The Categorical Revolution: Democratic Uprising in the Middle East

Author(s): IRFAN AHMAD

Source: Economic and Political Weekly , NOVEMBER 5, 2011, Vol. 46, No. 44/45
(NOVEMBER 5, 2011), pp. 30-35
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly

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I PERSPECTIVES
PERSPECTIVES I
The Categorical Revolution:
Democratic Uprising in the
Middle East
IRFAN AHMAD
Why 'The Categorical
The protests over the past year
Revolution'?
across the "Middle East" are
perhaps saying that the region
than 2% of the population participated
In the
first and foremost belongs to itsFrench
(Kurzman 2004: viii;revolution
cf, Milani 2010:
people and that the categories
26). In the of
Egyptian revolution of 2011, the
percentage of population participating in
"oil-rich", "oil-less" and "main
the revolution was surely far greater.1
route" are at best exciting
Symbolic of the recent convulsions in the
materials for a historian's archive.
the Middle East (first Tunisia and later
While unfolding this "categorical
Libya), the Egyptian revolution is thus his
toric and momentous. Recently, a demo
revolution", this article explodes
cratic storm has swept one Muslim coun
two key myths: (1) that of the
try after another. Clearly, we do not know
terminology of the MiddletheEast,
outcome of these convulsions in differ
and (2) Islam's incompatibility
ent places - diverse as they are - because
with democracy. as phenomena they are far from over.
Indeed, one might say that these momentous
changes are mere beginnings, the future
of which remain as much open as unpre
dictable. Furthermore, the future will de
pend not just on local, but more impor
tantly, the global actors, in particular, the
United States (us), Britain, France and the
European Union which have their century
long geostrategic interests in the region.
This article is not precisely about the
future of the Middle East. My attempt here is
to understand the unfolding of the dramatic
change in the region since Mohammad
An earlier version of this paper was presented
Bouazizi, a young street vendor of Tunisia,
at the symposium "Democratic Storm in the
publicly committed suicide in front of the
Muslim World: The Categorical Revolution" at
Monash University, on 23 March, 2011.1 thank
municipal office (on 17 December 2010) to
co-panellists Sayed Khatab, Benjaminprotest against the routine humiliation
Macqueen, Salih Yucel and the audience meted for
out by the police (Al-Jazeera 2011).
their reflections. I also wish to thank Kannan
Can we give this dramatic change, set in
Srinivasan and Nida for their thoughtful
motion by the self-immolation of Moham
comments and references. Discussions with
John Keane (University of Sydney) and Linda
mad Bouazizi, a name? I have chosen to
Herrera (University of Illinois, Urbana call it "the categorical revolution". Let me
Champaign) about the "new" Middle East have explain what I mean by this phrase.
been enriching. I use "categorical" in a double sense.
Irfan Ahmad ilrfan.Ahmad@monash.edu) is First, as an adjective of "category" by
with the School of Political and Social Inquiry which I mean the conceptual category, the
Caulfield Campus, Monash University,
notions and tools with which we think,
Australia.
rather have been verily forced to think
November 5, 2011 vol xlvi nos 44 & 45 E32S3 Economic & Political weekly
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with. Intellectual categories are not formed
overnight. Nor do they disappear over a
fine weekend. In the case of the Middle
East, many important categories have
been dominant for over a century; at least
they have been dominant since the
second world war. I shall discuss these
categories more fully later; let me quickly
mention here one such hegemonic cate
gory; namely, Islam and democracy are
by definition opposed to each other. The
recent events in the Middle East have sub
stantially destabilised, if not nullified,
this conceptual category. They have
of 1789, less uprooted several other established myths
and lies, hitherto often packaged and
paraded as truth.
Second, the recent events are also cate
gorical in the sense that they are not con
ditional. They are "unqualified, direct, ex
plicit" (Oxford English Dictionary). By this
I mean the recent events are categorical
enough to question the universal view -
dominant on tv, internet and newspapers
as well as in the syllabi of the universities
across the globe - that Islam and democ
racy are antithetical: that Muslims cannot
have democracy on their own; they badly
need benign external promoters such as
the us or European Union. Barack Obama's
reluctant and belated appropriation of the
"Arab Spring" notwithstanding, it needs
to be noted that it happened in spite of,
and indeed, as a critique of the West in
general and the us in particular.2 The re
cent events are also categorical in that
they cry for a redefinition of democracy, a
democracy that questions the universal
language of "national interests", and "geo
politics". Against the ruthless pursuit of
"national interest" and "geopolitics" -
which is the supreme principle of global
politics (Ahmad 2011) - the democratic
uprising in the Muslim world perhaps ges
tures a different language of enacting pol
itics - a politics of ethics and dignity.
In what follows, I interrogate two key
myths the categorical revolution has nearly
exploded. In the first section of this arti
cle, I examine the myth of the termino
logy, the very term called the Middle East
that is used in the West for the Middle
East. What does the term Middle East
mean? What precisely does it connote in
the western imagination? And in what
specific ways does the categorical revolu
tion speak to the term "the Middle East"?
In the second section, I discuss another
key myth - Islam's incompatibility with
democracy. Contra the established wis
dom, here I argue that far from being a
benevolent patron to democracy in the
Middle East, the West, in fact, consistently
de-democratised the region. Clearly, this
contention presupposes not merely the
normative compatibility between Islam
and democracy, but also the actual exist
ence of democracy and then proceeds to
ask how these democratic experiments
were subverted. A key mechanism of this
de-democratisation, championed, inter
alios, by Fareed Zakaria (editor-at-large of
Newsweek) has been the concerted efforts
to promote constitutional liberalism, pre
sided over by a select elite subservient to
the West, at the expense of political de
mocracy. I discuss Zakaria at some length
because he represents the mainstream
western perspective and is considered im
portant. In 1999, Esquire described him
"the most influential foreign policy advis
er of his generation" and in 2010 Foreign
Policy named him "one of the top 100 glo
bal thinkers".3 In the third and final sec
tion, I cautiously predict if and to what
extent the categorical revolution may in
augurate a new understanding of the the
ory as well as practice of democracy. Here
I engage with Derrida's notion of "democ
racy to come". Parenthetically, I also high
light the meaning of tahrir -Tahrlr Square
being the symbol of the categorical revolu
tion - and its relationship with the role of
intellectuals.
1 The Middle East - The Very Term
In the last 100 years or so, several catego
ries have ruled the Middle East. One such
important category has been the term
Middle East itself. Anthropologically spea
it is a geographical designation which puts West only in relation to whether it was
the West and Europe at the centre of the "oil-rich" or "oil-less".4
world. Historically, the term emerged in Stookey's description of the Middle East
the late 19th century. Alfred Mahan, an was in perfect consonance with the earlier
American navy officer, invented the term imperial description, particularly by the
Middle East and used it in his book Anglo-French alliance. Long before the
advent of the language of oil-rich or oil
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,
1600-1783. Later on, Halford Mackinder, a
less Middle East, it was Egypt's water and
land,
liberal imperialist of Britain, invested not her humanity, which rendered
this
term with some popularity that Egypt
subseimportant to the European powers.
The
quently only increased and became opening of the Suez Canal in 1869
sedi
mented (Khalidi 2003:170). (marked by an international pompous
Ever since its coinage, the western party
power at which the chief guest was France's
empress,
elite (in the sense used by Mills 2000) has Eugenie) generated a fervent
seldom used the term Middle East toresponse
prop from the literati of Victorian
erly refer to its human populationBritain.
in its British writers called it "brilliant";
entirety with its diverse, rich, social-cul
the canal epitomised "progress". "Brilliant"!
tural textures. Rather the Middle East has Fine. "Progress"! Ok. But for whom? Clear
often been used to mean an object "out ly, it was for the British population. Egypt's
there". For the western power elite, it in people did not matter at all. In fact, they
variably has two interconnected referents. were not regarded as even human; they
First, it refers to a land or area of multiple were mere beasts. Only 20 years earlier,
resources and strategic interests. the Suez Canal had been thrown open to
This is probably best illustrated by Rob the enhancement of Europe's ruthless com
ert W Stookey's description of the Middle mercial greed, Florence Nightingale, who
East. A prominent member of the us for had briefly lived in Egypt in 1849, de
eign service (with postings in the Middle scribed Egyptians as "a race of lizards,
East and a doctorate in political science), scrambling over the broken monuments".
in 1984, he published an edited book from William George Hamley (d 1893), a
Stanford University's Hoover Institution colonel in the Corps of Royal Engineers
on War, Revolution and Peace. The books and a novelist to boot, spoke of the im
published from Hoover Institution (Stookey mense benefits flowing (to England and
1984: iv) were "concerned with the us Europe) from the "piercing of Isthmus [of
involvement in world and regional poli Suez]" (both cited in Haddad: 2005: 366,
tics". Stookey (1984: xiii, italics added) 385). That 1,20,000 Egyptian labourers
began the book's introduction as follows: (almost slaves) died during the canal's
"Considering the economic and strategic construction over a period of 10 years
significance for our national interests, the (Ogen 2008: 527) was of no consequence.
Arabian peninsula is not well known to Ultimately, what mattered to the western
the general public". And this is how, within power elite was that because of the Suez
the framework of the us national interest, Canal, Egypt became a "main route"
he made the Middle East "known" to his (Lewis 1995: 298) between Europe and
American and European audience. Saudi Asia, particularly India. So, Egypt itself
and all the humanity that inhabited it
Arabia, he noted, had the "possession of
one-fourth of the non-communist world's merely signified the canal as a bare route

king, it is an etic, external (in contra oil reserves". to India. Egypt mattered insofar as the
distinction to emic) term. People of the Given the logic of the cold war preva
Suez Canal provided the shortest sea route
Middle East themselves did not coin this lent at the time of the book's publication,between western Europe and Asia, includ
term. Even today there are not many in the word "non-communist" is clearly iming the Far East and Australia; it reduced
the distance (formerly crossed via Cape of
the Middle East who actually use it. Out portant. A more crisp description is of
side too it does not have a global currency. fered soon after the passage cited above.Good Hope) between western Europe and
For instance, Indians do not use the term He described Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as Asia by more than 3,000 kilometres (Ogen
Middle East; they usually call it West Asia. "oil-rich" states. In contrast, he called the 2008: 529). Not surprisingly, when Egyp
So, when I hear this term I often ask my then two Yemens as "oil-less" (Stookey tian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, in
self: middle between which two points or 1984: xvi, xviii, xix). It is evident how 1956, nationalised the Suez Canal, the
locations? And yes, East of what? Clearly, the Middle East made any sense to the French press screamed that Nasser was a

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PERSPECTIVES

new Hitler (Shepherd Jr 1956: 6). emotion,

In Britishlike an eastern bridegroom it is hard to identify any Islamic leader who
about
opinion too he was dubbed as "another to lift the veil of his.. .unseen bride"made a reputation as an advocate...of demo
cracy while in office. Why is this? This ques
Mussolini", "another Hitler" and "a in
(cited madNairn 1999:203). Such is the tech
tion inevitably leads to the issue of culture.
dog" (Hitchens and Rostow 1986:102).
nology of masculine de-humanisation!
Huntington, indeed, averred that there
The people's protests across the Middle
My point about the West's conceptuali
sation of the Middle East as a land of mul East contest such a western masculine was an inverse relationship: more Mus
tiple resources with geostrategic saliencethinking. The democratic uprisings are
lims = less democracy. Read this: "Once
will become clearer if we look at Afghaniperhaps the strongest voice crying out became a majority in Lebanon ...
Muslims
stan. Technically, Afghanistan is not partthat the Middle East is first of all its Lebanese
people democracy collapsed" (1991:22,
of the Middle East. However, after 9/11,and that the categories of "oil-rich",
28)."oil
In his theorisation of democracy in
America, Tocqueville accorded much sig
many university presses in the us includless" and "main route" are at best exciting
ed even books on Pakistan (not to mentionmaterials for a historian's archive. nificance to the role Christianity played in
Afghanistan) in their catalogues on the fashioning civil society. However, like
Middle East rather than South Asia.5 Ever 2 The Myth of Islam's Hostility Huntington, he too held that the Quranic
since the 19th century, the West has oftento Democracy emphasis on faith rather than splendid
viewed Afghanistan as no more than a Let me discuss another category dominantdeeds made Islam fanatical and inhospita
mass of land and thus dispossessed for decades in western academia. This cat ble to democracy (Kelly 1995). Differenti
Afghanistan of, what to the West was, heregory is the so-called incompatibilityating between three versions of Islam - re
only possession, her geostrategic signifi between Islam and democracy. Though ligion, civilisation and politics - Lewis
cance. In itself it had barely any value; itmuch older, this debate got intensified in
stated that the last one was surely hostile
was important to the extent that it bethe wake of "Democracy's Third Wave"to democracy. The first two are also hos
came the fulcrum of what is known as the ending in 1990. During this wave, whichtile because "in Islam ... there is from the

Great Game between the imperial BritainHuntington called a "Catholic wave", beginning interpenetration of ... religion
and the tsarist Russia to exercise control 30 countries made the transition to democ and the state" (Lewis 1996: 54, 61). Ber
over Central Asia and India. Curzon, later racy In contrast, between 1980 and 1991, nard Lewis, in fact, remarked that, like
to become India's viceroy, exemplifiedof the world's 37 Muslim-majority coun Christianity, Islam is not a religion. "Islam
such a geostrategic conceptualisation tries only two were democratic (Hunting from its inception", he declared, "is a reli
of Afghanistan: ton 1991: 28). By 2005, of the undemocrat gion of power" (1986: 82). Curiously
ic regimes across the globe, Muslim coun enough, Islam's equation with power was
Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia
- to many these words breathe only a sensetries constituted a total of 55% (Fattah: advanced precisely at a moment when the
of utter remoteness, or a memory of strange
2006:1). This absence of democracy in the Middle East stood disempowered at the
vicissitudes and of moribund romance. To
"Muslim world" has generated many ex hands of the West.
me, I confess they are pieces on a chessboard
upon which is being played out a game for planations. Following the third wave, The lack of democracy in the Middle
Huntington wrote:
the domination of the world (cited in Rashid East was attributed primarily to the
2001:145).
Once viewed as no more than an area of

multiple resources with strategic signifi

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november 5, 2011 vol xlvi nos 44 & 45 EH22 Economic & Political weekly

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 PERSPECTIVES

standard
distinctiveness of Islam as a religion. Ifis not a sufficient explanation the form of parliament's demand for the
because
such an understanding is valid, how do we what we see is not just the double eviction of the us navy base from Bahrain.
explain the democratic upsurge but
in rather
the a series of multiple standards. It is important to mention here that the
Middle East? Logically, it will mean that robbery is probably an appro American military presence in Bahrain
Conceptual
the people marching in the street and
priate term to construe such a sudden dates to 1949. After the withdrawal of
chanting for democracy, even sacrificing
shift in the very terms of contrasting, even British forces, American presence sharply
their lives for it - were not Muslims. That
contradicting, explanations for the ab increased subsequently. Legally, Bahrain's
is, their struggle for democracysence
hasand
nopresence of democracy. parliament was right in asking for the
relations whatsoever to Islam. Indeed, this
The democratic storm swept across the eviction of the us navy. But the ruling Al
seems to be the case. Now that the Middle
Middle East not only because of the avail Khalifa dissolved parliament in 1975.
East has risen for democracy, most com ability of Facebook, youth unrest, and so Since then there has been no democratic
mentators have changed their explanaon; it was, in fact, a continuation of yearn institution until 2002. Various vibrant
tory paradigm. ings for democracy the history of which is institutions of civil society such as trade
The democratic storm in Egypt, Tunisia much older than what most commentators unions were all crushed. So, what mat
and Yemen is now explained not in termswould have us believe. People in the Mid tered to the us was not the voice of the
of Islam, but in terms of technology, Face dle East have been desiring democracy for Bahraini people, but America's national
book, youth, the rate of unemployment, long; it was the western power which con interest, which was to keep the American
and so on and so forth. Newsweek (21 Febtinually subverted and derailed it. In light navy base in Bahrain. Again, this is a
ruary, 2011; also see The Economist, 19-25 of the argument, I propose here the im classic example of how the West de
February 2011) ran a story titled "Faceportant question is not if Islam is compati democratised the Middle East (for details,
book Freedom Fighter". One commentator ble with democracy for it was a bogus see Ahmad 2011).
seemed to psychologise the issue in that question from the beginning (for details, It is for this pursuit of national interest
he attributed the fall of the regime of Musee Ahmad 2011), but how the West de by the West that, intellectuals such as
barak less to the massive demonstrations democratised the Middle East. To pursue Fareed Zakaria recently began to advo
and more to the loss of the grandchild of
my argument, consider two examples. cate constitutional liberalism at the cost of

the octogenarian President Mubarak. Af political democracy. In 1997, he wrote an

Coup against Mosaddeq
ter the sudden death of "old man's [Mu article in Foreign Affairs. In it, his main
barak's] great joy of life", the 12 year-oldFirst, the 1953 coup against the electedcontention was that electoral democracy
prime minister of Iran, Mohammadis not coterminous with democracy per se
Mohammad, Dickey (2011: 29) wrote in
Newsweek, "the spark behind his eyes wasMosaddeq. Mosaddeq enjoyed the approv for constitutionalism - individual liberty,
al of Iran's parliament for his nationalisa rights, checks against the abuse of power
gone". It is clear how the standard of ex
planation has changed - the absence oftion programme. As we know, the us-uk (by the state, church or society), and so on
democracy is because of Islam; the pres alliance organised a coup against Mosad - are equally, rather more, important for
deq and toppled him. Justifying Iran's democracy. In itself, this is a valid point
ence of democracy is in spite of Islam. This
notion persists despite the fact that many subversion of democracy, the then Ameri and I tend to agree with him. However,
protestors chanted, inter alia, "Allah 0 Akcan ambassador to Iran said: Zakaria drew a different conclusion from
bar" (Keane 2011: 3) and their leaflets and it - a conclusion which at once legitimised
Only a coup d'etat can save the situation.
badges carried verses from the Qur'an.6 Mosaddeq [Iran's Premier] has so flattered the authoritarian status quo and stigma
Before I might get misunderstood, let me the mob as the sources of his powers that he tised the oppositional forces in the Middle
quickly add that I am not saying that reli had, I fear, made it impossible for a successor East. Below is the relevant passage:
to oust him by normal constitutional meth
gion was the leitmotif of the categorical In the Islamic world, from the Palestinian
ods (cited in Abrahmian 2008:120).
revolution. Nor is it my point that the idea Authority to Iran to Pakistan, democratisa
tional framework of all actors in the revoIt is clear how Iran's democracy was tion has led to an increasing role for theo
cratic politics, eroding long-standing tradi
lution was uniform and singular: agnos sacrificed to serve the national interests of
tions of secularism and tolerance. In many
tics, Marxists, ex-Marxists, atheists as the us-uk alliance. This is a classic illus parts of that world, such as Tunisia, Morocco,
well as non-Muslims too took part in it. tration of de-democratisation I put forEgypt, and some of the Gulf States, were
My simple point is that contra the estab consideration to the readers. Another elections to be held tomorrow, the resulting
lished myth that Islam is hostile to democ example is Bahrain's de-democratisationregimes would almost certainly be more
illiberal than the ones now in place.
racy many also participated in the revolu from 1974 to 2002. Bahrain was a British
tion because they were inspired by Islam's protectorate. In 1971, Bahrain became inIn the Foreign Affairs article, Zakaria's
focus was not the Middle East. However,
message of democracy and human digni dependent. In 1973 the first elections were
ty. Returning to the shift in the explana held and an elected parliament formed.
his subsequent writings deal specifically
with the Middle East. In the wake of 9/11,
tion for the absence and presence of de That parliament challenged the unbridled
in Newsweek, he wrote a long article with
mocracy, one might say that it shows the authority of Al-Khalifa, the family which
double standards used by the western has ruled Bahrain since 1783. A major a messianic title "How to Save the Arab

commentators. But the logic of double challenge to the Al-Khalifa family came World".
in Outlining the us policy towards

Economic & Political weekly nrar] November 5, 2011 vol xlvi nos 44 s. 45

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PERSPECTIVES

the Middle East, he wrote: judgment stood". This fable typifies the
incompatibility with democracy is both
Oil, strategic ties, history will enduretheoretically
our on ideology and practice that the sovereign
and historically flawed. Con
going involvement. We will continue tothis
tra aid all-pervasive myth, I showed howdecides well before the legal procedures
the Egyptian regime, we will continue to
the West, on the contrary, de-democra
unfold; judgment is delivered prior to trial
protect the Saudi monarchy... The question
tised the Middle East from the early 1950s
and irrespective of evidence. The lesson of
really is, should not we ask for something in
onwards.
return? By not pushing these regimes, the To this end, I offered the ex
the fable is succinctly contained in the
amples of West's de-democratisation of
United States would be making a conscious opening lines: "The strong are always best
decision to let things stay as they are - toand Iran. I conclude this section
Bahrain at proving they are right/witness the case
once again opt for 'stability'...We don't seek
we are now going to cite" (2005: x).
by showing how the liberal position such
democracy in the Middle East - at least not
as Fareed Zarakria's that constitutional
Derrida takes the figures of wolf and
yet. We seek first.. .what I have called 'consti
ism, not
tutional liberalism' - the rule of law, indi democracy, should be lamb
promoted to institute a deconstruction of the
insepara
vidual rights, private property...the the Arab world is, in fact, a new mecha
contemporary and past forms of democracy.
tion of Church and state'.7
nism to continue the old western policyThe
of key to his "militant and interminable
As the reader will recall, Zakaria's vari
de-democratising the Middle East. critique" is the notion of "democracy to
ety of conceptualisation of the Middle East come", which at one place in the other
3 Conclusions: 'Democracy to
is precisely what I have been critiquing wise dense text he defines as a protest
(see Section I). Consistent with hisCome' and Tahrlr Square
line of "against all naivete and every political
When asked what he thought about the abuse, every rhetoric that would present
reasoning this is how he, in 2004, justified
the above policy: impact of the French revolution, Chair as a present or existing democracy, as a de
The Arab rulers of the Middle East are auto man Mao Zedong said that it was too early facto democracy, what remains inade
cratic, corrupt and heavy-handed. But theyto say (Osborne 2006: 2).8 If it is too early quate to the democratic demand..." (ibid:
are still more liberal, tolerant and pluralistic for an event of 1789, it is definitely earlier 86). One such inadequacy he identifies is
than those who would likely replace them for an event of 2011 which, in some ways, how democracy continues to be hostage to
(Zakaria 2004: 2).
is still in the making. However, it is my the violent logic of nation and its self-ful
The contradiction in Zakaria's argu hope that it is not the kind of democracy filling interests. He, thus, issues a plea for
ment here comes to its full glare as it unwe have seen in the 20th century and the installing a democratic global order of
dermines his own earlier argument (madefirst decade of the 21st century; from the democracy for the existing international
in 1997) that constitutionalism should notus to Australia, democracy also has a dark arrangements remain so distant from his
be sacrificed to the shallow logic of elec history of subjugation and utter violence conceptualisation of "democracy to come".
toral democracy. It is too well-known to (Ahmad 2009: 233-36). The categorical Describing the binding and enforceable
repeat that "the Arab rulers" like Mubarakrevolution, I hope and hypothesise, con power of the Security Council as "mon
repeatedly organised sham elections andtextually exemplifies some elements of strosity", Derrida observes:
showed little, if any, respect to individual what Jacques Derrida termed "democracy To put it in the most cut and dried terms, I
liberty, rights or constitutionalism of anyto come". would say that the fate of the democracy to
kind. In fact, the regime of Mubarak was Though present in earlier writings (e g, come, in relation to world order, depends on
highly skilled in the business of illegal de1994, 2004), his posthumous publication, what will become of this strange and sup
posedly all-powerful institution called the
tention, torture and killings of scores ofRouges: Two Essays on Reason, offers a
Security Council (2005: 98).
opposition activists (Hafez 2003). Yet, lib fuller treatment of "democracy to come".
erals like Zakaria have no qualms in justiIn preface to Rouges, Derrida cites a fable Returning to Derrida's fable, the demo
fying the brutal, anti-democratic regimes from La Fontaine (a 17th century French cratic storm in the Middle East shows one
(continually violating the constitutional fabulist). Titled The Wolf and the Lamb, it how to gallantly confront the wolf (the
provisions) such as Mubarak's or Salih's inshows how a blood-thirsty wolf, having sovereign) and secure dignity and justice.
Yemen on the lame pretext that "Islamdecided in advance to kill an innocent By enacting his individual sacrificial death,
ists" and "fundamentalists" might take lamb, enacts the justification to kill her.
Mohammad Bouazizi, it seems, succeeded
in lighting the hopes and aspiration of
over the reign of power. Right in the thickThe wolf accuses the lamb of dirtying the
of the Arab Spring or what I call the catewater to which she protests saying she is
millions for securing the collective life of
gorical revolution, the Dutch politician20 feet downstream from the wolf, and
Ayaan Hirsi Ali (now a resident fellow attherefore, could in no way muddy the
Economic&PoliticalwEEKLY
American Enterprise Institute, Washingwolfs water. In violent disregard to the
ton, dc) did exactly what Zakaria had pre lamb's plea based on evidence, the wolf available at
scribed much earlier. In The Wall Street persists in his allegation: "you are muddy
Journal (21 February 2011), she warned of
ing it". More allegations follow; the poor
Altermedia-Bookshop Ecoshop
M G Road
the takeover of Egypt by the "fundamen
lamb continues to present her defence and Thrissur 680 001
talist" Muslim brotherhood. evidence. But to no avail! The wolf always Kerala
To summarise, my argument in this sec wins. The passage ends: "The Wolf drag Ph: 2422974
tion has been that the notion of Islam's ged and ate his mid-day snack/so trial and

november 5, 2oii vol xlvi nos 44 & 45 033 Economic & Political weekly

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 PERSPECTIVES

Keane, John (2011): "The Refolution in the Arab

justice itself. Though anchored 3inSee his website http://www.fareedzakaria.com/
the
home/About.html. Accessed on 20 June 2011. World", Paper presented at the International Sym
nation state spaces, voices like Bouazizi's
4 On carbon, posium
oil and politics, see Mitchell's Spirited Voices from the Muslim World: Is
(2009)
and scores of those who followed him in fine and novel analysis. lam, Democracy and Gender Rights, University of
Sydney,
5 I owe this information to Ravi Arvind Palat, 28-30 April.
State
other modes of resistance across the
University of New York at Binghamton, Kelly,
who Christopher
men (1995): "Civil and Uncivil Reli
Middle East were not, as Keane (2011:tioned
5) this in an exchange (on list serve gions: Tocqueville on Hinduism and Islam", His
H-ASIA,
dated 26 August 2009; the author subscribes to
tory of European Ideas, 20 (4-6): 845-50.
fittingly notes, fired by the credo of this
na list) on "Is Afghanistan Part of S Asia?
Khalidi, AcaI (2003): "The Middle East as Area in
Rashid
tionalist gusto. They are probably vitaldemic
in Boundaries and Geographical Regions".
an Era of Globalisation" in Ali Mirsepassi Amrita
Also available at http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/
Basu and Frederick Weaver (ed.), Localising
frastructure to inaugurate a global order
logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-asia&month=09o8
Knowledge in a Globalising World (Syracuse: Syra
&week=d&msg=S9kjy9lTGicgZnR3HmpNQA&u
of justice and dignity. They exemplify a cuse University Press), pp 170-90.
ser=&pw= Accessed 10 July 2011. Kurzman, Charles (2004): The Unthinkable Revolution
promise and its renewability which 6isThese
ba badges are in author's possession; in
I thank
Iran (Harvard, Mass.: Harvard University
sic to "democracy to come". Linda Herrera (University of Illinois at Press).
Urbana
Champaign) for gifting them to me. Lewis, Bernard (1986): "The Return of Islam" in Mi
Before I conclude, let me say a word
7 Given that Islam has no church, is not chael
Zakaria's
Curtis (ed.), The Middle East Reader (New
about the meaning of TahrTr square, the
call to separate church and state in the Brunswick:
Middle Transaction Books), pp 69-82.
East not only eurocentric but also absurd?
centre of the democratic uprising in Cairo. - (1995): The Middle East: 200 Years History from
8 This remark is also attributed to Mao's
the Rise of Islam Christianity to the Present Day
TahrTr etymologically means liberation,
contemporary, Zhou Enlai (see BBC undated. "In
(London: Phoenix Press).
freedom and deliverance. In Arabic and side China's Ruling Party", http://news.bbc.
- (1996): "A Historical View: Islam and Liberal De
co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/o2/china_party_
mocracy", Journal of Democracy, 7(2): 52-63.
Urdu, tahrlr also means writing and the congress/china_ruling_party/key_people_
Milani, Abbas (2010): "Three Paradoxes of Islamic
events/html/zhou enlai.stm. Accessed on 15 July
written product - letter, note, message, Revolution in Iran" in The Iranian Revolution at
2011).
dispatch and document (Al-Mawrid Mod 30 (Washington DC: Middle East Institute).
9 Cf, Bayat (Bayat, Asef (2011): "Paradoxes of Refo
lution" http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/ Mills, C Wright (2000): [1956]: The Power Elite (Ox
ern English-Arabic Dictionary 1997: 285 ford: Oxford University Press), New Edition, with
786/paradoxes-of-arab-refo-lutions, accessed 5
286). The purpose of writing is thus to lib June 2011) and Keane (2011) who use the term a new afterword by Alan Wolfe.
"refoultion" as a synthesis between reform and Mitchell, Timothy (2009): "Carbon Democracy",
erate: not just personally, but also collec
revolution. Economy and Society 38(3):399-432.
tively; not nationally, but humanly. The Nairn, C M (1999): Ambiguities of Heritage (Karachi:
aim of writings by the scholars, intellectu City Press).
Newsweek (2011): "The Facebook Freedom Fighter",
als, not to speak of most pundits in the
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NOTES
Rienner).
should be reproduced in any form without
Haddad,
1 Drawn from numbers of protesters in Emily A (2005): "Digging to India: Moderni
different
ty, Imperialism and the Suez Canal", Victorian
towns/cities listed at Wikipedia http://en. prior permission of the author(s).
Studies 47(3): 363-96.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_revolution_of_
Hafez, Mohammed A soft/hard copy of the author(s)'s approval
2011. Accessed on 2iMarch 2011.1 am aware of the H (2003): Why Muslims Rebel: Re
extent to which this source is accurate. pression and Resistance in The Islamic World, should be sent to epw.
(Boulder, Colo: Lynne Reinner Publishers).
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49),andthe
Others: Suez 1956", Grand Street 6(1):
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102-119. of
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indeed the Samuel (1991): "Democracy's Third the articles, epw can be contacted for help.
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Economic & Political weekly 0353 November 5, 2011 vol xlvi nos 44 & 45 35

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