Marx and Engels on Nationalism and National Identity: A Reappraisal Erica L. Benner F.S. Northedge Essay, 1988 The F.S. Northedge Essay Competition was established in 1986 to commemorate the inspiration provided by one of our founders, Professor Northedge, during his many years at the LSE. in publishing well-argued student work alongside that of more established scholars in the field of International Relations, the Essay Competition continues the goals of both Millennium and Professor Northedge. The winning essay for 1988, by Erica L. Benner, provides a good example of the scholarship which Professor Northedge encouraged in his students and sets high standards for student essays. The author addresses the thorny problem of the place of nationalism and national identity in the thought of Marx and Engels and attempts to demonstrate that their ‘journalistic’ material and their more substantial work are not in contradiction, The number and standard of entries for the competition was higher than ever this year. The Editors consider that this is a fine tribute to Professor Northedge. We acknowledge the calibre of the remaining entries, and thank those who submitted their work. the Editors Marx and Engels’ failure to develop a systematic theory of nationalism is well-known. The founders of Marxism did produce what amount to volumes of writings on the national movements of their own day, and they were acutely aware that such movements might either advance their revolutionary programme or thwart it, corroborate their theory of historical change or call its deepest premises into question. But the journalistic and often polemical style of many of these writings has led some commentators to dismiss them as mere *hackwork" infused, Perhaps. with the occasional common-sense insight into international power Politics but still, in the words of one of Marx's recent explicators, ‘devoid of theoretical interest’,' Theoretical neglect appears a more serious charge when it is linked with that of practical error. Marx and Engels’ expectation that nationalism would soon cease to be a divisive force in a world where the mass of people were progressively becoming alienated from the ruling representatives of their nation- sates, and where capitalism was eroding the various forms of patticularism associated with nationality, has been confounded by events not readily explicable in terms of traditional Marxist theory. These considerations have led both Marxists and non-Maraists in the West to reach a most unusual consensus: they agree that Marx and Engels’ treatment of national phenomena is unsatisfactory. as a guide cither to theoretical understanding of those phenomena or to political practice. © Millennium: Journal of taternational Studies, 198R. ISSN 0305-8298, Vol. 17, No. Lo pp. 1-23Millennium This verdict is defended with singular tenacity within the discipline of International Relations, where it has effectively shut off further lines of enquiry on the subject. Among those who make it their daily occupation to investigate the sources of conflict among nation-states and stateless nations, there arises a natural scepticism towards any body of thought which professes to herald the end of such conflict. Recent scholarly efforts to draw Marxist theory into dialogue with traditional schools of international relations thought? have done little to dislodge the ‘class reductionist’ or ‘economic determinist’ image of Marxism which has, for generations, been imprinted in the minds of International Relations students throughout the English-speaking world* This article seeks to modify that image by making more determinate the theoretical basis of Marx and Engels’ views on national issues, to the extent that such a basis can be located at all. The following outline of the most widely accepted criticisms of those views is intended to serve as a touchstone for an assessment of the primary texts, Four broad types of objection have, in the past, been taken to constitute partial or sufficient grounds for dismissing Marx and Engels’ treatment of nationalism, These emphasise, respectively: the explanatory deficiencies of that treatment, the inconsistent patterns of political alignment it appears to prescribe, its philosophical incoherence, and its historical miscalculations. First, proponents of the ‘class reductionist’ thesis argue that Marx and Engels saw all the «liverse elements commonly thought to constitute nationality as ‘mere epiphenomena’ of the relations of production in class-divided societies.’ Prima facie, this scems a plausible assumption to draw from a theory of history which locates politics, culture and ideology in a category of phenomena explained ‘in the final analysis’ by the material basis of social life. In this framework the focal abject of social scientific enquiry, while national conflicts can be seen largely as a function of the class struggles taking place within each national entity. Marx and Engels warned their followers against using the “base-superstructure” model of society in such a way as to deny that son-cconomic factors can significantly influence the trajectory of class struggles.° Nevertheless, some commentators have concluded that the two men simply regarded patriotism, ethnicity, and national host al attention; once the dynamics of class struggle were understood, the ‘superstructural” reflexes. of nations would @ priori be expluined. This general assumption has spawned a variety of more specific claims: that Marx and Engels viewed all nationalist beliefs as ‘false consciousness’, that they treated classes, states, and stateless nations a interrelated ‘derivatives’ of the division of labour, or that the dissolution of all forms of national diversity was implied in their vision of communism. ‘A second set of criticisms can be subsumed under the ‘inadequate criteria’ thesis. According to some proponents of this thesis, the political position Marx and Enge adopted towards the national movements of their own day was theoretically untenable because it was predicated on purely tactical calculations, lacking any stable, theoretical point of reference." According to others, that position was morally indefensible because it was insensitive t the legitimate aspirations to statehood of certain national groups.” Marx and Engels’ failure to articulate the relationship between their writings on specific nationalisms, on the one hand, and their general socio-economic theory, on the other, has conveyed the widespread ses become es as matters unworthy of their theore 2Marx, Engels on Nationalism impression that they were not at all concerned to define a policy towards national movements in terms consistent with their general theory, but adopted a merely ‘opportunistic stance toward such movements in order to channel them into their revolutionary strategy. A third thesis focuses on the apparent absence in Marx and Engels’ writings of the resources needed to explain why men identify with one another not only as individuals sharing certain material and existential needs, or as members of the same social class, but also as members of entities they call ‘nations’. Proponents argue that Marx and Engels undervalued a basic human need for identification with historically and culturally defined collectivities. Their emphasis on the universal character of ‘species being’ may have led the two men to ignore the possibility that Particularisation is an indispensable condition of all human relationships. since ‘there is no way of being human which is not a way of being human’.* This thesis confronts the prospect that, as one Marxist writer has expressed it, communism ‘cannot abolish anthropological alienation’, although it may end social alienation.” The ‘economism’ thesis, finally, suggests that Marx and Engels were unduly optimistic in their belief that world capitalism would develop steadily along the free-trade lines described by liberal economists of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries./° The unimpeded expansion of the world market would, they thought, soon dissolve significant national differences, creating in all parts of the World the preconditions for socialist revolution. In underestimating the ability of modern states to interrupt this process by adopting aggressive foreign policies capable of stimulating nationalist attitudes throughout the class structure, or by offering concessions to militant workers, Marx and Engels are said to have overestimated the proletariat’s potential for ting globally to promote world revolution. They exaggerated, that is, the extent to which the success or failure of class struggles is determined by leveis of economic development. To some extent these objections are logically or causally interrelated. An inadequate explanation of the root causes of national confict may. for example, be directly responsible for a failure to anticipate the Future effects of national d upon the international workers’ movement. But even when no clear relationship can be identified between the propositions embodied in each set of criticisms, commentators have tended to confuse or conflate the distinct issues they raise. and then to assume that the validity of one objection must imply the validity of another. A dearth of critical rigour has consequently impoverished previous discussions of Marx and Engels’ wed effort to determine more precisely what is views. ws on national issues, warranting aren incomplete or untenable in thos The ‘Class Reductionist’ Thesis The apparent inability of historical materialism to yield the concepts needed to explain ‘ethnic’ or culture-group attachments has given rise to some of Marxism’s most intractable conundrums. There is no ambiguity, for example. in Marx and Engels’ repeated assertion that classes are destined to disappear with the advent of communism. They left room for speculation as to what precisely they meant in asserting that the state, too, would disappear; but with the anticipated demise of 3Millennium classes and exploitative property relations, the two men clearly expected the coercive apparatus, professional leadership and bureaucracy they associated with modern class states to become redundant. It is far less clear whether they regarded the ‘withering’ of nations as a corollary of the demise of classes and class states. This lacuna in their writings has encouraged attempts to extrapolate from Marx and Engels’ general theory a conception of national phenomena capable of explaining both ethnic and political affiliations in terms consistent with historical materialism. The simplest solution is to locate all such phenomena within Marx’s theory of capital accumulation, thereby singling out one essential element of the modern nation — unification of the internal market — as the definitive feature of nationhood, # feature significantly modified by the expansion of the world market and, subsequently, by the transition to communist forms of production and distribution.'! In this economic dimension the modern nation is largely a product of the state, which breaks down local customs barriers, laws and governments, homogenising the area of circulation of capital and commodi ties.'? The conclusion that Marx and Engels expected national differences to disappear with the abolition of classes and class states is deduced from the argument that, on their account, both the modern state and the nation were created, as isomorphic entities, by commodity capital in a process initiated by the modern mercantile bourgeoisie. The continuation of this process, in dissolving the economic self-sufficiency of separate states, would simultaneously dissolve all the different characteristics associated with nationality." Such attempts to reconstruct a ‘conception’ of national phenomena from other elements in Marx and Engels’ theory tend to reinforce the assumption that the twe men were theoretically equipped to deal with those phenomena only by subsuming them under production or class relations, or by treating them as the product of a deliberate policy applied by the ruling class of a state to maintain its own dominance over society. If it were indeed the case that Marx and Engels understood nationality primarily or exclusively in terms of the movement of capital with its attendant class relations, they would appear to have ignored altogether the question why the unification of state markets, and conflicts over resources and power, occur so frequently at the level of the nation. "* Having “reduced” nationa diversity to the relatively superficial differences between various ‘class states’, they could then equate the overthrow of those states with the elimination of intersocietal conflict. If, on the other hand, Marx and Engels recognised the influence of linguistic, cultural and historical factors on the formation of separate economic systems, their expectation that communism could put an end to conflicts within and among the peoples currently inhabiting those systems would have to rest upon one or two assumptions. They could have assumed that the non-political forms of diversity associated with separate ‘national’ groups may, in some form or other, persist under communism, yet not constitute a sufficient condition for the emergence of intersocietal exploitation or destructive antagonism; or they could have assumed that such diversity would be more or less thoroughly croded by the international expansion of capital, and seen this asa necessary condition for the elimination of alienated human relationships. Several passages in Marx and Engels’ early communist writings refer to the erosion of ‘nationality’ by the world market, but there is no reference in these works to the dissolution of ‘nations’. Here [ 4Marx, Engels on Nationalism attempt to clarify the way in which the authors used these cognates, and find that they were not treated as synonyms. In their early materialist writings, ‘nationality’ denotes for Marx and Engels an attribute of states, not of communities distinguished primarily by linguistic. cultural, or other characteristics not directly related to state institutions. Thus the authors assert that civil society ‘transcends the state and the nation, though’, they add, ‘it must assert itself in its foreign retations as nationality, and inwardly must organise itself as the state’.'* In this context, nationality is both the expression of a State's sovereignty vis-d-vis other states, and the expression of its population's allegiance to that state rather than to any other. It is in this latter sense that “nationality is already dead"'® for the workers of industrialised countries. To the extent that nationality is an abstract idealisation of unity within states comprising several classes, it is regarded by Marx and Engels as a collective ‘illusion’ of community fostered by, and directed towards, the nation-state. But consider this use of the plural, ‘nationalities’: “The communist revolution «+» is in itself the expression of the dissolution of all classes, nationalities. ete, within present society."'” It is clear that the authors are referring here not to an abstract or ‘imagined’ identity attributed by a state to its population, but to empirical aggregates of men: classes, nationalities, “ete,” The aggregates in this seties share a tendency to divide men from other men, setting up practical and cognitive obstacles to ‘species’ association of the kind Mars and Engels thought would be achieved under communism. There is no clear textual basis, however, for concluding that the authors regarded ‘nations’ as synonymous with ‘nationalities’, Since nothing in the context suggests that “present society" could be equivalent to ‘world society’, the assertion that communism repr the di nationalities within present socicty may be read as a calt for the elimination of national conflicts within existing states, insofar as such confticts impede. the development of proletarian solidarity against the bourgeoisie of each state. Marx and Engels regarded the struggle against both class and ethnic antagonisms within cach state as a prerequisite for the revolutionary internationalism they env an internationalism based, in the initial stages of revolution, on ort ceatralised to facilitate the nationwide organisation of the working class, Further support for this interpretation can be found in later writings, where Marx and Engels use the plural ‘nationatities’ almost exclusively in reference to the various ethnic groups within multinational states, Throughout Marx and Engels’ works, nation’ is often used interchangeably’ with ‘state’ to denote the modern nation-state, This terminological confusion is one of the main sources of the thesis that Marx and Engels saw the nation as essentially reducible to the class state, and hence as @ product of the same division of labour which gave rise to the latter entity, Once again, close attention to context can help to forestall this kind of misconstruction, although it cannot absolve the authors from their negligence in failing to define their terms more cl Consider, for example, a passage from a letter written by Mary in 1846: esents olution of lates s Is the whole internal organisation of nations, are all their international relations anything but the expression of a particular division of labour? And are they not bound to change when changes occur in the division of labour?!®Millennium The most plausible interpretation of this passage would be based on an understanding of ‘nation’ as synonymous with “state” or ‘nation-state’. since stateless nations are likely to lack both ‘internal organisation’ and the capacity (0 engage regularly in international relations. In other passages the authors distinguish between nations and states, while their journalism and correspondence abound with references to the stateless nations of their own era. Marx and Engels make this distinction in a Way which suggests that they recognised a set of characteristics, with both origins and a residual existence distinct from the state and the class struggle, that enables men to define themselves collectively as ‘nations’. In The German Ideology, one of their earliest collaborative works, they wrote that class states ‘are always based on the real bonds present in every family and tribal conglomeration, such as flesh and blood, language . . . .°” These apparently ‘natural’ antecedents of the class state help to explain why the formation of class-based productive systems occurs within one set of boundaries rather than another, and indicate that Marx and Engels did not treat political or other class-based explanations of national characteristics as exhaustive. ‘Nation’ also meant for them a collectivity with historical, proto-political roots, defined not only by modern state institutions or the centralisation of commodity production, but also by ‘bonds’ of consanguinity or language With these definitions in mind, we can now ask whether it would be reasonable to assume that Marx and Engels regarded nations as bearers of alienation and exploitation, and therefore as subject to the same process of dissolution as entities produced by the division of labour, Marx and Engels did not explicitly recognise @ non-conflictual dimension of national plurality. Nor did they suggest, however, that the dissolution of class relations under communism necessarily entails the dissolution of those features of nations which cannot be fully explained in terms of their functional relationship to a particular class's interest, ie. language. territoriality, or bonds of kinship. They suggested that the division of labour is the underlying source of national hostilities, but not that it creates all the diverse phenomena which contribute to the formation of distinct national identities. When these phenomena are monopolised by the state to serve class purposes. the communal ‘nation’ they are supposed to represent becomes an atienated and exploitative essence because these are properties of the class state. If, however, the clements constituting national identity are neither coextensive with class society nor derived from the division of labour, we need not ascribe to Marx and Enge the view that these will ‘disappear’ under communism in the same sense in which they expected classes and states to disappear Marx and Engels did not, then, view the problem of social and intersocietal conflict simply as a function of human diversity. This may strike Marxist scholars as an embarrassingly trite point, but it is so perennially overlooked by students of International Relations as to warrant explication.2" Classes and class states were seen as separating men from their immunent social nature not because these are a plurality of aggregates, but because they embody an exploitative set of productive relations: relations which, in the es of capitalism, finally become dysfunctional for the growth of productive forces. Classes were expected to become obsolete in so far as they embody social roles structured (@ facilitate the very m, Nothing in Marx andMarx, Engels on Nationalism Engels’ writings suggests that the exploitative features of capitalism are tied inextricably to the Jocal and cultural diversity associated with national identity. If Marx and Engels recognised a set of class-neutral, ‘natural’ characteristi capable of serving as a focus for national loyalty, then they would appear to have stumbled across a category of social phenomena that could not readily be explained in terms of historical materialism. This oversight might have undermined the coherence of their theory, or even vitiated it, had not Marx and Engels also s provided a rudimentary account of the historical conditions in which ethnicity might cease to operate as an independent source of non-class conflict and become. at most, a subsidiary source of conflict in class struggles, Whereas their critique of Political nationality depended on the argument that state-identifications conceal a nexus of exploitative class relations, their critique of ethnic nationality was based on the idea that strongly marked diversities in the living conditions. values and cultures of different ethnic groups are the residue of incomplete or uneven development of the preconditions for socialist revolution. Tsuggested above that Marx and Engels viewed national conflicts, but not all the Properties of nations, as the product of class society. Yet in a passage on primit classless society, Engels declared that ‘war is as old as the simultaneous existence alongside each other of several groups of communities’! while Marx. in his Grundrisse, describes war in pre-class conditions as ‘the great comprehensive task. the great communal labour which is required either to occupy the objective conditions of being alive, or to protect and perpetuate the occupation’? The first Statement seems to imply that it is the simple fact of communal plurality which causes conflict, notwithstanding the non-class nature of the productive relations subsisting in these primitive societies, The second statement can be interpreted as Suggesting that the territorial base of any community ma and social importance such that the very fact of human settlement, again apart from any class motivations, may furnish a permanent source of dissension among separate territorial groups. Expanding on these interpretations, some commentators have concluded that Marx and Engels acknowledged the essentially transhistorical role of two factors — plurality and territoriality — in rendering human society chronically prone to warfare, but that they failed 10 assimilate these factors into historical materialism, thereby jeopardising that theory's putative claims to explanatory sufficiency. Can Marx and Engels” statements on inter-communal conflict be made consistent with the proposition that national conflicts are coeval with class society, and eliminabte under communism? The key to this question lies in the basic differences between primi community and “full” communism as Marx and Engels conceived these epoch conflict-engendering character of territe: communities ought to be unde Prevailing in carly classless communities, but not in communism as such: (1) conditions of scarcity, (2) undeveloped productive forces, and (3) the consequent reign of unco-ordinated chance in human affairs, Marx envisaged communism, by contrast, as an cra of universal abundance. produced and reproduced by optimally developed productive forces and maintained under ational human control. In such conditions, he suggested. neither the impulse to warfare nor the secondary prejudices and antipathies engendered by conflict would ‘quire an economi The lity and social plurality in natural food as a function of three interrelated factorsMillennium have occasion to develop. For Marx the elimination of national conflicts in capitalist society was, of course, linked primarily to the extinction of class conflicts, to whose purposes ethnic divisions could be harnessed. The overcoming of the primordial conditions which produced conflict among ‘natural’ communities was, for Marx, of ancillary importance in an epoch in which productive forces were highly, if not optimally, developed and in which the scarcity experienced by the labouring class could be seen as a function of the exploitative dominance of the bourgeoisie. It is the impermanence of these primitive conditions which enabled Marx to acknowledge their existence as a prehistorical dimension of non-class conflict while at the same time arguing that such conflict would be absent under communism. While Marx and Engels’ materialist theory of history reflects their awareness of the extent to which economic relations and political institutions could become the main factors defining the human and territorial boundaries of social units, I have argued that they did not regard such relations and institutions as the only factors needed to explain why men frequently express collective interests in terms of nationality rather than class. Thus, in a series of articles on the rise of separatist nationalism in the Hapsburg Empire during the 1848 revolutions, Marx and Engels identified the development of productive forces and corresponding shifts in class relations as the catalyst activating previously benign national differences; but they were not therefore inclined to belittle the importance of cultural or historical factors in setting the parameters of national conflict.“ Nor did they suggest that national conflicts occur because they benefit the ruling class, or that the ruling class ‘creates’ nationalism {o serve as one of its weapons in the class struggle. They suggested only that such conflicts, having been inflamed in the course of revolutionary change, may be used intentionally or ‘ideologically’ by the ruling class to stahilise the property retations which benefit them. Marx and Engels developed this explanatory approach in the 1860s and 1X70) when they committed themselves more explicitly to a position which belies claims that they treated nationalism as “reducible” to the class struggle. In 1875. at a meeting of the International Working Men’s Association, Marx declared not in the least @ contradiction that the international workers’ party strives for the creation of an independent Polish nation - As long as the independent life of a nation is suppressed by a foreign conqueror it inevitably directs all its strength, all its efforts and all its energy against the external enemy; during this Gime, therefore, its inner life remains paralysed; it iy incapable of working for social emancipation.?* ‘This passage indicates Marx's awareness that the location of el the political arena may occur in such @ way as to make nationally-conceived interests the paramount issue in some historical periods. ‘The notion that such interest may acquire a certain ‘autonomy’ from the class conditions which produced them and ‘act back’ on the economic structure to reshape or consolidate existing class relations is implicit in many of Mars and Engels’ articles and speeches. In his ‘writings on the problem of national hostilities between English and Irish workers. Mare came close to acknowledging that nationalism may seriously retard the development of international class solidarity, In 1870 he noted that, as a result of s subjects within 8Marx, Engels on Nationalism Britain's systematic impoverishment of its ‘first colony’ and its attempts in the 1850s to supplant the Irish population ‘by sheep, pigs, and oxen’,* ‘all English industrial and commercial centres now possess a working class split into two hostile camps: English proletarians and Irish proletarians’.®” In explaining this division, Marx began with the observation that ‘the ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker because he sees him as a competitor who lowers his standard of life’. But why. within a class that was supposed to be virtually purged of national prejudices. should the competition among English workers themselves be any less fierce than competition with their Irish counterparts? Marx suggested that part of the answer lay in a psychological effect of the asymmetrical relations between metropole and colony, which allowed the English worker to regard himself as ‘a member of the ruling nation’. ‘For this very reason’, Marx declared, ‘he turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself Marx refrained, however, from offering a functional account of English-lrish hostilities. He did not say that the English worker harbours prejudices against the Irish worker because such prejudices benefit the English ruling class: he recognised the presence of historical, cultural and religious barriers impeding the development of a common proletarian consciousness. The claim that these barriers are ‘artificially sustained and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers. in short, by all means at the disposal of the ruling classes” is introduced only to explain how an unintended by-product of colonial policy may, once it has been seen as suitable for ideological service, be encouraged by the ruling powers to divide working class ranks. It is not apparent that Marx accorded absolute explanatory Primacy to any one of the economic, political or culturat factors he cited ax contributing causes of the split. His account did suggest, however, that cultural differences would not have become a source of political dissension had not Britain's capitalists and aristocracy invited competition through the forced emigration of Irish workers to England. ‘These arguments suggest that while Marx and Engels saw class as the primary explaining patterns of collective behaviour at both the national and international levels, they did not deny that national factors — both political and ‘cultural’ — condition the form and scope of class struggle. This in no way Tepresented an admission to the limitations of class theory. Since Marx and Engels regarded the state as essentially a class-construct. they could also view its role in restraining or promoting revolutionary transitions as part and parcel of the broader class struggle; and while they did not treat the nation as reducible to the state, they did refrain from explaining nationalism in abstraction from class relations. The novelty of Marx and Engels’ approach lay in their insistence that the analysis of class configurations within states, or indeed within stateless national groups, can explain more about patterns of international alliance and national confict than any non-class theory. The political implications of this approach will be illustrated in the following section. 9Millennium The ‘Inadequate Criteria’ The In the 1840s, when European working classes were still relatively small and disorganised, Mars and Engels pinned their revolutionary hopes on democratic and anti-feudal forces, led largely by the bourgeoisie or their allies among the landed aristocracy. They supported such revolutions ts a means of clearing away the debris: of feudalism in order to promote the centralising, industrialising, and proletarianising movement towards the next epochal struggle between bourgeoisie and working class. In their efforts to explain the tenacity of feudal property yelations and their corresponding political form, absolutist monarchy, Marx and Engels stressed the international dimensions of conservatism. For them. the most important factor to be taken into account in devising a strategy for democratic revolution was the likelihood of a common response by the ruling classes of Europe to a revolutionary threat affecting any one of them. Equipped with this class analysis of the Europezn states system, Marx and Engels set about formulating their controversial policy toward national movements: a policy which, by ensuring the collapse of solidarist reaction as it was represented by the Holy Alliance and sustained most zealously by Holy Russia, would serve the long-term interests of the worker's revolution, The case of Poland was of particular interest to them, as it was to other radicals and democrats in Europe, since the partition of Poland by the Holy Alliance was widely regarded as the mainstay of absolutist power on the Continent. They were also strong supporters of the movements for German and Italian unification, chiefly because they thought that if the multitude of small, unevenly developed units which comprised Germany and Italy in the mid-nineteenth century were welded into Large and economically viable states, those states could then cast off the reactionary influence of the Tsarist and Habsburg empires. At the same time, Marx and Engels were vehement, though not altogether uncompromising, in their opposition to the nationalisms of the various Slavic nationalities scattered throughout Habsburg and Ottoman territory. Engels in particular was prone to singularly unscientific outbursts against the pol aspirations of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Czechs. His more extreme pronouncements have not escaped the notice of unsympathetic commentators, many of whom have accorded disproportionate significance to these statements us a source for understanding Marx and Engels’ overall position on national movements.” ‘The ready susceptibility of these writings to misconstruction is, however, precisely the problem. It is even doubtful whether Marx and Engels can be said to have offered a perspective coherent cnough to be described as a “general position’ in their diffuse and stylistically heterogeneous writings on nationalism. Such doubts may arise from preconceptions about the criteria which ought to constitute a ‘principled’, consistent position on national movements, The criterion most commonly cited in this regard, by Marist as well as fiberal writers, is whether or not a nationalist movement is directed towards relieving ‘oppression’ in the broadest sense of the word.?" If one nation is to be supported in its struggle a a foreign yoke, on this view, it would surely be inconsistent not to support all nations struggling against the same phenomenon in their own territories. 'As an index of consistency, this criterion would impugn Marx and Engels’ ical 1GMarx, Engels on Nationalism Position only if they had supported some national movements on the grounds that the groups they represented were oppressed, while opposing other movements conducted by nations which endured comparable oppression. The basis on which Marx and Engels discriminated among separatist nationalisms was not, however, reducible to any general principle of this kind. A more complex conception of the relationship between the national and international dimensions of oppression informed Marx and Engels’ selection of the movements they regarded as eligible for communist support. Although it would be fruitless to search for a direct correlation between Marx and Engels’ general theory and their national policy, itis not the case that that policy lacked any theoretical grounding. Their general theory did not dictate Marx and Engels’ politics, but it did inform their analysis of the Political situation; and it was that analysis, in turn, which indicated the expediency of one national policy rather than another. The two men enunciated their basic theoretical premise in a series of speeches delivered in 1847, and this was to remain the cornerstone of their strategy towards national movements throughout their careers. In his speech, Engels declired, “A nation cannot be free-and at the same time continue to oppress other nations. This was not a glib metaphysical or moral proposition: it was a statement, firmly grounded in historical materialism, of the thesis that the exploitation of one nation by another can be explained in functional terms by the henefits which accrue to the tuling class of the exploiting nation. The oppression of other nations enables t class to hold down subordinate classes at home. Engels developed this theme a year later in an article on Poland, where he identified a sprawling ‘system’ of exploitation operating on several national fronts. He located the basic cause of Poland's partition between Prussia, Austria and Russia in class conflicts within Poland itself: the strategic and political motives of the partitioning powers were cited as secondary causes. According to Engels, the Polish aristocracy viewed the partition of its country by the Holy Alliance as the only possible means of protecting its traditional privileges against the ising bourgeoisie. The interests of the Polish ruling class therefore coincided with those of the three absolutist powers, whose rulers also sought external support to Strengthen their domestic position vis-d-vir their own national bourgeoisies. ‘This analysis led Engels to conclude that non-reforming nationalist movement against foreign domina fact the property relations and corresponding class configurations which allowed for exploitation in the first place, ought not to merit working class support. To be eligible for such support. he argued, a fationalist movement should be authentically national, advancing the long-term interests of a broad section of the nation’s people, not merely those of an otiose reactionary class. Marx applied this same criterion beyond the Polish case. He distinguished between the “nationalist” and ‘national’ parties in Ireland, suggesti that whereas the former prosecuted its case on the basis of a purely ne distinction between its own and other nations, the ‘national’ party infused the Protean, and potentially reactionary, principle of nationality with substantive social content. Marx was particularly discerning. in a time when romantic nationalism was rife, in pointing out that indigenous rule may be no less oppressive than a foreign yoke. “If the Russian autocrat’, he said, ‘were to be replaced by Polish aristocrats, then despotism would merely have taken out naturalisation papers... . Though is iMillennium the Polish lord would no longer have a Russian lord over him, the Polish peasant would still have a lord over him — only a lord who was free rather than one who was a slave, This particular political change involves no social change at all In a speech which followed these declarations by his partner, Engels gave the . “This brings us to a second difference between Marx’s idea of community beyond the nation and attachments based on nationality. For Marx, the only communities worthy of the name were those that fulfilled a substantive end-function. Marx regarded those entities whose representatives claimed to act merely to promote or defend reciprocally defined, and hence potentially antagonistic, group interests as a peculiar feature of class societies. Claims of this kind became the object of materialist scepticism when they were made on behalf of class states, since they were likely then to conceal an underlying class aim: the extraction of surplus-value both within and outside state boundaries. According to Marx, such obfuscation of. collective means and ends would not occur under communism: group-association would occur primarily when the purpose of such association ‘stems from the true character of the activity’s content’.*° Marx postulated a third feature of social life under commu: m which he thought would distinguish that era from previous epochs: he conceived of the communities of the future as freely chosen. Man's capacity to choose his own conditions of association, on Marx’s view, was a consequence of his pushing back the ‘natural’ limitations and traditional constraints imposed on earlier generations. { have suggested that Marx did not deny the trans-epochal tenacity of certain racial and cultural characteristics associated with modern ‘nationality’, and that his argument concerning the demise of the state could have been, but was aot, employed with reference to such ‘national’ features, The idea is implicit in his writings. however, that national characteristics will cease to be the primary foci for collective action. Individuals will not be preordained to play specific social roles, pursue particular interests, or follow patterns of behaviour because they happen to have been born into a particular family of locality. Marx recognised, of course, that an individual's choices and identities are ineluctably conditioned by history; but for Marx history itself is the aggregated product of human activity, through which men have always laid down their own conditions of association. It is only under commu however, that such conditions — including those associated with nationality — cease to appear as ‘natural’, alien, or immutable, and thence fall under man’s conscious control, n. The ‘Economism’ Thesis ‘The essentially ‘materialist’ framework for understanding nationalism outlined above, while more sensitive to the strength of national attachments than has 1SMillennium commonly been supposed, failed nonetheless to serve Marx and Engels’ own revolutionary purposes, Those purposes, as they were laid out in Marx’s dictum that the point of interpreting the world is to change it,"” were twofold. A materialist conception of nationality should, first, explain why national factors may become a relatively independent source of political or economic struggle, and identify the conditions which make it possible for national divisions to sustain or undermine the class structure. Secondly, this information should — if it is accurate and complete — enable revolutionaries to develop a strategy for the practical transformation of the conditions which help to reproduce class relations. In the aftermath of the abortive 1848 revolutions, Marx and Engels renewed their efforts to reach a clearer understanding of the reasons why nationalism was able to operate as a divisive force within the revolutionary camp itself. Although their resulting explanations led them to adopt a set of strategies designed to rescue proletarian internationalism from nationalist corrosion, it is often argued that these strategies failed, in part, because Marx and Engels did not provide a satisfactory account of the political and economic conditions of their own era: conditions which tended not only to sustain, but even to reproduce, the class structure of societies within the expanding orbit of capitalism. If Marx and Engels succeeded in developing some basic conceptual resources for dealing with separatist and anti-colonial nationalist movements, and some political methods for incorporating such movements into their revolutionary programme, they never fully understood the phenomenon of working class patriotism within existing states. The problem for Marx was to prevent the workers’ salutary interest in defeating a reactionary enemy, or in defending whatever limited gains they may have won within their own countries, from developing into outright sympathy with their national ruling classes." He dealt with this problem by arguing that in the capitalist era all warfare, whether aggressive or initially defensive, was motivated by the ruling class's need to contain domestic class struggles. On this view bourgeois nationalism was, by definition, predicated on hostility towards the majority within each ‘nation’, not upon any core set of class-neutral ‘national” interests. {t is not always clear whether Marx saw anti-revolutionary co-operation or intra-class rivalry as the dominant feature of bourgeois international relations. AL times he wrote as though the very notion of distinet and conflicting national interests within the bourgeoisie was a chimera, an ideological wexpon used solely for the purposes of deluding and dividing the working class. At other times, however, Marx implied that the bourgeoisie — a class whose origins were, after all, rooted in separate productive systems and pol prone to nationalistic attitudes. Yet the material foundations which supported such attitudes in the early stages of the capitalist era were, according to Marx, rapidly being eroded; and this erosion affected bourgeois as well as proletarian patterns of international behaviour. ‘The genuine patriotism of the bourgeoisie’, Marx wrote, * —so natural for the real proprietors of the different “national” estates — has faded into a mere sham consequent upon the cosmopolitan character imprinted upon their financial, commercial and industrial enterprise.“*” In this changed material context, the bourgeoisie came to face an inescapable dilemma. On the one hand, its different national factions came increasingly to share and perceive their common interest in suppressing revolutionary unrest in any part of the world. This interest ical structures — was congenitally 16Marx, Engels on Nationalism provided prima facie grounds for trying to avoid international conflict which, as Marx pointed out, gave revolutionaries a fine opportunity to ‘agitate’ against their respective governments. On the other hand, on Marx’s argument, the bourgeoisie simply could not avoid intra-class conflict; it was compelled to resort to war because the pressures of internal class struggle were too strong to be contained by any other means. Despite their apprehensions about the potential solidarity of anti-revolutionary forces, Marx and Engels based their hopes of revolutionary success largely on the expectation that the sporadic conflicts among national ruling classes would culminate eventually in large-scale war between them. For it was precisely in wartime that the founders of Marxism expected workers to shed their patriotic illusions, to recognise that the ‘national interest’ they were being summoned to defend in fact ran counter to their own interests, and to seize the moment of bourgeois weakness to overthrow capitalist rule in all the countries where it prevailed, The fact that these expectations were confounded with the outbreak of the First World War, when workers defected en masse to the patriotic camps of their various countries, is often cited as a sufficient reason for the relative neglect of Marx and Engels’ thought on nationalism and international relations. Some of the assumptions that inform this dismissal, however, are — from a theoretical standpoint at least — no less problematic than those which led to Marx and Engels’ miscalculations. If the latter can be attributed to a tendency inherent in historical materialism to produce ‘class reductionist’ or ‘economic determinist’ analyses of national issues, it is also possible that state-centric and nationalist theories may err in the opposite direction: they may propagate their own peculiar forms of reductionism, especially when they conceive the political or ethnic influences on the formation of collective actors in abstraction from the economic. Marx ind Engels did not seriously contemplate the possibility that national attachments might prevent altogether the transition to communism; but if our aim should be to qualify all forms of reductionist thinking, it would serve no purpose {0 reject their ideas out of hand without trying first to identify the points at which their theory failed to account for important historical developments. ‘As we have seen, Marx generally explained intra-bourgeois wars as an effect of essentially endogenous forces operating within each nation-state: he implied that international conflict could ultimately be understood as « function of the internal development of class struggles. At the same time, he and Engels remarked in the Communist Manifesto that one of the bourgevisie’s principal means of overcoming commercial crises was ‘by the conquest of new markets’ undertaken at the risk of provoking national wars of competition for the control of searce overseas markets ‘This would imply that there is no necessary causal relationship between provocative international behaviour and the internal struggle between classes. The immediate motive in this case is economic, the search for foreign markets as an outlet for surplus national production. But Marx and Engels never systematically drew a connection between inter-capitalist competition and national war. In failing to give sufficient weight to conflict among national ruling classes as an independent cau: of war, the two men aiso failed to offer satisfactory explanations for two related developments which were already becoming conspicuous in their own era: 7Millennium militarism and working class ‘reformism’. These developments were highly conducive to the survival and reproduction of national attachments and nationalist, politics, thereby exerting a strong countervailing impact upon the emergence of a transnational identity of working class interests Marx’s endogenous interpretation of foreign policy. first of all could not yield a really adequate account of the massive growth in the military power of European states that took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is difficult t0 see how this phenomenon can be explained primarily in terms of the ruling class's need to contain the internal revolutionary strivings of unarmed workers who. in Mary’s time, were only beginning to understand the power of general strikes. Even if it could piausibly be maintained that the process of militaris because of domestic class imperatives, which induced the ruling classes to use their armies outside as well as within their own borders. it would still be necessary to recognise that international — or, to use Marx's synonym, inter-bourgeois — rivalries might acquire a momentum independent from that of the class struggles taking place within any given country. The resulting growth of the bourge coercive capabilities would not only mean that armies mobilised in wartime could be used to stifle working class agitation in the event of war; it also meant that the risks of large-scale warfare to the workers’ own livelihood could be seen as outweighing the cost of revolutionism, or of refusal to support their respective governments in their war efforts Had Marx and Engels attained Lenin's later insights into the relationship between intra-bourgeois conflict and imperialism, they might have perceived a corollary of that insight: the relationship between imperialism and working class ‘reformism’ purchased by the capitalists with the profits squeczed from foreign labour. While the workers’ movement continued to expand throughout the 1870s, the external pressure of arms races and imperial rivalries came to bear upon the class struggle: through repressive measures, to be sure, but also through the granting of concessions favourable to social-democratic trends. If Marx and Engels had frequently to confront the possibility that the bourgeois state’s potential for generating support throughout the class structure might cons obstacle to the development of proletarian revolutionism, their failure to explain this potential disabled them from exposing systematically the ways in which it could be used to sidestep the real issues at stake in the class struggle, At the root of this failure lay Marx and Engels’ tendency to conceive of capitalism as an inexorably universatising force. This conception was limited in its explanatory power because it did not articulate the historical relationship between the international expansion of capitalism and the particularising. integrating activities of the modern state, with its capacity to pacify internal class struggle through a mixture of coercion and concession, ‘The idea, prevalent among nineteenth-century thinkers, that capitalism has no intrinsic relation to the nation-state was readily derived from the observation that capitalism promoted an unprecedented expansion of economic activity reaching far beyond state boundaries.*' Marx went further than his liberal contemporaries in arguing, first, that these activities created not only economic interdependence but also a high degree of cultural uniformity among the peoples of the world und second, that lism had reduced the distinctive identities and interests of bourgeois national ion was initiatedMarx, Engels on Nationalism governments, as well as those of the proletariat, to an anachronism or a ‘sham’. Both of these propositions lent support to the idea that, in the capitalist era more than in any other, class was more important than nationality in shaping collective interests and aspirations. But Marx and Engels’ lingering conviction that capitalism ‘has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood’*? neglected the extent to which individual states were integrated with the capitals in their own territory; that the ‘world market’ is fragmented into, and perhaps organically bound up with, the states-system.** The two men did not, therefore, perceive that the universalisation of production might not only be compatible with the preservation of national particularism, but that it might be partly responsible for stimulating new statist and separatist nationalisms, making the realisation of working class solidarity a more daunting task than ever. Conclusion The conclusions reached in the last section appear to corroborate the main argument of the ‘economism’ thesis. In underscoring the limitations of class theory as a basis for explaining the persistent discord among national ruling classes, we seem to have touched upon a rationale for confining Marxism and International Relations to their traditional, separate domains. If the ‘relative autonomy" of the states system could so effectively have crystallised national divisions that its ‘autonomy’ from class relations no longer appears merely relative, then there may indeed be a good case for debarring Marx and Engels’ thought from International Relations studies. It is not clear, however, that these problems ought to be scen as constituting sufficient grounds for dismissing all of Marx and Engels’ views on nationalism and national identity. Of the four sets of criticisms outlined at the beginning of thi essay, only the ‘economism’ thesis provides both an accurate representa cogent critique of the ideas discussed here. The philosophical objections posed in the ‘anthropological alienation’ thesis cited empirically plausible grounds for suspecting that individuals may have a basic, trans-historical need to identify differentially with ‘national’ groups; a need apparently neglected in Marx’s concept of ‘species-being’. But proponents of this thesis do not satisfactorily explain why the ‘nation’ is, or should be, the preferred object of identification in any given set of historical conditions. ‘They also lack convincing philosophical reasons for precluding the possibility that national identities might. in different conditions, be supplanted by or subordinated to less exclusive bases of self-definition. The normative objections im thesis appear particularly relevant in our own time, when nationalist movements have come to play a major role in redressing past injustices and resisting new forms of what Marx would have called ‘exploitation’, Some of Marx and Engels’ criteria for supporting or withholding support from different national movements were based on weak and apparently arbitrary premises, But those criteria were usually dictated by a realistic — if not always accurate — assessment of the political. demographic. and strategic factors which restricted the utility of the national self-determination principle for Marx and Engels’ long-range revolutionary purposes. Their selective use of that ion and a it in the ‘inadequate 19Millennium principle was directed toward the achievement of a society which they expected to provide a more substantive and effective kind of self-determination than any general ‘right’, enunciated in a global context of inequality and power politics, could hope te secure Finally, the theoretical objections raised by the ‘class reductionist’ thesis are valid in so far as they deplore the absence in Marx and Engels’ theory of a clearly-demarcated framework for analysing national issues. But proponents of this, thesis are not, therefore, correct in assuming that the two men relegated all national phenomena to the ‘superstructure’, thereby ‘reducing’ nationalism to a ruling class ideology or treating it as an aberrant form of the class struggle. Although their conception of nationalism suffers from significant facunae, Marx and Engels were at least deterred by their materialist theory of history from accepting a view of nationality prevalent in their age, and indeed in our own: a view that explains nationalism simply as an effect of inveterate, quasi-natural differences in collective consciousness or culture, without explaining how such consciousness emerges or why cultural differences become politically divisive. When the deeper theoretical problems addressed in the ‘economism’ thesis are put into perspective among the more viable elements of Marx and Engels’ views on nationality, they no longer appear to furnish self-evident grounds for dismissing those views. Nevertheless, any attempt to apply historical materialism to the study of current national issues would have to be made within a significantly modified version of Marx and Engels’ framework. A revised Marxian conception of nationality would doubtless require a closer investigation of the economic, sociological and political conditions which have enabled national states to assert their primacy in modern society as the preferred form of organisation for the pursuit of collective ends. In its efforts to account for the retarding impact exerted by modern political structures upon the revolutionary movement, Marxism may tun the tisk of multiplying ‘relative autonomies’ until historical materialism becomes indistinguishable from pluralist theory, But this is an avoidable risk. So long as it is able to explain the conditions which allow politics to prolong its ‘autonomy’ in terms of the economic structure of modern global society, historical materialism may preserve its integrity even in the face of an expanding states- system: and Marx’s legacy may yet yield fresh insights into the katent, non-political forms of power operating both within and beyond the state itself Erica L. Benner is a research student in the Department of Social and Administrative Studies sat St, Antony's College, Oxford, OX2 61F. REFERENCES 1, John Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge Unive Press, 1986), p. 17. 2. See. for example, Vendulka Kubilkova and Albert Cruickshank. Marxism and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) and also their Marxism-Leninism and International Relations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). 20,Marx, Engels on Nationalism 3. This is largely a legacy of Kenneth N. Waltz’s influential interpretation of Marx in Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). 4, See Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). pp. 7-8: Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism and International Relations, op. cit., p. 48; Ronaldo Munck, The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism (London: Zed Books, 1986). p. 22. 5. See, for example, Engels’ letter to Borgius in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Letters (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977). p. 101. 6. See Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations, op. cit., p. 57. 7. See J.L. Talmon, The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution (London: Secker and Warburg, 1981), p. 38. 8. G.A. Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Mater Marxism, 1983, p. 240. 9. Samir Amin, Class and Nation, trans. Susan Kaplow (London: Heinemann Educationat Books, 1980), p. ix. 10. See Horace B. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and Labour Theories of Nationalism to 1917 (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1967), pp. 7-11; Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985). 11. Cf. Walker Connor, The National Question, op. cit.. p. 8. Connor comments that Marx's ‘predilection for an economic interpretation of history caused him ¢o slight the importance of psychological, cultural, and historical elements... . The nation was to Marx essentially an economic unit’. 12. Marx and Engels emphasised the role of political centralisation in forging national unity in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. n.d.) pp. 55-7. ism’, NOMOS No. 36. 13. This interpretation is the basis for Michael Lowy’s assertion that “[t]here was a tendency towards economism in [Marx that the “standardisation of industrial produ nl living conditions” helps to dissolve national barriers and antagoni though national differences could be equated simply with differences in the production process’. “Marxists and the National Question’, New Lefi Review (No. 96, 1976). p. 82. 44. Nicos Poulantzas also raises this. objection against “determinist™ reconstructions of Mare’s view of the nation in State, Power, Socialis, trans, Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1980), p. 95. 15. K. Marx and F. Engels. The German Ideology. ed, C3. Arthur (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1974). p. 57. 16. tbid., p. 78. 17. Ibid., p. 94, 18, Marx, letter to PV, Annenkoy, in The Poverty of Philosphy (Beijing: Foreign Langusges P ess, 1978). p. 178, 19. K. Mars and rts, The German kdeology. op. cit. p. $3 2Millennium 20. 2. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 34, 35. 36. 37. 3B. 39 40. 41 2. a3. R.N. Berki comes close to adopting this view in ‘On Marxian Thought and the Problem of International Relations’, World Politics (Vol. 24, No. 1, 1971), pp. 80-105. F. Engels, Anti-Duhring (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1943), p. 202. K. Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 474. W.B. Gallic, for example, reads Engels’ sentence in this way: ‘The existence of war . . is postulated at the outset as an independent factor in the situation to be explained . . . we are shown how war was used to advance certain economic purposes; but this presupposes its existence, as a permanent inter-societal possibility’, Philosophers of Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 76 See Engels, ‘The Magyar Struggle’ in K. Marx and F. Engels Collected Works, Vol. 8 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 229. K. Marx, ‘For Poland’, The First Imernational and After, ed. David Fernbach (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 391. See Mary’s letter to Engels in K. Marx and F. Engels, Ireland and the Irish Question (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978), p. 157 |. Marx, letter to Meyer and Vogt, ibid.. p. 407. Ibid., pp. 407-8. Ibid., p. 408. See, for example, Michael Lowy, op. cit., pp. 81-5 See Ronaldo Munck, op. cit., pp. 13-14; J-L. Talmon, op. cit., pp. 21-66. F. Engels, Speech on Poland, The Revolutions of 1848, ed. David Fernbach (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 100 . See F. Engels, “The Frankfurt Assembly Debates the Polish Question’, Collected Works, Vol. 7 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, (977), p. 350. K. Marx, ‘Speech on Poland’, The Revolutions of 1848, op. cit., pp. 104-5. F. Engels, ‘Speech on Poland’, ibid. p. 108 F. Engels. ‘Debate on Poland’, ibid., p. 154. Two writers who describe the theory in this way are Ronaldo Munck, op. cit., p. 13, and Michael Lowy, op. cit. p. 84. See, for example, F. Engels, ‘The Prague Rising’, The Revolutions of 1848, op. cit., p. 127 F. Engels, ‘Democratic Pan-Slavism’, Collected Works, op. cit., Vol. 8. p. 376. G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. TM. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Pre 1967), p. 174. Thus Z.A. Pelczynski argues that Marx and Engels ‘ignore . . . the question whether such a vast world society could ever be perceived by anyone as a community, whether it could possibly become ar meaningful focus of loyalty and unity for a vast multitude of individu: Z.A. Pelczynski, ‘Nation, Civil Society, State: Hegelian Sources of the Marxian Non-Theory of Nationality’ in Z.A. Pelczynski (ed.), The State and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 277. G.A. Cohen, op. cit.. pp. 233-4. ‘Though Hegel sometimes seems to be alluding to the por lity of a future45, . K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Moscow: 47. 49. 50. Si. 52. 53. Marx, Engels on Nationalism phase transcending the nation-state; see G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 147. . For a discussion of the concept of social need in Marx, see Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx (London: Allison and Busby, 1974), pp. 127-30, K. Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 475. Progress Publishers, 1981), p, 92. K. Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx- Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), p. 145. . See, for example, Marx’s observations on the Crimean War, quoted in J. Elster, op. cit., p. 396. K. Marx, First Draft of “The Civil War in France’, The First International, op. cit., p. 264. K, Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, op. cit.. p. 59. Antony Giddens, op. cit., pp. 136-7. K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, op. cit.. p. 54. Cf. Martin Shaw, ‘War, Imperialism and the State System: A Critique of Orthodox Marxism for the 1980's’ in Martin Shaw (ed.), War, State and Society (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), pp. 47-69,ETHICS. Does it have anything to do with Foreign Policy? \ Find Out. 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