects Of Nuclear Arms Race In South Asia

The fundamental difference between the nuclear and conventional postures of India and
Pakistan is that former seeks great-power status and regional hegemony while the latter’s
concern is security. In conventional weaponry India is far ahead of Pakistan and is constantly
engaged in improving it massively to promote its agenda of becoming great power Pakistan
and India have land- and air-based strategic capability but lack in sea-based capability, which
assured the most effective form of credible second strike capability. However, India is
endeavoring its utmost to develop sea-based submarine nuclear capability and is allocating
massive funds for modernizing its naval forces.

India is also vigorously adopting new ways to equip its air force with the latest strategic
bombers. The US has already offered it to purchase F-16s and F-18s and if India acquires
them, it would certainly enhance strike capability. So the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal would
prompt Pakistan to counter the Indian threat by adopting such policies which would boast and
ensure its second strike capability. It would be likely that Indo-US civilian nuclear deal
would trigger an arms race in the region, which would directly threaten the deterrence
stability in South Asia. Many strategic analysts believe that the US agenda to help India in
becoming global power is aimed at countering the rise of China. China’s role in the South
Asian strategic environment is very important as some of the Indian security analysts seem
obsessed with the Chinese military threat in an effort to project India as an equivalent or a
potential military adversary to China. The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement would compel
China to counter India. In this way, China and India would indulge in a nuclear arms race,
which would invariably affect Pakistan, triggering a triangular nuclear arms race syndrome in
the region. Initially Pakistan adopted a cautious approach towards the Indo-US nuclear deal
and seemed not to be worried. However, subsequent events revealed that the US looks
determined to expand India’s stature at regional and global level.

China And Its Views

The first major Chinese comment on the Indo-US nuclear deal of 18 July 2005 appeared in
the People’s Daily in late October. The piece, “Who’s pushing nuclear proliferation”, was
critical of the US for ‘making an exception’ for India that would “bring about a series of
negative impacts,” particularly on the Iranian and North Korean issues. On the contrary, the
major thrust of the Chinese criticism is unambiguously American-centric. Such an act of the
United States once again proves that America is not at all a ‘guard’ of NPT and the treaty
however, is no more than a disguise serving the US interest. Overall, the signing of the pact
has totally changed the US stance on nonproliferation issue. That is to admit the nuclear
proliferation is inevitable and can be divided into ‘good or bad’. And ‘good’ proliferation can
be accepted while the ‘bad’ must be banned. And anti-proliferation can be second to the geo-
political factors

Implications on South Asian Security Environment

The opponents of the proposed nuclear cooperation termed the agreement a ‘fatal error’ for
global non-proliferation regime, and believe that this could have a domino effect as many
nuclear have-nots will be more inclined to regard NPT as an anachronism, reconsider their
self-restraint, and be tempted by the precedent that India has successfully established and that
now, in effect, has an American blessing. This could have a negative effect on the behavior of
several states including Brazil, South Africa and Ukraine, to name a few, that had given up
their nuclear weapons program, with a hope that other countries would emulate and the
international community could be led towards global nuclear disarmament.
The supporters of the deal however, argue that the sale of nuclear technology would serve
both countries’ national security interest as well as the goals of non-proliferation. They also
do not agree with the fact that the proposed nuclear deal is in any violation of Article 1 of the
NPT, and have in fact termed the argument as a ‘petty canard’ – that is based on a novel legal
interpretation of the US obligations that has never been accepted by the US government since
the United States signed the treaty in 1968.

India’s utilizes 11% of various available energy sources including oil, gas, coal, wind and
nuclear power for producing electricity. Out of this only 2-3% is produced through nuclear
power. The civil nuclear cooperation agreement, once materialized in its true essence by 2025
could increase this production to a maximum of 6.5 - 8% only. Therefore it is not clear how
this increase of 4.5 - 6% in nuclear electricity could make any substantial difference in global
climatic conditions or in the Indian economy.

Before the March 2, agreement, the US wanted India to put ‘great majority’ of its 22 nuclear
reactors on the civilian list. Presuming the ‘great majority’ means three quarters of the total
number of reactors, it would have meant that India should have declared as many as 17
reactors, including the six already under IAEA safeguards, as civilian. Additionally, US
asked India to place its current and future Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR’s) under safeguards,
which India claims to be an indigenous test program, still in its infancy, and cannot be
declared as civilian. India’s refusal to place FBR’s under safeguards is that U-333, - a by-
product of fission in FBRs, is a suitable fuel for India’s nuclear powered submarine that is
being developed under R&D program euphemistically called the ATV project. By putting
FBR’s under safeguards, Indian scientists feared that their indigenous research would be
exposed Some in India viewed US insistence to bring maximum number of nuclear facilities
including the FBR’s under safeguards an attempt to cap India’s fissile material production.
There are currently three types of safeguards agreements in vogue. They are:

1. INFCIRC24/66
2. INFCIRC/153
3. Voluntary Safeguards Agreements

It is not yet clear what will be the final outcome of the on going negotiations between India
and the IAEA. Perpetual nuclear fuel supply from the US would free India’s indigenous
uranium reserves to be exclusively used for making more number of nuclear weapons. India
has agreed to allow monitoring of 14 nuclear reactors to ensure nuclear fuel at these sites is
not used for weapons, eight other reactors and an unlimited number of future reactors would
continue to produce fissile material for producing NWs, free of any international controls.
India’s insistence on keeping large part of its nuclear facilities outside the inspection regime,
insistence on US assurances for perpetual fuel supplies for civilian facilities even if it violates
part of the agreement, and India’s reluctance to declare unilateral moratorium on fissile
material production clearly indicate India’s intention of increasing its nuclear weapons
stockpile.
 Response of Pakistan
Pakistan has so far adopted a cautious approach and seems not to be in a panic mode. It will
most likely follow the policy of ‘wait and see’ before making adjustments in its minimum
deterrent posture. Some of the factors that could affect Pakistan’s strategic thinking are;

1. First, the final outcome of the deal, how would it shape India’s NWs potential.
2. Second; the likely conventional imbalance as a result of 2005 Indo-US Defense
Cooperation Agreement
3. Finally; the future of India-Pakistan peace process.

While reacting specifically to the nuclear deal, Pakistan’s National Command Authority
(NCA), an apex strategic decision making body expressed satisfaction at the current state of
Pakistan’s strategic deterrence, noting that the strategic capability was sufficient to meet
current and future challenges. The second factor that could impact Pakistan’s strategic
thinking is the growing conventional imbalance between India and Pakistan. The Indo-US
Defense Agreement of 2005, once implemented, would enable India to acquire state-of-art
advanced fighter jets with possible transfer of technology besides other high tech
conventional military equipment. The resultant conventional military imbalance could force
Pakistan to either increase its defense expenditures in order to maintain rough conventional
parity between the two countries, or increase its reliance on nuclear deterrent, which could
lead to nuclear instability in the region.

Another significant component of India-US growing defense cooperation is the US offer of

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System to India. The third factor that could affect strategic
thinking on both sides is the future of on going India-Pakistan peace process. Despite
repeated assertions by both sides that the peace process is “irreversible”, there has been no
forward movement on the core issues. Unless the major disputes are not addressed, the
nuclear equation between the two adversaries cannot be de-hyphenated.

Analysis
Some of the Indian security analysts however seem obsessed with the Chinese military threat
in an effort to project India as an equivalent or a potential military adversary to China. They
believe that India should – create precisely the kind of dilemmas for China that Beijing has
created for it…

 By arming Vietnam with strategic weapons,

 Establishing a naval presence in Cam Ranh Bay and elsewhere in South East Asia,
 To match China’s ensconced military positions in Myanmar as also in Gawadar in
Pakistan’s Makran Coast,
 Cooperating with Taiwan in the nuclear and missile fields, and
 Coordinating its activities in Washington with those of Taiwan lobby
The exploitation of Chinese military threat helps India to create an illusion in the west
especially in the US that if helped in its pursuit of becoming a great regional/ global power,

Thus India is trying to seek primacy in every kind of modern military technology. It is
constantly striving to enhance its conventional and strategic capabilities both qualitatively
and quantitatively. The past events between India and Pakistan prove that fragile and
precarious deterrence stability is under severe threat by Indian aspirations for a great power
status. The convergence of Indo-US interests in a wide range of areas has further aggravated
the situation. The Indo-US ‘123 Agreement’ once implemented would surely prove to be a
“yellow cake” for India. India has acquired and is acquiring nuclear technology from the
West, especially the US, under the guise of civilian uses. Although Indo-US strategic
agreement is a bilateral affair, it has profound and grave regional and global implications and
deterrence stability in South Asia is most likely to be disturbed.

The nuclear cooperation agreement requires United States to amend its own domestic laws
that were formulated as a result of India’s misuse of civil nuclear technology and exploding a
nuclear device in 1974. US have also taken upon it to convince members of the nuclear
suppliers group (NSG) for making India-specific exceptions, to benefit India from civil
nuclear technology.

Missile Defense Systems and their impact on global strategic environment

Pakistan’s Ballistic missiles systems

System Status Range/Payload Source

Domestic
Hatf-1 Operational 80-100 km/500 kg
Production

Domestic/
Hatf-2 Tested/Development 190 km/500 kg
China

Domestic/
Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi) Tested/Development 280 km/500 kg
China

Domestic/
Tarmuk Development 300 km/800 kg
China

Domestic
Haider-1 Development 350 km/? kg
Production

Domestic/
Shaheen-1 Tested/Development 750 km/500 kg
China

Ghauri-1 (Nodong-1) Tested/Development 1,300+ km/700 kg Domestic/

 N. Korea

Domestic/
Ghauri-2 Tested/Development 2,300 km/700 kg
N. Korea

Domestic/
Shaheen-2 Development 2,500 km/1,000 kg
China

Domestic/
Ghauri-3 Engine Tested/Development 3,000 km/? kg
N. Korea

India ballistic missile system

System Status Range/Payload Source

Domestic
Prithvi-1 Operational 150 km/1,000 kg
Production

Domestic
Prithvi-2 Operational 250 km/500 kg
Production

Domestic
Dhanush/ Prithvi-3 Tested/Development 350 km/1,000 kg
Production

Domestic
Agni-1 variant Tested/Development 725 km/~1,000 kg
Production

Domestic
Agni-1 Tested/Prototype Only 1,500 km/1,000 kg
Production

Domestic
Agni-2 Serial Production 2,000 km/1,000 kg
Production

Domestic
Agni-3 Development 3,000-5,500 km/? kg
Production

Surya Development 5,500+ km/2,000 kg Domestic/Russia

Sagarika (SLBM) Development 350 km/500 kg Domestic/Russia

 Similarities between India and Pakistan ballistic missiles system
 Decision-making on nuclear weapons is highly personalized
 Significant foreign assistance
 Due to export controls, both the countries operated clandestine networks to procure
nuclear equipment and materials
 Scientific establishment given high degree of autonomy
 Both the countries have not signed the NPT and the CTBT
 Symbolism associated with nuclear weapons
 Anti-nuclear movement is not well developed
 Institutionalization of nuclear forces is less advanced

Militarization and Weaponization of Space

The prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) is a critical issue on the UN
disarmament and arms control agenda. On the page, you can find links to definitions of key
terms, information about relevant UN processes, and more. You can also download a two-
page version in PDF.

Definitions and key issues

One of the dangers in outer space is that almost anything can be used as a weapon. It does not
take more than a tiny rock (or a random piece of space debris) to destroy important satellites
or other devices. The United States argues that the inability to define space weapons is the
main barrier to a treaty that prevents them. One key element, however, is the distinction
between the militarization and weaponization of outer space:

Militarization of outer space

Space has been militarized since the earliest communication satellites were launched. Today,
militaries all over the world rely on satellites for command and control, communication,
monitoring, early warning, and navigation with the Global Positioning System. Therefore,
“peaceful uses” of outer space include military uses, even those which are not at all peaceful
—such as using satellites to direct bombing raids or to orchestrate a “prompt global strike”
capability, which is “the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the
range of military operations.”

Weaponization of outer space

Space weaponization is generally understood to refer to the placement in orbit of space-based
devices that have a destructive capacity. Many experts argue that ground-based systems
designed or used to attack space-based assets also constitute space weapons, though are not
technically part of the “weaponization of outer space” since they are not placed in orbit.
Some also argue that weapons that travel through space in order to reach their targets, such as
hypersonic technology vehicles, also contribute to the weaponization of space. Many
elements of the US ballistic “missile defense” system currently being developed or planned
could constitute space weapons as well, as many possess “dual-use” characteristics, allowing
them to destroy space assets as well as ballistic missiles.

Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

The overwhelming majority of UN member states are concerned that the weaponization of
outer space will lead to an arms race and insist that a multilateral treaty is the only way to
prevent such an arms race, emphasizing that this treaty would not limit space access, but
would prevent such limitations. In 2006, Russia argued that if all states observe a prohibition
on space weaponization, there will be no arms race. Russia and China also support
establishing an obligation of no use or threat of use of force against space objects and have
submitted a draft treaty to the UN on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.

Space weapons and missile "defence"

While as far as anyone knows there are currently no weapons deployed in space, the United
States has invested in developing potential technologies, and both China and the United
States have demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities in 2007 and 2008, respectively. In
response to the potential threats of space weaponization, as well as perceived ballistic missile
threats, the US is also developing a ballistic missile defense shield. While missile defense is
presented as a defense of American and allied territories against a limited missile attack, it is
in reality one more step towards full spectrum dominance.

Missile defence allows countries to develop offensive technologies under the pretence of
defense. For example, Kinetic Energy Inteceptors are missiles that are launched into space to
take out enemy missiles by smashing into them. They also have potential applications as
offensive anti-satellite weapons, because the same maneovering abilities and set of controls is
necessary to destroy satellites.

Major defense contractors are actively developing their aerospace capabilities, and smaller
aerospace corporations are competing to prove their technical innovation in making satellites
smaller and launch vehicles less expensive.

There are many reasons to be concerned about the development of missile defence and space
weapon technology, including the increased conventional military dominance by the United
States, the vast waste of resources that accompanies any arms build-up, whether it's a race or
an asymmetrical surge, and the physical results of fighting in outer space - especially space
debris, which will destroy civil and commercial space infrastructure such as satellites. The
corporations studied in Reaching Critical Will's Dirty Dozen and the Dirty Dozen Annex are
all contributing to the steady drive toward a future in which these concerns are our dirty
reality.

Space debris
Besides creating an new arms race, the weaponization of space means proliferation of space
debris. Such debris, resulting from 50 years of space activity, already poses a considerable
hazard to spacecraft. This crowding problem could worsen as a large number of space
weapons could be deployed in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The launching and testing of weapons
would also increase space debris. Moreover, deploying space-based weapons in the
increasingly crowded realm of LEO would leave less room for civilian systems. Those
problems would also occur during periods of peace. If a number of satellites were to be
destroyed during the course of a war, some scientists warn, they would create so much debris
that it would prevent future satellites from being stationed in space and generally limit space
access.

Effects on arms control and nuclear disarmament

The weaponization of space will destroy strategic balance and stability, undermine
international and national security, and disrupt existing arms control instruments, in particular
those related to nuclear weapons and missiles. These effects will inevitably lead to a new
arms race. Space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament
process. The United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the
development of US ground- and sea- based “missile defenses” have already increased
tensions with Russia and have led to increased missile proliferation.The deployment of these
technologies or the development of space-based technologies will likely cause Russia, as well
as the United States (in response to Russia), to make smaller and smaller reductions of their
nuclear arsenals and to reject the development of new treaties to regulate nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems. China would likely build more warheads to maintain its nuclear
deterrent, which could in turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit.

In January 2007, China tested an anti-satellite weapon against one of its own ageing weather
satellites. The United States, while condemning the test, forged ahead with several space and
missile defence projects with dual-use capabilities. In addition, in February 2008, the United
States shot down own of it's own failed satellites that was carrying a half-ton of hydrazine
rocket fuel (a toxic chemical). The US military shot it down with a Standard Missile-3, whose
primary vocation is interceptor for the US Navy’s missile defense system.

Current trends in US policy

While as far as anyone knows there are currently no weapons deployed in space, the US
policy on outer space is concerning. Under the Bush administration, the 2006 US National
Space Policy explained that the US will “preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of
action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing
capabilities intending to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities;
respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities
hostile to US national interests.”

At that point, the United States rejected treaties “limiting its actions” in outer space and its
space policy firmly opposed “the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that
seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space,” and insisted that “proposed arms
control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct
research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for US national
interests.”

In July 2010, the Obama administration released the new US National Space Policy. It states
that the US shall pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building
measures to encourage responsible action in, and the peaceful uses of, space. The new policy
also notes that the US will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they
are “equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the US and its
allies.” The language in this new policy suggests that this is a significant departure from its
predecessor. However, the actual implications of this change are still unknown. While
claiming that it is open to considering space-related arms control concepts and proposals, the
US argues that such proposals must meet the “‘rigorous criteria’ of equitability, effective
verifiability, and enhance the national security interests of the US and its allies.” The
Russian-Chinese joint draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space (PPWT) would not meet these criteria according to the US, as it is “fundamentally
flawed” and would not provide any grounds for commencing negotiations.

The United States Department of Defense continues to invest in programs that could provide
anti-satellite and space-based weapons capabilities. While the technology itself is highly
controversial, it presents major business opportunities to companies that know how to
overcome moral, logistical, and financial roadblocks. War has always been highly profitable,
and dominance of outer space leads to further profits in conventional warfare. As the Air
Force Space Command stated in its 2003 Strategic Master Plan, “the ability to gain space
superiority (the ability to exploit space while selectively disallowing it to adversaries) is
critically important and maintaining space superiority is an essential prerequisite in modern
warfare.” Superiority in conventional warfare relies on military assets in space, especially
satellites, which are used for intelligence, remote sensing, navigation, and monitoring, among
other things. Since the US currently asserts its political will through force, protection of its
own space assets and disturbance of others’ is key to guaranteeing US dominance.