REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SANDIGANBAY AN
Quezon City

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILI PINES,

Plaintiff,

-versus- S8-10-CRM-0086-0087
For: Falsification of Public
Document (Art. 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code and Perjury

DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO,
Accused.

Present:

DE LA CRUZ, J., Chairperson

ECONG, J. and
CALDONA, J.

PROMULGATED:
..,

AUG 0 Z 2017 -~

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CALOONA, J.:

Before the court for resolution is the Urgent Motion to Dismiss [by
reason of Res Judicata Based on the Decision dated 10 February 2015
Resolution
Criminal Cases Nos. S8-10-CRM-0086-0087
Pp vs. Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
P age \2 of 9
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affirmed with Finality by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 220420] dated May
1, 2017 filed by accused Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio, through counsel, as well
as the Comment/Opposition thereto dated May 1,6, 2017 filed by the
prosecution, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which elicited the
Reply dated June 29, 2017.

Accused-movant Villa-Ignacio seeks the dismissal of the instant

criminal cases for falsification of public document and perjury in view of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 10, 2015 dismissing the
administrative complaint against him for Dishonesty and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which was affirmed with
finality by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated December 7, 2015.
According to the accused-movant, the Court of Appeals found the
administrative case wanting in substantial evidence which is the requisite
quantum of proof for charges of that nature. He thus contended that the
instant cases which require a higher quantum of proof, that is, beyond
reasonable doubt, should be dismissed considering that all these charges
arose from his single act alleged to be a clear and deliberate falsehood in
filling out Question No. 24 of his 2005 Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in connection with his application for the
position of Ombudsman quoted hereunder:

Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise

imposed a sanction for the violation of any law, decree, ordinance
or regulation by any court, tribunal, or any other government office,
agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or any foreign country
or found guilty of an administrative offenses or imposed any
administrative sanction?

He posited that the Court of Appeals found that the act complained of
does not constitute "betrayal of public trust" as a ground for dismissal as a
special prosecutor as defined in the case of Gonzales vs. Office of the
Resolution
Criminal Cases Nos. S8-10-CRM-0086-0087
Pp vs. Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
P age 13 of 9
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President', He further contended that the CA ruling characterized his non-

disclosure in his PDS as "plain error of judgment, where circumstances
indicate that there is good faith and a lack of any attendant bad faith
necessary to constitute betrayal of public trust" which thus negates the
crimes of falsification of public document and perjury. Considering that the
same judgment is already final and executory, the accused-movant
asseverated that the instant criminal cases are dismissible under the
doctrine of res judicata.

For its part, the prosecution countered that res judicata is a doctrine
of civil law and cannot be applied in the instant criminal proceedings.
Furthermore, the administrative case and the criminal case do not involve
the same cause of action which is one of the indispensable elements for
the doctrine to apply. The prosecution likewise maintained that the criminal
case is of an independent nature and the Sandiganbayan must determine
the accused-movant's liability without its hands being tied by what
transpired in the administrative case. Additionally, the prosecution pointed
out that the CA did not categorically rule that accused-movant acted in
good faith when it cited the case of Gonzales but it merely emphasized and
discussed the phrase "betrayal of public trust" as a ground for the dismissal
of a special prosecutor. Thus, whether accused-movant's act or omission
was a plain error of judgment which indicates good faith and lack of bad
faith is a matter to be threshed out when he presents his defense in a full-
blown trial.

In his Reply, the accused-movant contended that the Supreme Court,

In a number of cases, applied the doctrine of res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment in dismissing criminal cases. He further

I G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012

Resolution
Criminal Cases Nos. S8-10-CRM-0086-0087
Pp vs. Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
P age 14 of 9
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contended that conclusiveness of judgment does not require identity of

causes of action.

As a general proposition, it is well-entrenched rule that public officials

are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a
wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and
administratively liable for the same act. Administrative liability is thus
separate and distinct from penal and civil liability2. Thus, the dismissal of
the administrative case does not preclude the filing or continuation of the
criminal case against the erring public official.

A circumspect consideration, however, of the decision of the CA in

dismissing the administrative case against herein accused-movant which
was later affirmed by the Supreme Court, leads this Court to depart from
the aforecited general rule. The CA held that the failure of Villa-Ignacio to
disclose in his 2005 PDS the administrative case wherein he was
reprimanded by the Supreme Court on account of his failure to act on a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period in a case pending
before his sala while he was an RTC judge does not constitute "betrayal of
public trust". In its decision, it quoted at length the definition of the said
phrase as discussed in the case of Gonzales vs. Office of the President',
VIZ:

While it was deemed broad enough to cover any violation of the

oath of office, the impreciseness of its definition also created
apprehension that "such an overarching standard may be too broad
and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the
legislature." Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of public trust
that referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes as penal
offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in
office" could be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or
negligence in office. However, deliberating on some workable

Melendres vs Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, et. al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012,
citations omitted.
3 Ibid.
Resolution
Criminal Cases Nos. SB-10-CRM-0086-0087
Pp vs. Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
P age 15 of 9
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standard by which the ground could be reasonably interpreted, the

Constitutional Commission recognized that human error and good
faith precluded an adverse conclusion:

MR. VILLACORTA: x x x One last matter with respect

to the use of the words "betrayal of public trust" as
embodying a ground for impeachment that has been raised
by the Honorable Regalado. I am not a lawyer so I can
anticipate the difficulties that a layman may encounter in
understanding this provision and also the possible abuses
that the legislature can commit in interpreting this phrase. It
is to be noted that this ground was also suggested in the
1971 Constitutional Convention. A review of the Journals of
that Convention will show that it was not included; it was
construed as encompassing acts which are just short of
being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against
public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable
negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of
discretionary powers. I understand from the earlier
discussions that these constitute violations of the oath of
office, and also I heard the Honorable Davide say that even
the criminal acts that were enumerated in the earlier 1973
provision on this matter constitute betrayal of public trust as
well. In order to avoid confusion, would it not be clearer to
stick to the wording of Section 2 which reads: "may be
removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, and
other high crimes, graft and corruption or VIOLATION OF
HIS OATH OF OFFICE", because if betrayal of public trust
encompasses the earlier acts that were enumerated, then it
would behoove us to be equally clear about this last
provision or phrase.

MR. NOLLEDO: x x x I think we will miss a golden

opportunity if we fail to adopt the words "betrayal of public
trust" in the 1986 Constitution. But I would like him to know
that we are amenable to any possible amendment. Besides,
I think plain error of judgment, where circumstances
may indicate that there is good faith, to my mind, will
not constitute betrayal of public trust if that statement will
allay the fears of difficulty in interpreting the term.

The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably

acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to "[a]cts
which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross
faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power,
inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of
discretionary powers". In other words, acts that should constitute
betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be
Resolution
Criminal Cases Nos. S8-1 O-CRM-0086-0087
Pp vs. Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
P age 16 of 9
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less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such
gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment.

x x x

From the foregoing definition, betrayal of public trust refers to acts

which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness
against public trust, among others. Acts that should constitute betrayal of
public trust as to warrant removal from public office "may be less than
criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and
seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment".

While the CA did not categorically state that Villa-lqnacio was in good
faith, its express statement that the act complained of does not constitute
betrayal of public trust clearly points towards the conclusion that the act
was not "attended by bad faith" as gleaned from the definition of the
phrase. Stated otherwise, the clear import of the pronouncement of the CA
is its finding that there was no bad faith on the part of Villa-Ignacio to
warrant his dismissal from the service. Too, the CA ruled that he cannot be
meted out the extreme penalty of dismissal considering that the case
concealed was not of a serious nature but one which involved his failure to
resolve a motion within the period prescribed by law for which he was only
reprimanded by the Supreme Court. The CA went on to state that what
mitigated his case was the fact that he mentioned in his PDS all the other
cases filed against him. The absence of bad faith therefore negates the
presence of criminal intent sufficient to sustain the instant charges for
falsification and perjury. In fact, good faith is a defense in falsification of
public documents". Anent the crime of perjury, the element of making a
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood is thus considered lacking in
this case. Verily, the elements for such offenses were not met.

4 Layug vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 121047-57, August 16, 2000.

Resolution
Criminal Cases Nos. S8-10-CRM-0086-0087
Pp vs. Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
P age 17 of 9
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

In fine, the CA held that the standard of substantial evidence was not
satisfied and thus dismissed the administrative complaint against herein
accused-movant. It ruled in this wise:

The quantum of proof necessary for the finding of guilt in

administrative cases is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence ,
which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant. While substantial evidence
does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence 'as is
required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable
doubt as is required in criminal cases, it should be enough for a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion.

The finding of the CA that the act of the accused in answering

Question No. 24 does not constitute betrayal of public trust which, on the
basis of its given definition, indicates lack of attendant bad faith, is
conclusive upon this court and thus precludes the prosecution of the instant
criminal cases. The case of Constantino vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. 5 cited
by the accused-movant is instructive, thus:

Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas

Constantino involved an administrative charge, still the findings in
the latter case are binding herein because the same set of facts are
the subject of both cases. What is decisive is that the issues
already litigated in a final and executory judgment preclude by the
principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res
judicata, and even under the doctrine of law of the case, the re-
litigation of the same issue in another action. It is well established
that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed,
it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case
and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule or decision continues to be binding between the same parties
as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue

5 G.R. No. 140656, September 13, 2007,citations omitted.

Resolution
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-10-CRM-0086-0087
Pp vs. Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
P age 18 of 9
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding
effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected
anew since such issue had already been resolved and finally laid to
rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least by
conclusiveness of judgment.

It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs from

criminal liability as the purpose of administrative proceedings on the
one hand is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-
honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other
hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of
the crime. However, the dismissal by the Court of the
administrative case against Constantino based on the same subject
matter and after examining the same crucial evidence operated to
dismiss the criminal case because of the precise finding that the act
from which liability is anchored does not exist.

It is likewise clear from the decision of the Court in Constantino

that the level of proof required in administrative cases which is
substantial evidence was not mustered therein. The same
evidence is again before the Court in connection with the appeal in
the criminal case. Ineluctably, the same evidence cannot with
greater reason satisfy the higher standard in criminal cases such as
the present case which is evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the court finds merit in the contention of the accused-

movant that the presentation of evidence in the criminal cases at bench
based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case
will be a futile and useless exercise as enunciated in the case of People vs.
Sandiganbayan6 which he cited, viz:

Although the dismissal of the criminal case cannot be pleaded

to abate the administrative proceedings primarily on the ground that
the quantum of proof required to sustain administrative charges is
significantly lower than that necessary for criminal actions, the
same does not hold true if it were the other way around, that is, the
dismissal of the administrative case is being invoked to abate the
criminal case. The reason is that the evidence presented in the
administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to
be presented in the criminal case. The prosecution is certainly not
precluded from adducing additional evidence to discharge the
burden of proof required in the criminal cases. However, if the
criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and
evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court trying the
latter already squarely ruled on the absence. of facts and/or

6 G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010, citations omitted.

Resolution
Criminal Cases Nos. S8-10-CRM-0086-0087
Pp vs. Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
P age 19 of 9
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal

indictment, then to still burden the accused to present controverting
evidence despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient
and competent evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Urgent Motion to Dismiss filed

by the accused-movant is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the criminal
cases for falsification of public document and perjury filed against Dennis
M. Villa-Ignacio are DISMISSED.

The bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is ordered
released, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures.

The Hold Departure Order (HDO) issued against the accused in

these cases is hereby recalled.

SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines

~'<'7lll\4,Ou~L'-_
DO M. CALDONA
·---+--I"'\~sociate
Justice

WE CONCUR:

~~~
EFREN ~)ci.J=
LA CRUZ GERALDINE FAITH A. EtONG
Asso~~te Justice Associate Justice
Chairperson