Chapter 2: Human Relations [Arts.

19-36, NCC]

a. Duty to Act with Justice, Observe Honesty and Good Faith

b. Actions for Breach of Promise to Marry
c. Unjust Enrichment
d. Rights to Personal Dignity and Privacy
e. Liability of Public Officers
f. Independent Civil Actions
g. Prejudicial Questions

Articles 19, 20, and 21

Art. 19 Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art 20 Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Art 21 Any person who willfully causes loss of injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 19

standards in Article 19

(1) to act with justice

(2) to give everyone his due
(3) to observe honesty and good faith

elements or requisites of an abuse of right under Article 19

(1) there is a legal right and duty

(2) which is exercised in bad faith
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It
consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of the
other.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgement or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest
or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior
and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury — that
others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively
will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and
that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing
in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society . (UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST
vs. ROMEO A. JADER, G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000)

In GF EQUITY, INC. vs. VALENZONA, G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005, the Supreme Court said, “This
article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of
one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that
in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though
by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Article 20

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

In De Guzman v. NLRC 211 SCRA 723, 730 (1992), this Court quoted the following explanation of
Tolentino why it is impermissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.

The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to
the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to
the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he
unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or good customs. Over and above the specific
precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice which the law develops and which are
expressed in three principles: honeste vivere( To live honorably, creditably, or virtuously), alterum non
laedere (Not to injure another) and jus suum quique tribuere;( Not to injure another) and he who
violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice
others.

When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law while Article 21, on the other hand, refers
to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to
injure.

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide
for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set
forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible. If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation,
an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20
provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damages." The latter provision is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps
in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes."
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20
or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of
each case.

(EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE, GR. No. 165842, November 29, 2005 citing Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 778)

Article 21

damnum absque Injuria

To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material distinction between damages
and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results
from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order
that one may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie,
although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any
lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to
another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is
damnum absque Injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from
action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means. Example is the fencing of one’s
property. If there is no easement or right of way that is existing, inconvenienced that may result to
neighboring properties cannot give rise to an action for damages. (Custodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
116100, February 9, 1996)

Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury)

Refers to self-inflicted injuries or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by
one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so
(Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et all vs. Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) G.R. No. 154259, Feb. 28, 2005).

A person who exercises his legal right does no injury. HOWEVER, it cannot be said that a person
exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or good customs. When
damages result from a person’s exercise of rights, it is damnum absque injuria (ABS-CBN v. Republic
Broadcasting Corp. G.R. No. 128690, January 21, 1999).

Art 22 Every person who through an act or performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.

Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to
account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion,
or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution. To substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant
must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was
not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the
benefit.

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the
defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other
remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any
other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso
will not lie.

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of
others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term
unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.

(Shinryo Company Inc. v. RRN Inc. G.R. No. 172525, October 2010)
There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit. Under
Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, USHIO Realty has the legal right to receive some
amount as reasonable compensation for CAR COOL's occupation of the property.15 As held in Benitez v.
Court of Appeals G.R. No. 104828, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 242., SC said:

“xxx Damages are recoverable in ejectment cases under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised
Rules of Court. These damages arise from the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, and not the damages which private respondents may have suffered but which
have no direct relation to their loss of material possession. Damages in the context of
Section 8, Rule 70 is limited to "rent" or "fair market value" for the use and occupation of
the property.”

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or
when a person retains the money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience. Two conditions must concur: (1) a person is unjustly
benefited; and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. The
main objective of the principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching oneself at
the expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person
shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense (Grandteq
Industrial Steel Products, Inc. v. Margallo, G.R. No. 181393, July 28, 2009, 594 SCRA 223, 238,
citing Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 74, 96).

The enrichment may consist of a patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is

appreciable in money. It must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage or injury to the plaintiff
which may consist, not only of the loss of the property or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but
also of the non-payment of compensation for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant
without intent to donate on the part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something what the
latter would have obtained. (Tolentino, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, COMMENTARIES AND
JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. I, p.78 and 80)

“Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is
appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony
of the defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from
service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or
personal; (4) the increase of value of property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the
defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right
in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant. (Elegir v. Philippine
Airlines, G.R. No. 181995, July 16, 2012 citng an authority on Civil Law on the subject)

Art 23 Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was
benefited.

Article 24 (PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE)

When a particular transaction is one of those fraudulent and anomalous one; that is taking advantage of
the very limited education of a person, the provisions of Article 24 of the New Civil Code which states:
"In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account
of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the
Court must be vigilant for his protection", should be applied. Rules of technicalities must be set aside in
order to give way to justice and equity. (Valenzuala v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56168, December 22,
1988)

Article 25 (thoughtless extravagance)

Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or
emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private
charitable institution.

Note:

 Extravagance during Emergency

 Law seeks to prevent INCONSIDERATE AND OSTENATIOUS ACTIVITIES during times of emergency
 Unless provided that entities are given legal standing to seek and injunction –
*Government
*Private Charitable Institution

Article 26 (respect for dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind)

Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

1.Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

2.Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

3.Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

4.Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.

The violations mentioned above are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other
similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person’s dignity, such as
profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.

The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The
sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration.
The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it
dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if
human personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights
of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind.
With respect to violation of the privacy of one's residence, one cannot hide behind the cloak of his
supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion.

(CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000)

Article 27 (NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE)

This provision abhors official inaction, willful neglect and unreasonable delay in the performance of
official duties. In no uncertain terms that it must be stressed that every public employee or servant
must strive to render service to the people with utmost diligence and efficiency. Insolence and delay
have no place in government service.

Non-feasance- refers to a failure to act that results in harm to another party.

Misfeasance is the act of engaging in an action or duty but failing to perform the duty correctly.
Misfeasance refers to an action that is unintentional.

Malfeasance is the willful and intentional act of doing harm.

"Article 28 (unfair competition)

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage."

This is different from unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293 - AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE AND ESTABLISHING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, PROVIDING
FOR ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Under this article, what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust,
oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or
to earn a living. Plainly, what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the
means use dare fair and legitimate.

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an
injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary
to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of
our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be
a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 117)

The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by
intellectual property laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair
competition" in American jurisdictions, the term covers cases of discovery of trade secrets of a
competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of
a competitor’s contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business. (Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 117.)

Article 29 (ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON CRIME)

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First
is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of, or
that the crime does not exist anymore. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. [Almeida, et al. V. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, 181 (1907). See also Almeida Chantangco
and Lete v. Abaroa, 40 Phil. 1056 (1910), 218 US 476, 54 l. Ed. 1116 (1910); Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil.
314 (1923), Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327 (1924)] There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out
of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
says:

Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 2. Institution of Separate civil action. –

xxx

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. (stress supplied)

The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only (Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 255
SCRA 202, 214 (1996), citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 (1984) This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or
omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are
similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot
be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions
involve the same act or omission (Almeida, et al. V. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, 181 (1907) The reason for this
rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable.

An example of the second instance is where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused
is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability
does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. In this
scenarios, civil liability will proceed.

What is the effect of the death of the accused before his final conviction on his civil liability?

On the effect of the death of the accused on his criminal liability, Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished.

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

By final judgement we mean that the SC had already decided with finality or that the accused did not
appeal his conviction.

It is also settled that "upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it
is on the criminal." (De Guzman v. People, 459 Phil. 576, 580 (2003), citing People V. Bayotas, G.R. No.
102007, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 239, 255)

Rules laid down by the SC in case of death of the accused pending final conviction:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

The case of Sendaydiego: (this was already abandoned in the case of Bayotas) G.R. Nos. L-33252-54.
January 20, 1978
Licerio P. Sendaydiego, provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson, as an
employee of a lumber store, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor as an accompliance,
used six forged provincial vouchers to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of
P57,048.23. They were charged with malversation through falsification. After trial the lower court
acquitted the auditor and found Sendaydiego and Samson guilty as principals of malversation through
falsification of public documents. While the case was on appeal, Sendaydiego died. SC however
continued the case on appeal and it said it will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal
liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego
resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference
that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may
be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:

"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the
court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule
87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by
the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.

This doctrine was abandoned by the SC saying that the reliance on this provision of law is misplaced,
clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Thus, it has been held that the judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for
damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist.
Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa,
theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and,
where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused
was acquitted

ACQUITTAL DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY BASED ON QUASI- DELICT

Acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi-delict. Thus. in Tayag, v. Alcantara, it was held: the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, S2(b)], refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.

Article 32 (independent civil actions for violations of constitutional rights)

Under the said article, it is not just public officers but also private individuals who can be civilly liable for
violation of the rights enumerated therein. It is not necessary that the defendant under this Article
should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of
the plaintiff. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in quasi-delict is determined
by the conduct and not by the mental state of the offender, and there are circumstances under which
the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is
that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does
not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort is
not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent. (Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco
Corp., G.R. No.141309, June19,2007)

In Aberca v. Ver, it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of accountability of
public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No
longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates,
secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter
against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled
people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or
indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would
certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect
of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the
Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression,
joint tortfeasors. (Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp.)

To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney’s fees for
acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited
acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts has not been
so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. (Cojuanco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999)

Article 33 (Independent civil action in case of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries)

Libel:

In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole. (Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel, 167 SCRA 255, 261
(1988) ; Quisumbing v. Lopez, et al, 96 Phil. 510, 513 (1955); Jimenez v. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52, 59 (1914).

The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or
restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is
libelous, depends upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. x x x

A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to
whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. So, the whole item, including display lines, should
be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined.
In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the article must be considered,
each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication x x x The headlines of a newspaper
must also be read in connection with the language which follows. Quisumbing v. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510, 513
(1955)

With respect to news, in determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news
item and the importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.
(Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc., G.R. No. 150256, March 25, 2004)

Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but every circumstances must
be considered if there is indeed a violation of such right or there exists an abused of the freedom of the
press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously
and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words. (Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc.)

Doctrine of Fair comment:

The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made
is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every
false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed
against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact
or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might be
reasonably inferred from the facts (Borjal et al. v. Court of Appeals et al, 301 SCRA 1 (1999).

Under the above provisions (Art. 33 of the Civil Code), independently of a criminal action for
defamation, a civil suit for the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the injured
party. It is apparent, however, from the use of the words "may be," that the institution of such suit is
optional." (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. I, p. 54) In other words,
the civil liability arising from the crime charged may still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the
offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve his right to institute a separate
civil action against the defendant.

However, there is no need of the reservation if the offended party did not intervene in the prosecution
of the offense, (Reyes v. de la Rosa (52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6548; 99 Phil., 1013) and the amount of damages
sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the criminal court so that a reservation of the civil
action is useless or unnecessary. (Dionisio v. Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz., [25]4633.])

Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the
right to file a civil action distinct from the criminal proceedings is not without limitations. If there is
already a finding in the criminal case that the suit is just a harassment, then the decision in the criminal
case is a bar to a separate filing of the civil case thereafter. (Ruiz v. Ucol, G.R. No.L-454404, August 7,
1987)

Article 34 (Peace officer and Municipality’s liability)

Article 35 (INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)

With respect to vehicular accidents:

In a vehicular accident, the aggrieved party may opt for the following options:

1. to sue under the RPC (reckless imprudence) – against the driver. If claim for damages is not reserve,
the driver is primarily liable while the employer is subsidiarily liable. Liability of the employer is under
respondeat superior)

2. culpa contractual – this is against the owner of the vehicle.

3. culpa aquiliana – against the employer of the driver (Art. 2180 in relation to Art 2176, Art. 2184),
principal and direct liability. (liability here is based on pater familias)

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi -
delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer
solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of
the diligence of a good father of the family.

Provisions involved:

Under the RPC:

When the case is filed under the RPC, the person directly liable is the accused himself. The liability of
the employer is just subsidiary:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.

ARTICLE 103. Subsidiary Civil Liability of Other Persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.

When the complainant decides to file a case under culpa contractual under the NCC:

Here the liability of the employer is direct as common carrier.

SUBSECTION 3. Safety of Passengers

Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.

Article 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers as required in articles
1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
statements on tickets, or otherwise.

Article 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common carrier's
liability for negligence is valid, but not for willful acts or gross negligence.

The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the common carrier's liability.

Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

Article 1760. The common carrier's responsibility prescribed in the preceding article cannot be
eliminated or limited by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or otherwise.

Article 1761. The passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to
himself.

Article 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his
death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the
amount of damages shall be equitably reduced.

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.

If it is not a common carrier (vehicle is owned by a private person), culpa contractual will not apply. The
options are for culpa criminal or culpa aquiliana.

Under culpa aquiliana:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant

xxx
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Xxx

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable.

The responsibility declared in article 2180 for the acts or omissions of those persons for who one is
responsible, is principal. The responsibility is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not
because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the
father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of
the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees,
apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have
committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is
condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another;
in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act.( Amandi, Cuestionario del Codigo Civil
Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430)

The primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles
calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in
order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits
resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee
the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said,
"they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and
all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such
responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent
employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such
employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.)

Quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the
civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 2180 of the Civil
Code, is primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.

The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court
of Appeals, (Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 8, 20 (1995) SC held:

x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77
SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused.

Under Article 2180, when the employee is found to be negligent, there is that presumption that the
employer was negligent in the selection and the supervision of its employee. It may only be overcome
by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.

Art. 36 (Prejudicial Question)

A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (Yap v. Paras, G.R. No.
101236, January 30, 1992).

Requisites of prejudicial question:

Requisites: (Section 7, Rule 111, Rules of Court)

a. Previously instituted civil action involves an issue

similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; an
b. The resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.

General Rule:

If both criminal and civil cases are filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence.

Exception:

1. In case of prejudicial questions, the criminal case is suspended because the issues in the civil case are
determinative of the outcome of the criminal case.

Example:

Where there is a civil action is pending in court, in which a validity of a document claimed to be false and
fictitious is in issue, the fiscal may not prosecute the person who allegedly executed the false document
because the issue of the validity of the instrument is sub judice and the prosecuting officer should be
ordered to suspend the criminal action until the prejudicial question has been finally determined.
Prejudicial question contemplates that there is a civil and criminal action and does not come into play
where both cases are civil. While this may be the general rule, this SC has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros
Oriental, Br. 42, and also in CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125646, September 10, 1999, that, in
the interest of good order, the action on one case can be suspended pending the final outcome of
another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.

Prejudicial question in the criminal case for bigamy.

Bigamy is a legal term that refers to the condition of having more than one wife or husband at one time.
Once a person is legally married, he or she must legally terminate that marriage before marrying
another person. Here in the Philippines it is punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of the crime are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, except for the
existence of the first.

If it is the validity of the second marriage that is being questioned, the civil case for the declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage is a prejudicial question, that is if the petitioner himself is the one
raising the issue of vitiated consent.
Example: (case of MERCED vs. DIEZ, G.R. No. L-15315, August 26, 1960)

What if it is the second wife who is raising the issue of vitiated consent?
Prejudicial question does not lie. (DONATO vs. LUNA, G.R. No. L-53642, April 15, 1988)

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on
prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question
to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage
was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction.
The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Cases
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER, G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000

PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

FACTS:
Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in
Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the
incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination.

In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree
of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the
plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated.

On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar
review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he
dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations.

He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s
negligence on account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam.

ISSUE:

1. WON the school is negligent to be liable for actual damages.

2. WON the Romeo can also be considered as negligent for him not to be entitled for moral damages.

RULING:

Yes, the school is liable for damages for its negligent act.

The university should have practiced the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code which states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully, or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered
into between said institution and the student. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely
inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she
had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would
be included among those who will graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal
ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational
institution's way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the list of those who
will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for
such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the
student of any problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also most importantly, of the
procedures for remedying the same.
The school, in belatedly informing Romeo of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time
when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good
faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an
honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious.

xxx

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for
the latter to inquire from the former.

The school therefore in not observing due diligence is liable for damages to Romeo under the principle
of abuse of rights as stated in Article 19 and 20 of the civil code.

2.

Romeo is not entitled to moral damages. At the very least, it behooved on him to verify for himself
whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a
senior law student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically
those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his
failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly,
taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are
also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the prospective examinee
must meet.

GF EQUITY, INC. vs. VALENZONA, G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005

Facts:

GF Equity, hired Valenzona as head coach of the Alaska basketball team in the PBA under a
contract of employment. He was tasked to coach at all practices and games scheduled for the Alaska
team, coach exhibition games, coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending every event
conducted, play-off games, etc.

The contract was for two (2) years with the condition that if at any time during the contract, the
coach fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the contract can be
terminated by the corporation. (Paragraph 3 of the contract)

“3. x x x If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the

sole opinion of the CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill
or competitive ability to coach the team, the CORPORATION
may terminate this contract. (Emphasis supplied)

Alaska placed only third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA Conference in 1988 and with this
his contract was terminated earlier relying on the 3rd paragraph of the contract.
 Valenzona then filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for breach of contract with damages,
ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the
contract without just cause and legal and factual basis.

Issue:

WON GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily terminating Valenzona’s employment

Ruling:

GF Equity has abused its right and therefore liable for damages to Valenzona. Paragraph 3 of the
contract is void for being unlawful as it is a one-sided provision.

Article 1308 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:

"The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of
one of them."

While GF Equity’s act of pre-terminating Valenzona’s services cannot be considered willful as it was
based on a stipulation, although void, it, in doing so, failed to consider the abuse of rights principle
enshrined in Art. 19 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in
the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give every one his due; and observe honesty
and good faith.

Since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground, hence, contrary to law, and
GF Equity negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination, e.g. that Valenzona breached
the contract by failing to discharge his duties thereunder, GF Equity failed to exercise in a legitimate
manner its right to pre-terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right of Valenzona to thus entitle
him to damages under Art. 19 in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code the latter of which provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

GO vs. CORDERO, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010

Facts:

Mortimer F. Cordero, whose into marketing of inter-island passenger vessels met Tony Robinson, an
Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries
Australia (AFFA). He was able to obtain exclusive distributorship in which he shall receive commissions
of 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.

Thereafter, he was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the
Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7, 1997 with Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG
Express Liner of Cebu City.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson. Calls were made to both
but left unanswered hence he filed a case for damages for his unpaid commissions and termination of
his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA.

Issue:

WON Go and Robinsons may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions and
termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA.

Ruling:

Go and Robinsons are liable for damages.

The right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from such
performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect.

While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties
can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for
inducing another to commit such breach.

Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to
the other contracting party.

The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with fairness, honesty and good faith in securing
better terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from AFFA, to the prejudice of Cordero as the
duly appointed exclusive distributor, is proscribed by Article 19 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

In this case, Go and Robinsons is liable for damages under Art. 21 of the NCC which states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
*morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

(*a person's standards of behavior or beliefs concerning what is and is not acceptable for them to do)

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010

Facts:

This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right committed by a superior public
officer in preventing a subordinate from doing her assigned task and being officially recognized for it.

Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and
Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from that
post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five
months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure
and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosqueta’s
position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and
injunction against Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of
Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court, in which the latter granted.

On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force,
petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the
powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner. She was excluded from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia. Further, she was prevented from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, her
salaries withheld, her leave applications were not acted.

Issue:

Whether or not Villanueva may be held liable for damages to Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary
injunction order of the RTC

Ruling:

Yes, Villanueva is liable for damages.

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of
his legal right or duty, act in good faith. If the person is in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another, he
would be liable under Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant a person indemnity for the injury
he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.

In this case Villanueva did not act in good faith when he ignored the injunction issued by the court. It
shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy
Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest
mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of
the position. As the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez (404 Phil. 586, 594 (2001), a party’s
refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful, constitutes an abuse
and an unlawful exercise of right.

ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 184315,
November 25, 2009

Facts:

In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last quarter of 1994, Chronicle
Publishing Corporation ("Chronicle Publishing" for brevity) published in the Manila Chronicle a series of
defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10 and 12, 1993 issues), he
was imputed to be a "Marcos crony" or a "Marcos-Romualdez crony," which term according to him is
commonly used and understood in Philippine media to describe an individual who was a recipient of
special and underserving favors from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez due to special and extra-ordinary closeness to either or both, and which
favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and dishonorable business activities.

Issue:

Whether or not THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION can be held liable for damages for
the statements made.

Ruling:

Yes, the publisher is liable for damages.

Under Article 33 of the NCC, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

Being called a "Marcos crony" is derogatory, the court took judicial notice of the fact that the said
phrase, as understood in Philippine context, refers to an individual who was the recipient of special
and/or undeserved favors from the late President Marcos due to a special closeness to the latter. It is
therefore defamatory; and when it is defamatory, it is presumed that it is malicious, unless it falls under
the exceptions stated in Art. 354 of the RPC which states:

Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it
be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of

any legal, moral or social duty;

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996

(Damnum absque injuria)
Facts:

This is a case for the the grant of an easement of right of way filed by Pacifico Mabasa (plaintiff) against
Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos
(respondents) before the Regional Trial Court.

Pacifico Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P.
Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property was surrounded by other immovables
owned by Morato, spouses Custodio and spouses Santos. Thereafter the respondents fenced their
property. As a result, the tenants left the apartment of Mabasa because there was no longer a
permanent access to the public street. Mabasa then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right
of way and claimed for damages for the loss he suffered.

Issue:

Whether or not the Mabasa’s claim for damages is proper under Article 21 of the NCC

Ruling:

No, Mabasa is not entitled to damages.

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The adjoining property owners
could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of
right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites
concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act
of the adjoining property owners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right
as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner
the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is
within the right of these owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code
provides that" (e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract.

(The fact that Mabasa had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision
of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It
was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after
payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the
exercise of said right. Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property
and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained
by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque
injuria. )

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. CALDERON, GR. No. 156168, December 14, 2004

Facts:

Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad. Sometime in
September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card. The said Visa
card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines.

On 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store
located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel Hongkong. There and then, Calderon purchased several
Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase amounted to
HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card
to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady who
promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification.

Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of
different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the
reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and
even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors. Deeply embarrassed and
humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items
that he bought.

Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and embarrassment on
account of EBC's wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the Gucci store in
Hongkong, Calderon filed with the Regional Trial Court at Makati City a complaint for damages against
EBC.

In its Answer, EBC denied any liability to Calderon, alleging that the latter's credit card privileges for
dollar transactions were earlier placed under suspension on account of Calderon's prior use of the same
card in excess of his credit limit, adding that Calderon failed to settle said prior credit purchase on due
date, thereby causing his obligation to become past due. Corollarily, EBC asserts that Calderon also
failed to maintain the required minimum deposit of $3,000.00.

A provision of the credit card agreement states that the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her
approved credit limit, otherwise, all charges incurred including charges incurred through the use of the
extension CARD/S, if any in excess of credit limit shall become due and demandable and the credit
privileges shall be automatically suspended without notice to the CARDHOLDER in accordance with
Section 11 hereof.

Issue:

Whether or not Calderon can claim damages for the humiliation he suffered.

Ruling:

No, he cannot. With the express provision on automatic suspension under the Credit Card Agreement,
there is simply no basis for holding petitioner negligent for not notifying respondent of the suspended
status of his credit card privileges.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the
law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called. damnum absque injuria

In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate
cause of the injury.

HOTEL NIKKO vs. REYES, GR. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA (to a willing person, no injury is done)

Facts:

Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October 13, 1994 at around
six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a party
at the penthouse where the hotel’s former manager’s birthday was being celebrated. He consented and
carried the latter’s present. At the party, when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, who
claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary, approached him and asked him to leave in a
loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied
the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.

Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed. She said
she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be
intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisaya’s claim that she
invited him to the party.

It was established though that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly
kissed each other. Reyes was taken by a police man because he refused to leave.

Issue:

Whether or not Lim’s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for damages caused to
plaintiff.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s
exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear
alone.

Reyes failed in proving the ill-motive of Lim. It was from his confession that when Ms. Lim approached
him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of defendant
Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent that the request was
meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause him
embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of
what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for
the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code.

EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE, GR. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO (Growing out of, or founded upon, misdoing or tort) OR EX-DELICTO (something
that arises out of a fault or wrong)

Facts:
Eduardo courted Rubylus and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even
brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same
assurance - that he was single. Thus, the Rubylus agreed to marry Eduardo, who even stated in the
certificate of marriage that he was single. Rubylus lived with the Eduardo and dutifully performed her
duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until
Eduardo heartlessly abandoned her, Rubylus had no inkling that he was already married to another
before they were married. She then filed a case for bigamy and asked for moral damages.

Eduardo’s defense is that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done
because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he
had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. He likewise
claimed that there is no physical injury to warrant moral damages.

Issue:

WON Eduardo could claim good faith

Ruling:

Eduardo is liable under Article 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages. Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of
another to do an act which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal
nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so
inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. (citing
Jekshewitz v. Groswald)

Eduardo’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution,
good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. His collective acts of fraud and deceit
before, during and after his marriage with Rubylus were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter.

SONNY D. ROMERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009
LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO
Facts:

On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by Sonny Romero and the Apego Taxi driven
by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose Fuentebella Highway at Barangay
Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga City while the taxi was going in the
opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr., Arnaldo
Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis and Jimmy Padua. Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son
Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious injuries. As a consequence, Romero was charged
with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical
injuries with damage to property in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur. After
trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted him of the crime charged in a decision dated November 9, 2000.
He was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of
P3,541,900 by way of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages
and loss of earning capacity. He questioned his civil liability.
Issue:

WON the Romero’s acquittal freed him of civil liability.

Ruling:

No, Romero’s acquittal does not mean that he is not civilly liable.

He was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime charged but because it could not ascertain
with moral conviction the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of
the accident. Put differently, petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the
collision is another matter. While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was
established by preponderance of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove
negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was
preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable.

(portions of Section 2, Rule 111 and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.—

Xxx

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.)

CECILIO PE ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE, G.R. No.L-17396, May 30, 1962
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES (against good morals)
Facts:

This is a complaint for damages filed by the parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe as against Alfonso
Pe. The family of Lolita is blaming Alfonso from leaving their house.

Alfonso was a collateral blood relative of Lolita’s father that is why he was close to the family and
considering also that they have the same surname. He frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext
that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love and kept their
affair a secret because Alfonso was a married man. When Lolita’s parents heard the rumors about them,
they forbid Alfonso from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. They even filed
deportation proceedings against Alfonso who was then a Chinese national. But the two still continued
their love affair until Lolita left their house. The family of Lolita filed a complaint for damages against
Alfonso for inducing Lolita into such an illicit relationship.

Issue:

WON the family of Lolita are entitled to damages for winning the affection if the latter, he being a
married man.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection
cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery,
seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray
the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually
fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs. When the rumors about their illicit
affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and
even from seeing Lolita. Parents even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
national. Nevertheless, Alfonso continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the
parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant
not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita
to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to
Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., G.R. No. L-14628, September 30,
1960
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Facts:

Soledad Cagigas had an intimate relationship with Francisco Hermosisima which resulted to the
pregnancy of the former. With the pregnancy of Soledad, Francisco promised to marry her but after she
gave birth to their child, Franciso married another woman. Hurt, Soledad filed a claim for moral
damages for alleged breach of promise to marry.

Issue:

WON moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry

Ruling:

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. To be
actionable, there must be some act independent of the breach of promise to marry such as:

1. Fraud or deceit; (seduction)

2. If expenses are actually incurred, actual damage could be sought;
3. When woman was forcibly abducted and raped, moral and exemplary damages could be sought

In this case held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioner is not morally guilty
of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy." Thus the complainant is not
entitled to award of damages.

BEATRIZ GALANG vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., G.R. No.L-17248, January 29, 1962
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
Facts:

This is an action against Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximino Quinit to recover damages claimed to
have been sustained by Beatriz Galang for an alleged breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo Quinit to
marry her.

Rodrigo and Beatriz became engaged after courtship. Thereafter, Rodrigo and his father Maximo went
to Beatriz house to arrange the marriage. Maximo agreed to give dowry and pay the expenses of the
wedding, except for the wedding dress. During the wedding arrangement, they stayed in the house of
Adolfo Dagawan as husband and wife. Prior to the scheduled wedding, Beatriz and Rodrigo,
accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage license but failed because Rodrigo did
not have a residence certificate, but both of them signed the corresponding application. After that,
Rodrigo left, on the pretext that he is going to their hometown to get his residence certificate, but never
returned. When Beatriz returned to their hometown, she found out that Rodrigo's parents had sprinted
him away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory.

Issue:

WON, Beatriz is entitled to damages because of Rodrigo’s failure to marry her.

Ruling:
No, Beatriz is not entitled to damages as already decided in the case of Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals, L-14628 (September 30, 1960) that breach of promise to marry is not actionable unless there
is: 1. Fraud or deceit; (seduction); 2. If expenses are actually incurred, actual damage could be sought;
and 3. When woman was forcibly abducted and raped, moral and exemplary damages could be sought.
However, none of these exemptions is present in this case, hence no claim for damages can be had.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Facts:

This is a case for damages and reimbursement filed by Marilou Gonzales as against Gashem Shookat
Baksh, for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married.

After courtship Marilou and Gashem decided to get married. Gashem went to Marilou’s house to
secure approval of her parents. After that, he forced Marilou to live with him in his apartment. Marilou
was then a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, Marilou filed a complaint because Gashem
started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in
school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but Gashem administered a drug to
abort the baby.

Gashem repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is already
married to someone in Bacolod. He alleged that he never proposed marriage or agreed to be married
neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out
of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private
respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.

Issue:

WON Gashem is liable for damages for breach of promise to marry.

Ruling:

Gashem is liable under Article 21, Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice
or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.

WASSMER vs. VELEZ, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married
and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be saying that he
wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But the next day, Sept.
3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning, and he apologizes.
Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez
filed no answer and was declared in default.

Issue:

WON Francisco is liable for damages for breach of promise to marry.

Ruling:

Francisco is liable for damages under Article 21. Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to
marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which
provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

NATIVIDAD vs. TUNAC, G.R. No. 143130, July 10, 2000

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Facts:
Elsa Natividad and Ronald Tunac grew up together. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers.
One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get the
biodata, which he needed in connection with his application for employment. Upon arrival at the
boarding house, there was no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and,
once inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss
of her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her. The families agreed to have
the wedding but due to the marriage of her sister and Elsa’s premature delivery of her baby, the
wedding was postponed. The miscarriage marked change in Ronald's attitude towards Elsa. In
January of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed Elsa
that he no longer wanted to get married to her. The Natividad’s sued Ronald not merely because
Elsa became pregnant but because Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her after their
agreement had already been much publicized in their town.
Issue: WON Ronald is liable for damages for breach of promise to marry.
Ruling:
Ronald is not liable for breach of promise to marry.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, breach of promise to marry becomes
actionable.
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less by his
parents. From the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two became lovers
before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by the
Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the defendant is in a
position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. This is not the case here.
That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's miscarriage, is already
beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a relationship gone awry.

SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC. vs. RRN INC., G.R. No. 172525, October
20, 2010
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Facts:

This is a case for recovery of unpaid account which consists of unpaid portions of the sub-
contract, variations and unused materials in the total sum of P5,275,184.17 and legal interest in
the amount of P442,014.73 which was filed by RRN Inc. vs Shinryo. Shinryo on the other hand
filed a counterclaim for overpayment in the amount of P2,512,997.96.

The parties here executed a "Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment, Consumables for the
Electrical Works-Power and Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation" for the Phillip Morris
Greenfield Project. RRN is the subcontractor here.

The project started but was never finished by RRN due to financial difficulties and hence
Shinryo paid RRN for the work that was done. RRN however demanded that the payment is still
lacking but Shinryo insisted that it is already paid because it included in its computation RRN’s
use of its manlift equipment. The record however shows that there is no provision in the contract
pertaining to the use of the manlift equipment if it should be rented or not. Shinryo is insisting
that even if there is no contract to that effect because RRN was benefited by the use of the
equipment, it should pay under the principle of unjust enrichment.

Issue:
WON Shinryo’s claim for the use of manlift equipment constitutes unjust enrichment.

Ruling:

No, there is no unjust enrichment here.

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or
obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense
that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.

To substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that
another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the
state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.

Article 22 of the NCC says that, “Every person who, through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him”. In order that accion in rem verso may
prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that
the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime
or quasi-delict.

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is
no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable
action under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the
principle of accion in rem verso will not lie. This is not applicable in this case because Shinryo’s
claim is based on contract and in that contract there is no mention of the rental of equipments.

CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation

G.R. NO. 138088, January 23, 2006
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Facts:
This is a case for ejectment filed by USHIO Realty as against CAR COOL Philippines Inc. The
trial court ordered for the payment of rentals from the time of the demand to vacate until the time
that CAR COOL would vacate the place plus legal interest.

The property being rented by CAR COOL was once owned by the Spouses Hector and Gloria
Hizon Lopez. Later on, it was sold to USHIO Realty. The latter, being the new owner demanded
that CAR COOL vacate the premises but to no avail hence this case. After evaluation of the
evidence, the lower court ordered for the payment of rentals from the time of the demand to
vacate until the time that CAR COOL would vacate the place plus legal interest.

CAR COOL asserts that USHIO is not entitled to an award for damages in the form of rentals
because it would constitute unjust enrichment at their expense. CAR COOL claims that it never
benefited from its occupation of the property after USHIO Realty's agents entered the property
on 1 October 1995 and unlawfully destroyed CAR COOL's office, equipment and spare parts.
Because of the destruction of the equipment and spare parts needed to operate its business, CAR
COOL asserts that it was no longer possible to continue its business operations. Records show
however that it was only on November 18, 1996 when the sheriff turned over the possession of
the property to USHIO Realty.

Issue:
WON award for damages in the form of rental constitutes unjust enrichment

Ruling:

No, there is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to
such benefit. (Under Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure) Under the Rules of
Civil Procedure, USHIO Realty has the legal right to receive some amount as reasonable
compensation for CAR COOL's occupation of the property.
USHIO Realty as the new owner of the property has a right to physical possession of the said
property. Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of its property, CAR COOL should pay
USHIO Realty rental as a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
Contrary to CAR COOL’s contention the payment of damages in the form of rentals for the
property does not constitute unjust enrichment.
ELEGIR vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 181995, July 16, 2012
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Facts:
Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a commercial pilot.
Subsequently, PAL posted a bid for the opening of slots for the crew of the new aircrafts and
Elegir was one of those awarded with the opportunity.
Elegir, along with the other 7 other pilots, were sent for training in Seattle, Washington,
United States of America for the necessary training of his skills and knowledge to handle the
new aircraft. He completed his training. After (1 year, 1 month and 16 days) of his training he
signified his intention of retiring after rendering 25 years, 8 months, and 20 days of continuous
service. PAL asked him to reconsider his retirement because the company has yet to recover the
cost of his training. In the event that he finally decides to leave, PAL said it will deduct the
unrecovered cost of his training from his Retirement Pay. He decided to leave afterall.
Issue:
Whether or not PAL had the right to reimburse themselves from Elegir’s retirement pay the
amount unrecovered from his training.

Ruling:

PAL is entitled to reimbursement for the unrecovered cost of his training. T o allow Eliger to leave
the company before it has fulfilled the reasonable expectation of service on his part will amount
to unjust enrichment. Article 22 of the New Civil Code is applicable which states:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or
when a person retains the money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience. Two conditions must concur: (1) a person is unjustly
benefited; and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. The main
objective of the principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching oneself at the
expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person shall
not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. The enrichment may
consist of a patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It
must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage or injury to the plaintiff which may consist, not
only of the loss of the property or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of the non-payment
of compensation for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on
the part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something what the latter would have obtained.
As can be gathered from the facts, PAL invested a considerable amount of money in sending the
petitioner abroad to undergo training to prepare him for his new appointment as B747-400
Captain. In the process, the petitioner acquired new knowledge and skills which effectively
enriched his technical know-how. As all other investors, PAL expects a return on investment in
the form of service by the petitioner for a period of 3 years, which is the estimated length of time
within which the costs of the latter’s training can be fully recovered. The petitioner is, thus,
expected to work for PAL and utilize whatever knowledge he had learned from the training for
the benefit of the company. However, after only one (1) year of service, the petitioner opted to
retire from service, leaving PAL stripped of a necessary manpower.

Undeniably, the petitioner was enriched at the expense of PAL. After undergoing the training
fully shouldered by PAL, he acquired a higher level of technical competence which, in the
professional realm, translates to a higher compensation.

VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE
Facts:
Carlos Telosa is a farmer and a fisherman. He had very limited education. He initiated a loan
with the Rural Bank of Lucena with a contract of mortgage. The mortgage covered a parcel of
land measuring 50,000 square meters. The bank however suffered financial distress and it has to
undergo liquidation. The loan of Telosa was included in the liquidation proceedings. The
mortgage was foreclosed and was sold to the highest bidder. The legal heirs of Telosa then filed
a case with the Court of First Instance of Quezon, against the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc. for
the annulment of sale saying that the loan had already been paid. The Court rendered a decision
in favor or the legal heirs of Telosa as it found that the loan of Telosa had already been paid.
The Rural Bank elevated the case to the CA. The CA decided that since the Rural Bank of
Lucena, Inc., is in the process of liquidation in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the case
should have been filed there. It said that if there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all
claims against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding.

Issue:

WON the State, thru the court, can deviate from this procedure under the doctrine of parens
patriae.

Ruling:

Yes, under the parens patriae doctrine.

The SC said that with rule that if there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all claims
against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding, the more proper procedure would
be to set aside the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Quezon and consequently
dismiss the case without prejudice to the right of the private respondents to take up with the
liquidation court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, the settlement of their mortgage
obligation.

However, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice it
is just right to deviate from the procedure. To order the heirs of Telosa to refile and relitigate
their case before the liquidation court would be an exercise in futility. It would mean another
several years of trial and additional expenses to them who are admittedly living in poverty.
Incidentally, the property in question is the only property of private respondents. The records
shows that the amount of loan is just P300 and not P5,000.

Needless to state in this regard that this particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and
anomalous transactions involving the officers of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The latter took
advantage of the very limited education of Carlos Telosa. . . . the provisions of Article 24 of the
New Civil Code which states: "In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the Court must be vigilant for his protection.

CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Facts:
This is a case for damages filed by Nestor Nicolas as against Rodrigo for spreading rumors that
he was having adulterous relationship with Florence Concepcion.

The problem started when Rodrigo the brother-in-law of Florence angrily approached Nestor at
the latter’s apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence.
He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng
P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli
para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing.”

The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor when the two (2) confronted
Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo
backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor from a relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo
called Florence over the telephone reiterating his accusation and threatening her that should
something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill
Florence.

As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he
could no longer face his neighbors. Florence also ceased to do business with him by not
contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture was no longer feasible. To
make matters worse, his relationship turned sour from the doubt of fidelity and frequent
bickering and quarrels. The wife even expressed her desire to leave Nestor.

Issue:
WON Nestor is entitled to damages because his right to privacy had been violated by Rodrigo.

Ruling:
Nestor is entitled to damages. The incident charged of Rodrigo was no less than an invasion on
the right of Nestor as a person.

Art. 26 is applicable in this case.

The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and
do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions
against a person’s dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive
language.
The inordinate interest of Rodrigo to know the truth about the rumor and why he was not
satisfied with the separate denials made by Florence and Nestor, is worth noting. He had to
confront Nestor face to face, invade the latter’s privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the
presence of his wife and children, neighbors and friends, accusing him - a married man - of
having an adulterous relationship with Florence. This definitely caused Nestor much shame and
embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood without feeling
distraught and debased. This brought dissension and distrust in his family where before there was
none.
The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be
exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for
human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of
every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from
being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed
defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.

PADALHIN vs. LAVINA

G.R. No. 183026, November 14, 2012
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Facts:
Lavina and Nestor were both diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul General,
respectively. In the course of their stay at Kenya , the residence of Lavina was raided twice. Prior
to the raids, Bienvenido Pasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in the
ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take
photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein. The first raid was conducted while Lavina and
his wife were attending a diplomatic dinner. Officials from the Criminal Investigation Division
Intelligent Office of Kenya took picture of Lavina’s house with the aid of Lavina’s house
helpers. The second raid again took place when Lavina was not present at the house, pictures
were taken.

Prior to that, Laviña received an information from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in
Manila that an investigating team was to be sent to Nairobi to inquire into the complaints filed
against him by the employees of the Philippine Embassy in Kenya, on one hand, and his own
complaint against the spouses Padalhin, on the other. The investigating team was led by Rosario
G. Manalo (Manalo) and had Franklin M. Ebdalin (Ebdalin) and Maria Theresa Dizon (Dizon).
The team entered Laviña’s residence unarmed with a search warrant, court order or letter from
the DFA Secretary. Laviña alleged that in the course of the inspection, the team destroyed
cabinet locks, damaged furnitures and took three sets of carved ivory tusks.

Issue:
Whether or not the unwarranted search and seizure made by the petitioners violated Lavina’s
right to privacy.

Ruling:
Article 26 of the civil code provides for the respect of dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of
mind of others and enumerates the acts that are considered violative thereof. There is no doubt
that the unwarranted seizures done where against Lavina’s privacy rights. Nestor himself
admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of Lavina's residence without the latter's
knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so sans bad faith or malice. However,
Nestor's surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept
ivories in his diplomatic residence, then, his behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is
not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the
privacy of one's residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent
intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages and attorney's fees in Lavina's
favor is proper.

PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 125704, August 28, 1998
NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE

Facts:

On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liability for the 2 nd, 3rd,
and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1 st and 2nd of 1992. Philex protested the demand for
payment of the tax liabilities stating it has pending claims for VAT input/refund for taxes it paid
for the years 1989 to 1991. Their claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax
liabilities. BIR stated that the tax refund is yet to be determined. It was the mistake of its
employees who are investigating the tax claims that is causing the delay of the computation of
their tax refunds.

Issue:
Whether or not the malfeasance of the employee justified the non-payment of the taxes due by
Philex.

Ruling:

The malfeasance of the BIR employees will not justify the non-payment of the taxes due
considering that there is a rule saying there can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that
the taxpayer may have against the government.

In this situation, the taxpayer is not left without a remedy against public servants or employees,
especially BIR examiners who, in investigating tax claims are seen to drag their feet needlessly.
If the inaction can be characterized as willful neglect of duty, then recourse under Article 27 of
the Civil which provides:

“Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary action that may
be taken.”

The provision abhor official inaction, willful neglect and unreasonable delay in the performance
of official duties. In no uncertain terms must that it must be stressed that every public employee
or servant must strive to render service to the people with utmost diligence and efficiency.
Insolence and delay have no place in government service. The BIR, being the government
collecting arm, must and should do no less. It simply cannot be apathetic and laggard in
rendering service to the taxpayer if it wishes to remain true to its mission of hastening the
country's development.

CORNELIO AMARO and JOSE AMARO, vs. AMBROSIO SUMANGUIT, G.R. No. L-14986,
July 31, 1962 (en banc)

On October 5, 1958 Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of
Silay. On the following day he, together with his father (Cornelio Amaro) and his witnesses,
"went to the office of the Chief of Police (Sumaguit) but instead of obtaining assistance to their
complaint they were harassed and terrorized;" With this, they filed a complaint for damages
under art. 21 and 27 of the new civil code.
The complaint was dismissed upon Sumaguit’s motion on the ground that it does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The pertinent allegations in the complaint are that on October 5, 1958 appellant Jose Amaro was
assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay; that the following day he,
together with his father (Cornelio Amaro) and his witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant
but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized;" that in
view thereof they "gave up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the
crime . . . .;" that upon advice of the City Mayor given to appellee an investigation (of said
crime) was conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to file or had already
filed an information for illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant; and that "having
finished the investigation of the crime complained of, the defendant chief of police is now
harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering them thru his police to appear in his office
when he is absent, and he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in
prepared affidavits exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in their case against the
perpetrator of the crime.

Issue:
Are the allegations sufficient to constitute violation of art 21 and 27 of the NCC?

Ruling:
The SC said that the facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on Sumaguit's part in the
light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That Cornelio and Jose were "harrased and terrorized" may
be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not
based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on Sumaguit's refusal to give them
assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law. The requirement under the
aforesaid provision that such refusal must be "without just cause" is implicit in the context of the
allegation. The statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated in a subsequent paragraph of the
complaint, where it is alleged that "he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs" to make them
sign affidavits of exculpation in favor of the policemen.
The complaint is, without doubt, imperfectly drafted. It suffers from vagueness and
generalization. But all that the Rules require is that there be a showing by a statement of ultimate
facts, that the plaintiff his a right and that such right has been violated by the defendant.

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION, G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014
(unfair competition)
Facts:
This is a case filed by Jesichris Manufacturing for damages under Art 28 of the NCC for unfair
competition against Willaware Products Corporation because the latter was manufacturing and
distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of Jesichris.
Jesichris is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products, while
Willaware is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic
and metal.

Sometime in November 2000, Jesichris discovered that Willaware had been manufacturing and
distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but
was selling these products at a lower price and to the same customers.

Willaware admitted he hired Jesichris’ former employees and deliberately copied its products
and sold these products to the latter’s customers at a lower cost. Willaware hired an employee
from Jesichris who was well versed with the machine used for plastic automotive spare parts.
Willaware also hired the warehouse and delivery man of Jesichris who was terminated because
he was accused of spying in favor of the latter.

Issue:
Is Willaware liable for damages under article 28?

Held:
Yes, Willaware is liable for damages under art. 28 for committing unfair competition.

"Unfair," have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and
(2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to
judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong
perpetrated by unconscionable means.
In this case, the two elements or characteristics of unfair competition is present. First, the two
are competitors or trade rival; second, it is evident that Willaware has acted contrary to good
conscience when it suddenly shifted its business from manufacturing of kitchenware to plastic-
made automotive parts; lured the employees of Jesichris to transfer to his employ and tried to
discover the trade secrets of Jesicrhis and used the experience of Jesichris’ employee.
When a person starts a business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss and
for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can take
advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong. Willaware here
acted in bad faith in competing with the business of Jesichris by employing acts which are
contrary to good conscience.

MANANTAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL
Facts:
A criminal case against GEORGE MANANTAN was filed for homicide through reckless
imprudence. He was acquitted of the crime charged because his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. On appeal, he was ordered to pay civil damages to the legal heirs of the
victim. He is questioning the award for civil damages by the CA because according to him the
non-declaration of the RTC of any award for damages was itself consistent with his acquittal
considering that the civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action and that there
was no express waiver of the civil action or reservation to institute it separately.
Issue:
WON a suit for civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of an accused.

Ruling:
The acquittal of the accused will not bar the claim for damages.

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. In this case there can be no civil liability. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Here, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may
be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

The instant case is under the second instance, the one that is contemplated in Article 29 of the
Civil Code, wherein one can maintain a separate civil action for damages "for the same act or
omission." Even if Manalo was acquitted, he is still civilly liable because his acquittal was just
based on reasonable doubt.

NUGUID vs. NICDAO

G.R. No. 150785, September 15, 2006
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY BY ACUITTAL

Facts:
The accused, Clarita Nicdao is charged with fourteen counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Clarita Nicdao issued several checks as
security for the P1,150,000.00 she owed to Emma Nuguid. As agreed, the checks will be
deposited if Nicdao will not be able to pay her obligations. As Emma was not able to pay
allegedly, the checks were deposited but bounced. On appeal, Nicdao was acquitted because the
CA found out that the obligation of Nicdao had already been paid. As per computation, Nicdao
was already able to pay P6,980,000.00.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the acquittal of Nicdao of
the violation of B.P. 22.

Ruling:
Yes, the civil liability was likewise extinguished.

The acquittal was based on the ground that the crime was non-existent already hence there could
be no basis for the civil liability. Based on the facts, it is clear that there was already an
overpayment of the obligation due. By and large, the obligation of Nicdao has already been
extinguished long before the encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for
account only when there is still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing
obligation was extinguished after full payment was made by Nicdao.

PEOPLE vs. AGACER, G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT
Facts:

Florencio Agacer together with the other accused was convicted for the crime of murder. They
appealed their conviction. While the case was pending with the SC, Florencio died.

Issue:
What will happen to the civil liability of Florencio?

Ruling:

The civil liability is likewise extinguished just like the criminal liability.
It is settled that upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal.

PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994

DEATH AS A MODE OF EXTINGUISMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY
Facts:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually convicted. Pending
appeal of his conviction the accused died. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of
the appeal but then required the Solicitor General to file its comment on Bayotas’ civil liability
arising from the crime. The SolGen relied on the case of People v. Sendaydiego, et al, saying that
the civil liability may proceed.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability.

Ruling:
Bayotas’ civil liability is extinguished. The controlling statute in this case is Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code. The provision states that death extinguishes the criminal aspect. In the case
at bar, there was no reservation of an independent civil action against the accused; the criminal
and civil aspects are therefore considered as instituted in the criminal action. Since the civil
action was anchored with the criminal case then it follows that the death dissolves both civil and
criminal liability.

CANCIO vs. ISIP, G.R. No. 133978, November 12, 2002

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
Facts:

The accused, Emerencia Isip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also known as
the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to
the check being deposited after 90 days from the date written on the check. The other two cases
of B.P. 22 that were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga were dismissed
due to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime.

Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. After
failing to present its second witness, the prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case but the
prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The
court granted the reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice
to the civil action. Later on, Cancio filed a civil case for the collection of the sum of money,
seeking to recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Isip then filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res
Judicata.

Issue:
WON the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal of the criminal
case of estafa.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action was
made by the prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.

In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual. The cause of action was
the breach of the respondent’s breach of the contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was
seeking to make good the value written on the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not
anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it is
distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed
regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.

HEIRS OF GUARING vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 108395, March 7, 1997
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL
Facts:

This is a case filed by the heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., for damages, based on quasi delict, in
the Regional Trial Court of Manila as against Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver,
Angeles Cuevas.

The trial court find them at fault, and hold them solidarily liable for damages to the heirs of
Guaring Jr. They appealed the case to the CA.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered the on the strength of a decision rendered
by the Regional Trial Court at San Fernando, Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the
bus driver Angeles Cuevas of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and double
homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners’ action was the alleged
negligence of the bus driver, the latter’s acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil
case based on quasi delict untenable.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his acquittal.

Ruling:

The CA was wrong. It should have observed the rule that the criminal action is separate and
distinct to that of the civil case.
This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is important
because the criminal court appears to have based its decision, acquitting the bus driver on the
ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it perceived to be relative capacity for observation of
the prosecution and defense witnesses. The case should be remanded to the CA so that it may
render another decision in accordance with the law and evidence. The issues raised by heirs of
Guarin are essentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is the function of the
Court of Appeals in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in
this Court.

VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO, G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)
Facts:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured
cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of
55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to the
effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and
“More”, all manufactured by Fortune, as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand
subject to the 55% Ad Valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands
were already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that
the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property
without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part,
Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope
of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. According to her, under Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil
liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence.

Issue:
Whether or not an independent civil action under Article 32 of the Civil Code would prosper
against the petitioner.

Ruling:
The complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive provision
thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code and not the administrative code.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxx

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

xxx

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

xxx

Under the said article, it is not just public officers but also private individuals who can be civilly
liable for violation of the rights enumerated therein. It is not necessary that the defendant under
this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main
purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation
of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular
specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is,
a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of
public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil
Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same
Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress
from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared
thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising
from errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision
which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of
constitutional rights.

COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)
Facts:
Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several racehorses which
he entered in the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his
horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and
winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the winnings
were being withheld on the advice of Presidential Commission on Good Government
Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz.
The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O. Carrascoso, offered to
give back the winnings but it was refused by the petitioner for the reason that the matter is
already in court. The trial court held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings
since there was no writ of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso feared that if
he did not withhold the winning he would be liable for neglect of duty. Carrascoso maintained
that bad faith did not attend his acts therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso
stated that he returned the principal amount of the winning evidencing his good faith.

Issue:
Whether or not Eduardo Cojuangco is entitled to damages for the violation of his constitutional
rights to due process.

Ruling:
Yes, Eduardo Cojuangco is entitled for damages under art. 32(6) of the NCC.

The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in accordance with Article 32 of
the Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code provides that any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages, in this case the right against deprivation of property without due process
of law.

Although Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as

arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice because he had particularly
sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued
against the properties of petitioner, still that will not excuse him from being civilly liable. Bad
faith is not necessary in praying for damages in Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under the Article, it
is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough
that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties.

A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for
the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any
such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the
showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. The
withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order
clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO, G.R. No. 182976, January 14, 2013
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)
Facts:
Pablito M. Castillo and Guia S. Castillo are spouses engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrication
under the name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprise.
In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi , Fully Phased
Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect Permanent Lights electric meter. Upon
inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the electric meter was tampered and right
there and then took down the meter. Later on, it was found out that indeed the meter has been
tampered with. The Meralco presumed it was the spouses. Thereafter, a new meter was installed
but the spouses noticed that it was shockingly high. They complained but Meralco kept on billing
them unrecorded electric consumption and so they filed a case for injunction and demanded their
overpayment and the return of their old meter.

During the trial it was found out that Meraclo violated RA 7832 which reads:
SEC. 4. Prima Facie Evidence.–(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances
shall constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the
person benefitted thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the
electric utility to such person after due notice, x x x
 (iv) The presence of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter, or mutilated, altered,
or tampered meter recording chart or graph, or computerized chart, graph, or log;

xxxx

(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances,
in order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by an
officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB).

Issue:
Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of the constitutional rights
of the respondent.

Ruling:
There is here violation of the constitutional right of the spouses to due process which entitles
them for civil damages under Art. 32 of the NCC.

The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into the
essence of due process. The High Court said it cannot allow Meralco to act virtually as
prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering.
That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that derives its
power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be
equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.

Absent any showing that an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB
personally witnessed and attested to the discovery of Permanent Light’s tampered electric meter,
such discovery did not constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity that justifies
immediate disconnection of electric service.

Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 4, RA 7832
requires due notice to the person benefited before disconnection of electricity can be effected.
Specifically, Section 6 of RA 7832 calls for prior written notice or warning.

With that constitutional violation to due process, the spouses are entitled to damages.

ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.

G.R. No. 150256, March 25, 2004
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)
Facts:
This is a case for damages filed by Catalino Arafiles against the publisher Philippine Journalists
Inc, Manuel Villareal Jr., Editor Max Buan Jr. and reporter Romy Morales. Morales wrote a
report that appeared on People’s Journal Tonight, which related how Emelita Despuig, was
forcibly abducted and raped. The article reads:

GOVT EXEC RAPES COED

By ROMY MORALES

A PRETTY coed, working as a grant-in-aid scholar at a Manila university and as an office

worker at a government office in Quezon City, was raped by her boss, a government agency
director, last March 15, but afraid to lose her job and of being harmed she chose to keep her
ordeal to herself.

Last night, the government man, a director of the National Institute of Atmospheric
Science, a branch of PAGASA, again abducted the girl after following her around, forcing her
into his car and locking her up in a Malate motel.

This time, however, the girl was not to be raped as easily as the first time, when the man
used chloroform in forcing her into submission.

The girl fought like a tigress, alerting roomboys at the Flamingo Motel at corner Carolina
and Quirino Ave. Perhaps as a ploy, motel personnel called up the room and told the man
some Capcom soldiers were waiting for them outside.

The call saved the girl from being raped the second time around.

Her abductor immediately left the motel, with the girl in tow, and then dropped her off
somewhere in Ermita.

When the man had gone, the girl took a taxi and went straight to the Western Police District
and filed a complaint.

The girl, 20-year-old Emilita Arcillano (not her real name), said she was first raped last
March 15 by her boss whom she identified as a certain Director Catalino Arafiles.

She recalled that while waiting for a ride at Plaza Miranda, Arafiles alighted from his
Volkswagen Beetle, dragged her inside and then pressed a cotton with chloroform on her
mouth and nose.

When she regained consciousness she was already inside the Flamingo Motel, already
raped, she said.

She said Arafiles told her not to report the matter or she would lose her job and she and her
family would be harmed.

When the act was to be repeated last night, Emilita decided to fight. Nanlaban ako at
nagsisigaw at sinabi kong mabuti pang patayin na lang niya ako, Emilita told Pat. Benito
Chio of WPD General Assignments Section.

She said the suspect abducted her at the corner of Taft Ave. and United Nations Ave. at
about 9:15 last night.

When Arafiles was told Capcom soldiers were waiting for them outside the Flamingo Motel,
he allegedly paid P100 each to four roomboys to help him go out through a side gate.
The police will pick up Arafiles for questioning today.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Arafiles instituted the complaint for damages, alleging that on account of the “grossly malicious
and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item”, his reputation as a director of NAIS was
injured, that he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-
crazed stalker and serial rapist and that the news deferred his promotion. He further alleged that
the police blotter which was the sole basis for the news item plainly shows that there was only
one count of abduction and rape reported by Emelita. The report however was just based on the
account of Emelita who was interviewed by Romy Morales.

The publisher, editor, and reporter, for their defense said that the news item, having been sourced
from the Police Blotter which is an official public document and bolstered by a personal
interview of the victim is therefore privileged and falls within the protective constitutional
provision of freedom of the press

Issue:
Whether or not the article published constitute a libelous material, which would make the editors
liable for defamation.

Ruling:
The publisher, editor, and the reporter are not liable for damages.

The complaint is based on Art. 33 of the NCC in relation to Art. 19 and 21.

In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge,
explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context.
Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken
in its entirety.

The presentation of the news item subject of complaint may have been in a sensational manner,
but it is not per se illegal.

Romy and the others, could, of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as
the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain
director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding
paragraphs (in which Arafiles and complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently
convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita
had reported at the police headquarters.
In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the
importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.
The right of Arafiles to enjoy a good name and reputation had not been violated here. There is
likewise no abused of the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway
and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in
our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race
with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be
held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of
words. (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, this Court finds that case against respondents has not been sufficiently established by
preponderance of evidence.

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES vs. ARGOS

G.R. No. 130362, September 10, 2001
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)
Facts:
In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the corporations’ operation in the
Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director. Merlin J. Argos and
Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director respectively of the International
Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) reported directly to Costa. Later on, they had serious
differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant, Argos and Pineda
agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim on
December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a Personnel Announcement which described
respondents as persona non grata and urged employees not to have further dealings with them.
On July 1, 1994, Argos and Pineda filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of
two Informations against Costa docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9917 and 9918 with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila.

On March 31, 1995, Argos and Pineda filed a civil case for damages filed and docketed as Civil
Case No. 65026 at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and IFFI, in its
subsidiary capacity as employer. IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Argos
and Pineda failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action when they filed the
criminal case. Also, IFFI insisted that under the RPC, an employer only becomes liable upon
conviction of the accused employee and proof of his insolvency.
Issue:
Whether or not the case against IFFI for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent
civil action would prosper.

Ruling:
No, the case against IFFI would not prosper.
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a
preponderance of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), The High court has
held that Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It
does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because
such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the
employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer
based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.

RUIZ vs. UCOL, G.R. No.L-454404, August 7, 1987

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)
Facts:
Agustina Tagaca, laundry-woman of Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against
Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In an answer to the
charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere tool used by Atty. Ruiz to get back to her because
of a case filed by Ucol’s husband against Ruiz. The administrative case however against Ucol
was dismissed. Thereafter, not content, Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol,
acting as the prosecutor, based on the alleged libelous portions of Ucol’s answer. The criminal
complaint was dismissed but Atty Ruiz, instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, filed
a separate complaint for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil action
for damages.

Ruling:
Yes, Ruiz is barred from filing a separate civil action for damages.
The right of Ruiz under Article 33 to file the civil action for damages based on the same facts
upon which he instituted the libel case is not without limitation.

Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in cases of defamation, among others,
the right to file a civil action distinct from the criminal proceedings is not without limitations.
The appeal of Ruiz is without merit as records of the trial court manifest that the suit being
charged by Ruiz to is a harassment suit based on the following grounds. (1)Ruiz had something
to do with the administrative complaint, (2) Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs.
Ucol’s answer in the administrative case after the administrative case’s dismissal, (3) Ruiz acted
as a private prosecutor in the criminal case actively handling as a lawyer the very case where he
was the complainant, and (4) After Ucol was acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols
by filing a civil action for damages.
BARREDO vs. GARCIA, G.R. No. 48006, July 8, 1942
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)
Facts:

This is a civil case filed by Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the victim of a
vehicular accident as against Fausto Barredo being the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Pedro Fontanilla, the driver at fault. The basis of obligation is that imposed in article
1903* of the Civil Code by reason of Barredo’s negligence in the selection or supervision of his
servant or employee.
A head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis resulting to the death of one of the carretela’s passenger,
16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted. The court in the criminal case granted the petition
that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.

On the basis of this reservation, the parents of the victim filed a civil case as against the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla (Barredo). Barredo questions
the filing of the civil case inasmuch as there was no award of the civil damages in the criminal
case against Fontanilla. He insisted that under the RPC, his liability is just subsidiary. Since
there was no civil liability adjudged against his driver, then he cannot be liable for any damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed by his employee.

Ruling:
Barredo is primarily liable for the negligent act of his employee..

The cause of action is based on article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent
employers. Under this article, employers are directly and principally liable for the acts
committed by their employees. In this case, the right to litigate a separate civil action was
reserved in the criminal case hence it is expected that no civil liability has been adjudged as
against the driver. The responsibility under this article is imposed on the occasion of a crime or
fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence
or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher,
etc., that is why this is independent of the criminal action. Had Garcia not reserved his right to
file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable under the provision
of the RPC. It must be noted that Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal
act, but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee under Article 1903.
*now art 2180 in relation to art 2176.

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY vs. TANGCO, G.R. No. 165732, December 14, 2006
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch,
Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advice of the bank's cashier as she would sign a
specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the
bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly,
Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing
her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, and
reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon
City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide.
Thereafter, Tangco filed with the Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages
against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard.
The CA on appeal decided that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable. It held that the applicable
provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi - delicts,
but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
WON the SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY is liable for damages under quasi-delicts or
under the RPC.

Ruling:

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY is directly and primarily liable under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article
31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of
these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission or under both causes. Here the heirs of the Evangeline chose culpa aquiliana under art.
2180 in relation to Art 2176, the conviction or acquittal of the accused therefore is immaterial
under this provision. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the security agency
to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.

CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125646, September 10, 1999
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
Facts:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
separated from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be
converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City
of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan
in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.
Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15,
1997.Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to
suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC
on June 19, 1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta
called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the
proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case.
Hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall
have been finally decided by the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled due to a prejudicial question of territory.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of prejudicial questions and
that the suspension or cancellation of the plebiscite be granted. A case involving a boundary
dispute between Local Government Units presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held. While it may
be the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does
not come into play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well
suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked to
the first.

A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified
by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily because
territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such issue is
resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only
be an exercise in futility.

Pulido vs People, GR No. 220149, July 27, 2021

(a void marriage can be a defense in a bigamy case)

(The parties are not required to obtain a Judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a void ab initio first
and subsequent marriages in order to raise it as a defense in a bigamy case. The same rule now applies
to all marriages celebrated under the Civil Code and the Family Code. Article 40 of the Family Code did
not amend Article 349 of the RPC, and thus, did not deny the accused the right to collaterally attack the
validity of a void ab initio marriage in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

A declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or subsequent marriages obtained by the accused in a
separate proceeding, irrespective of the time within which they are secured, is a valid defense in the
criminal prosecution for bigamy.)

Facts:

Pulido married twice. His first marriage was celebrated during the effectivity of the New Civil Code while
the second marriage was celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code. He was charged for
bigamy. During the pendency of his bigamy case, he instituted a petition to have his first marriage
declared void and was later on approved. He contends that there was no marriage license that was
issued in his first marriage as per certification from the LCR. The second marriage was declared void ab
initio because of being bigamous.

Question:

(A) Does the subsequent declaration of the nullity of the first and second marriages constitute a valid
defense in bigamy?

(B) Will a petition for the declaration of a void marriage be a prejudicial question in a bigamy case?
(C ) Will it also include even if the ground is psychological incapacity?

Held:

(A)

Yes. Article 40 of the FC applies only for purposes of remarriage. In a criminal prosecution for bigamy,
the parties may still raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity.

In this case, Pulido’s first marriage was celebrated when the New Civil Code was in effect, while his
second marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code. For purposes of remarriage,
he is required to obtain a judicial decree of absolute nullity of his prior void ab initio marriage. However,
in the bigamy case he may raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity. This is so because one of the elements of bigamy is the existence
of two valid marriages. If either one of the marriages is void ab initio, then there is no other marriage to
speak of, and there would be no basis for bigamy. The accused in a bigamy case should not be denied
the right to interpose the defense of a void ab initio marriage, which effectively retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the first marriage.

(B)

With the above discussion, it is clear that a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
a prejudicial question in a bigamy case. (same reason)

(C) Yes, SC said that the Family Code specifically provides that certain marriages are considered void ab
initio namely, Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 44 and 53. (Article 36 pertains to marriages which are void due to
psychological incapacity of either or both parties) Void marriages, like void contracts, are inexistent from
the very beginning. To all legal intents and purposes, the void ab initio marriage does not exist and the
parties thereto, under the lens of the law, were never married.

With this, it declared to abandon its earlier rulin9s (including that of Tenebro) that a judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages cannot be raised as a defense by the accused in a
criminal prosecution for bigamy. It held that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to
prove void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a declaration of
absolute nullity of the first and/or subsequent marriages obtained by the accused in a separate
proceeding, irrespective of the time within which they are secured, is a valid defense in the criminal
prosecution for bigamy.

Query:
In case the first marriage was not declared void but only the second marriage because it was bigamous,
can it be used as a defense?

Ans:

No, as there are two valid marriages here. The elements of a valid marriage are all existing here for both
marriages except only for the existence of the first marriage.

THE DOCTRINE UNDER THESE CASES WERE ABANDONED ALREADY. THE CASE OF PULIDO NOW APPLIES

BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

MERCED vs. DIEZ, G.R. No. L-15315, August 26, 1960

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

DONATO vs. LUNA, G.R. No. L-53642, April 15, 1988

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

------End of discussion------