PERSPECTIVE

Paths of Integration for Sexual

Minorities in Korea
Joseph Yi and Joe Phillips*

Abstract
The prevailing social model among the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender) in South Korea is to maintain somewhat sexually free but
separate social enclaves. This strategy avoids significant public backlash and
government oppression. However, the situation leaves them without legal
protection, social acceptance or significant public space for expressing their
sexual identity. Supporters of greater integration pursue a politically activist
model, which advocates government recognition and protection of the
LGBT as an oppressed minority. This strategy faces determined opposition
from some Christian groups and a mostly indifferent public. We highlight
a complementary “bridging-dialogue” model in which individual LGBT
persons nurture communicative social ties with members of the larger
society in ostensibly non-political settings. Although emerging and limited,
the bridging strategy attracts many more participants than does identity
politics and generates genuine dialogue and other social exchange among
different groups, including conservative Christians and foreign-origin
LGBTs. Bridging dialogue also appeals to a younger generation of Koreans,
who are more tolerant of and curious about ethnic and sexual diversity.

Keywords: LGBT, Christian, liberal, democracy, same-sex marriage, South

Korea, evangelical
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2015881123

Introduction: A Typology of LGBT Participation

S
ince the country’s transition to democratization and globalization in
the late 1980s, academics and popular media in South Korea (Korea)
have increasingly discussed the rights and welfare of historically
marginal groups, including women, the handicapped, North Korean refugees
and migrant workers. A key component of this discourse is the multicultural
____________________
Joseph E. Yi is an associate professor of political science at Hanyang University. His teaching and
research centre on diversity and cooperation, especially in East Asia and North America. Email:
joyichicago@yahoo.com.

Joe Phillips (corresponding author) is an associate professor of global studies at Pusan National
University, Busan, South Korea 609–735. His teaching and research focus on domestic and international
human rights. He has authored articles on due process, corporate social responsibility and minority
assimilation, and a legal treatise. Email: joephillips5@gmail.com.

© Pacific Affairs: Volume 88, No. 1 March 2015 123

 Pacific Affairs: Volume 88, No. 1 – March 2015

rights of different ethnic and cultural groups.1 Until recently, one group
generally not included in Korean human rights and multicultural discourse
was the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender).2
The LGBT play a central role in Western debates over minority rights,
and have inspired much academic and demographic research. In contrast,
Koh finds the LGBT “almost non-existent”3 in Korean academia, and Bong
observes that “no official or reliable statistics to measure the actual size of
their population exists.”4 Still, a small, growing literature discusses the LGBT
experience in Korea; from this and our ongoing fieldwork, we develop an
analytical and empirical typology revealing three models of LGBT
participation in Korean society.
The prevailing model among the LGBT in Korea is to participate in dense,
sexually active, but separate and passive enclaves. A small, vocal group of
LGBT activists pursue “identity politics,” seeking more open integration into
the larger society and government recognition and protection as an
oppressed minority. However, this has confronted vocal opposition from
some conservative Christian groups and, at best, an apathetic public. The
reaction of Christians in Korea is partly fuelled by the success of gay identity
activists—and the resulting marginalization of some orthodox Christians—in
the West.
We highlight an alternative, “bridging-dialogue” model of integration,
whereby LGBT individuals nurture social ties and communicate with
members of the larger society in ostensibly non-political settings, such as
gatherings of school friends, civic organizations and university forums. The
bridging model attracts many more participants than does identity politics
and includes members of groups who are relatively muted in politicized
settings. The dialogue found in these settings furthers democratic
deliberation and support for minority rights. Bridging dialogue also appeals
to a younger generation of Koreans, who are more tolerant of and curious
about diversity.
Our analysis draws on interviews with activists from the LGBT-rights
____________________

* Acknowledgment note: This work was supported by a Hanyang University Research Grant and
the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-
2014S1A5A8019313).
We appreciate the research assistance of Min Joo (Heather) Yang and the many university students
who participated in civil dialogue.
1
Nam-Kook Kim, “Multicultural Challenges in Korea: The Current Stage and a Prospect,”
International Migration 52, no. 2 (2014): 100–121.
2
Sexual minorities potentially include practitioners of a wide variety of nonconventional sexual
practices. This article focuses on those with same-sex attractions, specifically the LGBT. Among various
sexual minorities, the LGBT have gained the most social and legal acceptance in liberal, capitalist
democracies. We also use the terms homosexual or gay to describe those with same-sex attractions.
As in other countries, gay men are the largest subgroup of the LGBT in Korea.
3
Dong-Yeon Koh, “Globalizing Korean Queers? Project L(esbian), the First Exhibition of
Lesbian Arts in South Korea,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 14, no. 3 (2013): 378–400, 390–91.
4
Y.D. Bong, “The Gay Rights Movement in Democratizing Korea,” Korean Studies 32 (2008):
86–103, 87.

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coalition, members of a bilingual, LGBT-affirming church in Seoul, and

evangelical pastors and lay leaders in Seoul.

Paths of LGBT Participation

Segregation-Closeted
For centuries, persons with non-conventional, sexual preferences were
disorganized and isolated in Korea, largely conforming to a hetero-normative
lifestyle through marriage and procreation.5 During the mid-twentieth
century, Korea’s experiences as a development state, military dictatorship,
and adversary of North Korea “solidified the binary and hierarchical
conceptualization of gender that regards homosexuality as a foreign and
un-Korean value.”6
Since the 1980s, with the progression toward a liberal, capitalist democracy,
the LGBT have developed a large, vibrant subculture, including bars, clubs
and networking sites.7 Ivancity, the leading dating portal for gay men, has
claimed approximately 280,000 members.8 This subculture mostly remains
separate and invisible from the mainstream, hetero-normative society.9 Bong
explains that, “as long as homosexuals do not cross the boundary of ghettos
set by invisible rules in the [Korean] society, their access to ‘normal life’ is
guaranteed.”10
Most LGBTs have largely adjusted themselves to this compromise, showing
little appetite for activist-identity politics and accommodating themselves to
hetero-normative behaviour in the workplace and family. For example, Cho
has documented “contract marriages” between closeted gays and lesbians,
which satisfy family and other social pressures to marry while allowing
alternative lifestyles.11

Identity Politics
A small, vocal group of LGBT activists reject closeting and publicly advocate
for greater legal rights and social acceptance. Activists, in 2008, formed the
____________________
5
John (Song Pae) Cho, “The Wedding Banquet Revisited: ‘Contract Marriages’ between Korean
Gays and Lesbians,” Anthropological Quarterly 82, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 401–422.
6
Bong, “Gay Rights Movement,” 88.
7
Cho, “The Wedding Banquet, 403; Douglas Sanders, “Mujigae Korea” (2009), 14–15, 22–23,
www.asylumlaw.org/docs/sexualminorities/KoreaMujigae_Korea080309.pdf, last accessed 1 November
2014.
8
Junghoon Yang, “Homosexuals and the Contemporary Gay Rights Movement in Korea:
Movement Participation and Collective Identity,” (master’s thesis, University of Roehampton, University
of Gothenburg, University of Tromso, 2013), 4, 52; Ivancity, www.ivancity.com.
9
National Human Rights Commission of Korea, National Human Rights Commission of Korea:
Activities in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (Sidney: Asia Pacific Forum, 2009), 1–2,
http://asiapacificforum.net/support/issues/sexual-orientation/downloads/apf-regional-workshop-
may-2009/south-korea-nhri-background-paper/view, last accessed 1 November 2014.
10
Bong, “Gay Rights Movement,” 98.
11
Cho, “The Wedding Banquet,” 402–406.

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Rainbow Action, a loose coalition of 17 organizations, including the Solidarity

for LGBT Human Rights of Korea (DongInRyun) and Christian Solidarity for
a World without Discrimination (Chasegiyeon).12 Their efforts have contributed
to limited legal rights and recognition.13 The government’s National Human
Rights Commission declared unconstitutional both employment
discrimination against homosexuals and the military’s ban against same-sex
relationships. In 2011, the Seoul city government included a provision
protecting the rights of LGBT teens.14
Nonetheless, there is no enforceable law prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation or gender identity, and no right to same-sex marriage.
When the National Human Rights Commission suggested a general anti-
discrimination law, strong opposition, particularly among evangelical
Christians, led the Ministry of Justice, in 2007, to remove sections covering
sexual orientation from the proposed legislation.15
Despite weak identity activism and a near-invisible gay culture, social and
religious conservatives, including the Christian Council of Korea, vocally
protest against LGBT rights and recognition.16 The reaction of evangelical
activists in Korea is partly fuelled by the very success of gay activists in the
West. Some evangelicals, such as Paul Choi (International Cooperation
Mission Agency), imagine themselves as an embattled remnant, threatened
by non-believers, generally, and Western human rights activists, particularly.

Christians who stand by God’s Word are becoming outcasts in a world

ruled by the doctrine of human rights. The end-times tribulation of
Christians in the Bible will come through this continual anti-Christian
movement with the façade of bettering mankind through social
progress.17

____________________

12
Yang, “Homosexuals and the Contemporary Gay Rights,” 1–2, 19–20; Korea Sexual Minority
and Cultural Rights Center, http://kscrc.org/en/intro.shtml, last accessed 1 November 2014.
13
The Korea Times, “Will Homosexuality be Accepted in Barracks?” 6 June 2010; Bong, “Gay
Rights Movement,” 92–96; Sanders, “Mujigae Korea,” 14–49.
14
Hansook Oh, “Gay Rights Activists in Korea Step Up to Support LGBTQ Youth,” KoreaAm
Journal (16 February 2014).
15
Sanders, “Mujigae Korea,” 44–47; Human Rights Watch, “South Korea: Anti-Discrimination
Bill Excludes Many,” 6 November 2007, http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/11/05/south-korea-anti-
discrimination-bill-excludes-many, last accessed 1 November 2014.
16
The Korea Times, “Crusade on Gay Legislation,” 14 April 2013; The Korea Times, “LGBT Forum
in Korea Faces Resistance,” 29 October 2013. The Christian Council of Churches has claimed to be
the country’s most influential Protestant lobby organization, representing more than 45,000 churches
and twelve million followers.
17
Paul Choi, “Same-Sex Marriage and the Global Anti-Christian Movement,” Global Alliance
Newsletter (May 2013). For a description of this general worldview, see Ju Hui Judy Han, Missionary
Destinations and Diaporic Destiny: Spatiality of Korean-American Evangelism and the Cell Church Institute for
the Study of Social Change (Berkeley: Institute for the Study of Social Change, 2005), http://escholarship.
org/uc/item/0bg1r5nv, last accessed 1 November 2014. For the growing divide between Korean
evangelicals and gay activists, see Joseph Yi, Joe Phillips and Shin Do Sung, “Same-Sex Marriage,
Korean Christians, and the Challenge of Democratic Engagement,” Society 51 (July/Aug. 2014):
415–422.

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After the US Supreme Court overturned federal and California laws against
same-sex marriage in 2013, the Christian Council of Korea criticized America
for “completely discarding” its Puritan beliefs.18 In fact, conservative religious
activists consider any legal rights for the LGBT to be part of the movement
for same-sex marriage.19 Although vocal activists from the Christian Council
and the LGBT dominate media coverage,20 they make up a relatively small
segment of their respective communities. According to one informant, most
Protestant pastors do not agree with the militant, politicized tactics of the
Christian Council and generally avoid entanglement in secular politics. Many,
especially younger, pastors prefer constructive, one-on-one dialogue with
the LGBT. However, publicly starting such dialogue would incur the wrath
of older Christians, said Jay,21 a junior pastor at a Seoul-based megachurch:

As far as [older] pastors are concerned, no Koreans are gay, even though
statistics say that our youth group is filled with some kids who are having
homosexual tendencies. There’s nothing to be gained by addressing
those issues and a lot to be lost. If you say the wrong thing, you can
actually close down the whole [church] building.

The safe option for less-militant pastors is to simply not raise the issue.
Similarly, publicly out activists make up a small segment of Korea’s LGBT,
numbering about 300 in the Rainbow Action coalition. Sparse activism reflects
the relatively low level of visible police or other government oppression
against the LGBTs. Claims one activist: “Oppression [of LGBT in Korea] is
real and ubiquitous, yet invisible and weak enough to make calls for
advocating homosexuals’ rights look ‘excessive’ or ‘privileging.’”22
Much of this subtle oppression is thought to be cultural-familial, such as
the pressure to marry the opposite sex from parents and co-workers. In an
interview with the Hankyoreh newspaper (15 June 2009), Han Chae-Yoon (a
representative of the Korean Sexual-Minority Culture and Rights Center)
stated:

Although the number of homosexual social meetings has increased, and

the issue of homosexuality has become part of the social dialogue,
indirect discrimination and prejudices within the family and workplace,
and between coworkers, are still prevalent.23
____________________
18
The Korea Times, “Korean Church Group Bashes ‘Gay America,’” 2 July 2013.
19
Choi, “Same-Sex Marriage.” For similar arguments among evangelical Christians in Hong
Kong, see Chi Cheng Wat, “Political Opportunities and Discursive Opportunities Utilized by Two
Opposing Movements: Anti-Reform and Pro-Reform Rhetoric in the Case of Domestic Violence
Ordinance (DVO) in Hong Kong,” American Sociological Association, San Francisco, 2014.
20
For example, see The Korea Times, “Sexual Minorities Call for More Rights,” 10 June 2014.
21
Italicized names are pseudonyms.
22
Bong, “Gay Rights Movement,” 97.
23
Cited in Byung Ryang Lee, “The Development of Human Rights Movement of Sexual Minorities
and Policy Responses of Korean Government: A Hypothetical Discussion,” Journal of Governmental
Studies 16, no. 2 (2010): 13 (in Korean).

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In predominantly Confucian societies, like Korea or Hong Kong, gays

define discrimination as coming more from the cultural-family sphere than
the political-governmental one. They generally do not seek top-down,
governmental intervention or recognize its utility in changing the attitudes
of family members and co-workers. Most gays seek private solutions and
arrangements in lieu of political ones; for instance, some gays in China,
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore gradually introduce and integrate their
same-sex partners within their families, without overtly saying anything about
the couple’s sexuality.24 Chou Wah-Shan describes this “coming home” model
as emphasizing non-conflictual harmonious relationships, non-declarative
practical everyday acts, and a healthy personality that is not centered on
sexuality; it is, in his analysis, a practical, indigenous and, in some ways,
normatively superior alternative to the confrontational identity politics found
in the Western, “coming out” model. Chou has been sharply critiqued by
other scholars, such as Liu Jen-peng and Ding Naifei,25 for promoting a silent
form of homophobia that pressures gays to remain sexually invisible.
One group that could be an exception to Korea’s weak identity activism
is LGBT foreigners who immigrate from societies with vigorous sexual identity
activism, such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe. However,
participation of foreigners in identity activism remains problematic in Korea.
Historically, LGBT activists in Asia, Africa and other non-Western regions
struggled with the nationalist claim that homosexuality was a Western
import.26 Chou cites the attempt to organize a gay pride parade in Hong
Kong in 1992 that only managed to attract ten foreigners and two overseas
Chinese; organizers cancelled the parade to avoid reinforcing the foreign-
domination image.27
Early LGBT organizations in Korea, such as Sappo (lesbians) and
Chingusai (gay men), were founded by or included foreign-origin residents,28
but Korean native activists today stress the indigenous makeup of the LGBT
movement in their interactions with the media and public (e.g., Korea Times,
10 June 2014). Even with the growth of indigenous activism, foreigner
participation remains a sensitive topic among nationalist-minded Koreans.29
When Pastor Daniel Payne (white male, American, age 35), of the Seoul-
____________________

24
Chou Wah-Shan, “Homosexuality and the Cultural Politics of Tongzhi in Chinese Societies,”
Journal of Homosexuality 40, no. 3–4 (2001): 27–46; Chris K. Tan, “Go Home, Gay Boy! Or, Why Do
Singaporean Gay Men Prefer to Go Home’ and Not ‘Come Out’?,” Journal of Homosexuality 58, no.
6–7 (2011): 865–882.
25
Liu Jen-peng and Ding Naifei, “Reticent Politics, Queer Poetics,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies
Journal 6, no. 1 (2005): 30–55.
26
For example, see Ashley Currier, “The Aftermath of Decolonization: Gender and Sexual
Dissidence in Postindependence Namibia,” Signs 37, no. 2 (2010): 441–467.
27
Chou, “Homosexuality and the Cultural Politics,” 33.
28
Sanders, “Mujigae Korea,” 15.
29
For Korean nationalist opposition to foreign intervention, see Gi-Wok Shin, Ethnic Nationalism
in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 218–19.

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based, Open Doors Community Church, protested against the education

ministry’s removal of references to anti-homosexual discrimination in school
textbooks, a senior bureaucrat criticized him: “I don't know if it’s appropriate
for a foreigner to judge how we manage our education. You won't see us
commenting on how other countries teach at schools.”30

Bridging Dialogue
Korean society juxtaposes a relatively vibrant, but closeted, LGBT subculture
with a small, inhibited activist movement. Between these poles of segregation
and identity politics, a significant number of the LGBT follow a third path,
i.e., building close social ties and communicating with non-LGBT persons
in ostensibly non-political organizations and networks.
For instance, Seoul City Farmers (SCF) is a broadly inclusive organization
of would-be urban farmers who “care about food, care about health and
happiness, care about their neighbors and neighborhood and care about
the environment.”31 SCF’s website listed 382 registered members in 2014, 60
percent Koreans and 40 percent foreigners, communicating in English and
Korean. It included several, active gay members, such as James (white, male,
American, mid-30s), who answered honestly if members asked about his
dating status.
The Open Doors Community Church, located in Seoul and established
in 2011, is the first bilingual, LGBT-affirming church in Korea. Approximately
80 percent of the regular members (242 registered, with 40 to 60 typically
attending at least once a month) were self-identified LGBT, evenly divided
between native Koreans and foreigners. The founding pastor Daniel Payne
declared, “I do not want Open Doors to be a ‘gay ghetto,’ but open to all
people.”
Though most members avoided overt political advocacy, they participated,
altogether, in hundreds of organizations, including Animal Rescue Korea,
LanguageCast, Seoul City Farmers, Seoul Korean-Japanese International
Friends, Toastmasters and Yoga4Peace. These relatively new, multiethnic
organizations were “safe spaces” where members could develop close
friendships and discuss, with varying degrees of honesty, the lives and
challenges of the LGBT in Korea.
In these outwardly non-political settings, people interact and know each
other as individuals, rather than as representatives of opposing factions.
Less-politicized settings invite participation from members of groups who
are relatively absent in more-politicized environments. For instance, young,
moderate evangelical pastors, such as Jay, self-censored themselves in the
political debate over LGBT rights, but they found opportunities to dialogue
____________________
30
The Korea Times, “Pastor Protests ‘Homophobic’ Textbooks,” 27 October 2013.
31
Seoul City Farmers, http://seoulcityfarmers.org/; Seoul City Famers Meetup, http://www.
meetup.com/Seoul-City-Farmers/; http://www.meetup.com/Seoul-City-Farmers/events/166694212/,
last accessed 1 November 2014.

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and even befriend gays in non-politicized spaces—in Jay’s case, in seminary

classrooms when studying overseas:

At Western University, my professors were very diverse in their religious

background and sexual orientation. As you can imagine, my religious
upbringing and education clashed. So I was able to think through and
love my Jesus, but also think through social issues that concern my friends
and professors whom I love.

Another group empowered in non-political settings is foreign-origin LGBT

who, though problematic for identity activism, play a positive, creative role
in nurturing relations among gays and non-gays. As outsiders to Korea, and
often emigrants from relatively cosmopolitan societies, foreign-origin
residents share less of the fear or anger about social marginality that motivates
closeting or activism among native Koreans; they are relatively candid, but
non-confrontational, about their sexuality.
Probably the most important, organized venue for gay foreigners to
regularly interact with native heterosexuals is the after-school, private
academy (hagwon). Hagwon teachers are generally careful not to disclose
private details with underage students and their parents, but they are less
guarded with heterosexual staff members and some adult students, with
whom they sometimes form friendships. In a few instances, the teacher would
“come out” to an entire, adult student class, commonly in response to
questions about dating. This would spur additional questions and, for many
students, their first ties with an openly gay person.
Foreign-origin teachers spend many hours outside of class bonding with
native teachers and some adult students, sometimes disclosing their sexuality
with would-be friends, usually in an indirect fashion (e.g., “What are you
doing tonight, teacher?” “Oh, I am going home to my boyfriend.”). Many
natives, especially younger ones, prized friendships with foreigners as symbols
of global, cosmopolitan status, and friendships with gay foreigners were an
even more exotic marker. These friendships often led to introductions to
gay natives, because long-term resident foreigners mostly dated or lived with
native partners.
In general, we found foreign-origin residents—gay and straight—more
willing to publicly share their views on LGBT rights in Korea. We interviewed
more than twenty Protestant pastors and lay leaders based in Seoul, and the
only one willing to publicly discuss the LGBT was a resident foreigner, Ronald
Nielsen, who was the Seoul Korea LDS Temple president (2000–2003) and
Public Affairs missionary (2009–2011). With the exception of marriage, Elder
Nielsen supported full civil rights for gays, including military service.
Newcomers to Korea, such as James and Nielsen, were more open to
discussing LGBT issues than established natives; and relatively new, multi-
ethnic organizations (e.g., Seoul City Farmers) offered more opportunities
for honest dialogue than old-line, mono-ethnic organizations (e.g., alumni

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associations). Still, the vast majority of gays in Korea were neither newcomers
(foreigners) nor active members of new-line organizations. They were mostly
established natives, and—like straight natives—their primary affective, social
networks outside of the family remained churches and school alumni.32
Gay Christians mostly came from theologically conservative families; they
attended evangelical or Catholic congregations during childhood and para-
church organizations (e.g., Navigators) during college. Even these traditional
Christian groups acted as venues for heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals
to interact and form friendships; this was possible because LGBT members
did not treat the organizations as forums for activism, which would trigger
conflicts over morality and biblical interpretation.
For instance, Yoon (Korean male, 35) “came out” to his two best friends
from Navigator during graduate school, and kept in touch with his Christian
friends, even after leaving the organization. Yoon did not completely come
out to his other friends, mostly from school and college, but thought that
his friends understood at least “a little.” Yoon was less concerned about
revealing his sexuality than ensuring that his friends would accept his same-
sex partner Samuel (white male, 40), an expat English teacher. To varying
degrees, the friends understood that Samuel played an important role in
Yoon’s life.
Like Yoon, most gay natives that we observed were less concerned about
publicizing their authentic self than maintaining their affective, social
networks, and eventually including their same-sex partners in these networks.
Ambiguous, incomplete, incremental disclosure was the norm in Korea, just
as Chou and Tan found with gay Chinese.

Multicultural Generation
Critics may object that the bridging model is concentrated in, and limited,
to marginal or liminal spaces of society, characterized by native-foreigner
interaction. We suggest that it may also reflect larger, societal trends toward
accommodating ethnic and social diversity, especially among younger and
more educated persons. In 2006, President Roh declared, “It is irreversible
for Korea to move towards a multiracial and a multicultural society.”33 Public
tolerance is not limited to white Westerners, but extends to non-whites who
make up the bulk of labour and marriage migrants, and long-term foreign
residents. In surveys from the Sogang Institute for Political Studies and
Hankook Research (2013), 83.7 percent of the respondents answered that
they believe foreign workers contribute to the Korean economy; and most
respondents would accept a multicultural family as a neighbour (87.5
percent), as a co-worker (90.5 percent), and as a friend of one’s child (89.8
____________________
32
For affective networks in South Korea, see Seok-Choon Lew, Mi-Hye Chang and Tae-Eun Kim,
“Affective Networks and Modernity: The Case of Korea,” in Confucianism for the Modern World, eds.
Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 201–217.
33
Nam-Kook Kim, “Multicultural Challenges in Korea.”

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percent).34 The media highlights racially diverse, Korean-speaking celebrities,

from Jasmine Lee (Philippines) to Sam Okyere (Ghana).
A more tolerant, multicultural-minded generation broadens the normative
definition of “Korean” to include both native- and foreign-born, and
increasingly accepts both ethnic and sexual minorities. A Pew Research poll
found that general acceptance of homosexuality in South Korea increased
from 18 percent (2007) to 39 percent (2013). The generations are highly
polarized, with broad acceptance of homosexuality among the youngest (age
18 to 21) at 71 percent; minimal acceptance among the oldest (age 50 and
older) at 16 percent; and middling support among the middle-aged (age
30–49) at 48 percent.35
The high acceptance among the younger generation does not, currently,
translate into political activism; in contrast to their counterparts in the 1970s
and 1980s, university students today largely lack faith in mainstream politics.36
They do show support for less-politicized, educational and cultural activities,
such as LGBT-themed movies, university forums and festivals; the 2014 Korea
Queer Festival in Seoul, near Yonsei University, claimed a record 15,000
attendants.37
In this complex, changing landscape, the bridging-dialogue strategy allows
gays to communicate with a tolerant, sympathetic generation, while not
antagonizing older conservatives. A member of the multicultural generation
was Jose, a foreign-origin resident from Latin America. Jose was studying for
his social science doctorate in a provincial university, becoming fluent in
Korean (TOPIK Level 5), and hoping to become a professor and permanent
resident. Jose was gay and Christian, and eschewed identity politics that pitted
the two groups. He did not see the need to publicize his sexuality and cause
controversy among older professors. Rather, Jose sought to share his scholarly
research on Korean gays (native and foreign-origin) in various academic
forums and journal publications, and to educate a curious, sympathetic
generation. He described his experiences as a visitor and guest speaker at a
prestigious university in Seoul.

I felt a total open-mindedness and sincere acceptance of the students. I

had the opportunity to talk with a Swedish and a Korean student who
were very interested in the problems of the everyday gay life. I did not
need to “coming out” [sic] formally, but our conversation was natural
and respectful. My experience as speaker was conducted along the same
____________________
34
Naeil Sinmun [Naeil News], “Oeguk’in kŭlloja, kyŏngje en kiyŏ…hajiman pulan yoso” [“Foreign
Workers Contribute to the Economy…but are a Source of Unrest”], 31 July 2013; Naeil Sinmun [Naeil
News], “Hangukin ŭi tamunhwa insikŭn ‘ichungjŏk’” [“Koreans have Double Standard towards
‘Multiculturalism’”], 29 July 2013.
35
Pew Research, “The Global Divide on Homosexuality” (4 June 2013), http://www.pewglobal.
org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/, last accessed 1 November 2014.
36
Lee Young-Min, “Political Attitudes and the Formation Path of Political Preference of the 20s
in South Korea,” Korean Journal of Social Issues 19 (2010): 9–43 [in Korean].
37
The Korea Times, “Sexual Minorities Call for More Rights,” 10 June 2014.

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lines: interest, respectful and open-mindedness. I did not need to express

my personal [sexual] preferences, but explain the results of my research.
I think the students assumed my preference, but nobody asked me
directly. By contrast, they asked interesting questions [about my research
on Korean gays].

Democratic Deliberation and LGBT Integration

The prevailing model among Korean LGBT is closeted segregation from the
larger society. Activists such as Seo Dong-Jin, who reject the closet and pursue
greater integration, argue for a Western-style strategy of identity politics,
which demands legal rights and recognition of the LGBT as an oppressed
minority.38 Although this strategy has contributed to many legal gains in the
West (e.g., same-sex marriage), it has also undermined mutual dialogue, as
each side often sees the other as a threat to its rights and prerogatives. In
the United States and other Western countries, many same-sex marriage
proponents describe their opponents as bigots, who do not belong in public
discourse or positions of responsibility in public companies.39 Similarly, we
find some evidence that the success of LGBT identity politics, and the
resulting marginalization of religious conservatives in the West, has stiffened
opposition to legal rights in Korea; this is an interesting spill-over effect that
deserves further research. Whether in the United States or Korea, the LGBT
campaign for rights and recognition has fostered a vigorous religious counter-
campaign, polarizing debate and leaving little room for respectful dialogue.
We posit that bridging and dialogue in less-politicized settings—from
friendship networks to meet-up organizations to university classrooms—offer
a complementary strategy to LGBT integration. The intergroup contact
hypothesis proposes that increased familiarity with those perceived as
different reduces hostility and increases trust.40 The social capital generated
by bridging cannot replace liberal rights, but it does provide a foundation
for democratic citizens to communicate and build consensus.
The bridging model seems particularly apt for East Asian societies, such
as Korea, where Confucian-style principles and affective networks exist
alongside evolving liberal-democratic ideals.41 It builds on the principles of
non-confrontational and interpersonal harmony from Chou (“coming
home”), but extends from the family sphere to broader social networks and
civil society institutions. It encourages respectful but honest dialogue about
the lives and challenges of minorities.
____________________
38
Dong-Jin Seo, “Mapping the Vicissitudes of Homosexual Identities in South Korea,” Journal
of Homosexuality 40, no. 3/4 (2001): 65–79.
39
See Julie Hollar, “When Bigotry is ‘Balance,’” FAIR, 1 May 2013; Jessica Gerson, “Dear
Opponents of Marriage Equality: Here’s Why I call You a Bigot,” Huffington Post, 3 April 2013.
40
Sue Ann Skipworth, Andrew Garner and Bryan J. Dettrey, “Limitations of the Contact
Hypothesis: Heterogeneity in the Contact Effect on Attitudes toward Gay Rights,” Politics & Policy, 38,
no. 5 (2010): 887–906.
41
Lew et al., “Affective Networks,” 201–17; Tu Wei-ming, “Confucianism and Liberalism.” Dao:
A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2002): 1–20.

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 Pacific Affairs: Volume 88, No. 1 – March 2015

Our essay primarily focuses on the views and experiences of Christians in

Korea: conservative and moderate, gay and straight, native and foreign-born.
Because some Christians visibly lead the opposition to LGBT rights, persons
of Christian faiths are the most sensitive to the problematic relationship
between religion and sexuality. Persons of other religious faiths, especially
Buddhism, may have different views and experiences.
Most gay Christians, native and foreign-origin, remain closeted. A small
number openly rebel and politically battle their conservative brethren. A
significant, growing number eschew both closeting and identity politics in
favour of bridging dialogue across various fora. These bridging participants
tend to be younger, more educated, and foreign-origin residents or
internationally-minded natives; but rather than describe them as socially
marginal, we consider them at the forefront of a more tolerant, curious,
multicultural-minded generation.
This essay includes both empirical and normative components. We
illustrate different models of LGBT participation, as fertile areas of empirical
research for academics. Scholars may find them to be a useful analytical tool
for other societies that experience tensions between traditional hetero-
normative views and a liberal human rights regime. We also present bridging
dialogue as a promising and positive strategy for minority participation.
Those in positions of authority, such as professors and journalists, can do
more to promote such opportunities. We hope this article encourages more
people to step from the shadows and participate in the light—whether the
hot light of agonistic politics or the cooler one of social and civic dialogue.

Hanyang University, Seoul, South Korea

Pusan National University, Busan, South Korea, November 2014

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permission.