NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY, PAKISTAN.

‘Final Research Assignment’

Uncertainties in Nuclear Doctrines of India & Pakistan

Submitted To: Sir Muhammad Shafiq ur Rehman

Submitted By: Hammad Hassan

Roll No: NDU-BS-16/F-163

Course: Security & Strategic Dynamics of South Asia

Semester: BS-SS-6th (Fall-16)

Department: Strategic Studies (Faculty of Contemporary Studies)

 Uncertainties in Nuclear Doctrines of India & Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

Advent of nuclear weapon into battlefield was the most notable shift in the history of warfare.
Nuclear weapon unlike other weapons is most destructive weapon Atomic weapon is universally
considered as political weapon. Consequently, possession of nuclear weapons requires clear
articulation regarding its purpose or use. States possessing these weapons articulate the role of
nuclear weapons in their respective national security strategies through their nuclear doctrine or
policy. A state’s nuclear policy or doctrine is, also, a declaration of the strategic interests vital to
the state, for whose protection it will resort to the use of ultimate weapon. It also enables a state
to act purposefully in the face of the challenges confronting its security.1 In other words, it
reflects a rationale for acquiring nuclear weapons and importance of those weapons in the
broader national security framework.

Similarly, when India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons in 1998 both states officially or
via-a-via unofficially declared their nuclear doctrinal postures. This paper is sought to investigate
and figure out the uncertainties or ambiguities lying in the nuclear doctrines of both states.
Before furthering the debate, it is very important to understand the term ‘uncertainty’ in nuclear
domain. Most of the times when it comes to the mind word ‘uncertainty’ or ‘ambiguity’
associated with nuclear weapons then we think uncertainty must be regarding the accuracy of
nuclear weapons but that is not the case. Uncertainty in nuclear doctrine means ambiguity or
uncertainty lies in the theoretical aspect of nuclear use. Uncertainty exists in the literature, or
write-up which is devised by the strategic elite community of any state regarding nuclear use and
issues. This paper is divided into two fractions. In the first part we will try to figure out the
uncertainties in the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan and likewise second portion will most probably
highlight the ambiguities of India’s nuclear doctrine.

NUCLEAR DOCTRINE OF PAKISTAN

Nuclear tests in 1998 fundamentally transformed the nuclear policy landscape in Pakistan. With
these tests the era of a covert military‐nuclear program and a policy of ‘deliberate nuclear

1
Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), 405.
ambiguity’ came to an end. Prior to May, 1998 Pakistan’s nuclear program was covert, and the
country publically denied pursuit of nuclear capability. However, May, 1998 proved to be a
pivotal month. With overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan deterrence emerged as a new
factor in South Asian security environment. To date, Pakistan has not enunciated an official
nuclear doctrine. However, the broad contours of its nuclear policy have been defined
periodically by officials and the national leadership through formal statements, and addresses at
various academic and policy forums.

 Salient Features of Nuclear Doctrine of Pakistan

Pakistan’s nuclear policy is India‐centric, with which it is engaged in a competitive relationship,
rooted in territorial disputes, historical legacy of partition, and complexities of regional security
environment. Thus, few constants in shaping Pakistan’s nuclear policy have been the nature of
military‐security centric threats that it perceives from India, widening imbalance in the
conventional military forces, and growing asymmetry with India in relative terms. Moreover, the
regional security environment and engagement of external powers with the regional countries
have also influenced Pakistan’s nuclear policy. Pakistan’s nuclear posture is acquitted of some
salient features regarding the use of nuclear weapon which are as following:
 Credible Minimum Deterrence
After the nuclear tests, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in May 1999, announced the principle of
‘minimum credible deterrence’ as the corner stone of country’s nuclear policy.2 Pakistani
officials and political leadership have repeatedly stressed the same over the years. It has
gradually translated into following elements:
o Nuclear deterrence is India‐centric.
o Pakistan’s policy follows minimum, credible deterrence
o Requirements of minimum, credible deterrence are dynamic and evolve with changing
threat environment.
o Given India’s conventional military superiority, Pakistan does not subscribe to the policy
of No‐First Use.
In October 1999, Agha Shahi, Abdul Sattar and Zulfiqar Khan, the three leading figures of
Pakistan’s foreign and security policy establishment, in a joint essay, which in itself was a rare

2
PM remarks on Pakistan Nuclear policies and the CTBT at NDC, Islamabad 20 May 1999.
https://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html accessed on May 16, 2019.
public assertion on the subject, wrote that, “minimum deterrence has been and should continue to
be the guiding principle of Pakistan’s nuclear pursuit. Of course the minimum cannot be defined
in static numbers.”3
 First Use Policy
The debate on nuclear First Use (FU) and No First Use (NFU) is as old as the Bomb itself. It
formally started when the United States adopted the policy of FU from the onset of the Cold
War, especially in the early 1950s. First Use policy is adopted by a state to make its deterrence
more credible, keeping in mind the prevailing challenges to the national security of a state in the
strategic environment as well as one’s relevant superiority or inferiority in this context.
Pakistan’s reliance on a FU option is no different. Pakistan’s nuclear program aims at thwarting
adversaries’ (mostly India’s) conventional and potential nuclear attacks. Owing to its
conventional inferiority in comparison to India, Pakistan’s decision to retain nuclear FU makes
its deterrence credible, a dynamic that helps to avoid any adventurism by the aggressor. In this
vein, in order to comprehend Pakistan’s rationale of nuclear FU effectively, it is essential to skim
through the historical background of the doctrine.
 Full Spectrum Deterrence
Since 2006, the nuclear policy predicated on the principle of ‘minimum credible deterrence’ has
undergone gradual evolution. After the signing of India‐US strategic partnership agreement
Pakistan’s anxieties grew. The Indo‐US agreement envisaged nuclear and ballistic missile
defence cooperation. In September, 2013 NCA asserted that Pakistan adheres to policy of
‘Credible Minimum Deterrence, and will maintain ‘Full‐Spectrum Deterrence’ capability to deter
all forms of aggression. Moreover, a spokesperson of foreign ministry stated that Pakistan’s
“nuclear deterrence capability is aimed at maintaining regional stability in South Asia”.4
On 23 March 2015, addressing a conference in Washington, D.C., Lt. Gen (R) Kidwai, after his
retirement as DG‐SPD, explained the evolution of nuclear policy. He explained that Pakistan
began its nuclear journey with the principle of credible minimum deterrence, but gradually
‘translated it to the concept of full spectrum deterrence’. He asserted that Pakistan moved

3
P R Chari , Nuclear stability in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2003), 192.
4
Mohsin Ali, “Pakistan Maintains Stance on Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Gulf News Pakistan, April 18, 206,
https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistan-maintains-stance-on-nuclear-non-proliferation-1.1226992
accessed on May 15, 2019.
towards this new posture because India was attempting to find ‘space for conventional war’.5 In
September 2015, NCA underscored that ‘Full‐Spectrum Deterrence’ posture was in line with
principle of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’6 In February, 2016, NCA asserted that nuclear
deterrence is a “factor of stability” in the region, thus, Pakistan will continue to “maintain Full
Spectrum Deterrence, in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence”.7

UNCERTAINTIES IN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE OF PAKISTAN

Nuclear doctrinal posture is always the sensitive matter for all nuclear weapons states. There
always exist some uncertainties in their nuclear doctrine because having ambiguity always
confound enemy states regarding the vulnerabilities and nuclear threshold of that state. Secondly,
it suits the state adopting ambiguous and uncertain nuclear posture because it would be easy for a
state to find gray areas and loopholes in the doctrinal posture and able to play with it.
Uncertainties in nuclear doctrine of doctrine are as following.

 No Official Stance
It has been argued that since the acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan has not
adopted and declared any official stance in form of formal documented form. Pakistani officials
maintain that ambiguity serves Pakistan’s interests better, since ambiguity does not provide
information about Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds that an enemy would need to exploit gaps in the
plans.8 Whether this ambiguity actually brings stability or not is hard to figure.

 First Use Policy

Since the early years of its nuclear program, Pakistan has refused to declare a no-first-use policy;
the country retains the option of using nuclear weapons first in the event of a war. This policy
appears to have remained constant because of the growing conventional weapons asymmetry in

5
“General Khalid Kidwai, in conversation with Peter Levoy, Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference 2015,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, March 23, 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-
230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf accessed on May 16, 2019.
6
ISPR Press Release No-PR 133/2013-ISPR, September 5, 2013, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-
press_release&id=2361#pr_link2361 accessed on May 15, 2019.
7
ISPR Press Release No PR64/2016-ISPR, February 24, 2016, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-
press_release&id=3211 accessed on May 15, 2019.
8
“General Khalid Kidwai, in conversation with Peter Levoy, Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference 2015,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, March 23, 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-
230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf accessed on May 16, 2019.
India’s favor. But there is quite significant ambiguity and uncertainty in adopting First Use
posture. It is because it requires a high degree of efficiency, good military intelligence, and a
very effective early warning system. Secondly at one point Pakistan is carrying minimum
credible deterrence and minimum nuclear stockpile, it is uncertain that having less amount
nuclear stockpile is insufficient for Pakistan to carry out an effective and efficient first strike
against India’s very large territory.

 Credible Minimum Deterrence

Credible Minimum Deterrence is another standpoint in nuclear doctrine of Pakistan. Pakistan
principally decided to adopt the option of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence.’ CMD means that
Pakistan would retain the minimal number of nuclear weapons which would be credible enough
to deter the enemy. There exists an underlying ambiguity in this regard because word
‘Minimum’ does not identify any numeric value for the Pakistan’s stockpile of nuclear weapons.
Secondly word ‘credible’ again adds up in the count of ambiguity and leaves rooms for Pakistan
in modernization of their nuclear weapons under the tag of ‘credibility.’
 Full Spectrum Deterrence
After Indo-US nuclear cooperation in 2006 drove Pakistan to their security concerns.
Afterwards Pakistan adopted a policy of ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence’ According to FSD, Pakistan
decided to deter India at three levels i.e. strategic level, operational level and tactical level.
Under the flag of Full Spectrum Deterrence, Pakistan developed tactical or battlefield nuclear
weapon called Nasr missile to deter Indian thrust within the framework of ‘Pro-Active
Operations.’ Use of Nasr missile is most critical and ambiguous question because it is uncertain
that when will Pakistan use Nasr missile. Most recent Pulwama crisis is the prime empirical
evidence; it was the proactive and preemptive attack from Indian side against Pakistan but
Pakistan didn’t show any impression of use of Nasr missile.

NUCLEAR DOCTRINE OF INDIA

Twenty years ago, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government authorized nuclear
weapons tests, marking the overt nuclearization of the subcontinent. Even as the government
soon fell from power after losing a no-confidence vote in Parliament, the National Security
Advisory Board (NSAB) that had been appointed as part of revitalizing the National Security
Council system continued to churn out a nuclear doctrine. The resulting document, a draft
nuclear doctrine released in August 1999, marked a shift in India’s approach to nuclear weapons
from the recessed deterrence of the 1990s to credible minimum deterrence. This credibility was
reflected in its articulation of assured retaliation based on a triad capability. This draft nuclear
doctrine gradually came to serve as India’s official nuclear doctrine. Since the Indian
government in the interim had weathered two crises—the Kargil War and the Twin Peaks
crisis—it used the release of the official doctrine in 2003 to include a warning to Pakistan in the
form of the phrase “massive” nuclear retaliation. The logic was that India would threaten
to escalate by including counter-value targets in its retaliation, thus deterring a Pakistani “nuclear
attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.”

 Salient Features of Nuclear Doctrine of India

In the subsequent section, I survey the debate over various aspects of the doctrine, examining six
major areas around which India’s nuclear doctrine debate revolves. Salient features of nuclear
doctrine of India are;
 No First Use Policy

The no-first-use (NFU) pillar has had a better innings. It has been useful in projecting an image
of India as a mature and responsible nuclear power; thereby obscuring India’s buffeting of the
nuclear nonproliferation regime in 1998 and keeping nonproliferation lobbies off India’s quest
for a credible deterrent.9 Even so, the term “rapid” in the draft doctrine, which calls for a shift
from a peacetime mode to a deployed status in “the shortest possible time,” established
tendencies that over time have resulted in a shadow over India’s NFU policy. 10 The intent behind
this language was perhaps to safeguard against multiple attrition nuclear attacks, debilitating
India’s capability by quickly unleashing a retaliatory blow. Shivshankar Menon, a former
national security adviser, has let on that questioning the NFU’s continued utility did cross his
mind.

 Credible Minimum Deterrence

9
Manpreet Sethi, India and No First Use: Preventing Deterrence Breakdown (New Delhi: Institute for Peace and
Conflict Studies, 2014).
10
Raja Menon, “Just One Shark in the Deep Blue Sea,” Outlook, August 10,
2009, http://www.outlookindia.com/article/Just-One-Shark-In-The-Deep-Blue-Ocean/261048 accessed on May 16,
2019.
A second important salient feature of India’s nuclear doctrine is credible minimum deterrence
(CMD), which refers to the quantity of nuclear forces that India needs to deter potential nuclear
adversaries. Moderates and expansionists disagree about how many weapons are necessary, as
well as about India’s progress in weaponization. As deterrence optimists, moderates are
generally less concerned about the quantity or quality of nuclear weapons. Writing immediately
after India’s official nuclear doctrine was released, K. Subrahmanyam pointed out that credibility
is a function of how well command and control functions; the essence of deterrence, he argued,
is to have a command-and-control chain “from the political level to the implementing level” that
demonstrates its “survivability under the worst conditions of decapitation attack.”11 In a detailed
analysis of India’s CMD, Basrur argues that CMD fits well within India’s overall strategic
culture, pointing to reports that the Indian nuclear weapons are kept unassembled and
undeployed—a physical arrangement close to virtual deterrence.12
 Nuclear Retaliation to CBW attacks
This is third tenant of nuclear doctrine of India. The Indian nuclear doctrine leaves Indian
decision makers the option of using nuclear weapons to retaliate against CBW use, something
which was not considered in the DND. This expansion is something to which moderates have
objected, but it is also an issue on which not much debate has been generated. Some moderates
such as Sethi disagree with this expansion, arguing that this did not work in the case of the
United States, and it “hardly makes the Indian nuclear deterrent more credible,” 13 an argument
with which most moderates would agree.14 Sethi argues that the CBW are anyways outlawed,
and if nonstate actors use these weapons, then India’s nuclear deterrent could in any way not be
effective because it is not designed to counter such actors. Expansionists have not developed
arguments about the CBW issue, but they would presumably support nuclear use in response to a
CBW attack—arguing, as some officials reportedly have done, that nuclear retaliation for CBW
attack is simply leaving an option open since India has given up its CBW capacity. 15

11
K. Subrahmanyam, “The Essence of Deterrence,” Times of India, January 7, 2003,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/LEADER-ARTICLEBREssence-of-
Deterrence/articleshow/33600858.cms accessed on May 15, 2019.
12
Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2006), 30.
13
Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards Credible Deterrence (New Delhi: Knowledge World /
Centre for Air Power Studies, 2009), 127-128.
14
Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Is a Review Necessary?,” CLAWS Issue Brief no. 43 (December
2014): 4.
15
Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 86.
  Massive Retaliation
One of the rare areas of agreement between the moderates and the expansionists is over India’s
threat of massive retaliation to any nuclear attack. Most analysts in both camps fear the threat to
be empty. Some argue that India should consider substituting “punitive” for “massive” in the
doctrine.16 Moderates such as Basrur say that massive retaliation is a threat that the enemy will
always expect, and is unnecessary since it does not take much to deter. 17 Others suggest that any
Pakistani first use might be a very limited attack calibrated to avoid massive retaliation by India.
They propose that India retaliate with low-level strikes in the case of Pakistan’s limited first
use.18 Many Indian analysts continue to refer to “massive retaliation” as Indian doctrine,19
though the doctrine actually does not use this phrase, saying instead that “nuclear retaliation to a
first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”20 Saying retaliation
will be “massive” is different from massive retaliation; in all likelihood, the framers of the
doctrine were ignorant of the meaning of “massive retaliation” in nuclear theology and simply
wanted a tougher-sounding word to replace the DND’s phrase “punitive retaliation.”
UNCERTAINTIES IN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE OF INDIA
Most notably, there also exists number of uncertainties and ambiguities in the nuclear doctrine of
India as that of Pakistan. These uncertainties are as follows;
 No First Use Policy
The most controversial element of the Indian nuclear debate is undoubtedly India’s NFU
pledge. For instance, India claims that India will retaliate with nuclear in a case when Indian
Territory is being attacked or Indian forces are being attacked with nuclear weapons anywhere in
the world. This clause in Indian’s DND makes no sense and leaves a huge uncertainty and
ambiguity in doctrinal posture. For instance, if United States launch a nuclear attack against
North Korea and in that attack some soldiers of Indian armed forces dies then would it means
that India will launch a retaliatory nuclear strike against U.S.

16
Raja Menon, “Boxed In by Pakistan,” Indian Express, September 6,
2014, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/boxed-in-by-pakistan/ accessed on May 16, 2019.
17
Basrur, Minimum Deterrence, 117–20.
18
Verghese Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 244-
45
19
Bharat Karnad, “South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Deterrence Theory,” India Review 4, no. 2 (2005): 190.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480500225640 accessed on May 16, 2019.
20
“Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Press
Information Bureau, January 4, 2003,
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html accessed on May 16, 2019.
Secondly, India’s standpoint regarding retaliation in case of Chemical and Biological weapon
attacks on India. This is also very ambiguous in nature. It is because, Indian nuclear weapons are
Pakistan and China centric and both India and Pakistan have signed chemical and biological
weapon conventions. Here it is ambiguous that to whom India is referring the chemical and
biological attack, whether it is referring towards insurgents in J&K or non-state actors.
 Credible Minimum Deterrence
As it has been argued that Indian nuclear weapons are directed towards China and Pakistan. In
other words both China and Pakistan are India’s strategic rivals and enemies. China’s territory is
quite ten times of Pakistan then there must be distinct number of credible minimum nuclear
stockpiles for both China and Pakistan. But in India’s DND there is neither at one point
discussed variant ‘CMD’ for both enemies of India. There is lying uncertainty in this regard.
 Massive Retaliation v/s Minimum Deterrence
India’s DND claims that in case of any nuclear and chemical and biological weapon attack India
would retaliate ‘massively’ against the attacker. On the other hand Indian DND claims that India
will retain credible minimum nuclear forces against their enemies. Both these stances contradict
with each other and leave an impression of uncertainty and ambiguity in nuclear doctrine of
India.
CONCLUSION
All nuclear weapon states always adopt some nuclear doctrinal posture for use of nuclear
weapons against their enemies. Both India and Pakistan although don’t have written or
documented nuclear doctrinal posture like United States but there also exists nuclear doctrines of
both states having set of propositions. In all these features, someway lie ambiguities and
uncertainties. At some places these ambiguities and uncertainties serves the interests of states
and at some times these causes number of uncertainties within the strategic elite community.
Same is the case with nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan.