PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Part XII RELIEF FROM COURTS

Section 8, 21 RA 9262
SECTION 8. Protection Orders.

A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a
woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a
protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the
victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her
life. The provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcem ent agencies. The protection orders
that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and
permanent protection order (PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some
or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of
the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating
with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;

(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights
are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the
residence;

(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member at a
distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified
place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member;

(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal effect,
regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the
residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and
other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal belongings;

(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;

(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support.
Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or
salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically
remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the
woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect
contempt of court;

(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him to
surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and
disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the
court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on
the offender and take appropriate action on matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage,
medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;

(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and

(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the
petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated family or
household member consents to such relief.

Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree of legal separation or
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.

The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for,
or the court from granting a TPO or PPO.

SECTION 21
SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. – A complaint for a violation of a BPO issued under this Act
must be filed directly with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial
court that has territorial jurisdiction over the barangay that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be
punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action
that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the Rules of Court. During trial and upon
judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order as it deems necessary without need
of an application.

Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court
punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action
that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

ARTICLE 72
 What if the husband or the wife neglects his or her duties to the family?
 Article 72
When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts
which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party
may apply to the court for relief.
FORMS OF RELIEF

 File a case for legal separation (Article 55)

 Nullify the marriage based on Article 36
 Petition for receivership
 Petition for judicial separation of property
 Petition for authority to be the sole administrator of the community property
CASES:
TENCHAVEZ VS ESCANO
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-19671;
11/29/1965;
EN BANC; REYES, J.B.L., J.:
SUMMARY OF RD:
(1) A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
NCC
(RA386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contractedwith another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) The remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) The desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
(4) Anaction for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
NATURE: Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño,"
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño (Escaño) - 27 y.o. (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), Pastor Tenchavez - 32 years of age, an engineer,
ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock.They exchanged marriage vows without the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register. They
planned to get married and then elope. Elopement did not, however, materialize because when
Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother was already waiting for her at
the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor.
Mamerto and Mena Escaño (Escaño parents) were surprised, because Pastor never asked for
the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine
marriage would provoke. Escano parents wanted them to have a church wedding but Escano
changed her mind when she received an anonymous letter stating that Tenchavez had another
woman. Escano parents did not agree as well. Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. They continued to exchange letters that were not as
endearing as before. Vicenta went to Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her
marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition however and the case
was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing. She applied for
a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and
she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after 2 yrs. In US, Escano filed
divorce against the Tenchavez in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and
for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
Oct/21/1950 - decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said
tribunal.
Later, Escano married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children.Aug/8/1958 - She acquired American citizenship. -
Jul/30/1955 amended on May 31, 1956 - Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar against
Vicenta F. Escaño , legal separation for bigamy, against Escano Parents , whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church , for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Escano – claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her
present husband, Russell Leo Moran Escano Parents - denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages. CFI, Cebu - did not
decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant
(P45,000.00). Thus, plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce is valid.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: Authority of the solemnizing officer - Nowhere shown that said priest was not duly
authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages. Authorization from the parish priest and the
Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the
separation of Church and State but also because Act3613 of the Philippine Legislature (OCC)
which was the marriage law in force at the time expressly provided that — SEC. 1. Essential
requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and
consent. -Actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and,
therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects. SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal
requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of
the formal requirements of this Act x x x
Validity of Escano-Tenchavez marriage - The very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage
to plaintiff was valid and binding. - Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage, she
was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy
with appellant Tenchavez. -Such a vice did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely
voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. -This was
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in CFI, Misamis was dismissed for non-
prosecution. Validity of the divorce decree- Marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree
of absolute divorce that the wife obtained. - When it was issued, Escaño and Tenchavez were
still both Filipino citizens. Thus, Escano was then subject to Philippine law, and Art. 15NCC of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, - NCC does not allow absolute
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute
divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of
divorce, the NCC only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even
in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" - The grant of
effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, whose means do not permit
them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines. Escano and
Escano Parent’s liability - denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in
law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity. -Her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" -
Tenchavez claim that Escano Parents, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced
her conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence:
1.) He was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, - No records whether or not
they would refuse if courtship and marriage were done in the traditional religious way;
2.) It was Escano’s decision. She is acted independently, and being of age. They just supported
her. -Tenchavez, in falsely charged Escano parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, w/c caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
Award for Damages –
For Tenchavez - should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees; For
Escano Parents – P45K excessive. Lawsuits have become a common occurrence in present
society. Reduced to P5k.
NARAG VS NARAG
JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.

Facts: - In November, complainant filed an admin complaint with the SC against her husband, whom she
accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers1

 \Respondent was a full-time college instructor at St. Louis College of Tuguegarao in the College
of Arts and Sciences and Graduate School .
 Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and college student, was enrolled in his classes .
 Respondent then exerted his influence as a teacher, lawyer, and member of the Sanggunian in
Tuguegarao and courted Espita until she acceded to his wishes.
 They maintained an illicit relationship known to various circles in the community but it was kept
from complainant, so complainant was really embarrassed when respondent abandoned his
family to live with Espita
 It appeared that respondent used his influence as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Cagayan and got Espita a job at the DTI Office in Makati o Maybe out of appreciation or gratitude
that Espita, who was 22 now, agreed to live with him
 It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has abandoned
complainant, his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in the
tertiary level - SC referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation
 June: WEIRD, but seven months later complainant wrote to the office of Chief Justice Fernan
seeking the dismissal of her complaint, alleging that:
1. she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband;
2. all the love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and
3. she was suffering from emotional confusion arising from extreme jealousy. The truth,
she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and responsible family man.
4. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship with one
Gina Espita nor abandoned his family.
 Hence, IBP dismissed the complaint
 November: ANOTHER FIVE MONTHS LATER, complainant wrote to the SC again with her 7
children seeking the reinstatement of the case o She explained that she had earlier dropped the
case against him because of his continuous threats against her
 Respondent filed his Comment saying that the dismissal of the case be affirmed and that he
never threatened his wife, said that his wife filing the complaint was because she was an
incurably jealous and possessive woman
o He likewise said he was abused by his wife o He also denied every allegation of his wife about
him and Espita
o He denied that the two children of Espita were fathered by him
 IBP investigation officer recommended the indefinite suspension of respondent, which IBP
adopted.
 Later, complainant sought the disbarment of her husband, which the IBP granted. - IBP denied
respondent’s MR.
 Complainant’s witnesses:
o Herself
 o Charlie Espita (brother of the alleged paramour)
  Said that respondent was the live-in partner of his sister and the father of the
two children
  It was Charlie who handed to Mrs. Narag the love letters respondent had sent
to his sister
  Respondent tried to dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment
proceedings
 1 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

 Magdalena Bautista
 Bienvenido Eugenio

 Said he knew respondent because respondent was always going to the house of his
son in-law, Charlie

 Said that respondent and Espita were residing together as husband and wife o Nieves
Reyes

 Neighbor and friend of the couple, she learned from the Narag children that
respondent abandoned his family - Complainant also presented the love letters written by
respondent to Espita, whereby respondent professed his love to Espita and the two children
whom he acknowledged as his own

ISSUE:

W/N respondent his morally fit to remain an attorney – NO W/N respondent should be disbarred – YES

HELD:

 While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself
but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial
does not suffice.
 Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his
cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to
the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in
the Roll of Attorneys. - THIS HE FAILED TO DO!
 He only denied the affair, and alleged that his wife was an abusive husband-beater - The
testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not establish the fact that he maintained
that moral integrity required by the profession that would render him fit to continue
practicing law.
  Neither did their testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had
abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children.
 Some of them testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but merely
relied on information from either respondent himself or other people, while others were
presented to impeach the good character of his wife - Respondent himself admitted that
his work required him to be often away from home.
 But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead, he abandoned
his family to live with his paramour, who bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he
was hardly in a position to be a good husband or a good father. His children, who grew up
mostly under the care of their mother, must have scarcely felt the warmth of their fathers love.
 - Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove
otherwise.
 A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has
solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.
 The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.
 In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence,
that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the
law profession.
 As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record of Respondent
Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Bar Confidant.

PEREZ VS TUAZON DE PEREZ

[G.R. No. L-14874. September 30, 1960. ]

ANTONIO PEREZ, in his own representation and as Guardian Ad Litem of his son BENIGNO
PEREZ y TUASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANGELA TUASON DE PEREZ, Defendant-Appellee.

Alfonso Felix Jr. for Appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; GUARDIANSHIP COGNIZABLE BY JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS

COURT. — Since the complaint asks that defendant be placed under guardianship because of her
prodigality, and prays that a suitable person or institution be appointed to administer her properties,
the action falls squarely under the provisions of subsection (b), Sec. 38-A, Republic Act No. 1401, as a
"case involving. . . . . guardianship" exclusively cognizable by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court.
2. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS UNDER ART. 116, CIVIL CODE; COGNIZABLE BY JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS COURT. — Inasmuch as the plaintiff seeks to recover damages because his wife’s acts
placed him "in an embarrassing and contemptible position and causing him grave anxiety, wounded
feelings, extreme humiliation," the case involves acts of a spouse that brings . . . dishonor . . . upon
the other "under Art. 116," Civil Code; hence, pursuant to subsection (d), Sec. 38-A of Republic Act
No. 1401, this action likewise fails exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.

3. ID.; ID.; MERE SUBMISSION OF COMPROMISE DOES NOT PLACE PARTY IN ESTOPPEL; COURT MAY
MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS ACTION. — Assuming for the sake of argument that defendant was placed in
such estoppel by merely executing the compromise and submitting it to the Court’s approval, such
estoppel could not operate against it, because regardless of the parties, the Court, at any time, could
motu proprio inquire and determine whether it had jurisdiction, and could dismiss the case if it found it
had no power to act therein.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order, dated October 27, 1958, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing its
Civil Case No. 34626 for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff Antonio Perez, in his own representation and as guardian ad litem of his adoptive son,
Benigno Perez y Tuason, initiated this civil case against Angela Tuason de Perez, the plaintiff’s wife
and Benigno’s mother. The complaint states three causes of action.

Under the first cause of action, it is averred that the defendant is squandering all of her estate on a
young man by the name of Jose Antonio Campos Boloix, because of which Benigno Perez y Tuason,
acting through his guardian ad litem, the plaintiff, prays that his mother, the defendant, be declared a
prodigal and placed under guardianship; that a suitable person or institution be appointed to
administer her properties; and that during the pendency of this suit, a writ of injunction be issued to
prevent the continued waste and dissipation of her properties.

In his second cause of action, the husband Antonio Perez, for and in his own behalf, asserts that by
virtue of the said alleged acts of prodigality committed by the defendant wife, the conjugal partnership
of gain is being dissipated to the prejudice of both spouses; wherefore, he prays for a writ of
injunction to restrain her from "dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains."

Finally, as a third cause of action, the plaintiff husband avers that, in addition to the aforementioned
acts, the defendant has repeatedly advised him, as well as other persons, that she intends to marry
Jose Campos Boloix and to have a child by him not withstanding her present marriage to the plaintiff,
Antonio Perez; and that, if she could not have such a child, she was willing to have one by any other
person, just to put plaintiff in a ridiculous and embarrassing position. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks to
recover from her the total sum of P185,000.00 by way of damages and attorney’s fees. On January 2,
1958, after a preliminary hearing, wherein plaintiff was heard ex parte, the Court of First Instance of
Manila issued a preliminary injunction as prayed for in the complaint.

On March 19, 1958, the defendant appeared through counsel and prayed for the dismissal of the case
on the ground of res judicata, and that the preliminary injunction be dissolved. Said motion was
denied by the court a quo in its order of April 2, 1958.

On April 16, 1958, the defendant filed a second motion to dismiss the case, this time on the ground
that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction over the present proceedings, which,
according to her, is vested under Republic Act No. 1401 with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court. While this last motion was being considered by the Court, a compromise agreement was arrived
at and submitted for approval of the court on May 2, 1958. On May 31, 1958, before the Court could
act, defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the compromise agreement, on the ground that
(a) the same is contrary to law and (b) it was not freely or validly entered into by her representative.
Without resolving this particular question, the lower court asked the parties to submit further
memoranda on the sole issue of jurisdiction. After this was done, the trial court, by order of
September 30, 1958, ordered the dismissal of the case on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Hence, plaintiffs Perez (father and son) appealed.

Appellants assign three alleged errors in the order appealed from, as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the
causes of action alleged by Antonio Perez in the complaint.

"The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the
causes of action alleged by Benigno Perez y Tuason in the complaint.

The trial court cried in holding that the Doctrine of Estoppel of Jurisdiction is not applicable in this
country and erred further in failing to apply said doctrine to the present proceedings." cralaw virtua1aw library

We find the appeal to be untenable.

Republic Act No. 1401, creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the City of Manila and
defining its jurisdiction, provides, among other things, that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 38-A — Provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(b) — Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;

DE GUZMAN VS PEREZ

G.R. No. 156013 July 25, 2006

ROBERTO P. DE GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
HERNANDO B. PEREZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, and SHIRLEY F.
ABERDE, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his station in life
and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect of child under Article 59(4)1 of PD 603?2

In this petition for certiorari,3 petitioner Roberto P. de Guzman assails the January 3, 2002 resolution
of public respondent, then Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, dismissing de Guzman’s petition
for review of the City Prosecutor of Lipa City’s resolution in I.S. No. 2000-2111. Likewise questioned
is public respondent’s September 24, 2002 resolution denying reconsideration.

Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in the
University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent became pregnant.
She gave birth to petitioner’s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman with
whom he begot two children.

Petitioner sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice — the first in 1992 and the second in 1993.
In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray the
cost of the child’s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances, petitioner never
provided any other financial support for his son.

In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby’s needs, private respondent accepted
a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was only because of her short
stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to school. However, she reached
the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her and Robby’s needs. The
child’s continued education thus became uncertain.

On the other hand, petitioner managed the de Guzman family corporations. He apparently did well
as he led a luxurious lifestyle. He owned at least five luxury cars, lived in a palatial home in the
exclusive enclave of Ayala Heights Subdivision, Quezon City, built a bigger and more extravagant
house in the same private community, and sent his children (by his wife) to expensive schools in
Metro Manila. He also regularly traveled abroad with his family. Despite his fabulous wealth,
however, petitioner failed to provide support to Robby.

In a letter dated February 21, 2000, private respondent demanded support for Robby who was
entering high school that coming schoolyear (June 2000). She explained that, given her financial
problems, it was extremely difficult for her to send him to a good school.

Petitioner ignored private respondent’s demand. The latter was thus forced to rely on the charity of
her relatives so that she could enroll her son in De La Salle high school in Lipa City.

On June 15, 2000, private respondent filed a criminal complaint4 for abandonment and neglect of
child under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Lipa City. It was
docketed as I.S. No. 2000-2111.

In his counter-affidavit,5 petitioner averred that he never abandoned nor intended to abandon Robby
whom he readily acknowledged as his son. He claimed that he discharged his responsibilities as a
father and said that he paid P7,000 for his son’s hospitalization and medical needs. He also
shouldered the expenses of Robby’s birth and sent money to help out when Robby was sick or was
in need of money. Claiming financial incapacity, he insisted that the acts attributed to him did not
constitute abandonment or neglect.

Petitioner pointed out that private respondent was the financially capable parent while he had no
fixed job and merely depended on the charity of his father. He asserted that the five luxury cars
belonged not to him but to Balintawak Cloverleaf Market Corporation. He denied ownership of the
big house in Ayala Heights Subdivision, Quezon City. He lived there with his family only by tolerance
of his father. He also disclaimed ownership of the newly constructed house and again pointed to his
father as the owner. Even the schooling of his two children (by his wife) was shouldered by his
father.

On August 1, 2000, private respondent submitted her reply-affidavit. 6 To prove petitioner’s financial
capacity to support Robby’s education, she attached a notarized copy of the General Information
Sheet (GIS) of the RNCD Development Corporation. It showed that petitioner owned P750,000
worth of paid-up corporate shares.
In his rejoinder-affidavit,7 petitioner maintained that his equity in the RNCD Development Corporation
belonged in reality to his father. The shares were placed in his name only because he had no means
to invest in the corporation. He could not use, withdraw, assign or alienate his shares. Moreover, the
corporation was virtually dormant and petitioner did not receive any compensation as its secretary.

On August 15, 2000, the City Prosecutor of Lipa City issued his resolution8 dismissing the complaint
for abandonment but finding probable cause to charge petitioner with neglect of child punishable
under Article 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Section 10(a)9 of RA 7610.10

On August 25, 2000, an information was filed before Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa
City for the crime of neglecting a minor child. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 0431-00.

Before petitioner could be arraigned, however, he filed a petition for review of the City Prosecutor’s
resolution with the Secretary of Justice.

On January 3, 2002, public respondent dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the City
Prosecutor’s resolution.11 He found that petitioner’s ostentatious and luxurious lifestyle constituted
circumstantial evidence of his ample financial resources and high station in life. Petitioner did not
deny allegations that he failed to send a single centavo for the education of his son. All the elements
of the offense were therefore sufficiently established. Petitioner’s claim that everything he had
belonged to his father was a defense which should properly be raised only during trial.12

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was denied.13 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the City
Prosecutor’s resolution. He insists that there is no probable cause to justify his prosecution for
neglect of a minor child. First, he is financially incapable to give support. One can only be charged
with neglect if he has the means but refuses to give it. Second, Robby is not a neglected child. He
has been given, albeit by private respondent who is the financially capable parent, the requisite
education he is entitled to.

The petition is without merit.

The rule is that judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a
determination of whether it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.14 Courts are without power to substitute their judgment for that of the executive
branch.15 They may only look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave
abuse of discretion.16

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which amounts to
an excess or lack of jurisdiction.17 Where it is not shown that the findings complained of are wholly
devoid of evidentiary support or that they are patently erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, the findings must be sustained.18

The assailed resolutions of public respondent were supported by evidence on record and grounded
in law. They were not issued in a capricious, whimsical or arbitrary manner. There is therefore no
reason to countermand them.

Petitioner is charged with neglect of child punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603 which provides
that:
 Art. 59. Crimes. – Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family’s station in life and
financial conditions permit.

xxx xxx xxx

The crime has the following elements:

(1) the offender is a parent;

(2) he or she neglects his or her own child;

(3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the child and

(4) the offender’s station in life and financial condition permit him to give an appropriate
education to the child.

Here, petitioner acknowledged Robby as his son. He has not denied that he never contributed for his
education except in two instances (1992 and 1993). He admitted that the boy’s education was being
financed by private respondent and her relatives. He stated under oath that the last time he sent
material support to his son was in 1994 when he gave P7,000 for the latter’s hospitalization and
medical expenses.

There is a prima facie showing from the evidence that petitioner is in fact financially capable of
supporting Robby’s education. The notarized GIS of the RNCD Development Corporation indicates
that petitioner owns P750,000 worth of paid-up shares in the company.

Petitioner’s assertion that the GIS is not evidence of his financial capability (since the shares are
allegedly owned by his father) is of no moment. The claimis factual and evidentiary, and therefore a
defense which should be interposed during the trial.

The argument that criminal liability for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of PD 603 attaches only if
both parents are guilty of neglecting the child’s education does not hold water.

The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not depend
on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of any
parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the family’s
station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from
the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful compliance with his or her
own parental duties.

Petitioner’s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield
himself from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.19

However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge against
him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:
 SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those
covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
(emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including
those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code."

The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference
of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal
Code.20 Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.

We make no determination of petitioner’s guilt or innocence of the crime charged. The presumption
of innocence in his favor still stands. What has been ascertained is simply the existence of probable
cause for petitioner’s indictment for the charge against him, that is, whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably
guilty thereof, and should thus be held for trial. Petitioner’s guilt should still be proven beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 0431-00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chairman, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.

Footnotes

1
It attaches criminal liability to any parent who neglects his child by not giving the latter the
education which the family’s station in life and financial condition permit.

2
Child and Youth Welfare Code.

3
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

4
Complaint-affidavit dated June 15, 2000; rollo, pp. 37-39.

5
Dated July 27, 2000; id., pp. 40-46.
 6
Id., pp. 47-56.

7
Dated August 9, 2000; id., pp. 57-61.

8
Id., pp. 62-66.

9
It penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development
including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code.

10
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.

11
Resolution dated January 3, 2002; rollo, pp. 23-26.

12
Id.

13
Resolution dated September 24, 2002; id., pp. 27-28.

14
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tonda, 392 Phil. 797 (2000).

15
Id.

16
Id.

17
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 294.

18
Estrella Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 261 (1999).

19
Article 8, PD 603.

The crime of indifference of parents, the essence of which is the failure to provide the child
20

with education, is punished under Article 277 and is also penalized by Article 59(4) of PD
603. (Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, 1st Edition [2000], National Bookstore, Inc., p.
502)

ARROYO VS VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO

GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921

FACTS:

Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived together as man
and wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of
living separate from her husband. Mariano’s efforts to induce her to resume marital relations were all in
vain. Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live
with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been
compelled to leave because of the cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of
separation be declared and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate
maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion
that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other

HELD: NO.

It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the
pair are invalid, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no
other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these
countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows
that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano
B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt,
entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is
her duty to return. Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original
complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the
marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is
absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance.