THE MALTESE CORSO IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY*

MARK A. ALOISIO

The Maltese islands, located in the narrow channel that separates Sicily
from Tunisia, served as a base for corsairs and privateers well before
the arrival of the Order of St. John in the sixteenth century. In the
early thirteenth century, the Genoese count of Malta, Enrico Pescatore,
used the island to attack Pisan and Venetian interests in the central
and eastern Mediterranean, while an intervention in Malta by Frederick
IV of Sicily in 1372 was possibly provoked by piratical activities against
Genoese ships by the captain of the island.1 The archipelago, part of
the kingdom of Sicily since the Norman conquest in 1127, was drawn
into the Aragonese orbit from the late thirteenth century.2 Late medieval
Malta and Gozo were peripheral, but by no means isolated, outposts
of the crown of Aragon, largely cut off from the main trade routes that
traversed the Mediterranean, and exposed to attacks from the crown’s
enemies. The intention of this paper is to describe the political, social
and economic context that made the Maltese islands a fertile ground
for corsair activity in the central Mediterranean during the fifteenth cen-
tury. I will begin by describing the process whereby the crown’s policy
of delegating the defense of the archipelago to its galley-captains led to
the establishment of a military aristocracy on Malta who were also
financiers and organizers of corsairing ventures. Secondly, I will look at
the links that existed between corsairing and trade on the islands, and
show that here, as elsewhere in the Mediterranean, corsairing was often
an economic enterprise. I will then conclude with a brief discussion of
the impact of corsairing on Maltese society in the fifteenth century as

* I am grateful to Kathryn L. Reyerson for her help in preparing this article.

1
D. Abulafia, ‘Henry Count of Malta and his Mediterranean activities: 1203-1230’
in Medieval Malta. Studies on Malta before the Knights, ed. A. T. Luttrell (London, 1975);
H. Bresc, ‘Documents on Frederick IV of Sicily’s intervention in Malta: 1372’, Papers of
the British School in Rome, 41 (1973).
2
A. T. Luttrell, “Approaches to Medieval Malta” in Luttrell, Medieval Malta.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003 Medieval Encounters 9,2-3

Also available online – www.brill.nl
194  . 

indicated through the records of the universitas or municipal government

of Malta.
Corsairing was a legalized form of piracy, undertaken with the official
or implicit sanction of the authorities in return for a share of the spoils.
At the same time, it was also an important aspect of naval warfare in
the Mediterranean, and the Aragonese rulers were particularly adept in
the use of the guerra di corso to promote their political interests.3 A sub-
stantial part of the Aragonese fleet during military campaigns was made
up of privately owned vessels belonging to Catalan, Castilian, and
Valencian galley-captains.4 When not in the direct service of the king,
these individuals were permitted to act as armatori or organizers of the
corso, attacking ships and merchandise belonging to the crown’s enemies
and launching swift raids into enemy territory, known as razzias, to
destroy crops and animals, and take the inhabitants captive as slaves.
Their actions could be directed towards a number of goals, including
that of wearing down an adversary, hindering maritime trade or of
obtaining concessions or commercial treaties. In other instances, these
galley-captains-cum-corsairs were assigned to defend territories, which
the Aragonese rulers lacked the financial and material resources to pro-
tect, especially small, relatively isolated islands, such as Malta and
Pantelleria, and exposed coastal towns, such as Augusta and Sciacca in
Sicily.5 It was in the context of this policy that a small military aris-
tocracy established itself on Malta during the fifteenth century and
rapidly assumed a prominent role in local political and economic affairs.
The military campaigns undertaken by Alfonso V during his long
reign as king of Aragon, Naples and Sicily drew Malta and Gozo into
the war at sea and the guerra di corso. The islands served as staging points
for attacks by corsairs and the royal fleet against the Hafsid rulers of
Tunis, which in turn exposed them to destructive counter-incursions

3
J. H. Pryor, Geography, technology, and war. Studies in the maritime history of the Mediterranean
649-1571 (Cambridge, 1988), 153-64. On the use of corsairs by the crown of Aragon,
M. del Treppo, I mercanti catalani e l’espansione della Corona d’Aragona nel secolo XV (Naples,
1972); M. D. López Pérez, La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb en el siglo XIV (1331-1410)
(Barcelona, 1995); J. L. Yarrison, ‘Force as an instrument of state policy: European mil-
itary incursions and trade in the Maghrib, 1000-1355’ (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University,
1982).
4
I. Schiappoli, La marina degli aragonesi di Napoli (Naples, 1940), 50.
5
H. Bresc, ‘La course méditerranéenne au miroir sicilien (XIIe-XVe siècles)’ in
H. Bresc, Politique et société en Sicile, XII e-XV e siècles (Aldershot, 1990), 94-6.
   CORSO     195

from the Hafsids, notably in 1429 when a large number of Maltese

were taken captive.6 Alfonso’s wars on the Italian mainland brought the
Crown of Aragon into conflict with Genoa and Venice, whose trade
was also vulnerable to corsairs operating from Malta and the other
islands in the central Mediterranean. It was in the context of these polit-
ical and military developments that a number of families of Aragonese
and Castilian origin established themselves in Sicily and in Malta dur-
ing the first half of the fifteenth century. Many of them, as Henri Bresc
has noted, were ‘galley-captains who acted as entrepreneurs devoted to
the private corso and as officials of the royal armata, according to the
occasion.’7 On Malta the new arrivals were granted rights over royal
estates and were also appointed to positions of military and civil com-
mand in recompense for their services to the crown. Among them was
Petrus de Busco, a member of the de Nava clan, and described in a
document as militem, patronum Galee, who in 1439 was granted two estates
from the royal patrimony in recompense for services which he was ren-
dering to the crown with his galleys.8 These families, who besides the
de Nava also included the de Guevara and the Desguanez, formed a
military aristocracy whose status was derived from their direct associa-
tion with the monarchy and were hence distinct, at least initially, from
the native elite, whose fortunes were related to the affairs of the uni-
versitas.9 Descendants of the de Guevara, Desguanez and de Nava
effectively monopolized the office of castellan of the royal castle at Birgu
until the early sixteenth century.10

6
On the impact of these events on Malta see the articles by R. Valentini published
in Archivio Storico di Malta (henceforth ASM ), especially ‘Gli ultimi Re Aragonesi ed i
primi Castigliani in Malta’, ASM, vii, 4 (1936) and supporting documents, ASM, viii, 1
(1936-7). More generally, R. Brunschvig, La Berbérie Orientale sous les Hafsides, des origines
à la fin du XV e siècle, 2 vols. Paris, 1940; C. Trasselli, ‘Sicilia, Levante e Tunisia nei sec-
oli XIV e XV’ in C. Trasselli, Mediterraneo e Sicilia all’inizio dell’epoca moderna (Ricerche
Quattrocentesche). Cosenza, 1977.
7
H. Bresc, ‘The ‘secrezia’ and the royal patrimony in Malta: 1240-1450’ in Luttrell,
Medieval Malta, 146.
8
Document published in R. Valentini, ‘L’espansionismo aragonese nel Mediterraneo
come causa della decadenza di Malta’, ASM, xii, 2-3 (1941), 100.
9
C. Dalli, ‘Capitoli: the voice of an elite’, Proceedings of History Week 1992, ed.
S. Fiorini (Malta, 1994).
10
G. Wettinger, ‘The castrum maris and its suburb of Birgu during the middle ages’
in Birgu: a Maltese maritime city, 2 vols., eds. L. Bugeja, M. Buhagiar, S. Fiorini (Malta,
1993), 43.
196  . 

Arguably the most powerful of these lineages were the de Nava, who
came to Malta from Sicily, where they had already established a strong
presence in Syracuse.11 Suero and Gonsalvo de Nava of Syracuse were
prominent corsairs and galley captains who preyed on Genoese ships
near Tunis and the small island of Djerba and probably made use of
Malta from time to time.12 In 1447 Suero was being sheltered by the
castellan of Malta to the consternation of the jurats of the universitas
who feared that the island might be the target of reprisals by his ene-
mies.13 Another member of the family, Gutierre de Nava was castellan
of Malta from 1421 to 1437 and served with the royal fleet on numer-
ous occasions.14 In 1429 he commanded a squadron of galleys when
Alfonso V attacked Djerba in response to the Hafsid attack on Malta
a few months earlier.15 He was later captured at the battle of Ponza
(1435) fighting for Aragon against the Genoese and spent many years
in a Genoese jail for his depredations against their ships.16 Two nephews
of Gutierre, Pedro del Bosch, who was castellan of Malta from 1435
to 1446 and Gonsalvo de Nava, both galley-captains, were likewise
responsible for various attacks against Muslim and non-Muslim ships in
Maghribi waters.17
While the Aragonese crown made extensive use of corsairs in time
of war, it sometimes struggled to restrict their activities after hostilities
ceased or were suspended. The Genoese and the Venetians lodged
numerous protests to Alfonso V in which they claimed that their mer-
chant ships were being attacked even during periods of peace.18 Corsairs
also threatened to undermine the king’s protracted negotiations with the
Hafsids. In 1446 negotiations for a truce between Abu 'Omar 'Othman
of Tunis and Alfonso V were stalled when subjects of the sultan were

11
M. del Treppo, I mercanti catalani e l’espansione della Corona d’Aragona nel secolo XV
(Naples, 1972), 498.
12
Ibid.
13
G. Wettinger, Acta iuratorum et consilii civitatis et insulae maltae. (Associazione di Studi
Malta-Sicilia. Centro di Studi Filologici e Linguistici siciliani) (Palermo, 1993).
14
Del Treppo, 498; (or 1429-35 according to Wettinger, ‘Castrum maris’, 42).
15
A. Ryder, Alfonso the Magnanimous, King of Aragon, Naples and Sicily, 1396-1458 (Oxford,
1990), 187.
16
Ibid., 205.
17
Wettinger, ‘Castrum maris’, 42; R. Valentini, ‘Documenti per servire alla storia di
Malta (1432-1450)’, ASM, viii, 4 (1937), § 20 (15.2.1441); Bresc, ‘Sicile, Malte et monde
musulman’, in Malta: a case study in itnernational cross-currents, ed. S. Fionini and V. Mallia-
Milanes (Malta, 1991), 73.
18
Del Treppo, 493-504.
   CORSO     197

captured by the fuste of Antonio Desguanez of Malta. The king was

eventually able to obtain the release of the “captivi mori ” but only after
he paid compensation, out of his own money, to Descguanez amount-
ing to 940 ducats.19 In 1473 the inhabitants of Sicily, Malta, Gozo, and
Pantelleria were informed by the viceroy that, following the signing of
a two-year truce between the king of Aragon and the sultan of Tunis,
they were to desist from attacking subjects of the sultan or risk death
and the confiscation of their assets.20
For the de Nava and the Desguanez, corsairing represented an eco-
nomic opportunity that was frequently indistinguishable from ordinary
commercial enterprise. The fifteenth-century notarial archives from Malta
provide ample evidence of the close ties that existed between corsair-
ing and trade as well as of the participation of individuals of diverse
social backgrounds in the corso.21 No doubt, their participation was in
part a response to what Braudel regarded as one of the key problems
facing small Mediterranean islands, namely ‘how to live off their own
resources.’22 Contracts concerning the corso are in fact very similar to
those that concern economic activity in the normal sense of the term,
a similarity which has also been recently observed in contemporary
sources from Sicily.23 The recent publication of several sources of medieval
Maltese history, including the administrative records of the universitas of
Malta and some notarial registers, has added considerably to our under-
standing of social and economic conditions on the island in the fifteenth
century.24 A contract from October 1494 describes how four Maltese,

19
F. Cerone, ‘Alfonso il Magnanimo ed Abu 'Omar 'Othmân. Trattative e negoziati
tra il Regno di Sicilia di quà e di là dal Faro ed il Regno di Tunisi (1432-57)’, Archivio
storico per la Sicilia orientale, x, 1-2, n.d., § xvii and xviii.
20
M. L. de Mas Latrie, Traités de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les rela-
tions de l’Afrique septentrionale au moyen age (Paris, 1866), § XXIV.
21
S. Fiorini, Documentary sources of Maltese History. Part I. Notarial Documents: No. 1 Notary
Giacomo Zabbara R494/1 (I) 1486-1488 (Malta, 1996); idem, No. 2 Notary Giacomo Zabbara
R494/1 (II-IV) 1494-1497 (Malta, 1999).
22
F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip
II, trans. S. Reynolds, 2 vols. (London, 1972), I, 152.
23
N. Zeldes, ‘Ad Piraticam Exercendam: two “piratical” contracts from early sixteenth-
century Sicily’, Mediterranean Historical Review, vol. 15, ii (2000).
24
Wettinger, Acta; S. Fiorini, Documentary sources of Maltese History. Part I. Notarial Documents:
No. 1 Notary Giacomo Zabbara R494/1 (I) 1486-1488 (Malta, 1996); idem, No. 2 Notary
Giacomo Zabbara R494/1 (II-IV) 1494-1497 (Malta, 1999); J. del Amo García, S. Fiorini,
G. Wettinger, eds. Cathedral Museum Mdina. Archivum Cathedralis Melitæ. Miscellanea 33: 1405-
1542. (Documentary Sources of Maltese History. Part III: Documents of the Maltese
Universitas) (Malta, 2001). To these should be added some notable earlier efforts, espe-
cially the Maltese capitoli, published in S. Giambruno and L. Genuardi, Capitoli inediti
198  . 

including magnificus Antonio Gatt Desguanez, agreed to form a societas

to build and equip an armed ship ad piraticam exercendam.25 Each partner
contributed an equal share of the capital invested, and it was agreed
that one of them would also captain the vessel. The ship’s destination
is not mentioned in this instance but, as in a later corsairing venture
in which Gatt Desguanez again participated, it was possibly directed to
Maghrebi waters, ‘contra Infideles et hostes regios’, as the notary then
recorded.26 Other contracts were drawn up in the following weeks by
one or more of the partners to recruit Maltese and Gozitans to serve
on the vessel.27
Another observation that again serves to stress the essentially eco-
nomic nature of the enterprise is the lack of social stigma that one
might otherwise presume would be associated with corsairing. Gatt
Desguanez belonged to an aristocratic family, related to the Desguanez
who had arrived on the island two generations earlier, and he was also
actively involved in local civic affairs.28 His partners in the venture were
of more modest status and the indications are that there were many
others like them who invested money in the corso. In a contract from
the following year (1495), Andreas Falzon, a judge of the universitas of
Malta, sold a donkey on credit to Nicola Grima, but reserved the right
to demand that the Grima pay off his debt by serving on board a cor-
sair vessel that Falzon was considering investing some money in.29 The
practice of converting outstanding debts into service on corsair ships is
also encountered in other contracts. In April 1496 the same Antonio
Gatt Desguanez requested a debtor of his to sail on a fusta (a small gal-
ley) that was about to depart on another voyage against the Moors or
else to pay twice the amount owed.30
The registers of the Maltese notary Giacomo Zabbara provide valu-
able details of the commercial links between Malta and north Africa in
the late fifteenth century, links which are only sporadically discernible

delle città demaniali di Sicilia approvati sino al 1458, I Alcamo-Malta (Palermo, 1918) and var-
ious fifteenth-century documents published by R. Valentini in Archivio Storici di Malta
[ASM] during the 1930s.
25
Fiorini, Zabbara, 2, § 19 (22.10.1494).
26
Ibid., II, § 253 (11.4.1496).
27
Ibid., § 79, 82, 83 (6.2.1495), § 88 (10.2.1495).
28
On the participation of Gatt Desguanez in the deliberations of the universitas,
Wettinger Acta, passim.
29
Ibid., § 127 (3.7.1495). Falzon served as a judge and jurat of the universitas of Malta.
30
Ibid., § 253.
   CORSO     199

for previous centuries. The documents reveal that a number of Maltese,

as well as foreigners based in Malta, some of whom were associated
with corsairing, were also, at the same time, present in the Maghreb
as merchants. In a recent study on relations between the Crown of
Aragon and the Maghreb during the fourteenth century, María Dolores
López Pérez has noted that Catalan, Valencian, and Mallorcan ship
owners sometimes alternated commercial and corsair voyages to the
same area or even combined the two in the same venture.31 It would not
be surprising if, indeed, this situation was reproduced in Malta. Maltese,
especially Maltese Jews, some with kinship ties to co-religionists in Tunisia
and Djerba, had longstanding commercial interests in the Maghreb.32
The Catalans had had a vice-consul on Malta at least since the mid-
fourteenth century and Catalan merchants are evident on the island in
the fifteenth century, often trading between Sicily and the north African
coast, sometimes in partnership with Maltese.33 For sure, their opera-
tions on Malta were part of a much larger trade network based mainly
around two commodities: grain from Sicily and Calabria and slaves
from sub-Saharan Africa obtained from a region known as Monti di
Barqa, located in modern Libya.34 It was a lucrative exchange, with
extensive involvement by Catalan merchants, and sustained by the
demand for household slaves in Sicily (to a lesser extent even in Malta)
and the need to import regular shipments of grain in north Africa.35
At least some of this trade was being channelled through Malta from
the Monti di Barqa which is repeatedly mentioned as the final destina-
tion of merchants in Malta. The nature of this exchange, involving small
vessels that sufficed for the short voyage between Malta and Barbary,
appears akin to cabotage or tramping, which left few written records
and therefore has often been underestimated by historians. Among the
Maltese actively involved in this exchange were the father and son

31
López Pérez, 625-6.
32
G. Wettinger, The Jews of Malta in the Late Middle Ages (Malta, 1985). In 1436 Maltese
Jews stood surety for a corsairing venture. Bresc, ‘Sicile, Malte et monde musulman’, 73.
33
A. T. Luttrell, ‘Malta and the Aragonese Crown: 1282-1530’, Journal of the Faculty
of Arts (The Royal University of Malta), iii (1965), 6; S. Fiorini, ‘Relaciones Catalano-
Maltesas en la Baja Edad Media. Una approximacion a partir de los archivos malteses’
in Actas Primer Coloquio Internacional Hispano Maltes de Historia (Madrid, 1991).
34
Del Treppo, 178-79.
35
On slavery in Sicily, C. Verlinden, ‘L’esclavage en Sicile au bas moyen âge’, Bulletin
de l’Institut historique belge de Rome, XXXV (1963); for examples of purchases of slaves by
Sicilian Christians and Jews, Il registro del notaio ericino Giovanni Maiorana (1297-1300),
2 vols, ed. A. Sparti (Palermo, 1982), § 138. For Malta, Fiorini, Zabbara, 1,2.
200  . 

Jackinus and Peri Caruana. Jackinus first appears in the records as a

corsair, for in 1473 he was given permission by the universitas of Malta
to depart with his galleys on a corsairing expedition to Barbary.36 Some
years later, however, he is referred to as a mercator in a notarial con-
tract in which he appears with his son and a Catalan merchant, Vincencius
Bestardes, ferrying merchandise to north Africa.37 In January 1495 he
and Bestardes, along with two other Maltese, invested 360 gold onze in
a ship loaded with unspecified merchandise to be sold at Monti di Barqa.38
Prior to this voyage, Caruana was in Syracuse—one of Sicily’s main
centres for slave trading—where he entered into an agreement with
Johannes Moroto and Poncius Frou (the latter possibly a Catalan) to
purchase on their behalf one and three slaves respectively.39 An indi-
cation of the goods carried on these voyages comes from another con-
tract in which Peri Caruana, in association with Johannes de Bonayuto
from Syracuse, and two Maltese, transported barley from Syracuse and
woolen cloth from Malta (barracani ) to the same destination.40 These and
other documents reveal a pattern whereby merchants from Malta sailed
to Syracuse, where they loaded grain and other commodities, then
returned to Malta where other merchandise was perhaps also taken on
board, before proceeding to the Monti di Barca. At their destination they
were able to purchase slaves whom they then sold in Malta or Syracuse.
At other times they were also appointed to ransom Maltese and Gozitan
captives and bring them back with them.41
While the potential financial rewards that could be obtained from
corsairing made it an attractive prospect for many individuals on the
island, its impact on contemporary Maltese society should not be viewed
solely in economic terms. In a letter to Martin the Elder of Aragon in
1410, officials of the Maltese universitas protested against the reinstate-
ment of a royal tax of one-fifth on the spoils of the corso, because they
alleged, it would discourage corsairs from arming in Malta and hence
weaken the ability of the islands to defend themselves against Muslim
raids. They claimed that previously corsairs who sailed against ‘the sara-

36
Wettinger, Acta § 492.
37
Fiorini, Zabbara, II, § 74, 107.
38
Ibid., § 74 (27.1.1495).
39
Ibid., § 68 (21.1.1495).
40
Ibid., § 5 (10.9.1494).
41
Ransoming of captives: ibid., § 200 (12.12.1495), § 223 (3.3.1496). In 1483 the
Maltese Jew Azar Marsany travelled to Susa to negotiate the ransom of a Christian
Maltese: Wettinger, Jews of Malta, 78-9.
   CORSO     201

cens of Barbary’ from Malta were exempted from the tax and as a
result ‘the audacity of the Saracens had decreased while that of the
Maltese and Sicilians had increased, and so the homeland was defended
and the enemy offended’.42 This document, however, does not seem to
reflect the general attitude that prevailed in the universitas towards cor-
sairs throughout most of the fifteenth century. The universitas, in fact,
seems to have been largely opposed to the use of Malta as a base by
foreign and Maltese corsairs. The reasons given for this stance, as repeat-
edly stressed in council meetings or in letters sent to the authorities in
Palermo, were two. First, it was argued that indiscriminate activity by
corsairs from Malta, especially when they were foreigners (and pre-
sumably more difficult to police), could provoke reprisals from the gov-
ernments or compatriots of those whose ships had been attacked. The
problem was compounded by the fact that an important part of the
island, namely the royal castle (castrum maris) at Birgu and its harbour
area, was outside the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities. The office
of castellan was normally in the hands of the military elite, which lim-
ited the ability of the universitas to enforce the law throughout the island.43
Hence the annoyance of the jurats with the castellan in 1447 at the per-
mission granted by him to the corsair Sueru de Nava to make use of
the Birgu harbour.44 The jurats claimed that de Nava had previously
attacked Venetian, Genoese, and even Catalan ships, implying that the
island might suffer the consequences if it granted shelter to de Nava.
Some years later the officials decided that Levantine privateers should
only be allowed to stop in Malta and Gozo if they gave an assurance
not to harm the inhabitants, be they Christians or Jews, and their prop-
erty, while in port.45 The second argument put forward by the universitas
against the corso was that corsair-captains, by recruiting Maltese to serve
on their vessels, were drawing local men away from the island, some
of whom failed to return, and thus compounding an already serious
population decline due to food shortages, migration, and razzias by
Muslim corsairs.46 In February 1453 the viceroy of Sicily acceded to a

42
R. Valentini, ‘Gli ultimi Re Aragonesi ed i primi Castigliani in Malta. Documenti’,
ASM, viii, 1 (1936-7), § 2: “la audacia di li Sarachini diminuia et di li Sichiliani et Maltisi aug-
mentava, et cussi era difisa la patria et uffisu lu inimicu”.
43
Wettinger, ‘The castrum maris’.
44
Wettinger, Acta, § 5.
45
Wettinger, Jews of Malta, 16.
46
‘Parti di quilli ki vanu cum ipsi tali fusti may hanu tornatu’: R. Valentini, ‘Documenti per
servire alla storia di Malta (1432-1450)’, ASM, viii, 4 (1937), § 25 (24.3.1449).
202  . 

request by the universitas to halt corsairs from operating on Malta and

ordered that ‘neither citizens nor foreigners may arm galleys or sailing
ships or other ships, except in the service of your majesty and [on] his
orders or in case of real necessity as determined by this universitas.’47
The crown, with good reason therefore, appears to have been largely
sympathetic to complaints by the universitas, but its repeated proclama-
tions seem to indicate that rarely the desired effect was achieved. The
problem for the universitas was complicated when those breaking the law
were powerful groups such as the de Nava, the de Guevara or the
Desguanez who could often count on the support of influential family
members in Sicily and elsewhere. In these instances the authority of the
universitas was severely circumscribed even when it obtained prescripts
from the viceroy addressed to specific individuals.48 Moreover, corsairs
were especially careful to avoid drawing attention to their activities by
equipping in one place and returning with their spoils to another. Some
citizens of Syracuse equipped in Malta while the Desguanez often oper-
ated from Pantelleria.49 The organization of these ventures was often so
complex that one can understand the difficulties facing the authorities.
Bresc has highlighted a case where a vessel from Ragusa (Dubrovnik)
was attacked by a galiotta from Syracuse that was commanded by a
Catalan and financed by two Maltese Jews.50 In these circumstances one
can understand the frustration of the Maltese officials who remarked
that local corsairs were causing much harm (‘cause di molti danpni’) to the
island.51
In his study on the maritime history of the medieval Mediterranean
John Pryor noted that corsairing and the guerra di corso reflected the
multi-faceted competition for dominance at sea, a struggle that was
partly inter-religious warfare and partly “an intra-religious free-for-all.”52
The Maltese islands, at the crossroads between Islam and Christianity,
were ideally placed as a base for corsairs, especially when political con-
ditions, as under the crown of Aragon in the fifteenth century, offered
them the opportunity, and the license, to do so. At a more mundane

47
Giambruno-Genuardi, Capitoli inediti, § 10 (9.2.1453).
48
Wettinger, Acta § 82 (30.5.1457), addressed to Johanni de Guevara forbidding him
to arm vessels in Malta.
49
Bresc, ‘La course méditerranéenne’, 98-9.
50
Ibid., 98.
51
Valentini, ASM, viii, 4 (1937), § 16 (24.3.1449).
52
Pryor, 156.
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level, corsairing represented an economic activity that helped to estab-

lish a military aristocracy on the islands and also provided a source of
income for many others. Yet, in many respects, the golden age of Maltese
corsairs was yet to come. From the sixteenth century, what had until
then been essentially a private enterprise loosely regulated by the state,
became a veritable ‘industry’ that also helped to perpetuate the raison
d’être of the knights of St. John.