People vs Jalosjos

G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000

Facts:

The accused-appellant, a full-fledged member of Congress, confined at the national

penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense.

Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the
sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty
to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos, which
states that –

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of
such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want
their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House
of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his
mandate.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member

of House of Representatives

Held:

No.

The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite
of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the
duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of
obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.