OSPR EY· VANGUARD I

British
7th ARMOURED
DIVISION 1940-45

John Sandars

..
 VANGUARD SERIES
1
I

EDITOR: MARTI N WINDROW

British
7th ARMOURED
DIVISION
1940-45
Text by JOHN SANDARS

Colour plates by MIKE CHAPPELL

OSPREY PUBLIS HI NG LONDON

Published in 1977 by
O sprey Publishing Lid
M ember company of the Geo rge Philip Group
12- 14 Long Acre, London WC2[ 9LP
© Copyright 1977 Osprey Publishing Ltd
This boo k is co pyri ght ed und er the Bern e Convention .
AI! ri ghls rese rved. Apart from a ny fai r d ealin g for th e
purpose of private stud y, resea rch, crit icism or rev iew,
as permitted und er th e Copyright Act, 1956, no pa rt of
this publ ica tion may be reproduced , stored in a
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th e prior permiss ion of th e copyri g ht own er. En quiri es
should be addressed to th e Publishers.

Filmse t a nd prin ted by BAS Printers Limit ed ,

O ver \'\Iallop, Hampshire

The au th or wishes to thank th e Imperial \'Var

Muse um , the Kent a nd Sharpshooters Yeo manry a nd
Boris Mollo, Mike Co nnirord , a nd T erry Gand er ror
permission to use phorograp hs from their collections,
and Dav id List for making ava ilable the result s o f
research in ro vehicl e ca mou Aage and markings not yet
published.
The mai n sources co nsulted were: The Desert Rats by
M aj Cell Vern ey, 71h AmlOllred Division by Li ndsa y an d
J oh nson, The SIOry rifthe RASC 193'r45, CrajtsmeJI of lhe
Army. The regimenta l hisro ries of3 rd , 7th a nd 8 th
H ussa rs, I I th H ussa rs, 5th Dragoon Guards, 3rd & 4th
C LY, 2nd RGH , The Royal Tank Regiment, Th e
Rifl e Brigade, th e KRR C, a nd the Quee ns, a nd th e
Roya l Artillery Com memoration Boo k have proved
most helpful , as have British and Commonwealth Anlloured
Formatiolls by Dunca n Crow, a nd Our Armoured Forces b y
Ma rt el.

Cover painting by Mike Chappell shows A I 0 a nd A9

Cr ui ser tanks of 6th Roya l Tank Regime nt , willler
1940 .
2

Introduction
The story of 7th Armoured Di vision is one of a lmost
continuous front-line service throug hout six years
of war: a record un equal led by any similar British
formation. I t is told against a background of
cOlll inuous changes in composition , equ ipm ent,
and organi za tion. Units were replaced as th ey
became depicted by casualties or were required
elsewhere; better weapons were isslied as they
became available, a nd the orga ni zational 'mix' of
units was a ltered frequentl y in the lig ht of ex -
perience, and to cater for different th eatres ofwar.
The Bri tish Army started to ex periment with
mechanized formati o ns ora ll arms in th e late 1 9~ws
and earl y 1930s. By 1934 it had decided o n- but
not formed - two types of division: a mechanized
infantry divisio n wi th its own battalion o f slow
heavy tanks to support the foot soldiers in dismo un-
ted actions, and a mobile di vision with a brigade of
lighter tanks : a mechanized cava lry brigade in
tru cks (intended to fight dismounted like dragoons
I U ni versal ca rrier of a motor batta lion with Italian prisoners,
lai C 1940; lypical armament of Boys ami-lan k riflc in front
spo nson and (covered ) Bren gun on AlA mou nting. These
vehicles were subsequen tl y used by carrier platoons in lorried
inranlfY ballal io ns, and as arlillery OP ve hicles, ambulan ces,
mo rt ar and machine.gun ca rri ers in NW E.urope . ( Imperial
War Muse um )
of old) and a small number of guns and sa ppers.
The laller type of formation , w hi ch was in due
course to become th e armoured division of World
Wa r ll , was naturall y based on lessons learnt from
th e previous war and the id eas of c urrent military
theorists such as Fuller and Lidd ell Hart. As a result
its role was envisaged as one of exploiting break-
throug hs, turn ing flank s and other 'i ndirect'
actions, rather tha n the assa ulting of fixed defences,
whi ch task was to be left to the infantry di vision. At
the sa me time, th e relative invulnerability of vVorld
War I tanks , once they had got behind the narrow
defended belts into the rear areas, with at best
primitive anti-tank measures a nd few if any tanks
for counter-attack, led to an overestimate of the
capabilities of unaccompanied tanks and a failure
to understand the need for adequate infantry a nd
artillery in armoured formations.
Tank desig n therefore split into two streams]
with speed ta king precedence over armour a nd
3
hitting power in vehicles destined to serve in th e
mobile divisions, and pro tection taking precedence
in those (' I ' tanks) for the infa ntry divisions. This
di cho tomy, which made it difficult for the two types
to opera te together, was to continue throughout th e
war even after the 'I' tanks were removed fro m the
actual infantry d ivisions. This was foll owed by the
abso rption of the mecha nized cavalry in to the
Roya l Armoured Corps a nd their re-eq uipment
with tanks on the eve of the wa r. Altho ugh at th e
same tim e specia l Motor In fantry battalio ns,
mounted, unlike th eir mechanized counterparts, in
small cross -country tru cks and carriers were added
to what were by then armoured divisions, the result
was a very tank-heavy organization with in-
adequate infantry, guns, or support services. These
earl y ass umptions as to type of tank a nd orga ni-
zatio n were to dog 7th Armoured , a mong o ther
British divisions, for much of the war.
As tanks were few, and the cavalry, apart from a
coupl e of armoured-ca r regiments, was still mostl y
horsed in ' 934, the first mobil e di visio n, which
subsequentl y became First Armoured Di vision, was
not in fact formed until la te ' 937. In the mea ntim e
th e threat to Egy pt posed by th e I talians in Libya
during the Abyssini a n crisis had led to th e
mecha nization of the Cairo Cavalry Brigade in
'935 , a nd this was the nucl eus arou nd which 7th
Armoured Division was to be form ed some fi ve
years la ter. The brigade consisted of , Ith H ussars
in armou red cars, 8 th Hussa rs in trucks, and 7th
Hussars in light tanks. Th ey origina lly formed th e
basis of the ' Matruh M obi le Force', or ' Immobile
Farce', as it came to be known. Between '935 and
th e Muni ch crisis in '938, w hen it next 'stood-w' in
the desert, the force had learnt mu ch a bou t
operating there, and had been a ugmented by a
tank regiment, a regiment of g uns, and skeleton
service units. Further reinforcements followed in
th e form of ano ther tank regiment and a motor
in fantry battalion and th e force was renamed
'Mobile Division Egypt'; at the same time the re-
eq uipm ent of 8th Hussa rs with light ta nks tra ns-
formed th e cavalry brigade into a light armo ured
brigade. I t was during this period between the
M-unich crisis and the declaration of war with
Cerma ny in September ' 939 th at ma ny of the drills
and proced ures for o perating in the desert, which
were to remain as dogma throughout the cam -
4
paig n, were d evised and practised und er th e
d ynamic leadership of the divisional comm a nder,
Maj Cen P. C. S. Hobart. This offi cer had been
in volved in th e earl y armo ured formation experi-
ments in Eng land , and was subsequently to form
79th Armoured Divisio n, with specia li zed types of
armour, for th e 'ormand y in vasion.
Even after the war in Europe had sta rted there
was a further period for training and reinforcement
before Ita ly came in on the Cerman side in June
' 940. In Februa ry th e d ivision was renamed 7th
Armo ured a nd became part of ' Western D esert
Force' under Lt Cen R. N. O ' Connor. Maj C en
H obart was relieved by Maj Cen M . O ' Moore
Creagh as div isional commander.
2 Bofors 37m m anti ·t ank gu n- no t a standa rd British Arm y
weapo n. A batch on their way to the Sudan were com ·
mand eered in [940 and issued to the div ision, ror lack or an
alternative. Carried po n ce o n 15cwt tr ucks, th ey were
rep laced ea rl y in [94 [ by regu lat ion 2pdrs, also portccd on
30cwt and 3 ton trucks. (Gander)
War with Italy
The deserts of western Egypt and Libya where the
d ivision was to fi ght for the next three years were
ap tl y described by a Cerman genera l as a
'tacti cian's drea m and a quartermaster's nig ht-
mare'. Much of th e area is covered by a feat ureless,
level, gravel platea u on which movement at speed
in any d irectio n, even by wheel ed vehicles, is
usual ly possible. At two points, nca r Agheila and
Alamein , salt marshes and an impassable depres-
sion form bo ttl enecks to within a few miles of the
coastl ine. Th ese a rc the o nl y places where defences
can be built that ca nnot be ou tfla nked throug h the
o pen desert, until lhe mountains and cultivated
areas of western T ripolitania ancl Tunisia are
reached. Th ese gaps are not th e o nly milita ril y
 Orders of Battle 1939 and 1940

MOB I LE D IV I S I O N EGY PT
August ' 939

Divisiollal H Q.

~
-------DiV troops: I RASC Coy.
. I Field Aumbul ance
j
Light Arm'd Bdt HtO/!)' Arm'd Bdt Pivot Group
7lh Hussars (light tanks) lSI RTR (Iighllanks) 3rd RHA (field & A /T guns)
8th Hussa rs (Iighl la nks) 6lh RTR (light ta nks & 1St KRR C (molOr infantry)
I I lh H ussa rs (arm'd cars) c rui se rs)

7th A RM O R ED D IV ISION
'ovcm ber I 940

Divisiollal HQ.
I
I
4th Anll'd Bdt 7th Anll' d Bdt Support Group Diu troops
7th Hussars 1st RT R 4th RHA (field g uns) 11th Hussa rs (arm 'd
2nd RTR grd Hussa rs ISI KRR C cars)
6th RTR 8 th Hussars 2nd RiAe Ede lo6 th RHA (A /T &
AlA)
I Bty. 3rd RHA (A/T ) I Bty. 3rd RH A (A/T ) I Bty. 3rd RHA (A/T )
R E : Fld. Sqn . & Pk .
Tp.
RASC : 6 Coys
RAM C: 2 Cav Amb
RAOC : Workshop, Pk
(Mk V IB light tanks, A9 & A ,o Cru isers, 37mm & 3 It rc pa ir sees
Bofors A/T guns, I 8/2s pdr fi eld guns)

sig nifi ca nt fea tures, ho weve r ; in Egypt a nd C yr-
enaica the level inland pla teau steps down to a
narrow coasta l plain in a series o f steep esca rp-
ments, a nd the points a t which these pelcr o ut,
south o fSidi Barra ni a nd west o fTo bruk, or where
ga ps ena bled vehicles to pass up o r dow n th em ,
such as H a lfaya nea r So llu m a nd S idi R ezegh JUSt
so u th o f T o bruk, were to be th e focus o f mu ch
action. In the fl a t dcsen even the lo w hills a nd
ri dges o f th e coasta l pla in a nd in th e A la m ein ga p
achieved an imporla nce o ut o f a ll propo rti o n to
th eir size. The sing le m eta lled coa st road , a lo ng
wh ich a ll supp lies ha d to tra vel , was to become th e
lifeline of bo th sides, linking th em to t heir bases a t
Alexa ndria a nd Tripo li a nd limiting th eir speed of
advance and depth of penetra tion into the desen 1O
th e south . The o th er m a in features were th e hill y
culti va ted a rea of th e Djebel Akhdar in th e
Beng ha zi-Mec hili-Dern a tri a ngl e, a nd th e barbed-
w ire ba r ri er wh ich th e Italians had built a long Lhe
Li byan-Egy ptian rro ntier. It was here 'on the wire'
thatlhe divisio n first wenl inlo acuo n in mid - I940.
Des pite th eir five divisio ns in Cyrena ica backed
up by nine more in Tripo lita nia the Ita lians made
no immed ia te a ttempt to in vad e Egypt. Instead
th ey preferred to remain within th e defend ed
perimelers o rlhc coasta l lOwns, a nd in 'Beau Gesle'
forts behin d th e fro ntie r, esconing co nvoys be -
5
 ~-

.'.
.- .

3 Crusade r Mk II of 3rd Cou nty of London Yeoma nry, This press ure was maintained for the next fou r
pho tograp hed at a momenl of domestic tranquillity! The
ma rkings of'A' Sqn, 4 T roop are just visi ble on the rear of lh e months a nd led to th e compl ete dom ination o r th e
turret bin, beyond the lowered NO.9 set aeria l which is he re Libya n side o r the rro ntier by th e division 's patrols.
being used as a washing-line. A name (' A I LSA II '?) is dimly
visible on the tu rret side , but there are no divisional or unit
Not onl y was mu ch userul intell igence gained abo ut
tactical signs. The rack of2gal water ti ns, and the use of cut- the enem y's defences and th e nature of the desert
down 4gal 'Aimsics' as stoves, are typical , as is the tarpaulin (th e 'going' ), bu t q uite substa ntia l rorts were
bivouac slung from a side ra il origina ll y fitted to mount a
hessian 'lorry' camouflage rig. (Sharpshootcrs) captured and sacked ; even c ucumber patches
cul tivated by th e Libya n troops were not immune
tween them with tanks and trying to dominate the from sudd en ra ids by hungry riA emen or hussars in
desert by air power a lone. With 7th Armourecl search o r a cha nge or diet I Armou red clashes a lso
Division still in the process o r re-equipping and th e occurred in which th e skilrul combinatio n or the
onl y other trained division , 4 th In dian infantry, speed orth e light ta nks a nd th e hitting power orthe
short or a brigade, as well as an acute overa ll cruisers, backed up by their own a ttached anti -tank
shortage or artill ery a nd motor transport, the guns (a combin a tion which the Ge rmans were to use
Western D esert Force was hardly in a position to most effec tively, but whi ch Bri tish com manders
o ffer an e ffec tive defence, let a lone to mount an seemed to rorget in later battles) led to spectac ular
attack . It thererore establ ished ilSelr in dep th wi th small-scale successes. O n on e occasion the RiAe
the in ran try based on the derended area or M ersa Brigade even engaged a n Ita li a n destro yer with
M a tr uh whi le 7th Armoured Division lay behi nd Bren g uns.
th e rronti er with a small rorce, usua lly consisting or All this led th e I ta lian Commander- in-Ch ier,
th e I I th H ussars, pa rt or the support group, and M arsha l G raziani, to overestimate British strength
one of the armoured regi ments, right up on the grea tl y, so it was not until 13 Sep tember tha t, und er
wi re. This rorce had the tas k or ra id ing in to Libya increasing pressure from Mussolini , he sent his
to fi nd out the enem y d ispositions, to harass his large bu t poorl y equipped a nd a lmost entirely
garrisons and convo ys, and genera ll y to take and unm echa ni zed arm y across the rronti er into Egy pt.
kee p the initiative in th e area, as well as giving The division , with an a ttached ba tta li o n of
adva nce warn ing orany moves tha t he might make. Coldstream Guards and some machine-gu nn ers,
So effecti ve was this policy th at in the first rew rell back as planned towards Matruh borore a n
weeks o f hostiliti es severa l hundred prisoners were e nem y who ad va nced w ith great ca ution in
taken with little loss, some of them even unaware formations more sui ted to th e parade gro und than
that war had been decl ared. the battlefi eld , covered by heavy arti llery ba rrages
6
usuall y dirccted onto arcas of cmpt y desert. Delays
were imposed by mines and hit-and-run a ttacks
where possible, and some 3,500 casualti es were
inflicted for about '50 British losses in the first three
days. Then, to th e surprise of the British, the
advance slopped orits own accord a t S idi Ban·ani ,
onl y half way from the frontier to the dcfences at
Matruh . Thc Italians sCllled down to improvc the
road and build fortifi cd ca mps where the escarp-
ment ended south of Sidi Barrani ; they then
a nnounced to the wo rld that th ey had restorcd the
tram services in that city (which was in fa ct nothing
more than a coll ection of SLOne huts).
Thus began another three months of sta ti c
warfare during which th e division continued its
harassing and reconnaissa nce tasks and went on
building up its streng th. It was during this pcriod
that the 'J ock Column ', which was to become such
a feature or the divisio n's acLivilies in quie t periods,
came into being. Named after Lt Col J ock Camp-
bell of 4th RHA , these columns consisted of a fcw
fi eld g uns, some a rmoured ca rs and usually a
company of motor infantry. Their offensive mano -
euvres did much to foster British morale and to
upset that of the encmy, but the material damage
they could inflict was small.
By the cnd of November ' 940 the arrival of new
troops and equipmcnt had built Western Desert
Force into quite a hand y lillie corps consisting of
7th Armoured Di vision ; 4th Indian Infantry
Division; two medium-gun and three ficld-gun
banerics in addition to those in the divisional
artillerics; 7th RTR (a ballalion of the heavy
Ma tilda infantry suppo rt tanks which were imper-
vious to any Italian and-tank g un) and a minimum
of necessary service uniLS . 7th Armo ured Division
had at las t more or Icss ca ught up with the o ffi cial
establishment of an armou red division of that time
Bizel1a 'b""\.. A
M~ . - TUNI S "'0 MALTA
\ J Enlidavllie
~ - le Kel ~'Sousse M edi t erranean
~
\ Siax )
;
Gain . Aklill
i''' ~\,.\
~r."
. for.
.1 ~'fjO
I Gabes /
l>c,.. Medenine ' , · 8eda Fomm
'-. '/.- -'
/S / A
,
I ....
.' LIB Y A
(it was seldom to coincid e exactl y with any official
composition). The difference between cavalry and
tank formations had disappeared , at least on paper,
a nd the three regiments in each armoured brigade
all had a mixture of light and cruiser tanks,
achieved in some cases by swapping squadrons
between units.
Thc ' lights' were by then mostl y the three -man
Vickers Mk Vlb, a fast, generall y reliable lillie
tank which suffered from poor tracks and from
being armed o nl y with mac hine guns. Although it
could not compete with the gun -armed Ita lia n
medium tanks M, , and M ' 3, its speed usually kcpt
it out of trouble ; a nd the small number of A9 and
A, 0 Cruisers, a lthoug h obsolcscent by Europcan
standards, were both faster and better-armed tha n
the Italian mediums, while the Italia n light tanks
were no match for any of ours . The support group
was up to strength, shortages in th e KRRC having
been made good by Rhodesian voluntcers; butth e
combined AA-A/T regim ent only had the lilli e
Bofors 37 mm gun, carried ponce on the back of a
15c\vltruc k, in its two AfT batteries. Even this was
ca pa ble of stopping most [talian ta nks at over 600
yards however, and the presence of an ex tra
regiment of these guns, 3rd RHA, meant that
ba lleries could be allached to the armoured
brigades, and troops distributed to individual units.
Th e ,"h Hussars had also been augmented by
Rh odesian troops, and were subsequentl y to
borrow a squadron of RAF armoured cars. Th ey
still retained th eir ' 9'0-'4 pattern Rolls-Royces,
armed only with Bren guns and A /T rifles of
do ubtful va lu e, and were without wireless, but
regimental and squadron HQs and troop leaders
now had th e roomier Morris cars which carried No.
g seLS. Units had their own first-lin e services such as
filters, sig na llers, medical officer, and usually two
CA'RO\~
•
~
EGYPT
,j
100 200 300
EI A!lhella
L-__~, __~l' ~~'~~
7
4 Stua rt (' Honey') fo ll owed by Crusader Mk Is, late 194 1, in
typical desert scrub coun try with esca rpm ent in backgro und.
All appear to be finished plai n stone without added camou Aage
or markings. ( Im pe rial War Mu se um )
transport and suppl y ech elons: 'A' to carry fuel and
ammunition needed in ac tio n, and 'B' to link this
with th e di visional services fa rther bac k and to hold
vehicles such as office trucks nOt needed in th e
battle area. Divisional services were still very wea k.
Two of the RAS C compa nies were borrowed from
Commonwealth formation s; the divisional sig nals
were a scratch unit with very little eq uipm ent, and
the workshop orga ni zation was largely stati c, with
less than a dozen recovery vehicles in th e whole
di vision.
This was the state when th e C-in-C Middl e East,
Gen Sir Archiba ld Wavell , ordered Gen O 'Connor
to lau nch a surprise attack on th e Italian ca mps
south of Sidi Barrani. Pa trols of the division had
discovered an unprotected ga p between them
through which the Indian infantry and the in-
vincible Matildas were able to pass, undetected , to
attack them from the-rea r at dawn on 9 December
' 940, while 7th Armoured Division swept up
through the desert to cut ul e coast road west ofSidi
Ba rra ni , which fell on th e following da y. This
signall ed the start of the Bri tish advance that was to
drive the I talians right out of Cyrena ica, and
during which the di vision was able to report the
prisoners taken in acres rather than numbers. In
8
th e next two months they cut off first Bard ia and
th en Tobruk prior to their assa ult and ca pture by
6th Austra li an Di vision (which had replaced the
India ns). On , J a nuary ' 94' th e Wes tern D esert
Force, by th en well clear of th e western desert of
Egy pt, was renamed ' 3 Corps. Although the
ad van ce w ~s rapid and the e nemy's tact ics were
orten more suitabl e to the Na poleoni c wa rs than LO
the 1940s, the di visionIs losses from e nem y ac tio n
and attritio n were not insig nificant. The 3rd
H ussars lost 13 light tanks in a matter of minutes
when th ey bogged down in a sa lt marsh in th e face
of enemy g uns cast of Sollum , and o ther isolated
reargua rds and counter-attac ks took their toll . By
mid-J anuary o ne regim ent in eac h armoured
brigade had to be dismou nted to keep the re-
mainder up to a reasonable ta nk stre ngth. The
farth er west th ey went- before the coaSt road was
cleared th roug h Bardia a nd T obruk- th e more
acute the suppl y situation became. Eventua ll y the
infantry truc ks had to be pressed into service to
keep the di vision supplied , and water was severely
rationed. Food stocks were often augmented by
ca ptured Ita lian del icacies such as tinned tunn y
fi sh . Petrol was the main prob lem, mad e wo rse by
the high rate of leakage from the flim sy 4-gallon
tins in w hich it was suppli ed - this remained a
headache until th e appearance of the 'j erri can ' in
'943·
By earl y February a d epleted but hig hl y con-
fid ent 7th Armoured Division had reached Mech-
iii , where it became known that th e Italians were
plann ing to abandon Benghazi, their last major
town in Cyrenaica. At this point one of the boldest
decisions of the campaig n was made, and the
division was ordered to move almost 150 mil es a t
full speed ac ross a ppal li ng cou ntry in ord er to cut
the enemy off from escape in to Tripolitania along
the road past Beda Fomm . This move sta rted o n 4
Febru a ry, bu t it soon became clear that if the
division continued to move as one formation it
wo uld arri ve too late. A fl ying column consisting of
2nd Bn Rifle Brigade, 11th Hussars, a battery of
fiel d guns and less than a dozen anti -ta nk guns was
therefore sent on a head with orders to block the
road a nd hold it until th e rest of the di vision ca ught
up. Despite ai r attacks and minefields, this col umn
of 140 vehicles reached the road south of Beda
Fomm near Sidi Saleh at 14.30 hrs on the 5 th , less
than an hour before the advance g uard of loth
Italian Arm y a ppeared from th e north, all un aware
of th e ambush.
From then until daw n two days late r the thin lin e
of gunners a nd riflem en beat off frequent, bu t
luckil y unco-ordinated attacks from some 20,000
bewi ldered Ita li a ns, while a solitary sq uadron of
the KDGs, who had just j oi ned the d ivision,
protected their rear against possible a ttack from the
direction of Tripol i. At one stage a Rifle Brigade
se rgeant major even succeeded in capturing an
M 13 ta nk by knocking its commander over the
head with a rifle butt, and many other insta nces of
close combat occurred. By nightfa ll on 5 Februa ry
the two rema ining regiments of 4th Armoured
Brigade, 7th Hussars and 2nd RTR, had reached
the road in the vicini ty of Beda Fom m and were
ab le to a ttack the massive I talian column from the
fl a nk ; by early the next morni ng the 3rd Hussars
a nd leading elements of 7th Armoured Brigade
were also in position a little furth er north. The
battle raged a ll that day bu t the Ital ia ns never
managed to co-ordina te th eir efforts and break out,
alth ough it was often touch-a nd-go. Their final
effort came at dawn on the 7th when a column of
some 30 ta nks attacking straight down the road
broke through the Rifl e Brigade com panies and
destroyed most of th e anti -tank gu ns at the
roadblock before being stopped by field gunfire
within yards of the ba tta lion HQ At th is point,
Gen Bergonzol i and fi ve other generals sur -
rend ered, together w ith over 20,000 men and their
5 Armoured regiment breaking leag uer; tanks and softskin
vehicles ope n o ut from the close formation adop ted at night.
Grants and 15cWl lorries arc visible in the backgrou nd and
ae ri al pe nn ons arc in evidence. Th e Crusader in the
foregrou nd has a seru[ly ca mouflage finish, sugges ting the use
of coloured cement applied wet with CO llon waste - a me thod
used for a lime in 22nd Armoured Brigade. The turret bea rs the
'A' Sqn sign, and the number T 43739, tOge th er with th e slogan
'Avon/i .1 Avonti.1 ') the Italian fo r 'Forward!' (Sharpshooters)
9
 6 Fordson WOT'2c 15 cwt 4 x '2 infantry truck ; each section in
a motor infantry platoon rode o ne of these, g ivi ng greater
tactical flexibilit y th an in the lorried infantry, where a whole ·
platoon rode in asingle 3 -ton lorry. Morris, and la ter Chevrolet
15cwts were also extensively used. (Conniford )

action. Th e crisis was ca used by the arrival of the

German 5th Light Di vision at Tripoli under Lt Gen
Erwin Rommel. This officer, fresh from leading a
Panze r Division in spectacular fashion during the
Blitzkrieg in France, quickl y rea lized the weakness
of the British troops in Cyrenaica and turned a
200 guns and 100 tanks, having cost 7th Armoured reconnaissance in force by his own units and the
Division 9 killed and 15 wounded during the two- Italian Anele Armoured Division into a major
day battle. offensive. The two und erstrength and in-
Thus ended the division's first campaign. Shortly ex perienced British divisions, 2nd Armo ured and
after the victory at Beda Fomm it was withdrawn to 9th Australian infantry, augmented by 3rd Hussars
re-equip as its vehicl es were now tota ll y worn out. and 6th RTR left behind by 7th Armoured with the
Before it wenl, however, it was to see om inous signs few serviceable light tanks and captured lta lian
of things to come in the form of German aircraft ones, were no match for this Axis advance, which
over the battlefi eld. Although th e campaign was not halted until it was across the Egyptian
culminating in Beda Fomm, and the difficulties it frontier near Soli urn, with only Tobruk holding out
had produced for the division , should not be behind it.
belittled , the com para ti ve ease with which a well- This sudden reversal of fortun e, which had
led, highly-trained mobi le force had been abl e to includ ed the capture of Gen O ' Connor, was far
defea t a badl y-led, poorly-equipped army with low from welcome to Mr C hu rc hil l, who responded by
morale (many of whom were local Libyan troops), taking the bold step of di verting a tank convoy
led to some tactics and practi ces which proved less thro ugh the M editerranean rather than sending it
satisfactory against sterner opponents, and gave round the Cape, to enable an earl y counter-
undue confidence in the make-up of the armoured offensive to be launched. As a result, by mid -J un e
division of that tim e. 7th Armoured Di vision was o nce again in business,
but only as a 'scratch' formation, with two brigades
each of two regiments and the support group. In
The Desert 1941-42 7th Brigade 2nd RTR had the old Cruisers while
After leaving the desert in early 1941 the ' Desert 6th R T R got the first Crusaders, as yet untried in
Rats' (so named by Mussolini in a gibe that battle and unfamiliar to their crews. In 4th Brigade
misfired ) were virtu all y disbanded due to a lack of 4th a nd 7th RTR were given M atild a'!' tanks, as
ta nks and oth er eq uipm ent fo r them. U n its found nothing else was available.
themselves doing guard duties in Egypt while the Wavell 's plan for Operation Battleaxe was for the
divisional commander gave lectures in Turkey, but 4th I ndian Division supported by 4th Armoured
by late April first the KRRC battalion and then the Brigade (since they had all the ' I' tanks) to move up
11th Hussars, hurriedly re-equipped with South
African Marmon-HerringtOn cars which offered
little improvement over the Rolls, were back in

7 Chevrolet CooL 3· (on 4 x 4 CS lorry. T ogether with si milar

Ca nadian Fords and Brilish 3 -tonn ers of various makes, these
provided the workhorses of the divisional RASC compan ies
and the unit echelons; in the desert they also carried the
infantry of 131 Brigade. Desert tyres are show n, but 'trackgrip'
and ' run flat' tyres were also common, even mixed on the sa me
veh icl e. (Conniford )
10
 O RD ER O F BATTL E
November '94'

Divisional H Q
I I
4th Arm'd Bd, Cp 22nd Arm'd Bde 7th Arm'd Bd,
8th HUSSarS} 2nd R .G. Hussa rs 7th H ussars
3rd R T R Stuart 3rd C. L.Yeomanry 2nd RTR
5 th R TR ta nks 4th C.L.Yeomanry 6th RTR
2nd RH A (Fld. guns) (Crusader ta nks) (Crusader, Alo & AI3
2nd Scots Guards tan ks)

Support Croup DivisionaL troops

3rd RH A (2pdr A/T guns) 3 arm'd car regts (I I1h Hus, KDGs, 4th SAAC)
4th RH A 1
60th Fld. RA 25pdrs
A/T regt (2pdrs)
A/A regt (Bofors 40mm)
IStKRRC Di v Signals regt
2nd Rifl e Bde R E: Field and Park Squadrons
RASC : 6 Companies
RAMC: 3 ligh t Field Ambulances
RAOC: Div Workshop & Par k, LAA WS
+ J It repa ir sec, I It
recove ry sec & 1 park sec
to each brigade & Supp gp

the coast and capture the area where the coast lost some 90 ta nks for very little gain.
road made its way up th e escarpment near Soli urn. Al though Battleax, was a fa iled offensive rather
At th e same tim e 7th Armo ured Division was to th an a maj or defeat it showed the da ngers of
sweep ro und to the south a nd west on the inl a nd spli tting u p the availa ble armo ur, a nd gave a clear
platea u to cut off the enem y defences near the wa rning th at the Germans, despi te lack of desert
frontier, be fore moving north- wes t to relieve experi ence, were formid a ble opponents. It was a lso
Tobruk . U ntil the in fa ntry cou ld release 4th clear that the Bri tish ta nks no longer had the edge
Armoured Brigade, however, this inla nd th rust over the enem y; the M a tilda, although superior to
wou ld onl y consist of the two regim ents of 7th the Germ a n tanks of the time except in speed, was
Brigade. In the event the Germa ns had placed haIf- now vulnerabl e to anti- tank fi re. M ore important,
a-dozen of th ei r 88mm guns a nd had la id mine- fro m 7th Armoured 's po int of view, the Crusader,
fi elds in the So llum area, a nd by 15 ]une, when the which was th e latest design a nd whi ch was to
British a ttack was launched , had placed the newly- rema in with the di vision until mid- 1943, had
arri ved 15th Panzer Division near Bardi a, as we ll as proved unsatisfactory on several coun ts. Th eoreti-
5th Light near Tobruk. 4 th Armoured Brigade lost cally superior to the Germ an pzK w III a nd IV
heavi ly to the 88m ms a nd were tied dow n by ta nks until a t least mid-1 942 on a g un/armo ur
counter-attacks which prevented their reverting to basis, it was found to be difficult to maintai n, and
7th Armoured Di vision as intended ; the weak 7th tria ls in Egy pt showed tha t it could be penetrated
Armou red Brigade o n its own could not break more easily th an should have been possible con-
through the skilful tank a nd a nti-ta nk g un a m- sidering the thi ckness of its armo ur. Perha ps even
bushes laid by th e G erma ns a mong a seri es of low more serio us in the long run was its chron ic
ridges in their path, and , witho ut a thi rd regiment, unreli ability, d ue to a fa ulty waterpump a nd
had difficulty in repulsing flank a ttac ks by 5 th lubricating system whi ch frequentl y immobilized
Light. After two d ays Lt Gen Beresford -Pierce, the the ta nk ; inaccessibility of these mean t tha t it was
Corps comm and er, ca lled off the operation, having often impossible to repair them, a nd so Crusa-
II
 8 Wh ite -Ruxtallg22 18-ton 6 x 4 tank transpo rter o neof the
early models used by the division in 194 1. The fo ll owing year
they were largely replaced in recovery units by ca mmell sem i-
trai lers. The vehicle shown appears to have bee n sprayed with
a dark coloured camouflage over the basic stone shade j the so ft
edges are ulll ypi ca l, as most Middl e East theatre ca mou flage
dircctivt.'S stressed the need for sharp-edged pattcrns. (Con-
niford )

g un ; it a lso needed special aviation -grade petrol.

22 nd Brigade no t o nl y had the unrelia ble C rusader,
but was entirely composed of as-yet inexperienced
Yeomanry (territoria l cavalry) regimen ts . With
ders were abandoned intO enemy hands witho ut o nl y one suppOrt group, the whole organiza tion
having suffered any action damage. These fau lts was very tank-heavy compared with 15th and 2 1St
were never properl y cured . Panzers and Ariele, which each had their own
After the fai lure of Ballieaxe many changes LOok infantry and a rtillery units.
place. Gen Wavell was relieved as C-in-C by Gen Efforts to provide brigades with more direct
Auchinleck, and within the division M aj Gen support by a naching baneries of fi eld guns, troops
'Strafer' GOlt, an old desert hand who had of anti-tank guns and companies of mOLOr infa ntry
command ed the KRRC ballalion and later th e from the support group to them o n a semi-
support group, assum ed comm and. His place in permanent basis onl y led to such a dispersal of the
cha rge of th e support group was taken by Brig J ock ava il able guns and infantry that neither th e
Campbell , eX-4th RHA . By November 1941 , remains of th e support group nor th e individua l
when the next British offensive Operation Crusader brigades had enough to be able LO look after
was launched , suffi cien t reinforcements had ar- th emselves without calling on the other formalions
rived in the desert for 8th Army to be formed und er for assistance. Th e unwieldy nature of the di vision ,
Lt Gen Sir Alan Cunningham. This consisted of and the British policy of using extreme dispersion as
tWO corps: the old 13th became a mainly infantry pro tection against air attack, mea nt th at all too
formation with 4th Indian and 2nd New Zealand often the tig ht, well-balanced di visions of the much
Divisions supported by a brigade of 'I' tanks, and more easil y-controll ed Afrika Korps were able to
the new 30th had 7th Armoured Di vision with 1St ca tch single brigades, or the support g roup, on their
South African In fantry Division and a Guards own. Another problem for Gen Go n was the fact
mOLOr infantry brigade. that the corps commander, Gen Pope, was killed in
7th Armoured Division itself was made up LO the a n air crash and had to be replaced by Maj Gen
unprecedented size of three armou red brigades by Norrie, himself onl y a divisional commande r a nd
the addition of the 22 nd , which was really part of new to the desert. As a result, th e forthcoming
1st Armoured Division, then on its way out to th e banle was marked at times by more consultation
Middle Eas t. Although this meant that with some than decision in 30 Corps, and on one occasio n Gen
500 tanks in units and as replacements th e division GOlt was left virtuall y in charge of the whole corps.
had superiority over th e combined Italia n ar- By 18 j ovember wh en, afte r va rious postpone-
moured division and the two German ones of the ments, Crusader was finall y launched , Rommel was
Afrika Korps, who could onl y muster 320 between on the point of assa ulting T obruk, whi ch was still
them , th e quality was very variable. 7th Armoured holding out. For this he had 15th Panzer a nd th e
Brigade still had nea rl y 100 obsolete A I 0 and A 13 Germa n 90th Lig ht infantry division in that area,
cruisers, some of which were so decrepit that th ey as well as the three static I ta lian divisions tha t were
had to be taken inLO ballie on the few tank investing the fortress. T o cover his rear he had Ariele
transporters that were in the desert a t that time. 4th at Gubi some 30 miles due south of T obruk, and
Armoured Brigade was completely eq uipped with a nother J talian division backed by German g uns,
the American Stuart or ~ H on ey' light tank, which plus 21St Pa nzer behind them in his frontier
although reliable had a very short range and a poor defences, which had been extended some 20 miles
12
south-west from Sollum. Gen Cunn ingham 's pl a n
was to send 30 Corps on a sweep round the end of
this defence lin e to take up a position behind , from
which it could threaten Romm el's communi ca tions
in such a way that he wou ld be forced to a ttack the
massed ta nks of 7th Armoured Di vision on ground
of their own choosing, (using up ' his Panzer
Divisions in the process. As soon as the armoured
battle was decid ed , 13 Corps was to capture the
fronti er defences and move along the coast to
Tobruk , where the garrison should already have
broken out to link up with th e victorious 30 Corps.
At first a ll went well , but such was the secrecy of the
initial moves that Rommel was unawa re th at he
was being threatened and fa iled to respond to 30
Corps's thrust as anticipated. The massed a rmour
of the division, therefore, bega n to split up: 4th
Brigade drifted east to protect the Aank of I 3 Corps,
22 nd Brigade was sent to a ttack Ariele in th e west,
and 7th Brigad e went north to the real key a rea, th e
airfield at Sid i R ezegh on the escarpments, just
south ofT obruk, overl ooking the road leading up to
the front ier. Each was individua lly too weak for its
task ; 22 nd Brigade partly overran the Ita li ans a t
Gubi but, owing to lack of in fantry, could not hold
its gains; 7th Brigadefollowed by the support group
occupi ed Sidi R ezegh, but could not ta ke the
dom in ating surrounding areas ; a nd 4th Brigade
was attacked on its own by first one, a nd then both ,
Panzer Divisions, which then swung north in
concert a nd mau led 7th Brigade so severely that it
was unable to take a ny further part in th e battle or
even the campaign . D espite the switching of 22 nd
Brigade, first to help 4th Brigade a nd then to Sidi
R ezegh, a nd efforts by the T obruk garrison to
break o ut, th e division never managed to achieve a
local superiori ty, a nd on 22 November the support
group was driven south off the airfield. During th e
two days th ey had held it, the support group had
won a ll three of the ves th a t the d ivision was to win
in the desert. R fmn Beeley of the KRRC di ed wh ile
charging a machin e-gun nest ; Lt Ward Gunn ,
RHA, was kill ed whi le firin g a 2pdr a nti-ta nk gu n
from a b urning portee ; and Brig Campbell per -
sonally orga nized a nd led many counter-attacks in
9 Hu mbe r Mk I II armoured car. These followed th e simi lar
Mk li s, wh ic h we re th e first modern ca rs to reac h the di visio n,
late in '94 1. With beller armour and a , smm BESA machine-
gun they could conrront Germa n rccce uni ts on more equal
terms than their pred ecessors. Sand c hannels, fo r pUlling under
the wheels in soft sand, can be see n secured below the spare
wheel ; th e engine deck is in th e raist."<i posi ti on, enabling the
dri ver to sec o ut be hind when reversing. Bedrolls, 4gal petrol
'f1imsies', '2 ga l water tins and a ca ptured water jerrica n ca n be
seen stowed on the car. ( Impe ri al War Museu m)
- >.
.j --
.,
his open car, holding the defence toget her by his
exampl e.
By 24 November the first phase of the ba ttle was
over ; 4th Brigade had had its HQ and 8th Hussars
overrun in night leaguer, and 22nd was red uced to
a single composite regiment foll owi ng ullslI ccess fu l
attempts to prevent the destruction of one of the
South African in fa ntry brigades. At this point
Rommel erroneously, but perhaps understandably,
thought that 30 Corps was fin ished , a nd set olf east
to the frontier with the Afrika Korp> to tackle 13
Corps. H ere, a lthough this example of Blil~krieg
unnerved Gen Cunningham to the po int where
Auchinleck decid ed to replace him with Lt Gen
Ritchie, Rommel was too late; much of the frontier
had a lready fallen and the New Zealanders were
well on thei r way west a long the coast as plann ed,
eventua ll y recapturing Sidi R ezegh a nd linking up
with the Tobruk garrison. While this was going on,
the division was a ble to reorganize and coll ect new
ta nks, as well as salvaging man y from the battle-
field, despite the odd brush with Ariele. As a
result , when the Panzers returned to the west on 27
November in response to cries for help from the
Axis troops a ro und T obru k, now themselves
threatened by the New Zealande rs, 4th and 22nd
Brigades with 120 tanks were able LO ca tch a
wea kened 15th Panzer Division on its own . Once
aga in, however, it had its supporting arms with it,
including attached 88mm guns; a nd despite
intervention by th e RAF it was able LO hold olfthe
two brigades un til nightfa ll when, in accorda nce
with long-established British desert custom , they
withdrew from th e battlefield to leaguer, thus
losing their best opportunity to destroy the enemy
and a llowing him to link up with his troops at
T obruk. In the following days the New Zealanders
were eventually forced to give up Sid i R ezegh a nd
the link with Tobruk was broken, whi le 30 Corps
were kept to the south and prevented from com ing
LO th eir aid by th e skilfu l usc of anti-tan k screens. By
th is tim e, however, a ttrition had taken its toll , and
whereas Auchinleck still had reserves availab le,
Rommel had not. H e was forced to aba ndon his
rema ining frontier defences a nd pull back first to
Gazala a nd fin all y to Agheila at the end of the year.
Crusader was a rguably the hig h point of 7th
Armoured Division's career. Never aga in was it LO
command so many tanks, and this was the las t
14
occasio n on wh ich it foug ht as the sole armoured
division in an y area. Crusader was a lso th e fastest
moving, farthest ra nging a nd most complicated
battl e of the whole desert war, and despite its
vicissi tud es it ended in a considerab le if tempo ra ry
victory. In retrospect it is perhaps less surprisi ng
that th e divisional command set-up was at times
unabl e to cope, than that the suppl y and other
services did so well .
Following Crusader the division was once again
withdrawn to re fit , and was at the same time
radi ca ll y reorganized in to a much more balanced
form a ti on, not un like th e Panzer Divisions in
composition . The old concept of two a rmou red
brigades equipped solel y with tanks, with the few
guns and infantry being fo rmed into a support
group, was abandoned in favour of two more-or- less
self-contained brigade groups. Th e armou red one
retained its three regiments of tanks but had its own
mOLOr infant ry battalion and a field a rtill ery
regiment, to which ha lf of the divisional anti -tank
regiment was usua lly attached. The second brigade
consisted of three motor infantry battalions, now
with lheir own anti- tank and machine guns, wi th
similar arti llery supporl. The engineers, service
arms, and the light AA regiment were split up
between the two brigades and the much reduced
divisional troops, who retained the armoured ca r
regiment. Although this organization got away
from th e 'a ll tank' idea, the self-contai ned nature of
the two brigades led to them frequently being used
separa tely rather than in mutual support, a nd the
continued tendency to split the motor brigade into
columns meant that the di vision was still li abl e to
find itself at a d isad vantage aga inst the better co-
ordin ated Panzer Divisio ns.
New equ ipment was also available. Two of the
Stuart squad rons in each armou red regi menl were
replaced by ones with 12 Gra nt tanks apiece.
These, although slower than the Stuarts, were
much more heavil y armou red and were the first in
th e di vision to ou tgun the German tanks, being
fitted wi th a 75mm weapon as well as a 37mm.
Th ey also proved generally reliable . Th e in crease
in th e numbers of field a nd anti-tank guns was to
some extent olfset by the fact th a t the new 6pdr on ly
reached units in any numbers after the next battle
had started, and in the meantime the field g uns still
had to be used to bac k up the inadequa te 2pdrs, to
 --

~ .0

th e detriment of their proper tasks. Most of the soft 10 Half-squad ron o f Gra nts on 'good goi ng', ie, Hal, hard
g ravel desert. All seem to be pailllcd in light SlOne over a darker
transport was now made up of Canad ian mili tary shade- probably th e US ol ive drab deli very scheme- which
pattern C hevrolet a nd Ford vehicles in place of the shows around the serial nu mber and on the suspension un its.
older British designs. An increased number of The crew's steel helmets pro tect the headl igh ts; note the tripod
mo unt for a "gocal-machine g un stowed front left , and the large
tractors a nd transporters, as well as a fu ll workshop pe trol filling funnel slowed len rcar, both typical features, as is
company for each brigade in place of the previous the bracketed rai l along the top of the trackguard. A fai nt '8 '
Sqn sign (perhaps overpainted) is visib le on th e turret sid e.
light re pa ir and recovery sec tio ns, g reatly increased (Impe rial W ar Muse um )
the di vision 's ability to sa lvage and refit its own
casualti es.
T wo losses to th e di visio n, o ne permanent a nd from Ag heila, but this time onl y as fa r as a li ne
the o th er tem porary, occu rred at thi s tim e. M aj stretch ing from Gazala south to Bir H acheim.
Gen 'J ock' Campbell ve, who had just ta ken over as During th e spring Gen R itchi e had fortified this
divisiona l commander when 'Strafer' Gatt was lin e as a sta rt po int for a further offensive, w ith a
promoted to comm a nd 13 Corps, was kill ed in a continuous mi nefi eld belt backed by dispersed
motor acciden t ; M aj Gen M esservy from 4th infantry brigade ' boxes' (sta tic wired -in defensive
Indian Di vision too k over in his place, and I I th locations) . T he 1st Armoured Division was pos-
Hussars, who had been in the desert from the start, itioned behind the centre of this line and th e 7th
took thei r Humber armo ured cars off for a spell in behind the southern end. During the following
Iraq , being replaced by the KDGs in th e less -well· month the motor brigade a nd armoured cars
armed M armo n-Herrington Mk Ills. operated columns round the enem y's southern
Wh en the di vision returned to the desert in April Rank a nd in to his rear areas.
1942 Rommel had aga in d ri ven 8th Arm y back In the event Rommel struc k before R itchie was
read y wi th his offensive, coming round to the south Ju ly the remains of th e di vision were back at th e
ofBi r H acheim a nd then swinging north and north- Ala mein position a fter a seri es of dela ying actions
east with bo th Panzer Divisions and 90th Light, on near Sidi R ezegh a nd M at ruh . Tobruk had fa ll en
the night of 26 M ay. Despite this move being on2 lJu ne .
reported by the armo ured ca rs, the di vis ion was not This ended the second phase of the division's war
warned in time to ta ke up its battle positions. Th e in the desert, which had included th e large-sca le
armoured brigade was caught dispersed and on the mobile ba ttles against the Afrika Korps that are
move by th e concentra ted ta nks and guns of 15th perh a ps the best-remembered feature of the whole
Panzer, which made short wo rk of first 8 th Hussars campaign. AlulOugh the events of th is period read
and then 3rd R T R . The motor brigade was a lso like a cha pter of disasters when treated as bri eAy as
unabl e to hold its partia ll y-compl eted box east of is necessary here, it was during this year, from mid-
Bir H acheim , and the di visiona l H Q was overrun , 1941 to mid-1 942, and largely as a result of th e
Gen M esservy being captured but late r escaping. effo rts of the division , that much of the 'cream ' of
30 Corps HQ, which comma nded both a rmo ured the Axis forces were d estroyed , so tha t their
di visions, was also forced to pack up and move in a effecti veness from then on was much reduced .
hurry. After this promising start th e Pa nzers Thus, a lthough 7th Armoured Division was not to
continu ed to move north but were engaged by 1st play such a leading role in the victories th a t were to
Armoured Division, and having suffered heavy follow, it had done much, during this period of poor
losses were brought to a ha lt a nd virtually sur- equ ipm ent and unsatisfa c tory organi zation, to
rounded. The Grant ta nks a nd the fi rst 6pdrs had make those victories easier.
proved a nasty shock for them.
The next few days were critical ; if the British
could keep the Afrika Korps cut off from its supplies Alamein and After
behind the intact Gaza la line they would win the
battle. The division, in its weakened a nd d isorga- When th e di vision reached the Al amein position in
nized state, was able to contribute little towards this Ju ly 1942 it was command ed by M aj Gen]. M . L.
(except for the inevitable motor brigade columns) Renton, a rifl eman, and it took over the southern
unti l th e end of the month , by which time Romm el end of th e rath er nebu lous defensive line. During
had retri eved the situation by his tighter control th e nex t couple of months th ere were num erous
and better co-ordination of all arms a nd had fa llen changes in organization as th e losses o f the retreat
back onto the eastern side of the British minefi elds, were made good and the positio n was stabilized ,
capturing 150 Brigade box which covered th em but for most of that time the 4th, rena med 'Light' ,
a nd clearing suppl y ro utes through. During the Armoured Brigade consisted of a composite regi -
next ten da ys 8th Army made repea ted pi ecemeal ment of 4/8th Hussars a nd two a rmoured-ca r
a nd un co -ordinated efforts to break into this regiments, the latter being eventua lly replaced by
'Cauldron '; these resulted in much heavier losses to the Roya l Scots Greys . As their o nl y tanks were
themselves than to the Axis, who were able to beat Stuarts the y could do little more than form columns
off each individua l attack with their whole re- wi th the motor brigade to watch the minefi elds.
sources. By I I Jun e the Free French box at Bir Fortuna tel y the real figh ting too k place farther
Hacheim had fa llen, and the Gazala line had to be north , with Cen Auchin leck now in personal
aba ndoned to prevent the infantry in the northern comma nd of the a rm y.
boxes being cut off. It was whi le a ttac king fu rth er I n August, following a visit to th e desert by
enemy moves eastwards tha t the remaining ta nks of C hu rchill , Auchinleck was reli eved by Gen Al ex -
the two d ivisions were taken in rear by the Panzers a nd er as C -in-C Middle East, a nd Lt Gen Gott was
from the 'Ca uldron' a nd suffered such losses tha t ap poi nted to command 8th Arm y. U nfortuna tely
the initiative passed irrevocabl y to Rommel. From he was shot down a nd kill ed while fl ying to take
then on the battle became a retreat. By mid-June over. This was the end of a n era as fa r as the a rm y
8th Army was down to 60 tanks g rou ped in mixed and th e di vision were concerned. The new Arm y
regiments under 4th Armoured Brigade, and by I Comma nder, Lt Gen B. L. M ontgomery, was not a
16
man to be overawed by the reputation of Rommel, 1 I Daimler Di ngo scout car of 4lh Fi cld Sq n, R E. Combi ned
di visional and uni t tacsigns can be seen on th e front plate ; a
or to be influenced by the desert ' folk-lore ' which sand chann el is strapped across lh e front for usc o n 'soft going'.
had grown up over the years. This had spawned ad T he late desert camouflage scheme o f wavy·cdged lines of a
sing le dark colour (bluc.black , g reen o r brown) over light
hoc formation s, with an accent o n dash, sometimes Slone o r pink is clearl y visible. ( Imperial War M useum )
at the expense of sound military practice; and a
tendency to make hurried but ambitious plans
regard less of the state of tra ining and eq uipment of subsidiary role. Wh en Rommel launched his fina l
the troops involved , initia lly from necessity but attempt to brea k through to Alexandria at the end
later almost from habit. Montgomery worked on of August they delayed his advance through th e
the ass umption that the usua l principles a pplied in southern mine fi elds of the Alamein line, the 6pdr
the desert as elsewhere, and insisted on keeping guns of the motor battalion really proving their
close personal control over what went all, modify- worth for the first time, before the massed ta nks of
ing his plans where necessa ry to ensure that they other di visions halted the Panzers on the slopes of
were within the capabi liti es of his arm y, and thus Alam-el-Halfa ridge. Between this encounter and
removing the chance of defeat, even if his chances th e battl e of Al a mein in October, th e 22 nd
of snatching spectacular vi ctories were reduced. He Armoured Brigade, with Grant and Crusader
was fOrlunate in taking over at a time when in ta nks, rejoined th e division. The 7th M otor Brigade
numbers, quality of equipment, and in air support, was replaced by 131 Quecns Brigade, which ,
the British had finall y achieved a lasting superiority having been pa rt of the recently arrivcd 44th Home
over Axis forces, exhausted by previous fi ghting. Counties In fantry Division, was no t mo torized and
In the battle of Alam ein , and its forerunner had fcwer support wea pons but morc men than a
Alam-el-Halfa, 7th Armoured Division played a motor brigade. During th e battlc it was given its
17
own RASC transport a nd becam e a lo n'ied
brigade, remaining with the division, like 22 nd
Armoured Brigade, until the end of the war.
Maj Gen J H a rding, later to becom e a Field
Marshal and post-war governor of Cyprus, took
over the division with the task of attacking through
the enemy minefields o pposite the southern end of
the Alam ein line, primarily to keep 2 1st Panzer
Division tied down there while the main a ttack by
the infa ntry di visions of 30 Corps went in furth er
north, Gen H orrocks of 13 Corps, of whi ch the
division was part, was told not to incur heavy
1'2 Mk I I 6pdr anti·tank gu n, as issued to the di visio n fro m
mid-1942 j it was capable of defeating all enemy tanks at
norm al fighting ranges. Like the 2pdr whi ch it replaced , the
6pd r was carried portee on the back ora lorry, in N. A frica.
Later the more powerful Mk IV gun, with longer ba rrel and
muzzle brake, was used by divisional infantry units un ti l th e
end of the war in Europe. ( Im perial Wa r Museu m)
• •
, ---,
casualti es because his armour wo uld be needed as a
reserve for 10 Corps, which contain ed the majority
of the a rmo ured di visions a nd had the job of
making th e fin al brea kthroug h once 30 Corps had
broken into th e enemy defences, When the battle
opened on the night of 23 O ctober th e di vision
moved through gaps cleared in th e enemy min e-
field s by a specially train ed task force from 44th
Divisional Reconna issance R egiment, and form ed
a bridgehead 'as crowded as the car pa rk at
Ch eltenham races', but was unabl e to get as far as
had been hoped; it did , however, keep 21St Pa nzer
in the south unti l the 28th, during a cri tical stage of
the main battle, Thereafter, now without 4th Light
Armoured Brigade, it moved north behind the
front on 3 1 O ctober, and became part of 10 Corps
ready for th e breakout planned as Operation
Supercharge,
" .'
... .,
- ... --.
1
<.
":. ;'
-- . .•
J
,
.'
• .J ' _
.-,,
'- .... .',
 ORD ER OF BATTLE
November 1942
Divisional HQ.
I
I
I I
4th Lt Ann'd Bde 22nd Ann'd Bde
Royal Scots Greys 1st RTR
4/8th Hussars Sth RTR
(both Stuart & 4th C. L.Yeo.
Grant tanks) (aU Crusader &
2nd Derby Yeo. (arm'd Grant tanks)
cars) 4th & 97 th Fld Regts
3rd RHA ( 2 SpdI~) RA (2s pdrs)
1st KRRC 1st Rifle Bde
Altho ugh, unlike the o ther armoured di visio ns,
7th ha.d received no new ta nks, th ey had suffered
less heavil y in the ba ttle a nd so took a more
prominent pa rt in the pursuit tha n had been
anticipa ted . On 4 N ovember, led by I I th Hussars,
they fin a lly broke out to the west of the enemy
positions; a ft er a shon action with th e remains o f
the Ariete Division during which they destroyed six
M1 3s, and a confused battl e between di visiona l
HQa nd Germa n stragglers, they pushed o n to cross
the Egy ptia n fronti er for th e las t time on the 9 th . A
combina tion of ra instorms which bogged even the
tanks inextrica bly, a nd petrol shortages, frustra ted
efforts to cut off the bulk of the enemy on the coast
road, a lth o ug h a tra in was shelled by 22 nd
Brigade's ta nks to th e south of Bardia . The sta te of
the di visio n's antiquated ta nks, many of them
veterans from Ga zala, was a constant worry; but
the fa ct that th ey were ad vancing, and well-
supported by the newl y formed REME, meant tha t
many could be recovered a nd repa ired . In genera l
the a rmo ured brigade a nd I Ith Hussars led the
chase, with the Queens Brigad e moving behind a nd
coming up to occupy lowns, such as T obruk, or to
attack when th e tanks were held up in unfa vo ur-
able country, as happened nea r Agheila in mid-
December. The 4th Light Armo ured Brigade had
I
'3' ( Qyems) Bde Divisional troops
I/Sth Queens I I th Hussars (arm 'd
I/6th Queens cars)
I/7th Queens Isth LAA Regt RA
(aUlorried infa ntry) 6Sth A/T Regt RA
S3rd Fld Regt RA (6pdrs)
(2Spdrs) Div. Signals
2 A/T Btys (6pdrs) 2 Fld & I Pk qns RE
I Fld Coy RE RA C : 7 Coys
RAMC : I Fld & I L,
Fld Amb.
REME : In f Bde,
Arm'd Bde, and
LAA Workshops
RAOC : Fld Park
rej oined just after the division left Egy pt ; and in
earl y December 8th Armoured Brigade, with the
fi rs t Sherma ns to reach the di vision, tempo rarily
reli eved 22 nd Brigade with its Gra nts a nd Crusa-
d ers. A medium a rtillery regim ent of 5"sin guns was
a lso a ttached at this time for a couple of months.
The ad va nce progressed in fits a nd starts, oft en
with th e Queens or o ne of the armoured brigades
'gro unded ' for lack of petrol while the ports of
T obruk a nd then Beng hazi were hurri edl y put back
into service. Casualties fro m mines and rearguard
ambushes were frequent ; C en Harding was woun-
ded by shell fire a nd had to leave th e division. Maj
Gen G . W . E. J. Erskine took over a nd led it on
thro ugh Tripoli a nd , in conjunction with thrusts by
the New Zeala nd and Highla nd infantry di visions,
into Tunisia. Here, amid increasingly rugged a nd
cultivated country, a halt was made a t M edenine to
a llow th e rest of th e arm y a nd supplies to catch up
prior to a n assault being la unched on the heavil y-
defended Ma reth line. The di vision was initia ll y
somewha t out o n a limb, but was shortl y joined by
5 1st Hig hla nd Division , a nd 20 lSt Gua rds Brigade
whi ch came und er comma nd . 22 nd Armoured
Brigade, now with di esel-engined Sherman and
6pdr- arm ed Crusader Mk III tanks, had rejoined
in place of 4th Light Armoured Brigade, which
19
 13 ~\'l in e huntin g wilh electrical detectors , which ca me illlo use
at the time of Alamein ; previously the usual method was to
prod the grou nd with a bayonet. The NO.2 in each learn carries
markers to place over the position of any mine found.
(Sharpshoolm )

a rtillery was a lso augmented b y extra fie ld and

weill to the New Zea la nders.
It was clear that an attack was im minent, so the
division took up a defensive position with the
Guards and Queens Brigades in front , and the
armour in reserve behi nd. Although the positions
were not mined or wired th ey were well supplied
with anti- ta nk g uns, even the Queens now having
6pclrs as well as a few of the old 2pdrs; thecl ivisional
medium regiments. One aspect of the tightening-
up of control at, and after, Alamein had been to
in troduce high-level con trol of th e a rtillery so that
regim ents su p porting ind ividua l uni ts could be
q uickly co-ord inated in to an overall fi re p la n when
necessary. This policy was well vindicated wh en the
German armour was switched from attacks on the
Am ericans (who, with the Bri tish LS t Army, had
been fi gh ting in weste rn Tunisia since th ey la nded
just a fter Al a m ein) to at tac k at M edeni ne on 6
M arch '943. All da y German and Italian attacks
were broken up by massive artillery concentrations,
sometimes by the whole divisional artillery; ma ny
o f th em never even reached the British positions as a
resul t, whi le those tha t did were eflectiveiy stop ped
by the in fa ntry a nd d ivisiona l anti-ta nk guns. Eve n

T H E A RM OU R ED RE G I M EN T

a ) '940: RHO. 4 x Mk VIB ligh t ta nks

HQSqn Admin troops, A & B echelons, MO , fitters, etc. *
Sqns :2 sqns with light tanks, I with cruisers. Each has HQ of 4 tanks, and 4
Troops each of 3 ta nks

b ) '94" RHO. 4 x cruiser tanks (A 13, Crusader or Stuart )

HQSqn Admi n troops, A & B echelons, MO , fi llers, etc.
Sqns 3 sqns; each has HQ with :2 x cruiser and :2 x close support tanks, and 4
Troops each of3 cruisers**

c) '942-43 : RHO. 4 x cruiser and 8 x ligh l A/A w nks

HQ Sqn Adm in troops, etc., and recce troop with 12 scout cars
Sqns 3 sq ns ;:2 wi th Gram or Sherman, I wit h Stuan or Crusader. Each has HQ
with 4 tanks and 4 Troops each with 3 tanks

d ) '944: RHO. 4 x Cromwell, 8 x A/A tanks (latter discarded after Normand y landi ng)
HQSqn Adm in troops, etc., and Recce T roop with 10 Stuans, 1:2 seoUl cars
Sqns 3 sqns; each has HQ with :2 x 75 mm and :2 x 95mm Cromwells, and 4
T roops each wi th 3 x 75 mm Cromwells and I x Sherman Fire fl y or
Chall enger* * *

• Unil echelons: A echelon nonnally had aboul 12 softskin transport vehicles, and B echelon up 10 100 .
•• Close support tan ks were cruisers (A9, A 10, A IS or Crusader) fitted with 3in or S·7in howitzer to fire H E and smoke shell ,
which was nOI possible with 2pdr armament of other ta nks.
··· 'n 19448th H ussars sqns had 5 Troops eachorS lanks.

20
 ORDER OF BATTLE
Seplem ber 1943

Divisional HQ
I
I I 1 I
22nd Arm'd Bdt 131 ( Queens) Bdt Royal Artillery Divisional troops
lSI RTR } 1/51h Queens 3rd RHA (25Pd,,) 1 Ilh Hussars (arm 'd
5th RTR Shermans 1/61h Queens 51h RHA (Priest SPs) ca,,)
4th CLY 1/71h Quee ns 2 Fld RegIS RA Div Signals
lSI RiA e Bde (aillorried infa ntry) LAA R eg t RA 2Fld & 1 Pk Sqns RE
MG Coy (Cheshires) A /T Reg t RA (17pdrs) RAS C: 6 COl'S
Med Regl RA (Y5in ) RAMC : 1 Fld & 1 LI
Fld Amb
RAOC: 3 Fld Pks
REME : 4 Workshops

Stuka attacks were driven olf by AA fire before they a rmoured divisions, of which one was the 7th, all
were a bl e to press home; over 40 enemy ta nks were under th e comm and of Gen H orrocks (now of 9
destroyed , many by the Queens, for few British Corps), with heavy arti llery a nd a ir support. It was
losses and without it being necessary to commit the highly successful and a fitting example of how
armoured brigades a t a ll. A subseq uent night British methods had progressed during the cam-
attack by the Guards motor brigade on 16 M a rch to paign . Divisions from two different armies worked
clear a fea ture known as th e Horseshoe was less to a co-ord inalcd plan with intimate co-operation
successful, and heavy casualties were suffered in between tank , artillery a nd infantry units at all
unsuspected minefields before the attack was call ed levels : a far cry from th e dispersed brigade groups
olf. and columns of the desert days. The attack started
The division was not directl y involved in the next on 6 M ay and the l!th Hussars led the way into
two battles a t Mareth and Wadi Aka rit, a lthough Tunis o n the 7th - nearl y 2,000 miles and SIX
8th Armoured Brigade and part of 22 nd went to months' fi ghting from Alamein. Thus end ed the
other di visions for tha t purpose. Tiger tanks first division's active service in Africa.
appeared in April , and I Ith Hussars actua lly Th e fina l phase in th e Midd le East was a brief
captured a disabled one. After preparing to
attack Enfidaville at the end of the month the
di vision was sudd enl y switched from 8th to 1st
Arm y, together with 4th Indian D ivision and 201
Guards Brigade, so as to attack towa rds Tun is fro m
the west. This involved a 300 -mile journey o n
transporters for the tanks, which also had to be
repainted green, as th e desertschemeofcamouAage
was highly conspi cuo us among the oli ve groves .
The attack was made from M edjez to Tunis by
two infantry di visions ab reast followed by two

14 Regimental aid pOSt , the fi rst link in the cas ualt y

evacuation chai n. Th e unit M edi ca l O ffi cer can be seen with
stretcher-beare rs and wou nded in an open desert location. Th e
ambu lance car is th e Austin K2 used by divisional Fi cld and
Light Fi eld Ambulance units. In Europe armoured half-tracks
and carriers were also used. ( Imperial War M useum )
21
three-month spell in Italy. During the invasion of coun tered. The sappers had to gra pple with Bailey
Sicily [h e division remai ned in Africa and 2'2nd a nd tank-mounted scissors bridges for the first Lime,
Brigade was fe-equipped with new Sherma n tanks as well as ma king up inferior roads, 'w hile th e close
throughout; I Ilh H llssars reorganized on a Euro- country made even finding the enemy difficult, a nd
pean basis, and 5th RHA provided a self-propelled much ammunition was expended on likely hide-
regiment of 'Priest' I 05mm guns to work with th e outs. Malaria began to ta ke its toll, and even the
armour. On 15 September 1943 th e di vision landed generall y friendl y I talia ns, now on the Allied side,
in Ital y in the bay of Salerno as the follow-up were not above reel ing up the di visional telephone
division of 10 Corps, behind 46th a nd 56th cables for use as wash ing lines. After a fi erce fight
Divisions. Here many new problems were en- just to the south by the Queens, the road bound
15 Lifting o ut the engine of a Stuart lank with lhe gamry of a division, covering some 50 miles on a sing le road,
breakdown lorry, possibly from the RAOe light repair section reached Na ples on I O ctober. After this the country
or the unit LAD . This task was much quicker \V"jth the air-
cooled Continental engine of the Stuart than with th e water- o pened OUl a bil a nd the armo ur was able to ta ke
cooled Libert yofthc Crusader. A Neil Robertson stretcher, for th e lead , but the maize fi elds and small farms and
removi ng casua lties from insid e a vch icle by strapping them in
a restraini ng frame of thin laths, can be seen on the side of the villages kept the motor ba ttalion, 1st RB, busy. By
lank. ( Imperia l War Museum) the 5th the di vision had reached the ri ver Volturno

22
16 A 3i n mOrlar in acti on in h aly. MOlor battal ions received
these at the time of Alamein, and [31 Brigade always had
them. Firing a [olb bomb some 1 ,60oyds, they we re a welcome
add it io n to the ba ttalion's fire power . In NW Europe the [31
Brigade SU PP0rl com pany had the still more powerful 4 ''2in
mOrlar. ( Imperia l War M useu m)

near Capua, to find a ll the bridges blown a nd th e

enem y dug in on the far ba nk. During th e follow ing
week energe ti c pa trolling by th e Queens, which
in volved parties swimming th e ri ver, revealed most
of th e enem y positions. The main attac k was to be
ma d e elsewh ere by th e in fantry di visions, bu t 7th
Armoured mounted its own di version ary crossing
on 12 O cto ber. The Qu eens secured a sm a ll
brid geh ead in to which m achine g uns a nd a nti-ta nk
guns were ferri ed, a nd behind which the sa ppers
sta rted bridging th e ri ver, whil e th e a rm oured
brigade fo und a ford where, by dint o f
wa terproofin g their ta nks a nd mu ch use of bull-
doze rs a nd inge nuity, th ey a lso crossed. After a
furth er minor attack a t Mond rago ne, fa rther down
the Volturno towards th e coast, the di vision was
withdrawn a nd on 19 November 1943 sta rted to sail
for hom e, as one of the formati ons earmarked for
the Norm andy in vas ion.
Normandy
During th e fi rs t six mon ths o f ' 944 mu ch re-
orga nization and re -equi pment took pl ace in
preparati on for th e Norm and y in vas ion. Even so,
7th was not to end up as a n enti rely stand a rd
armoured di vision of th e period , sin ce 22 nd
Armoured Brigad e was iss ued w ith th e C rom well
cruiser instead of th e Sherm an medium tank used
by the o ther di visions. The C romwell was a fas t
relia bl e ta nk with a du a l-purpose 75 mm g un. It did
not burn as easil y as the Sh erman when hit, and it
was to prove highl y successful during the more fluid
phases o f th e campaign ahead; however, its
gun/arm our comb ination was no match fo r th e
slowe r a nd less reli a bl e G erm a n Tige rs a nd
Panthers in close fi ghting, where it co uld no t use its
speed. The lack of gun -powe r was to some ex tent
allevia ted by th e ad d ition of a Sher ma n ' Firefl y'
with a 17 pdr g un to each troop of C rom wells, a nd
of two Cromwe lls armed wilh 95mm howitzers to
each squ adro n headq uarters. Tn th e reconnaissance
troo ps, Stu a rts ha d la rgely replaced scou t cars a nd
carri ers, but some had th eir turrets removed and
'5in heavy machine guns fi tted instead, lo red uce
their silhouette.
The 11th Hussars, who tempora ril y left the
di visio n lO become corps troops but soon retu rned
in Norm andy, were now organi zed with their own
a rtill ery (75 mm ha lf-trac ks) a nd infa n tr y/sap per
lroops, bOlh of whi ch were to prove invaluable; the
former ha d to be ' pension ed of!' before th e end of
the campaign with worn-out barrels, such was the
use ma d e o f th em. Th e S taghound armoured car in
their HQs was no t popula r, being cumbersome a nd
un abl e to reverse quickl y, and as someone put it,
'onl y good for kn ockin g down gateposts'. Th e
Da imler cars in the squ adrons we re good , a nd a lso
sometim es had their turrets removed , whil e th e
three-m a n Humber scout cars, often equi pped with
tw in Vickers 'K ' gu ns, were much liked.
Another unit that rejoin ed the division as a new-
style armoured reconnaissance regiment was the
8 th Hussars, but since its equi pment of C rom wells
a nd S tuarts was ide nti ca l to that of22 nd Armoured
Brigade it was used as a fourth armoured regiment
under di visiona l contro l, being a llocated to the
armoured or th e infantry brigad e as req ui red .
I ni tia ll y it ha d no Fire fl ys, bu t during th e campa ign
it received instead Ch a ll engers, which a lso had
I 7pdr guns. The Crusader a nd Centau r AA tan ks

23
 THE ARMO RED CA R REGIMENT

a ) '94': RHQ4 cars HQsquadroll Admin and echelons, Ct C

3 Squadrons each with 4 or 5 Troops of3 cars (2 Rolls & I Morris in ' 940- 2 Hum bers
& I Daimler in 1943)

b ) '944: RHQ. 3 car.; (Staghounds) HQ.Squadro1/ Admin and echelons, etc

4 Squadrons each with HQ (3 Staghounds & 3 Humber scout car.;), I troop of
'2 x 75mm gun half-lracks, I SCOU l lroop in a rmoured half-lracks, and 5 Troops each of
'2 Da imler armoured ca rs a nd I Hum ber sco ul car.

ART ILL ERY REGIME NTS

a ) RHA RegiInent 1941- 42: '2 Batteries each Of2 Troops of 4 or 6 x 25 pdr

b ) Field Regintent RA: 3 Bancri es each of'2 Troops of 4 x 25 pdr

c) Light A/A Regintent: 3 Balleries each of 3 Troops of 6 x 40mm Bofor.;

d ) Anti-tank Regintent : 3 Batteries each o f 4 Troops of 4 x zpdr, 6pdr, or 17pdr gu ns ( I

ballery self-propelled in 1944- 45)

In all regim ents were found to be unnecessary
owing to Allied a ir superiority, and were discarded
shortly after la nding.
The mOLOr infantry received armou red ha lf-
tracks in place of th eir sectio n trucks, whil e th e
Queens Brigade rema ined lorry- borne by courtesy
of the RASC . Both had improved 6pdr AfT guns
firing disca rding sabot a mmunition and LOwed fi rs t
by Lloyd and later Windsor tracked carriers. Some
considered the 6pd r a handier weapon than the
more powerful but more cumbersome t7pdr in
close country, where the infa ntry's PLAT, a ha nd-
held close-range AfT weapon firing a hollow
charge bomb, also proved use ful. In the Queens
the machine-gun company of the Cheshires was
replaced by a support company of th e Roya l
NOrlhumbe rl a nd Fusil ier'S with 4 02 in mortars as
well as Vickers machin e-g uns.
The artillery received Sherman OP tanks, a nd
reta ined one RHA regiment of towed 25pdrs, whil e
the other excha nged the American 105mm PriestS
for 25pdr Sextons, also sel f-propelled, LO ease
ammu nition suppl y problems. The AfT regiment
of Norfolk Yeoma nry had two ba lleries of SP
24
17pdrs while the other two were LOwed, first by
lla lf-tracks and later by C rusaders conven ed to g un
tractors. The LAA regim elll a lso had some of its
Bofors mounted on trucks for mobile work .
The REME now had workshops for each
brigade, for the divisiona l troops, a nd for the LAA
guns, as well as Centaur or Cromwell a rmoured
recovery vehicles with each regiment, whil e the RE
had six scissors bridges on Valentine tan ks with the
armou red brigade as well as Bai ley bridging
equipment. The RAMC had dental and hygiene
units as well as the field a mbula nces, but th e RASe
were red uced from their desen establishm ent to a
mere three or four companies. "'lith improved
eq uipm ent such as the No. 19 set, and shorter
distances, th e di visional signa ls were to have a n
easier task than in the Middl e East.
The di vision sta rted lO la nd at Arromanches, to
the north-east of Bayeux, in the wake of 50th
(Northumbrian) Division on D + 1,7 June 1944.
They formed pan of 30 Corps under Lt C en
Bucknall , which was the right-ha nd corps of 2nd
British Arm y commanded by Cen Dempsey. This
in LOfn combined with the American 1St Army
 '-t;,
THE DIVISIONAL SIGN

Vehicl .. hi. " '9<1, .....

L-=: --.J
V.. hlcI" " I,n '940 TO I'"'' f ... ~ h ' !HQ V.,hlcl" "II" ' 9'1"·"~

S h o .. ld .... fI~ .. h ' 9.... ·0

Dlvihional HQ
ORDER OF BATTLE
MA l ' '~ ':hho ... in. ,,,,i, ~"hh: l e "i.m' and ""P bad.e..

".h Arlno .. rlHi 8rl,.d.. ,'h Mo,or Hri,,,d ..

\l Sil"" lh S'I"
IIr' l" d .. A .. mour.-d Ca r R,.

ATRfljl

Arlnour .. d Rlh Motor 'Iou, 1., All. Rfij '

RE

1.. fit!

Uni,~

Ilr',:ad.. Work"hol' ~

"
B Egyptian Frontier, 1940
 c_ .• >
C Support Group,Sidi Rezegh, November 1941
,
D North~ West Europe, winter 1944~45
 2A 2B
"

4A
~ ' 67 5A ~
21C

4B 5B
& e 5c

4c 5D BB
BA
[JJ
'a1Ntf I.:j ,t~ ~
Angus
a~.. ... .,
I:
~-
lO A
lO B
T4:J720 II A

A 1211686 li B
E
furth er west to form the All ied invasion force of 2 1st
Army Group und er M o ntgomery. The di vision was
therefore now a fairl y sma ll cog in a fairl y big
wheel, and this was not the onl y change they had to
adjust to in the North-West Europe campa ig n. This
was no lo nger a war of easil y defin ed battles
interspersed with periods of preparation in the rear
areas; it became a continuo us push over a wide
front, with the emphasis shifted period ically from
one area to a nother. Sometimes the di vision would
be in the lead , at others it wo uld be holding the line
while th e ma in effort was elsewhere, but gone were
the days of leave between battles in Cairo or
Alexandri a. Gone a lso was the ebb and flow of
previous years; here the movement was a ll for-
wards, however slow.
After the battles of the beachh ead during whi ch
Panzer a nd infa ntry div isions were used en masse
(including th e di vision 's old enemy, 2 1st Panzer)
the principal opposition became small groups of
tanks, or more often self-propell ed g uns; snipers
and panzerfaust teams; and small fana ti cal battle-
groups. These were a change from the massed
Panzer formations, the mines and the Stukas which
had been the ma in problems in the desert. In a n
area of field s a nd towns such as North-West
Europe, where advances norma lly had to be made
a long roads, such oppositio n was highl y effective,
a nd as a result the ta nks often had to play second
fidd le to the infa ntry within the division, being
una ble to get forward un til a way had been cleared
for th em. The I I th Hussars soon realized that the
onl y way th at they could scout a head of the di vision
was to dri ve on until the leading car was fired on-
often a t point-blank range- and hope that some-
one survived to send back the news. Rivers were
another problem ; before the campaign was over
the sappers of 21st Army Group had to bui ld over
500 bridges and repair ma ny more. Th e slowness of
opening up ports posed a fam ili ar headache for the
d ivisional RASC, who found that ex posed centre-
line roads were j ust as vuln erable to par ties of by-

THE I N FA N TRY BA TTALIO N

a) Motor Battalion 1940:

BHQand: 4 motor compani es each orS motor platoons Or3 secti ons ( I x 15cwl lruck , 6 men, I
LM G each ) and onc sco ut pl atoon of 3 secti ons (3 uni ve rsal car riers each)

b) Motor Battalion 1942:

B H Qand: I A fT company of 4 pl atoo ns each of 4 x 2pdr or 4 x 6pdr gu ns
3 motor co mpanies each with a mortar secti on (2 x s in mortars), '2 motor platoons, I
scout platoon, and I MG platoon (4 x Vickers MMG)

c) Motor Battalion 1944:

BHQand: I support company of 12 x 6pdr A fT guns and 8 x Vickers MMGs

3 motor co mpa nys each of 3 motor platoons (in armoured half-trac ks) a nd I sco ut
platoon (still in carriers)

d) Lorried Battalion 1943- 44:

BHQ and: HQcompany wi th
I mortar platoon (6 x 3in mortars )

I ca rri er platoo n ( 13 ca rri ers)

I A fT platoon ~8 x 2pdr, later 6pdr guns)
I pionecr platoon ( 20 mcn)
4 rifl c co mpan ies each of 3 platoons of3 scctions of 10 mcn + I LMC ( I MMC
pl atoo n with 4 x Vickers and I RASe tra nsport platoon with 30 x 3 ton lorri es often
attached from Brigade)

passed enemy as the open desert had been. On the
cred it side, changes in cl uded rriendl y populations,
at least until German y itselrwas reached , and hel p
from the resistance; I I th Hussars even engaged
some as scouts on a semi-official basis. The hig hly
co -ordinated air and heavy artillery support that
was almost a lways quick ly available, and the
continuous air cover, were welcome novelties.
T he first month arter th e landings differed rrom
what was to foll ow, however, as the G ermans threw
in a ll thei r reserves in the West in an effort to drive
the Allies back into the sea rrom the ideal derensive
bocage country orsmal l fields, thick hedges, sunken
roads a nd orcha rds, to the west or Caen.
M ontgome ry's pla n was to lead the enemy to
concentrate all availa ble arm our aga inst th e British
2nd Arm y, so as to give th e Americans th e cha nce to
break out aga inst minima l opposition and drive
round rrom the Cherbourg Peninsular into the
heart or France behind the rormations racing the
coast. To achi eve this, repeated attacks had to be
made in the Caen area to keep th e Pa nzers
occupi ed, and the division had much stiff fi ghting
ror negligible territorial gains. During the first
three weeks they lost 1, 150 casualti es, mostly rrom
the inrantry units (compared with about 20 a t Beda
Fomm ). So close was the fighting that tan ks were
actually ' boarded' at tim es, and a hurried issue or
Sten gu ns to AFV crews became necessary.
During this peri od two actions in w hi ch the
division took part stand ou t. On 12- 13 Jun e, as
26
I7 Divisional HQ vehicles in Pom pei i during the drive on
Naples. The box-like AEC 'Dorchesler' armoured command
vehicl e (left ) was used from early in 194' until the end of the
war. Di visional HQ used four or more of them as command
and signals vehicles, and they were also issued to brigade HQ§
from 194'2. Even Rommel used captured Dorch esters!
( Imperial War M useum )
German armour was struggling rorward in the race
of murderous a ir attacks to counter-attack the
Allied bridgeheads, a n opportu ni ty occurred ror
the division to work south rrom Bayeux on th e
extreme west of the British sector, and then east
towa rds high ground ncar V il lers Bocage. This
enabled them to outflank th e Panzer-Lehr Division ,
which was racing the British positions to the north
a nd preventing them rrom en larging the bri dge-
head. Speed was essent.ial, as 2nd SS Panzer
Division Dos Reich was com ing up rrom rurther
south and wou ld shortl y close the gap. As a result
the cl ivision got bad ly strung out a long th e
Normandy roads, a nd it was not possibl e to rollow
them up with 50th Division as pla nned. When the
leading units were in a nd just beyond Villers
Bocage they were suddenly attacked by Tiger
ta nks, one or which , comma nded by Obersturmftih-
rer Mi chael Wittmann , destroyed th e bunched-up
vehicles or 4th CL Y RHQ and an entire squad ron
of tan ks, as well as 'A' compa ny o r I st RiAe Brigade
who were with them. This action, which has
perh aps become the most celebrated single tank
action or a ll time, was a result or two Tiger
compa ni es or 50 1 SS H eavy Tank Battalion
happen ing to be in the area behind Panzer- Lehr's
fl an k. Later in the day the re mai ns orthe armoured
brigade a nd the Queens restored th e situation to
some ex tent by holding Vill ers Bocage against 2nd
SS Panzer- a nd the local fire brigade, who wou ld
insist on trying to exti nguish the burning German
tanks- but the advance had been halted and the
d ivision had to ra il back into a 'box' in the bocage
where it rought a fi erce derensive ac tion until it
could retire to the north aga in. A measure of the
degree or co -operation now common can be gauged
from the fact tha t their withdrawal was covered at
relatively short notice by RAF La ncaster strategic
bombers a nd fire rrom R N warships and US heavy
artill ery. This was the last opportu ni ty ror mobile
warfare, as more Germ an divisions moved in to seal
off th e landing areas.
 By mid-Jul y in fa ntry losses had reached serious
proportions throughout 2nd Arm y; the bridgehead
was still very congested, a nd there were signs that
th e Germa ns, who still held parts of Caen, might
fee l tha t they were containing the Bri tish a nd that
they could di vert some armour aga inst the A mer-
icans who were still bu ilding up for their breakout
further west under Gen Patton . To rectify this
si tuation M ontgomery staged Operation Goodwood,
whereby 8 th Corps under Gen O 'Connor (the
victor of Bed a Fomm , who had been captured in
Africa a nd had subsequentl y escaped from Italy)
consisting of three armoured divisions- I I th, the
Guards, and 7th - was to ad vance several m iles in
morc open country across the river Orne to th e
south-east ofCaen to capture th e Bourg uebus ridge
threatening Fa la ise. This armoured assa ult was to
be preceded by a ir a nd artillery preparation of
massive weight, but in cl uded no in fa ntry divisions
to clear the way for the ta nks. In the event,
Goodwood fai led to reach its obj ectives owing to
over-estimation of the da mage air a ttac ks wo uld
cause (a common error from D unkirk to V ietnam),
and the fact that the Germ an defences extend ed
much farther back th an had been a nticipated. Th e
two leading arm oured divisions were severely
N O R T H
ma uled ; 7th was following up read y to exploit a
breakth rough and so suffered rela ti vely lightly. In
fact the main recollection of many who took part
was th e nightmare journ ey by the whole di vision
from the wes t of Caen and across a single bridge
over the Orne under enemy observation in to a
conges ted forming-up area alread y occupied by the
two oth er di visions. D espite its cost, the attack did
achieve M ontgomery's primary obj ective of keep-
ing up the pressure in the a rea so th at the enemy
were unabl e to release armour from it.
Du ring the rest ofJul y th e d ivision made further
lim ited a ttac ks east of the Orne, and when the
Ameri ca ns fin ally bro ke out a t the beginning of
Aug ust 30 Corps, to which the division had
returned , was ra pidly switched back to the western
end of the Bri tish area for fur ther attacks south -
wards from the Villers Bocage area. Slow progress
was made during th e first week in August, but then
an ill-ad vised Germa n counter-attack to th e west
was defeated and the Americans reall y got moving,
swinging ro und south ofFa la ise a nd catchi ng many
o f the remaining enemy units in the 'pocket'
between them and the Canad ians and other British
troops coming south from Caen . After ta king part
in this fin a l push from the no rth , the division was
SEA
BERLl N@
Cologne
100,
'. mile<
too wea k in infantry to continue and was reli eved in
the line. The 4th CL Y had al ready left after
Goodwood to amalgamate with their sister regiment ,
3rd CL Y, elsewhere, a nd their place had been
taken by 5th Royal l nniskilling Dragoon G uards,
hurriedly converted to a Cromwell regim ent for the
purpose. At this stage in the campaig n the GOC,
Genera l Erskine, was relieved by M aj Gen G. L.
Verney.
France and the
Low Countries
With the trapping of some 50,000 German troops in
th e Fala ise pocket in mid-August th e enemy's
efforts to contain the in vasion in Norma ndy were
over, and the British as well as the Am erica ns were
able to brea k out of th e constri cting bocage. The
British and Canadian task was to move cast and
north to capture th e 'V -weapon' sites fro m whi ch
28
London was being bomba rded, a nd the majo r
ports, in particu la r Antwerp, which the Alli es
wou ld need to support thei r ultimate drive into
German y. 'T'he division first adva nced east to th e
Seine through more open country, but was im-
peded by several minor rivers a nd determined
rearguards. The I I th Hussars th erefore led on a
wide front to find un blown bridges a nd unblocked
roads, wi th the infantry brigade 'two up', and with
each battalion supported by a squadron of 8th
Hussars, behind them ; the a rmoured brigade
brought up the rear. After some fi erce fi ghting
round Lisieux , which also involved 51St Highland
Division, a ga p was found , and the armou red
brigad e sw ung into th e lead , reaching the Seine on
th e 31St. Pa ris had a lready fallen to the America ns
[8 Sherman tank in Italy; this vehicle has the rubber block
tracks sim il ar to those used o n Gra nts and Stua rLS , which were
latcr rcplaced by all·mc tal assem bli es. It appcars to be paillled
in th e standard light mud/ bl ue·black camou flage sc hemc , and
has an 'A' Sqn triangle and a rcd/ white/ red recognition fl ash
on th e lUrrCl. Note the No. [9 set acrial , th inner tha n tha t oCthe
NO.9 sc t sce n in previous illustrations. (Sharpshoo tcrs)
19 No. 19 rad io set, complete with covcr and and protcctivc
cage, in turret of a Sherman tank . Im rod uccd shortly before
Alamcin, th is sct bccame standa rd for tan ks and othcr vchiclcs;
it provcd reliable, aftcr some initial problems due to high
temperature. (Sharpshooters)
and Free French on 25 August.
From here on, the armoured divisions were to
lead with the in fantry com ing up to consolidate or
subdue areas o f stiff' resista nce. 7th Armoured was
directed on Ghent as pa rt of 12 Corps und er Lt Gen
Ritchi e (erstwhile comma nder ofSth Arm y in the
desert), wi th the Ca nadians moving along the coast
on their left a nd 11th Armoured on their right
going for Antwerp. Now th e adva nce rea ll y got
going. The Cromwells proved ideal , being highl y
rel iabl e and capa bl e of continuous high-speed
running, even keeping up with wheeled transpo rt
on the roads with no trouble. The Som me was
crossed north of Amiens on 1 September. After the
division met resista nce among the coalmin es and
ca nals north of Lill e o n the 4th, permission was
given to by-pass this area to the south , and it
reached G hent o n the following day. After haggles
with th e German garrison command er, who
refused to surrender to any lesser person tha n a
genera l, a nd who saw thro ugh the efforts of th e
colonel of 5 th RTR to impersonate one, th e town
was entered a nd th e I nniskill ings found themselves
with a comple te horsed cavalry regiment, among
other prisoners. The 11th Hussars had cap tured
several 'V-bomb' sites during the advance.
The di vision had advanced '2'20 miles in a \veek,
cap turing over 1,000 prisoners for the loss of less
than 100 men (compared with 1,300 casua lti es
duri·ng their tim e in the bocage). Such was th e
speed of advance that rnaps ran ou t and wireless
contact was lost with Corps HQ Though they
increased th e spare petrol at the expense of
am munition, a nd grounded units such as the LAA
regim ent, the las t 70 miles into Ghent could on ly be
mad e by a composite grou p of units from both
brigad es while the re ma inder of the di vision sta yed
ncar Lill e. T he di visiona l RASC now had a
formidable task as su p pl y lines still stretched from
the Normandy beaches a nd the ever-lengthening
centre line was often tempora ril y cu t. REME was
able to move up only its recovery units, not its
workshops, and the evacua tio n of the wounded
began to cause problems. The leading troops had
received ecstati c welcomes from the local pop-
ul a tio ns, o ften ex pressed with Ao we rs and - less
com forta bl y- fruit and vegetables thrown onto the
passing ve hicles. At this stage man y of the unit
histories also mention passing baltl efields where
their regiments had fought before, from Oudenarde
in the da ys of 1arlborough to the Escaut Ca na l in
1940 .
There was a pause a t Ghent. Th e armoured
brigade was down to a bou t two thirds of its proper
ta nk strength and the Queens were as low as half
strength ; a lso, th e bu lk of the d ivision had to ca tch
up, a nd there was a threat of a n attack by th e
rema ins of the German 15th Arm y wh ich was c ut
0[[, no rth o f the Scheidt. I n the face of this the
sa ppers had to switch hurried ly from repa iring
bridges to blowing them up! In th e event no attack
was made and after a week the di vision was able to
go forward aga in when the Ca nad ia n infantry
came up a nd reli eved them. The motor batta lion
had helped a ll evia te its shortage of men by enlisting
loca l Belgia ns, a nd had increased its firepower by
fitting Browning machine gu ns to some of its
earners.
The nex t step was Opera tion Market Cardell,
which includ ed the a irborne la nding a t Arnhem.
For this, 12 Corps- o f which the di vision was still
pa rt- moved into H oll and with th e tas k of guard-
ing th e western side of the corridor that 30 Corps,
led by th e Guards Armou red , was to crea te in order
to link up with th e a irborn e troops, wh ile S Corps
with 11th Armoured protected it from th e cast. The
country was unsuitable for armo ur, with fl at
marshy polder a nd d ykes, the poor roads usually
being exposed on top of ba nks. During this period,
the second ha lf of September 1944, infantry
29
20 Sappers launch ing a Bai ley bridge in Italy. Th is invention,
together with the armoured scissors bridge which was also used
by the divisiona l R E, proved inva luable in N \ V Europe, where
most of the bridges over the numerous rivers and ca nals had
been blown. (Imperial War ~"I useum )
shortage within the di vision reached the point
where ta nk crews had lO ac t as foot soldiers to help
hold the line against the va rious a llacks, usua ll y by
batta lion-sized baulegroups of paratroops, such as
Gruppe Hubner and Gruppe Hardegg, which were
renown ed for th eir fanatic ism.
After the remains o f the British airborn e division
had been pull ed out on 25- 26 September the 7th
Armoured pushed on to the M aas. Although
Antwe rp had been ta ken, it could not be used as the
enemy still held the ba nks o f the ScheIdt estua ry
below it ; 12 Corps was there fore swung wes t in to
Bra bant lO clear the northern shore. I n fi erce
fighting the Queens a nd Sth Hussars, assisted by
minesweeping Aail ta nks a nd Aamethrowing Ch ur-
chill Crocodiles, eliminated the various stro ng -
points in the a rea. Fo llowing this, the di vision had
its fi rst real rest since landing in Normandy while
30
keeping a sta tic wa tch on the Maas, as forces and
supplies were b uilt up fo r th e crossing of the Rhine
in to Germany further easl. Even this period was
interrupted by the need to capture ule lock ga tes at
Panheel on 14 Novem ber before the enemy could
destroy th em and j eopa rd ize the ponlOon bridges
that were being used to cross a canal lower down.
Although onl y a m inor operation by a ba tta lion of
the Queens and a squadron o f Sth H ussa rs, it met
with heavier artillery fire than had been en-
countered since Normand y; heavy casualties were
suffered , and it was onl y due to th e initiati ve o f a
platoon command er, recently transferred from the
REME and in ac tion for the first tim e, that success
was achieved.
The problem of rein forcement was now so grave
th at corps and anti-aircra ft troops were being
increasingly retrained as in fa ntry; even so, one
in fa ntry di vision, the 50th , had lo be disbanded.
Following this, the much reduced ' 16th and ' 17th
Queens d epa rted from 7th Armoured, leaving onl y
' 15th Queens in ' 3 1 Brigad e. Their places were
ta ken by 2nd Devons a nd 9th Durham Light
 ORDER OF BATTL E
November '944

Divisiollal HQ
I
I I I I
22nd Aml'd Bde /3/ ( Queens) Ede Royal Artillery Divisional troops
1st R TR } Cromwells 1/5th Queens 3rd RHA (25Pdrs) II th Hussars (arm'd
5th RTR & Sherman 9th Durham L. I. 5th RHA (Sexton SPs) cars)
5th DGs FireAies 2nd Devons A /T Regt (SP & LOwed 8th Hussars (Reece
1st RiAe Bde Support Coy (RNFus, 17pdrs) regt)
MMGs & 4·2in LAA Regt (SP & LOwed Di v Signals
mortars ) Bofors) RE : 3 Sqns
RASC: 4 Coys
RAM C: 2 Ambs
RAOC: 3 Parks
REM E: 4 Workshops

In fantry from 50th Division , while Maj Gen Lyne,
also from th e NOrl humbri an d ivision, relieved Gen
Vern ey in command of the d ivision.
The division was not in volved in repelling the
Germa n Ardennes offensive in mid-December, but
those at home were p erha ps remind ed of its
existence on Christmas D ay, when a corporal o f the
th e M aas in murderously cold weather which froze
lank trac ks solid inLO th e mud , caused several cases
of frostbite, and immobi lized a patrol of I I th
H ussars, with froz en weapons and veh icles ea rl y on
Boxing Day.
2 1 Bedford QLT 3-ton troop ca rrier, which replaced (he

Queens was interviewed on the rad io immediatel y general service 3-lOn ner as a IOfried infantry veh icl e in NW
Europe. This vchicle is finished in the standard softskin
before the king delivered his C hristmas message. European camou Aage of kha ki overpa illled with black
The year of 1944 ended wi th 7th A rmoured still on 'Mickey Mouse cars' (Conniford)

31
22 Sca mmell SV /2S, th e stand ard hcavy recovery traclOr used
in the dcscn and N W Euro pe. In N. Africa they werc attached
to unit LAOs as well as RAO e 01' REME workshop and
rccovc ry uni ts, but by 1944 th ey had been repl aced for from·
lin c work by tanks convencd into armoured recovery vehi cles.
(Co nni ford )
Into Germany
In mid-J a nuary 1945 advantage was taken of the
freezing weath er for I'Corps to launch Operation
Blackcock to ca pture a pocket of marshy g ro und
north of Aachen. Though the division had to use a
single one-way road, a nd had to cope with hazards
such as smoke screens freezing to form fog, it
operated most successfull y under th ese conditions;
13 1 Brigade was provided with ' K angaroo' troop
carriers (tanks with the turrets removed ) for th e
first tim e, and th e tanks co-operated well with a
Commando brigade. Much fi erce fi ghting was
involved , including th e capture of the village of St
J oost from the notorious Parachute R egim ent
Hubner.
Training and preparation for Opera tion
Plunder- th e crossing of th e Rhine, and in the case
ofthe division the advance to H am burg- started in
late February. Extra supp lies were to be carri ed on
tanks and no vehi cle recovery was to be attempted
beyond the river, althoug h a rrangements were
made to pick up stra nded crews. Twent y-five
brand new tanks were received from Engla nd , and
Churchill scissors bridges, Sherma n flail s, K a n-
garoos for the infa ntry, and flam ethrowing Croco-
diles were all allocated to th e division , which now
a lso had an a ir artillery observa tion squadro n. The
actual crossing took place on '7 March following
infantry assaults by other divisions and an airborne
land ing on the other side; 7th was the first British
armoured division across th e Rhine and , during th e
following week, adva nced to the Ems with th e
a rmoured brigade leading. Resistance was con-
tinuous but came from small un co-ord inated
groups; the in habitants were natura lly hosti le, but
subdu ed. The country was wooded and an ex tra
infantry brigade, 155 th , was attached to guard the
division's open left flank.
By this time the end was in sight a nd com-
mand ers threw away their maps, as they ran o ff
them , confid ent tha t th ey would not need th em
3'
agam to withdraw. A brief check occurred at
Ibbe nburen , north of H anover, wh ere excep-
tionall y stubborn resistance by staff and train ees of
a Wehrmachl offi cer training school proved trouble-
some, but the divisio n side-stepped a nd left th em to
53rd I nfa ntry Division , who were following up.
Another ha lt occurred at th e Weser a nd th e
divisio n was diverted to the north to help round LIp
1st German Parachute Arm y, but Bremen itself
proved too well defended to be taken by a n
armoured division , so once aga in it was by-passed
and left for th e in fantry ; this time, 3rd Di vision. I t
was a period of stubborn fi ghting for every village;
o n one occasion 8th Hussars were surprised and
attacked in leaguer at night, and in cidents occurred
of ambushes being sprung und er cover of the white
fl ag, but progress continu ed. On 16 April 8th
Hussars liberated two large prisoner-of-war ca mps
at Fa llingbostel; one of th ese had a lready been
taken over by the inmates, and had British sentries
in pressed battledress and clean webbing on th e
ga tes, a nd a pa ratroop RSM very much in
comm and!
The final actions lOok place south and west of
H amburg, rounding up groups of police, SS,
paratroops, marines and even redundant sub-
marin e crews, fig hting in th e heath lands of th at
region. Th e Rifle Brigad e made good use of their
newl y- issued carri er-borne Was p fl amethrowers.
Th ey also ca ptured a large number of G erman
'vVrens' in Bux tehud e, with no casualties except th e
RSM's foot, on which o ne formidabl e frauleill
dropped a heavy object.
On '9 April 1945 surrender negoti a ti ons for
Hamburg commenced , and on the a fternoon of 3
May units ofthe di visions drove unopposed into th e
shattered city. Fittingly, perhaps, one of the first
vehicles to enter th e ma in square, where the
commandant and o ther dignitaries wa ited in full
dress to surrender, was the scout car of the CO of
11th H ussars; that officer, who was very info rm ally
dressed a nd not a whit impressed by the reception
committee, stopped to feed the pigeons with a rm y
biscuits. So ended six years of war fo r 7th Armoured
Divisio n .
It has not been possibl e to mention a ll th e ma ny
un its tha t served in th e di visio n during that lim e,
nor a ll the higher form a tions to which it was
attached , let a lone a ll th e individua ls involved , but
it is hoped that this very brief account will have
given some idea of how th e British armoured
di vision came to be form ed , a nd how it developed
both in equipment a nd organization during the
2nd World Wa r. It was ind eed a fa r cry from the
' Immobile Farce' of 1935, or th e over-a rmoured
and under-supported forma tion of the ea rl y wa r
years, to th e fl exible well-ba la nced mixture of a ll
arms, ca pa ble of ad vancing or side-stepping as
necessary, and swinging either armour or in fa ntry
into the va n, whi ch entered Hamburg in 1945.
The Plates
A The Division Sign
Th ejerboa was added to the pla in whi te disc earl y
in 1940, by Gen Creagh ; th e exact date is
uncerta in, but some vehicles arc kn own to have
reta ined the earl y form a fter the outbreak of war
with Italy. The j erboa on a pl ain white square
was used in N W Europe a longside the earlier type
featuring thejerboa o n a white disc on a red square.
The brownish anima l on th e la te shoulder fl as h
caused queries as to whether d ivisiona l troops in
NW Europe were Austra lia ns!
Order of Battle, unit vehicle signs and cap
badges, May 1942
At this time the di vision was organized into sel f-
conta ined brigade groups a nd two of the di visiona l
AT regiment batteries were integra ted into th e
RHA regim ents a nd used their signs. Detachments
of RE, LAA a nd oth er services were a lso allac hed
perma nentl y to brigades. Brigade workshops would
a lso have had brigade colo urs behind the numbers
'23 Sexton scl r-propcllcd 25 pd r gu ns in action in NW Europe,
1944; note Allied recogn itio n stars. Th is weapon, based on
the Ame rican M 3 chassis, eq uipped 5th Roya l Horse Arti llery,
who norma ll y supported the armoured brigade; 3rd RH A,
who norma ll y worked wilh the infanlry brigade, kept towed
25 Pdrs. (Gander)
33
24 Achilles M I 0 self-pro pell ed I 7pdr anti-tank g uns follow a
laped 'safe' lane in the bocage of Normandy. At least onc
battery of the divisional AfT regiment in NW Europe was self-
propelled to work with thc armoured brigade; the remainder
supported the infantry with towed 17 Pdrs. ( Imperial War
Museum )
on their signs when operating wi th the brigad es
independen tl y, rather th an under d ivisional con-
trol. I n late ' 942 a ll a rtill ery reverted to d ivisiona l
cont rol so th at th e CR A could co-ordinate its
efforts, although still often attached to su p port th e
brigad es. On the fo rm a ti on of R E M E before
Al a m ein , a ll wo rk shop u n its ad o pted
bl ue/yellow/ red hori zo n tall y-st ri ped signs a nd
came under d ivisio na l CREM E cont rol, whil e the
remaining RAO C units had ve rticall y-stri ped
bl ue/red /bl ue signs.
U nit tactical signs were supposed to be com bin ed
wi th the d ivisiona l sign on the reverse of th e PASS
plate (8tin squa re, mounted on nearside of so ft skin
ve hicles, used to in d ica te vehicle ou t o f ac tion) b ut
were o ften pai n ted on opposite sid es of fron t a nd
rear, on mudg uards, sandshields, etc. Brigade and
arm of service colour plates remained more or less
constant throughou t th e war, but unit num bering
systems cha nged , o ffi cially, at least fou r ti mes; th a t
shown here was in fo rce, with minor alterations,
from m id - '94' to earl y '943 . Style va ried from u nit
to unit or even from crew to crew. Division and un it
34
signs were often omi tted in the desert, particul arl y
on AFYs, bu t were a lways used in NW E u ro pe
where tra ffi c control made them more necessary .
Cap badges were me ta l a t this period; later in the
war, those of O th er R a n ks were mad e of coloured
plas tic simul ating silver, brass and bronze fi nishes.
B Egyptian Frontier, 1940
I t is su mm er on the coastal plain; escarpments lead
u p to the inla nd pla teau in the background. The
AFYs are in earl y straight-edged ca mouA age
patterns of two contrasting colours over light stone;
o ffi cial va ria tions included black a nd green (mid-
' 940) a nd si lver-grey with sla te (November '940),
bu t other colours were used at comm anders'
d iscretion. F ro m left to rig ht:
Rolls-Royce 1924 Pattern Armoured Car, 11th Hussars
A rmed with a Bren g un on an AA mounting, a
Boys anti-tank rifle, and a smoke-bomb projector,
the car carri es no rad io and no markings except the
vehicl e serial nu mber. D esert eq ui pment incl udes
radiator cond enser, sand chann els, sun com pass,
and cut-down petrol tin as 'brew can'. Crew wear
brown, crimson-band ed 1 1 th Hussar berets w ith-
o ut badges; the stand ing warrant o ffi cer wears his
ra nk badge on a leather wrist stra p . Pistols were
seldom worn ; when they were, then wa istbelt
hols[ers were at least as common as th e Royal
Armoured Corps pattern with leg strap shown here.
Lance-Corporal, King's Royal Rifle Corps
Summer combat dress, wi th bl eached ' 937 partial
webbi ng se t ; respirators, packs and picks a nd
shovels in li eu of entrenching tools were no rma ll y
carri ed in seClion trucks. The shorts a re 'taken up' a
few inches from length as issued; note black Rifle
ran k chevron on sleeve. The weapon is the SMLE
No. , Mk III rifle with ,8in ba yonet- termed
'sword' in Rifl e regim ents.
Lieutenanl, King's Royal Rifle Corps
Other R anks wore khaki fi eld-service (sid e) caps
with regi mental badge on the left ; officers often
wore No. , Dress caps in rifl e-green with black
bUllons, a nd a silver bugle-horn badge on a small
raised red boss, as here. R emovable shoulder-straps
on the kha ki shirt bear black meta l or woven rank
pips and ' KRRC'; the slacks a nd rubber-soled
suede desert boots are private-purchase items. The
equ ipment is the officer's '937 we bbing set with
holstered NO.2 Mk I Webley revolver, am munition
pouch, compass pouch and binocular pouch ; an
officer's small pack , slimmer than the OR's type,
ha ngs on the hip.
Private, Royal Amry Service Corps
Wolsley pattern sun helmet with RAS C puggri
flash (genera ll y removed on the outbreak of war for
securit y reasons) . Bl ancoed skeleton webbing with
small '907 pouches, , 8in bayonet sca bbard ,
'Bombay bloomers' buttoned up and worn as
shorts, and full- length puttees were all common in
earl y '940 but, except in rear areas, the helmet and
puttees had generally d isappea red by the following
year.
Vickers M k VIB Light Tank, lsi RTR
Armed with ·5 in a nd ·303in Vickers water-cooled
machine-guns in comb ined mo unting, with two
smoke-bomb projectors. Th e spotlight a nd AA
mounting for the ·303 in gun on the sides of the
cupola were rarely seen a fter the first cam pa ign.
Penno ns were positioned o n the NO.9 set ae rial in
accordance with a recognition code. Separate unit
tactical sign and divisional sign were normal at this
date. Bl ack tan k corps overa lls were still worn quite
25 A 40mm Bofors light anli-aircraft gu n, winter 1944; this was
the standard light A/A gu n throughout th e war. Earli er models
used in the desen lacked the shield and the sight correc ting
gear shown here . In NW Europe so me SP Bofors mounted on
lorry chassis were also used. (Imperial War Muse um )
wid ely in '940 but seem to have been replaced by
khaki denim overalls later ; shirt, shorts or slacks
were a lso wo rn in summer and partial or complete
battledress in winter.
Background: Morris CS II /30 30cwt truck
Pl a in light stone fini sh with Egyptian civil ia n-type
number plates, typical of types used in '940 by unit
echelons, etc.
Foreground:
Discarded 4gal ' flim sy' petrol tins had many uses;
pierced , a nd placed over a hurricane lamp, they
made night signs. This, and the cut-out metal day
sign point to divisional main HQ The triangle on
the partly buried telephone line indi cates an
infantry battalion line.
C Suppo rt Group, Sidi R ezegh, N ovelllber
1941
The desert was both cold and wet at tim es,
particularly at night, a lthough usua lly warm and
dusty la ter in the day. In some areas, rock below the
surface prevented anything but shallow weapon
pits being dug; a lternati ves were 'sangars' wi th
walls of rocks or sandbags, but these were da n-
gerously more consp icuous. From left to righ t:
25pdr Mk 11 with No. 27 Artillery Trailer (limber) , 1st
Field Regiment, Royal Arlillery
As with a ll guns used in the desert, this is without
muzzle brake a nd counterweigh t; it also lacks, at
this date, a direct fire sight- tanks were engaged
using the di a l sight until, 942. Yellow shells piled on
the pit are HE ; black shells held by the detachment
are AP shot. Detachment members' warm clothing
includ es woollen cap comforters, balaclavas, great-
coats, leather jerkin, battleclress blouses, a nd even
rubber Wellington boots. Kneeling figure at limber
35
26 Dese rt Rat in N \'" Europ e ~ but not 7th Armo ured
Divisio n. Th ese vehicles bearing the black jerboa with its tail
over its head are from 4 th Armoured Brigade, which retained
the old sign on leaving the division in Africa. The Hum ber
scout car and M3 half-track are, however, typical of vehicles
used in the division: the former by I Ith Hussars and HQ§, and
the lattcr by thc R iAc Brigade mOtor compan ics, R E, RAMC ,
and other services. (Sharpshooters)
has RA fl ash on sleeve, but o thers wear clothing as
issued , wilho ut insigni a. RA cannon insignia
appears above chevrons of sta nding sergeant in field
serVIce cap.
Brigadier 'J ock' Campbell, vc
Dressed in a leather golfing jacket a nd corduroy
slacks, Camp bell wears no insig nia apa rt from his
hat wilh rank distinctions. His staff car is a cu l-
down Ford station wagon, a ty pe wid ely used by
senior officers in lh e desert . Signs on il include a
bridging circle, combined di visional and Support
Gro up HQ tactical signs, and the veh icl e serial
number. There are racks of 2ga l water tins and a
radiator condenser, made from an empty one. The
windshi eld is smeared with grease a nd coated with
sand , apart from a small area, to ki ll refl ections.
Bren LMC team, 2nd Bn Rifle Brigade
No . I has his helm et covered in sandbag hessian; he
has a tape and cotton bandoli er of'303 amm unition
36
clips over his shoulder, and is loading a Bren
magazine by ha nd. Note chevron in regimental
blac k on green, and black shoulder title. No .2 has
a n issue j ersey over khaki drill shirt and slacks, and
is using his comforter as a scarf. Equipment around
the pit includ es a No. 36 hand grenade (red crosses
on green ba nd indicate a fu sed grenade read y for
use) , pouches of Bren magazines, and a captured
German MP. 38. U nl ike German rifl e platoons and
British divisiona l infan try, with their Thompson
guns, British motor infantry had no sub-machine
g un issued to sectio ns.
Background : infantry support weapons
Boys ·ssin anti -tank rifle, one of whi ch was carried
in each section tru ck and carrier; and 2in mortar, a
platoon HQ weapon capable of firing smoke or H E
bom bs up to soo yards.
In th e foreground , discarded evidence of the
British soldier's staple ration- a bu ll y beef tin.
D North-West Europe, winter 1944
A road junction somewhere in H olland. From left
to right:
Private, 131 ( ~ueens) Brigade, Lorried IIIJantry
Th e new steel helm et was now in use a longside the
old type. Service issue steel-rimm ed spectacl es were
designed to be wearabl e under a respirator. T he
No. 4 Mk I rifle with short spike bayo net was
standard issue by this date, as was the entrench ing
tool slung in a wall et on th e back of the belt. Th e
camouflaged windproof smock, origina ll y issued
for Norwegian operatio ns is wo rn here ove r both
battledress and the sleeveless leather jerkin.
REME Officer, InniskiLlings LAD, on BSA B30
Motorcycle
Congested European roads bro ught mo torcycles
back in to favo ur : in the desert, jeeps or pick-ups
were preferred. Th is officer wears the black RAC
beret with REME cap badge, and semi-uniform
rai ncoat. Note tactical sign on fuel tank of BSA.
Cromwell Tank, 8th Hussars
O vera ll kha ki with no add itional pai nted
camouflage; chi cken wire and hessian scrim on
tu rret onl y, to obscure distinctive turret sha pe
above walls a nd hedges. Combin ed di visiona l and
reconnaissance regiment tactica l sig ns, th e latter a
white '45' on a horizontally-striped blue-over-
green patch. Tank name partly visibl e on turret
sid e. Commander wears black beret, and radio
operato r the riml ess RAC helm et introduced in
1943. Aeri al pennons were not used in Italy or N W
Eu rope except by some higher H Qs. T ank arma-
ment, 75mm main g un and two '303in BESA
machine-guns.
Lance-Corporal, Divisional Provost CompatI)'
Motorcycl ists' helmet, boots a nd breeches; battle-
dress wi th meda l ribbons and di visional sho ulder
flash ; red on black MP brassard on right arm, a nd
traffic control sleeves; white webbing. MPs on
lonely traffic control points were often attacked by
enemy stragglers, hence the Sten gun and spare
27 Challenger tank armed wilh 17pdrgun in a high turret on a
modified Cromwell chassis. Th e lan k shown is ma rked as oncof
'A' Sqn of th e armoured recce regiment of 11 th Armoured
Di vision , but , apart from th e d ivisional sig n, is identical to those
used by 8th Hussars in 7th Armoured Division. Note the
remova l of the bow machi ne-gun during modification , also a
fcalUfc of tile Sherman Firefly, th e 17pdr gun lank of lhe o th er
regimenlS in the divisio n. ( Imperial War Museum )
37
28 \'Vindsor ca rriers of the ami-tan k platoon of 1/5t h Queens
towing 6pdr guns in Germany. Timber baulks lashed 10 the
from seem to have been a com mon feature of carriers in
Euro pe. Note mixture of old and new steel helmets, and the
facl th al mOS t of th e crew wear the RA e win ter lank sui t. The
Windsor was an elongated and more powerfu l version of the
uni versal ca rri er. (Im perial War Museum)
magazin e in boot top, as well as the revolver.
Reece Troop Stuart /vI k V, 8th Hussars
More heavil y camouflaged than the g un tank, this
recce vehicle, known as a 'J alopy' or 'Sawn-Off""
has had the turret removed, and a '5in machine-
gun fitted , to reduce the silhouette.
Officer, 8th Hussars
H e wears the green, gold -l aced ' tent hat' peculia r
to this regiment. The winter tank suit- 'pixie' or
'ZOOt' sui t- was issued to all ranks. I t had a bla nket
lining and two neck-to-ankle zipped openings, a nd
by ma nipula tio n of the zips could be converted into
a sleeping bag.
J eep, Divisional RE Field Park Squadron
J eeps had been used in th e division since 1942, a nd
had g radually replaced pick-ups and 8cwts for
officers' runabouts, despatch riders) etc. The driver
wears the general service cap, wh ich had now
replaced the fi eld-service cap as standard Other
Ranks' headgear ; the badge is plasti c. The major
38
wears the soft kha ki peaked cap, with leather strap
a nd metal badge, of the commissioned ranks, a nd the
semi-offi cial 'British Warm ' coat.
E Camouflage and Markings
Official camo uflage schemes vari ed frequentl y, and
many uno ffi cia l ones were used; some of th e most
common a re illustra ted on this and preced ing
pla tes. All the com mo nly used types of vehicl e sign
a re a lso shown ; method and position of application
va ried with units. Most sig ns were used by all
vehicles to which they a pplied in lW Europe, with
th e exception of some armoured cars. In th e desert
they were often omitted , a lthough squad ron a nd a ir
recognition sig ns seem to have been commoner
lhan either di visiona l or uni t sig ns.
I AI 3 C ruiser, 1941 , of3 Troop, 'A' Squadron,
senior regiment in brigade. Light ston e with single
colour overpainted in semi-slra ight-edged scheme,
used before wavy -edged schemes became stand ard .
2 Bridging circles, 5in fig ures on front offsid e of
vehi cles: 2A Hollow type sometimes a pplied to
avoid breaking camouflage pattern . 2B ormal
type.
3 Pri est 105 mm SP gun, 5th RHA , I taly 1943.
Light mud colour overpai nted with black wavy -
edged sch eme. Note white undersurface of g un ; in
th e Middle East und ersides a nd sh adow areas were
ofte n w hi te at this time .
4 Aerial pennons, 9in x ' 3in: -tA CO , th ird regt. III
senio r o r o nl y a rmoured brigad e. -tB ' A' Sqn CO in
second senior regt. 4C 2 Troop ta nk, junior regt.
Some units fl ew pennons in regim enta l colours
instead of those indi ca ting brigade or seniority.
5 Squadron/compan y signs, painted on turret sides
a nd rear and som etimes front of AFVs, and cab
doors of softskin tra nsport . Colour indica tes regi-
ment by seniority; a rmoured cars used white. 5A
16in x 12in ; second-ill -comm a nd HQ Sqn , se nior
regt. sB 9in sides; 3 Troop, ' A' Sqn , second regt. 5C
' 211l square; HQ, 'B' Sqn , junior regt. 5D 6in
rad ius ; CO , ' C ' Coy, a rmoured brigad e motor
batta li on.
6 Daim ler Dingo Scout Car, used '940-45; plain
' Portland stone' colour, as were many desert
vehicl es. M ed ica l officer's runabo ut in a rm oured
Legendes
I tJiliversaJ carrier d 'un balail1OI1 motorise avec prisonnicrs ilaliclIs, '940 ;
I'armcmcnt comprcnd un fusil Bo)'ll anti-tank, <':1 UIlC mitrailleusc Brcn , sous les
couvcrtures da ns cen e photo, avec mOntage anti-aCrien. 11: Canon anti-tank
Bofon 37 mm - ce n'etai ! pasd'anne reglemcntairedc l'Arm&! Britanniquc, mais
la division fut forc~ de Ie r6quisitionner en 1940. 3 Un char Crus.1der Mk II d ' A
Squadron 4 Troop, County of London Yeoma nry. Une vue typique d'un
Ct]uipage de char, a une periode calme, et de leur char encombrC. 4 Lcs chaNi
Stuart et Crusader Mk I, fin 1941 , dans Ie deserl ; ils sonl pcints en beige pale,
sans camouflage ni enblCmcs. 5 I..cs chars ella camions se disjoignent de I'ordrc
serre adople chaque nui l. Observez Ics chars Crusader el Granl , eelui-lit. avec
I'emblcme lriangulaire d'A Squadron el Ics mots 'Avanti ! Avant i !' - cri de
guerre italien. 6 Un cll111ion Fordson 15 cwt scrvait a tra nsporter chaq ue groupe
d 'une seclion d'i nfa nterie mOlorisee. 7 Un cam ion Chevrolel 310n , servait it
transporter ulle sect ion enticre de la brigade inf.1.nterie-camion et accomplit
beaucoup d' autres taches de transportation. 8 Transl)()rteu r de chaNi \Vhite-
Ru xlall 181On, rem place plus lard par Ie transporteur articulC, Scammell. 9
Automobile blindee H umber Mk III dans cette vue t)'piquede desert observez
['auto tout couvene d 'cfrels, attaches partoul CI Ie nom ·Clara' sur la lOurelle. 10
ChaNi Grant sur la plainedescne; Ic char Ie plus prochc porte I'emblcmea ca rredc
' B' Squadron sur la tourelle.
I I Un Daimler Dingo, \·oiture de reconnaissance du 4th Field Squadron Royal
Engineen. Lcsemblema typiquescomprellnent I'attribut de la division avec, en
meme temps, ['insignc tac tique de ['unite. 12 Canon anti-tank l\<\k [I 6 pound,
comme il ~ I a i t ulilise par la division de la mi-t942. II elait transportc sur un
camion dans I' Afriq ue d u nord. 13 L deteCleUNi clcclriques de mines, distri bucs
immcdiatemenl avant la balaille d 'Alamein. '4 Un poste sanitaire de regiment
dans Ie desert avec une ambulance Austin K'2. 15 On demonte Ie !Iloteur d 'un
char Stuart. 16 Morlier de 3- en combat, en h alie 1943. 17 Lcs voilUres de
quartier general a Pompei i; a gauche un Dorehester - une voiture de
commandement blindce. Rommel se servit d'un Dorchester pris a I'cnncmi dans
Ie desert . • 8 Un char Sherman en Italie, carnoune de beige el de noir, avec
I'emblcrne triangulaire d 'A Squad ron et Ie panncau d'idelHifi ca tion cn rouge el
blanc sur 101 IOu rei Ie. 19 Lc posle rccepteur No 19, Ie poste reglementaire pour Ics
chan et d'aulres voilUres pcildanl la deuxieme p..1rtie de la guerre. 20 Lcs
ingenicurs 'Ianccnt' un 'Baile:y bridge:' en Italie.
21 Un camion Halford 3lon, Ie carnion normalement utilise pour tranSI)()rter les
tro upes en 1944- 45. 22 Un tracteur Scammell qui servait a remorquer les chars
abimes. 23 I..es canons autop ropulses de campagne - Ics Sexton 25 I)()Ulld, en
France, 1944. 14 I..es pieces anti-tal.lks autopropulsees, les M lo Achilles 17
jXlund, en Norma nd ie. Une ballerie de canons autOpropulses f.-,.isait partie de
I'armcment du regimem ami-tank. 25 Vne piece ami-aerienne 40mm Bofon, en
Allemagne: 1944. Avcc quelquc:s peti lcs modifications, Ie Bofon etait I'anne
legere regiemelllaire anti-aerienne pendant toule la guerrc. 26 Une volturc de
recon naissance 1·l umbcr el une aUlo-chenille M3 dc la ,ph Armoured Brigadc.
Dans la 7th Armoured Division Ie Humber sen 'ai l plusieun Elau- Majon el les
regt ; unit a nd di visiona l signs o bscured by sand
cha nnel.
7 Air recognition signs, on truck bonn ets or tilts,
AFV turre ts or engin e d ecks, as la rge as possibl e:
,A ' 94' , ro und ed ge o f turre t top.
Late ' 942- mid-'943, show n on pink a nd green
' 942. ,B ,C
sch eme used on AFVs around tim e of Ala mein. ,D
' 943 onwards.
8 Ground recognition signs : 8A Tun isia a nd Ita ly.
8B Desert, ' 94 '.
9 75 mm ha lf- track, ,nh Hussa rs, ' 944, in kha ki
and black N W Europe scheme.
10 Vehicle names, ofte n not a ppli ed: lOA 1St R TR,
' 940. lOB 3rd CLY, '942.
II Vehi cle serial number styles: IIA T a nk in
desert. liB Ambulance, NW Euro pe.
12 D a imler Mk I Armoured Car, "th Hussars,
winter '944- 45. Plai n kha ki overpa inted whi te in
snow. Liul ejohn ada pter on 2pdr gun a nd Vickers
' K ' gun o n turret pintl e were standard a llhis tim e.
11th Hussan, CI Ie ~1 3 eillil employc par I'infanterie mOlOrisee de 101 Rifle
Urigade. 27 VII char Challenger avec une piece 17 pound etait employe par Ic:s 8th
Hussan de la 7th Armoured Division. 28 TransjXlrteur Windsor de la section
anti-tank, 15I(5Ih Queen's Regi melll 1945.
Planches en couleur
A Les insignes de la division, comme portCs sur les voiturc:s el quelquefois sur les
vetements, furent changes de la rondelle blanche au jerboa rougc, debut 1940.
Celul-ci, avcc Ie je:rboa sur un carreau blanc, elaiem employes simuhanemelll
pcndant les annees 1943- 44: I'auribut noir sur I'epaulet fUI inlroduit en
1944- 45·
Le lableau d ' organisation dcmontre la division en mai 194'2. Les panneaux el
les ehiffres colores ctaicllt portes sur les voilU res de diflerentes unites
divisionnclles; Ics atlributs de easquette indiquelll Its regimen15 qui equipaient
eo unitesdansl'organisaliondivisionnelleacetteepoquc. Dalula 71h Armoured
Division 10 palllleaUX ctles chiffres d'unite etaient d'habitude allies a I'attribut
de division dans un seul insigne, I'attribut de division place au-dessus de celui de
l'unite.
B L1 frontiere Egypt-Libyecli 1940. A gauchese trouve une automobile blindec,
un Rolls Royce 19'24, avec I'equipagequl porte les berets brUludes 11th Hussars.
Remarquez les bandeaux rouges etl'abscnee d 'atlributs. Un lance-corporal du
King's Royal Rifle Corps el un Lieutenant du mCllle regiment parle a\·ec un
Private du Royal Army Sen ·ice Corps. Lc chevron dc rang du Rifleman CSt en
noir, distinction rcgimentale, el I'oflieier porte Ie ealot vert des rangs
commissionnCs du regiment, avec I'emblcllle du cor-dc-chasse en argent sur une
coearde rouge. Lcs deux homllICS portelli 101 cienturc, Ics bretelles elc. de I'annec
1937. l..esoldat RASC porte Ie casque colonial a I'ancicnne mode, avec I'anribut
en couleurs regimentalcs; les troupes dll frOllt se deparlirent de I'habitude en
1940. A drolle se trouvc un Vicken Light Tank Mk VIB du 1St Royal Tank
Regiment I'«]uipage porle toujours la s.-,.Iopen e noire du RTR des premieNi
mois de ]a gucrre. Observcz les insignes individucls de division et d'unile sur Ie
dc vant du char, eequi n'Clait pas rare a ce temps-Ia. Dans Ie fond vous voyez un
camion Morris 3oeWt, pcint cn beige pale et avec des plaques matricules
egyptiennes.
C Divisional Support Group, Rczegh, novembre 1941. Par les temps froids et
pluvieux Its troupes portaient Ics pardcssus, Ics veSlcs en cuir, el mcme Its bones
en caoutchouc.
Dans Ie fond , a ga uche, vous vo)'ez l'i:quip.1ge du '25pdr canon de campagne
du lSI Ficld Regiment, Royal Arlillery. Au centre se tient Brigadier 'Jock'
Campbell, Victoria Cross, dans son break Ford adaptc it. voilUre de quartier
general. A droile rcmarqucz ['equipage de deux hommes d 'ull Brcll, avec les
allributs dans Ie cou1cun dll 2nd Bn, 'nle R ifle Brigade. Observez le:s munitions
et les effe15 dispenCs panout , el Ie M P38 allemand; les milraillettes en
manquaiel1 t a celie pcriode-I:1. Dans Ie fond, .j droite, se trouvent un mortier 2
inch et un Boys ·55 inch fus il anI i-lank.
39
D Une routt, en Hollandc. '944- 45. A ga uche se lient un private de 13 '3'
(Queens) Infantry Brigade,av« Ie casque, modele [944,el un (usil N04 Mk I. II
porte une vale en CUiT aussi un bloUJi()Il a I'eprcuve du vtm, ((nUe leopard
dislribuee pour la premiere fois pour Its operations en NorvCgc mais garclee par
quelques unites ulterieurtmcnt. Dalls Ie fond vous voye;: un oflici cr dll RE~'IE
sur un BSA B.30 mOlocyclcnc, et un char Cromwell d es 8th H ussarsavec insignes
de division el d'uniti:. La lOurel1e est camouR&: de ueillage en fil de fer et des
lambc:aux . Au cemre se tiell! un lance-corporal, mOlocyclislc de la j\·l ilitary
Police de la division, armed ' un milrailletlc Stell el d 'un pistoict. Dans Ie fond, it
d roi le, se tro uve u n cha r Stuart Mk V de la re<:onnaissancc Iroop d es 81h Hussars,
dont on a enleve la tourelle, CI montca la place une mitraillette '50 inch. A droite
vous voyel unjeep du dc taehement Royal Engineers, et un officier qui [)()rte une
salopeue d'hiver de I'equipage de char et [e calOi vert ct couleur de I'or,
particuticr aux o fficiers des 8th H ussars.
E Emblemes et camouflage. ( I ) Char AI3 1941 avec emblemes du 3 Troop, A
Squadron, r~imcmsuperieurdc la brigade. (2) LcsslylesdilfCrenu d'indicalion
des timiles de poids sur les ponu. (3) Un canon Priest 105111111, 5th Royal Horse
Artillery, en Italie '943- observel Ie dcssous peint en blanc. (4) Les drapeaux
etaient chan~es chaque jour en code de reconnaissance. A _ commandant ,
lroisieme reg1ll1em dans [a brigade. B. commandant, A Squadron, deuxicme
regiment. C _ char de 2 T roop, regiment cadet. (5) Lcs emblcmcs d'escadron
peinu sur les voitures blindees. La couleurs indiquell t la superiorite des
regimcnts ct les automobiles blindecs se servcnt du blanc: A _ Commandan t cn
second, HQSquadron, regimcnt superieur. B- 3 T roop A Sc:luadron, deuxiblle
regiment. C _ HQB Squadron , regiment cadet. D =commandalll, C Company,
bataiUon d'i nfanterie mOlOriseede la brigade blindee. (6) Voiture de camp..1gne
un Daimler Dingo d'un mCdecin milit;tire du regiment blindee. (7) Signes de
reconnaissance aerien ne sur Its toia des voilures : A - 194' , B _ t942,
C _ 1942- 43, D .. '943- 45. (8) Panneaux dercconnalssallceemployesell T Ullisie
et ell Italic (A) etdans ledi:serl (8 ). (9) Auto-chenille 75mm, , tth H ussan, 1944.
( lOA et B) Styles typiques des noms de chars, pas souvent utilises. ( I IA el B)
Styles Iypiques de numeros matricutes d'un char et d'une ambulance. ( 12)
Camouflage d' hiver d'ull Daimler lI..lk I autOmobile blindee des 11th H uss.11"S,
1944- 45·
O'be r scbrift
I Ein Universal Carrier cines mOlorisierten I nfanteriebataillonsmil italicllischen
Kriegsgefallgenen, [940. Die Bordbewaffnung des Fahn:eugs iSI eine Boys
Panlerabwehrkanone (PAK) und ein Bren, lcichtes M-G, aufciner Fliegerab-
wehmlontierung (im Bilde ilbel"logen). ~ Eine Bofors 37mm PAK ; nicht die
EinheilS ..... alfe Hirdas brilische Heer, sondem in [940, wegen l\-tangel an anderer
Waffen, in die Division als NotlOsung eingeHihrt. 3 Ein Crusader ~'I k II Panler
von ' A' Squadron, 4 Troop, 3rd Count y of London Yeoma nry. Typisches
Ruhepausebild. Die vielen Klamollen alii Panler heachten! i Stuart und
C rusader Mk I Panler in der Wuste, aplit 1941. Die Tamfarbe ist hellbeigeohne
irgendwelcher Markicrung. 5 Panze r und Las tkraftwagen (LKW) brechen von
einem Nachtlager auf. Crusader und Grant Pamer sind im Bilelc : die ersten mit
dem 'A' Squadron Drcicckabzeichen und dem ilalienischen Wahlspruc h :
'Avanti! Avanli!' 6 Ein Fordson 15 CWI LKW. JOOe I nfanteriegruppc cines
motorisienen Infanterielugs wurde in cinCIII solchen ' Vagen transportierl. 7 Ocr
C hevrolet 3-ton LK W. Das Alllwechsfahrteug konnte cinen ga nzen Zug ciner
mOlomierten Infanteriebrigade transportieren, und hatle auch viele alldere
Transportaufgaben 7.U verrich[en. 8 Das White-Ruxtall 18-ton Pan-
urtransportfa hneug; es wurde spitler durch das Scammell Transportfahr.t:eug
enellt. 9 Ocr Humber Mk I I I Panlerwagen ineiner typischen \VilStenSlene. Die
vielen lusa [lIichen Klamotten und die Turmname 'Clara' beachten! 10 Gram
Panzer aufci ner 'Vilstenebene. Ocr Panler im Vordergrund tmgt am Turm das
vierecki ge Ableichen dc r 'B' Schwadron.
I I Ein Daimler Dingo Panzcnpiihwagen vom 4th Field Squadron. Royal
f.ngineen. Typisch ist das ko mbinierte laklische Divisions - und Einheitsab-
lcichen. I~ Die Mk l l 6-pound PAK, VOIl der Division ab Mille 1942 benutzt. In
Nordafrika wurde sic auf einem LKW getragen. 13 Solche elektrische
Minensuchgemte wurden kurt vor der Schlacht lU EI Alamein geleifert. Ii
RegimenlSveroondpta tl mit Austin K2 Kran kenwagen in der WilsIe. 15
Moto raustausch in einem Stuart Panler. 16 Ein 3-inch ,,·IOner im Einsatl,
halien, 1943. 17 Fahneuge des DivisiotUaabs in Pompeii; links ein Dorchester
Panlentabsfahneug. Rommel hal im Wilstenkerieg einen erbeutelen Dorches-
ter in gebrauch genommen. 18 [in Sherman Panler in halien. Die T a rnf:1Tben
sind beige und schwan, am Turm das "A' Squadron Dreieckabzeichen und die
rot-weiss-rote Erkcnnungstafd. 19 Oat ·Nr. 19' Funkgemt, Einhcltsfllnkgerlit for
Panzer und andere Fahrtellge in der 1.weiten Kriegshalfte. ~o l'ionicl'e schlagen
cine 'Sailey n ridge' cine Fluss in h alien.
~I Ein Bedford 3-lOn LKW de normal Truppentransporlwagen 1944- 45' ~It Die
Scammel Zugrnaschine, als 'Bergepanler' cingesctzl. ~3 Die 'Sexton' '25-pounder
selbstfahrhaubitlell, Frankrcich 1944. 24 M [0 Achilles 17-pounder Jagdpanler
in der Normandie. Das Panzerabwehrregilllcnt der Division hatle cine U..1t1erie
solcher Fahneugen. ~5 40mm Bofon Fliegerabwehrkanoncn (FLAK ), De-
utschland 1944. Dicsc Kanone, in vielen Abarten, war die nonllalc leich[e FLAK
der brilischen Armee den ganttn Kri eg hindurch. ::t6 H umber Panlerspahwagen
und M3 Halbkettenfahneug der 4th AmlOured Brigade. Ocr l'l umber wu rd ~
innerhalb der 7th Armoured Division von verschiedenen Stiibetl und "on den
Illh H ussars, de r 1\·13 von der Rifle Brigade (molorisierlen Inr:Ulteriercgimelll)
bcnutzt. 27 Ein 'Challcnger' Pam:er mil 17-pounder Kanone, von den
Auflarunguegimcnt, I I th Division. 28 Ein Windsor T ransportkcuenr..hrl.eug
des l'all7.erabwehr.t:ugcs, Ist{5th Queen's Regiment. [945.
Farbtafeln
A Das Divisionsableic.hen, auf FahrJ.eugen und manchmal auf Bekleidung
gelragen, erfuhr einige l\nderungen : luent ein weisser Kreis, dann (im F riihjahr
1940) eine rOte Springmaus. letz[ere und eine Springmaus au,f einem weissen
Viereck wurden 1943- 44 aile beide :w sehell . Dat schwane A.rmelablciehen
erschien erst 1944- 45. .
Der Starke- und Ausrilstungsnachwcis (STAN ) leigt den Divisiollswsland im
Mai [942. Die farbigen Schilde mil den Nummern wurden auf den Fahneugen
der verschiedenen Divisionseinheiten getr.tgen. Die Milllenabzcichen sind die
der Regimelller, die sich 1.U diese r Zeit inncrhalb der Division befanden. In der
7th Armoured Division war es ilblich das Divisionsableichcll und Einheitswap-
pen gleichlei[ig, mit denl crstcren nach oben, zu trage n.
B Oil' Grenle zwischen A.gypten und Lybien, [9-10. Links ei n Rolls Royce M
[924 Panlerwagen mit einer iksatlUng der Illh HU$S..1n - braune Berets
mit dunkelrotem Kop£band, ohne Mililenableichen. Ein Lance-Corporal und
ein leulnant des King's Royal Rifle Corps unterhalten sich mil cinem Private
des Royal Army Service Corps. Ocr Riflemall tmgt sein DiellStgradableichen
(Winkel) in schwan - ein RcgimentHradition. Ocr Offilier tragt das grune
Offiziersschiffchen des Regiments mit silbernem J agdhomemblem auf roter
Kokarde. Beidc Manner tragen die Kampfausrilstung M [937. Ocr RASC-
soldat tragt den altmodischen Sonnenhelm mit dem Abzeichen in Re-
gi mcntsfarben . Ocr Helm wurden von de n Kampftrup pen schon 1940
aufgegebe n.
Reclm ei n Vickers Lig ht T ank Mk V I B Yom ,st Royal Tank Regiment.
Wah rend den cnlen Kri egsmonalen wurde das RT R mi t den scwarl.cn
Panlerkombinalionen ausgestatle[. Die gelrennlen Divisions und Einheits..1b-
leichcn vorne am Panler bemerkcn; so etwas kam haufig IU dieser Zeil vor. 1m
Hintergrund cin Morris 30-<:wl LKW, hellbeige und mit agyptischen 7.ivilell
Kennlcichens.schilden.
C Divisional SUPI)()rt Group, Sidi Rezegh, November 194" Vorilbergehend war
das Weller sagar ka h und nass und die Truppen lOgen dann Mantel, Lederwams
und Gummistiefd an. Links im Hintergrund steht die hesalli ng cines 2s-pdr
Fddgeschulzcs "om lSI Field Regimen t, Royal Arlillery. In der Mille
Brigadier 'J ock' Campbell 'Victoria Cross' inseinem ford Ko mbifa hn:eug,das in
cin Stabsfahrtcug verwandelt wordell ist. Rcch ud iezwei-Mann Bcsa[zungeinen
Bren Icichten M -Gs. Sie trage n die Ableichenr:lrbe n des 2nd Balallions The
Rifle Brigade.
Die umherliegenden Munition, Gerat und die erbeutete deutsche M P 38
beachten! Solche Maschinenpistolen waren in diesen Tagen hum lU haben .
Recha in Hintergrund stehen ein 2-inch Moner und cine Boys '55-inch PAK .
D Eine StrassenS1.ene in Holland, 19H- 45. Links cin Soldat (private) der 13 1
(Qucens) Infantry Brigade mit dcm Helm M 1944 und dem Gewehr NO.4 Mk I.
Er tragt ein Lederwams und die windfeste Tarnjacke, die luerst rur die
Operation in Norwege n lugeteih wurden, die aber in einigen Einhciten im
spiileren Gebrauch bliehen. 1m Hintergrund cin Offizier der REr..·I E auf ci nem
MOlo rrad BSA B.30 und cin Cromwell Panler von den 81h H ussars mit
kombinie rtcn Divisions- und Einheitsabzcichen. DerTunn ist mit Drahtnetzund
Stoflfetlcn gctarnt worden. I n der Mittc ci n Lance-corporal Motorradfahrerdcr
Divisions MilitaT))()lilclkompagnie. Als IkwaffnulIg hat er cine Pistole und cine
S[en M-I'. Rechu im Hinlergrund ein Stuart Mk V Panze r der Reconnaissance
Troop der 8th Hussars, ohne Turm und mit einem lUsat7.lichen -50-inch M-C.
RechlS ein J eep d cr Divisions-Royal Engineerabteilung und ein Offizier der 8th
Hussan in der PanzerbeS..1tlungswintcrkombi nation und dem g riln-goldenen
Regimen tsschiffchen.
E Fah r.t:eugablcichen und Tarnfarhen. ( I ) Ein A 13 l)anzer, 1941 , mit den
Abzcichen \'Om 3 Troop, A Squadron YOm rangal tcsten Regiment de r Brigade.
(2) Verschiedene Briickengewich tsmarkierungen. (3) [ine ' Priesl' J05mm
selbstfahrende Kanone vom 5th Royal Horse Artillery, Italien, '943. Die weisse
Rohrunterscite bemerken! (4) Radioanten nenwimpcl, die von T ag IU Tag in
einer hcs timmlen Reihenfolge als Erken n ungschiffre gewechscll wurden:
A _ Chef des drillen RegimenlS der Brigade. B _ Chef, 'A' Sq uadro n, des
zweiten Regiment. C .. Panzer "om 2. Troop de Jlingsten Regimenu. (5)
Panlerkompanieerkennungsableichen (die Farbenlelgen die Rangordnung cler
Rcgimenter ; Radpanlerkampfwagcn lind Sp..'ihwagen trugen weiss)
A ",Slellvertretellder KOlnpallIeche r, HQ Squadron des rangaitcslen Regi-
men u. B _ 3. Troop, ' A' Squadron des zweitell Regiments. C= 'B' Squadron -
Stab des jilngslen Regiments. 0 = Kompaniechef, 'C' Company eines mOt-
orisierten I nfanteriebatallons einer Panlerbrigade. (6 ) Daimler Dill,lto Pan-
zerspiihwagen cines Regimentsartztes cines PanlerregimenlS. (7) Erken-
nUIlgS"l.eichell, die fUr Flugzeuge oben auf Fahneugen allgebraeht wurden:
A - I94I, 13 - 1942, C - 1942- 43, 0 - 1943- 45. (8 ) Erkennungstafel (A) a.us
I[alien und Tuncsien, (B) in der Wilste. (9) 75mm Halkettenselbslfahrlafettevon
den 11th H Uss.1r1, 1944 . ( [oA und B)- Ikispiele verschicdener Panzername n,
die ab und zu 1.U sehen waren. ( [ IA und U) - Ikispicle typischer Panzer- und
Krankenwage nkennziffer. (12) Wintertarnfarben cines Daimler Mk I Pan-
zerspiihwagen von den I [Ih H ussars, [944- 45.
 O SPREY· VANGUARD

A seri es 01 books describin g th e key units and weapons systems

. of the Second World War, prepared by leading military experts
for the enthusiast and modell er, and ilili stratil~ g auth entic details
of unirorms, in signia. annour and supporting vehicles, camouflage,
markin gs and weapons.

Avec annotations en fran~s sur les planches en couleur

Mit Aufzeichnungen auf deutsch tiber die Farbtafeln

ISBN 0 85045 281 3

~ -