The Sources of Salafi Conduct

Harsh Politics in the New Middle East

William McCants
September 19, 2012

If the Arab Spring uprisings were an earthquake in Middle Eastern politics, last week was a major aftershock. The
rumbling began in Cairo, where a satellite TV station run by Salafis played clips of an inflammatory film about the
Prophet Muhammad. Soon after, Salafi religious leaders called for protests at the U.S. embassy in Cairo, blaming
Washington for not censoring a film made in the United States. The pattern was repeated in Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and
elsewhere. Although much has been made of the riots as a response to the film, they are more fundamentally about the
nature of the post-Arab Spring regimes, and specifically about who gets to police public morality. Salafis across the
region see themselves as the rightful guardians of the public sphere -- and are acting to ensure that others see them that
way, too.

Although Salafis do not make up a majority of the population in any of these countries, they were able to set the political
agendas there for the past week for several reasons. They punch above their weight because of the vast funding they
receive from fellow travelers in the wealthy Gulf monarchies, particularly in Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Each year,
millions of dollars flow out of the Gulf and into Salafi charities and satellite channels like the one that touched off the
riots. (By comparison, liberal NGOs receive far less support from the wealthy countries in the region.) Salafi leaders
spend this money on social programs and proselytizing, handy tools with which to gin up votes or whip up anger at
perceived slights to Salafism or Islam.

Indeed, most of the Salafi groups do not aspire to take over the state through violence or even elections -- their numbers
are too small. Instead, they seek to use public anger to pull these states to the right. Where they have strong political
and cultural institutions behind them, as in Egypt, they can do so through political pressure and shows of strength in the
street. Where such institutions are lacking, Salafis instead use vigilantism or preaching to challenge the powers that be.

It is unclear what percentage of Egypt's population Salafis make up, but they control a quarter of the parliament. This
means that the less conservative Muslim Brotherhood, which won both the parliamentary and presidential elections,
cannot ignore them. In parliament, Salafis have agitated for a constitution that recognizes the paramount authority of
Islamic law. They have also pushed for legal codes that reflect the Koran's commandments.

Like the religious right in Israel, Egyptian Salafis hold the feet of less conservative politicians to the fire. They
demonstrated the full extent of their power to do so last week as protests raged. On September 13, the deputy head of
the Muslim Brotherhood, Khairat el-Shater, sent a conciliatory letter to the American people via The New York Times. In
it, he wrote that "the breach of the United States Embassy premises by Egyptian protesters is illegal under international
law. The failure of the protecting police force has to be investigated." Presumably, he did not want to provoke Western
anger and put U.S. financial assistance at risk. But Cairo had to worry about domestic politics, too, and so Egyptian
President Mohamed Morsi embraced the protests and turned a blind eye to their excesses, either hoping for the Salafis'
praise or fearing their wrath.

In other countries, Salafis make up even smaller percentages of the population and have less institutional clout, but their
penchant for vigilantism makes them feared nonetheless. In Tunisia, the moderate Islamists in power only recently
allowed the Salafis to establish a political party leaving the Salafis without representation in the new Constituent
Assembly. To push their conservative agenda, Salafi activists have taken to the streets, where they have ransacked
alleged symbols of Western decadence such as bars and art exhibits and clashed with police in protests against the
secular state. Salafi rioters also burned cars and smashed windows at the American embassy, allegedly encouraged by
a jihadi Salafi cleric in Tunisia. The Tunisian government has since sought his arrest.

Organizationally, Libya's Salafis fall somewhere in between those of Tunisia and Egypt. Their number is reportedly
greater than in Tunisia but they do not have the centralized institutions of the Egyptian Salafis, which makes it hard for
them to mobilize politically. Their three political parties fared poorly in the recent elections, winning only one seat
between them. Like their Tunisian counterparts, Libyan Salafis are noteworthy for their vigilantism, particularly for
attacking the shrines of local saints. It seems likely that Salafi jihadis led the assault on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi
that resulted in the death of several American citizens, including the U.S. ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens.
The government responded quickly by condemning the violence and vowing to track down the culprits. Libyan citizens
also protested against the perpetrators of the attack.

As the United States considers how to respond to the protests, it would do well to consider the varied national
circumstances underlying them. In Egypt, after all, Salafis who participate in politics have shown that they are not
necessarily hostile to U.S. security interests in the region. As shown by their political platforms, they care more about
cultural issues. Yet it is precisely their anger over a cultural issue that led to their assault on the U.S. consulates and
embassies. If Salafis become involved in electoral politics across the region, their cultural views will not change. At the
very least, though, they would become more answerable to their fellow citizens.

The best course for the United States is to address its concerns about Salafi groups to their respective governments and
to make it clear that these concerns have to do with security and not religion. Washington must emphasize that it
expects governments in the region to prevent the most extreme of its Salafis from resorting to violence. Withholding aid
from these countries would be the most drastic measure; the United States can also issue travel alerts, which hurt the
tourism and foreign investment that these governments depend on. Calling attention to the double talk of political and
religious leaders in the region also helps hold them accountable. Even raising doubts about the status of an ally, as
Obama did in an interview with Telemundo last week, can give more leverage to Islamists working to improve relations
with the West.

If Middle Eastern governments respond by punishing those who harmed American property and citizens, protecting U.S.
embassies during future protests, and discouraging violent reprisals for cultural insults, the United States will not have to
act on its threats. Indeed, Tunisia and Libya are already doing so, which the United States should reward with security
assistance if those countries require it. But if those same governments pander to the protestors or continue to allow them
to destroy American lives and property, then the United States should respond quickly. A U.S. failure to enforce its
redlines hurts non-Salafi Islamists as much as it hurts the United States. The non-Salafi Islamists appear weak, dancing
to someone else's tune. They also appear incapable of policing their own citizens.

Salafis also stand to gain by reining in their vigilantes. The movement is too closely associated with violent excess,
which has hindered Salafism from becoming a majority movement outside the Gulf. During the recent protests, the self-
described "jihadi trend" was in full view. Al Qaeda's flag flew prominently at several demonstrations; protesters even
raised it over the U.S. embassy in Cairo in place of the American one. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri's brother, a
self-professed jihadi, also played a prominent role in the Cairo protests. The refrain "Obama, all of us are Osama" was
written on nearby walls, and it echoed around the protest. Such slogans scare moderates in the region, regardless of
ideology, and likely worry outside Salafi funders who would rather avoid association with an international pariah such as
al Qaeda.

The embassy protests will not be the last aftershock of the Arab uprisings. There are simply too many extremists and
provocateurs on both sides of the Atlantic. As the region continues to rebuild itself, the Salafis will not likely come to
power but will certainly continue to press those who do. Until moderate Islamists take them to task, Salafis will continue
to erode their authority and jeopardize their alliances.