Res Publica (2005) 11:201–211
Springer 2005

DOI 10.1007/s11158-005-0734-x

EMANUELA CEVA

LIBERAL PLURALISM AND PLURALIST LIBERALISM

William Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political
Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 150pp.

As its title indicates, the central elements of Galston’s investigation

are ‘liberalism’ and ‘pluralism’; his prime focus is on how the relation
between the two might most adequately be theorised.
After a brief contexualisation of the issues at stake (Section I),
Galston explores that relation at different levels. In Section II, his
analysis focuses on the theoretical investigation of the ideas of lib-
eralism and pluralism. Having identified value pluralism and a form
of negative liberty as fundamental values to be safeguarded, in Sec-
tion III Galston explores different ways of combining the protection
of these elements with the need for State intervention, which is
essential to grant structural stability in terms of the constant respect
of legitimate diversity. Galston deals with the practical implications
pluralism may have for political theory, in terms of the justification of
democratic institutions, the role of education and the definition of
freedom of association. Given the impressive number of thought-
provoking suggestions put forward in this book, I have decided to
concentrate mainly on Section II and, particularly, on the argument
Galston offers in support of the compatibility between pluralism and
liberalism.

Near the beginning of his work, Galston states explicitly that its aim is
to define a proposal for a ‘liberal theory of politics’ (3) which is both
pluralist and comprehensive. With this aim in mind, Galston directly
engages with two influential thinkers of our time: John Rawls and John
202 EMANUELA CEVA

Gray. Against Rawls’s endorsement of a purely political form of lib-

eralism, Galston makes a case for a comprehensive conception. Sub-
sequently, he argues for the compatibility of such a form of liberalism
with the implications of value pluralism, thus contravening Gray’s
famous argument for the incongruity between these two terms.1
In Galston’s characterisation of liberalism, a chief role is played by
what he calls the ‘principle of expressive liberty’. This states that
individuals and groups should lead their lives in the light of what they
value ‘within a range of legitimate variation’ (3), and, in doing so,
they need to be protected from external interference. It is precisely to
allow individuals and groups to exercise this liberty that liberal
institutions need to be in place. These latter may restrict individual
freedoms in order to prevent violations of expressive liberty, and are
thus presented as having a purely instrumental value.
Building on this sketch of certain liberal essentials, Galston turns
to the relation between autonomy and diversity. By the former he
means ‘individual self-direction’, whilst the latter stands for ‘legiti-
mate differences among individuals and groups over such matters as
the nature of the good life, sources of moral authority, reason
versus faith, and the like’ (21). Traditional liberal views have
combined these two terms in a way which suggests that autonomy is
a precondition of the flourishing of diversity. Galston puts this view
into question, highlighting the strikingly partial nature of autonomy
as a value. In other words, whilst diversity is a fact (besides being a
value that some cultures may want to support), autonomy has an
entirely normative status and its acceptability depends on which
contexts we wish to take into consideration. Accordingly, in
opposition to Will Kymlicka’s attempt to reconcile autonomy and
diversity,2 Galston argues that ‘many cultures or groups do not

1
I shall return to Gray’s views on the incompatibility between liberalism and
pluralism in Section III. In broad terms, the focus of Gray’s argument rests on the
idea that if we are to take value pluralism seriously, we cannot simultaneously
attribute the kind of priority to the idea of negative liberty which liberals seem in fact
to argue for. Within a consistently pluralistic perspective, according to Gray, neg-
ative liberty can be endorsed only as one value among many others – and so any view
that gives pride of place to such a value (as liberalism does) is doomed to clash with
any serious commitment to pluralism. See on this J. Gray, Liberalism (Buckingham:
Open University Press, 1995) and J. Gray, Isaiah Berlin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1996).
2
See W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1989).
 LIBERAL PLURALISM AND PLURALIST LIBERALISM 203

place a high value on choice and (to say the least) do not encourage
their members to exercise it’ (21). If liberals go on linking their
programmes so tightly to the endorsement of the value of auton-
omy, they risk making ‘‘liberalisation’’ sound like ‘‘imposition of
autonomy’’. Accordingly, this would imply a high level of inter-
ference in the lives of those groups, or cultures, that do not value
autonomy in the first place. Building on this, Galston goes on to
argue that, ‘properly understood, liberalism is about the protection
of legitimate diversity’ (23) – and that consequently, placing a thick
conception of autonomy at its foundation significantly narrows
down its capacity to accommodate diversity. Galston endorses a
Berlinian portrait of our moral universe, as ‘characterised by plural
and conflicting values that cannot be harmonised in a single com-
prehensive way of life’. This comes together with the recognition
that duly fostered, a ‘wide (though not indefinitely wide) range of
such goals and conceptions could serve as bases of worthwhile lives’
(27).
Here we have, then, a serious attempt to sketch the essential
traits of a theory of liberalism which is brave enough to part
company with a partial, westernised tradition, and to transcend
what may have seemed to be its natural boundaries: and in so
doing, to become more inclusive and sensitive to plurality. None-
theless, the scope of such a theory will strongly depend on the
definition of what counts as ‘legitimate diversity’, i.e. what counts
as a variation that can be tolerated, and thus needs to be protected
through liberal practices and institutions. As we have seen, Galston
openly criticises those liberals that place autonomy at the heart of
their theories, since in doing so they seem to fail to recognise that
autonomy is only ‘one possible mode of existence in liberal soci-
eties – one among many others’ (24). Such different ways of life
need in fact to be equally respected in order to allow the fullest
possible scope for diversity. It is precisely on what we might mean
by ‘the fullest scope’ that I shall concentrate in this review from
now on. As will emerge later, it is in this process of definition of
what counts as ‘legitimate diversity’ that Galston tries to defend –
against Gray – a compatibility between pluralism and liberalism.
The risk here is that in trying to combine these two ideas in an
acceptable way, Galston in fact underestimates the scope of Gray’s
criticism, thus significantly limiting the reach of his answer. I ex-
pand on what I mean by this in Section IV below.
204 EMANUELA CEVA

II

Among the hardest tasks to tackle in attempting to accommodate

diversity within a liberal state is the need to find a balance between
respect for individual freedom and the extent of State power. In this
respect, Galston introduces and analyses three key concepts which, he
hopes, may be of some help in addressing such an issue. These con-
cepts are:

(1) Expressive liberty, in the sense specified earlier.

(2) Value pluralism, which, along the lines of Isaiah Berlin’s
definition, is characterised in terms of ‘a world in which
fundamental values are plural, conflicting, incommensurable in
theory, and uncombinable in practice – a world in which there
is no single univocal summum bonum that can be defined
philosophically, let alone imposed politically’ (30). This
metaphysical view of values3 does not entail that no possible
ranking can ever be established between different values. But
what is rejected, from this perspective, is the ‘idea of a once-
and-for-all priority of some values over others’ (31).
(3) Political pluralism, in accordance with which ‘our social life
comprises multiple sources of authority and sovereignty – indi-
viduals, parents, associations, churches, and state institutions
among others – no one of which is dominant for all purposes
and on all occasions’ (36). At such a political level, the main
challenge seems to be related to the centrifugal tendencies of
pluralism. In Galston’s words, ‘the political meaning of moral
pluralism emerges in the unending dialogue between the differ-
entiating force of individuality and the organizing tendencies of
commonality’ (78). To face such a situation a structured political
and institutional framework is needed, as Galston observes in
addressing the relation between the constitutional element of a
society (embodying a community’s identity) and its pluralist
awareness.

3
For a comparative analysis of such a normative conception of pluralism with a
more descriptive stance see C. Larmore, ‘Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement’,
Social Philosophy and Policy, 11 (1994), 61–79 and E. Ceva, ‘Giustizia Procedurale e
Pluralismo dei Valori’, in eds M. Ricciardi and C. Del Bò, Pluralismo e Libertà
Fondamentali (Milano: Giuffrè, forthcoming).
 LIBERAL PLURALISM AND PLURALIST LIBERALISM 205

The above definition of value pluralism is characterised in terms of a

comprehensive moral doctrine, and Galston endorses it as both
metaphysically and politically relevant. Such a move clashes openly
with the spirit of the post-Rawlsian separation of political from
comprehensive doctrines.4 The implications of such a divorce are
particularly significant when it comes to the matter of public justifi-
cation. This latter, according to a Rawlsian stance, needs to be based
only on political values, these being the only possible focus of an
overlapping consensus between different agents who have deep dis-
agreements in terms of their comprehensive doctrines. Rawls’s
argument seems to install a sharp distinction between the political
sphere (where only public reasons – i.e., reasons that are free from
any reference to any comprehensive doctrine – are allowed) and the
background culture, where the appeal to one’s comprehensive doc-
trine is permitted.

Against Rawls’s model, Galston invokes the well-known – and

communitarian-flavoured – argument that it is questionable, at
least, that agents can actually detach their views on political and
public matters from the comprehensive doctrines to which they
subscribe. The example provided involves certain religious mat-
ters, like human sacrifice, which in a complex society need to be
politically tackled and regulated, thus requiring a political dis-
cussion of issues that are almost exclusively supported by a ref-
erence to comprehensive doctrines. We might think here of
controversial cases like abortion, assisted suicide or issues around
reproductive rights, where religious and ethical views will be
deeply interwoven with any political stance agents may put for-
ward.5 From this perspective, it seems unfeasible to, say, ask a
Catholic to make a ‘political’ case against abortion without
making any reference to her views concerning the inviolability of

4
In Political Liberalism, Rawls explains that ‘a doctrine is fully comprehensive
when it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articu-
lated scheme of thought; whereas a doctrine is only partially comprehensive when it
comprises certain (but not all) non-political values and virtues and is rather loosely
articulated. Note that, by definition, for a conception to be even partially compre-
hensive, it must extend beyond the political and include non-political values and
virtues, J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993),
175.
5
See on this M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982).
206 EMANUELA CEVA

life as a gift from God. More generally, Galston suggests, it is

impossible to make sense of the political and moral disagreement
that characterises our world without making reference to those
comprehensive doctrines that form the basis of the disagreement
itself.

III

Thus having established the need to elaborate a comprehensive the-

ory of liberalism (which alone seems to be able to take moral dis-
agreement seriously), Galston goes on to explore the various
implications value pluralism may have for a definition of a theory of
this sort. In so doing, he takes into consideration the disagreement
between Berlin and Gray on pluralism, defending the position of the
former against the criticism of the latter. Galston singles out two
‘master-ideas’ Berlin uses in his theorising of liberalism,6 i.e., (i) value
pluralism and (ii) negative freedom. According to Gray, these two
ideas are in fact hardly compatible, since ‘the more seriously we take
value pluralism, the less inclined we will be to give pride of place to
negative liberty as a good that trumps all others’ (48). On this basis
the overall compatibility between value pluralism and liberalism (as a
theory which grants priority to the value of negative liberty) is open
to doubt. Consequently, liberalism’s universalistic aspirations are
questioned and confined to a more local or, better, contextualised
dimension of acceptability. Though he has some sympathies with
Gray’s emphasis on the limits of liberalism in the face of pluralism,
Galston questions the possibility of translating this point into a
general, in-principle declaration of incompatibility between the two.
Even while Galston endorses Gray’s stance, according to which
autonomy is an unsuitable basis for a pluralism-sensitive theory of
liberalism,7 he attempts, at the very same time, a defence of the idea
of negative liberty as an adequate complement to the acknowledge-
ment of value pluralism.

6
See I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
7
In Galston’s words, taking value pluralism seriously, ‘there are many valuable
ways of life […] that are not autonomous in the sense that they are not the product of
conscious reflection and choice but, rather, of habit, tradition, authority, or
unswerving faith’ (49).
 LIBERAL PLURALISM AND PLURALIST LIBERALISM 207

Following Daniel Weinstock’s reading of Berlin,8 Galston coun-

terposes to a radical approach to pluralism (according to which ‘any
objective value can in principle be replaced by any other’) a restricted
version of it, which does not treat all values as equally replaceable. In
particular, Berlin seems to consider negative freedom to be an ‘‘un-
touchable’’ value. Galston recognises Berlin’s ambiguity in explaining
how such a restriction can be justified: Berlin appeals to an ‘essence of
human nature’, a metaphysical position which includes the idea of
negative liberty as a threshold ‘below which no form of life can be
considered minimally human, decent, and morally acceptable’ (50).
Galston tries to defend such a view, showing that Gray has no
compelling arguments to undermine it. In my view, since Berlin is
arguing for a pretty ‘‘thick’’ metaphysical stance, given the context of
pluralism (where such stances are likely to be objects of disagreement
between different agents), the burden of justification should lie not
with Gray, but with Berlin himself. If our world is regarded as being
deeply divided in terms of what counts as an overriding value, or
worldview, any value or worldview that wants to place itself beyond
any questioning would seem to need more urgent justification in the
face of pluralism, than pluralism needs in the face of claims to
overriding value. But pace this point, let me proceed in presenting
Galston’s argument to see whether he is successful in his defence of
Berlin.
To provide a minimal definition of negative liberty, Galston
stresses that its basis is not ‘the belief system or psychology that
leads individuals to particular ways of life but, rather, the absence
of force’ (51). From this negative perspective, freedom is thus
essentially identified with the ‘ability to leave’ a given situation
without any interference coming from any source of external
coercion.9 Berlin places such a value at the basis of his pluralistic

8
See D. Weinstock, ‘The Graying of Berlin’, Critical Review, II /4 (1997), 481–501.
9
This is indeed a very minimal conception of negative freedom, from which all
other specific forms of negative liberty (such as, for instance, free speech or freedom
from arbitrary arrest) may be derived. It may be argued that its very minimalness
makes the conception too thin, and that it scarcely represents the complexity of
liberals’ endorsement of the idea of negative liberty. It is important to notice here,
though, that such a characterisation is instrumental to Galston’s argument, to show
how such a minimal version of this value can be compatible with different specific
commitments to several other different values, i.e. it is compatible with a commit-
ment to pluralism. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for his/her comments on
this point.
208 EMANUELA CEVA

conception of liberalism, via a line of reasoning which goes

roughly like this: even if many cultures may not have negative
liberty among their fundamental values, it may none the less be
worthy of protection to grant exit options to those members who
may want to leave a given group. At the risk of oversimplifying
Berlin’s argument, we can see that, despite the respect which is due
to values other than negative freedom, the protection of this par-
ticular value seems to be fundamental at least in a specific but not
infrequent case, i.e., when ‘certain individuals or subcommunities
within a non-choice society cease to feel this sense of identification,
wish to live their lives differently, perhaps wish to leave altogether’
(54). The endorsement of negative freedom seems then to be
essential to prevent cultures from turning into prisons – and thus it
needs to be supported cross-culturally. From a general liberal
perspective, one could scarcely disagree with such a stance, and so
must acknowledge the compatibility between pluralism and liber-
alism (represented here in terms of its fundamental value, i.e.,
negative freedom). But it is also worth noticing that this is a
justified conclusion to reach precisely because a ‘‘liberal’’ values the
ideas of freedom of choice, conscious belonging and explicit con-
sent which the very idea of negative liberty entails. It would look
completely different, say, from a paternalistic perspective, where a
political leader is supposed to do what she perceives to be in the
best interest of her fellow citizens, even when this entails acting
against their wills.10

IV

Galston scores a kind of victory here. What such a line of reasoning

unequivocally shows is the compatibility between liberalism and a
certain restricted form of pluralism, whose grounding value is a
definitively liberal one. Otherwise, we would not be able to under-
stand why it should be coercion – rather than the freedom to

10
One may ague here that many horrible crimes have been committed in the name
of a supposed better insight into other people’s interests. But it is equally true that
freedom of choice has often led to destruction. I am not interested in this particular
issue here. The reference to a hypothetical paternalistic scenario is only instrumental,
providing an example of a situation that is unbearable from a liberal perspective, yet
makes perfect sense from a different one.
 LIBERAL PLURALISM AND PLURALIST LIBERALISM 209

leave – that stands in need of justification. And yet outside of liberal

assumptions, negative liberty cannot be conceived of as a sort of
self-justifying value, just as coercion cannot. Such a ‘pervasive hu-
man desire to go our own way in accordance with our own desires
and beliefs’ (58) presupposes a liberal understanding of human
beings as self-defining individuals, which is not as uncontroversial as
Galston sometimes seems to suggest. It is also true that this rep-
resents only a marginal problem for Galston, who throughout the
work makes no attempt to conceal the liberal roots of his analysis.
Indeed, quite the reverse.
But if it is clear that Galston does have a strong point against
Gray in his defence of a compatibility between liberalism and plu-
ralism, it seems equally true that Gray himself does not emerge
completely defeated. Galston unquestionably scores a point in
claiming that it seems implausible to argue for the absolute
incompatibility between liberalism and value pluralism. As we have
seen above, Galston is successful in showing that liberalism is
compatible with value pluralism when this latter is conceived in a
restricted form. Within his theory of liberalism, Galston’s attention
to pluralism rules out the idea of a universally accepted ordering of
values. Consequently, the scope of Galston’s understanding of
pluralism seems to be related to the various ways in which different
values may be combined, according to different orders of priority.
But the range of such combinations needs, none the less, to remain
within the boundaries of the liberal sphere (i.e., needs to be com-
patible with the idea of negative liberty) to be acceptable as a
legitimate variation.
Galston carefully points out that ‘to offer [as he has] a qualified
defence of liberal universalism in the context of value pluralism is not
in any way to recommend the imposition of liberal institutions
everywhere’ (62). Galston is certainly right on this; and in fact, far
from risking such an imposition, what seems the most problematic
point within his argument is the narrow scope of its analysis. As we
have noticed above, the scope of the version of pluralism which is
here considered is restricted to those legitimate variations, which are,
that is to say, compatible with a liberal understanding of the world.
Moving from this, what clearly emerges from Galston’s analysis is a
defence of a particular variety of liberalism – pluralist liberalism –
and of its superiority over other forms of liberalism (e.g., liberal
perfectionism or monistic liberalism) in dealing with a particular sort
of pluralism: liberal pluralism.
210 EMANUELA CEVA

From this perspective, Galston’s answer to Gray’s challenge

seems only partially convincing. If Galston is successful in showing
that pluralism and liberalism are not necessarily incompatible, at
least according to a particular understanding of each, he avoids the
deeper implications of Gray’s criticism. In other words, given his
interest in defending a liberal understanding of pluralism, Galston
never questions his liberal forma mentis and related assumptions.
This significantly limits the impact of the critique he deflects back
onto Gray. If pluralism is to be taken seriously, the same kind of
criticism that Galston directs at those liberals who place the value
of autonomy at the basis of their theories is to be faced by those
who, like him and Berlin, place negative liberty at the heart of
their views.
Let me explain what I mean by this claim. Even if negative liberty
may seem to be a thinner value than autonomy (and Galston’s case
for this seems to be persuasive), it remains none the less a contro-
versial value, which is hard to justify once liberal assumptions are
questioned. The liberty to leave a given group when one no longer
feels comfortable within it can be seen as directly clashing, for
instance, with such values as the preservation of the unity of a
community – just as upholding autonomy is in tension with, say,
obedience to authority. Similarly, if an argument can be proposed to
show the compatibility between a certain restricted understanding of
pluralism and a theory of liberalism based on the idea of negative
freedom (defined in the sense specified above), a case might equally be
made for a compatibility between a similarly restricted understanding
of pluralism and a theory of liberalism that is grounded in the value
of autonomy. It all depends on the range of legitimate variations one
normatively allows to be included within pluralism. In this last case,
for instance, it would be restricted to those ways of life that have been
consciously chosen by those who live according to them.
Galston’s case for the complementarity of value pluralism and
negative freedom is certainly more inclusive and sensitive to differ-
ences than an argument based on autonomy. Nevertheless, it never
goes beyond the safe boundaries of liberal thought and, accordingly,
seems only partially to respond to Gray’s challenge. This is not
necessarily a problem for Galston’s argument, which is surely suc-
cessful in proposing a distinctly inclusive pluralist theory of liberal-
ism. But all the same, it would have been interesting had he met
Gray’s challenge at a deeper level, met value pluralism in its most
radical implications, and responded to the possibility that liberal
 LIBERAL PLURALISM AND PLURALIST LIBERALISM 211

ideas (like autonomy and negative freedom) might simply be ‘‘some

among many others’’.

Department of Government
Dover Street Building
University of Manchester
Manchester
M13 9PL
E-mail: emanuela.ceva@stud.man.ac.uk