Ehrenreich 1

Natan Ehrenreich

Dr. Rogachevsky

American Political Thought

30 Nov, 2022

An uninitiated student might step foot into a lecture or course on the Federalist Papers

expecting to begin with Federalist 1, and proceeding through the papers in order. That is almost

never the case. Often, students begin by reading two papers in particular: Federalist 10 and 51.

Though neither paper provides a particularly detailed view of the American system of

governance, these papers remain timeless for their commentary on the nature of human beings

and the virtues and vices that arise when a diverse people form a united polity.

Federalist 10 concerns itself with the concept of factions. James Madison describes a

faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole,

who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the

rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” Though

we might instinctively call any group of people united in common political interest a faction, it is

important to note that the Madisonian faction is necessarily “adversed” to the rights of other

citizens. When Madison asserts that the emergence of factions is inevitable, he does not mean

that a citizenry is simply destined to fracture into groups. Rather, a citizenry is destined to

fracture into groups that oppose one another.

We thus see that from the beginning, Federalist 10 assumes a view of human nature in

which human beings are oppositional creatures. Cooperation, if it exists dispositionally, is not

universal. In this way, there is a sort of Hobbesian anthropology that runs through the Federalist.
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Sure, neither Madison nor Alexander Hamilton see the American founding as a simple social

contract in which humanity removes itself from the state of nature, but both thinkers worry about

the tendencies of human beings when they are left completely to their own devices. Conflict, in

some sense, is inevitable.

Madison notes that one can either attempt to remove the cause of faction, or else attempt

to alleviate its negative effects. Of the first proposal, not much needs to be said. Only by

demolishing the ideal of liberty and human difference might one successfully exterminate

factions. Madison notes of human nature: “[man’s] opinions and his passions will have a

reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach

themselves.” Here, we see a second observation on the nature of human beings that goes

underappreciated: man is not simply a creature of reason. Though the Federalist opens by

pondering whether good government can be formed from rational reflection, Madison is not one

to fantasize about “rational man” in a vacuum. Like Hume, he understands the inevitable

relevance of passion. Furthermore, he understands that passion often animates factions against

each other, which leads to the main point of Federalist 10: a large–rather than a small–republic is

most conducive to stopping factions from implementing their “schemes of oppression.”

Madison notes two structural advantages of a vast republic. First, large electorates are

more likely to identify and promote leaders of strong character. In his own words:

as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in

the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with

success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the

people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most

attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

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It might be noted that this observation seems at odds with historical examples, and with political

theory. The qualities of leadership that draw one to the masses are not obviously changed when

the electorate grows larger. Nonetheless, Madison’s argument in favor of a large republic

remains persuasive because of his second observation:

Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it

less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights

of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who

feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.

Madison’s point, extended logically, is that a large republic necessarily lends itself to a limited

government. As the sheer size of a polity grows, so do the number and variations of factions,

which, each opposed to one another, cancel each other out. Thus, you are protected from the

tyranny of majority will, which establishes itself as public power in a democracy. Madison adds

that “a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for

any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union

than a particular member of it.” Of course, modern audiences will understand that it is actually

not that difficult to excite a frenzy for the abolition of debts, which is why the internal controls of

the American Constitutional system, mentioned most famously in Federalist 51, are needed.

Now, it is important here to distinguish between two concepts which are often referenced

interchangeably but which decidedly should not be. They are “separation of powers” and “checks

and balances.” Both refer to deviations from a totalitarian, unified government, but they do so in

very different ways. “Separation of powers” refers to the limitation on the powers of any single

branch of government. “Checks and balances” refers to the intertwining of those powers among
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the different branches. Importantly, Federalist 51 endorses both strategies, though its focus is

predominantly on the latter, and the possible contradictions between the two are not lost.

Federalist 51, then, should not be read as a rigid and doctrinaire endorsement of the

separation of powers, but as a nuanced commentary on the need for the entanglement of powers.

In fact, the paper explicitly notes the impracticability of complete separation.

Were [the principle of separation of powers] rigorously adhered to, it would require that

all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies

should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels

having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of

constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in

contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would

attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be

admitted.

After dispelling with the notion of utter separation between the different branches of

government, the Federalist muses on the concept of checks and balances in what is likely the

most well known excerpt from the papers.

Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be

connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human

nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But

what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men

were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither

external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a

government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
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you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place

oblige it to control itself

It is here where we might draw the most important parallel between the two most famous papers,

and the view of humanity they describe. Federalist 10 describes factions motivated by passions

to oppress each other. Federalist 51 zooms on the individual, and the specific passions which

drive him. Ambition, notably, is inherent to the human condition. It cannot be expunged. Good

government, then, must attempt to channel the ambition of one into the prosperity of the many.

The Constitution and the Federalist do this by intentionally placing the men and women of the

different branches of government against one another. While Federalist 10 speaks on the dangers

of factions, Federalist 51 intentionally engineers factions and places them inside the federal

government. In this way, the logic of the two papers is remarkably consistent. Federalist 51

attempts to artificially create the benefits of the large republic that Federalist 10 mentions. Like

the large republic, the diversity of interests inside of the federal government is precisely what

stops it from instituting oppression.

We see, then, that the two papers collectively represent one consistent view of human

nature in which people are driven by passions to conflict. Individuals and factions alike are ever

in pursuit of power, and effective systems take advantage of this oppositional nature to protect

the rights of all. Yes, the powers of each branch of government are in some ways separate from

each other, but in others, they are intentionally fused. Both the legislature and the executive, for

example, have a role in the establishment of laws. The presidential veto is not an example of the

rigid separation of powers, but of the specific involvement of the president in creating new laws.

And yet, even though the Federalist envisioned the branches of government interacting

with each other in an oppositional manner, it notes that “in republican government, the
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legislature necessarily predominates.” This is not a statement of prescription, but of description,

and it is here where we see that the observations of the Federalist were not always correct. For a

time, the Congress did indeed represent the most powerful branch of government. But such an

orientation is certainly not necessary. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to argue that today’s

Congress is anything other than the weakest branch of government.

So why did Madison’s observation turn out to be wrong? Maybe the fault was the

Federalist’s conflation of individual and institutional ambition. It seems that the Federalist was

correct in noting the prevalence of individual ambition. But perhaps it should not be assumed, as

Federalist 51 does, that the ambition of individuals will inevitably translate to the collective

ambition of the institutions they form. In other words, the ambition of individual members of

Congress might not translate to the ambition of the Congress.

This observation proves illuminating to our own state of affairs. Today’s members of

Congress are certainly ambitious, likely to a fault. A seat in the house of representatives or the

senate is now simply viewed as a stepping stone to power, money, and influence. Even so,

Congress’ modern legislative agenda seems to consist mostly of renaming post offices.

Obviously, the ambition of Alexandria Ocasio Cortez or Ted Cruz has not translated to a

Congress militantly protective of its authority.

Perhaps the most cogent critique of the American constitutional system is that the

founders did not adequately ensure that institutional ambition would be made to counteract itself.

In many ways, it is up to us to think clearly of how we might remedy this fault.

Overall, though, that the Federalist was not entirely correct in its observations does not

make it any less of a masterpiece in the history of political thought. Importantly, the Federalist

outlined an eminently correct and unchanging view of human nature by which human beings
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need constant formation and constraint to act well. This view stands in stark opposition to the

utopianism of the modern left, which sees complete liberation as the ideal. We ought to think

soberly about how we might employ the view of human nature that the Federalist endorses to

rectify the decay of the checks and balances it set out to establish. Just as the Constitution’s

preamble mentions, it is our duty to build upon the foundations the Federalist establishes,

endeavoring always towards a union ever more perfect.