Vadlamani

Has the introduction of nuclear weapons increased or decreased stability in South

Asia?

India and Pakistan’s ties intensified with their nuclear capabilities in May 1998.

Two nations, in a bitter historic rivalry and in close geographic proximity, gave no choice

but for the International sphere to take note. Naturally, a great and heated debate arose

over the significance of a nuclearized South Asia. There were two sides to this debate;

some believed that this would lead the region to further destabilize; others expected

nuclear weapons to act as deterring factor as the Indo-Pak conflict can now become

extremely risky. These deterrence theorists could be divided into two groups – pessimists

and the optimists. 1

Nuclear pessimists argue that the existence of so-called nuclear option has

destabilized the South Asian security environment. They argue that Pakistan’s

possession of nuclear weapons have encouraged them to attempt to achieve hegemony

and earn their status quo aggressively. In simple terms, they argue that it has

strengthened them to pursue revisionist policies vigorously2. The “low-intensity conflict

strategy” adopted by Pakistan, as a result, is seen as a destabilizing element in the region.

Further, theories such as the perception/misperception and the arms race theory are a

matter of concern to these theorists. The innate organizational difference, and the

1 For a description of these alternating arguments, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The 1 Spread
of Nuclear Weapons, A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).

2 See“Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review 8, no. 3 2 (Fall-
Winter 2001), p. 83
command and control structures are also a point of concern in the two countries from the

eyes of the pessimists.

Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, believe in the deterring capabilities of

nuclear weapons in the South Asian region. Mainly focusing on the Indo-Pak

relationship, they use case studies such as the Kargil War, the 2001-02 military standoff

and the 2008 crisis to exemplify how India and Pakistan have displayed restrained

behavior, thus stabilizing a primarily turbulent relationship.

While these two camps express their theories with relation to nuclear arsenal,

which is whether stability has increased or decreased with the mere existence of nuclear

weapons, Vipin Narang poses that while examining “(the) nuclear postures adopted by

India and Pakistan… (they) generate difference conflict dynamics” and hence have

“differential effects on dispute dynamics”. 3 Through his analysis on every military crisis

of India and Pakistan, he argues that nuclear postures matter, and they in fact produce

differential deterrence and stability effects. 4

Within the framework of arguments articulated by Narang and the two opposing

camps of deterrence theorists, I argue that the introduction of nuclear weapons has

successfully reduced the likelihood of a major conventional nuclear war in the region and

3 Narang, Vipin. "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability." 4
International Security 34, no. 3 (2009): 38-78.

4 Narang, Vipin. "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability." 4
International Security 34, no. 3 (2009): 38-78.

 Vadlamani 3

that there is nuclear robustness. However, I also argue that with both countries actively

working towards expanding and broadening their arsenal of nuclear and conventional

weaponry, this suggests at potential instability in the future.

In this essay, I start by laying out the foundation of the arguments made by

deterrence theorists. Through the literature present, I showcase the conflict, or rather the

difference between the two camps, i.e. the differing conceptions and definitions of

‘stability’. I go on to examine the India-Pakistan relationship and the various times of

dispute, through which I attempt to establish the robust nature of nuclear deterrence.

Finally, I explore the nuclear posture adopted by Pakistan and its implications on stability

in the South Asian region.

Paul Kapur, a well-known proliferation pessimist, believes that the introduction of

nuclear weapons in South Asia has encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior by

shielding them from an all-out Indian retaliation. 5 This aided in favor to the revisionist

Pakistani claims – limited warfare in Kashmir became achievable. Thus began an

extensive project to support and assist the anti-India insurgency in Kashmir, with

Pakistan providing support in terms of political and military capabilities. 6 Pakistanis

aggressive behavior, strengthened by its nuclear capabilities, resulted the Kargil war.

While this situation might be very similar to the stability/instability paradox, where

5 S. Paul Kapur. "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia." International Security 33, no. 2 5
(2008): pp. 72.

6 S.Paul Kapur. "India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not like Cold War 6
Europe." International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 127-52.

stability at the top or nuclear level tends to increase conventional conflict between

countries, Kapur contends the contrary. He argues that in South Asia, instability at the

bottom has led to an increasing instability at the top. 7

On the other hand, Sumit Ganguly puts forward empirical evidence to suggest the

robustness of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. Even though he acknowledges that

Pakistan’s procession of nuclear weapons capability has shaped its authority and control,

he argues that the threat of nuclear escalation has deterred India from carrying out any

kind of conventional military attacks despite provocation from the Pakistani’s, on

multiple occasions. It can be said that both Kapur and Ganguly agree that there exists

instability at the bottom. For Ganguly, instability at the bottom corroborates with the

working of the stability/instability paradox, whereby it creates strategic stability at the

upper level, and nuclear deterrence is robust. However, Kapur would argue that

instability at the bottom in fact increases the scope of escalation to the nuclear level,

ultimately creating instability at the top.

For the purpose of this essay, I use both these differing theories of stability and its

relation to nuclear weapons. With the definitions laid out by both the deterrence camps, I

argue that nuclear deterrence has so far been strong. Here, I elucidate the role played by

nuclear weapons in stabilizing a historically volatile relationship between India ad

Pakistan, thus agreeing with the proliferations optimists claim. However, in the later half

 Vadlamani 5

of my essay, I highlight South Asia’s security trends in the contemporary world, which

could potentially be destabilizing, this partially validating a pessimist’s claim.

Since the partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have generally remained in a

constant state of hostility, a reason for the existence of the disputed territory of Jammu

and Kashmir.8 While India seeks to assert its secular ideology by keeping its Muslim-

majority reason close, Kashmir ideates with Pakistan’s identity since the very state was

created for the Muslims of South Asia. Hence, Pakistan has long pursued a revisionist

policy with respect to Kashmir. In the first seventy years post Independence, India and

Pakistan have fought four wars (1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999), out of which three (1947,

1965, 1999) have been about Kashmir. However, after the nuclearization in 1998, the

frequency of a full-scale conventional warfare has steeply declined. After India

conducted its first successful nuclear bomb test in 1974, only one legitimate war has

broken out between two nations (1999).

Moreover, these peaceful times have fallen under highly unstable conditions at the

sub-conventional level. Since 1989, Pakistan has actively backed an anti-India

insurgency in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 9 This has resulted in the two countries

being at their necks since, thus preventing any form of dialog that could resolve disputes.

Yet, I argue that nuclear deterrence has been robust in South Asia.

8 Khan, F. (2003). Challenges to nuclear stability in South Asia. The Nonproliferation Review, 10(1),
pp.59-74.
9 See Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, Harvard University) 8

 To support my argument, I will look at three conflicts between India and Pakistan

wherein one of the countries had demonstrated restraint. This was adopted as a result of

the enemy’s nuclear capabilities, thus discouraging escalation. I will focus on the Kargil

War, the 2001-02 military stand-off and the 2008 crisis.

The Kargil War

Towards the end of the Kargil War in 1999, India had every motive to escalate the

conflict. India, in comparison to Pakistan had a considerably stronger conventional army.

10
Yet, restraint was clearly shown and the extent the war unfolded was limited. At this

period, a self-confident and nationalistic government was ruling India. Although these

factors do not establish a strong causation between nuclear weapons and it not leading to

a nuclear war, it is a possible correlation between the two.

There were widespread disagreements regarding various aspects of the Kargil

War, amongst which most scholars agree that nuclear weapons played an important, if

not the definite role in deterring escalation. With regard to nuclear weapons, Indian

restraint was evident on two fronts. First, India would have invested in an all-out

conventional retaliation against Pakistan, if not for nuclear weapons. Jalil Jilani, former

director-general for South Asia in Pakistan’s ministry of foreign affairs argues that

without “Pakistani’s clear nuclear capacity…India wouldn’t be restrained” in such tense

10 Ganguly, Sumit, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” pp. 67

 Vadlamani 7

situations. 11 General Ved Malik, the Indian Chief of Army Staff during the Kargil

operations also concedes that Pakistani’s nuclear weapons led Indians to rule out a full-

scale conventional war. 12 Second, India’s BJP government was firm about limiting the

scope of war against Pakistan, and hence India’s military and air force were under strict

orders to not target Kashmir areas that were governed by Pakistan. Tracing history, India

never had such inhibitions in 1965, before the introduction of nuclear weapons. Thus,

nuclear weapons played a deterring role, as India did not retaliate across the border, even

though it could have been militarily advantageous.

Restraint showed in 2001-02 and 2008

The tensions between India and Pakistan only rose. It remained tense in the

aftermath of the Kargil War, and was further aggravated by the rise of the military regime

in Pakistan. During this tense period, three major terrorist attacks on Indian soil brought

India and Pakistan very close to war. The first one occurred on October 1st 2001 when a

group of insurgents disguised as police officers, hijacked an official vehicle, loaded it

with explosives and crashed into the Assembly building of Jammu and Kashmir which

was controlled by the Indian board. This attack killed twenty-six individuals.13 The

second took place on December 13th, 2001 when a white Ambassador drove past the

11 S. Paul Kapur. "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia." International Security 33, no. 2 10
(2008): pp. 76.

12 S.Paul Kapur. "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia." International Security 33, no. 2 10
(2008): pp. 79.

13 Ganguly, Sumit, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” pp. 59

security boundary, heading towards the Central Hall of the Indian parliament. Militants

emerged from the car and a gun battle occurred, killing 14 people in total. The third took

place on May 14th, 2002 when two suicide bombers attacked an Indian military base in

Kaluchak. A total of thirty-three individuals died, mostly the wives and children of Indian

Army personnel. With regards to all three attacks, Pakistan based jihadist groups

Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed had taken responsibility. 14

However, the Indian response to such volatile conditions was rather limited and

careful. It exercised a rather coercive diplomacy with Operation Parakram rather than

other, more aggressive measures. Analyzing these attacks, especially after the Kaluchak

massacre, Indian troops were in a perfect position to carry out limited attacks against

terrorist groups in Pakistan. However, once again, Indians exhibited significant restraint.

While the tensions and insurgency in J&K reduced steadily, another crisis situation

erupted on November 26th, 2008, when terrorists from LeT attacked the city of Mumbai,

leaving the city crippled for three days and with a casualty of 200 people. Although there

was significant support from the Pakistan government to LeT, the Indians displayed

restraint.

Indian governments continuous showcase of restraint arose questions with regard

to the decisions against such grave provocations. Scholars suggested that the American

intervention and mediation between India and Pakistan and the lack of mobile forces

explain Indian behavior. However, a former Indian Army Chief, Gen. Roychowdhury,

14 Ganguly, Sumit, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” pp. 60-63

 Vadlamani 9

contested that India was deterred from attacking Pakistan post the Mumbai attacks due to

nuclear threat. Further, he claims the same about the Indian response of the 2001

Parliament attacks. 15 Gen. Roychowdhury’ claims are paramount because as former

Indian Army Chief, he has every incentive to curtail the deterring effects of Pakistan’s

nuclear arsenal, as it could lead to a negative conception of the Indian army.

With the basis of the number of wars fought by India and Pakistan post a

nuclearized South Asia, along with the restrained techniques shown by the Indian

government, one may be inclined to conclude that the stability/instability paradox is at

play in South Asia. However, this conclusion would be inaccurate. According to the logic

of the paradox, with regards to the Indo-Pak relationship, a low likelihood of nuclear

escalation would reduce the capability of Pakistani nuclear weapons to deter an Indian

attack. In that case, Pakistan would not act as revisionist state following aggressive

policies because of Indian army’s strong military advantage. The reality, however, is

somewhat different. As in the examples discussed above, as Pakistan’s forces repeatedly

crossed international borders to launch limited conventional attacks, India did not

retaliate with it’s own military attacks. 16 With this, I argue that the process in which

Pakistan has operationalized its nuclear capabilities has not only deterred escalation of

conflict, but simultaneously allowing them to pursue revisionist claims. 17 Examining the

15 “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Deterred India,” Hindu, March 10, 2009.

16
S. Paul Kapur. "India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not like Cold War 16
Europe." International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 127-52.
17
Narang, Vipin. "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability."
International Security 34, no. 3 (2009): 38-78.
implication of the Pakistani regime, I argue that embodying such a posture will

potentially dampen the Indo-Pak relationship, ultimately destabilizing the future.

Pakistan considers its doctrine to be “credible minimum deterrence”, however, it

has all the characteristics of a first-use asymmetric nuclear posture. 18 This kind of

posture threatens accelerated escalation of a conventional nuclear warfare. In order to

block such attacks by an adversary, nuclear assets are gathered quickly through certain

ordered procedures. However, Narang states that this poses a crucial problem. He argues

that it can create severe command and control structures (C2) due to the credibility

requirement, which increases the reckless use of nuclear weapons. Hence, while the

threat of asymmetric first use produces deterring effects, it could produce dangerous

outcomes19. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s nuclear regime has provided them a path to achieve

two objectives. First, India, one of their main opponents, has been deterred from seriously

considering conventional warfare against Pakistan, as explained in the above sections.

Second, due to a deterred and restrained India, Pakistan has taken this opportunity to

pursue its limited revisionist claims. I further argue that such revisionist policies could

have grave implications for the future of South Asian security conditions.

Due to India’s helpless condition to restrain its forces against Pakistan on many

occasions (2001-02 and 2008), it has found itself unable to act during important crisis.

The restraint and inability to act can be witnessed from the Operation Parakram, itself.

18
Scott D. Sagan, "The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine," in Sagan, Inside Nuclear
South Asia, pp. 219-263.
19 Narang, Vipin. "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability." 19
International Security 34, no. 3 (2009): pp. 8.

 Vadlamani 1
1
Since then, India has developed a new military doctrine called ‘Cold Start’, that allows

India to target Pakistan without crossing the nuclear threshold. However, tracing the

26/11 attacks, many argue that India failed to fuel a response despite the existence of

Cold Start. However, many believe that given time, Indian army will over come its

shortcomings and gain power in terms of more aggressive stages of Cold Start. 20

The Cold Start regime by the Indian army also provoked a response from the

Pakistani military, as the Cold start could prove to be dangerous. Nasr, a short-range

battlefield nuclear missile has been developed as a direct response to Cold Start. 21 This

is problematic on two fronts. It could lead to instability because as Narang argued,

deploying such a short-range missile would pressurize Pakistani’s C2, increasing the risk

of using the missile for futile purposes. This could also bring about further response from

the Indian side. Keeping in mind the restrained response of the Indian army, there exist

questions regarding India’s response. Would India retaliate at a nuclear level? Would this

escalate into a nuclear conventional war? These questions highlight trends that hint that

this could lead to instability in the future.

On one hand, we have a system that is moved to potentially destabilize the

military doctrine in Cold Start. On the contrary, we have a military that is keen to show

its mark in the South Asian military stand off. Scholars, such as Shiv Shankar Menon

among others, do argue that there are other reasons for the stability present in this

20 “Why General Bipin Rawat acknowledged the Cold Start Doctrine,” The Wire, January 20, 2017.

21 Inter Services Public Relations, No. PR94/2011-ISPR, April 19, 2011(press release)

context. The existence of poor diplomacy from the Indian side, miscalculations and

communications from the Pakistani’s, effective brinkmanship and American mediation

are few among the many that are put forth. But one factor that has systematically deterred

escalation in every single potential crisis since 1974 is the presence of nuclear weapons.

Hence, amidst opinions about the instability in the future, nuclear deterrence in South

Asia have so far been robust.

 Vadlamani 1
3

Works Cited

Khan, F. (2003). Challenges to nuclear stability in South Asia. The Nonproliferation

Review, 10(1), pp.59-74.

Sagan, S. and Waltz, K. (2013). The spread of nuclear weapons. New York, NY: Norton.

Narang, Vipin. "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian

Stability." 4 International Security 34, no. 3 (2009): 38-78.

S. Paul Kapur. "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia." International Security

33, no. 2 5 (2008): pp. 72.

Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, Harvard

University) 8

Ganguly, Sumit, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,”

"Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Deterred India,” Hindu, March 10, 2009.

Scott D. Sagan, "The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine," in Sagan,

Inside Nuclear South Asia, pp. 219-263.

“Why General Bipin Rawat acknowledged the Cold Start Doctrine,” The Wire, January
20, 2017.

Inter Services Public Relations, No. PR94/2011-ISPR, April 19, 2011(press release)