Lawyers League for a better Philippines vs.

Corazon Aquino,
G.R. 76180

Facts:
The legitimacy of the government of President Corazon Aquino is questioned. It is claimed
that her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is a de facto government.

Held:
No; Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For
the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact
and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy
of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to
uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
 De leon vs Esguerra,
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

Facts:
Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de
Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC
Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno
as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC
Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
On February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated
December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V.
Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the
same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void
and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which
shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and
shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to
designate their successors.
Respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on
March 25, 1986, which provided: SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees
under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if
such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of
elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue
of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that
the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six
(6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted
provision of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

Held:
No; examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective
officials under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon
the occurrence of any of the events mentioned.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8,
1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which
it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.
 But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted
provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading. SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose
and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date,
therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that
the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the
autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political
subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and limits the President's power to "general
supervision" over local governments.
Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the
term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still
govern.
 Lambino vs Comelec;

Facts:
Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and
individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government.
COMELEC denied Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in
Santiago v. Commission on Election declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the
Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves
cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."

Issue 1:
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

Held:
No; Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision
that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein.
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because
the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its
face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition"
only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. There is not a single word, phrase, or
sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither
does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it.

The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives. A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment
of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can
propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution
provides: Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative.
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The
first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a
clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended,
and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly
withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change
that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative
test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive
in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and
balances."
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes
overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a
total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the
separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition
alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature
and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a
shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition
of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a
revision, not a mere amendment.

Issue 2:
Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution

Held:
A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary. An affirmation or reversal of
Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to
revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of
the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
 Occena vs Comelec,
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Facts:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang
Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing
their alleged constitutional infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both
members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that
framed the present Constitution.
Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so
extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim
Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was
to revise and not to amend.

Issue:
Whether the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments.

Held:
Yes. The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall
have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim
National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof." One of such
powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments.
Citing Del Rosario vs. COMELEC; it held that "And whether the Constitutional
Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the
new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new
one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision'
or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is
ratified by the sovereign people."
 Imbong vs Comelec,
G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970
Facts:
On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of
the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional
Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each
representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be
elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code.
After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that
year, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the
aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No.
2.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No.
4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention
"shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts
according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall
be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of
members of the House of Representatives," "and that any other details relating to the specific
apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional
Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be
inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution."
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No.
6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular
provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns
the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same
grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
[R.A. No. 6132 -

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6132 unconstitutional.

Held:
No; SC sustain the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting
as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as a Constituent
Assembly because:

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has
full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the
purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately.
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-
fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a

constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other
powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix
the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as
appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of
the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details indispensable to a
fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the above-mentioned details, except
the appropriation of funds.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution
solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the
implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No.
6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such
implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the
constitution, they are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative
body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is
expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is
no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any
difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can
reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing
details.

Issue 2:
Whether Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is unconstitutional on the ground that it deprived liberty
without dues process of law.

Held:
No; citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic
under our constitutional system. The State through its Constitution or legislative body, can create
an office and define the qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions
on a public officer. Consequently, only those with qualifications and who do not fall under any
constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly elected or appointed to a public office. The
obvious reason for the questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting
influence of self-interest, party interest or vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time
to performing solely in the interest of the nation his high and well nigh sacred function of
formulating the supreme law of the land, which may endure for generations and which cannot
easily be changed like an ordinary statute. With the disqualification embodied in Sec. 5, the
delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for concessions in the form of an
elective or appointive office as long as the convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing
authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his own proposals. Not love for self, but
love for country must always motivate his actuations as delegate; otherwise the several provisions
of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests, subversive of the welfare
of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the disqualification is not permanent but only
temporary only to continue until the final adjournment of the convention which may not extend
beyond one year.
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid
limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not
arbitrary.

The Court declared that while the authority to call a Constitutional Convention is vested by the
Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly, the power to
enact the implementing details or specifics of the general law does not exclusively pertain to
Congress, the Congress in exercising its comprehensive legislative power (not as a Constitutional
Assembly) may pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of the
Constitutional Conventions, such as the number, qualification, and compensation of its member.

The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132
are as follows:

 Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution

has authority to propose constitutional amendments or call a convention for the
purpose by ¾ votes of each house in joint session assembled but voting separately.
 Such grant includes all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal
power by necessary implication.
 Implementing details are within the authority of the Congress not only as a Constituent
Assembly but also in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power which
encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or
removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action so long as it does not
contravene any provision of the Constitution; and
 Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary implementing legislation to
fill in the gaps, which Congress as a Constituent Assembly has omitted.
 Planas vs Comelec,
January 22, 1973

Facts:
Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution
No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic
Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of
delegates to said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional
Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session
on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines
under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the
Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification
or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification
or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
Charito Planas filed, with this Court, Case G. R. No. L-35925, against the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or
their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of
the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as
law because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same,
the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the
appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in
Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set
for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no
sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."
Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the
Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the
plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution.
The other argument of another petitioner is that "That the proceedings of the so-called
Citizens' Assemblies are illegal, null and void particularly insofar as such proceedings are
being made the basis of a supposed consensus for the ratification of the proposed
Constitution because elections contemplated in the Constitution, Article XV, at which the
proposed constitutional amendments are to be submitted for ratification, are elections at
which only qualified and duly registered voters are permitted to vote, whereas, the so-called
Citizens' Assemblies were participated in by persons 15 years of age and older, regardless of
qualifications or lack thereof, as prescribed in the Election Code among others.
The President signed Proclamation No. 1102 which is the announcing the ratification by
the Filipino People of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Respondents therein alleged in their answer thereto, by way of affirmative defenses: 1) that
the "questions raised" in said petition "are political in character"; 2) that "the Constitutional
Convention acted freely and had plenary authority to propose not only amendments but a
Constitution which would supersede the present Constitution"; 3) that "the President's call for a
plebiscite and the appropriation of funds for this purpose are valid"; 4) that "there is not an
improper submission" and "there can be a plebiscite under Martial Law"; and 5) that the "argument
that the Proposed Constitution is vague and incomplete, makes an unconstitutional delegation of
power, includes a referendum on the proclamation of Martial Law and purports to exercise judicial
power" is "not relevant and without merit."

Issue:
Whether SC have authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree No. 73.

Held:
Yes; the contested decree purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the
issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list
of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the
Executive, but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935
Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority of this Court to review cases involving
said issue.
The Convention was legally free to postulate any amendment it may deem fit to propose
— save perhaps what is or may be inconsistent with what is now known, particularly in
international law, as Jus Cogens — not only because the Convention exercised sovereign powers
delegated thereto by the people — although insofar only as the determination of the proposals to
be made and formulated by said body is concerned — but, also, because said proposals cannot be
valid as part of our Fundamental Law unless and until "approved by the majority of the votes cast
at an election at which" " said proposals "are submitted to the people for their ratification," as
provided in Section 1 of Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution.
As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting
to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating
funds therefor," I find it unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon such question, because the
plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be
scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the
circumstances may justify.
Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this:

1. There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree
No. 73.

2. On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Esguerra and myself, or six (6) Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has
become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold
the validity of said Decree.

3. On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to
incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justices
Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and myself have voted to uphold the authority of the
Convention.
4. Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had
authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial
Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view.

5. On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of
the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned,
Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated
under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore,
grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are
of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that
Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for
the purposes contemplated.

6. On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed:

a. Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and
myself are of the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not
been properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon
such question.
b. Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No.
1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the
"purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution ... based on the referendum
among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the
requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate
drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances,
... the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should be recognized as
legitimately in force.
c. Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not
been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that,
accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever.
d. Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue
whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the
absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue
"poses a question of fact.
 Lambino vs Comelec;

Facts:
Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and
individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government.
COMELEC denied Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in
Santiago v. Commission on Election declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the
Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves
cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."

Issue 1:
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

Held:
No; Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision
that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein.
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because
the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its
face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition"
only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. There is not a single word, phrase, or
sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither
does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it.

The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives. A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment
of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can
propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution
provides: Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative.
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The
first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a
clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended,
and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly
withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change
that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative
test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive
in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and
balances."
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes
overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a
total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the
separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition
alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature
and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a
shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition
of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a
revision, not a mere amendment.
 Defensor-Santiago vs Comelec,
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
Facts:
Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" wherein Delfin asked
the COMELEC for an order fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and instructing Municipal
Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people
power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
Petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
 The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed
 It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it
failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution.
 COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national
and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations
for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress
is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
 The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision
thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore,
outside the power of the people's initiative.
Private respondent argued that he claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires
is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers
the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Act and that the he proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere
amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the
Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine
or overhaul the entire document.

Issue 1:
Whether R.A. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution.

Held:
 YES; R.A. No. 6735 intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, but is, unfortunately, inadequate to cover that system.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
Section 2 of R.A. 6735 does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The said section reads: Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system
of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with
the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum
on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to
amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined
only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can
only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that
Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the
registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of
initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as
among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the
case of initiative on the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II)
and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act
is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to
fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could
have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest,
or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
 Tolentino vs Comelec,
41 SCRA 702

Facts:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the
Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2
and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively.
The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and
the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132.
The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force
and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the
elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on
November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out
the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that
the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively
in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention.
Respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down
the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper
to propose is within the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its
power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such amendments
either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion.

Issue:
Whether there is any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution
which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1

Held:
Yes; the Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the
amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single
"election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to
a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose. We hold that the plebiscite being
called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971
is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention
and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says
distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the
purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of
amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely
provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may
be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of
Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocally says "an election" which means only
one.
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an
amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as
its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole.
We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article
XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can
base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible
frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole
purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election
for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed
plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the
Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional
Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow
these eighteen years old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people
under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or
not the mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God has given
Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished,
and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing
the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or
plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not
denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding that
under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not
separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present
Convention.
 Sanidad vs. Comelec,
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
Facts:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President
of his present powers.
President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the
previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976.
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640
for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16 among others. Petitioners
contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President
to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
Another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was
instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting
that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of
the Constitution.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law,
the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the
submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum;
and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which
confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying
outside the domain of judicial review.

Issue:
Whether the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of judicial
review.

Held:
Yes; Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular
act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that
matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom
of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
 Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS,
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid
of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September
1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent
GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. It is also the thesis of petitioner
that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part
of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share.
Respondents except. They maintain that: Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision
and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be
existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done."

Issue:
Whether Section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is self-
executing.

Held:
YES; although some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who
merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make
it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature
is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as
the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such
a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision
of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation
must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that in the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation
on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional
right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium
[wherever there is a right, there is remedy].
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared
the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make
the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution
the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

The following are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
legislation:
 personal dignity (Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation)
 sanctity of family life (Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation)
 promotion of social justice (Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation)
 values of education (Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation)
 provisions on social justice and human rights (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance)
promotion of general welfare (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato)
 promotion of total human liberation and development (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato)
 Oposa v Factoran,
GR No. 101083

Facts:
Petitioners filed an action before the court to annul the Timber Licence Agreement by the
Secretary of DENR. The respondent Secretary averts that the petitioner did not able to alleged the
specific legal right or a specific legal wrong committed by him.
Petitioners maintained that their causes of action is that the TLA encroaches the
Constitutional provisions of Balance and Healthful Ecology [Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution].

Issue 1:
Whether or not plaintiffs have cause of action.

Held:
YES. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that
it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter
of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter,
it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting
their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not
only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of
the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.

Issue 2:
Whether Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing.

Held:
YES; the complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides: Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to
a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
 Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain [G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008]
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to
sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the
leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to
be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist
orientations.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which
is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain. The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which
right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority
of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states
or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state
in the modern sense.
The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the
past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro
homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat
a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong) each ruled
by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others.
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with
defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and
commerce with foreign nations."
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor
the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for
the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of
the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not
in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.

Issue 1:
Whether respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation
and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD.

Held:
Yes. As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the statutory right to
examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987
Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano, the Court ruled that access to public
records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern
since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
political significance.
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. The right to
information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right
to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated,
and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects

Issue 2:
Whether the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws.

Held:
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded. In
general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein
to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing
some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful
to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-
AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly
alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES,
and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-
AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government.
MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and
trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the
BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and
the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the
BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border
agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with
the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,
namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter
into relations with other states.
 Francisco vs. House of Representatives,
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5
of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora
and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella
(Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed
by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
Senator Pimentel contends that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial
review. Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections
16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI
of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section
3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because
filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3
ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by
at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that
the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials
could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven
Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective
body, has yet to act on it.

Issue:
Whether or not second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
unconstitutional.
Held:
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort
to statutory construction is, therefore, in order. That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5)
of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate
Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained
by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings,
which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included
the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word
"initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to
commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with
Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments
of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise: Finally, it should be noted that the House
Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed
initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses
a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are
initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened
earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint.
In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in
deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision
of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the
House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of
the Constitution."
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word
"initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz: “Section 3 (1) The House
of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year…” refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The
object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is
"impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term
"cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the
House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense
that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do
it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be
followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from
the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It
has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists
of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is
the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of
all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates
an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the
Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and
the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding"
initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in
the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when
a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of
"to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both
ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning
into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself
affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment
by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article
XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.
 First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared: “We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever
be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in
the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the
need for construction is reduced to a minimum.”
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. Supreme Court apply this
principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary: “A foolproof yardstick in constitutional
construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the
words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.”
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon, this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared: “[T]he
members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.”
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review:
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like
almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
 When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there
is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before
he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he
would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It
is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.

Ripeness and Prematurity:

In Tan vs. Macapagal, this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture." Only then
may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.

Political question
The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers
to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
Judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by
the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
In Marcos v. Manglapus, this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
“The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left
to the political departments to decide.”
 And in Daza v. Singson, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled: "In the
case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question."
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable
political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
Judicial Restraint:
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of
review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.