Tres Articulos Lateralizacion

History of Psychology © 2016 American Psychological Association
2016, Vol. 19, No. 4, 259 –273 1093-4510/16/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hop0000035
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BRAIN

The Politics of Split-Brain Research in the 1970s–1980s
Michael E. Staub
Baruch College, City University of New York
In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, theories derived from neuropsychological
research on the bisected brain came rapidly to achieve the status of common sense in
the United States and Canada, inflecting all manner of popular and academic discus-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
sion. These theories often posited that the right hemisphere was the seat of creative
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
expression, whereas the left hemisphere housed rationality and language. This article
analyzes the political and cultural implications of theories about the split brain. Gender
relations, educational reform, management theory, race relations, and countercultural
concepts about self-expression all quickly came to be viewed through the lens of
left-brain/right-brain neuropsychological research. Yet these theories were often con-
tradictory. On the one hand, some psychophysiological experiments premised that the
brain was inherently plastic in nature, and thus self-improvement techniques (like
mindfulness meditation) could be practiced to unfurl the right hemisphere’s intuitive
potentialities. On the other hand, other psychophysiological experiments concluded that
Native Americans as well as African Americans and persons from “the East” appeared
inherently to possess more highly developed right-brain talents, and therefore suffered
in the context of a left-hemisphere-dominated Western society. In both instances,
psychologists put neuroscientific research to political and social use. This article thus
connects a story from the annals of the neurosciences to the history of psychological
experimentation. It analyzes the critical impact that speculative ideas about the split
brain were to have not only on the post-1960s history of psychology but also on what
soon emerged after the 1990s as the social neuroscience revolution.
Keywords: neurosciences, race relations, education reform, self-help and popular

psychology, counterculture
In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, a sin- or to state openly that one’s rational left brain
gular development within the neurosciences was simply too dominant and needed to be
swept unexpectedly both into the rarified world mellowed. Influential psychologists as well as
of academia and into the popular mainstream. many leading public intellectuals in a variety of
This was the split-brain craze, sometimes disciplines across the humanities and hard sci-
known as “dichotomania,” and it extrapolated ences contributed to these remarkable develop-
from research findings regarding a single neu- ments, as did well-regarded general interest
roanatomical fact about the mammalian brain— magazines and journals like Scientific American
namely, that it is divided into a right and a left and the New York Times Magazine.
hemisphere— only then to make an incredible In 1976, for instance, iconoclastic manage-
range of claims about what the two hemispheres ment guru Henry Mintzberg effused (in the
could (or could not) do.1 It became customary pages of the Harvard Business Review) that
in the course of these decades to voice a desire split-brain research had “great implications for
to access one’s own right-brain intuitive talents both the science and art of management.” He
declared that management theorists too fre-
quently neglected the creative capacities of
“well developed right-hemispheric processes,”
This article was published Online First May 23, 2016.
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Michael E. Staub, Department of English, Baruch
1
College, City University of New York, 55 Lexington Ave- Neuropsychologist Marcel Kinsbourne is credited with
nue, New York, NY 10010. E-mail: Michael.staub@baruch coining the term “dichotomania” to denote split-brain the-
.cuny.edu orizing “in its excesses” (as cited in Galin, 1979, p. 23).
259
260 STAUB
choosing to focus instead on “the logical, linear What are we to make of this episode in the
functions” that resided in the human brain’s left annals of psychology and neuroscience? There are
hemisphere. “Did you ever wonder why some (at least) three ways one could read it. The first
things come so easily and others seem so diffi- way might observe that although the excitement
cult, why sometimes you just cannot get your was enormous for a decade, there were already a
brain to work?” Mintzberg rhetorically in- few skeptical voices at the height of the fascina-
quired. “Maybe the problem is not that you are tion with split-brain research, and after the wave
stupid or tired, but that you are tackling a prob- crested in the first half of the 1980s, the enthusi-
lem that taxes the least developed hemisphere of asm for this research dissipated quite rapidly. In
your brain” (Mintzberg, 1976, pp. 57–58). this version, one could easily tell the phenomenon
Such pronouncements on the virtues of right- of the culture-wide fascination with split-brain
brain thinking were hardly limited to the question theories within the paradigm of the hype cycle
of how to make it in the corporate world. Psychol- (often called the “Gartner hype cycle”). The idea
ogist Julian Jaynes hypothesized in The Origins of here is that in many areas of scientific research
Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral (e.g., genetics, stem cell), a new discovery can
Mind (1976) that schizophrenia could be traced initially trigger breathless, overblown claims
to the asymmetric hemispheres of the brain and (along with a sharp spike in funding), only then to
that the voices heard by schizophrenics emanated be followed by dramatic disillusionments and ex-
from the right temporal cortex. These voices had tended intraexpert debates before scientists settle
become stigmatized in the course of human his- down and arrive at more modest— but also more
tory and were now largely taken to signal mental stable— expectations (Fenn & Raskino, 2008).
illness. However, Jaynes averred, the hallucina- Another story one could tell involves the ever-
tory voices heard by schizophrenics should be challenging question about how best conceptually
interpreted as “the voices of the gods” because it to relate the brain and the world. One might sur-
was entirely possible “that there exists [a] vestigial mise that a turn toward the neurobiological in this
godlike function in the right hemisphere” (Jaynes, era could all too easily mean leaving attention to
1976, pp. 404 – 405). Jaynes’s book was a great social contexts aside, or indeed imply right-wing
commercial success and was nominated for a Na- politics—as, for instance, The Bell Curve would
tional Book Award in Contemporary Thought. (It soon do (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Yet, in fact,
has remained in print to the present day.) many of the key players in this split-brain craze
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were were passionately progressive in intent and—
numerous advice manuals that urged persons to although occasionally flakey, even mystical in
learn to utilize both hemispheres of their brain. tone—particularly concerned with social justice
for ethnic and racial minorities. Indeed, the effort
People should engage in whole-brain thinking
to make split-brain theorizing effective specifi-
and not neglect the untapped potentialities of
cally for education reform led to quite concrete
their right brain. An entire shelf of self-help
curricular experiments—some of which (albeit in
split-brain books appeared; these included The
adapted form) continue to inform innovative ped-
Tao Jones Averages: A Guide to Whole-Brained
agogical approaches to this day (especially by
Investing (1983), Whole-Brain Thinking: Work-
those adamantly opposed to the damaging trends
ing from Both Sides of the Brain to Achieve
set in motion by the federal No Child Left Behind
Peak Job Performance (1984), and Intuitive Act of 2001).2 Yet a third interpretation of this
Management: Integrating Left and Right Brain
Management Skills (1984). There were also
2
(still-in-print) titles like Teaching for the Two- No Child Left Behind was the culmination of a trend in
Sided Mind: A Guide to Right Brain/Left Brain education policy taking shape through the 1990s. It used
incentives and sanctions in an attempt to pressure schools to
Education (1983) and Drawing on the Right improve student outcomes in reading and mathematics. In
Side of the Brain: A Course in Enhancing Cre- fact, however, it ended up failing to remediate the achieve-
ativity and Artistic Confidence (1979), which ment gap between lower and higher income students and
has sold more than 2 million copies worldwide. created an atmosphere of “teaching to the test” while reduc-
ing support for instruction in history, science, and the arts
Marketed as an asset to anyone in pursuit of an (precisely the areas which could have helped students de-
extra edge (at work or in life more generally), velop their reading and math abilities as well). See the
split-brain theory became a lucrative business. chapter “NCLB: Measure and Punish” in Ravitch (2010).
THE POLITICS OF SPLIT-BRAIN RESEARCH 261
episode not only would note how powerfully the mals (e.g., monkeys and cats), this not only
metaphors of left- and right-brain thinking have “prevented the spread of learning and memory
stuck with the general public but also would con- from one to the other hemisphere,” it also “was
sider how significant a preparatory phase the split- as if each of the separated hemispheres had a
brain craze was to become for the subsequent complete amnesia for the experience of the
dissemination of brain-talk and “brainhood”—the other, as if each had its own independent per-
idea that the brain is “the location of the ‘modern’ ceiving, learning, and memory systems”
self”—that has made the public conversant as well (Sperry, 1962, p. 46). Sperry began tentatively
with such brain regions as the hippocampus, the to propose that the two hemispheres of the
amygdala, and the prefrontal cortex (Vidal, 2009). mammalian brain were “special and nonsym-
All three of these versions have merit. metrical” (p. 47). At another moment, Sperry
had declared, even more emphatically, “In these

The Return of Split-Brain Research respects it is as if the animals had two separate
brains” (Sperry, 1961, p. 1749).
Theories of the split brain in humans were not It was in the early 1960s as well that Sperry,
new developments in the 1970s and 1980s (Har- now based at the California Institute of Tech-
rington, 1987). More than a century earlier, nology (hereafter, “Caltech”), and with the as-
French surgeon Paul Broca reported that pa- sistance of psychologist Michael S. Gazzaniga,
tients with brain lesions in the left frontal lobe and under the supervision of neurosurgeons Jo-
experienced a loss of speech. Consequently, seph E. Bogen and Philip J. Vogel, conducted
Broca posited that the left hemisphere was research with a human subject who suffered
likely the location in the brain for language. from epilepsy and who had consented to a com-
Karl Wernicke, a German neurologist, also pro- missurotomy. Bogen proposed that cutting the
posed that the left side of the brain controlled patient’s corpus callosum might prevent the ep-
speech and language functions. More research ilepsy from spreading between the brain’s hemi-
concerning the lateralization of cerebral facul- spheres. The surgery worked—it halted the pa-
ties soon followed. Based on his clinical obser- tient’s seizure activity. The patient afterward
vations, British neurologist John Hughlings told Sperry that he felt better than he had in
Jackson suggested in the 1860s and 1870s that
years. But the brain surgery also resulted in
the brain’s right hemisphere was the site of
“impairments,” such as an inability to “cross-
visual ideation. During the next several decades
locate with either hand across to the other”
and into the first half of the 20th century, re-
(Gazzaniga, Bogen, & Sperry, 1962, p. 1766).
search into hemispheric specialization signifi-
There was a similar difficulty with regard to
cantly subsided, although important work was
done by the German neurologist Hugo Liep- visual perception. Sperry concluded that now,
mann to establish the role of the left hemisphere in a human patient, there was compelling evi-
in purposive motor activity and to reconceive dence that “the separated hemispheres were
the functioning of the corpus callosum (the neu- each unaware of activity going on in the other in
ral fibers that connected the two cerebral hemi- the case of those functions that are highly lat-
spheres).3 eralized” (p. 1767).
In 1940, the first split-brain surgery, or cere- Sperry and his team subsequently went
bral commissurotomy, was performed. This in- through a several-year phase in which they
volved the severing of a monkey’s corpus cal- mused about the various possible implications
losum (see Akelaitis, 1941; Van Wagenen & of the fact that humans did not so much have a
Herren, 1940). In the course of the 1950s, neu- split brain as a doubled one— or continued to
ropsychologist Roger W. Sperry at the Univer- mull how the two halves differed. In 1964,
sity of Chicago and his graduate student Ronald Sperry published the results of his experiments
E. Myers conducted split-brain studies on cats, on the bisected brain in Scientific American.
which confirmed that the corpus callosum Here, he presented the hypothesis that the “two
served to transfer visual data from one hemi-
sphere to the other (see, for instance, Myers & 3
For more on the 19th-century history of the split-brain
Sperry, 1958). Sperry further observed that paradigm and Liepmann’s findings, see also Harrington
when the corpus callosum was severed in ani- (1985, 1995).
262 STAUB
halves of the mammalian brain are mirror twins, globe intuitively grasped the inherent duality of
each with a full set of centers for the sensory human nature (Bogen, 1969b, p. 156). He ar-
and motor activities of the body,” and that when gued that individuals possessed of a “technical
the connection between these halves had been proficiency in music, drawing or writing” none-
severed, “either half of the brain can to a large theless often produced art “devoid” of genuine
extent serve as a whole brain” (Sperry, 1964, intuitive talent because “creativity requires
pp. 42, 52). Gazzaniga, meanwhile—with rather more than technical skills and logical thought.”
contrary emphases—affirmed that in adults He hypothesized that “certain kinds of left
there was a high level of “hemispheric inequal- hemisphere activity may directly suppress cer-
ity,” and that the right hemisphere handled non- tain kinds of right hemisphere action,” and that
verbal cues, whereas the left hemisphere man- there may be “a physiological basis” for the
aged language abilities (Gazzaniga, 1967, p. “failure” of some people “to develop fresh in-
24).4 And Jerre Levy, another psychologist who sights (in the sense of new understanding of the
studied with Sperry at Caltech, argued that there outside world).” Thus, and according to Bogen,
might be evolutionary reasons for the “differen- the left hemisphere exerted an “inhibitory ef-
tial perceptual capacities” of the right and left fect” on intuition and creative processes (Bogen
hemispheres of the brain (Levy-Agresti & & Bogen, 1969, pp. 200 –202). The romancing
Sperry, 1968, p. 1151). Levy additionally as- of the right hemisphere had officially begun.
serted that the female brain might be less later-
alized than the male brain, and that this, in turn, We Are Left-Brained or Right-Brained
interfered with women’s spatial abilities (Levy,
1972). Psychologists in the United States and in Widespread fascination during the 1970s and
Canada continued to pursue and promote 1980s with split-brain research may be taken as
Levy’s theory about “sex and the single hemi- yet one further instance of what Kaiser and
sphere” throughout the 1970s (Goleman, 1978; McCray (2016) have labeled “groovy science.”
Witelson, 1976). The allure of split-brain theories may also be
However, it was the neurosurgeon Joseph interpreted as part of the broader “anti-
Bogen who did more than anyone to articulate modernist lament” during and immediately after
and popularize concepts specifically about the the 1960s, as Harrington (2008) has identified
brain’s right hemisphere. Bogen’s ideas meshed (p. 206). However, the dynamics in this instance
well with the countercultural mood of the his- represent an even more complicated confluence
toric moment. Between the years 1969 and of countercultural impulses and neuropsycho-
1972, Bogen published a multipart essay, enti- logical sciences. Hard science was offering new
tled “The Other Side of the Brain,” that no evidence for perspectives that were already
doubt gained notoriety because of its author’s widely held. The heyday of split-brain research
stature as a physician on Sperry’s team. “What arrived precisely at the moment of “the notori-
is the right hemisphere for, in the human ous ‘Zen boom’” (as the popularizer Alan Watts
scheme of things?” became Bogen’s overarch- labeled it)—a moment primed to identify neu-
ing question. At least, at first, Bogen remained rological findings through a countercultural lens
tentative: (Watts, 1972, p. 248). Watts had himself called
early and often for “a cross-fertilization of
We do not yet understand how the one hemisphere Western science with an Eastern intuition,” and
produces language; but of the other hemisphere we do
not even know what it is producing . . . The lesser
research into the bisected brain appeared very
known and hence more fruitful area for investigation of much to be an answer to that call (Watts, 1966,
mental activity is that carried out by the other side of p. x). Similarly, as another sympathetic account
the brain. (Bogen, 1969a, p. 105) summarized, a belief that “the Eastern person
interprets the world as whole/one, while the
Bogen went on to claim that the right hemi-
Western person interprets it as unjointed de-
sphere was the seat of musical ability as well as
tails” had been in circulation among Zen pro-
artistic and creative talents.
ponents long “before split-brain research be-
Bogen soon pushed his speculations into far
woollier terrain. He noted that persons who
lived in “the East” and tribal peoples around the 4
Also see Gazzaniga (1970).
came popular” in the United States (Zion & public awareness about how to unlock whole-
Raker, 1986, p. 37). According to this frame of brain potential. Ornstein really got the word out
reference, what neuroscientific experimentation and, in the first years of the 1970s, became the
confirmed was the esoteric wisdom of ancient right brain’s first true evangelist.
non-Western philosophies. Ornstein’s theories emerged from the psy-
“Two very different persons inhabit our chophysiological experiments he had conducted
heads,” dramatically opened science reporter on right hemispheric activation in his university
Maya Pines in 1973 in the New York Times lab. Assisted by psychiatrist David Galin, Orn-
Magazine, “One of them is verbal, analytic, stein attached electrodes to the right and left
dominant. The other is artistic but mute, and sides of the scalps of “normal people” (that is,
still almost totally mysterious” (Pines, 1973a, p. subjects who had not had surgery to sever their
32). Pines noted further that the “sudden surge corpus callosum) so that they might record their
of interest” in the “nonspeaking side of the subjects’ electroencephalography (EEG) pat-
human brain” was “probably no accident at a terns while they accomplished various tasks
time” when widespread fascination with the (like writing a letter or constructing a block
nearly “nonverbal disciplines” of yoga and design from memory). When subjects per-
meditation were “enjoying such a vogue” (p. formed a language task, there was more left-
32). With mention to the split-brain research of hemispheric involvement; when they performed
Sperry, Gazzaniga, and Bogen, Pines wrote, a spatial task, there was more right-hemispheric
“We know almost nothing about how the right engagement. Having demonstrated that EEG re-
hemisphere thinks, or how it might be educated— sults differed depending on the tasks performed,
and we have just begun to discover how much it Ornstein and Galin went on to hypothesize that
contributes to the complex, creative acts of man” “in most ordinary activities we simply alternate
(p. 32). Pines asserted that persons who wished to
between cognitive modes rather than integrating
improve the rational and literate or intuitive and
them,” and they concluded with the anticipation
creative sides of their personalities might soon
that ultimately their work might facilitate “the
“learn to activate” their “left or right hemisphere
training of ordinary individuals to achieve more
voluntarily” (p. 126). Certainly, Pines observed,
precise control over their brains’ activities”
recent studies of the split brain were nothing less
than “extraordinary in their implications” (pp. 32, (Galin & Ornstein, 1972, pp. 413, 418).5 Again,
126). a key to turning on the right hemisphere might
In profiling the capacity of individuals to be meditation (Ornstein, 1973). “All meditation
jumpstart the hemispheres of their own brains, techniques are alike in that all involve a focus of
Pines cited Robert Ornstein, a psychologist at attention,” observed science journalist Marilyn
the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute at Ferguson in her book, The Brain Revolution
the University of California, San Francisco. Not (1973): “Neurologically, the focus stimulates
unlike Bogen, Ornstein proselytized that the
left-hemisphere-dominated West had too long 5
Ornstein and Galin’s concluding hope that their work
demeaned the right-hemisphere philosophies of could “enable the training of ordinary individuals to achieve
the East (see Wald, 2008). Ornstein believed more precise control over their brains’ activities” was spec-
that individuals could practice their right hemi- ulative, based on their idea that although some extant bio-
feedback efforts were directed to encouraging either “theta”
spheric skills and thereby learn effectively to or “alpha” activity, their own “development of an index of
double their mental capabilities. As Ornstein lateralized functions” might provide a basis for targeted
(1972) wrote in his best-selling The Psychology training of hemispheres (Galin & Ornstein, 1972, pp. 417–
of Consciousness, people had the capacity to 418). For a typical example of the enthusiasm of the time for
“shift from the individual, analytic conscious- biofeedback’s capability for “turning on the power of your
mind,” see Karlins and Andrews (1972). The general idea
ness to a holistic mode, brought about by train- was that electrodes placed on a person’s body (e.g., the
ing the intuitive side of ourselves” (p. 178). head, the chest, a finger) would transmit information to a
Throughout, Ornstein preached the psychologi- monitoring device and thereby alert the subject about phys-
cal and neurological benefits of techniques like iological processes of which he or she would otherwise be
unaware, and hence prompt the individual to learn to self-
Zen meditation, Sufism, and yoga. Although regulate. The belief, in the early 1970s, was that biofeed-
Bogen would soon bring the neurosciences into back could help reduce anxiety, control migraines, alleviate
politics, Ornstein did more than anyone to raise hypertension, and bring about bliss.
264 STAUB
the brain rhythmically.” Citing the research of ington, 1975, p. 14). Taken together, these psy-
Ornstein and Galin, Ferguson wrote that “in chophysiological experiments—and the
meditating subjects” there was “the possibility hypotheses derived from them—advanced a
that a new generator, another source of energy, view of the human brain as plastic; people pos-
had been activated in the brain” (Ferguson, sessed an inherent ability to effect long-term
1973, pp. 77–78). Or as psychologist Thomas physiological alterations inside their own heads.
H. Budzynski recommended in 1976, perhaps
“a combination of self-directed phrases, breath- Right-Brain Neglect
ing exercises, and the new technique of biofeed-
back” could help individuals “control and ma- A concept of neuroplasticity was less consis-
nipulate various internal states” which might tently applied, however, when the topic turned
“promote a quieting of the autonomic functions to the implications of split-brain research for
as well as the skeletal muscle system” and, thus race relations and education reform. In 1969,
in turn, “produce a relaxed, quiet, inward- Joseph Bogen remarked that persons labeled
turning state of mind” (Budzynski, 1976, p. “‘culturally disadvantaged’” most probably
364). Building on earlier theorizing that the two possessed right-hemisphere talents that “re-
halves of the brain might be competing for mained undeveloped for lack of proper school-
expression, some defenders of the right brain ing,” suggesting that environmental factors had
recommended trying to reduce left-brain activ- a profound impact on the brain’s development
ity. As Budzynski, for example, optimistically (Bogen & Bogen, 1969, p. 202). Yet in 1972,
concluded, “Perhaps the decrease in critical, Bogen went on to argue that “certain ethnic
analytical, logical linear-functioning that occurs groups” were the beneficiaries of “relatively
with a lowering arousal level is the gradual, greater development of right hemisphere poten-
functional disabling of the major [that is, left] tial.” He also proposed that the “hemispheric
hemisphere” (p. 381; cf. Bogen & Bogen, specialization” of indigenous peoples and per-
1969). sons of color was related to the fact that these
Psychophysiological experimentation and peoples had grown up in subcultures that em-
split-brain neuroscience research melded in phasized “spatial skills” and deemphasized “in-
ways that psychologists announced could tensive education of the left hemisphere poten-
change the way persons were treated for a range tial for reading, writing, grammar, etc.” Thus,
of emotional disorders. Harvard psychologist the “cultural differences” between White people
Gary E. Schwartz reported hopefully in 1975 and persons of color “can be interpreted in part
that “once the basic processes” of “hemispheric as a result of asymmetry in hemispheric utiliza-
asymmetry data” had been “isolated,” it would tion” (Bogen, DeZure, TenHouten, & Marsh,
become possible for subjects who suffered from 1972, pp. 49 –50, 58). In sum, Bogen sought—
anxiety or depression to be “trained with bio- however clumsily—to use split-brain neurosci-
feedback to regulate specific patterns of EEG ence to challenge a repressive left-brain (and
activity across the hemispheres and to relate Western and white) social order, even as he
these physiological states to specific underlying remained fuzzy as to the direction of causation
cognitive and affective experiences.” Much like at the source of the problems he had identified.
Ornstein and Galin, Schwartz suggested that A growing body of empirical research in the
subjects might well be able to produce “self- 1970s sought to bolster claims that minority
induced cognitive states” (such as “a happy groups exhibited hemispheric activity in a man-
state”) by learning how to “regulate patterns of ner that was essentially different from white
physiological activity” (Schwartz, 1975, p. and/or Western people. In 1977, the Interna-
320). And as Saturday Review observed in tional Journal of Neuroscience reported on a
1975, techniques geared to “intervening in the psychophysiological experiment that used EEG
brain’s processes” could help individuals “to recordings to map differentials in the right–left
experience our sensations more joyfully, to brain activity of 16 bilingual Hopi Indian chil-
keep ourselves mentally and physically healthy, dren. The children first listened to a story in
to learn and remember better, to ‘know who we English and then again in Hopi. The children
are’ with a greater sense of wisdom and matu- experienced “a greater right hemisphere partic-
rity, to be more creative” (Rosenfeld & Kliv- ipation in the processing of the Hopi speech.”
This finding led researchers to conclude that do poorly in a society in which a quite different array
Hopi language (said to be less abstract than of talents was needed to be successful. (cited in Orn-
stein, 1978, p. 83)6
English) and Hopi culture were more right-
hemispheric than White culture and the English No less an authority than Roger Sperry also
language (Rogers, TenHouten, Kaplan, & Gar- came to advocate for education reform on the basis
diner, 1977, p. 1). And a study published in the of split-brain research. Repeatedly in the course
journal Child Development in 1979 used a di- of the 1970s, Sperry argued that the right-brain
chotic listening test (premised on the idea that skills of children were being neglected by the
because the left ear corresponded with the right left-hemispheric emphases of American curri-
hemisphere of the brain, a full appreciation of cula. In 1973, Sperry put the matter bluntly:
emotional tones and statements was processed “What it comes down to is that modern society
principally through the left ear rather than the discriminates against the right hemisphere”
right) to determine whether Navajo and Anglo (Sperry, 1973, p. 209). In 1975, Sperry emphat-
children favored one ear or the other. The study ically underscored this point again when he
found that Navajo children had a left-ear pref- opined how “our educational system and mod-
erence, indicating (or so it was asserted) that the ern society generally (with its very heavy em-
indigenous brain processed language in their phasis on communication and on early training
right hemisphere because of a “cognitive style” in the three Rs) discriminates against one whole
in harmony with the natural world (Hynd & half of the brain” (Sperry, 1975, p. 33). Sperry
Scott, 1980; see also Scott, Hynd, Hunt, & even used the occasion of his lecture in Stock-
Weed, 1979). Again, it remained vague whether holm on being awarded the Nobel Prize in 1981
such differences were rooted principally in cul- for his research on the bisected brain to com-
ture or in biology. ment on how “the need for educational tests and
Decrying the injustices of an educational sys- policy measures to identify, accommodate, and
tem geared to left-brain (i.e., White) students serve the differentially specialized forms of in-
became a fashionable sport. In 1973, Maya dividual intellectual potential” had become “in-
Pines concluded—as if it were really just a creasingly evident” (Sperry, 1982, p. 1225).7
matter of common sense—that a growing body No doubt spurred by pronouncements like
of evidence from the neurosciences indicated these, specialists on education looked increas-
how “children from poor black neighborhoods ingly to split-brain theory for guidance on how
generally learn to use their right hemisphere far to reconceive the learning experience of stu-
more than their left—and later do badly on dents. When education psychologists at Stan-
verbal tasks” (Pines, 1973b, p. 151). Ornstein ford University in 1975 examined a student’s
and Galin delivered a paper in 1974 at the decision on where to sit in a classroom (on the
annual meeting of the American Association for left or the right side of the room), they deter-
the Advancement of Science in which they mined that this decision might be a predictor of
freely applied their research on brain lateraliza- that student’s left or right hemispheric domi-
tion to explore the relationship between socio- nance (with analytic left-brain students display-
economic inequality and the limited educational ing a preference for the right side and right-
opportunities available to right-brain students brain students selecting the left side of the
(Ornstein & Galin, 1976, p. 65). Harvard Med- room; Gur, Gur, & Marshalek, 1975). In 1976,
ical School neurologist Norman Geschwind ad- when researchers used a dichotic listening test
ditionally questioned the classification of indi-
viduals with learning difficulties, wondering 6
what, in fact, such classification might be re- Geschwind had argued already in 1974, “In an illiterate
society a lack of visual-auditory associations would not
vealing about a highly rational and literate so- seriously inconvenience anyone except in unusual situa-
ciety that lacked an appreciation of the whole tions; literacy makes this ability highly important” (Ge-
brain. Geschwind wrote in 1978 of “the child schwind, 1974, p. 229).
7
who has trouble learning to read”: For a helpful overview of the stages in Sperry’s re-
search, the scene at Caltech, and the funding streams and
My suspicion would be that in an illiterate society such professional networks that nourished his productivity— but
a child would be in little difficulty and might, in fact, also Sperry’s conviction that his split-brain work had been
do better because of his superior visual-perceptual tal- “over-interpreted, especially by non-scientists”—see Puente
ents, while many of us who function well here might (2002, p. 74).
266 STAUB
on White and Black children of various socio- child development rhetorically inquired in
economic backgrounds, they determined that 1980, “What is our loss when schools stress the
there were no innate “racial differences” in the more measurable left hemispheric mathematical
development of “cerebral dominance,” but that and verbal skills which are referred to popularly
there were “significant social class differences” as ‘the basics’ and at the same time ignore the
in how these children’s brain hemispheres de- development of ‘right brained’ intuitive think-
veloped (Borowy & Goebel, 1976, pp. 363– ing?” (Gray, 1980, p. 131).
364). And when the National Education Asso- Throughout, and strikingly, education re-
ciation of the United States that same year formers did not call for poor and minority chil-
announced how urgently important it was that dren to receive more compensatory “left-brain”
schools address the special needs of “right- education. The opposite was often the case. In
brained kids” trapped “in left-brained schools,” 1975, Joseph Bogen railed against how “the
it concluded that it was unacceptable that chil- usual justification of IQ tests is that they predict
dren be “handicapped” in their studies simply further scholastic achievement, and that the lat-
because they were actually “more proficient in ter is in turn predictive of ‘life success.’” Bogen
right hemisphere (visual) input processing” added that such efforts to predict “life success”
(Hunter, 1976, pp. 45– 48). Here, too, the ques- were “ultimately based upon a criterion of ‘suc-
tion of whether schools needed to better accom- cess’ which is not only most often measured
modate right-brain students or whether brains monetarily, but seems to depend in part upon an
were so plastic that with holistic training all analytic attitude hypertrophied by centuries of
children could develop both sides of their brains contention against nature.” The reason so many
had not been fully sorted out. students were choosing to reject traditional ap-
The unclear relationship between (supposed) proaches toward education, Bogen suggested,
right-brain preference and racial group identity was that these conventional pedagogical meth-
notwithstanding, it became commonplace to ods solely addressed students’ “left-hemisphere
hold that the right hemisphere of countless mi- potential,” while they typically and almost en-
nority and disadvantaged youngsters’ brains tirely neglected these students’ deep desire to
was getting short shrift in the setting of the “learn to live within nature as bilaterally edu-
American classroom, and that gross disinterest cated, whole persons” (Bogen, 1975/1977, p.
in right-brain learning was causing these same 146).9 Indeed, “the dominant white culture” had
children of color to flounder and fail. Repeating “almost religiously accepted the rational logical
a now-familiar argument, the New York Times modes of the left hemisphere,” as psychologist
cautioned in 1978 that “the brain’s division of Bob Samples (1976) wrote in his popular right-
labor” meant that right-brain schoolchildren brain manifesto, The Metaphoric Mind. Thus,
were being unfairly tracked into remedial class- Samples added, “minorities, locked out of the
es. “Given new insights into the nature of the contexts of the dominant culture, have been
two hemispheres of the brain,” the Times criti- falsely judged to be inferior in motivation” (pp.
cally observed, “educators should be wary 151–152). The clear goal was hemispheric
about assuming that they are dealing with a equality—not further neglect.
slow learner” (Landsmann, 1978, p. EDUC24). In a historical context in which (purported)
A liberal-left political position about dispar- genetic differences between racial groups were
ities in the American educational system be- being put forward to explain variations in IQ—
came consolidated, based almost wholly on hy- most influentially by Berkeley psychologist Ar-
pothetical notions about the split brain. In 1979, thur Jensen in his 1969 Harvard Educational
the Journal of Research and Development in Review essay, “How Much Can We Boost IQ
Education directly attacked “current individual and Scholastic Achievement?” (A. R. Jensen,
intelligence tests” that “do not begin to tap the 1969)—the invocation of split-brain research
rich resources of the right cerebral hemisphere,”
because these tests tended to discriminate 8
against “socioeconomically disadvantaged Kaufman went on to assert, “The possibility that blacks
may have some degree of preference for the right hemi-
black children” with “a right brain leaning” sphere may actually suggest an inhibiting effect on their
(Kaufman, 1979, pp. 102–103).8 And citing the scores earned on left-brain tests” (Kaufman, 1979, p. 104).
neuroscience research of Sperry, an expert in 9
Also see Thompson, Bogen, and Marsh (1979).
seemed to provide hard-science support for a or greys) are the words “logical,” “analytical,” or
(self-understood as progressive) reconceptual- “Western rationality.” More luridly etched across the
right cerebral hemisphere (perhaps in rich orange or
ization of the issues at stake in the debates about royal purple) are the words “intuitive,” “artistic,” or
race and education.10 The new excitement about “Eastern consciousness.” (Gardner, 1978, p. 113)
hemisphericity offered a kind of sideways re-
joinder that sought to break the impasse that had Or as an account from the 1980s put it in
been evolving all through the 1960s between starker terms, and based on near-incompatible
hereditarianist and environmentalist approaches— metaphors, the “widespread cult of the right
even as both sides had all too often veered into brain” had pulled down “the duplex house that
problematic and condescending assumptions Sperry built” so that there could be constructed
in its place “the K-Mart of brain science”
about maternal or cultural “deprivation” to press

(Hooper & Teresi, 1986, p. 223).
their respective cases (Raz, 2013, pp. 62–75).

Split-brain fervor left open the question of Leading neuroscientists began to speak out
whether the differences being asserted were the more generally against dichotomania. Psychol-
result of nature or nurture. Instead, the aim was to ogist and neuroscientist Michael C. Corballis
redirect the entire discussion by revaluating the succinctly wrote in 1980,“This transcendental
creative and intuitive abilities that had for so long conception of hemispheric duality is inspired
been scorned, and by calling into question the high more by age-old myths about left and right than
esteem traditionally accorded to reasoning and by the empirical evidence” (Corballis, 1980, p.
verbal facility. 287). Neurologist Joseph E. LeDoux, who had
studied with Gazzaniga, wrote in 1983 that al-
though “cerebral asymmetry has attracted much
The K-Mart of Brain Science attention in recent years,” it was nevertheless an
Not everyone, however, concurred that split- unfortunate fact that “speculation concerning
brain research had broad and positive cultural the implications of hemisphere differences has
and political implications. A few psychologists gone well beyond the data” (LeDoux, 1983, p.
argued from the start that the claims being made 212).11 Gazzaniga was more harshly dismissive.
by split-brain advocates were distortions of real “It’s pure nonsense,” he reflected, in 1985,
science. A small backlash against the split-brain about claims concerning the talents of the right
paradigm took shape. Cognitive psychologist hemisphere. He sarcastically added,
Robert D. Nebes, who had trained with Sperry The simple fact is that you don’t have to invoke one
at Caltech, complained already in 1975, cent’s worth of experimental psychological data or
“Lately, everything from creativity and imagi- neuroscience to make the observation that there are
some people in this world who are terribly intuitive and
nation to the id, ESP, and cosmic consciousness creative, and some who aren’t. (cited in McKean,
have been suggested to reside in the right hemi- 1985, p. 34)
sphere.” It was, Nebes added, as if the right
hemisphere had been annexed “by countercul- Neuropsychological experiments failed to
ture groups as their side of the brain” (Nebes, replicate many of the more exuberant results
1977, pp. 104 –105). In 1977 psychologist Dan- linked to the bisected brain. One study chal-
iel Goleman (despite the fact that he had ac- lenged the reliability of dichotic listening ex-
tively promoted split-brain theory elsewhere) periments concerning asymmetry in hemi-
criticized “the hemisphere fad” because it fo- spheric responses to musical tones and verbal
mented “widespread confusion between the po- speech; the study argued that “ear preference”
etics of experience and the hard facts of brain was often arbitrary, and it calculated that 30%
function” (Goleman, 1977, p. 151). Develop- of subjects altered ear preference when retested
mental psychologist Howard Gardner expressed (Pizzamiglio, De Pascalis, & Vignati, 1974). A
weary despair at split-brain mania. “It is becom- study in the American Journal of Psychiatry
ing a familiar sight,” Gardner wrote in 1978, “did not provide support for the notion” of
sardonically adding, “structural asymmetries in schizophrenic pa-
Staring directly at the magazine reader—frequently
10
from the publication’s cover—is an artist’s rendition of For a valuable contemporary assessment of the dis-
the two halves of the brain. Written athwart the left putes unleashed by Jensen, see Cronbach (1975).
11
cerebral hemisphere (probably colored in stark blacks Also see Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978).
268 STAUB
tients,” thus casting doubt on Jaynes’s theory of actual educational settings. The instruction of
“the bicameral mind” (Andreasen, Dennert, Ol- the fine arts (e.g., art, music, theater) were
sen, & Damasio, 1982, p. 430). among the initial scholarly disciplines in which
Split-brain research that suggested that mi- split-brain research had an often profound im-
norities and White people or women and men pact on pedagogical practices, spurred in large
exhibited differential brain activation also did part by the publication of art teacher Betty Ed-
not prove to be especially robust. A study in wards’s blockbuster guidebook, Drawing on the
1981 concluded that “both the direction and Right Side of the Brain (1979). At a moment
magnitude of language laterality appear to be when budgets for the fine arts were being
identical in Anglo and Navajo persons” (Mc- slashed, neuroscientific evidence about the dis-
Keever, 1981, p. 597). A study conducted with tinctive way the right brain processed the world
bilingual Crow Indian children did not establish became a useful weapon. A view that right-
that these children’s right hemispheres were brain-stimulating activities might be used to
more dominant (Vocate, 1984). After Native assist in the teaching of (the purportedly left-
American scholar Roland Chrisjohn and neuro- hemispheric-grounded matters of) language and
psychologist Michael Peters examined all the literacy followed, as educators contended that
available split-brain studies on indigenous especially slow learners could be helped
hemispheric brain activity, they angrily wrote through the use of body movement and through
that the idea of “the right-brained Indian” rep- the incorporation of visuospatial techniques into
resented nothing more than a “pernicious myth” the instruction of reading and writing skills (Si-
(Chrisjohn & Peters, 1986). The claims ad- natra & Stahl-Gemake, 1983). Elementary and
vanced by psychologist Jerre Levy and others high schools from New Jersey to Michigan to
that the female brain might suffer from a deficit California soon began to implement what they
in spatial abilities (whereas the male brain ex- called “brain-based learning”—and school prin-
celled at these) were also met with strong skep- cipals cited strong successes after doing so
ticism. Biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling con- (Caine & Caine, 1995; Della Neve, 1985;
cluded, in 1985, that although concepts about Walker, 1995). By the early 1990s, there was
split-brain neuroscience and gender differences also much talk in education circles about psy-
remained “still in fashion,” there was in truth chologist Frances Rauscher’s so-called “Mozart
“no evidence” to support them—as in “quite effect,” that is, the cognitive benefits that ap-
simply, none whatsoever” (Fausto-Sterling, peared to result after very young children lis-
1985, p. 50).12 tened to a Mozart sonata (Rauscher, Shaw, &
Ky, 1993). Rauscher’s argument was that when
Curricular Reform children listened to classical music, it helped
to “systematize the cortical firing patterns so
Yet despite these diverse caveats, within the they can be maintained for other pattern de-
realm of education theory, split-brain thinking velopment duties, in particular, the right
was just coming into its own. Educators cited
hemisphere function of spatial task perfor-
split-brain neuropsychological research (includ-
mance” (Rauscher, Shaw, Levine, Ky, &
ing dichotic listening tests) in their defense of
Wright, 1994, p. 21). Also the potential ad-
the neurological benefits of bilingualism, just as
vantages of “whole-brain learning” for the
many public school systems were shifting away
academic performance of African Americans
from their support for bilingual programs. The
once again became, in this moment, a theme
argument was that learning two languages
in educational discourse (Walker, 1995). In
strengthened the whole brain (Krashen, 1981).
every instance, the proponents of brain-based
Already in the late 1970s, but through the 1980s
and accelerating after the publication of psy- curricular reform announced a desire that stu-
chologist Renate Caine and Geoffrey Caine’s dents be taught “in accordance with the way
highly influential Making Connections: Teach- the brain is naturally designed to learn” (E.
ing and the Human Brain (Caine & Caine, Jensen, 1995, p. 6).
1991), leading educators and psychologists ar-
ticulated a comprehensive case for applying 12
And yet these claims do persist (cf. Ecuyer-Dab &
hemisphericity research to curricular reforms in Robert, 2004).
The call to tap the potential of neuroplasticity brain’s hemispheres possessed “its own sense of
in underprivileged children has continued to self” (pp. 655, 657). In so doing, Gazzaniga
undergird much 21st-century discussion of echoed older formulations but also served to
brain-based education reform. If the brain can meld split-brain study with a broader 21st-
be rewired in the context of an enriched educa- century conversation among psychologists, his-
tional environment, or so the argument goes, torians of science, and philosophers as to the
neuroeducation—with its call for a more holis- consequences for selfhood in what has been
tic pedagogical approach—represents a power- dubbed the era of “cerebral subjects” (Ortega &
ful rebuke to a single-minded obsession with Vidal, 2007). Split-brain study— however se-
math and reading testing scores (Sousa, 2005; lectively recast— has remained in play as a key
Wolfe, 2009). In this way, neuroeducation historical reference point.

could well be said to be a step-child of right-

brain advocacy a generation earlier. Just as the
pronouncements of right-brain advocates from Conclusion
the 1970s were, so, too, the more recent asser-
tions about the brain and learning put forth by In conclusion, it is evident that the passionate
so-called neuroeducators have been promi- interest in split-brain research in the 1970s and
nently debunked as unsubstantiated and over- 1980s did not just consist of a characteristic
stated (Howard-Jones, 2014). And yet notwith- reaction of excitement, overpromising, and in-
standing such critiques, many popular creased funding flows in response to a new set
pedagogical models for holistic learning—such of discoveries. Nor is the best explanation for
as those offered by the global network of Wal- the fascination with split-brain research that it
dorf schools— continue to be represented as provided natural science justification for socio-
“provid[ing] a developmental framework cultural agendas. Yet the hemisphericity fad
aligned with the . . . neuroscience understanding was also not merely a precursor step preparing
of the development of specific systems of the the American public for the most recent trend of
brain” (Larrison, 2013, p. 65; cf. Amso & correlating brain regions to cognitive functions,
Casey, 2006). To keep pace with neuroscientific emotions, and behaviors.
progress, many key assumptions about hemi- Above all, split-brain thinking succeeded be-
spheric specialization have since been adapted cause it offered something for everyone. It
to be more attentive to the localization (not the could appeal to those who held that there were
lateralization) of skills (e.g., memory and essential differences (whether genetic or envi-
higher cognitive abilities) in specific regions of ronmental) between different ethnicities or ra-
the brain. Nonetheless, it is clear that the history cial groupings—while giving positive valua-
of split-brain research remains a crucial precur- tions to those typically underprivileged. And it
sor in terms of its ability to speak powerfully to could appeal to those who believed that brains
a broader public. In this redefined context, the- were plastic and that training could result in
ories about how to use brain science to optimize transformation and improvement.13 It could at-
the way children learn continue to find a recep- tract the financial bottom-line-oriented business
tive audience among educators. elite. But it could inspire do-gooders and ro-
Moreover, perhaps more surprisingly, and al- mantics of all stripes as well. And as limited as
though he once deemed florid speculations the science was subsequently declared to be, the
about split-brain research to be “pure non- political claims made in its name—not least
sense,” psychologist and neuroscientist Michael about the benefits of a more well-rounded edu-
Gazzaniga (2005) argued that this research was cation— have proven to be especially prescient
“still going strong.” Indeed, “what is exciting (Ravitch, 2010, p. 108). Important insights can
about the present era is that split-brain research sometimes be based on imperfect science.
is now leading the way again.” In particular,
Gazzaniga reported, split-brain research was 13
proving useful in “providing the basis for inter- For another instance in which plasticity and training
were connected with popular and expert debates over race,
preting neuroimaging results.” Yet he, too, had class, and intelligence (in the evolving uses to which per-
changed with the times, as he turned his atten- sonality psychologist Walter Mischel’s “marshmallow” ex-
tion to the question of whether each of the periments in self-control were put), see Staub (in press).
270 STAUB
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Education and the Right Hemisphere of the Brain: Thinking in Patterns for a Computer
World Hopkins, Richard L Journal of Thought; Summer 1984; 19, 2; ProQuest pg. 104
NruMrcrvncv Vol. 5. pp. 195 10 206
Pergsmon Press ltd 1980. Printed in Great BnUin
0 lBR0
~O~~ENTA~Y
MIND-BRAIN INTERACTION: MENTALISM, YES;

DUALISM, NO
R. W. SPERRY
California Institute of Technology, Division of Biology, Pasadena, CA 91125, U.S.A.
Abetract-A traditional working hypothesis in neuroscience holds that a complete account of brain
function is possible. in principle, in strictly neurophysiological terms without invoking conscious or
mental agents; the neural correlates of subjective experience are conceived to exert causal influence but
not mental qualities per se. This long established materialist-behaviorist principle has been challenged in
recent years by the introduction of a modified concept of the mind-brain relation in which conscious-
ness is conceived to be emergent and causal. ~choph~~l interaction is explained in terms of the
emergence in nesting brain hierarchies of high order, functionally derived, mental properties that interact
by laws and principles different from, and not reducible to those of neurophysiology. Reciprocal upward
and downward, interlevel determination of the mental and neural action is accounted for on these terms
without violating the principles of scientific explanation and without reducing the qualities of inner
experience to those of physiology. Interaction of mind and brain becomes not only conceivable and
~entific~ly tenable, but more plausible in some respects than were the older parahelist and identity
views of the materialist position.
This revised cpncept of consciousness as causal, with its recognition of mental phenomena as expiana-
tory constructs in science,has brought a marked change during the past decade in the scientific status of
consciousness and of mental and cognitive phenomena generally. Resultant mehtalist trends within
science have been accompanied also by a corollary rise in acceptance of various mentalist-related
concepts and dualist beliefs in the supernatural, the paranormal and in uncmbodied forms of conscious
existena that receiveno logid suppon from the new mind-brain concepts of neuroscience. Reasons are
advanced to show that our latest mind-brain model is fundamen~liy monistic and not only fails to
support dualiim but aerves to further discount fading prospects for finding dualist forms or domains of
conscious experience not embodied in a functidning brain.
THE NEW INTERACTIONXSM locus of consciousness and the support of dualism.. I

have always favored monism, and still do. Sir John
WHEN two eminent authorities of science and philoso- tells me that I am a dualist and I respond, ‘Only if the
phy, of the stature and influence of Sir John Eccles term is redefined to take on a new meaning quite
and Sir I&u1 Popper, join forces to aflirm dualistic dilTerent from what it traditionally has stood for’in
beliefs in the reality of the’supematural and the exist- philosophy.’ Dualism and monism have long repre-
ence of extraphysical, unembodied agents to challenge sented a dichotomy that offers opposing answers to
some of the most fundamental precepts of science, one one of man’s most critical and enduring concerns,
is impelled to take more than passing notice. Regard- namely, Can conscious experience exist apart from
less of one’s personal convictions and reactions, the the brain? Dualism, aflirming the existence of inde-
kind of public message that is conveyed, directly and pendent mental and physical worlds, says ‘yes’ and
indirectly, by their book The Self and Its Brain-An opens the door to a conscious after-life and to many
Argumentjbr Interactionism (Porn & ECCLES,1977) kinds of supernatural, paranormal and other-worldly
along with Eccies’s more recent volume Thp Human beliefs. Monism, on the other hand restricts its
Mystery (ECCLES,1979) and the potential impact of answers to one-world dimensions and says ‘no’ to an
these on the intellectual perspectives of our times independent existence of conscious mind apart from
become a matter of some concern. Such consider- the functioning brain.
ations, and the fact that my own views and writings In recent years there has arisen some real need to
are cited in support of some of the key concepts and change and sharpen ddinitions of certain philosophic
as being in alignment with dualist interactionism, terms to fit our new views in neuroscience. However,
prompt this effort to clarify certain points that other- in the case of monism and dualism, I see no advan-
wise leave erroneous impressions. tage in changing the dassic definitions. We greatly
Before I attempt to focus on specifics, it will help to need terms by which to distinguish the critical dicho-
mention broadly that whereas Sir John Eccles and I tomy regarding the potential separability of brain and
have similar outlooks with many highly congenial conscious experience during life as well as after. Dtut-
persP=tives, aims and values, we do, however, share lism and monism have long served this need in the
certain friendly dilTerences in regard to the nature and past and seem best qualified to continue.
Nb.C 5/2-A 195
196 R. W. SPERR’I
At the same time I am in strong agreement with still complete heresy to those of us in neuroscience
Eccles in rejecting both materialism (or physicalism) and I did not venture to push them at this conference
and reductionism-or at least what these terms pre- beyond mild reference to ‘a view that holds that con-
dominantly stood for prior to the mid-1960s. Since sciousness may have some operational and causal use’.
1965 I have referred to myself as a ‘mentalist’ and To this Eccles responded by asking ‘Why do we have
since the mid-1930s have fhmly renounced reductio- to be conscious at all? We can, in principle, explain all
nism in the philosophic. ‘nothing but’ sense to be our input-output performance in terms of activity of
explained below. However, in the case of the terms neuronal circuits; and. consequently, consciousness
‘mentalism’ and the opposing ‘materialism’, and the seems to be absolutely unnecessary’ (Eccles, 1966, p.
form of dichotomy these two imply, some change and 248). This is, of course. what we had all been taught
sharpening of definitions is now called for by our and believed for decades, not only in science but also
modified mind-brain concepts. On our new terms, (by the great majority) in philosophy. The idea that
which I will outline below, ‘mentalism’ is no longer the objective physical brain process is causally com-
synonymous with ‘dualism’ nor is ‘physicalism’ the plete in itself without reference to conscious or mental
equivalent of lonism’. By our current mind-brain forces represents the central premise of behaviorism
theory, monism has to include subjective mental and of scientific materialism in general and has long
properties as causal realities. This is not the case with served as a prime basis for the renunciation of the
physicalism or materialism which are the understood phenomena of subjective experience as explanatory
antitheses of mentalism, and have traditionally constructs in science. Eccles, however, already at the
excluded mental phenomena as causal.constructs. In time a dualist by faith, training and publication
calling myself a ‘mentalist’, I hold subjective mental (ECCLES,1953);went on to add: ‘I don’t believe this
phenomena to be primary, causally potent realities as story, of course; but at the same time, I do not know
they are experienced subjectively, different from, more the logical answer to it.’ Nevertheless, his considered
than, and not reducible to their physicochemical ele- conviction on the first point was firmly reiterated in a
ments. At the same time, I define this position and the later session, ‘I am prepared to say that as neurophy-
mind-brain theory on which it is based as monistic siologists we simply have no use for consciousness in
and see it as a major deterrent to dualism. In order to our attempts to explain how the nervous system
better explain these distinctions, it will be helpful to works.. .’ (ECCLE.S,1966, p. 250).
start at the beginning and to follow the conceptual I argued the point briefly but was not yet suffi-
developments step-by-step as they occurred. ciently versed in my new-found answer to pursue it
My long-trusted materialist logic was first shaken vigorously at the time. In the ensuing weeks and
in the spring of 1964 in preparing a nontechnical lec- months, however, in pondering the unifying role of
ture on brain evolution in which I was extending the callosal activity, the ideas kept recurring and the
concept of emergent control of higher over lower more I thought about them, the better. they looked. A
forces in nested hierarchies to include the mind-brain trial run the next April to our Caltech Division of
relation. I found myself concluding with the then- Biology convinced me that reductive neuroscience
awkward notion that emergent mental powers must and biology were not exactly ready for this kind of
logically exert downward causal control over electro- thinking. However, I decided to proceed anyway with
physiological events in brain activity. Mental forces a presentation the following month in a humanist lec-
were inferred to be equally or more potent in brain ture at the University of Chicago for the volume, New
dynamics than are the forces operating at the cellular, Views of the Nature ofMan, edited by J. hATi ( 1965).
molecular and atomic levels (SPERRY,1964). Again in For the purpose of this lecture, I worked the new
September of that year, when preparing a paper for mind-brain ideas into a discussion of holist-reduction-
the Vatican Conference on Brain and Consciousness ist issues, emergent downward control. and ‘nothing
organized by John Eccles, it occurred to me that the but’ fallacies in human value systems, in a broad refu-
functionist interpretation of consciousness that I had tation of the then prevalent ’ mechanistic, material-
outlined in the early 1950s (SPERRY,1952), and still istic, behavioristic, fatalistic, reductionistic view of the’
favor, must also logically call for a functional (and nature of mind and psyche’. It was on this occa-
therefore causal) influence of conscious experience in sion that 1 openly changed my alignment from beha-
brain activity. It was obvious that these combined viorist materialism to antimechanistic and nonreduc-
concepts, were they to hold up, would provide a new tive mentalism (-as the term ‘mentalism’ is used in
approach to the old question of how consciousness psychology in contrast to behaviorism; not, of course.
may be of functional use and exert a causal control in the extreme philosophic sense that would deny
role in brain processing. The kind of psychophysical material reality). At the same time, I described this
relation envisaged showed how mind could influence new position as a unifying scheme that ‘would elimin-
matter in the brain, making the interaction of such ate the old dualistic confusions’ in favor of ‘a single
different things as mental states and physical events “this world” measuring stick for evaluating man and
logically understandable at long last on terms that existence’.
were scientifically acceptable. The main thesis of the essay, as in the Poppe-
In the mid-sixties, such interactionist concepts were Eccles book, was psychophysical interaction, its logi-
Mind-brain interaction 197
cal support and its scientific, philosophic and human importance in the present context and will not be
value implications. Essentially, it presented the view pursued here. However, in the case of those differ-
that subjective experience as an operational derivative ences that pertain to the mind-brain problem and to
and emergent property of brain activity plays a prime dualist interactioniim WC deal, as Sir John has very
causal role in the control of brain function. It differed ably emphasized. with more than ordinary professional
from previous emergent theories of consciousness, and academic interpretations. At stake are central
from C. LLOYDMORGAN (1923) onward, in that earlier key concepts that directly involve fundamental con-
emergent views of mind had been conceived in terms victions regarding the nature of man’s inner being,
that wereparallelistic, double aspect, or epiphenomenal, physical reality, the meaning of existence, and related
and had rejected any direct causal influence of mental matters of ultimate concern. Because perspectives in
qualities on neural processing (K~~HLER,1961). The this area profoundly shape human value systems and
thesis was focussed on contradicting the traditional, societal decision-making and hence human destiny,
mechanistic assumption expressed by Eccles that we mutually agree that these issues must take prece-
brain processing can be completely accounted for, in dence over other considerations.
principle, without including conscious phenomena. Looking back today, it Seems clear that I quite
Presented in terms of neuronal circuitry and concepts failed to foresee how the new mind-brain solution
of neuroscience, it seemed to counter and refute, for might be taken to support dualism. Even though dua-
the first time on its own grounds, the classic physicalism and mentalism had long been associated and
list assumption of a purely physical determinancy of even equated, and some colleagues had forewarned
the CNS. The subjective mental phenomena had to be that I might accordingly be accused of dualism, I
included. Mind-brain interaction was made a scienti- nevertheless supposed the new mentalist-dtialist dis-
fically tenable and even plausible concept without tinctions to have been sufficiently clarified (see
reducing the qualitative richness of mental properties. especially, SPERRY, 19706). Back in the 1960s dualist
The overall aim of the paper, as in ihe Popper-Eccles views were no threat to science and accordingly, it
volume, was to show that this recognition of the pri- seemed much more important in those years to com-
macy of conscious mind as causal would alter pro- bat the more prevalent errors of materialism, mechan-
foundly the value implications of science which were ism, behaviorism and reductionism, than to empha-
being downgraded by the then strongly dominant size the conjoint logic against dualism. Again, the
philosophy of reductive mechanistic materialism. finer points involved here are better and more easily
At the same time, the proposed mind-brain model explained if we continue to follow the chronological
was taken to undermine dualism as well by explaining approach.
conscious experience in terms that would make mind
inextricably inseparable from, and embodied in, the
functioning brain. It provided a rationale for the evo-
GROWING SCIENTIFIC ACCEPTANCE
lution of mind from matter and also the emergence of
mind from matter in brain development. Presented as After waiting more than three years during which
a ‘conceptual skeleton on which to build a body of the feedback was mostly positive, especially from
philosophy’, it was described as a scheme that ‘would humanist groups, I tested the theory more directly in
put mind back into the brti of objective science and the scientific community by presenting it at a neuro-
in a position of top command’. logical meeting (SPERRY, 19704 and then to the
When the reprints arrived, I sent my new mind- National Academy of Sciences (SPERRY,19694 with a
brain ‘answer’ to Eccles who previously had follow-up printed version in the Psychological Review
expressed little, if any, active interest in the holist- (SPERRY, 19696). The result was a wide exposure,
reductionist issues (ECCLES,1966). I was delighted to increased by several reprintings and a critique (Bw-
see by his next IBRO presentation (ECCLES,1968) that DRA, 1970) and reply (SPERRY, 197Ob), within those
he had clearly joined our ranks as an ardent anti- disciplines most knowledgeable and most apt to be
reductionist denouncing ‘the materialistic, mechanis- critical. In these conjectural areas where the concepts
tic, behavioristic, and cybernetic concepts of man . . .’ are still beyond any direct experimental verification,
Reversing his earlier stand on the uselessness of con- the next best test is to put them in the marketplace to
sciousness for a full account of brain function, E&es be churned over by hundreds of minds from all differ-
has since lent his support to the new logic for the ent angles. In this respect the years I%9 to 1971 were
causal intluence of mind over neural activity. On the critical years for this theory. No logical flaw nor
these points I believe we have remained in good gen- prior statement, so far as I know, has yet come to
eral agreement (see ECCLF!S,1973). It is in regard to light.
the nature of the causal influence and to the use of By the early 19709, the -modified concept of cons-
these new mind-brain concepts to support dualism ciousness as having causal eflicacy began to gain sub_
that our critical differences arise. Other differences stantial scientific acceptance particularly in psy-
concerning the relation of consciousness to the right chology in a pervasive resurgence of mentahsm and
hemisphere, to language, to animals, and to self cons- anti-behaviorism that is still gathering momentum
ciousness, though of some concern, are of secondary &WTOR, 1978). Essentially, the new interpretation
198 R. W. SPERRY
brought a logical change in the scientific status of advanced by Eccies (POPPER& ECCLES,1977)one
subjective experience replacing behaviorist principles finds much the same reasoning (see pp. 361-362 and
with a mental&t or cognitivist paradigm. Psycholo- the Summary on p. 373) that I have used to support
gists could now refute the lo@c and principles of my own concept of consciousness (cf. SPERRY,
behaviorism and refer directly to the causal influence 1952-1970a,bf The phraseology and emphasis are
of mental images, ideas, inner feelings, and other sub- somewhat different and some different neural
jective phenomena as explanatory constructs. The examples of the principles are introduced but the
suddenness with which this began to occur was conceptual model for mind-brain interaction that is
almost explosive in the cognitive disciplines (PYL- inferred seems entirely consistent and certainly no dis-
SHYN,1973). The movement has been referred to as tinct alternative is offered.
the ‘cognitive revolution (D~MBEX,1974) and also Eccles emphasizes with italics (p. 362) that ‘A key
variously as the ‘humanist’, ‘consciousness’ or ‘third component of the hypothesis is that unity of con-
revolution (MATSON,1971) and has extended also into scious experience is provided by the mind and not by
philosophy, anthropology (FWMAN, 1979) and the neural machinery’, and this point is again stressed
neuroscience (BUNGE. 1977; JOHN, 1976; MACKAY, in Dialogue VIII, p. 512, and again in his Gifford
1978). Lectures (Eccles, 1979). Here we are in full accord. I
EC&S’s increasingly vigorous campaign for dualist too have made precisely the same point (SPERRY,
interactionism during this same period has followed 1952) stating, ‘In the scheme proposed here, it is con-
on a curve that closely parallels the above. A similar tended that unity in subjective experience does not
curve can be drawn for a rising public belief in psy- derive from any kind of parallel unity in the brain
chic, paranormal and related mentaiist phenomena, processes. Conscious unity is conceived rather as a
along with mysticism. occultism, and other dualist functional or operational derivative’, and There need
beliefs in the su~~atural and in ot~r-worldly forms be little or nothing of a unita~ nature about the
of existence. Some of these have logical support in the physiological processes themselves.’ in his earlier
new mind-brain concepts; others are bolstered only thinking Eccies had given priority to quite a different
spuriously by association. There is good reason to concept, expressed in terms of extraphysical ‘ghostly
think that the gains made by these mentaiist-related influences’ aBecting the course of synaptic events
deJelopments during this period have been substan- (ECCLES, 1953). I have since referred to and consis-
tially aided directly and indirectly, by the appearance tently reiterated the above expiration of mental
in neuroscience of a plausible logical answer by which unity in reference to the role of the cerebral commis-
to counter the basic premises and principles of the sums and to the graininess’ problem (SPERRY,
traditional behaviorist paradigm. Without a convinc- 1%5-1978), emphasizing that the subjective unity
ing alternative to replace the physicalist logic, we does not correlate with the array of excitatory details
would be back today much where we were in the comprising the infrastructure of the brain process but
mid-1960s. i.e. where materialist-~haviorist reason- rather with the holistic ‘mental’ properties.
ing effectively outweighed all the intuitive, natural In a reflective appraisal near the end of their
and omnipresent subjectivist pressures and argu- volume, Eccles (POPPER & Ecctw 1977. p. 552)
ments, and where cognitive psychology remained in observes, ‘As we have developed our hypothesis, we
principle a science of para- and epiphenomena. More have returned to the views of past philosophies that
specifically. the increasing assurance with which the mental phenomena are now ascendant again over
Eccies has been able in recent years openly to pro- the material phenomena.’ Similarly, I too from the
claim dualist arguments not visible in the 1964 confer- start have described?he hy~t~is as one that ‘puts
ence suggests that he has developed in the interim a mind back over matter.. .’ (SF+ERBY, 1965); ‘would re-
new ‘logical answer’ that was not perceived earlier. store mind to its old prestigious position over matter’
(SPERRY,19704. That our key concepts for this and
for mind-brain interaction in general are essentially
WOW MANY NEW MIND-BRAIN SOLUTIONS?
one and the same is further indicated where Eccles
A first question that needs to be considered is (POPPER& Em&s, 1977, p. 373) ends the condensed
whether the set of concepts which Eccles currently summary of his hypothesis with the statement, ‘Sperry
uses to support dualism (Karl Popper’s arguments has made a similar proposal (SPERRY, 1969)’
will be discussed separately) is signiiicantiy dilI&ent and concludes another ‘very brief summary or outline
from that which I proposed as a nondualist, monistic of the theory. ’ (p. 495) with the statement, ‘Thus. in
solution. Have we independently come on two di&r- alyeement with Sperry, it is postulated that the self-
ent answers for mind-bra interaction, or is it a conscious mind exercises a superior inte~retative and
matter of different interpretations of basically the controlling role upon the neural events.’
same solution? So far as I am able to determine, the When we turn to the solution to the mind-brain
underlying concepts bv which psychophysical interac- problem upheld by Sir Karl Popper, we find it is also
tion is inferred by Eccles do not differ in any relevant basically the same, but the. history of its acquisition is
respect from those which I have presented as menta- quite different. Prior to 1965. Popper’s support of
list monism. In searching the arguments and evidence dualism rested mainly on the argument that no causal
physical theory of the descriptive, argumentative func- . , , recall that a molecule in many respects is the master of
tions of language is possible. Products of the mind, its inner atoms and electrons. The latter are hauled and
like myths, abstractions and mathematical formulas for& about in chemical interactions by the overall con-
fi~~tional properties of the whole molecule. At the same
cannot be accounted for by the laws of physiology or
time. if our given molecule is it&f part Of a single-o&d
physics (POPPER, 1%2). During the years in which this
organism such as paramecium, it in turn is obliged, with all
argument was propounded, it failed by itself to have its parts and its partners, lo follow along a trail of events in
much influence in countering physicalist objections time and space determined largely by the extrinsic overall
that products of the mind have neural correlates and dynamics of Purumecium cat&turn. When it comes to
that these products of the mind, Iike other mental brains, remember that the simpler electric, atomic, molecu-
entities, were better interpreted in ~lle~stic terms iar, and cellular forces and laws. though still present and
as being epiphenomena, inner aspects of, or identical operating have been superseded by the configurational
to their neurological correlates. As expressed by forces of higher-level mechanisms. At the top, in the human
OPPENHEIMER & PUTNAM(1958): brain, these include the powers of perception, cognition,
reason, judgment, and the like, the operational, causal
It is not sufficient, for example, simply to advance the effects and forces of which are equally or more potent in
claim that certain phenomena considered to be specifically brain dynamics than are the outclassed inner chemicai
human, such as rhe use of verbal Ianguage in an abstract
forces (Spmav, 1964).
and generalized way, can never be explained on the basis of
neuraphysiotogical theory, or to make the claim that this Note that this statement includes the basic key con-
conceptual capacity distinguishes man in principle and not cepts on which the Popper-Eccles case for mind-
only in degree from nonhuman animals. brain interaction mainly rests, i.e. the downward cau-
In 1%5, Popper proposed a new solution to the sal control influence. of higher emergent (mental) over
mind-brain relation that was exactly what his earlier lower (neural) entities, and the fact that the mental
argnments had been looking for, and which has since and neural events are d&rent kinds of phenomena
become a major theme of hi% philosophy (POPPER, regulated by different kinds of laws and forces.
1978). In a lecture devoted firstly to a discussion of Hence, from very different backgrounds, Popper
physical indeterminism, and in a departure from his and I had arrived by l%S at the same answer to
prior long-time concerns with the logic of knowing, Eccles’s problem. Popper presented his as an answer
POPPER f 1972) added a second theme concerning to ‘a new view of evolution’ and ‘a different view of
some revised perspectives on ~o1ution which he then the world’. I pramted mine as ‘a scientific theory of
extended to include the body-mind problem. He mind’ and ‘a long-sought unifying view of man in
emerged with what seems to be basically the same nature’. We both offered our view as a new solution
view of evolution and the mind-brain relation that I to the mind-body problem. When one considers that
too had proposed a year earli& in my James Arthur this new turn in Popper’s thinking had not appeared
Lecture (SPERRY, 196Qf.In essence, the idea of emerg- in his extensive philosophical publications over the
ing hierarchic controls is applied to the mind-brain previous 40 years, the timing of these convergent de-
relation. This I%5 switch in Popper’s philosophy velopments is remarkable.
from a position in which evolutionary theory was In Popper’s case, his new solution did not become
held to be tautological, explaining almost nothing, to generally available apparently, except by offprint
one in which it expl+ins almost everything was offered request, until the lecture came to be published in 1972
with ‘many apologies’, as a development for-which he among other philosophic essays in the volume O&ec-
was obliged ‘to eat humble pie’. In Iine with the main tiw Knowledge (POPPER, 1972). Even Popper’s own
theme of his lecture, a ‘plastic’ indeterminacy of the thinking seems curiously to have been little influenced
emergent controls was emphasized but the degree of during this interim. His long article ‘On the Theory of
looseness or tightness in the controls is not a critical the Objective Mind’, prepared for the 1972 volume
part of the argument. out of two previous papers from 1968 and 1970, intro-
Because these cunccpts concerning hierarchic or- duces his ‘three world’ terminology. It deals with a
ganization and ‘downward’ control are crucial both to subject that, unlike the 1%5 lecture, almost cries for
the Poppet-Ecclcs volume and to the present paper, I the use and application of the new mind-brain soiu-
restate them with exact quotes: tion and different view of the world, yet this goes
unmentioned. Even in his subsection on the causal
Evolution keeps complicating the universe by adding new relations between the three worlds, he does not refer
phenomena that have new properties and new forces and to his new solution for the control of brain by mind,
that are regulated by pew scientific principles and new
but instead adds a footnote on the word ‘interact’ to
scientific laws-all for future scientists in their respective
explain he is using it ‘in a wide sense so as not to
disciplines to discover and formulate. Note also that the
old simple laws and primeval forces of the hydrogen age exclude psychophysical parallelism’.
never get lost or can&led in the process of compounding
the compounds. They do, however, get superseded, over- DETERMINISM VERSUS INDETERMINISM
whelmed, and outclassed by the higher-level forces as these
successively appear a1 the atomic, the molecular and the Another main theme of Popper’s philosophy, inde-
celhdar and higher levels (SPERRY,1964). tenninism, is applied to the mind-brain relation, In
200 R. W. SPERRY
this we are in fundamental disagreement. I favor phenomena as causal determmants in brain process-
determinism of an emergent, mentalist form that fol- ing are extended and enriched particularly in the
lows directly and logically from my concept of mind upper linguistic and epistemological levels by the
as causal (SPERRY, 1964: 19766). In contrast to Pop insights of Popper. I should also make clear at this
per. I hold that every time the elements of creation, point that in reading Popper’s work for the first time
whether atoms or concepts, are put together in the for this occasion, I was repeatedly impressed with the
same way under the same conditions, that the same great extent, particularly in regard to his general pos-
new properties would emerge and that the emergent itions on epistemology, to which I feel we are in
process is, therefore causal and deterministic. To this strong and warm accord. The present discussion, and
extent and in this sense it may also be said to be, in concern for the impact of dualist ideology, brings a
principle, predictable though generally, with few disproportionate emphasis on our relative differences.
exceptions, it is not so in practice. Rather than view-
ing the mind of man as a ‘first cause’ or ‘prime
IS CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE CAUSAL-OR
mover’ (POPPER,1962; POPPER & ECCLES,1977). I see
ONLY ITS NEURAL CORRELATES?
the brain as a tremendous generator of emergent
novel phenomena that then exert supercedant control This long, chronological approach may help to
over lower-level activities. The higher-level functional clarify the following: The difference between the view
entities of inner experience have their own dynamics of Eccles today and his position in 1964, and similarly
in cerebral activity and, contrary to Popper’s interpre- the sudden rise during this same period in the scien-
tation of my view (POPPER& ECCLES,1977, p. 209), tific acceptance of mental entities as explanatory con-
they also ‘interact causally with one another at their structs, as well as the recent new strength of Popper’s
own level as entities’ (SPERRY, 19696). But the creative dualist arguments, all depend in a very critical way on
process is not indeterminant. The laws of causation the appearance of a logical alternative by which to
are nowhere broken or open (excepting perhaps in refute the traditional behaviorist-materialist para-
quantum-level indeterminacy which is here irrele- digm. The new availability of a logical answer contra-
vant). It is all part of a continuous hierarchic mani- dicting our earlier reasoning that consciousness is
fold, a one-world continuum. acausal and unnecessary for a complete account of
On these terms, human decision-making is not brain function meant that the multiple subjectivist
indeterminant but selfdeterminant. Everyone nor- pressures toward humanism, cognitivism and menta-
mally wants to have control over what he does and to lism were no longer held at bay by behaviorist theory.
determine his own choices in accordance with his own The logical deterrents to dualism also were corre-
wishes. This is exactly the kind of control our mind- spondingly reduced. The one new concept that
brain model provides (SPERRY,1976b; 19776). But this appears to have the logical qualifications and that can
is not freedom from causal determinacy. A person be said to make the interaction of such different
may be relatively free in this view from much that things as physical and mental states now seem plaus-
goes on around him, but he is not free from his own ible, where in 1964 it had seemed inconceivable, is the
inner self. The emphasis here is the diametric converse concept of the mind-brain relation which Popper and
of the behaviorist contention that ‘ideas, motives, and Eccles make the main thesis of their book and on
feelings have no part in determining conduct and which they very largely build their argument for dua-
therefore no part in explaining it’ (BLANSIARD & list interactionism, and it is the concept that I too
SKINNER,1967; SKINNER,1971). Even Skinner, how- have proposed.
ever, seems in recent years to have withdrawn from No other development is visible during this period
his former stance to a point where his present pos- that serves to distinguish between the causal potency
ition (SKINNER,1974) is no longer distinctive. In that of mental experience per se and that of its neural
great complex of external and internal determinants correlates, providing for the former over and above
that control behavior, one can pick out for emphasis the latter, in direct contradiction to behaviorist
either the environmental factors or those of the inner theory. The increasingly frequent references of late to
self. From my standpoint, it is the latter that es- the evolutionary survival value of consciousness as
pecially tend to distinguish man, while the former are evidence of its causal usefulness (GRAY, 1971) was for
more characteristic of animals and increasingly so as many decades effectively rejected on the grounds that
one descends the phylogmetic scale. The self- it is the neural correlates that are causal and have
determinants in man include the stored memories of a survival value, not their conscious qualities. Similarly.
lifetime, value systems, both innate and acquired, plus recent advances in cognitive and humanistic psy-
all the various mental powers of cognition, reasoning, chology now expressed in terms of the causal role of
intuition, etc. mental images and other subjective phenomena, are
In any case, it has become evident that Popper’s equally interpretable, as in the past, on behaviorist
philosophical arguments for mind-brain interaction terms that recognize the causality of the neural corre-
have become greatly strengthened by having the older lates of the subjective phenomena, not the subjective
pre-1964 logic of neuroscience countered on its own qualities themselves. New developments in the mind-
grounds. Conversely, my own concepts of mental brain identity position, the recent ‘consciousness’
movements in clinical and humanistic psychology, that their dualistic extensions and additions are both
and the counterculture developments of the 1960s consistent with, and supported by, the emergent
have all been chronologically and otherwise associ- causal model for mind-brain interaction.
ated, but also similarly fail to furnish any critical Because this model combines features from both of
reasoning that would distinguish betwctn the causal the earlier classical opposing philosophies of monist
efficacy of consciousness and that of its neural corre- materialism on the one hand and dualist mental&m
lates, or to otherwise refute, so far as science is con- on the other, it was presented as a compromise view
cerned, the iong domina’nt materialist-behaviorist (SPERRY,lQ6Q; 19X&; 19764 and could have been
paradigm. The one development that does this and labeled either way at the outset to favor either alter-
presents a logical and plausible alternative, is the native (given certain qualifications and some redefini-
modified concept of mind as a causal, functional tions). It is entirely understandable that Popper and
emergent. Eccles with their prior ~rn~trn~~ to du~ism on
It is the idea, in brief, that conscious phenomena as other grounds should try to make the new com-
emergent functional properties of brain processing promise as consistent as possible with their earlier
exert an active control role as causal detents in thinking. I similarly could have presented it, for
shaping the flow patterns of cerebral excitation. Once example, as ‘enlightened physicalism’, ‘neomateria-
generated from neural events, the higher order mental lism’, ‘emergent& cognitivist or mentalist materia-
patterns and programs have their own subjective qua- lism’, ‘nonreductive materialism’, etc. In what follows
lities and progress, operate and interact by their own I will try to outline briefly the reasons for presenting
causal laws and principles which are different from this interactionist mode1 as neither dualistic nor
and cannot be reduced to those of neurophysiolo~, materialistic. I think it combines features that separ-
as explained further below. Compared to the physio- ately exclude it from both the foregoing and that it is
logical processes, the conscious events are more best recognized as a fundamentally distinct alterna-
molar, being determined by configurational or organi- tive. From here on it may be understood that my
xationaf interrelations in neuronal functions. The comments will be confined strictly to my own version
mental entities transcend the physiological just as the of the model with which I am directly familar. As I
physiological transcends tbe molecular, the molecular, interpret it, this concept of the mind-brain reiation
the atomic and subatomic, etc. The mental forces do not only refutes the doctrines of behaviorism and
not violate, disturb or intervene in neuronal activity materialism, mechanistic determinism and reduction-
but they do supervene. Interaction is mutually reci- ism, as Popper and E&lea correctly it&r, but also
procal between the neural and mental levels in the and with equal force, strongly d&counts dualism. By
nested brain hierarchies. Multilevel and interlevel exptaming &&cious experience in mOrristic terms we
determinism is emphasized in -addition to the one- undermine dualism at its source and point of stron-
level sequential causation more ~a~tion~ly dealt gest support, leaving for dualism only abstract argu-
with. This idea is very different from those of extra- ments like those of Plato and Popper and observa-
physical ghostly intervention at synapses and of inde- tions like those from parapsychology (BEKW, 1962).
t ermmistic influences on which Eccles and Popper
had earlier relied. The question at issue is whether
this form of psychophysical interaction is fundamen- EMERGENT DETERMINISM
tally monistic as I interpret it or whether it is dualistic It will be helpful as we proceed to have in mind
as presented by Popper and E&es. some further concrete examples of the principles of
In following up this question we want to first recog- emergent (holist) control as illustrated at different
nize that Popper and E&es go well beyond the given levels in some simpler and more farnil& physical sys-
formula for mind-brain interaction to promote cor- tems. I have earlier (SPERRY,lQ6Qb) used the example
relative concepts and final overall positions that are of how a wheel rolling downhill carries its atoms and
genuinely dualistic. Eccles‘s description of the cons- mole&es through a course in time and space and to
cious self as having supernatural origins and as some- a fate determined by the overall system properties of
thing that survives death of the brain, and Popper’s the wheel as a whole and regardless of the inclination
concepts of unembodied ‘world 3’ entities existing of the individual atoms and molecules. The atoms and
independently of any material substrate are distinct moiecules are caught up and overpowered by the
examples. Elsewhere in .their writings,’ many implica- higher properties of the whole. One can compare the
tions can be found where they discuss the loose, open rolling wheel to an ongoing brain process or a pro-
and ~~t~in~tic nature of the liaison between gressing train of thought in which the overall proper-
mind and brain that leaves no doubt that they both ties of the brain process, as a coherent organizational
have something genuinely dualistic in mind. ‘The diffi- entity, determine the timing and spacing of the firing
culty is that these dualistic features ‘are indistinguish- patterns within its neuronal infrastructure. The con-
ably mixed in and fused with the given theory for trol works both ways; hence, mind-brain ‘interac-
mind-brain interaction that itself has stood up under tion’. The subsystem components determine colkc-
criticism and is regarded by many of us as being de& tively the properties of the whole at each kvel and
nitcly monistic. Throughout the volume,. it is implied these in turn determine the time/space course and
202 il. W. SPERRY
other relational properties of the components. The 1952) plus also the relating of both these to sensory
organism and its component cells and organs is inputs, to memory, and to emotional values and
another familiar example. The principles are homeostatic needs. The conscious attentional compo-
universal. nent in this central metasystem may be only a small
An example I come back to for classroom illus- surface feature of the whole vast complex of cerebral
tration contrasts the prorating determinants in a intergration. The crucial features of the central self
television receiver with the electronic and other physi- system are presumably innate in each species and
cal interactions involved in its operation. Complete largely preorganized independently of sensory input.
knowledge of the electronic and physical theory that It is import~t to recognize that the term ‘interac-
enables one to fully understand, build and repair the tion’ applies in these examples only in the general
appliance, is no help to explain why Mary struck sense in which it has been used in the history of psy-
John on channel 4, or what caused the building to chology and philosophy to imply a causal influence
collapse on 2, or the laughter on 7. There is no way between mind and brain. I have stressed that the term
that these, or the political message on channel 5, can ‘interaction’ is not to imply that the mental forces
be explained in terms of the laws and concepts of intervene in, or disturb or disrupt the physiology or
electronics. They involve a different order or level of chemistry of the brain, but oniy that they supervene,
interaction. Yet these higher order, supervening, pro- like TV programs over the electronic processes. No
gram variables do control at each instant, and int~ruption or violation of the laws of physiology is
determine the space-time course of the electron flow involved. I infer that Popper and Eccies also use the
patterns to the screen and throughout the set-just as term mostly in the same way and only rarely here and
a train of thought controls the patterns of impulse there in the more specific sense of an actual djsturb-
tiring in the brain. The shift to a new program or to a ante of physiological events, as MACKAY(1978) seems
new channel can be compared to a shift in the brain to have misinterpreted their meaning.
to a new mental set, focus of attention. or to a new
thought sequence (SPERRY,1%5). Popper would pre-
MONISM VERSUS DUALISM
sumably allocate the programs of television to a sen-
arate world (‘worlds“within ‘worlds?). Ahhough the Given our original description of the theory and its
allocation of such human artifacts to a distinct separ- consistent reiteration, along with illustrative examples
ate world proves helpful in some ways and interesting like the foregoing (SPERRY,1964-1972), it is not easy
in its original form as a philosophic conjecture, the to understand how this concept of the mind-brain
current promotion of the separate worlds with a capi- relation co&d be taken as support for dualism.
tal ‘W’ in a true dualistic sense seems fundamentally Firstly, it fails to satisfy the classic philosophic defini-
inaccurate and misleading. tion of dualism as two different forms or states of
The television analogy breaks down if pushed too existence neither of which is reducible to terms of the
far, of course, in that the superimposed programs of other. Our theory describes the mental states as being
television are linearly traceable to the recording stu- built of, composed and constituted of physiological
dio, whereas the brain, by contrast. is largely a self- and physic~hemi~l elements, and thus, in the sense
programming. self-energizing system. It creates its of the definition, reducible to these. It needs to be
own superseding mental programs with its own explained here that much confusion has arisen from
built-in subjective generators calling also on a tife- use of this term ‘reducible’ in two quite different
time of internal memories and an elaborate built-in senses in different contexts. In common usage a build-
system of .value controls (PUGH, 1977) and homeo- ing is said to be reduced to rubble by an earthquake.
static regulators. Also, the programs passing through This is denied, however, in philo~phi~, holist-reduc-
the television monitor lack the internal interaction tionist dispute on the contention that in the reduction
and competition of those of the brain, and also the process, even with careful disassembly, the building as
self-developing originative properties as well as an such has been lost and therefore has not been and
internal selector of the programs to be attended to. cannot be, in principle, reduced to its parts. It is only
The conscious programs of the brain may be pre- in this latter specialized sense, and not in the common
sumed to be created in activity that lies beyond and is sense of the above definition or dictionary usage that
different from that occurring in the genicuiostriate I describe the mental events as not reducible to brain
system. The difference we envisage here is not in re- physiology.
spect to events at the neuronai level but in more sys- The reason that mental or other entities cannot be
temic. organizational, relational. configurational thus reduced to the parts may be understood more
aspects and design features of the cerebral integration. easily if one thinks of a given entity not as a system of
The special central system for consciousness, or the just material components. but as a combined space-
conscious Self, must include a constant registration of time-mass-energy manifold. Think of space being
the changing body schema (so strong it tends to per- bent around and molded by the material parts and
sist after limb amputations) and in reference to which time as similarly defined by events in temporal and
sensory input is consciously perceived, plus a feeling moving systems with the space-time com~nents
for the volitional command of the system (SPERRY. both arranged also in vertical nested hierarchies cor-
responding to and filling in around the material tional attribute of brain activity, conscious experience
elements and de&ted by their relative positions and is inextricably linked to, and inseparabk from, the
timing. The process of reducing an entity to its mater- functioning brain. It is only in the functional relations
ial components, physically or conceptually, inevitably within the matrix of brain processing that the sub
destroys the space-time components at the affected jective qualities appear and have their meaning
level. These last components from the space-time The subjective effects are generated by, and exist
manifold interfusing with, shaped by, and demarcated only by virtue of, brain activity. Even where higher
by the material components, are highly critical in order mental forms are compounded of lower level
determining the causal and other distin~ishing mental entities, as we assume to be the CBSC,the
properties of any system as a whole. The spacing and entire hierarchy is still embodied in, dependent
timing of the parts with reference to one another on, and inseparable from the physiological sub
largely determine the qualities and causal relations of structure.
the whole but the laws for the material components Much the same solution to the mind-brain prob-
fail to include these space-time factors. Attempts to lem has been arrived at recently by MACKAY (1978)
recognixe them in so-called ‘colkctivc’ and ‘coopera- who presents it in the more restricted t~inolo~ of
tive’ effects tend to fall short of an adequate recogni- information theory using for illustration the example
tion of the basic importance of the space-time ele- of goal-directed operations in a computer. The same
ments. This is why quantum mechanics is of little help example was offered by MacRay in 1964 couched in
in explaining physical reality at orders much above ‘dual aspect’ theory when he held the view (most
the quantum level. favored in neuroscience at that time) that the mental
None of this is to reject. the value of reduction as a and the physical are ~rnpl~~~ aspects of one
method in science or as a means to gain understand- and the same process where ‘no physical action waits
ing in general. The properties of any entity are on anything but another physical action’ (MAcKhY
determined largely (but not entirely, and in some 1966, p. 438). In those years, MacKay granted the
cases more than others) by the properties of its parts. physical determinancy for the CNS holding conscious
It obviously helps enormously, as a rule, to know how brain activity to be predictable in principle, in objec-
and of what anything is composed. Further reduction tive terms from a knowledge of the precedent physical
to the composition of the parts of the parts, and so determinants (provided one did not reveal the predic-
on_ becomes increasingly less explanatory of oper- tion of a predicted sequence to a person involved in
ations at the higher, starting level. Though brain the prediction). The emergent nature of the mental
quarks and gluons are not of particular relevance to controls as we now conceive them in a vertical or
behavioral science, one can expect that in many nested hierarchy, and the manner in which they
respects brain physiology in -its upper dimensions supersede, rather than merely parallel as an inner
may become to behavior and cognitive processing aspect, the physiological determinants were missed by
what molecular theory is to chemistry. It is only the MacKay in 1964 but apparently are accepted in his
reductionist reasoning ‘that therefore things can be 1978 version, along with a new recognition of the
reduced to ‘nothing but’ their parts that is rejected causal efficacy of consciousness. These changes now
or that all science can be reduced, in principle, to a bring our respective views into rather close accord
basic unity in one fundamental discipline, or that with respect to those features most directly relevant to
the ‘essence’ of anything is to be sought in its the min~rain problem.
components. Apparently u&quainted with the history of these
Along with the failure to qualify as dualism by defi- conceptual developments and the original concepts
nition, our proposed mind-brain model also is non- from which Popper and Eccks argue, MACKAY (1978)
dualistic in that it makes mind and brain inseparable misinterprets the kind of interactionism they have in
parts of the same continuous hierarchy the great bulk mind and then finds it ‘astonishing’ how dose and
of which, by common agreement, is not dualistic. It natural a fit can otherwise be made between theirs
becomes illogical to make a special exception of the and his own description. Preserving consistency with
principle at the one level of mind and not at those his earlier position, MacKay is inclined to emphasize,
above and below. On the proposed scheme, one can more than I, the extent to which the proposed alter-
proceed continuously in the same universe of dis- native is a physicalist rather than a mentalist view. It
course, following the path of evolution, from sub has to he remembered in this regard that whereas the
atomic elements in the brain up through molecules, programs of the computer or tekvision analogies are
cells and nerve circuits to brain processes with con- conceived in physical terms, those of the brain have
scious properties and on upward through higher always been described as mental with subjective
compounds all within the one ‘this-world’ mode of properties defined as contrast to the physical or
CXiStCfKC. material. In any case, I fully agree with MacKay that
Dualism would seem to be further contradicted in the arguments and evidence advanced in support of
our description of subjective meaning as a functional dualist-interactionism in the Popper-EC& volume
derivative rather than a brain copy or a spatiotem- are very much open to the kind of alternative inter-
poral transform (SPERRY,1952). As an emergent func- pretation that we propose.
204 R. W. SPERRK
MENTALISM VERSUS MATERIALISM these and related materialistic. mechanistic and reduc-
tionist trends.
The explanation of mind in the foregoing terms as Meantime mind-brain identity theory which has
an organizational functional property of brain pro- become the strongest thrust in materialist philosophy
cessing, constituted of neuronal and physicochemical has undergone substantial changes during the last
activity, and embodied in, and inseparable from the decade. In its initial form as a semantic twist to the
active brain has led to an impression in some cases old ‘double aspect’ view that goes back at least to
that this should properly be interpreted as therefore Spinoza, it was described as a ‘dual access’ or ‘double
an essentially materialist view. Some further reasons language’ theory (FEEL, 1967) and was strongly
for defining it instead as mentalist (or cognitivist) can reductivist. In particular, it held that a complete
be outlined as follows: The principal feature of this account of brain processing is possible, in principle, in
model is the new recognition it gives to the primacy neural terms only without resorting to subjective lan-
of subjective mental phenomena in scientific explana- guage or mental terms. Unlike the epiphenomenal
tion and the higher level control role accorded mental view, or the emergent, double aspect or interactionist
or cognitive phenomena as causal determinants, over views, identity theory itself seems to provide no new
and above their neural correlates. It is characterized concrete concepts to the mind-brain problem only
as placing ‘mind back over matter’, and as ‘a scheme different semantic approaches. Our introduction in
that idealizes ideas and ideals over physical and the mid-1960s of the opposing view of consciousness
chemical interactions, nerve impulse traffic, and as a nonreductive emergent with causal potency and
DNA. It is a brain model in which conscious mental downward control has been followed by a spate of
psychic forces are recognized to be the crowning new semantic transformations in identity. thepry in
achievement of some five hundred million years or which a new emphasis is put on the causality of con-
more of evolution’ (SPERRY,1965). As such, it consciousness and on emergent concepts under terms
forms to the common textbook and lay definitions of such as organizational, contigurational, holistic, col-
the terms mental and mentalism. The subjective quali- lective, and the like (Groeus, 1973; WILSON, 1976;
ties are recognized to be. real and causal in their own PERRY, 1978; SMART,1978; WARD, 1978). In all cases
right, as subjectively experienced, and to be of very the changes appear to bring these two initially con-
different quality from the neural, molecular and other trasting approaches into closer convergence. The
material components of which they are built. Because argument from identity philosophy today seems
mind and matter, the mental and the physical, have accordingly to he not so much that our emergent
long been de&red as direct contrasts and given mean- determinist view is incorrect, but rather that this is
ing in terms of their opposites, this proposed recogni- what identity theory actually should have been taken
tion of the causal primacy of subjective mental quali- to imply all along. We thus have the curious result
ties would seem to logically exclude materialism. that our latest mind-brain model is today being iden-
In particular, the present position represents a di- tified with materialism on the one side and with
rect refutation of what materialism had long come to dualism on the other.
stand for over many decades in science, philosophy Finally, in defense of the mentalist rather than the
and humanist thinking generally. Materialist beha- materialist designation, I would only add the follow-
viorism asserting the principle that ideas, motives and ing: If there is anything in this world that has been
feelings have no part in determining conduct and commonly defined as a contrast to the material or
therefore no part in explaining it (SKINNEK,1967) had physical, it is the intangibles of conscious experience.
gone, in the extreme, to denying even the existence of The psychological contents of mind from their first
consciousness in any form and, at the least, denied as recognition in language, philosophy and science, have
a founding central premise any causal efficacy of been treated by tradition as opposites of physical and
conscious or mental forces in brain processing. material in the mind-matter dichotomy. Accordingly,
Materialist philosophy and the so-called psychophysi- a position can hardly be called materialist if its very
cal identity theory was being advanced during the essence and reason for being is a new antimaterialist
1960s on the contention that ‘man is nothing but a stress on the existence and functional primacy of men-
material object, having none but physical properties’. tal phenomena and their role as high level causal
And ‘Science can give a complete account of man in determinants in brain function, obeying laws that are
purely physicochemical terms’ (ARMSTRONG,1968). different in kind from those of their constituent
The ‘Unity of Science’ movement, closely aligned with material, neuronal and electrochemical processes. A
identity theory, held that the laws of science can all be mentalist is defined in behavioral science as one who,
reduced eventually, in principle, to the laws of a single in opposition to behaviorist doctrine contends that
basic discipline (CARNAP, 1938; FEIGL, 1953; OPPEN- mental entities and laws are involved in determining
HEIM8~ PUTNAM,1958). Physical science was seeking behavior and are needed to explain it. The concept of
answers to all nature in terms of ‘the four fundamen- consciousness as causal emergent has been presented
tal forces’ with hopes for a further unifying field from the outset as a view that restores to science the
theory to describe the essence of reality. Our view common-sense impression (overruled during the
arose in the mid-1960s in direct opposition to all of behaviorist-materialist era) that we do indeed have
mind and mental faculties over and above, and differ- lated logical concepts and facts they stand for. When
ent from, our brain physiology-just as we have ~ellu- Popper and Eccles, representing modem philosophy
lar properties that are over and above and different and neuroscience, jointly proclaim arguments and
from their molecular constituents. beliefs in dualism, the supernatural and in unem-
The distinction between the mentalist paradigm bodied worlds of existence, the repercussions quickly
and that of materialism or behaviorism, though im- extend beyond professional borders to influence atti-
portant within psychology, is less-critical overall than tudes and faith-belief systems in society at large. The
that between monism and dualism. If common usage result has been a major setback for those of us (for
in the long run should tend to favor the stretching of example, BURHOE, 1975; PUGH, 1977; SPERRY, 1977)
the meaning of materialism and/or physicalism to who see hope for the future and for the very aims and
encompass mental phenomena in the causal, emer- ideals that I think Sir John and Sir Karl strive for, to
gent, embodied non-reductive form we now envisage, lie in replacing old dualist perspectives, values and
there would be no great loss provided there was no beliefs, dualist theologies and related mythological
resultant confusion in regard to the actual conceptual worldview guidelines of the past with a new unifying
changes themselves and their new implications and holistic-monistic interpretation of reality as an ulti-
connotations. Of all the questions one can ask about mate reference frame in the search for criteria of value
conscious experience, there is none for which the and meaning.
answer has more profound and far-ranging implica-
tions than the question of whether or not conscious-
ness is causal. The alternative answers lead to basi- Acknowledgements-This article was prepared initially for
a volume on mind-brain interaction edited by D. L. WIL-
cally different paradigms for science, philosophy and
SON, P. GLOTZBACH and M. RINGLE that was to have
culture in general.
included a response from KARLPOPPERand Jo+t~ ECCLE~
If the concern with terminology begins to seem but later had to be cat&led. Aided by the F. P. Hixon
over done, it should be remembered that labels and Fund of the California Institute of Technology. I thank
their connotations and the right hemisphere impres- JERRELEW, Co~wm TREVARTHEN. EVELYNTEXG and
sions they carry are often more important in human EDWARDREEDfor helpful comments on an earlier draft of
decision-making than are the more precisely formu- the manuscript.
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(Accepred 23 September 1979)

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History of Psychology © 2016 American Psychological Association

2016, Vol. 19, No. 4, 259 –273 1093-4510/16/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hop0000035

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BRAIN

Keywords: neurosciences, race relations, education reform, self-help and popular

had declared, even more emphatically, “In these

about maternal or cultural “deprivation” to press

their respective cases (Raz, 2013, pp. 62–75).

Wolfe, 2009). In this way, neuroeducation historical reference point.

could well be said to be a step-child of right-

References Chrisjohn, R. D., & Peters, M. (1986). The pernicious

10.1111/j.0963-7214.2006.00400.x Ecuyer-Dab, I., & Robert, M. (2004). Have sex dif-

court Brace Jovanovich. (Ed.), Interhemispheric relations and cerebral

Members of Underrepresented Groups:

If you are interested in reviewing manuscripts, please write APA Journals at

• To be selected as a reviewer, you must have published articles in peer-reviewed

• To be selected, it is critical to be a regular reader of the five to six empirical journals

MIND-BRAIN INTERACTION: MENTALISM, YES;

California Institute of Technology, Division of Biology, Pasadena, CA 91125, U.S.A.

THE NEW INTERACTIONXSM locus of consciousness and the support of dualism.. I

(Accepred 23 September 1979)

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