Piracy

1.
2 First Generation Crimes 23
excluding responsibility, such as intoxication, self-defence or duress,48 and the

principle of superior order.49 They must be distinguished from procedural bars to
investigation and prosecution, such as ne bis in idem50 or immunities.
1.2 First Generation Crimes

The history of international crimes is marked by paradoxes. Today there is a strong
focus on three categories of crime, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes, and, in some cases, the crime of aggression. These crimes are often referred to
as ‘core crimes’, although that term is ambiguous.51 These categories of crime are
typically directly prohibited under international law and associated with individual
criminal responsibility, rather than mere suppression duties of states. They are char-
acterized by their systematic nature, i.e. their commission by entities, such as state
agents, statelike entities or organized networks of criminality, or their harm relating to
a large group of victims.52 They are deemed to be marked by exceptional gravity,
rather than cross-border harm that affects common interests of all or a number of
states (transnational element).
However, there is a whole set of other crimes that enjoyed a high degree of
recognition even before the emergence of these crimes. They are sometimes referred
to as ‘first generation crimes’.53 They include certain ‘private’ forms of violence, i.e.
crimes by non-state actors. Initially they were considered as international offences,
because they target the common interests of states. In recent years, some of them have
gained fresh attention in modified form.
mekobreoba
1.2.1 Piracy
Piracy is usually considered to be the first universal jurisdiction crime. Pirates have
arakanonieri xomaldebi
been treated as outlaws for centuries since they targeted vessels at all times, without
54
regard to the nationality. Their activities have affected the security of navigation
vachroba gia zgva
and commerce among nations, particularly on the high seas, a zone that falls outside
the territorial jurisdiction of any state. The criminalization of piracy is closely related
to the space of commission of the crime. It was declared a universal crime for
xelisshewyoba
pragmatic reasons, namely to facilitate the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.55
48
See Art. 31 ICC Statute.
49
See Art. 33 ICC Statute.
50
Art. 20 ICC Statute. See also Section 3.6.1.
51
On the ambiguous nature of the term, see O’Keefe, International Criminal Law, 62–64.
52
L. May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
53
Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities, 29–32.
54
M. Wachspress, ‘Pirates, Highwaymen, and the Origins of the Criminal in Seventeenth-Century English Thought’
(2015) 26 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 301.
55
E. Kontorovich, ‘The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation’ (2004) 45 Harvard
International Law Journal 183.
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24 International Crimes
In the sixteenth century, the nature of the crime was heavily debated.56 Alberico
Gentili argued that pirates were enemies of all. He claimed that pirates did not deserve
the protection of the law of nations, since they violated obligations and placed
themselves outside the community of humanity and the international order.57 Hugo
Grotius advocated that pirates should be extradited or punished.58 Universal jurisdic-
tion was justified on the ground that pirates challenged not only individual nations,
but communication and trade within the community of nations and rules governing
sea travel. The punishment of piracy rested on the individual nations which enacted
piracy laws. Definitions of piracy varied across jurisdictions. They encompassed
saxelmwifo galati
elements of treason, robbery and dzaladoba
violence on the high seas by private vessels, without
uflebamosileba
lawful authority. Pirates were distinguished from ‘privateers’, i.e. state-licensed sea-
robbers.59 Universal jurisdiction was an option, not a duty. Throughout the eight-
eenth century execution was deemed to be an appropriate punishment.
tanamedrove
Under contemporary law, pirates are no longer subjects outside the law (i.e.
‘enemies’), but criminals. Piracy is essentially a crime committed by non-state actors
shenaxuli gaero
for personal gain. The modern law on piracy is enshrined in several UN conventions,
such as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation60 and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).61
UNCLOS, which is largely recognized as reflecting customary law, defines piracy as
an illegal act of violence or detention committed by a private actor against another
ship or aircraft on the high seas for private ends. It thereby differentiates piracy from
sazgvao konfliqti
naval warfare and acts of piracy committed in the territorial waters of states.
The UNCLOS definition poses difficulties for investigation and prosecution, due to
the fact that it excludes acts on territorial seas or land, or crimes of financing and
organizing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.62 One key distinction from
existing core crimes is that UNCLOS and UN resolutions only provide a framework
chaxshoba
for the repression of piracy under international law. They set obligations for states to
criminalize piracy domestically and to enhance international cooperation for their
56
For a survey, see M. Kelly, ‘The Pre-History of Piracy as a Crime & Its Definitional Odyssey’ (2015) 46 Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law 25.
57
A. Gentili, De Iure belli Libri Tres (1612) (John C. Rolfe trans., Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933), 423 (‘For pirates
are common enemies, and they are attacked with impunity by all, because they are without the pale of the law. They are
scorners of the law of nations; hence they can find no protection in that law. They ought to be crushed by us . . . and by
you in common, and by all men. This is a warfare shared by all nations’).
58
H. Grotius, The Free Sea (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004), 128 and, De Iure Belli ac Pacis, Book II, chap. XXI, paras.
III and IV; English translation, The Law of War and Peace, Classics of International Law (F. W. Kelsey trans., 1925),
526–529.
59
See Kontorovich, ‘The Piracy Analogy’, 210.
60
UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1678 UNTS 221,
27 ILM 668 (entered into force 1 March 1992). The focus lies on damage or destruction of a ship or its cargo and
endangerment of safe navigation.
61
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, 21 ILM 1261 (entered into force
16 November 1994)
62
M. Scharf, M. Newton and M. Sterio (eds.), Prosecuting Maritime Piracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015).
1.2 First Generation Crimes 25
prosecution. But they do not provide for individual criminal responsibility.63 At

present, piracy thus remains largely a transnational crime.64
There is no principal reason why certain forms of modern piracy could not develop
into an international crime, especially if they affect more than one state.65 Piracy may
be more than simple ‘robbery at sea’.66 Acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia have
sazgvao
shown that maritime piracy may reach beyond personal gain and involve organized
saqmianoba
criminal enterprise that is a threat to international peace and security. The Security
sabcho
Council requested the UN Secretary-General to report on accountability mechanisms,
generaluri mdivani
including an international tribunal for piracy offences.67 The Secretary-General sug-
gested several options: a hybrid court, a treaty-based regional court or an ad hoc
tribunal under chapter VII for piracy. The idea of a special piracy court68 was
ultimately rejected for pragmatic reasons, such as set-up time, high costs, a large
caseload and ongoing criminality. Instead special assistance was given to domestic
jurisdictions.69 The Protocol of Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol)70 marks a step beyond
the classical formulation as universal jurisdiction crime. It foresees the exercise of
regional jurisdiction over piracy as a crime, modelled after the UNCLOS definition.71
1.2.2 Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices

Slavery is a second crime that has a long historical tradition. Its origins lie in the anti-
slavery movement. Slave-trading counts among the first international crimes. It has a
forgotten history that continues to be relevant, for instance in relation to ‘combating
illegal action by non-state, transnational actors’.72 Bilateral anti-slavery courts count
among some of the first experiments to combat transnational crime. The
63
D. Guilfoyle, ‘Piracy off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and IMO Regional Counter-Piracy Efforts’
(2008) 57 ICLQ 690, 693.
64
See M. Bo, ‘Piracy at the Intersection between International and National: Regional Enforcement of a Transnational
Crime’, in H. van der Wilt and C. Paulussen (eds.), Legal Responses to Transnational and International Crimes
(Cheltenham: Elgar, 2017), 71, 74.
65
On the ICC and piracy, see Y. M. Dutton, ‘Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy within the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 11 Chicago Journal of International Law 197; M. O’Brien,
‘Where Security Meets Justice: Prosecuting Maritime Piracy in the International Criminal Court’ (2014) 4 Asian Journal
of International Law 81.
66
Contra Bo, ‘Piracy at the Intersection’, 73.
67
SC Res 1918, S/RES/1918 (2010), 27 April 2010.
68
C. Thedwall, ‘Choosing the Right Yardarm: Establishing an International Court of Piracy’ (2010) 41 Georgia Journal of
International Law 501.
69
Report of the Secretary-General on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons
responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, S/2010/394, 26 July 2010, paras.
97–102, arguing that ‘[t]he crime of piracy is well established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea and customary international law and should not present a difficulty of definition’.
70
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, AU Doc.
No. STC/Legal/Min. 7(1) Rev. 1, 14 May 2014, adopted by the AU Assembly on 30 June 2014.
71
See Art. 28 F of the Malabo Protocol. In favour of regional jurisdiction, see Bo, ‘Piracy at the Intersection’, 90–91. For
caution, see F. Jessberger, ‘Piracy (Article 28F), Terrorism (Article 28G) and Mercenarism (Article 28H)’, in G. Werle
and M. Vormbaum (eds.), The African Criminal Court (The Hague: TMC Asser, 2017), 71.
72
J. S. Martinez, ‘Anti-Slavery Courts and the Dawn of the International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 117 Yale Law
Journal 550, 633.
safrtxe
sazgvao sadazrgvevo polisi
haagas
dzarcavs
personali
sakmarisi
utanxmoeba tanxmoba
mdinaris napiri
mogzauroba
mgzavroba
guza
anazgaureba
kapitanis qmedeba romelic xomalds azianebs
damzgvevi
mitaceba
kapitanis an gundis ganzraxuli qmedebebi

jarebi
datmo
republika
,meamboxeebi
ajanyeba
FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY
*785 Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Company,

Limited
In the Court of Appeal
CA
Vaughan Williams, Farwell, and Kennedy L. JJ.
1909 Jan. 27, 28
In the King's Bench Division
Pickford J.
1908 June 18
Insurance (Marine)--"Pirates," Meaning of in Policy--Seizure of Goods by Political

Malcontents--"Warranted free of capture, seizure, and detention, piracy excepted."
Goods were shipped upon a vessel for carriage from a place at the mouth of the
Amazon to a place far inland upon a tributary of a tributary of that river, situated in a
remote territory belonging to Bolivia on the boundary between that country and
Brazil. These goods were insured for the voyage by a policy in the form of a marine
policy against, among other risks usually specified in such a policy, "pirates" and "all
other perils" that should come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the subject-
matter of insurance. The policy contained the following clause: "Warranted free of
capture, seizure, and detention, and the consequences thereof, or any attempt
thereat, piracy excepted, and also from all consequences of riots, civil commotions,
hostilities, or warlike operations, whether before or after declaration of war." The
goods insured consisted of provisions and stores which belonged to the Bolivian
Government, and were intended for Bolivian troops engaged in establishing the
authority of that Government in the before-mentioned territory. Certain malcontents,
mostly Brazilians, who were desirous that the authority of the Bolivian Government
should not be established there, had fitted out [ekipireba] an expedition which
ascended the Amazon in armed vessels for the purpose of resisting the Bolivian troops
and establishing an independent republic in the before-mentioned territory. Those on
board one of these vessels stopped the vessel on which the goods insured were
shipped and seized those goods. In an action on the policy claiming as for a loss
through pirates:--
Held, affirming the decision of Pickford J., that, even assuming that*786 the acts of
those who seized the goods came within the legal definition of piracy for some
purposes, the word "pirates," as used in the policy, must be construed in its popular
sense, and in that sense it meant persons who plunder indiscriminately for their
private gain, not persons who simply operate against the property of a particular
State for a public political end, and, therefore, there had not been a loss through
"pirates" within the meaning of the policy.
Held, also, that, having regard to the terms of the warranted free clause, the seizure
of the goods could not be treated as coming within the general words "all other perils"
as being ejusdem generis with piracy.
ACTION tried by Pickford J. without a jury.
The action was brought by the Republic of Bolivia on a policy of insurance in the form
of a marine policy issued by the defendants upon goods belonging to the Bolivian
Government shipped on the steamship Labrea for carriage from Para at the mouth of
the Amazon to Puerto Alonzo and (or) other places on the river Acre and (or) in that
district.
The risks covered by the policy were thus described therein:
"And touching the adventures and perils which the company is made liable unto or is
intended to be made liable unto by this assurance, they are of the seas, men-of-war,
fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, letters of mart and counter-mart,
surprisals, takings at sea, arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes,
and people of what nation, condition, or quality soever; barratry of the master and
mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to
the hurt, detriment, or damage of the aforesaid subject-matter of this assurance or
any part thereof."
The policy contained the following clause:--
"Warranted free of capture, seizure, and detention, and the consequences thereof, or
any attempt thereat, piracy excepted, and also from all consequences of riots, civil
commotions, hostilities, or warlike operations, whether before or after declaration of
war."
The following statement of the facts is for the most part taken from the judgment of
the learned judge:--
Puerto Alonzo, the Labrea's port of destination, is upon the river Acre, a tributary of a
tributary of the Amazon, far inland in territory belonging to the Republic of Bolivia,
known as Colonias, and subsequently as the Free Republic of El Acre.*787 During the
course of the voyage insured the Labrea was stopped at a place called Caqueta, which
is upon the river Acre, by an armed vessel called the Solimoes, which had been fitted
out by one Carvalho and his associates under the circumstances after mentioned.
Those on board the Solimoes seized and carried away the whole of the goods insured
on board the Labrea.
In 1867, by a treaty between Brazil and Bolivia, the territory of Colonias was either
ceded or assured to Bolivia. There was, however, no demarcation of the frontier until
1898, when a commission of delimitation was appointed by the two Governments and
a frontier line was fixed, called the Cunha Gomes line. Apparently Bolivia had not
before 1898 exercised any effective jurisdiction in the territory, but there was
valuable property there, rubber of considerable value being produced, and both
Brazilians and Bolivians, but chiefly Brazilians, had settled there, and traded in rubber
and other things. What the exact nature of the government of that territory was in
those days was not quite clear; probably there was not much government. There was
a custom-house at Manaos, and another at Para, at the mouth of the Amazon, and
customs were exacted in respect of goods coming down the Amazon from Colonias,
but there was no Bolivian custom-house or government set up there, and, if there
were any government exercised at all, it was exercised by magistrates appointed by
the Brazilian Government, some of whom might have been stationed on the Bolivian
side of the Cunha Gomes line. After the demarcation of the frontier was effected, the
Bolivian Government were minded to take effective possession of the territory and to
establish proper Bolivian government there, and the first step they took was to
establish a custom-house at or near Puerto Alonzo; but the representatives sent there
were turned out and one of them killed by certain persons, chiefly Brazilians, who
were not desirous that there should be a Bolivian government there, and had joined in
establishing there what they called the Free Republic of El Acre. About the same time
as the establishment of the custom-house at Puerto Alonzo and the establishment of
the Free Republic of El Acre, the Bolivian Government sent an expedition from La
Paz,*788 the capital of Bolivia, under the command of one Munoz, in order to take
possession of the territory. It was a long and difficult march from La Paz, and the
expedition was several months on the way, but it did eventually arrive within the
territory, and then the Free Republic of El Acre, for a time at least, disappeared. Some
of the republicans crossed the Brazilian frontier, and in Brazilian territory set
themselves to work either to re-establish the original Free Republic of El Acre or a
government of their own--at any rate to oust the Bolivian Government. The Brazilians
near the frontier line seemed to have been very much in sympathy with the republic,
or at any rate those persons who were resisting the establishment of the Bolivian
Government. That clearly appeared from a speech of the Governor of Manaos which
was read in the course of the trial. The Bolivian expedition, although it had arrived at
and taken possession of the territory, was in a rather difficult position; it was a very
long way from the capital, and it was very difficult to supply the expedition with
provisions and stores. They could not very well get them from the Brazilian side,
because the Brazilians were not well affected; and it was very difficult to get them
from the Bolivian capital in consequence of the distance. Accordingly it was arranged
between the Brazilian and Bolivian Governments that the expedition should be
provisioned by sending stores and provisions up the Amazon from Para, and this was
done on the Labrea, and it was in connection with the insurance of those provisions
that the question in this case arose. The before-mentioned Carvalho had been
concerned in the establishment of the Free Republic of El Acre, and was among those
who were desirous that the Bolivians should not establish any stable government in
Acre; and he started or assisted in a movement either for the re-establishment of the
Free Republic of El Acre or the establishment of another republic on his own account.
In pursuance of this design he and others fitted out an expedition in Para to intercept
the stores to be sent up for the Bolivian force, and he intended to intercept them at
Puerto Alonzo, and, having got possession of the stores, to attack the Bolivian
expedition and to make himself master of the place. With that object they fitted out
either two or three vessels, which*789 were armed, one of them, the Solimoes,
being fitted with a quick-firing gun. This expedition went up the Amazon and got
somewhere into the neighbourhood of Puerto Alonzo, and there they stopped a
number of steamers, but they did not take goods from any of them, when they
ascertained that they were not carrying goods for the Bolivian Government. When,
however, the Labrea arrived, they stopped her, and, finding that she was carrying
goods for the Bolivian Government, they took possession of her. The Solimoes was
flying a flag which the persons on board the Labrea thought to be the flag of El Acre.
Those on the Solimoes took the stores and then crossed the Bolivian frontier and
attacked, or were attacked by, the Bolivian force, with the result that the
revolutionary force was defeated and disappeared. It was contended for the plaintiffs
that the acts of those on board the Solimoes came under the head of piracy.
Scrutton, K.C. , and F. D. Mackinnon, for the plaintiffs.
J. A. Hamilton, K.C., and Leck, for the defendants.
1908. June 18. PICKFORD J.
after stating the facts substantially as above, proceeded as follows: The question is
whether, in these circumstances, the loss occurred by piracy. Those on board the
Solimoes professed, at any rate, to act on behalf of the republic which they wanted to
re-establish, or were seeking to establish, and they were flying a flag which was
supposed to be that of El Acre. The plaintiffs say that the loss was by piracy, and their
counsel have referred me to several definitions of piracy, some given by writers on
international law and some by writers on criminal law. I am not sure that the
definitions so given are necessarily in point on the question as to the meaning of the
word in a policy of insurance. One definition which was relied on was that given in
Russell on Crimes, 6th ed., vol. i. p. 260, and which is as follows: "The offence of
piracy at common law consists in committing those acts of robbery and depredation
upon the high seas which if committed upon land would have amounted to felony
there." It was said that these goods were forcibly stolen, that there was a felony, and
that the offence came within that definition, because "the high seas"*790 there
mentioned must be extended to all waters over which there was Admiralty
jurisdiction. In Reg. v. Anderson [FN1] the jurisdiction of the Admiralty was held to
extend to a ship some distance up the river Garonne, and therefore it is argued that
this place was within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. As to that, all I will say at the
moment is that I am not satisfied that an illegal act by Brazilians in a place situated
upon a tributary of a tributary of the Amazon, that act consisting in taking from a
Brazilian ship goods belonging to the Bolivian Government, comes within the
jurisdiction of the British Admiralty, but, in the view I take of the case, it is not
necessary to decide that point. I was also referred to the definitions of piracy given in
Hall's International Law and Oppenheim's International Law. The definition given by
the latter writer does not seem to be of much assistance to the plaintiffs, as he says
that the offence must be committed on the high seas. The definition given by Hall is,
no doubt, very wide, but, as I have already said, I am not at all sure that what might
be piracy in international law is necessarily piracy within the meaning of the term in a
policy of insurance. One has to look at what is the natural and clear meaning of the
word "pirate" in a document used by business men for business purposes; and I think
that, looking at it in that way, one must attach to it a more popular meaning, the
meaning that would be given to it by ordinary persons, rather than the meaning to
which it may be extended by writers on international law.
FN1 (1868) L. R. 1 C. C. 161.
This policy was for a river transit up the Amazon, and it was contended that the word
must be read in connection with that, and that the people who seized the goods
insured must be considered to be pirates in respect of that voyage, although they
were not upon the open sea, and although they might not be held to be within the
jurisdiction of the Admiralty. I will assume in favour of the plaintiffs--although I am
not sure that it is a correct assumption--that, if those people had in other respects the
attributes which ought to be attached to pirates in the case of a policy of marine
insurance, I ought to hold that the loss in this case occurred by piracy, although what
took place was not on the open sea and not within the jurisdiction of the*791
Admiralty. The facts show that there was an organized expedition for the purpose of
establishing a government in a particular territory, and they also show that
interference with property was only intended, and only effected, so far as was
necessary for that object, and not for the plundering of every one indifferently. It was
said that Carvalho's motives were private and personal motives. I do not think I can
go into that. Probably in every revolution it is not possible to say that all the persons
concerned acted simply from disinterested motives. I can only look at what was done.
Did that constitute those people pirates within the meaning of the policy? I do not
think it did. As I have said, I have to look at the more popular or business meaning of
the word "piracy," and I do not think that can be better expressed than it is in Hall's
International Law, 5th ed. p. 259, where it is said: "Besides, though the absence of
competent authority is the test of piracy, its essence consists in the pursuit of private,
as contrasted with public, ends. Primarily the pirate is a man who satisfies his
personal greed or his personal vengeance by robbery or murder in places beyond the
jurisdiction of a State. The man who acts with a public object may do like acts to a
certain extent, but his moral attitude is different, and the acts themselves will be kept
within well-marked bounds. He is not only not the enemy of the human race, but he is
the enemy solely of a particular State." That I think expresses what I have called the
popular or business meaning of the word "pirate"; and I find that several, though not
all, of the definitions cited in the note on p. 260 of the same work bear out that idea.
No doubt there are definitions which do not embody that idea, but that I think is the
common and ordinary meaning; a man who is plundering indiscriminately for his own
ends, and not a man who is simply operating against the property of a particular
State for a public end, the end of establishing a government, although that act may
be illegal and even criminal, and although he may not be acting on behalf of a society
which is, to use the expression in Hall on Indternational Law, politically organized.
Such an act may be piracy by international law, but it is not, I think, piracy within the
meaning of a policy of insurance; because, as I have already said, I think you have
to*792 attach to piracy a popular or business meaning, and I do not think, therefore,
that this was a loss by piracy. There is another passage in Hall on International Law,
at p. 262, which throws some light upon the matter. Speaking of depredations
committed at sea upon the public or private vessels of a State, or descents upon its
territory from the sea by persons not acting under the authority of any politically
organized community, notwithstanding that the objects of such persons may be
professedly political, Hall says that such acts are piratical within the meaning of the
term in international law, but he goes on to say this: "Sometimes they are wholly
political in their objects and are directed solely against a particular State, with careful
avoidance of depredation or attack upon the persons or property of the subjects of
other States. In such cases, though the acts done are piratical with reference to the
State attacked, they are for practical purposes not piratical with reference to other
States, because they neither interfere with nor menace the safety of those States, nor
the general good order of the seas. It will be seen presently that the difference
between piracy of this kind and piracy in its coarser forms has a bearing upon usage
with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction." I think that "piracy" in a policy of marine
insurance means piracy in what is called by Hall its coarser sense. I therefore come to
the conclusion that these goods were not lost by piracy. For these reasons I think
there must be judgment for the defendants.
The plaintiffs appealed.
1909. Jan. 27, 28. Scrutton, K.C., and F. D. Mackinnon, for the plaintiffs. There was in
this case a loss through "pirates" within the meaning of the policy. "Piracy" is not
confined to depredations upon the open sea. It includes depredations committed on
land by depredators landing from the sea. In this case the expedition organized by
Carvalho started from a point at the mouth of the Amazon, which is so wide there as
to be practically an arm of the sea. The voyage for which the goods were insured was
from that point to the place of destination upon the river Amazon and tributaries
thereof, and some meaning must be given to the*793 word "pirates" as used in
relation to it. "Piracy" is merely robbery on the high seas or any waters within the
jurisdiction which belonged to the Lord High Admiral: see the definition of "piracy"
given by Sir Charles Hedges, Judge of the Admiralty Court, in Rex v. Dawson [FN2],
and approved of by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Attorney-General of
Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing. [FN3]In a policy which relates to a voyage on a river the
word "piracy" must be construed as covering any acts which, if done on the high seas,
would constitute piracy: see Boehm v. Combe. [FN4]In Reg. v. Anderson [FN5]it was
held that the Admiralty jurisdiction extended to a British vessel up the river Garonne,
ninety miles from the sea. It is contended that the acts of Carvalho and his associates
amounted to piracy jure gentium, an offence which might be dealt with by any nation,
although in practice, no doubt, only the nation whose property is attacked would
interfere in such cases. But, even if that is not so, the term "piracy," as used in this
policy, cannot be confined to piracy jure gentium. The policy being made in England
must be construed according to English law, and the word "piracy," as used in it, must
therefore be taken to include anything that would come within the meaning of that
term for the purposes of English law, as to which see Palmer v. Naylor [FN6] and
Nesbitt v. Lushington. [FN7] For the purposes of this policy a seizure of the goods on
water which amounted to a robbery would be piracy. The seizure of these goods
amounted to robbery. Those who seized them cannot, under the circumstances, be
considered as belligerents, and it would seem that they must have seized the goods
either in the capacity of belligerents or of robbers. In Oppenheim's International Law,
vol. ii. p. 86, it is stated to be a customary rule of the law of nations that insurgents
can be recognized as a belligerent power, provided they are in possession of a certain
part of the territory of the legitimate Government and have set up a government of
their own, and conduct their armed contention with the legitimate Government
according to the laws and usages of war. None of those conditions were*794 fulfilled
here. At the time when the seizure took place, those who seized the goods were not
in possession of any part of Bolivian territory; they had not set up a government of
their own; and they could not be said to be conducting their contention with the
Bolivian Government in accordance with the laws and usages of war. They had not
been recognized as belligerents by any power. They were mere filibusters. In Hall on
International Law, 5th ed. p. 262, it is said that descents upon the territory of a State
from the sea by persons not acting under the authority of any politically organized
community are piratical, although the object of those persons maybe professedly
political. Here the acts of Carvalho and his confederates were not done by the
authority of any politically organized community. If the seizure in this case does not
come within the term "piracy" as used in this policy, it comes within the general
words "all other perils, losses, and misfortunes," &c., which must be construed as
covering anything ejusdem generis with the specific risks enumerated, and therefore
anything ejusdem generis with piracy. [They also cited Rex v. Allen [FN8]; In re
Tivnan [FN9]; Dean v. Hornby [FN10]; Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v.
Hamilton, Fraser & Co. [FN11]]
FN2 (1696) 13 St. Tr. 451.

FN3 (1873) L. R. 5 P. C. 179.
FN4 (1813) 2 M. & S. 172.
FN5 L. R. 1 C. C. 161.
FN6 (1854) 10 Ex. 382.
FN7 (1792) 4 T. R. 783.
FN8 (1837) 1 Moo. C. C. 494.
FN9 (1864) 5 B. & S. 645.
FN10 (1854) 3 E. & B. 180.
FN11 (1887) 12 App. Cas. 484, at p. 494.
J. A. Hamilton, K.C., and Leck, for the defendants. By the terms of the policy, unless
the seizure of these goods amounted to piracy, the defendants are not liable. It is not
sufficient to say that the acts done were similar to piracy, because the insurance is
"warranted free of capture, seizure, and detention, ... piracy excepted"; and
therefore, unless the seizure amounts to piracy, it does not come within the policy.
Matters which are excluded by the warranted free clause cannot be brought within the
operation of the policy under the general words "all other perils, losses," &c. So it is
irrelevant to consider whether the acts in question resemble piracy. The question
therefore is whether they amount to piracy. Pickford J. was right in saying that what
had to be considered was the meaning of "pirates" in the policy. But, indirectly, the
consideration of the general or any particular*795 meaning of the term "piracy" for
other purposes may assist in determining the meaning of that term in the policy. To
call the acts here in question from any point of view "piracy" appears to be fantastic.
They want certain essential characteristics of piracy. It is a characteristic of a pirate
that he should be hostis humani generis: see definition of a pirate by Lord Coke, 3
Inst. 113. In Palmer v. Naylor [FN12] it was not really held that the acts done by the
coolies in seizing the ship were actual piracy, but that they were ejusdem generis
therewith; but on the facts it might have been said that the coolies were acting as
hostes humani generis, for they by open violence seized a ship, and assumed the
navigation of her upon the high seas, and were ready to defend themselves against all
authority for the purpose of escape. Throughout all the cases in which acts have been
held to be piracy the underlying test has been that for the time the actors were
criminals at war with society in general. Those who seized these goods cannot be said
to have been at war with society in general. They may be called rebels or insurgents,
offenders against their own Government, which was at peace with Bolivia, or against
the Bolivian Government, but not enemies of the human race. Again, it is another
characteristic of piracy that it is an exception from the general rule by which the
jurisdiction of Governments is confined to acts done within their respective territories,
and is an offence repressible by and cognizable in the Courts of any country, because
all nations are interested in its suppression. It cannot seriously be suggested that the
acts in question would be cognizable as piracy in an English Court. Again, it is above
all things essential to the character of a pirate that he should be an indiscriminate
plunderer for his own benefit. There is nothing in piracy of a political character.
Rioters or insurgents committing acts of violence on some political ground against a
particular Government are not pirates. The persons who seized these goods were
acting in the character of belligerents, carrying on war, on a very small scale it is true,
against the Bolivian Government in a remote and ill-organized territory of that
Government, for the purpose of maintaining, or at any rate re-establishing,*796 the
independent republic of El Acre. The case was rather that of a "civil commotion" than
of piracy. Again, it is a characteristic of piracy that it should be committed on the high
seas or should start from the high seas. The term cannot by any stretch of language
be applied to what was done, not on the main stream of the Amazon, but on a
tributary of a tributary of that river, at a place more than a thousand miles inland. In
Hall's International Law, 5th ed. p. 257, it is said that acts of piracy must be done
under circumstances which render it impossible for any State to be held responsible
for them. That cannot be said to have been the case here. The Brazilian Government
were responsible for the suppression of an expedition starting from their territory for
the purpose of committing such acts.
FN12 10 Ex. 382.
F. D. Mackinnon , in reply.
VAUGHAN WILLIAMS L.J.

In my opinion this appeal fails. I adopt what Pickford J. says as to the meaning of
"piracy" in the following passage of his judgment: "I do not think that can be better
expressed than it is in Hall's International Law, 5th ed. p. 259, where it is said:
'Besides, though the absence of competent authority is the test of piracy, its essence
consists in the pursuit of private as contrasted with public ends. Primarily the pirate is
a man who satisfies his personal greed or his personal vengeance by robbery or
murder in places beyond the jurisdiction of a State. The man who acts with a public
object may do like acts to a certain extent, but his moral attitude is different, and the
acts themselves will be kept within well-marked bounds. He is not only not the enemy
of the human race, but he is the enemy solely of a particular State.' That I think
expresses what I have called the popular or business meaning of the word 'pirate,'
and I find that several, though not all, of the definitions cited in the note on p. 260 of
the same work bear out that idea. No doubt there are definitions which do not
embody that idea, but that I think is the common and ordinary meaning; a man who
is plundering indiscriminately for his own ends, and not a man who is simply
operating against the property of a particular State for a public end, the end of*797
establishing a government, although that act may be illegal and even criminal, and
although he may not be acting on behalf of a society which is, to use the expression
in Hall on International Law, politically organized. Such an act may be piracy by
international law, but it is not, I think, piracy within the meaning of a policy of
insurance; because, as I have already said, I think you have to attach to 'piracy' a
popular or business meaning, and I do not think, therefore, that this was a loss by
piracy." I adopt that passage as the basis of my judgment.
It was said by the plaintiffs that the learned judge has given no specific definition of
what he held to be the meaning of "piracy" in this particular policy. I do not agree. I
think that in the words which I have already read the learned judge has given a most
plain definition, both by affirmative words and by words of exclusion. He expressly
disclaimed deciding what was the meaning of piracy in international law. He referred
to the particular policy and said that the word "piracy," as used there, meant piracy in
a popular or business sense, and then stated what he considered that to be. As far as
the facts were concerned, if that was the true meaning, it was for the learned judge
to construe the document and find the facts, and then decide whether the facts so
found came within the definition which as a matter of law he had given. If his
definition was right, the facts in my opinion did not constitute piracy within it. In this
case the facts were not really in dispute at all.
Having said that, I ought now to say a few words on the policy itself. The words of the
policy which describe the risks insured against are these: "And touching the
adventures and perils which the company is made liable unto or is intended to be
made liable unto by this assurance, they are of the seas, men-of-war, fire, enemies,
pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, letters of mart and counter-mart, surprisals,
takings at sea, arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes, and people of
what nation, condition, or quality soever; barratry of the master and mariners, and of
all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt,
detriment, or damage of the aforesaid subject-matter of this assurance or any part
thereof." The enumeration of risks which I have read*798 includes the word
"pirates." The first contention of the plaintiffs was that their loss was covered by the
word "pirates." I think it was not so covered for the reasons already given. But then it
was said that, even if the facts did not amount to piracy, strictly speaking, yet the
general words "all other perils, losses, and misfortunes," & c., so plainly included
matters which, though not piracy, were matters ejusdem generis therewith, that we
ought to say that the loss of the plaintiffs was covered by the policy. As to that, there
is this difficulty. The policy contains a warranty clause in the following terms:
"Warranted free of capture, seizure, and detention, and the consequences thereof, or
any attempt thereat, piracy excepted, and also from all consequences of riots, civil
commotions, hostilities, or warlike operations, whether before or after declaration of
war." It seems to me that, although piracy is excepted from the warranty, that clause
shews that it is piracy only, and not things like piracy, which is excluded from it. I say
this because there are several matters, some of them being like piracy, which are left
part of the subject-matter of the warranty, such as riots, civil commotions, hostilities,
or warlike operations. Under those circumstances I think it is impossible for the
plaintiffs to rely on the ejusdem generis doctrine as helping them, because amongst
the things which are left within the warranty clause are "riots" and "civil commotions,"
which are an extremely close description of the very events which have taken place in
this case, and which were prima facie not piracy, but matters ejusdem generis. It is
not admissible to bring in under the general words, as being ejusdem generis with
piracy, things of the description excluded by the warranty.
Pickford J. has decided this case, expressly leaving out of determination all definitions
of piracy for purposes of either international or English municipal law. He has decided
the case merely on the meaning of the word "piracy" in this particular policy. I wish,
however, to say for myself, though we have not got to decide that question, in case of
any difficulty hereafter as to the meaning of the judgment of Pickford J. or of that of
the Court of Appeal, that in my opinion there is no pretence for calling what in this
case had happened on the borders of Brazil and Bolivia piracy. In the first place, I
do*799 not think that the place where these events happened, which was not on the
Amazon where it ran into the sea, but on a branch river running into another branch
river of the Amazon, was a place where a piracy could be committed. After all, this
was a policy of marine insurance, and the loss sought to be covered was alleged to be
loss by piracy, or something ejusdem generis. Whatever the definition of piracy may
be, in my opinion piracy is a maritime offence, and what took place on this river,
running partly in Brazil and partly in Bolivia, far up country, did not take place on the
ocean at all. That distant place was not the theatre on which piracy could be
committed. It is a region which cannot be said to be, like the ocean, under the
jurisdiction of no particular power. It was under the jurisdiction of either Brazil or
Bolivia. That part of the river is not the highway of the world, where ships of all
nations can go protected only by the law of nations. It is a place where, if any ships
go, they go, not on the sea, but on a river running in occupied territory which is under
the government of a specific nation which has jurisdiction there. I wish to add one
word in relation to the distinction between piracy jure gentium and piracy by
municipal law. Whatever other limitation there might be in this policy, it could, in my
opinion, only extend to piracy jure gentium, and not to robbery on a river which at
that point had been running through land for a long distance and had to run for a
further distance, and both banks of which there belonged to Bolivia. In my opinion the
judgment of Pickford J. was quite correct, and this appeal must be dismissed.
FARWELL L.J.
I also am of opinion that the conclusion arrived at by Pickford J. is correct. I desire to

express no opinion upon the point with which my brother Vaughan Williams has dealt
in the last part of his judgment, namely, whether the acts in question were piracy in
the abstract. I neither dissent from nor assent to what the Lord Justice has said on
that subject. If it had been necessary to decide that question for the purposes of the
present case, I should have desired to consider the matter further. I think that the
question which we have to consider here is whether in this policy the meaning of the
word "piracy," contrasted*800 as it is with the words "riots, civil commotions,
hostilities, and warlike operations, whether before or after declaration of war," can
possibly be extended so as to comprehend within it such acts and misdeeds as the
learned judge has found to have taken place in this case on the borders of Brazil and
Bolivia. It is plain, when one considers this question, that, as regards some acts,
"piracy" and some of the matters which would come under terms contained in the
warranted free clause run upon lines very close to one another; but it appears to me
that those who entered into this policy have drawn a hard and fast line in that clause
by saying that, though piracy, generally speaking, is one of the risks insured against,
the insurers are to be exempted from liability in respect of certain named things. This
entirely answers the argument for the plaintiffs based upon the general words "all
other perils," which are by r. 12 of the rules for the construction of policies contained
in the First Schedule to the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, declared to include only perils
similar in kind to the perils specifically mentioned in the policy. It is impossible under
those words to include in the category of perils insured against, as being ejusdem
generis with a peril specifically mentioned as the subject-matter of insurance, acts or
things which are actually specified in the document as included in the opposite
category, namely, that of risks which are excluded from the insurance. That being so,
the question remains whether the acts of those who seized the goods insured in this
case do or do not come within one or other of the heads mentioned in the warranted
free clause, namely, "riots, civil commotions, hostilities, or warlike operations,
whether before or after declaration of war." I do not desire to put my judgment in this
case on the ground that there was here anything in the nature of war or belligerency
in the sense of war between two hostile States. I do not think that it is necessary to
do that.
The evidence shews that the piece of territory where the acts in question took place,
though it had been delimited on paper to Bolivia, was never effectively occupied by
the Bolivian Government before 1898, but had been occupied to some extent by
settlers, of whom the majority were Brazilians, but some were from Bolivia. When the
Bolivian troops advanced to the spot,*801 the Brazilian settlers appear to have
retired into their own country, and endeavoured by their action thence to render the
position of the Bolivian troops untenable. They did this in Brazil itself by raising what I
think may properly be called civil commotions, which were as much rebellion against
their own Government, which had made the delimitation between their territory and
that of the Bolivian Government, as against the latter Government. This is very much
like the commencement of those intestine troubles which sometimes lead to a civil
war. Mr. Mountague Bernard in his "Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great
Britain during the American Civil War," p. 91, says in a note in which he sums up the
effect of certain decisions in the American Courts: "A civil war ... is never formally
declared: it becomes such by its accidents--the number, power, and organization of
the persons who originate, and carry it on. When the party in rebellion occupy and
hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory, have declared their
independence, have cast off their allegiance, have organized armies, have
commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them
as belligerents and the contest as a war." Before the point is reached at which a state
of civil war can be said to exist, there are, as the author points out, various stages.
First there is, possibly, a riot, and this may be followed by what may be described as
"civil commotion." I think this was the stage at which affairs had arrived in the
present case. If the adventure of those who seized the goods had been more
successful, it might have developed into a civil war. But, being what it was, I think
that it may properly be described as a "civil commotion," and therefore comes within
the express exception in the warranted free clause. For these reasons I agree that the
appeal should be dismissed.
KENNEDY L.J.
In this case the learned judge was in the position of both judge and jury, and had to
decide all questions which might arise, whether of law or fact. Having heard the
arguments which have been addressed to us, I cannot find any ground for saying that
in the conclusion at which he arrived he was wrong either in law or in fact. The policy
sued upon*802 was a policy of insurance upon goods and merchandise shipped upon
a vessel called the Labreafor carriage from Para at the mouth of the Amazon to Puerto
Alonzo and (or) other places on the river Acre and (or) in that district. It is on the face
of it, having regard to the place of departure and the place of destination, what I may
call a "riverine" policy, upon goods which were to be carried, not upon the sea, but
upon a river. Para, the port of departure, is at the mouth of the Amazon, and, though
the estuary, where the river joins the sea some way further up, and the river itself for
a long distance inland are of great width, the river being one of the largest in the
world, those who accepted the insurance in this case must be taken to have known
that this was a riverine policy, and that none of the transit was to be upon the high
seas, the destination of the vessel being a place situated far inland upon a tributary of
a tributary of the river. The word upon which this case turns is "piracy." The view
which Pickford J. appears to have been disposed to take, though he refrained from
giving any decision upon the point, and which to the best of my judgment is correct,
is that there might be a loss by "piracy" within the meaning of such a policy as that in
question, though that loss was not upon the open sea or within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Admiralty. I doubt whether the insurance company who entered into this
policy could be heard to say that they meant by that word something which could not
possibly happen during the voyage in reference to which the policy was effected. The
authorities show that the word "piracy" is one capable of various shades of meaning,
and that, even when used strictly as a legal term, it may be held to cover different
subject-matters according as it is considered from the point of view of international or
that of municipal lawyers. It seems to me that in the case of a policy like this it ought,
if possible, to be construed in the sense which would give it a meaning applicable to
the insurance effected by the policy. I do not doubt the general correctness, according
to the existing authorities, of the definition given by the late Mr. Carver in s. 94 of his
valuable work on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 4th ed. p. 117, where he says: "Piracy is
forcible robbery at sea, whether committed by marauders from outside the ship
or*803 by mariners or passengers within it. The essential element is that they
violently dispossess the master, and afterwards carry away the ship itself, or any of
the goods, with a felonious intent." In the case, however, of this policy, so far as their
intention went, the parties could not have meant by the term "piracy" something
taking place in the open sea, because that meaning would be inapplicable to the
particular voyage; and I am disposed to think that there may be "piracy" in such a
locality as that of this voyage.
The question remains whether what occurred in this case was "piracy" in any sense of
that term. In dealing with that question a judge sitting without a jury must direct
himself as to the meaning of the term "piracy" in the particular contract upon which
the action is brought. In my opinion Pickford J. was right in holding that, so far as the
matter is one of legal construction, the term "piracy" must be regarded as having
been used in a business document like this policy of insurance in the sense in which
business men would generally understand it; and I think that, from that point of view,
he was right in defining "pirates" as being those who plunder indiscriminately for their
own gain, not persons who operate solely against the property of a particular
Government for such objects as those for which the persons who seized the goods
insured were operating against the Government of Bolivia in the present case. If there
had been a jury, I am not prepared to say that the learned judge would have been
wrong if, in order to ascertain the business meaning of the term "piracy" as used in a
business document like this policy, he had put questions to the jury as to its meaning;
for though, of course, it is, as a rule, for the judge to construe a document, it is in the
case of a mercantile document sometimes properly within the province of a jury,
where there is any evidence that in a particular line of business a term has a special
meaning, to assist the judge by a finding as to its meaning. The learned judge in this
case, sitting without a jury, has asked himself what "piracy" meant in this policy, and
he has given it a meaning which clearly does not bring that which happened within
the meaning of the term. To my mind the term "piracy" is inapplicable to the acts of
the persons who*804 seized the goods insured in this case, however wrongful or
lawless their conduct may have been according to the law of Brazil or Bolivia. They
seized these goods not for their private gain, but in furtherance of a political
adventure in the latter country. I do not think that any business man would say that
those acts constituted "piracy" in the sense in which that term is used in this policy.
They are more like the matters mentioned in the warranted free clause, such as riot
or civil commotion. I do not think it is necessary to discuss such cases as Palmer v.
Naylor [FN13] and Nesbitt v. Lushington [FN14], the particular facts in which Mr.
Carver has covered in his definition of "piracy," to which I have referred, by saying
that piracy may be committed not only by marauders from outside the ship but also
by mariners or passengers within it. The matter may hereafter have to be considered
further. I do not think that the acts proved here, in the circumstances, constituted
those who did them pirates in such a sense as would give any nation a right to deal
with them as being "hostes humani generis." Assuming that in some connection the
term "piracy" may include all that is covered by Mr. Carver's definition, I am clearly of
opinion that, in dealing with this particular case, the learned judge has given the right
judgment both as regards the law and the facts.
FN13 10 Ex. 382.
FN14 4 T. R. 783.
Representation
Solicitors for plaintiffs: Thos. Cooper & Sons. Solicitors for defendants: Waltons,
Johnson, Bubb & Whatton.
Appeal dismissed. (E. L.)
(c) Incorporated Council of Law Reporting For England & Wales

[1909] 1 K.B. 785
END OF DOCUMENT
Copr. (c) West 2004 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
Achille Lauro Affair (1985)
Chiara Ragni
Content type: Encyclopedia entries

Product: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law [MPEPIL]
Article last updated: June 2009
Subject(s):
Reprisal — Aut dedere aut judicare — Act of state — Hostage taking — Military assistance — Reprisals —
Piracy — Obligation to prosecute
Published under the auspices of the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law
under the direction of Rüdiger Wolfrum.
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 27 December 2018
A. Description of the Achille Lauro Affair
1 On 7 October 1985, four armed members of the Palestine Liberation Front (‘PLF’), a
faction of the → Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), seized the Italian cruise liner
Achille Lauro as the ship was sailing in Egyptian waters on its way from Alexandria to Port
Said.
2 Holding the passengers and the crew hostage, the hijackers threatened to kill them if
→ Israel did not release 50 Palestinian prisoners. They also threatened to blow up the ship if
any rescue attempt was made. On 8 October, in the absence of any progress in negotiations,
the Palestinians murdered Leon Klinghoffer, a wheelchair-bound Jewish-American
passenger, and threw his body overboard.
3 On the following day, the terrorists surrendered, after having secured a safe conduct
agreement with Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy, on the condition that
they would release all the passengers in exchange for handing the hijackers over to the PLO
(Sacerdoti 25–27). The negotiations were conducted on behalf of the Palestinians by the
leader of the PLF, Abu Abbas. When the news that an American citizen had been murdered
on board began to circulate in the media, the President of the United States immediately
asked for the → extradition of the Palestinians. In response, Egypt denied any knowledge of
the crime and allowed the hijackers to leave its territory. Once Klinghoffer’s murder was
confirmed, Egypt upheld its intention to respect the agreement, probably in the hope of
avoiding terrorist reprisals from Palestinian groups and a worsening of its political relations
with the PLO.
4 On 10 October, the Egyptian aircraft transporting the hijackers and the Palestinian
negotiators, including PLF leader Abu Abbas, was intercepted on its way to Tunis by four
American fighter planes and forced to land at the NATO base of Sigonella, in Sicily, after
having received permission from the Italian authorities. Once they had disembarked, the
terrorists were taken into judicial custody by the Italian authorities, which refused both
United States’ demands for the extradition of the hijackers and the request for the
provisional arrest of Abu Abbas. After having questioned him on board the aircraft, the
Italian officials declared themselves satisfied with the results of their inquiries. Although
the US requested additional time to bring further evidence in support of their application
for arrest, the Italian authorities allowed the Egyptian aircraft, with Abu Abbas and the
other Palestinian negotiators on board, to leave the NATO base bound for Rome. Abu Abbas
then flew from Ciampino Airport on a Yugoslavian aircraft.
5 The Italian courts later put 15 men on trial for the → hijacking of the Achille Lauro. Only
five of them appeared before the tribunal, the others, including the PLF leader, were judged
in absentia and found guilty of serious breaches of Italian criminal law.
B. Legal Assessment of the Facts

6 The events described here raised some legal questions concerning the → legitimacy of
the decisions and subsequent actions taken by the States involved under international law.
The hijacking of the Achille Lauro also made the → international community aware of the
need to adopt political and legal measures in order to provide an adequate response to acts
of maritime → terrorism, with a view to preventing their recurrence in the future.
1. Characterization of the Crimes and the Right of the US to
Exercise Jurisdiction over Them
7 The first question concerns the characterization of the acts performed by the hijackers.
Even though the seizure of the Achille Lauro was an instance of maritime terrorism, at the
time there was no common definition of such a crime, nor were there any specific
international rules for dealing with it.
8 The United States charged the Palestinians with → piracy and with taking → hostages,
thus aiming to establish US jurisdiction over the crimes and its right to arrest the terrorists.
As to the first charge, the definition of the seizure of the Achille Lauro as piracy iuris
gentium, which would have enabled the establishment of American jurisdiction according to
the → universality principle, was controversial. The prerequisites set by international law
and enshrined in both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (→ High Seas) and by
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea were not satisfied in this case. According to
Art. 15 High Seas Convention and Art. 101 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in order
to fall within the category of piracy, an act of maritime violence must be committed for
private ends by a private ship against another ship on the high seas. Thus, the hijacking of
the Achille Lauro could not be qualified as a piratical act, since the two-vessel requirement
was lacking and because the terrorists acted for political ends.
9 Having said that, a part of the doctrine that diverges from this conclusion holds that the
definition of piracy included in the 1958 High Seas Convention and in the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea does not embody → customary international law. In
addition, it has been argued that the conventions should be reviewed and that the definition
of piracy should be widened, as it appears to be anachronistic and too narrow to meet
prevailing political and social needs. Originally aimed at preventing States from becoming
involved with insurgents (→ Insurgency) who had not yet been given the status of a
belligerent party, the definition does not take into account acts committed for political ends,
while targeting the ship of a third State neutral to the conflict.
10 The US stance, even if supported by some scholars, was not shared by the international
community. Even after States had been requested to draft a convention aimed at countering
maritime terrorism, they opted not to consider a broader definition of piracy (see paras 27–
30 below).
11 Even if one subscribes to the position which equates modern pirates with terrorists, the
interception of the Egyptian aircraft for the purpose of apprehending the Palestinians would
still have been illegitimate. In fact, international law authorizes States to arrest the pirates
themselves or to seize their vessels, but not to seize the ships or the aircraft of sovereign
States that are transporting them.
12 As to the second charge—that of hostage taking—both the United States and Egypt
were parties to the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages ([adopted
17 December 1979, entered into force 3 June 1983] 1316 UNTS 205), which allows a State
Party to exercise jurisdiction when the hostage ‘is a national of that State’. If the offenders
are present in the territory of another State Party, the latter is bound either to try them or
to hand them over to the State requesting extradition. By signing the safe conduct
agreement without US consent, Egypt derogated from the 1979 Convention against the
Taking of Hostages and violated its obligations towards the United States. The legitimacy
under international law of the US reprisal, consisting of the interception of the Egyptian
aircraft, will be discussed in the next section.
2. Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers

13 Even if one admits the right of the United States to arrest the Palestinians and to put
them on trial, and the violation by Egypt of its obligation to extradite terrorists, the
legitimacy of the interception of the Egyptian aircraft, and its forced landing at Sigonella is
still questionable. In this respect, the act amounted to a use of military force, which is
banned under international law (→ Use of Force, Prohibition of). Indeed, Art. 2 (4) UN
Charter must be interpreted as prohibiting not only war but also the use of a lesser kind of
armed violence. The interception of the aircraft is to be considered as an unlawful act,
which cannot be justified under the exception of legitimate → self-defence provided for by
Arts 51 and 53 UN Charter. In fact, Egypt, the State against which the United States used
force, had not perpetrated any form of violence against American citizens.
14 In responding to the unlawful refusal of Egypt to extradite the Palestinians, the United
States should have resorted to peaceful alternatives. In the first instance, they should have
demonstrated that every legitimate effort to secure the extradition, arrest, and prosecution
of the terrorists had failed or would have been likely to fail. In the case under examination,
the Italian government took all the necessary steps to ask the PLO to extradite the
hijackers, so that the US government could have waited and demanded that Italy hand over
the terrorists at a later stage.
15 Instead, the United States preferred to resort to military force under the assumption
that they were acting lawfully. The fact that the US government did not offer any
explanation to Egypt, even when asked to do so, simply proves this point.
3. Request for the Extradition of the Palestinians and for the

Provisional Arrest of Abu Abbas
16 A further question is whether the Italian government’s decision not to extradite the four
hijackers to the United States, and its refusal to carry out the provisional arrest of Abu
Abbas, were legitimate under international law. Article 3 Extradition Treaty between Italy
and the United States of America ([signed 13 October 1983, entered into force 24
September 1984] 1590 UNTS 161; ‘Extradition Treaty’) establishes that when one of the
parties requests an extradition for crimes not committed on its territory, then the requested
party has the power to grant the extradition if its laws provide for the punishment of such
an offence or if the wanted person is a national of the requesting party. According to this
provision, Italy had the authority to concede to, or to refuse, the extradition of the
Palestinians.
17 As to the request for the provisional arrest of Abu Abbas, which was necessary for his
extradition, Art. 12 Extradition Treaty provides that the application for the arrest must
include certain documents listed in its text. The United States attached to their request the
evidence that they deemed sufficient to show that the PLF leader had directed the whole
operation and that he had given instructions to the Palestinians engaged in the seizure of
the Achille Lauro. Notwithstanding this claim, the three Italian judges charged with the
examination of the request and the enclosed documentation found that such evidence was
insufficient to justify a measure restricting Abu Abbas’s freedom. Accordingly, the Italian
government denied the US request on the basis that the evidence produced lacked the
substantial elements that were needed in order to carry out the arrest in accordance with
Italian criminal law. In addition, the Italian Ministry of Justice declared that the aircraft had
enjoyed extraterritorial status and rights since it was on a special mission for the Egyptian
government (→ Extraterritoriality; → Immunities, Special Missions). As a consequence, the
national authorities could not adopt coercive measures while Abu Abbas was on board and
without the consent of the pilot of the aircraft.
18 The arguments put forward by the Italian officials were not fully consistent with
international regulations. Indeed, a very important principle of customary international law,
also enshrined in Art. 27 → Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), declares that
a State cannot invoke its own legislation as justification for its failure to comply with an
international treaty. In the case under examination, the Italian judges applied very precise
and strict rules in order to evaluate the evidence produced by the United States. Article 12
Extradition Treaty merely states that available evidence must be attached to the application
for provisional arrest, without further specifying the type of evidence required. In this case,
the international rule should have prevailed over the Italian one, since the former was
embodied in an international treaty and that treaty was enacted subsequent to the Italian
code of criminal procedure (lex posterior).
19 However, even if one were to concede that according to Art. 12 Extradition Treaty the
evidence produced by the United States satisfied the preconditions to allow the provisional
arrest, Italy had still to respect the immunity of the aircraft. Accordingly, the Italian
authorities could not take coercive measures limiting the freedom of Abu Abbas while he
was on board, without violating Italy’s obligations towards Egypt under customary
international law. But they could have proceeded to arrest the Palestinians’ representative
once he had left the Egyptian aircraft in Ciampino Airport.
20 The reasons why the Italian authorities did not comply with the American request are
more of a political than a legal nature. At the time of the request, the ship was still
anchored in Port Said and the Italian government probably wished to secure the safe return
of the passengers on board. Thus, the strongest rationale behind their decision was that the
Italian authorities intended to avoid any form of terrorist revenge against Italian citizens or
territories.
21 The decision to allow Abu Abbas to leave Italy was controversial and not without
consequences. It contributed to a crisis of diplomatic relations with the United States and to
the collapse of the Italian government.
4. Legal Proceedings before the Italian Courts

22 The Italian authorities later came to regret the escape of Abu Abbas. In 1986, the Court
of Assizes in Genoa found him guilty of having planned and instigated the seizure of the
Achille Lauro. Abu Abbas was condemned in absentia together with ten other terrorists
(decision of 10 July 1986, not published). However, he was arrested only in 2003 in Iraq.
Three of the four hijackers appeared before the same court and were sentenced to 30 years
in prison, while the fourth was sentenced by the Juvenile Court in Genoa. The decisions
were confirmed by the Appellate Court of Assizes and by the Juvenile Section of the Court
of Appeal respectively. The Italian judges sentenced the terrorists on the grounds of
kidnapping for terrorist purposes according to Art. 289 bis Italian Criminal Code.
23 The competence of the Genoese judges was established by the Italian Supreme Court
(Corte di Cassazione Penale [30 October 1985]). In order to decide on the matter, the Court
first invoked Art. 19 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone ([done 29
April 1958, entered into force on 10 September 1964] 516 UNTS 205)—which corresponds
to Art. 27 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—and which actually grants to the coastal
State the criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea ‘if
the consequence of the crime extend to the coastal State…or if the crime is of a kind to
disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea’ (→ Maritime
Jurisdiction). The conclusion of the Supreme Court, supported by the Court of Assizes of
Genoa, was that the crimes under consideration did not meet the requirements to affirm
Egypt’s jurisdiction. It then argued that since the offences had been committed on board a
ship sailing under an Italian flag, it was as if they had taken place on Italian territory,
specifically, in the harbour of Genoa, where the hijackers, posing as tourists, boarded the
ship.
24 Once they had established their jurisdiction, the Genoese judges identified Italian
criminal law as applicable to the case, since the acts were committed on board an Italian
ship. However, they did not resort to international law in order to evaluate the crimes
perpetrated by the Palestinians. As pointed out by scholars (cf Cassese 105–21), before
applying the lex fori, the Italian courts should have first determined whether the hijackers
were to be considered as mere terrorists and, as such, liable to the penalties foreseen in
Italian criminal law for ordinary crimes, or whether they were lawful → combatants in a war
of national liberation (→ Wars of National Liberation), and thus subject to the rules of
humanitarian law (→ Humanitarian Law, International).
25 To its credit, however, the Court of Assizes presented a very precise reconstruction of
the facts that led to interesting conclusions from the point of view of international law.
Whereas the terrorists had tried to demonstrate that their original goal was to reach and
then attack Israel, after a very detailed analysis of the facts and the background to the
affair, the judges concluded that from the very beginning, the only operation planned by
Abu Abbas was the seizure of the Achille Lauro. His objective was probably to have the
international community believe that Yasser Arafat was responsible and that the seizure of
the ship could thus not be seen as anything other than a terrorist act. Armed actions by
Palestinians could be justified as a fight for → self-determination as long as they targeted
Israel, its citizens, or the Arab territory it occupied (→ Israel, Occupied Territories). As
remarked on by scholars, the purpose of the hijacking of the Italian ship was instead to
sabotage the development of Yasser Arafat’s negotiations with Egypt and Jordan, and to
undermine his prestige within the PLO, thus benefiting his rival, Abu Abbas.
26 Italian judges demonstrated that Abu Abbas alone was responsible for planning and
carrying out the hijacking, while the PLO and Arafat had played no role in it. Thus, in
proving that such action was not part of the Palestinian war of liberation, the judges
implicitly showed that the hijackers were not lawful combatants and that they therefore
could be found guilty of ordinary crimes under the Italian Criminal Code.
C. Consequent Development of Treaty Law
27 The seizure of the Achille Lauro made the international community aware of the need to
develop a legal framework suited to the task of countering terrorism at sea. With the
support of Austria and Egypt, Italy put forward Resolution 40/61 to the United Nations
General Assembly and this resolution was adopted by consensus on 9 December 1985
(GAOR 40th Session Supp 53, 301). After condemning ‘as criminal, all acts, methods and
practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed’ (para. 1), the resolution
requested the → International Maritime Organization (IMO) to ‘study the problem of
terrorism aboard or against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate
measures’ (para. 13). As suggested above, one of the options on the table was to enlarge
the notion of piracy so that it could also include acts such as the seizure of the Achille
Lauro. However, the States involved in drafting a convention for the prevention and
suppression of maritime terrorism under the auspices of the IMO followed a different route.
The conference that was convened in Rome in 1988 to negotiate the agreement decided to
follow the ‘sectorial’ approach for dealing with international terrorism that had been
adopted in previous multilateral treaties, such as those concerning unlawful acts against
the safety of air navigation.
28 In accordance with the ‘sectorial’ approach, Art. 3 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (‘SUA Convention’), which entered
into force in 1992, lists the specific offences to which it applies. The description of those
acts follows the model of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation 1971 ([concluded 23 September 1971, entered into force 26 January
1973] 974 UNTS 177) and includes the condition that the offences are ‘likely to endanger
the safe navigation of the ship’ (Art. 3 SUA Convention).
29 Since the background behind the drafting of the SUA Convention, unlike other anti-
terrorist multilateral treaties, is strictly linked to the seizure of the Achille Lauro, the SUA
Convention provides that the act of killing or injuring a person, when perpetrated in
connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any other acts listed in Art.
3 SUA Convention, amounts to a separate offence and not just to an aggravating
circumstance of other crimes. The influence of the events relating to the Achille Lauro is
traceable, even in the way the SUA Convention defines how States may establish their
jurisdiction over the offences. The definition includes the State targeted by the terrorist act,
as well as the State whose citizen is the victim of the offence. In this sense, the SUA
Convention bypasses the traditional principles of active nationality and of territoriality,
which are usually the criteria chosen for establishing compulsory jurisdiction.
30 Like other treaties against terrorism, the SUA Convention follows the principle → aut
dedere aut iudicare. Accordingly, it obliges the party in whose territory the offender is
found to either extradite the person to another State that has established its jurisdiction
under the SUA Convention, or to submit the case to its own authorities for prosecution.
D. Conclusions
31 The SUA Convention marks a fundamental step forward in the fight against terrorism
and, more generally, in the development of international law. Its importance for countering
violence at sea has been recently stressed even by the UN Security Council in its Resolution
1846 (2008) of 2 December 2008, which urged States Parties to fully implement their
obligations under the SUA Convention.
32 It provides States with a fundamental legal instrument with which to tackle episodes
similar to the seizure of the Achille Lauro, even though it is not likely to guarantee that
many of the legal problems discussed above that were raised by such an affair will not
occur in the future. The legal consequences of the non-compliance with a request for
extradition, the legitimacy of acts—such as those covered by the SUA Convention—
committed by individuals on behalf of governments or of national liberation movements, as
well as the legitimacy of the reaction to such acts, are among the matters that continue to
be regulated by the rules and principles of general international law to which the preamble
of the SUA Convention makes reference (→ General International Law (Principles, Rules and
Standards)).
33 In addition, the case of the Achille Lauro confirms how States are influenced and
guided in their actions by political and diplomatic motives. This analysis highlights the fact
that each of the actors involved in the incident complied with international law only to a
limited extent, instead choosing to pursue their political interests. However, this conclusion
does not serve to belittle, but rather to emphasize the importance of the efforts made by the
international community in this field. Such efforts have been directed at overcoming the
political and ideological aspects of international terrorism, while building, step-by-step, a
network of international obligations able to cover the phenomenon in all—or most of—its
various manifestations. The SUA Convention itself provides the possibility for States Parties
to update and, if necessary, to broaden its scope. In this regard, it is worth pointing out the
amendments adopted in the form of the Protocol of 2005, which broaden the range of
offences to which the regime provided for by the SUA Convention applies.
Select Bibliography
G Gaja ‘Sulla repressione penale per I fatti dell’Achille Lauro’ (1985) 68 RivDirInt
588–90.
JP Pancracio ‘L’affaire de l’Achille Lauro et le droit international’ (1985) 31 AFDI 221–
36.
N Ronzitti ‘Alcuni problemi giuridici sollevati dal dirottamento dell’Achille
Lauro’ (1985) 68 RivDirInt 584–88.
AL Liput ‘An Analysis of the Achille Lauro Affair: Towards an Effective and Legal
Method of Bringing International Terrorists to Justice’ (1985–86) 9 FordhamIntlLJ
328–72.
GR Constantinople ‘Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro
Incident’ (1986) 26 VaJIntlL 723–53.
JA McCredie ‘Contemporary Uses of Force against Terrorism: The United States
Response to Achille Lauro—Questions of Jurisdiction and Its Exercise’ (1986) 16
GaJIntl&CompL 435–67.
M Pisani ‘Il caso dell’Achille Lauro ed il trattato di estradizione tra l’Italia e gli Stati
Uniti’ (1986) Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 775–88.
G Cataldi ‘Il caso dell’ “Achille Lauro” e la giurisdizione dello Stato costiero nel mare
territoriale’ (1987) 70 RivDirInt 548–72.
Y Dinstein ‘The International Legal Response to Terrorism’, in Università di Genova
(ed), Le droit international a l’heure de sa codification: Etudes en l’honneur de R Ago
vol 2, La coopération des etats à l’épreuve de la codification (Giuffrè Milano 1987)
139–51.
GV Gooding ‘Fighting Terrorism in the 1980’s: The Interception of the Achille Lauro
Hijackers’ (1987) 12 YaleJIntlL 158–79.
JJ Paust ‘Extradition and United States Prosecution of the Achille Lauro Hostage-
Takers: Navigating the Hazards’ (1987) 20 VandJTransnatlL 235–37.
F Francioni ‘Maritime Terrorism and International Law: The Rome Convention of
1988’ (1988) 31 GYIL 263-88.
M Halberstam ‘Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO
Convention on Maritime Safety’ (1988) 82 AJIL 269–310.
A Cassese Terrorism, Politics and Law: The Achille Lauro Affair (Polity Press
Cambridge 1989).
G Guillaume ‘Terrorisme et le droit international’ (1989) 215 RdC 287–416.
G Gaja ‘Measures against Terrorist Acts under International Law’, in N Ronzitti (ed),
Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Nijhoff Dordrecht 1990) 15–24.
N Ronzitti ‘The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force against Terrorist Activities’, in N
Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Nijhoff Dordrecht 1990) 1–
14.
N Ronzitti (ed) Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Nijhoff Dordrecht 1990).
G Sacerdoti ‘States’ Agreements with Terrorists in Order to Save Hostages: Non-
Binding, Void or Justified by Necessity?’, in N Ronzitti, Maritime Terrorism and
International Law (Nijhoff Dordrecht 1990) 25–41.
T Treves ‘The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation’, in N Ronzitti (ed), Maritime Terrorism and
International Law (Nijhoff Dordrecht 1990) 68–90.
T Treves ‘The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation’ (1998) 2 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law
541–56.
MK Bohn The Achille Lauro Hijacking: Lessons in the Politics and Prejudice of
Terrorism (Brassey’s Washington DC 2004).
MH Nordquist et al (eds), Legal Challenges in Maritime Security (Nijhoff Leiden
2008).
H Tuerk ‘Combating Terrorism at Sea: The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation’, in MH Nordquist et al (eds), Legal Challenges in
Maritime Security (Nijhoff Leiden 2008) 41–78.
R Wolfrum ‘Fighting Terrorism at Sea: Options and Limitations under International
Law’, in MH Nordquist et al (eds), Legal Challenges in Maritime Security (Nijhoff
Leiden 2008) 3–40.
Select Documents
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (concluded 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) 1678 UNTS
221.
Convention on the High Seas (done 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 September
1962) 450 UNTS 11.
Corte di Cassazione Penale (Italian Supreme Court) (sez I) (30 October 1985) (1987)
70 RivDirInt 955–60.
International Maritime Organization, ‘Protocol of 2005 from the International
Conference on the Revision of SUA Treaties to the Protocols for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
Shelf’ (1 November 2005) LEG/CONF.15/22.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (concluded 10 December 1982,
entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 396.

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1.

2 First Generation Crimes 23

excluding responsibility, such as intoxication, self-defence or duress,48 and the

1.2 First Generation Crimes

prosecution. But they do not provide for individual criminal responsibility.63 At

1.2.2 Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices

kapitanis an gundis ganzraxuli qmedebebi

*785 Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Company,

In the Court of Appeal

Vaughan Williams, Farwell, and Kennedy L. JJ.

1909 Jan. 27, 28

In the King's Bench Division

Insurance (Marine)--"Pirates," Meaning of in Policy--Seizure of Goods by Political

1908. June 18. PICKFORD J.

FN1 (1868) L. R. 1 C. C. 161.

FN2 (1696) 13 St. Tr. 451.

FN4 (1813) 2 M. & S. 172.

FN6 (1854) 10 Ex. 382.

FN7 (1792) 4 T. R. 783.

FN8 (1837) 1 Moo. C. C. 494.

FN9 (1864) 5 B. & S. 645.

FN10 (1854) 3 E. & B. 180.

FN11 (1887) 12 App. Cas. 484, at p. 494.

FN12 10 Ex. 382.

VAUGHAN WILLIAMS L.J.

I also am of opinion that the conclusion arrived at by Pickford J. is correct. I desire to

FN13 10 Ex. 382.

Appeal dismissed. (E. L.)

(c) Incorporated Council of Law Reporting For England & Wales

Content type: Encyclopedia entries

B. Legal Assessment of the Facts

2. Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers

3. Request for the Extradition of the Palestinians and for the

4. Legal Proceedings before the Italian Courts

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