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FACTS IN ISSUE

A-2 and Kanta got married on May 12, 1990. Kanta died within 3 months of her marriage. On
August 11, 1990, she was found dead by hanging from a ceiling fan in the appellants' house.
About 20 days prior to Kanta's death, A-1 had gone to the house of PW-8 and told him that her son
A-2 wanted to start milk vending business and for that a motorcycle is needed for carrying the milk
to the city. She demanded a motorcycle for A-2 to be purchased by PW-8. PW-8 told A-1 that he was
not able to purchase motorcycle as demanded by her, as he was a poor rickshaw puller who did not
have the money to purchase the motorcycle. A-1 warned PW-8 that if he failed to provide a
motorcycle to A- 2, then Kanta would not be allowed to stay in the matrimonial home. PW-8 called
Amar Singh (PW-10) and Mam Chand (DW-1) to his house and told them about the demand made
by A-1.
After the meeting with PW-8, A-1 and A- 2 started harassing and ill-treating her. Some five days
prior to Rakshabandhan, A-2 brought Kanta to the house of PW-8. A-2 left Kanta there and returned
to his house the same day. Kanta told PW-8 about harassment and ill-treatment being meted out to
her by A-1 and A-2. Three days thereafter, A-2 went to the house of PW-8 and told him that he had
come to take Kanta with him as there was engagement ceremony of his brother. A-2 assured PW-8
that he would bring Kanta on the day of Rakshabandhan. Kanta, however, was reluctant in going
with A-2 as she knew that there was no engagement ceremony at her in-law’s place. She had
apprehension that if she went to her matrimonial home, her life would not be spared. PW-8
persuaded his daughter to go along with A-2 as she must spend her entire life with him.
On the insistence of her father, Kanta went to her matrimonial home along with A-2. On the day of
Rakshabandhan, PW-8 and the members of the family waited for Kanta for whole day, but she did
not come. After about eight days i.e., on August 12, 1990, PW-8 was informed by some villager that
Kanta was dead. PW-8 then went to the house of A-1 and A-2 along with few persons and saw the
dead body of Kanta lying in a room. It appeared to PW-8 that Kanta's death had occurred some 2/3
days earlier.
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT

(1) The appellants claimed that a request for a motorcycle from Pale Ram was extremely unlikely
to be filed, well aware that it could not be met by him because he was a Rikshawpuller
earning Rs. 20/- a day.
(2) it may be said that DW-1 was the only credible witness to the claim, but the prosecutors did
not question him. DW-1 was investigated in defence, however, and he denied in his presence
that any application was made by his mother.
(3) the appellants argued that there was no evidence of his son's desire for a motorcycle. they
also argued that in any case the motorcycle's demand for commercial purposes was not
counted as a 'dowry charge' and that no lawsuit should be regarded against the appellants
under Section 304-B IPC. In this case, he relied on a decision of this Court in “Appasaheb &
Anr V. Maharashtra State”1.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS

(1) Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta, a learned Haryana state counsel, supported the High Court's
decision.
(2) The demand of a motorcycle came within 2 months of marriage and when this demand was
not fulfilled, it became a 'dowry' demand, Kanta was constantly mistreated and threatened,
forcing her to take drastic measures to bring an end to her life.
(3) There is no truth in the appellants' counsel's argument that the motorcycle application does
not count as a 'dowry appeal.' All of the necessary elements under Section 304B IPC to carry
home the guilt are defined by the proof of litigation against the appellants.

1
Appasaheb & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 SCC 721.
DOWRY PROHIBITION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1986

“Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986”, enacted section 304B into IPC with effect
from 19 November 1986. The IPC thus instituted substantial offense relating to 'dowry
murder.' The following portion of IPC 304-B reads:
“304B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily
injury or occurs otherwise than under normal 1 (2007) 9 SCC 721 circumstances within seven
years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called dowry death, and such husband or relative shall
be deemed to have caused her death”.
“Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub- section, dowry shall have the same meaning as in
section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961 )”.
(2) “Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”
“The prosecutor must show the following components to assess an offense of dowry death
under Section 304B”:
I. A woman's death may have been caused by burns or physical damage or her death
must have resulted in circumstances other than natural;
II. This death had to have taken place within seven years of her marriage;
III. Her husband or the relatives of her husband must have been subjected to violence or
abuse shortly before his death; and
IV. It must be linked to such violence or abuse;
THE INTERPRETATION OF DOWRY

In the case of Kamesh Panjiyar @ Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar 2 this Court, when
grappling with the word 'dowry' in Section 304B IPC, held as follows:
“The word dowry in Section 304-B IPC has to be understood as it is defined in Section 2 of the
Dowry Act. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the marriage, second is at
the time of marriage and the third at any time after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be
an unending period. But the crucial words are in connection with the marriage of the said parties.
Other payments which are customary payments e.g. given at the time of birth of a child or other
ceremonies as are prevalent in different societies are not covered by the expression dowry. (Satvir
Singh v. State of Punjab3)
As was observed in said case, the suicidal death of a married woman within seven years of her
marriage is covered by the expression ``death of a woman is caused ......or occurs otherwise than
under normal circumstances as expressed in Section 304-B IPC”.

In the case of Appasaheb4 the appellants' learned counsel relied heavily on the following findings
made by this Court:
"A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic
expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is
normally understood".
3 (2005) 2 SCC 388 The Court's findings referred to above must be interpreted in regard to the trial.
“This was a situation in which testimony from the prosecution did not prove any demand for dowry,
as described in Section 2 of the 1961 Act”. The accusation that, in the circumstances of the event, the
deceased was required to carry money for household expenses and to buy manure was not deemed
sufficient to be protected by the 'dowry provision.' Appasaheb 5 can not be translated as making the
absolute presumption that an offer for money or other useful items or security need not be taken into
account. a 'demand for dowry' because of any commercial or financial obligation6.
“Explanation to Section 304-B refers to dowry as having the same meaning as in Section 2 of the
Act, the question is : what is the periphery of the dowry as defined therein? The argument is, there
has to be an agreement at the time of the marriage in view of the words agreed to be given occurring
2
Kamesh Panjiyar @ Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar, 2005 (2) SCC 388
3
Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 8 SCC 633.
4
Ibid
5
Ibid
6
Ibid
therein, and in the absence of any such evidence it would not constitute to be a dowry. It is
noticeable, as this definition by amendment includes not only the period before and at the marriage
but also the period subsequent to the marriage. This position was highlighted in Pawan Kumar and
Ors. v. State of Haryana”.7

JUDGEMENT

The Judgement stated that it is clear that Kanta died in conditions other than natural. There is no
question the evidence that Kanta's death took place within seven years of her marriage. “The
documentation from PW-8 and PW-9 shows that Kanta was exposed to abuse and ill-treatment by
mother and son after PW-8 failed to consider their application for motorcycle purchases. Also there
is evidence of PW-10 that he had been called by PW-8 and DW-1 to his house where his mother
made motorcycle demands. PW-10 said he tried to argue with his mother over PW-8's unwillingness
to send a motorcycle to which mother got angry and warned that Kanta would not be able to live in
her marital home. It is true that the appellants created DW-1 in defense, and in his exam-in-chief he
claimed that he did not encounter mother at PW-8's home, but in cross-examination when faced with
his argument under Section 161 Cr. P.C. where it was reported that he and PW-10 had gone to the
PW-8 house and that both of them (PW-10 and DW-1) had instructed mother to refrain from
requesting a motorcycle”, but DW-1 had no reason whatsoever to give.
Therefore, the DW-1 proof is likely to be dismissed. In the face of the proof given by the
prosecution, “It can not be claimed that the trial court erred in alleging that it was established that the
unlawful demand for motorcycles was made by the mother and son of PW-8 and that Kanta was
harassed because of his failure to supply the motorcycle and that Kanta was suicidally hanged”.
Apparently the PW-8 mother's demand was for her son, and when Pale ram showed his inability to
fulfill the demand, her son began to harass and ill-treat Kanta. In this opinion, it can not be assumed
that son did not follow the matter. The High Court further investigated the matter thoroughly and
came to the conclusion that mother and son had requested motorcycle purchase; The offer was made
within the engagement of 2 months and was a plea for 'dowry' and Kanta was continuously
mistreated and harassed when this demand was not met which led her to take desperate steps to bring
an end to her life. We comply with the High Court opinion set out above. There is no truth in the
appellants' counsel's argument that the motorcycle demand does not count as a 'dowry appeal.' All of

7
Pawan Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana, (1998) 3 SCC 309.
the necessary elements under Section 304B IPC to carry home the guilt are formed by the proof of
litigation against the appellants. As a matter of practice, In the circumstances and the facts of this
case “the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is drawn in full. The appellants
refused to rebut the presumption set out in Section 113B”.

CONCLUSION
In Bachni Devi vs State of Maharasthra, the High Court has also examined the matter thoroughly
and reached the finding that A-1 and A-2 had raised a demand for purchase of motorcycle from PW-
8; this demand was made within two months of the marriage and was a demand towards ‘dowry’.
And when this demand was not met, Kanta was maltreated and harassed continuously which
eventually led her to take the extreme step of finishing her life.
There is no merit in the contention of the counsel for the appellants that the demand of motorcycle
does not qualify as a ‘demand for dowry’. The appellants are found guilty on the basis of 302-B IPC.

I am in full favour of the Court’s verdict of upholding the decision of the High Court and the trial
court. This is a clear case of an offence under section 302-B IPC. Keeping in mind the harassment
and the torture that Kanta had to face, and the fact that she’d rather take her own life than spend a
lifetime with her husband and family says all there is about her situation and how pathetic her
condition should have been.

REFERENCES

● Bachni devi and Anr. Vs State of Haryana, (2011) 4 SCC 427.


● Appasaheb & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 SCC 721.
● S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P, 1996(4) SCC 596.
● L.V. Jadhav vs. Shankar Rao Abasaheb Pawar & Others, (1983) 4 SCC 231.
● Reema Aggarwak v. Anupam & Ors, (2004) 3 SSC 199.
● Kamesh Panjiyar @ Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar, 2005 (2) SCC 388.
● Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 8 SCC 633.
● Pawan Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana, (1998) 3 SCC 309.

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