FINALS NOTES
POSSESSION (October 1 & 2, 2023)
ART. 523 Possession is the holding of a thing or
enjoyment of a right
CORPOREAL – Possession of a Thing
INCORPOREAL – Possession of a Right
In this sense, we can infer that the concept of
possession implies a relation of power or control
over the object of possession and its possessor.
That is why, the concept of possession connotes
the following:
1. It implies a relation between an object
and a thing;
2. Such relation is one of power and
control;
3. Such control is one of fact which is
effective but without resolving whether
it carries with it or not a title of
ownership
Elements:
1. There must be occupancy, apprehension or
taking
2. There must be intent to possess (animus
possidendi)
Pp. v Tira to exemplify possession:
The Pangasinan Police held surveillance
operations on the house of Amadeo and Connie
Tira for drug activities. After a few days of
surveillance, the police got a warrant and
searched the house. The police found a number
of drugs, some paraphernalia, and money
assumed to have gotten from the trade, which
was hidden under the bed where Amadeo was
sleeping in.
Amadeo, in his defense, said that the house the
police searched was rented by his nephew. But
this claim was belied by the testimony of Connie,
who stated that the room was occupied by two
male and one female boarders who were in the
room when the searched happened.
The trial court convicted the spouses for
possession of illegal drugs.
The essential elements of the crime of
possession of regulated drugs are the following:
(a) the accused is found in possession of a
regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized
by law or by duly constituted authorities; and, (c)
the accused has knowledge that the said drug is
a regulated drug.
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such,
criminal intent is not an essential element.
However, the prosecution must prove that the
accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs.
Possession, under the law, includes not only
actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the
drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is
under the dominion and control of the accused
or when he has the right to exercise dominion
and control over the place where it is found.
The Supreme Court in this case gave emphasis to
the concept of control and dominion over a
thing. Knowledge of this kind is an internal act.
In this particular case, it can be presumed from
the fact that the accused had control and
dominion over the place where the drugs were
found since the drugs were found under the bed
in the inner room of the house where the
spouses resided.
They had actual and exclusive possession and
control and dominion over the house, including
the room where the drugs were found by the
policemen.
There are varying degrees of possession:
1. Possession without any title or right
whatsoever, as that of a thief;
2. Possession with a juridical title or right, but
not in the concept of owner, as that of a lessee;
3. Possession with a just title, or a title sufficient
to transfer ownership, but not from the true
owner, as that of a buyer in good faith;
4. Possession derived from the right of
ownership or possession with a just title from the
true owner. This is the possession that springs
from ownership.
Degrees of Possession
1. Possession without Title;
2. Possession with juridical title (Lessee);
3. Possession by just title;
4. Possession derived from their right of
ownership.

Possession under the Civil Code
1. Possession in one’s own name and
name of another; ( Art. 524, NCC)
Possession in one’s name
- Fact of possession and rights to such
possession are found in the same
person.
Possession in the name of another
- Possession of a person without any
right of his own and one which is
strictly of an agent or merely an
instrument in the exercise of such
possession.
Santos v Manalili
This case involves a parcel of land known
as the "Furukawa Plantation." The
Furukawa Plantation Company, a
Philippine corporation, is the registered
owner of a large tract of land in the
Province of Davao, as evidenced by an
OCT of the land records of that province,
issued more than 30 years ago.
As a result of the last war, this tract of
land was turned over to the NAFCO
(National Abaca and Other Fibers
Corporation) for administration and
disposition and, together with other
Japanese-owned properties in the
province, distributed among war
veterans and deserving civilians, each of
whom was allocated five hectares
pursuant to the directives of the
President of the Philippines and the
agreement entered into between the
Philippine Veterans Legion and the
NAFCO. From the NAFCO, it was later
turned over to the Board of Liquidators
(BOL).
On August 6, 1970, Manalili filed with
the BOL an application to purchase a
property in the Fukuwara plantation,
attaching therewith his Occupant's
Affidavit. The application was favorably
acted upon and on March 27, 1972, the
BOL required Manalili to pay the
downpayment of the purchase price.
Thereafter, Manalili declared the land
for taxation purposes.
The Manalilis administered the land but
they left for Manila in 1972. Before
doing so, they appointed an
administrator to oversee the land and
the improvements and crops they have
planted thereon, such as bananas and
coconut trees.
On March 25, 1981, after the lapse of
nine (9) years and even after the BOL
had already issued a Certification of Full
Payment endorsing the approval of the
sale of the land in question to applicant
Manalili, Rodolfo Santos wrote an
undated letter to the BOL protesting
Manalilis application. Santos filed a case
for Reconveyance and Annulment of
Title against Manalili.
The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of the Manalilis. It affirmed the
BOLs finding that the Manalilis had a
better right of possession thereto.
Preponderant evidence of Manalili have
sufficiently established that as early as
1970.
The case was appealed by Santos all the
way up to the Supreme Court, which
ruled that the circumstance that after
the sale, the Manalilis resided in Manila
and Pangasinan is of no moment. As it is,
possession may be exercised in one's
own name or in that of another. It is not
necessary that the owner or holder of
the thing exercise personally the rights
of possession. Rights of possession may
be exercised through agents or an
administrator who will oversee the land
and the crops plated thereon by
Manalili.
- Possession may be exercised in ones’
own name or in that name of another.
- It is not necessary that the owner or
holder of a thing exercise personally the
rights of possession. It is not necessary
that the owner of a parcel of land should
occupy the property. Someone in his
name may perform the rights.
 - Rights of possession may be exercised
through agents or an administrator
who will oversee the land and the crops
plated thereon. (NOT IN MATERIAL
POSSESSION)
Reyes v CA
Reyes sold to Raymundo, initially, one half of a
parcel of land. A new title was consequently
issued by reason of such sale.
Raymundo used her one-half share as a collateral
in obtaining a loan from GSIS.
In 1969, Reyes sold her remaining interest in the
property to Raymundo and their old title issued
replaced by a new one (TCT No. 149036) in the
name of Raymundo.
Since 1967 the house standing on the property
was being leased by the Palacios spouses from
Reyes.
But in 1987, Raymungo intervened and claimed
ownership of the entire property as well as of
the existence of a lease contract between her
and the Palacios spouses supposedly dated 17
March 1987 but retroactive to 1 January 1987.
On 23 August 1987 Reyes filed a complaint
against Raymundo for cancellation of TCT No.
149036 and reconveyance. Reyes alleged that
the sale in 1969 was simulated since she was
merely constrained to execute the deed without
any material consideration pursuant to an
agreement with Raymundo that she will obtain a
new loan from the GSIS for the construction of
an apartment. But should the loan fail to
materialize, Raymundo would reconvey the
property subject of the second sale to Reyes.
After she learned that the loan was disapproved
she repeatedly asked Raymundo for
reconveyance but to no avail. Their true
agreement was embodied in a private writing
dated 10 January 1970.
The trial court found that the second deed of sale
was indeed simulated since despite its execution
Raymundo allowed Reyes to exercise ownership
over the property by collecting rentals from the
Palacio spouses until December 1986. It was only
in 1987 that Raymundo asserted ownership
thereof.
The CA, however, ruled that as between a
notarized deed of sale earlier executed and the
1970 agreement contained in a private writing,
the former prevailed. It also found that Reyes's
cause of action had prescribed since the
complaint should have been filed either within
ten years from 1969 as an action to recover title
to real property, or within ten years from 1970
as an action based on a written contract.
The Supreme Court ruled that in the case of Heirs
of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, it ruled that
an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land
based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title
over the property. But this rule applies only
when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the
trust is not in possession of the property since if
a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.
Actual possession of land consists in acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as those a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.
It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of
land should himself occupy the property as
someone in his name may perform the act. The
owner of real estate has possession, either
when he himself is physically in occupation of
the property, or when another person who
recognizes his rights as owner is in such
occupancy.
In a lease agreement, the lessor merely transfers
the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing
leased. The Palacios spouses have been the
lessees of Reyes since 1967. Thus, Reyes was in
actual possession of the property through the
Palacioses and remained so even after the
execution of the second deed of sale. It was only
in 1987, when Raymundo asserted ownership
over the property that Reyes’ possession was
disturbed. Consequently, the action for
reconveyance filed a couple of months later has
not prescribed.

The SC also held that the second deed of sale
was simulated. It is true that as between a
public document and a private document, the
former prevails. But in one case, the SC ruled
that although the notarization of the deed of
sale in question vests in its favor the
presumption of regularity, it is not the intention
or the function of the notary public to validate
and make binding an instrument that did not
intend to have any binding legal effect upon the
parties thereto. The intention of the parties still
is and always will be the primary consideration
in determining the true nature of a contract
which in the present case was contained in the
agreement of 10 January 1970.
Moreover, the fact that Raymundo was able to
secure a title in her name did not operate to vest
ownership upon her of the property. The SC has
already ruled that the act has never been
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.
The Torrens system does not create or vest title.
It only confirms and records title already existing
and vested. It does not protect a usurper from
the true owner. It cannot be a shield for the
commission of fraud. It does not permit one to
enrich himself at the expense of another. Where
one does not have any rightful claim over a real
property, the Torrens system of registration can
confirm or record nothing.
- Sale was simulated
- Reconveyance of a parcel of land based
on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years (only applies if
the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property; If the plaintiff asking for
reconveyance is in actual possession of
the property and seeks for quieting of
title to the property, does not prescribe.)
- In lease agreement, the lessor merely
transfer temporarily use and
enjoyment of the thing leased. Reyes
was in actual possession of the property
through the palacioses as their lessees.
- Possession in the name of another
- Torrens system does not create or vest
title. It does not protect the usurper
from the true owner.
- Notarization is for the presumption of
regularity but does not determine the
intention of the contracting parties.
2. Possession as an owner or holder;
(Art. 525 , NCC)
Possession as an owner
- A possessor in the concept of an owner
maybe the owner himself or one who
claims to be so.
Possession in the concept of a holder of
a thing or right
- A lessee or usufructuary are considered
as possessors in the concept of a holder
with respect to the thing itself
Considered as possessor in the concept
of an owner with respect to their right over
the property as lessee or usufructuary
thereof.
Carlos v Republic
Carlos filed an application for registration of
a parcel of land. She claims to have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the property since 1945. At
the time of her application, she alleged that
her possession of the property has been for
over fifty years. The trial court granted her
application.
The Republic appealed. The decision was
reversed because at the time when she filed
her application for registration, the property
had been sold by her mother to a
corporation, and the fact of sale was
admitted by Carlos.
It was shown that at the time of her
application for titling, possession and
occupation of the land in question did
pertain not to her but to the corporation
An applicant for titling must have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under
a bona fide claim of ownership. The
applicant must show that she is in actual
possession of the property at the time of the
application. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own
property.
By reason of the sale, the applicant was no
longer in possession of the property in the
concept of owner. Even if it were true that
she had actual possession of the land at that
time, such possession was no longer in the
concept of an owner; she was in possession
in the concept of a holder. One who
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in
another a superior right which he believes
to be ownership, whether his belief be right
or wrong.
Carlos acknowledges the sale of the property
to the corporation and in fact promised to
deliver the certificate of title to the
corporation upon its obtention. Hence, it
cannot be said that her possession since
1996 was under a bona fide claim of
ownership. Under the law, only he who
possesses the property under a bona fide
claim of ownership is entitled to
confirmation of title. Appeal of the Republic
was GRANTED.
- By reason of the sale, the applicant was
no longer in possession of the property
in the concept of owner. (OCEAN not
present)
- The corporation was in possession ,has a
bona fide claim of ownership and is
entitled to confirmation of title.
- Possession was in the concept of a
holder
Bukidnon Doctor’s Hospital v MBTC
Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital obtained a loan
from MBTC. As security, it mortgaged the
parcel of land on which the hospital stood.
Upon default in the payment of the loan, the
said parcels of land were extrajudi cially
foreclosed and put in a public auction and
were sold to MBTC.
In order to continue its business the hospital
proposed that it would lease the land for a
period of three years. MBTC agreed to the
proposal.
About 20 months after the agreed effectivity
date of the lease contract, MBTA asked the
hospital to vacate the leased premises within
fifteen days. The hospital refused, invoking
the subsisting lease agreement.
By reason of the hospital’s refusal, MBTC
filed for Ex Parte Motion for a Writ of
Possession. RTC granted the motion.
The hospital did not appeal the RTC Decision.
Instead, it filed a petition before the
Supreme Court asking whether or not a writ
of possession is the proper remedy for
evicting a mortgagor who became a lessee of
the mortgaged properties after the
mortgagee has consolidated ownership over
the properties and was issued new
certificates of title.
The law and jurisprudence are clear that in
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, an
order for a writ of possession issues as a
matter of course, after the expiration of the
redemption period without the mortgagor
exercising the right of redemption, or even
during the redemption period provided a
bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in
case the foreclosure sale is shown to have
been conducted without complying with the
requirements of the law or without the
debtor violating the mortgage contract.
The rationale for the ministerial issuance of
a writ of possession is to put the foreclosure
buyer in possession of the property sold
without delay, since the right to possession
is founded on ownership of the property.
Possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right.
By material occupation of a thing, it is not
necessary that the person in possession
should be the occupant of the property; the
occupancy can be held by another in his
name.
Thus Articles 524 and 525 of the Civil Code
provide: Art. 524. Possession may be
exercised in one's own name or in that of
another; and in Art. 525, it says: The
possession of things or rights may be had in
one of two concepts: either in the concept of
owner, or in that of the holder of the thing
or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership
pertaining to another person.
In other words, an owner of a real estate has
possession, either when he himself is
physically occupying the property, or when
another person who recognizes his rights as
owner is occupying it.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the
parties in this case entered into a contract of
lease.
By this new contractual relation the hospital
recognized that possession of the properties
had been legally placed in the hands of
MBTC, and that it had taken such possession
but delivered it to the hospital as lessee of
the property.
By paying the monthly rentals, the hospital
also recognized the superior right of the
respondent to the possession of the
property as owner thereof. And by accepting
the monthly rentals, the bank enjoyed the
fruits of its possession over the subject
property.
Clearly, the bank is in material possession of
the subject premises. Thus, the trial court’s
issuance of a writ of possession is not only
superfluous, but improper under the law.
Moreover, as a lessee, the hospital was a
legitimate possessor of the subject
properties under Article 525 of the Civil
Code. Thus, it could not be deprived of its
lawful possession by a mere ex parte motion
for a writ of possession.
Where a lease agreement, whether express
or implied, is subsequently entered into by
the mortgagor and the mortgagee after the
expiration of the redemption period and the
consolidation of title in the name of the
latter, a case for ejectment or unlawful
detainer, not a motion for a writ of
possession, is the proper remedy in order to
evict from the questioned premises a
mortgagor-turned-lessee.
A new relationship between the parties has
been created. What applies is no longer the
law on extrajudicial foreclosure, but the law
on lease.
And when an issue arises regarding the right
of the lessee to continue occupying the
leased premises, the rights of the parties
must be heard and resolved in a case for
ejectment or unlawful detainer.
- The rationale for the ministerial issuance
of a writ of possession is to put the
foreclosure buyer in possession of the
property sold without delay, since the
right to possession is founded on
ownership of the property.
- The hospital recognizes the superior
right of MBTC by paying the monthly
rentals
- MBTC was in material possession of the
property, thus, writ of possession is
improper under the law.
- Possession of MBTC was in the concept
of an owner.
- Any issues that arises in the contract of
lease are subject to ejectment or
unlawful detainer.
3. Possession in Good Faith or Bad Faith
Possessor in Good Faith – if he is not
aware that there exist in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
Requisites for possession in good faith
1. The possessor as a title or mode of
acquisition;
2. There is flaw or defect in the title or
mode of acquisition which
invalidates it;
3. The possessor is unaware of the flaw
or defect, or he believes that the
thing belongs to him.
Possessor in Bad Faith – if a person has
knowledge that the right he is enjoying
or the thing he is holding is not really his
and maybe taken away from him by the
real owner.
Florentino v Supervalue
Florentino was engaged in the retail of
empanada with outlets in different malls
and business establishments within
Metro Manila. Supervalue was engaged
in the business of leasing stalls and
commercial store spaces located inside
SM Malls found all throughout the
country.
Due to several infractions of their lease
contract, Supervalue refused to renew
its Contracts of Lease with Florentino. It
also took possession of the store space
and confiscated Florentino’s equipment
and personal belongings found therein
after the expiration of the lease
contract.
Florentino filed a case for Specific
Performance, Sum of Money and
Damages against Supervalue.
Supervalue, on its part, alleged that
Florentino committed several violations
of the terms of their Contracts of Lease
by not opening from on certain dates,
and by introducing a new variety of
empanada without their prior consent,
as mandated by the Contract of Lease.
Florentino also frequently closes earlier
than the agreed closing hours.
Supervalue claimed that the seizure of
Florentino’s personal belongings and
equipment was in the exercise of its
retaining lien, considering that the she
failed to settle the said obligations up to
the time the complaint was filed.
When the case went up to the Supreme
Court, one of the issues was whether or
not Supervalue is liable to reimburse
Florentino for the sum of the
improvements she introduced in the
leased premises.
Court said: in Geminiano v. Court of
Appeals, this Court was emphatic in
declaring that lessees are not possessors
or builders in good faith. Being mere
lessees, they know that their occupation
of the premises would continue only for
the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot
be considered as possessors nor builders
in good faith.
It has been held that Article 448 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of
the same Code, which allows full
reimbursement of useful improvements
and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to
a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who
builds on land with the belief that he is
the owner thereof. It does not apply
where one's only interest is that of a
lessee under a rental contract;
otherwise, it would always be in the
power of the tenant to "improve" his
landlord out of his property.
Since Florentino’s interest in the store
space is merely that of the lessee under
the lease contract, she cannot therefore
be considered a builder in good faith.
Consequently, Supervalue may
appropriate the improvements
introduced on the leased premises
without any obligation to reimburse the
Florentino for the sum expended. Every
improvement he introduced to the
property was done so at his own risk.
- Lessees are not possessors or builders in
good faith. Their occupation is of the
premises will only continue for the life of
the lease.
- Reimbursement only applies to
possessors in good faith. It does not
apply where one’s interest is that of a
lessee under a rental contract.
- Florentino was only a lessee
- Supervalue may appropriate the
introduced on the leased premises
without any obligation to reimburse the
petitioner for the sum expended.
Rivera v Trinidad
The property subject matter of this case
was a parcel of land which was owned by
Dolores. Maximo Trinidad entered the
lot with Dolores’ consent. On the land,
Maximo constructed a building which he
used for repairing and tuning pianos. At
the time Maximo built his shop, the
parties had a harmonious relationship
that no written contract was executed to
define the rights of Maximo. But over a
year later, a misunderstanding arose
between Dolores and the wife of
Maximo.
Dolores filed a case of unlawful detainer
against Maximo. The case was hotly
contested by Maximo. There were those
who advised Dolores that the action
would have better success if the
property should be transferred to some
other person, who, as purchaser, will
exercise the power of terminating the
lease . So Dolores sold the property to
Rivera and a new Torrens certificate was
issued to Rivera.
Believing that the sale of the property
from Dolores to Rivera, her nephew was
a simulated one, Trinidad raised the
issue of whether the court had
jurisdiction of an action in which a
purchaser seeks to oust a tenant under
the conditions existing in this case. The
issue went up to the Supreme Court
where the court ruled that the lower
court had jurisdiction.
The court ruled that Rivera is merely
proceeding in the character of owner,
to recover possession from a tenant
holding over after the termination of
the right to hold possession. When
attention is given to this point it is quite
clear that the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment. So far as this case is
concerned it is wholly immaterial
whether the plaintiff has paid anything
for the lot or not; and the supposed
collusion between him and Dolores is
likewise without significance.
The plaintiff is declared to be entitled to
possession of the lot in question.
Rivera, being the new owner of the
property, is entitled to possession;
Maximo, as lessee, merely possesses the
property as a holder.
- Sale was simulated
- Rivera is merely proceeding in the
character of owner, to recover
possession from tenant holding over
after the termination of the right to hold
possession.
- Rivera, being the new owner of the
property, is entitle to possession, even if
there is supposed collusion or if he had
paid or not has no significance, since he
is still the new owner and has the right
to file for unlawful detainer; Maximo, as
lessee, merely possess the property as a
holder.
Wong v CA
Manuel acquired his right to possess the
land in litigation from William Giger by
virtue of a deed of sale with right to
repurchase executed in 1972.
Since then Manuel began harvesting
coconut fruits and he paid the taxes on
the land. He went periodically to the
land to make copra but he never placed
any person on the land in litigation to
watch it. Neither did he reside on the
land as he has business elsewhere.
Neither did he put any sign or hut to
show that he is in actual possession.
He knew that there laborers of Wong
were in the land as early as August, 1976
and that they have a hut there but he did
not do anything to stop them. Instead he
was happy that there were people and a
hut on the land.
Before July, 1976, Wong went to the
land in litigation to find out if there were
other people residing there or claiming it
besides the owner. He found none. So
on the said month, he bought the parcel
of land from William, the same person
from whom Manuel bought the land.
After the execution of the deed of sale,
Wong asked for the delivery of the title
to him and it was so given. Mr. Wong
declared the land in suit for taxation
purposes in his name. He tried to
register the pacto de retro sale with the
Register of Deeds by paying the
registration fee but due to some
technicalities, the pacto de retro sale
could not be registered. He placed
laborers on the land, built a small farm
house and also placed signboards.
On September 27, 1976, Manuel went to
the land to make copras.
On November 18, 1976, when Wong
ordered the harvest of the coconuts
from the land, nobody disturbed him. It
was on November 29, 1976, that he
received a copy of Manuel's complaint
for forcible entry with summons to
answer which is the case now before the
Court.
The MTC found that Wong had prior,
actual and continuous physical
possession of the disputed property and
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
RTC ruled in favor of Manuel. Wong
appealed but since the issue was on pure
question of law, the CA certified the case
to the SC.
The SC ruled that the execution of a sale
thru a public instrument shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing.
If, however, despite the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have
the enjoyment and material tenancy of
the thing and make use of it herself,
because such tenancy and enjoyment
are opposed by another, then delivery
has not been effected.
In this case, it is clear that possession
first passed from vendor William to
Manuel by virtue of the first sale a retro,
and accordingly, the later sale a retro in
favor of Wong failed to pass the
possession of the property because
there is an impediment — the
possession exercised by Manuel.
The act of entering the property and
excluding the lawful possessor
therefrom, necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property,
hence the validity of the complaint for
Forcible Entry.
One of the issues raised in Wong’s
appeal is the validity of the Decision
which orders him to pay a monthly
rental from August, 1976 until the
property is returned.
Wong argued that there is no legal or
factual basis for the payment of monthly
rentals because bad faith on his part was
never proved.
While Wong is correct that possession
acquired in good faith does not lose this
character, such good faith, however,
ceases from the moment facts exist
which show that the possessor is not
unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully. (Art. 528, Civil
Code).
Possession in good faith ceases from
the moment defects in the title are
made known to the possessors, by
extraneous evidence or by suit for
recovery of the property by the true
owner.
Whatever may be the cause or the fact
from which it can be deduced that the
possessor has knowledge of the defects
of his title or mode of acquisition, it must
be considered sufficient to show bad
faith. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil.
Vol. II, p. 226).
Such interruption takes place upon
service of summons.
 Two forms of constructive delivery:
A possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits only so long as his possession
is not legally interrupted, and such
interruption takes place upon service of
judicial summons (Arts. 544 and 1123,
Civil Code).
Doctrine of Constructive Possession
A perusal of the records of the case
shows that Wong received Manuel's
complaint for forcible entry with
summons on November 29, 1976. His
good faith therefore ceased on
November 29,1976. Accordingly, the
computation of the payment of monthly
rental should start from December,
1976.
- The execution of sale through public
instrument shall be equivalent to the
delivery of a thing.
- Good Faith ceases from the moment
facts exist which show that the
possessor is not aware that he possesses
the thing improperly or wrongfully or
form the moment that facts in the title
are made known to the possessor, by
extraneous evidence or by suit for
recovery of the property by the true
owner.
ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION (ART 531)
Mode of acquiring possession:
1. By material occupation of a thing or the
existence of a right;
2. By subjecting the thing or right to the
action of our will; and
3. By the proper acts and legal formalities
established for the acquisition of such
rights.
Requisites for Acquisition of Possession
1. Corpus or the material holding of the
thing or the exercise of the right which
may be acquired through any of the
modes mentioned in Art. 531 and 532;
2. Animus possidendi – the intent to
possess a thing or right.
1. Tradicion brevi manu ( like when a lessee
of a private property ultimately become
its owner); and
2. Tradicion constitutum possessorium (
seller transfers ownership and retains
usufruct).
- The doctrine provides that the
possession and cultivation of a portion
of a tract under a claim of ownership of
all is constructive possession of all, if the
remainder is not in the adverse
possession if any.
- Actual possession of part of the property
is deemed to extend to the whole
because possession in the eyes of the
law does not mean that a man has to
have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in
possession.
The following must be present:
1. The alleged possessor must be in
actual possession of a portion of the
property;
2. He is claiming ownership of the
whole area;
3. The remainder of the area must not
be in the adverse possession of
another;
4. The area claimed must be
reasonable.
Lacsam v Director of Lands
In the case of Lasam v Dir. Of Lands, the
Supreme Court held that while there was
evidence showing that the claimant
might have possessed a portion of the
parcel of land claimed by him, such
evidence, however, was insufficient to
establish with certainty the particular
portion occupied and the extent of such
occupation.
The Supreme Court said that while
possession in the eyes of the law does
not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of the
ground before it can be said that he is in
 possession, the same is not gained by
mere nominal claim.
Hence , the mere planting of a sign or a
sum ol of possession cannot justify a
Magellan-like claim of dominion over an
immense tract of territory.
The application of the doctrine of
constructive possession shall depend on
the size of the tract in controversy, with
reference to the portion actually in
possession of the claimant.
- While there is evidence showing that the
claimant might have possessed a portion
of a parcel of land claimed by him, such
evidence, however was insufficient to
establish with certainty the particular
portion occupied and the extent of such
occupation.
- In the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of the ground before it can
be said that he is in possession, the same
is not gained by a mere nominal claim.
- It shall depend on the size of the tract in
controversy, with reference to the
portion actually in possession of the
claimant.
Mode of Possession
1. Subjecting the thing to the action of our will
This mode of possession does not involve any
material occupation. It connotes, however, a
mode of control over the thing sufficient to
subject the same to the action of one’s will.
What is important is the intention to possess
manifested by certain fact which are present.
Included in this mode are the two forms of
constructive delivery where material occupation
is not involved: tradicion symbolica and tradicion
longa manu.
a. Tradicion Symbolica
- Takes place through the delivery of
symbols or some object to represent
those delivered, thus placing the thing
under the control of the transferee.
b. Tradicion Longa Manu
- is effected by the transferor pointing out
to the transferee the things which are
being transferred.
2. Proper Acts and Legal Formalities
This mode refers to any judicial acts by which any
possession is acquired or to which the law gives
the force of acts of possession.
Judicial acts are acts to which the law gives the
force of possession. (Donations, Succession,
Execution and Registration of Public Instruments
and Inscription of Possessory Information Titles)
Mangaser v Ugay
Mangaser alleged that he was the registered
owner and possessor of a parcel of land covered
by an OCT. On Oct., 2006, Mangaser discovered
that Ugay stealthy intruded and occupied a
portion of his property by constructing a
residential house thereon without his knowledge
and consent; and that demand letters were sent
to Ugay but he still refused to vacate the
premises, thus, he was constrained to seek
judicial remedy by filing a complaint for Forcible
Entry.
Ugay denied the allegations in the complaint,
putting up the defense that he has been a
resident of the area since birth. He alleged
having started occupying a parcel of land since
then.
That place was then known as Sta. Lucia, Aringay,
La Union; that years later, this parcel of land was
designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La
Union due to a survey made by the government;
that he introduced more improvements on the
property by cultivating the land, and in March
2006, he put up a “bahay kubo”; that in October
2006, he installed a fence made of “bolo” to
secure the property; that in installing the fence,
he was guided by the concrete monuments
which he knew to be indicators of the boundaries
of petitioner’s property; that while he could not
locate some of the monuments, he based the
boundaries on his recollection since he was
around when these were installed; that he knew
the boundaries of petitioner’s property because
he knew the extent of the “iron mining” activities
done by a company on the said property.
Ugay alleged that Manager was never in actual
possession of the property occupied by him, and
it was only on October 31, 2006 when he
discovered the alleged intrusion.
Ugay further alleged that after he received the
demand to vacate, he assured Manager that he
would voluntarily vacate the premises if he
would only be shown to have intruded into his
titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out
to him. But instead of showing the boundaries
to him, Mangaser filed an action for forcible
entry before the MTC.
After conflicting decisions in the lower court and
appellate court, the case finally reached the
Supreme Court.
One of the issues identified was whether
Mangaser was able to established prior
possession over the subject property.
The Supreme Court ruled that possession can be
acquired not only by material occupation, but
also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
action of one’s will or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such
right.
In this case, the Court finds that Mangaser
acquired possession of the subject property by
juridical act, specifically, through the issuance
of a free patent under Commonwealth Act No.
141 and its subsequent registration with the
Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987 such that
it is now covered by an Original Certificate of
Title.
Mangaser's OCT and his tax declarations should
absolutely not be disregarded. The issuance of
an original certificate of title to Mangaser
evidences ownership and from it, a right to the
possession of the property flows. Well-
entrenched is the rule that a person who has a
Torrens title over the property is entitled to the
possession thereof.
Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled
with tax declarations. While tax declarations are
not conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of
land, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or constructive possession. Together
with the Torrens title, the tax declarations dated
1995 onwards presented by Mangaser
strengthens his claim of possession over the land
before his dispossession on October 31, 2006 by
Ugay.
If the Court were to disregard juridical acts to
obtain prior possession, then it would create an
absurd situation by putting premium in favor of
land intruders against Torrens title holders, who
spent months, or even years, in order to register
their land, and who religiously paid real property
taxes thereon.
- Possession can be acquired not only by
material ocupation, but also by the fact
that a thing is subject to the action of
one’s will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring
such right.
- Mangaser acquired possession of the
subject property by juridical act,
specifically, through the issuance of a
free patent under Commonwealth Act
No. 141 and its subsequent registration
with the Register of Deeds on March 18,
1987 such that it is now covered by an
Original Certificate of Tile.
- Well- entrenched is the rule that a
person who has a Torrens title over the
property is entitled to the possession
thereof.
Acquisition of Possession Over Rights
Material occupation is not available as mode
of acquiring possession over rights since the
same requires actual physical possession
and applies only on to corporeal objects.
With respect to right, possession is acquired
through any of the following:
1. To exercise such right
2. By subjecting it to the action of our will
3. By proper actions and legal formalities.
Transfer of Possession through Succession
Succession is one of the juridical acts sufficient to
transfer possession without need of physical or
material of the property.

If possession is affected by succession, whether
testate or intestate, such possession is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption
from the moment of death of the decedent if the
heir accepts the inheritance.
This rule will apply even if the heir is not in actual
physical possession of the property.
But if the heir validly renounces the inheritance ,
he will be deemed never to have possessed the
property even if he is in actual possession of the
same.
Consequences of Wrongful Possession
The existence of bad faith on the part of one
possessor does not prejudice his successor in
interest.
Only personal knowledge of the flaw in one’s
title or mode of acquisition.
The reason is because bad faith is personal. Its
effects must, therefore, be suffered only by the
person who acted in bad faith. His heir should
not be saddled with such consequences. So if the
heir is not aware of the flaws affecting the title
or mode of acquisition of the decedent, the heir
shall be considered a possessor in good faith
because good faith is always presumed.
ESCRITOR V IAC
Escritor filed an application for the titling of a
parcel of land. There being no opposition, the
application was approved on May 15, 1958.
Immediately thereafter, Escritor took possession
of the property.
On Aug. 2, 1958, Simon filed a petition for review
of the decision contending that the same was
obtained by Escritor through fraud. Before the
case could be decided, Escritor died. His heirs
took possession of the property.
Thirteen years later, or in 1971, Simon’s petition
was granted, ordering the heirs to vacate the
land.
In 1975, Simon filed another case against the
heirs for recovery of damages for the fruits of the
land which was allegedly possessed by the heirs
unlawfully in bad faith. The lower court
dismissed the complaint but the appellate court
ruled in favor of Simon, saying the heirs of
Escritor were possessors in bad faith.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it reversed the
CA decision.
The Supreme Court said that only personal
knowledge of the flaw in one’s title or mode of
acquisition can make him a possessor in bad
faith, for bad faith is not transmissible from one
person to another, not even to an heir.
As provided for in Art. 534, one who succeeds by
hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences
of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it
is not shown that the heir was aware of the flaws
affecting the title.
This is because bad faith is personal and
intransmissible. Its effects must be suffered only
by the person who acted in bad faith; his heir
should not be saddled with such consequences.
If no evidence is presented proving bad faith, as
in this case, the presumption of good faith under
Art. 527 remains. The heirs being possessors in
good faith, they should not be held liable for
damages.
INSTANCES WHERE POSSESSION IS NOT
ACQUIRED
ART. 536 Use of force or intimidation
The law does not look with favor the commission
of unlawful acts for the purpose of acquiring
possession.
The law does not recognize the acquisition of
possession through force, violence or
intimidation. As such, if a possessor is physically
ousted from the property through the use of
force or violence, he is still deemed the legal
possessor in the eyes of the law. His possession
is not considered interrupted because the law
does not recognize the acquisition of possession
effected in this manner.
A person in possession cannot be ejected by
force, not even by the owner. If such illegal
manner of ejectment is employed, the party who
proves prior possession can recover possession
even from the owners themselves.
HEIRS OF LAURORA V STERLING
The spouses Laurora alleged that they were the
owners of a parcel of land.
Sterling Technopark, through their Engineer,
bulldozed and uprooted the trees and plants,
and with the use of armed men and by means of
threats and intimidation succeeded in forcibly
ejecting Laurora spouses. Sterling alleges that
the subject lot was sold to them.
Does Sterling have a right to forcibly eject the
Heirs of Laurora?
The SC ruled that even if the heirs are mere
usurpers of the land owned by Sterling, still they
are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully
ejected therefrom. Under appropriate
circumstances, Sterling may file, other than an
ejectment suit, an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria.
The SC ruled that even if the heirs are mere
usurpers of the land owned by Sterling, still they
are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully
ejected therefrom. Under appropriate
circumstances, Sterling may file, other than an
ejectment suit, an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria.
ART. 537. ACTS MERELY TOLERATED
Acts merely tolerated do not affect possession.
Those persons whose occupation of a property
by tolerance of the owner are not considered as
possessors in law.
Tolerance in itself does not bear any legal fruit
and it can easily be supplanted by a sudden
change of heart on the part of the owner.
Hence, mere permissive use cannot be made the
basis of acquisitive prescription, no matter how
long the possession may be.
Persons who occupy the land of another at the
latter’s tolerance, without any contract between
them, are necessarily bound by an implied
promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand.
RESUENA V CA
Borromeo is the co-owner and overseer of
certain parcels of land but the proportion of the
undivided shares with his co-owners was still
undetermined.
Resuena was occupying a portion of the
property, allegedly upon permission of
Borromeo’s co-owners.
Borromeo developed the portion occupied by
him into a resort. In his desire to expand the
same, Borromeo demanded that Resueno vacate
the property, which is a part of the co-owned
property. She refused. Borromeo filed an
ejectment suit.
In Answer, Resueno reasoned that in a previous
case, Borromeo waived in favor of his co-owners
the portion that she is presently occupying. He
is now estopped from claiming the portion.
The Court, however, found that there was no
writing presented by Resueno to evidence any
claim of ownership or right to occupancy to the
subject properties. There is no lease contract
that would vest the right to stay on the property.
The Court held that the absence of any
document or any occupancy right of Resueno is
a negation of their claim that they were allowed
to construct their houses thereon and to stay
thereon until further notice.
On various occasions, the Court has ruled that
persons who occupy the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, are necessarily bound
by an implied promise that they will vacate the
same upon demand, failing in which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against them.
Their claim of estoppel does nothing to
strengthen the claim that they had a right to
occupy the properties. Estoppel is effective only
as between the parties thereto or their
successors in interest. A stranger to a transaction
is neither bound by, nor in a position to take
advantage of an estoppel arising therefrom.
ART. 537. CLANDESTINE AND UNKNOWN ACTS
Acts which are executed clandestinely and
without the knowledge of the possessor do not
affect possession. His possession is not deemed
interrupted. It will not interrupt the running of
the period of acquisitive prescription in favor of
the legal possessor, nor will it affect his right to
receive fruits.
An act is considered to have been done
clandestinely if the same is done in secret,
hidden or concealed.
However, even if the act is done clandestinely
but the same is known to the possessor, his
possession will be affected.
In the same way, if the act is done publicly, even
without the knowledge of the possessor, the
same will affect the latter’s possession.
Consequences:
If the act of the actual possessor is clandestine
and unknown to the legal owner, his possession
does not affect the true possession of the legal
possessor.
As a consequence, the legal possessor’s
possession is not deemed interrupted. It will not
interrupt the running of the period of acquisitive
prescription in favor of the legal possessor, nor
will it affect his right to received the fruits.
On the part of the actual possessor, his
possession acquired through clandestine acts
not known to the legal possessor will not ripen
into ownership through prescription because
one of the requirements thereof – that the
possession be public in character- is not present.
CLANDESTINE AND UNKNOWN ACTS – REYES V
PRIETO
Prieto was the owner of a parcel of land. She
alleged that Reyes, by means of stealth and
without her knowledge, built a hut on the lot.
Despite repeated demands to vacate, Reyes
refused, alleging that since December 3, 1948,
she was a bona fide occupant of the land, having
bought from one Dominador Merced the house
as well as the right of occupation as tenant of the
lot.
It was established during the trial that Prieto, as
owner of the lot, learned of the existence of
Reyes's house only in January of 1952; that in
February of that year Prieto's lawyer wrote
Reyes several letters asking her to vacate, but
Reyes paid no attention. Reyes had occupied the
lot without the knowledge and consent of Prieto.
Reyes alleged that the MTC did not have
jurisdiction over the case for forcible entry
because she had been in possession of the
property since December, 1948, and the action
was started only in 1952. Reyes alleged that it
was error for the court to start the counting of
the initiation of the summary action only from
the time the owner learned of her
encroachment.
The SC ruled that the contention is
unmeritorious. There is a natural difference
between an entry secured by force or violence
and one obtained by stealth, as in this case. The
owner of the land could not be expected to
enforce his right to it's possession against the
illegal occupant and sue the latter before
learning of the clandestine intrusion. And to
deprive the lawful possessor of the benefit of the
summary action, under Rule 70 of the Revised
Rules, simply because the stealthy intruder
managed to conceal the trespass for more than
a year would be to reward clandestine
usurpations even if they are unlawful.
CLANDESTINE AND UNKNOWN ACTS Santiago v
MWSS; G.R. No. 109111 June 28, 2000
MWSS filed an application for registration of title
under the torrens system of eleven parcels of
land, situated in San Mateo, Rizal. Long before
World War II, MWSS buried a 42-inch diameter
steel aqueduct pipeline under the subject
parcels of land. The pipeline drew water from
the Wawa Dam in Montalban to the Balara
Filters in Quezon City. Fifteen kilometers long, it
ran through the municipalities of Montalban, San
Mateo and Marikina.
MWSS alleged that it has been in "'open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the said parcels of land,"
under a bonafide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945.
The heirs of Manahan filed an opposition to the
application. They alleged ownership of a portion
of the land subject of the application. They
presented transfer certificates of title, related
papers and documents to support their claim.
They stated that neither they nor their
predecessors-in-interest have ever ceded
ownership or possession of the property to any
person. Even assuming that MWSS possessed
the land, it did not acquire ownership by
prescription.
The RTC dismissed the application of MWSS and
upheld the opposition of the heirs of Manahan
reasoning, among others, that: the tax
declarations presented by MWSS did not prove
ownership and merely constituted prima facie
evidence of possession; the pipelines installed by
MWSS were buried and hidden under the
ground, hence, MWSS' possession was not
"open". Further, MWSS admittedly discontinued
use of the pipelines after 1968, hence,
possession was not "continuous".
It also said that the transfer certificates of title
presented by Manahan proved ownership and
cannot be attacked collaterally.
The CA reversed the RTC saying that the property
of the Manahans covered by the original and
transfer certificates of title clearly state that they
adjoins and are adjacent to the property claimed
by MWSS. Such is shown by the technical
descriptions in the certificates of title presented
by Manahan.
The CA held that the MWSS acquired ownership
by prescription. True, the pipes were "hidden"
under the land. However, it is a matter of public
knowledge and judicial notice that the pipes
existed and were buried there before World War
II. The existence of the pipelines was indicated
above the ground by "pilapils" constructed by
the adjoining landowners themselves, since they
planted rice alongside the strips of land. Further,
the fact that use of the pipes was discontinued
was not relevant since the pipes had remained
buried under the land up to the present.
On appeal to the SC, it ruled that the titles
presented by the Manahans showed that it
covered land adjacent to that claimed in MWSS'
application for registration.
MWSS presented tax declarations to buttress its
ownership of the land. True, tax declarations do
not prove ownership. However, tax declarations
can be strong evidence of ownership when
accompanied by possession for a period
sufficient for prescription. Since MWSS
possessed the land in the concept of owner for
more than thirty years preceding the application,
MWSS acquired ownership by prescription. By
placing the pipelines under the land, there was
material occupation of the land by MWSS,
subjecting the land to its will and control.
The Manahans cannot argue that MWSS'
possession was not "open". The existence of the
pipes was indicated above the ground by
"pilapils". Even if the pipes were "hidden" from
sight, the pilapils were proof of their existence
and they cannot claim ignorance of the existence
of the pipes. Since they were not able to prove
that possession was clandestine, continuous
possession by MWSS was established.
ART. 538. CONFLICT OVER POSSESSION DE
FACTO
The law does not recognize the possibility that
possession de facto may reside at the same time
in two different personalities unless they are co-
possessors.
In case of conflict involving the question of
possession as a fact, the following rules of
preference shall govern:
1. The present possessor shall be
preferred;
2. If there are two possessors, the one
longer in possession is preferred;
3. It the dates of possession are the same,
the one who presents a title is preferred.
If all of the foregoing are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination
of its possession or ownership through proper
proceeding.
YU V PACLEB
Sometime in September 1992, a certain Javier
offered to sell a parcel of land to Yu. Javier
alleged that he purchased the land from
Rebecca, who, in turn, acquired it from Baltazar
Pacleb.
The title of the property, however, remained in
the name Pacleb and the instruments in support
of the series of alleged sales were not registered.
On September 11, 1992, Yu accepted the offer
and gave Javier P200,000 as downpayment for
the lot. Javier then delivered his supposed
muniments of title to Yu and after the execution
of a contract to sell, he formally turned over the
property to Yu.
At the time of the turn-over, a portion of the lot
was occupied by Ramon Pacleb, son on Baltazar,
as tenants. On September 12, 1992, Ramon and
his wife allegedly surrendered possession of
their portion to Yu, who appointed Ramon as
their trustee over the subject lot.
Yu enjoyed possession of the property from
Sept., 1992 until Sept. 1995.
During this time, Baltazar Pacleb was in the
United States. Upon his return in May, 1995, he
entered the property. Asserting his right as the
registered owned of the property, and despite
demands from Yu. Pacleb refused to vacate and
surrender possession of the same to Yu.
Yu filed an action for Forcible Entry against
Pacleb, alleging entry by force. The MTC ruled in
favor of Yu. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision.
The CA reversed the same on the ground that the
possession of Pacleb ante-dated that of Yu.
The SC ruled that possession is the holding of a
thing or the enjoyment of a right. Possession
always includes the idea of occupation. It is not
necessary that the person in possession should
himself be the occupant. The occupancy can be
held by another in this name as in this case
where the son of Pacleb was in possession of the
property, in the name of his father. Without
such occupancy, there can be no possession.
Yu, on the other hand, failed to establish that
they had prior physical possession to justify a
ruling in their favor in the complaint for forcible
entry.
Yu sought to prove their exercise of rights over
the land through alleged frequent visits and the
designation of Ramon as their own trustee.
These, however, failed to convince the court of
their actual occupancy of the subject land. First,
Yu acknowledged that Ramon occupied part of
the land as tenants of Pacleb. Second, there was
no clear proof in the records of the appointment
of Ramon as Yu’s trustee save their self-serving
statements to this effect.
"Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession."
In the face of this factual finding that the tax
declarations and receipts in 1994 and 1995 were
in the name of Pacleb established their
possession of the property. The payment of real
estate tax is one of the most persuasive and
positive indications showing the will of a person
to possess in concepto de dueno or with claim of
ownership.
Most important, the title of the land remained in
the name of Pacleb.
Art. 538 provides that possession as a fact
cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities except in the cases of co-
possession. Should a question arise regarding
the fact of possession, the present possessor
shall be preferred; if there are two possessors,
the one longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents
a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the
thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.
In view of the evidence establishing Pacleb’s
continuing possession of the subject property,
Yu’s allegation that Pacleb deprived them of
actual possession by means of force was clearly
untenable.
CEQUENA V BOLANTE
This case involves a parcel of land originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Sinforoso Mendoza.
Sinforoso is the father of Bolante.
Sinforoso was the occupant of the parcel of land
in question until the time of his death in 1930.
After Sinforoso’s death, his brother Margarito
took possession of the land and cultivated it with
the help of his son Miguel.
But Bolante, together with her monther, also
continued residing on the land. When Bolante
became of age, she paid the realty taxes on the
land from 1932 to 1948.
In 1953, Margarito declared the land for taxation
purposes in his name and paid realty taxes from
1952. When Margarito died, Miguel continued
cultivating the land.
In 1985, Miguel was physically ousted from the
property by Bolante. Litigation ensued on the
question of who shall be considered as the
preferred possessor.
On the strength of the tax declarations
presented by the heirs of Margarito, the lower
court ruled in favor of Cequena.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the
ruling of the trial court, saying Bolante should be
preferred because she was in notorious, actual
and exclusive possession of the land.
Cequena on the other hand, contended that
Bolante came into possession through force.
The Supreme Court said that despite having been
forcibly removed by Bolante in 1985, Cequena
did not lose legal possession because possession
cannot be acquired by force. Cequena is still
deemed the legal possessor.
However, possession by Cequena does not
prevail over that of Bolante. For while Cequena
was in possession before 1985. such possession
was not exclusive, as Bolante also acquired
possession of the land before 1985. Before
1985, the land was occupied and cultivated by
the father of Bolante.
In resolving the issue of possession, the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Bolante because she has
been in possession for a longer period,
benefitting from her father’s tax declaration of
the land since 1926. Cequena’s father acquired
joint possession only in 1952.
The only issue settled by Art. 536 is on the
question of possession, which is different from
ownership.
With regards to ownership, the issue will be
settled by determining who between the
claimants have proven acquisitive prescription.
The possession by Bolante was not disturbed
until 1953, when the father of Cequena claimed
the land.
But by then, the possession of Bolante, which
was public, peaceful and uninterrupted, already
ripened into ownership. Also, Bolante herself,
after her father’s death, declared and paid realty
taxes for the disputed land.
Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation, when coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, can be the basis of a
claim for ownership through prescription.
Cequena, on the other hand, because they
farmed a portion of the land for more than 30
years, can claim ownership over the portion that
they actually farmed.
The possession by Bolante was not disturbed
until 1953, when the father of Cequena claimed
the land.
But by then, the possession of Bolante, which
was public, peaceful and uninterrupted, already
ripened into ownership. Also, Bolante herself,
after her father’s death, declared and paid realty
taxes for the disputed land.
Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation, when coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, can be the basis of a
claim for ownership through prescription.
Cequena, on the other hand, because they
farmed a portion of the land for more than 30
years, can claim ownership over the portion that
they actually farmed.
ART. 539 EFFECTS OF POSSESSION
Right to Protection of Possessors
The protection is given because the Civil Code
assumes that the possessor of a thing is the
owner and also because even if the possessor is
not the owner, his situation should be protected
until it is shown that there is another person with
a better right.
The fact of possession in itself, therefore, has a
positive value and is endowed with a distinct
standing of its own in the law of property.
ART.540. Only the possession acquired and
enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a
title for acquiring dominion.
Possession in the concept of owner.
The following are effects of possession in the
concept of owner:
1. It raises a disputable presumption of
ownership.
2. It creates a disputable presumption that
the possessor has just title and he
cannot be obliged to show it.
3. It can ripen into ownership through
acquisitive prescription, subject to
additional requirements under Art. 1118
of the Civil Code.
The presumption, however, is disputable and
may be rebutted by proof to the contrary. But so
long as the person claiming a better rightis
unable to prove his own title, the presumption
prevails in favor of the possessor in concept of
owner.
In Art. 1131, it is provided that: For purposes of
prescription, just title must be proved, it is never
presumed.
Although the wordings of Art. 541 seem to
suggest that the term “just title” refers to written
documents, it must not be interpreted in such
restricted sense.
The term “just title” should be construed as
referring to that which is legally sufficient to
transfer ownership of the thing or the real right
to which it relates.
Consequently, it may be proved orally by
witnesses as well as through written documents.
ART. 555. MODES OF LOSING POSSESSION
A possessor may lose his possession by:
1. Abandonment of the thing
2. Assigning the thing to another, either by
onerous or gratuitous title
3. Destruction to total loss of the thing or
because is goes out of commerce
4. The possession of another, subject to
the provisions of Art. 537, if the new
possession has lasted more than one
year. But the real right of possession is
not lost till after the lapse of ten years.
ART. 556. RULE WITH RESPECT TO MISPLACED
MOVABLES
Distinction must be made between movables
which have been abandoned and thosw which
have been misplaced.
When it is abandoned, all hope for its recovery is
already gone.
When it is misplaced, the possessor does not
automatically lose possession because the
movable is still deemed remaining under his
control even though for the time being he may
not know its whereabouts.
The rule with respect to possession of movables
is that the same is not lost so long as the movable
remains under the control of the possessor and
they will be deemed remaining under his control
so long as they are not under the control of
another possessor.
POSSESSION OF MOVABLES
DOCTRINE OF IRREVINDICABILITY
Possession of movables acquired in good faith
does not only create a presumption of ownership
but it is already equivalent to title. Unlike in the
case of immovable property where actual
possession under claim of ownership will only
create a disputable presumption of ownership
and that the possessor has just title, the
possession of a movable property acquired in
good faith is already equivalent to title. Further
proof is no longer needed.
Art. 559 establishes not merely a presumption in
favor of the possessor, but an actual right, valid
even against the true owner, except upon proof
of loss or illegal deprivation.
For possession of a movable to be considered
equivalent to title, the following requisites
must be present:
1. The movable property must be acquired
in good faith;
2. The possession must be in the concept
of an owner.
As a consequence of this principle, when a
movable property is in the possession of one
who has acquired it and holds it in good faith, the
true owner cannot recover it as a general rule for
the title is valid, even against him.
For possession of a movable to be considered
equivalent to title, the following requisites
must be present:
Exceptions to the rule on irrevindicability:
1. When the thing was lost;
2. When the owner has been unlawfully
deprived thereof.
Under these circumstances, the owner has a
right to recover the thing, not only from the
finder, thief or robber, but also from a third
person who may have acquired it in good faith
from such finder, thief or robber.
The owner can always recover the movable from
the possessor in cases where the same was lost
or the owner was unlawfully deprived thereof.
The only difference is that if the movable was
acquired by a possessor in good faith, at a public
sale, the owner can recover it only upon
reimbursement of the price paid by the
possessor.
But if it was not acquired at a public sale, the
owner can recover it without paying any
indemnity.
Public sale is one where there has been public
notice of the sale and in which anybody has a
right to bid and offer to buy.
PALERO-TAN v. URDANETA
Tan is a Court Stenographer. She charged
Urdaneta, Utility Worker of the same court of
having stolen her ring and bracelet.
Tan claimed that it has been her practice to keep
her and her sister's pieces of jewelry in the
locked drawer of her table at her RTC office
because she fears that they might be lost at the
boarding house she is renting.
However, on 8 July 2005, she discovered that her
ring and bracelet were missing. Tan remembered
that on 18 June 2005, a Saturday, her younger
sister went to the RTC to ask for her necklace.
She took out from her table drawer a
transparent plastic sachet which contained her
ring and bracelet, and her sister's necklace, and
after handing over to her sister the necklace, she
returned the plastic sachet, still containing the
bracelet and ring, to her table drawer.
She maintained that the only person who was
present and saw her take out the jewelry from
her table drawer was Urdaneta, whose table is
adjacent to hers.
According to Tan, when she found out that her
ring and bracelet were missing, she informed her
officemates about it, but nobody claimed to have
seen the missing jewelry. On 28 July 2005, an
officemate confided to her that he heard from
his landlady that Urdaneta and his wife had a
quarrel because the wife discovered a ring and a
bracelet in Urdaneta's coin purse. Milagros
suspected that Urdaneta bought the jewelry for
his mistress.
Complainant approached the RTC presiding
judge and relayed to him the information she
gathered. The judge called the persons involved.
The wife admitted that she had a fight with
Urdaneta because she found a ring and bracelet
inside his coin purse which she believed he
would give to his mistress. The description given
by the wife of the jewelry made Tan conclude
that it was hers.
In a separate meeting with the judge, Urdaneta
confessed that he found Tan’s jewels in the
court's premises, but he could no longer return
them because he already threw them away
when his wife fought with him. He thought it
was fancy jewelry that belonged to a litigant and
was going to return it.
When a person finds a thing that has been lost or
misplaced by the owner, and takes the thing into
his hands, he acquires physical custody only and
does not become vested with legal possession.
In assuming such custody, the finder is charged
with the obligation of restoring the thing to its
owner. It is thus Urdaneta’s duty to report to his
superior or his officemates that he found
something.
The Civil Code, in Article 719, explicitly requires
the finder of a lost property to report it to the
proper authorities, thus: Article 719. Whoever
finds a movable, which is not treasure, must
return it to its previous possessor. If the latter is
unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it
with the mayor of the city or municipality where
the finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the
mayor for two consecutive weeks in the way he
deems best.
If the finder does not comply with the procedural
requirements and appropriates for himself the
movable he found, he shall be guilty of theft.
Contrary to Urdaneta's claim, the Supreme Court
was convinced that he had the intention to
appropriate the jewelry to himself had these not
been discovered by his wife. His claim that the
ring and bracelet were worthless "fancy" jewelry
is immaterial because the basis for his liability is
his act of taking something which does not
belong to him.
CRUZ V PAHATI
The car subject matter of this case was originally
owned by Northern Motors and was
subsequently purchased by a Chinaman. This
Chinaman then sold it to Belizo, who in turn sold
the same to Cruz.
Belizo was a second-hand car dealer. He offered
to Cruz that he will sell the car to a prospective
buyer. Since the car registration was missing,
Belizo convinced Cruz to issue an authorization
letter to him (Belizo) to obtain another
certificate of registration.
Cruz turned over the car to Belizo. But Belizo
falsified the letter and converted into an
absolute deed of sale. Because of this, he was
able to secure a car registration in his name and
was later able to sell the car, which was finally
sold to Pahati. This prompted Cruz to file an
action for replevin against Pahati.
Who between Cruz and Pahati has a better right
over the car?.
One who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from
the person in possession of the same and the
only defense the latter may have is if he "has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale" in which
case "the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor."
Also, Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that
"where goods are sold by a person who is not the
owner thereof, and who does not sell them
under authority or with the consent of the
owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the
goods than the seller had, unless the owner of
the goods is by his conduct precluded from
denying the seller's authority to sell.”
Applying the above legal provisions to the facts
of this case, it can be concluded that Cruz has a
better right to the car for it cannot be disputed
that Cruz had been illegally deprived thereof
because of the ingenious scheme utilized by
Belizo to enable him to dispose of it as if he were
the owner thereof.
Cruz therefore can still recover the possession of
the car even if Pahati acquired it in good faith.
EDCA v. SANTOS
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain
Professor Jose Cruz who ordered these by
telephone, which was agreed to be payable on
delivery. The said Prof. Cruz represented himself
as a Dean of the dela Salle University, which
turned out to be false.
The books were subsequently delivered to him
with the corresponding invoice, and he paid with
a personal check.
Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor
Santos who asked for verification, and was then
showed the invoice for the books.
EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered
another set of books even before his check could
be cleared. Upon investigation, EDCA found that
he wasn’t the person he claimed to be. EDCA
had the police capture Cruz, as well as seize the
books from Santos. Santos demanded the return
of the books.
Should the books be returned to Santos?
It is the contention of EDCA that Santos have not
established her ownership of the disputed books
because she was not able to produce a receipt to
prove they had bought the stock. Such proof is
not necessary because the first sentence of
Article 559 provides that "the possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title."
The argument that Santos did not acquire the
books in good faith is not correct. Santos was
able to ascertained the ownership of the books
from the EDCA invoice showed to her by Cruz,
proving that the same were sold by EDCA to Cruz.
When Cruz alleged that he was selling them for a
discount because he was in financial need, the
same did not appear suspicious to Santos since
as one who was in the business of buying and
selling books, she often dealt with hard-up
sellers who urgently have to part with their
books at reduced prices.
To Santos, Cruz must have been only one of the
many such sellers she was accustomed to dealing
with. It is not bad faith for any one in the
business of buying and selling books to buy them
at a discount and resell them for a profit.
By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in
fact, too trusting in dealing with the impostor.
Although it had never transacted with him
before, it readily delivered the books he had
ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted
his personal check in payment. I
t did not verify his identity although it was easy
enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the
check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it
indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by
the printed terms thereon, that the books had
been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting
ownership in the buyer.
By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in
fact, too trusting in dealing with the impostor.
Although it had never transacted with him
before, it readily delivered the books he had
ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted
his personal check in payment. I
t did not verify his identity although it was easy
enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the
check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it
indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by
the printed terms thereon, that the books had
been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting
ownership in the buyer.
EDCA insists that it had been unlawfully deprived It would certainly be unfair now to make Santos
of the books because the check issued by the bear the prejudice sustained by EDCA as a result
impostor in payment therefor was dishonored. of its own negligence. The Supreme Court found
Citing jurisprudence, it mentioned that the no justice in transferring EDCA's loss to the
owner who has been unlawfully deprived of Santoses who had acted in good faith, and with
personal property is entitled to its recovery proper care.
except only where the property was purchased
at a public sale, in which event its return is CASES WHEN THERE IS NO RECOVERY:
subject to reimbursement of the purchase price. There are cases where the owner may no longer
EDCA argues that because Cruz acquired no title recover the movable property even if he has lost
to the books that he could have validly the same or he has been unlawfully deprived
transferred to the private respondents. thereof, as in the following cases:
Its reason is that as the payment check bounced 1. If the possessor acquired the thing at a
for lack of funds, there was a failure of merchant’s store, or in fairsm or in
consideration that nullified the contract of sale markets in accordance with the Code of
between it and Cruz. Commerce and special laws;
2. Where the possessor acquired the thing
But a contract of sale is consensual and is by sale under statutory power of sale or
perfected once agreement is reached between under the order of a court of competent
the parties on the subject matter and the jurisdiction;
consideration. Art. 1477 provides that 3. Where the possessor is a holder in due
ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred course of a negotiable document of title
to the vendee upon actual or constructive to goods, or where the owner is barred
delivery thereof. On the other hand, Art. 1478 by the principle of negotiable
provides that the parties may stipulate that instruments;
ownership in the thing shall not pass to the 4. When the owner is barred by reason of
purchaser until he has fully paid the price. his own acts or neglect from denying the
seller’s title;
It is clear from the above provision that 5. If prescription has set in.
ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the
buyer until full payment of the purchase only if
there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise,
ownership shall pass upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the
purchase price has not yet been paid.
If the term "unlawfully deprived" were to be
interpreted in the manner suggested by EDCA, a
person relying on the seller's title who buys a
movable property from him would have to
surrender it to another person claiming to be the
original owner who had not yet been paid the
purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second
sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak,
and would be compelled to return the thing
bought by him in good faith without even the
right to reimbursement of the amount he had
paid for.

Santos did not have to go beyond that invoice to

satisfy herself that the books being offered for
sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did.