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Fake News and the Challenges of Criminal Law
Giulia Lanza*
Abstract
The spread offake news online is a global and complex phenomenon. It can be considered a
"virus" that must be actively fought at several levels (i.e., supranational level and
domestic level) and by different actors (i.e., private and public). This phenomenon is
challengingfor both social media companies and states, and they are called on to work in
a synergy to address it. Many mechanisms and legislative measures have been proposed
and adopted in order to counter the diffusion of fake news online. Some countries have
also relied on criminal law. However, due to the complexity of the phenomenon, the
specificity of each domestic legal order and the variety offake news, it is not an easy task
and it is difficult to adopt a unique solution that applies in all circumstances. The
situation in Italy reflects such a difficulty. Therefore, particularattention will be paid to
the different approachesproposed in Italy in order to address the spread of fake news
online. Can we be sure that criminal law is the only (or the best) solution to deal with
such a growing phenomenon? I conclude that criminal law may be invoked only in
exceptional circumstancesand when non-criminalmeasuresprove inadequate to protect
legal goods (Rechtsgater) of paramountimportance. Nevertheless, criminal law and the
fight against the diffusion of fake news cannot be used - as has been done in certain
countries - neitheras an excuse nor as a tool to violate the righttofreedom of expression,
and to limitpluralism and participatorydemocracy.
Keywords: Fake news, global phenomenon, social media, criminal law, human rights,
freedom of expression.
The problem of fake news is not a contemporary one. History has always
witnessed the diffusion of "false stories"'. The only new factor is the means of
communication (the Internet) used in the "digital era" to spread false or misleading
* Postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Law, University of Verona. This is an elaborated

version of the paper presented on 6 November 2020 at the International Biennial Conference, 13th
Edition, organized by the Faculty of Law of the West University of Timisoara. The fake news
phenomenon is very complex and presents several problematic issues that cannot be addressed here.
The paper offers an updated overview of the measures adopted at supranational level to fight against
this growing phenomenon, further increased during the Covid-19 pandemic. Moreover, it focuses on
the different approaches developed at domestic level to address it and on the possibility of relying on
criminal law to counter the diffusion of fake news.
1 F. Safieddine, History of Fake News, in F. Safieddine, Y. Ibrahim (eds.), Fake News in an Era of Social
Media: Tracking Viral Contagion, Rowman & Littlefield International, London, New York, 2020, p. 18 ff.;
F. Sciacchitano, A. Panza, Fake News e disinformazione online: misure internazionali,in Rivista di diritto dei
media, 1/2020, p. 104; L. Canfora, La storiafalsa, Rizzoli, Milano, 2008. See also: S. Casillo, F. Di Trocchio,
S. Sica, Falsigiornalistici.Fintiscoop e bufale quotidiane,Alfredo Guida Editore, Napoli, 1997.
GIULIA LANZA
information, accompanied by the speed and the low cost of its diffusion in cyberspace2
.
The global emergence of the Internet, the uncontrolled access to information available
on it and the increasing usage of social media3 in several countries - including less
economically developed countries (LEDCs) - determined a massive wave of false and
misleading information in several contexts. Consider, for example: the US presidential
elections of 2016; the Brexit referendum that had taken place in the same year; the
new pandemic disease (Covid-19) that plagued (and is still plaguing) the entire word
and has been accompanied by an unprecedented 'infodemic' 4 ; the humanitarian crisis
that afflicted Myanmars. In all these scenarios, very different from each other, the
spread of fake news had (and continues to have) a very negative impact.
Mass online disinformation campaigns are very frequent and sometimes may
have a transnational character. They can be considered a "new weapon" of the "digital
era"6 . They take advantage of social media and are used in order to cause harm or
social unrest, as well as to manipulate public opinion, jeopardizing the democratic
principle7 . They are among the most dangerous and subtle forms of aggression against
2 P. Guercia, I progetti di legge sulle fake news e la disciplina tedesca a confronto,

in A. Cadoppi,
S. Canestrari, A Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime, Utet, Milan, 2019, pp. 1257-1258; M. Bassini, G.E. Vigevani,
Primi appunti su fake news e dintorni, in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2017, p. 15. On the specificity of
cyberspace, ex multis: L. Picotti, Dirittopenale e tecnologie informatiche:una visione d'insieme, in A. Cadoppi,
S. Canestrari, A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime,Utet, Milano, 2019, pp. 57-58.
3 M. Monti, Fake news e social network: la veritd ai tempi di Facebook, in Rivista di diritto dei
media, 1/2017, p. 80 ff.; C.E. Paliero, La maschera e ii volto. (Percezione sociale del crimine ed 'effetti
penali'dei media), in Rivista italianadi dirittoe procedurapenale, 2/2 006, p. 470.
4 This term was used by the World Health Organization (WHO) to target the proliferation of an
excessive amount of information about Covid-19. It further specified that infodemics "can spread
misinformation, disinformation and rumors during a health emergency [...] can hamper an effective
public health response and create confusion and distrust among people", https://www.un.org/en/
un-coronavirus-communications -team/un-tackling-'infodemic'-misinformation-and-cyb ercrime-covid-
19, accessed on 29 November 2020. The WHO considered such a phenomenon as one of the greatest
threats to public health. On the impact of Facebook on the diffusion of fake news related to the
pandemic: T. Guerini, La tutela penale della liberta di manfestazione del pensiero nell'epoca delle fake
news e delle infodemie, in discrimen.it, 14 June 2020, pp. 14-15. Fake news also has a strong impact on
the vaccination campaign, increasing hesitancy to vaccinate. On the impact of fake news on public
health more recently, see: K. Mamak, Do we need the criminalization of medical fake news?, in
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2021, p. 1 ff.
s As highlighted in the Report of the detailed Findingson the Independent InternationalFact-Finding
mission on Myanmar, "Facebook has also widely been used to spread misinformation, including by
government officials and the Tatmadaw", A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018, para. 1346.
6 M. Monti, Italian Populism and Fake News on the Internet A New Political Weapon in the Public
Discourse, in G. Delledonne, G. Martinico, M. Monti, F. Pacini (eds.), Italian Populism and ConstitutionalLaw.
Challanges to Democracy in the 21th Century, Palgrave, Macmillan, London, 2020, p. 177 ff. (the author
refers in particular to the use of fake news in politics); E. Perucchietti, Fake news. Dalla manipolazione
dell'opinionepubblica alla post-verita. Come il potere controlla i media efabbrica l'informazioneper ottenere
consenso, Arianna Editrice, Bologna, 2018. See also: T. Nagasako, Global disinformation campaignsand legal
challenges, in InternationalCybersecurityLaw Review, 1/2020, p. 127 (the author refers to disinformation as
a "new form of warfare created by the information society").
7 E. Van Wie Davis, Shadow Warfare: Cyberwar Policy in the United States, Russia, and China,
Rowman & Littlefield, London, 2021, pp. 19-20; T. Nagasako, Global disinformation campaigns and
legal challenges, in International Cybersecurity Law Review, 1/2020, pp. 12 6-127 (the author stated
that disinformation "is a severe challenge to democracy, since it is executed by combining the leakage
of information stolen by cyberattacks with information warfare in media and SNS to transform public
opinion in individual countries and to influence democratic processes, such as the outcome of
elections and demonstrations").
FAKE NEWS AND THE CHALLENGES OF CRIMINAL LAW
individual and collective legal goods of primary rank, such as reputation, honour,
public order, safety and health 8
.
The online word is a fertile ground for the propagation of all types of
information 9 and debunking fake news is challenging. Most of the individual's life is
spent online. This aspect has been further intensified by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, are the most
common instruments used to spread both "false" and "truthful" information. Social
media algorithms1 0 , as well as mechanisms of sharing, reposting and retweeting, can
contribute to the proliferation of fake news. In the "digital era", users are no longer
mere consumers of online services, but they play an active role, sharing and producing
content". The use of bots and fakes profiles' 2 further accelerates the diffusion of such
news 3 . A role is also played by "filter bubbles"1 4 and "echo chambers" 5 that may
8 S. De Flammineis, Diritto penale, beni giuridici collettivi nella sfida delle fake news: principio di
offensivita ed emergenze, in Sistema penale, 6/2020, p. 131 f .; T. Guerini, La tutela penale della liberta di
manfestazionedel pensieronell'epoca dellefake news e delle infodemie, in discrimen.it,15June 2020, p. 4
.
9 F. Sciacchitano, A. Panza, Fake News e disinformazione online: misure internazionali, in Rivista di
diritto dei media, 1/2020, pp. 104-105; S. De Flammineis, Diritto penale, beni giuridici collettivi nella sfida
dellefake news: principio di offensivita ed emergenze, in Sistema penale, 6/2020, pp. 141-142; G. Pitruzzella,
La liberta di informazionenell'era di Internet, in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2018, p. 30 ff.
10 On the relationship between algorithms and fake news: G. Marchetti, Le fake news e ii ruolo
degli algoritmi, in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2020, pp. 29-36. The author examines the role of
algorithms both as an instrument to create and spread fake news, and as an instrument to counter
their diffusion. For example, Project Fandango, funded by the European Union's H2020 EU research
and innovation program, is aimed at using artificial intelligence and, in particular, algorithms to
counter fake news, for more details see: https://fandango-project.eu/the-project/what-is-fandango/,
accessed on 15 January 2020.
11 L. Picotti, Dirittopenale e tecnologie informatiche:una visione d'insieme, in A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari,
A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime, Utet, Milano, 2019, p. 43; F. Sciacchitano, A. Panza, Fake News e
disinformazione online: misure internazionali, in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2020, p. 104; P. Caretti,
A. Cardone, Diritto dell'informazione e della comunicazione nell'era della convergenza, Il Mulino, Bologna,
2019, p. 254 ff. This aspect has been emphasized also by the Council of Europe in Resolution 2143 (2017),
Online media and Journalism:Challenges andAccountability, https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-
XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=23455&lang=en, accessed on 20 November 2020.
12 On the impact of fake profiles and bots in the diffusion of fake news: A. Mazziotti di Celso, Dal
primo emendamento al bavaglio malese. Fake news, liberta di espressione e ii rovesciamento delle
categoriepolitichetradizionali, in Rivista di Diritto dei Media, 3/2018, p. 93 ff.
13 F. Donati, Fake News e liberta d'informazione, in Rivista di Diritto dei Media, 2/2018, p. 440.
14 The term "filterbubble" is used to describe a phenomenon that limits the exposure of the
individual to a full range of information on the Internet by algorithmically prioritizing content that
matches the user's profile, his or her online history, excluding content that does not. This term was
coined in the following book: E. Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You,
Penguin Group, London, 2011. For further details: Sumpter D., Outnumbered: From Facebook and
Google to Fake News and Filter-bubbles. The Algorithms that Control our Lives, Bloomsbury, Londra,
2018; F.J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, D. Trilling, J. M6ller, B. Bod6, C.H. De Vreese, N. Helberg, Should we
worry aboutfilterbubbles?, in InternetPolicy Review, 2016, p. 1 ff.
15 The term online or social media "echo chamber" is used to describe an "environment" in which
the same opinions are repeatedly promoted and voiced. As a result, users are not exposed to
opposing views. G. Marchetti, Le fake news e il ruolo degli algoritmi, in Rivista di diritto dei media,
1/2020, p. 31; G. Ziccardi, Tecnologie per il potere. Come usare i social network in politica, Raffaello
Cortina Editore, Milano, 2019, p. 78; G. Pitruzzella, La liberta di informazione nell'era di Internet, in
Rivista di dirittodei media, 1/2018, p. 31 ff.; W. Quattrociocchi, A. Scala, C.R. Sustein, Echo Chambers
on Facebook, in ssrn.com, 13 June 2016; W. Quattrociocchi, A. Vicini, Misinformation:guida alla societa
dell'informazionee della credulita, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2016, pp. 66-67.
GIULIA LANZA
contribute to the propagation of fake news. These phenomena have an increased

impact on vulnerable users or on users with a low level of media literacy, and in
regions where social media constitutes the sole (or principal) source of information.
This is clear, for example, in the case of Myanmar.
Defining fake news is not an easy task 6 . The term "fake news" became
particularly common during the Presidency of Donald Trump". The former President
of the United States is the first politician to have deployed it very often, also using it as
a slur to counter his opponents1 8. In 2017, it became the term of the year1 9
.
However, the term "fake news" is generally used to refer to a growing and
widespread phenomenon, characterized by the circulation of news with a misleading
or outright false content 20. Therefore, it reflects a vast category, which includes
different types of information.
In the context of this work, the term "fake news" is used in a broad sense and
includes misinformation, disinformation and mal-information 2 1. Nevertheless, it must
16 Emphasizing the difficulty for institutions to define the concept of "fake news": F. Sciacchitano,
A Panza, Fake Newse disinformazioneonline: misureinternazionali,in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2020, p. 105.
17 In the press there are those who refer to the "Trump's era of 'fake news"': B. Stelter, Analysis:
Election Day is also a Referendum on Trump's era of fake news', 30 October 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/
2020/10/30/media/fake-news-age/, accessed 29 November 2020.
18 For example, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Resolution 2255 (2019)
recommended to member states to "avoid the term "fake news", which has been excessively
politicized and frequently used to negatively label independent critical journalists or media outlets",
but to use instead "the concept of "information disorder" to describe the content, the purpose and the
extent of dissemination of misleading information", http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-
XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=25406&lang=en, accessed on 20 November 2020. Similarly, the High-Level
Expert Group (HLEG) set up by the European Commission to advise on policy initiatives to counter
fake news and disinformation spread online issued a report where it stated that the term "fake news"
"has been appropriated and used misleadingly by powerful actors to dismiss coverage that is simply
found disagreeable": A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation. Report of the Independent High
Level Group on fake news and online disinformation, Publication office of the European Union,
Luxemburg, 2018, p. 5, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-
expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation, accessed on 20 November 2020.
19 S. Meza, "FakeNews" Named Word of the Year, in newsweek.com, 11 February 2017 https://www.
newsweek.com/fake-news-word-year-collins-dictionary-699740, accessed on 20 November 2020.

20 F. De Simone, 'Fake news, 'posttruth', 'hatespeech': nuovifenomeni sociali alla prova del diritto
penale, inArchivio penale, 1/2018, p. 3.

21 For example, for a different meaning assigned to these terms, see the Report of the Council of
Europe DGI(2017)09: C. Wardle, H. Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary

Framework for Research and Policy making, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2017. The authors
differentiate between: "mis-information: when the news spread is false but no harm is meant"; "dis-
information, when news is false and shared to cause harm"; and, "mal-information, when genuine
information is spread to cause harm" (p. 5), https://edoc.coe.int/en/media/7495-information-
disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research-and-policy-making.html, accessed on
20 November 2020. See also the HLEG's Report, where disinformation is defined "as false, inaccurate,
or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or
for profit. The risk of harm includes threats to democratic political processes and values, which can
specifically target a variety of sectors, such as health, science, education, finance and more" and
misinformation "as misleading or inaccurate information shared by people who do not recognize it as
be noted that there is not a uniform definition of these terms and they may be used
and interpreted in different ways, in relation to the context in which they are
considered 22 . Not all types of false or misleading information require the same
treatment and the tools with which they need to be addressed may vary. This holds
true in particular with regards to the feasibility of relying on criminal law. Therefore,
in order to limit the scope of a possible intervention of criminal law to counter the
phenomenon under examination, it is important to make a preliminary specification.
Particular attention will be paid to fake news that may threaten or harm legal goods of
paramount importance, such as public order, safety and health. Indeed, false
information per se, as well as its diffusion, does not necessarily fall within the sphere
of criminal law, except for where it harms or threatens a legal good, such as those
previously mentioned2 3
.
Before focusing on the possibility of relying on criminal law to address this

specific type of fake news, it is important to examine the measures proposed and/or
adopted at both supranational level and domestic level to combat the phenomenon
under examination.
The continuous growth of the fake news phenomenon and its global dimension
constitute one of the major problems of the modern, connected word and requires a
global answer. This became particularly manifest in the face of the Covid-19
pandemic. The World Health Organization (WHO) defined the proliferation and the
overabundance of information - including false information - as an "infodemic" and
one of the greatest threats to public health. Consequently, it predisposed a reporting
mechanism aimed at countering the spread of false and potentially harmful
such", A multi-dimensionalapproach to disinformation.Report of the Independent High-Level Group on

fake news and online disinformation, Publication office of the European Union, Luxemburg, 2018,
p. 10. On the different types of "fake news" in academic literature, ex multis: T. Nagasako, Global
disinformation campaigns and legal challenges, in International Cybersecurity Law Review, 1/2020,
p. 125 ff.; F. Safieddine, History of Fake News, in F. Safieddine, Y. Ibrahim (eds.), Fake News in an Era of
Social Media: Tracking Viral Contagion, Rowman & Littlefield International, London, New York, 2020,
p. 1 ff. In Italian academic literature: T. Guerini, La tutela penale della liberta di manifestazione del
pensiero nell'epoca dellefake news e delle infodemie, in discrimen.it, 15 June 2020, p. 11 ff.; M. Bassini,
G.E. Vigevani, Primi appunti su fake news e dintorni, in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2017, pp. 11 ff.
More specifically related to the different interpretation of false information in the Italian criminal
legislation and case law: C. Perini, Fake news e post-veritd tra diritto penale e politica criminale, in
archiviodpc.dirittopenaleuomo.org,20 December 2017, pp. 2-3.
22 In this vein: F. Sciacchitano, A. Panza, Fake News e disinformazione online: misure internazionali,
in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2020, p. 105.

23 In Italian academic literature: P. Guercia, I progetti di legge sulle fake news e la disciplina
tedesca a confronto, in A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime, Utet, Milano,
2019, p. 1256; A. Costantini, Istanze di criminalizzazione delle fake news al confine tra tutela penale
della verita e repressione del dissenso: verso un nuovo simbolismo penale?, in Rivista trimestrale di
diritto penale contemporaneo, 2/2019, p. 68; C. Perini, Fake news e post-veritd tra diritto penale e
politica criminale, in archiviodpc.dirittopenaleuomo.org,20 December 2017, p. 3. See also: A. Pace, in
A. Pace, M. Manetti (eds.), La liberta di manifestazione del proprio pensiero (commento all'Art. 21
Cost.), in Commentario della Costituzione, Bologna - Roma, 2006, p. 89; P. Barile, Diritti dell'uomo e
libertafondamentali, Il mulino, Bologna, 1984, p. 229; C. Esposito, La liberta di manifestazione del
pensiero nell' ordinamento italiano, Milano, 1958, p. 36.
GIULIA LANZA
information online 24. Moreover, a team of the WHO "mythbusters" started to

collaborate with social media platforms to limit the spread of fake news related to the
virus 2 s. Regardless of the mechanisms adopted, it is important to respect individual
fundamental rights: in particular, the right to freedom of expression. Indeed, as
stressed by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Robert
Kaye, in 2017, "fake news has emerged as a global topic of concern and there is a risk
that efforts to counter it could lead to censorship, the suppression of critical thinking
and other approaches contrary to human rights law"2 6
.
The Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and "Fake News", Disinformation
and Propaganda signed on 3 March 2017 by the United Nations (UN) Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the
Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, contains the
principles that should be aimed at balancing the different interests involved 27. More
precisely, the Declaration encouraged the promotion of pluralism in the media,
identified the applicable human rights standards and highlighted the specific roles of
the intermediaries, journalists and all stakeholders.
One of the major challenges for the European Union is that of combatting fake
news and online disinformation 28 . The European Commission has taken several
actions in order to address the relevant actors, methods, tools and targets to give a
prompt response and put an end to this growing phenomenon.
The first attempt of the European Commission to counter this phenomenon dates
back to March 2015, with the establishment of the Task Force East StratCom in the
European External Action Service (EEAS), following the disinformation campaign in
Russia 29
.
24 For more details on the mechanism developed by the WHO "How to report misinformation
online": https://www.who.int/campaigns/connecting-the-world-to-combat-coronavirus/how-to-report-
misinformation-online?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI6ZKfy7_x7gIVvSB 7Ch2i6gD4EAAYASAAEgJ46vDBwE,
accessed on 3 December 2020. See also: J. Zarocostas, How to Fight an Infodemic, in The Lancet, Vol. 395,
February 2020, p. 676.
25 For more details: https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/un-tackling-
'infodemic'-misinformation-and-cybercrime-covid-19, accessed on 20 November 2020.
26 See: https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsD=21287&LangID=E,
accessed on 20 November 2020.

27 The text of the Declaration is available at the following link: https://www.osce.org/fom/
302796, accessed on 3 December 2020.
28 For an overview of EU joint and coordinated action against disinformation: https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/tackling-online-disinformation, accessed on 3 December 2020. For a detailed

analysis of the EU joint and coordinated action against disinformation: F. Sciacchitano, A. Panza, FakeNews e
disinformazione online: misure internazionali,in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2020, p. 106 ff. This was an
important issue not only for the European Union, but also for the Council of Europe, see in particular:
Resolution 2143 (2017), Online media and journalism: challenges and accountability, https://assembly.
coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=23455&lang=en, accessed on 3 December 2020.
29 For further details on the Task Force East StratCom: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headquarters-homepageen/2116/, accessed on 3 December 2020.

In 2018, the European Commission established a High-Level Expert Group

(HLEG) on fake news and online disinformation with the aim of proposing initiatives
to counter fake news and disinformation spread online 30 . The responses proposed by
the HLEG were expressed in five pillars: 1) enhancing transparency of online news;
2) promoting media and information literacy; 3) developing tools for empowering
users and journalists; 4) safeguarding the diversity and the sustainability of the
European news media ecosystems; 5) promoting continued research on the impact of
disinformation in Europe 31
.
In the Communication "Tackling Online Disinformation: a European Approach" of
26 April 2018, the Commission emphasized the importance of the private sector, and
therefore of social media platforms, in tackling the problem of online disinformation 32
.
In an attempt to regulate the expansion of the phenomenon under examination
and in view of the 2019 European elections, the European Commission published the
"Code of Practice on Disinformation" 33. It constitutes an important step in the fight
against the spread of online fake news within the EU. It is the first time that players
within the industry (i.e., Facebook, Twitter, Google, Mozilla, advertisers) agreed, on a
voluntary basis, to adopt self-regulatory standards to fight against fake news online 34
.
The aim of the Code is to achieve the objectives delineated in the Commission's
Communication "Tackling Online Disinformation: a European Approach". In particular,
it contributes to ensuring greater transparency on platforms' policies against fake
profiles and disinformation. However, all measures adopted must respect and
guarantee freedom of expression. Throughout the entire text, particular attention is
paid to this fundamental right 35 . Specifically, the Code reads that "the Signatories are
mindful of the fundamental right to freedom of expression and to an open Internet,
and the delicate balance which any efforts to limit the spread and impact of otherwise
30 The work of the HLEG results in the following report: A multi-dimensional approach to
disinformation. Report of the Independent High-Level Group on fake news and online disinformation,
Publication office of the European Union, Luxemburg, 2018, p. 5.
31
Ibid., p. 35.
32 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Tackling
Online Disinformation: a European Approach, 26 April 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236, accessed on 3 December 2020.
33 The text of the Code is available at the following link: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/code-practice-disinformation, accessed on 3 December 2020. In 2019, Facebook, Google,
Mozilla, Twitter and trade associations representing the advertising sectors submitted their first
reports on the measures taken to comply with the Code: Firstresults of the EU Code of Practiceagainst
disinformation: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/first-results-eu-code-practice-
against-disinformation?fbclid=IwAR3WQmydZDdMH 6uiUGQPDyERTC_4oTik7dI3H31rDO7WsYq9-
jKyBwYff4I, accessed on 3 December 2020.
34 Self-regulation is defined as follows: "Self-regulation constitutes a type of voluntary initiative which
enables economic operators, social partners, non-governmental organizations or associations to adopt
common guidelines amongst themselves and for themselves. They are responsible for development,
monitoring, compliance with and enforcement of those guidelines", in The Sounding Board's Unanimous
Final Opinion on the so-called Code of Practice, 24 September 2018, https://www.beuc.eu/documents/
files/30pinionoftheSoundingboard.p df, accessed on 3 December 2020.
3s The right to freedom of expression is enshrined both in the Constitutions of democratic legal
systems (e.g., art. 21 of the Italian Constitution) and in other supranational legal instruments, such as
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (art. 11), the European Convention on
Human Rights (art. 10), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 19) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 19).
- GIULIA LANZA
lawful content must strike"3 6 . The signatories of the Code also have to produce on a
regular basis reports regarding the program for the monitoring and reporting of
Covid-19, as well as, more recently, reports on the measures adopted to combat the
spread of disinformation regarding Covid-19 vaccines.
In the context of the efforts made by the EU to combat online disinformation, we
also find "The Action Plan Against Disinformation", published in December 201937.
The Action Plan is also aimed at monitoring the actions of the big players of the
information market, such as Google, Facebook and Twitter 38 and to urge platforms to
implement the self-regulatory Code of Practice and Disinformation. As set out in the
Action Plan, the response to disinformation is based on four pillars: i) improving the
capacities of European Union institutions to detect, analyze and expose disinformation;
ii) strengthening coordinated and joint responses to disinformation; iii) mobilizing the
private sector to tackle disinformation; iv) raising awareness and improving societal
resilience 39 . It emphasizes the requirement for a coordinated response in the fight
against fake news, as well as for increased international cooperation and the
involvement of society as a whole to cooperate in such a fight (i.e., online platforms,
fact checkers, public authorities, researchers and social society). The approach
adopted in the Action Plan was also followed to counter the disinformation wave
during the Covid-19 pandemic4 0 . Indeed, it had harmful consequences for public
health and effective crisis communications. The same still holds true with regards to
the vaccination campaigns.
36 This aspect was previously stressed in the Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and "Fake
News", Disinformation and Propaganda signed on 3 March 2017 by the United Nations (UN) Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
(ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information.
37 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Action Plan Against Disinformation,
5 December 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/action-plan-disinformation-commission-
contribution-european-council-13-14-december-2018_en, accessed on 3 December 2020.
38 The European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Medial Service (ERGA) plays a fundamental role in
the monitoring activities related to the implementation of the commitments by the signatories of the Code
of Practice Signatories. At the same time, it has to guarantee the media pluralism. For a detailed analysis of
the role played by the ERGA: F. Sciacchitano, A. Panza, Fake News e disinformazione online: misure
internazionali,in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2020, p. 1 1 8 ff.
39 In the context of the Action plan against disinformation the European Digital Media
Observatory (EDMO) was established. It was aimed at creating a European center for fact-checkers,
academics and other relevant stakeholders with the purpose to: 1) map fact-checking organisations;
2) support and coordinate research activities; 3) build a public portal; 4) ensure secure and privacy-
protected access to platforms' data; 5) support public authorities. It started its activities on 1 June
2020. For more information on its activities: https://edmo.eu, accessed on 3 December 2020.
40 Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative the European
Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions. Tackling COVID-19 disinformation - getting the facts right (JOIN(2020) 8
final), 10 June 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020JC0008,
accessed on 3 December 2020. This Communication focuses on the immediate response to
disinformation around the coronavirus pandemic, responding to the Joint Statement of the Members
of the European Council to resolutely counter disinformation of 26 March 2020, https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2 020/03/26/joint-statement-of-the-members-of-the-
european-council-26-march-2020/, accessed on 3 December 2020.
The Commission particularly recalled the importance of combatting disinformation

in the context of elections and in the democratic process in the European Democracy
Action Plan (2 December 2020), which is built on three pillars: i) free and fair
elections; ii) media freedom and pluralism; iii) fighting against disinformation 41
.
Finally, the appeal for online intermediaries and platforms to take more
responsibility for the content they host, as set out in the Digital Service Act 4 2 , may also
impact positively on the fight against the spread of fake news online.
Measures aimed at countering the phenomenon under examination are widely

debated throughout the world 43 . At domestic level, three different approaches can be
identified.
The first approach is that of relying on existing law which regulates the use of
traditional media, anti-defamation and elections in order to address the phenomenon.
The problem of this approach is that relying on existing law, as it may be based on
rules adopted in the pre-Internet era (e.g., Italy), may not be adequate. The second
approach is that of adopting specific legislation which imposes sanctions on
individuals and social media platforms who spread fake news. The countries that have
adopted this approach relying on criminal law 44 include China 45 , Malaysia 46
,
41 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. On the European Democracy
Action Plan, 3 December 2020: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A 2020
%3A790%3AFIN&qid=1607079662423, accessed on 20 December 2021.
42 The Digital Service Act and the Digital Markets Act are two legislative measures proposed by the
European Commission and part of the European Digital Strategy, aimed also at creating a safer digital place
where users' fundamental rights of digital services are protected. For more details: https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/digital-services-act-package, accessed on 20 December 2020.
43 For an overview: Report of the Library Congress Law, Initiatives to counter fake news in
selected countries, April 2019, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fake-news/index.php, accessed on 20
December 2020.
44 For an overview: R.K. Helm, H. Nasu, Regulatory Responses to 'Fake News' and Freedom of
Expression:Normative and EmpiricalEvaluation,in Human Rights Law Review, 2021, p. 21.
4s In China the media environment is rigidly controlled. In 2015, art. 291 of the Penal Code of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) was amended by the introduction of a criminal offense that
punishes anyone who fabricates false information on dangerous situations, epidemics, disasters or
alert situations, or intentionally disseminates such information by means of information networks or
any other media, knowing that it is fabricated, and thereby seriously disturbing public order, with a
penalty of up to three years of imprisonment. If the consequences are serious, the penalty varies from
three to up to seven years imprisonment. The PRC Cybersecurity Law approved on 7 November 2016,
which entered into force on 1 June 2017, further provides for the prohibition of fabricating or
disseminating false information that may disrupt the economic or social order, also by means of
social media. It also imposes several obligations on network operators (e.g., they have to monitor the
content and, if it is found to be false, they have to record and report the information to the authority).
For more details on the Chinese legislation, see: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/social-media-
disinformation/china.php#_ftnref13, accessed on 20 December 2020. In August 2018, the Illegal and
Unhealthy Information Reporting Centre, affiliated to the Cyberspace Administration of China, set up
a platform that refutes rumors at national level. This platform relies on artificial intelligence to
identify misinformation (http://www.piyao.org.cn/). For more details on the measures adopted by
the Chinese government to reduce and minimize fake news during the Covid-19 pandemic: U.M.
- GIULIA LANZA
Singapore 47 and Burkina Faso 48 . These countries have been criticized for having used
such an instrument in order to control information and suppress freedom of expression 49
.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, several States have also adopted criminal measures to
counter the diffusion of fake news (e.g., Russia5 o).
The third approach is that of addressing the issue in a more general way by
educating citizens about the danger of fake news and thus emphasizing the importance
of media literacy (e.g., Finlands1 ).
In Europe, the first European States that have adopted legislation against fake
news are Germany and France. Therefore, the following sections will focus on these
countries. Particular attention will be paid to the situation in Italy as it represents an
important example on the difficulty of finding the ideal solution to countering the fake
news phenomenon.
V.1. Germany
The Network Enforcement Act (in German Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz,

NetzDG) 5 2 , also known as the Facebook Act, entered into force on 1 October 2017. The
Rodrigues, J. Xu, Regulation of COVID-19 Fake News Infodemic in China and India, in Media
InternationalAustralia,2020, p. 127 ff.
46 The Anti-Fake News Act was published in the Federal Gazette of Malaysia on
11 April 2018,
https://perma.cc/Y5H3-D6G8, accessed on 20 December 2020. However, it was repealed in 2019
https://perma.cc/VMT7-GAN4, accessed on 20 December 2020. The Act provided for the punishment
with the imprisonment of up to six years and/or with a fine of up to five hundred thousand ringgit for
anyone "who, by any means, knowingly creates, offers, publishes, prints, distributes, circulates or
disseminates any fake news or publication containing fake news". For further details: A. Mazziotti di
Celso, Dal primo emendamento al bavaglio malese. Fake news, libert6 di espressione e ii rovesciamento
delle categorie politiche tradizionali, in Rivista di Diritto dei Media, 3/2018, p. 105 ff.; M. Monti,
Cronacadell'emanazione e dell'abrogazionedell'Anti-Fake News Act malaysiano, in Rivista di Dirittodei
Media, 3/2018, p. 435 ff. The possibility of reviving the Anti-Fake News Act is under discussion of the
Malaysia's Parliament: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-to-discuss-the-revival-
of-anti-fake-news-act-at-parliament, accessed on 20 December 2020.
41 The Parliament passed the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) on 8
May 2019, which came into force on 2 October 2019, https://www.pofmaoffice.gov.sg/resources/,
accessed on 20 December 2020. In particular, Part II relates to the "Prohibition of Communication of False
Statement of Fact in Singapore". It provides for strict penalties. The text of the Act is available at the
following link: https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/POFMA2019#pr7-, accessed on 20 December 2020.
0
48 The Burkina Faso's Parliament with Loi N 044-2019 amended the Penal Code (in particular
artt. 313-12 ff.) by introducing specific offences related to the fight of fake news. For further details:
https://www.assembleenationale.bf/IMG/pdf/loi_044_portantmodificationducodepenal.pdf,
accessed on 20 December 2020.
49 T. Nagasako, Global disinformation campaigns and legal challenges, in InternationalCybersecurity
Law Review, 1/2020, p. 135.
so In 2019, Russia passed two laws banning fake news and disrespects of authorities, providing for
administrative sanctions. However, on 31 March 2020, art. 207 of the Russian Penal Code was amended in
order to counter false information related to serious issues of public safety, such as Covid-19,
https://ipi.media/new-fake-news-law-stifles-independent-reporting-in-russia-on-covid-19/, accessed on
20 December 2020.
s1 Finland'sSecret Weapon in the Fight againstFake News: its kindergarten children, 16 February
2021, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/climate-and-people/finlands-secret-weapon-fight-
against-fake-news-kindergarten/, accessed on 17 February 2021.
52 Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (Networks Enforcement Act), Bundestag,
17 July 2017. The text of the law is available in English at the following link: https://www.bmjv.de/
inadequacy of the self-regulatory mechanisms adopted by social media to counter

illegal content online led to the establishment of this Acts 3 . In order to define what
must be considered "illegal content", more strictly related to fake news, the Act
explicitly refers to some of the offenses endorsed in the penal code, which include
defamation (§ 187 StGB), treasonous forgery (§ 100 a StGB) and the forgery of data of
probative value (§ 269 StGB).
According to § 1 of the Act only applies "to telemedia service providers which, for
profit-making purposes, operate Internet platforms which are designed to enable
users to share any content with other users or to make such content available to the
public", with more than two million registered users in Germany.
The Act imposes two types of obligations. Firstly, according to § 2, the provider of
a social network that has received more than 100 complaints in a calendar year has to
report, on a bi-annual basis, the complaints and the measures adopted in order to
counter the illegal content on the platforms. This is required for reasons regarding
public transparency and in order to determine whether the NetzDG is effective.
Furthermore, on the basis of § 3, the provider of a social network has to handle
complaints about unlawful content and follow the procedure provided by the provision
(i.e., take note of and examine the complaint, remove or block access to unlawful
content within a certain amount of time after receiving the complaint).
The violation of the obligations imposed by the NetzDG on social networks
constitutes administrative offenses, punishable with a regulatory fine of up to five
million euros (§ 4(2)). The peculiarity of the Act is that it can be applied even if the
offense is not committed in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany (§ 4(3)).
The NetzDG is not exempt from criticism 4 . The legal concerns relate in particular
to the alleged limitation of the constitutional freedom of expression, the violation of
the legality principle55 and the contrast with the limits imposed by the E-Commerce
Directive. The Act attributes excessive power to the platforms. The absence of an
independent entity (e.g., a State authority) to control the content of information that is
likely to be false could lead to private censorship, and thus jeopardize the right to
freedom of expression. Moreover, the threat of applying such strict sanctions would
lead to the risk that "suspicious" content would be removed if its reviewers had
doubts about its veracity. The severity of the sanction poses some doubts also with
regard to its effectivity administrative nature, as, substantially, it could be considered
matiere pdnale as defined by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 56
.
SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDGengl.pdf;j sessionid=E54C7EC36D9B 604A

237AFF2CF2965C9C.2_cid289?_blob=publicationFile&v=2, accessed on 20 December 2020.
s3 V. Claussen, Fighting Hate Speech and Fake News. The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) in
Germany in the context of the EuropeanLegislation, in Rivista di dirittodei media, 3/2018, p. 117.
s4 V. Claussen, Fighting Hate Speech and Fake News. The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) in
Germany in the context of the European Legislation, in Rivista di Diritto dei Media, 3/2018, p. 119 ff.;
M. Liesching, Die Durchsetzung von Verfassungs- und Europarechtgegen das NetzDG: Oberblick uber
die wesentlichen Kritikpunkte, in Multimedia und Recht, 1/2018, p. 27; G. Spindler, Der Regierungsentwurf
zum Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz - europarechtswidrig?,in Zeitschriftfar Urheber- und Medienrecht,
2017, p. 481.
ss Claussen V., Fighting Hate Speech and Fake News. The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) in
Germany in the context of the EuropeanLegislation, in Rivista di Dirittodei Media, 3/2018, p. 119 ff.
56 T. Guerini T., La tutela penale della liberta di manfestazione del pensiero nell'epoca delle fake
news e delle infodemie, in discrimen.it, 15 June 2020, fn. 73.
GIULIA LANZA
V.2. France
So far, France is the only European State to have adopted a penal legislation in
order to combat fake news online. In 2018, France enacted the "Loi organique n° 2018-
1201 du 22 decembre 2018 relative a la lutte contre la manipulation de l'information"
and the "Loi n° 2018-1202 du 22 decembre 2018 relative a la lutte contre la
manipulation de l'information", both related to the fight against the manipulation of
informations 7 . These laws were developed in order to better protect democracy and to
adopt stricter rules to be applied to the media during the electoral campaigns,
specifically in the three months before any election. Indeed, this period is considered
especially delicate for the democracy of the country. According to Art. L163-1 of the
Electoral Code, as modified by Loi n° 2018-1202, in the three months before the
elections, platform operators have particular obligations concerning transparency,
among which is the duty to provide users with "honest, clear and transparent content"
regarding the identity of the natural person or the name of the company, the registered
office and the purpose of the juridical person who pays to promote content related to a
"debate of national interest". Violation of the provision is punishable with the penalty of
up to one year of imprisonment and a fine of 75.000 euros58
.
Moreover, in the abovementioned period, a judge, upon request of a prosecutor, a
candidate, a party, a political movement of anyone with an interest to act, may order
"any proportional and necessary measure" to block the "deliberate, artificial and
massive" dissemination of inexact allegations or imputations, or news that falsely
report facts, with the intention of changing the genuineness of a vote5 9 . The judge is
required to decide within 48 hours. This aspect was criticized as such an evaluation
would require more time and a deeper analysis, and would jeopardize the right to
freedom of expression 60 . The legislative intervention is further criticized as it relates
to specific circumstances and to a limited time frame. It only involves the political
sphere and does not explore the broader context of the phenomenon examined.
V.3. Italy
In Italy, the debate related to the introduction of measures aimed at countering

the creation, sharing and spreading of fake news on the Internet is a burning
57 The text of the laws are respectively available at the following links: https://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000037847556 and https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/ JORFTEXT0000
37847559/, accessed on 20 December 2021. For a detailed analysis: C. Magnani C., Liberta d'informazione
online e fake news: vera emergenza? Appunti sul contrasto alla disinformazione tra legislatori statali e
politiche europee, in Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali, 4 April 2019, p. 16 ff. It is also important to call
attention to the 1881 Law on Freedom of the Press ("Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la libert6 de la presse"),
particularly art. 27 which punishes the publication, dissemination or reproduction of fake news in bad faith.
Moreover, art. L.97 of the Electoral Code prohibits the dissemination of "fake news, defamatory rumors or
other fraudulent schemes" that affect the result of an election. Another measure developed in France to
address the phenomenon under evaluations is the Cross Check fact-checking project. For further details on
the project: F. Sciacchitano, A. Panza, Fake News e disinformazioneonline: misure internazionali,in Rivista di
diritto dei media, 1/2020, p. 128 ff.
58 Art. L112 of the Electoral Code as modified by Loi n 2018-1202.
59 Art. L163-2 of the Electoral Code as modified by Loi n 2018-1202.
60 In this vein, the Syndacat National des Journalistes (SNJ) in the press release entitled: "Fake news":
un project de loi liberticide: https://www.snj.fr/article/«-fake-news-»-un-projet-de-loi-liberticide-60222644,

accessed on 20 December 2020. See also the decision of the Conseil constitutional: Decision n. 2018-773 DC
20 decembre 2018. In academic literature: E. Lehner, Fake news e democrazia, in Rivista dei Media, 1/2019,
pp. 6-7.
issue6 1 . The Italian legal order does not have specific legislation related to the fight
against fake news online 62. However, it does provide for several provisions dealing
with, or which are in some way related to, fake news. Examples include: false
corporate communications ("false comunicazioni sociali", art. 2621 of the Italian Civil
Code), market manipulation ("manipolazione del mercato", art. 185 of the Consolidated
Law on Financial Intermediation), which refers to "anyone who spreads false news";
political defeatism ("disfattismo politico", art. 265 of the Penal Code, hereinafter
referred to as c.p.); fraudulent price fluctuation on the public market or on the stock
exchange ("rialzo e ribassofraudolento di prezzi sul pubblico mercato o nelle horse di
commercio", art. 501 of the Penal Code, i.e. agiotage); publication or dissemination of
false, exaggerated or biased news, likely to disrupt public order ("pubblicazione o
diffusione di notizie false, esagerate o tendenziose, atte a turbare l'ordine pubblico",
art. 656 c.p.) 63; raising false alarm for authority ("procurato allarme presso l'Autorita",
art. 658 c.p.) 64
.
During the XVII Legislature, a number of legislative proposals were presented in

order to address the fake news phenomenon 65 . Particular attention will be paid to the
most relevant bills; the other initiatives will be only mentioned.
Before getting into the core of the analysis, it is important to recall what is stated
in the Preamble of the Declaration of Internet Rights, elaborated by the Commission
61 A bill (ddl n. 1900) on the establishment of a parliamentary committee of inquiry on the
massive diffusion of fake news is under examination by the Senate. For more details see:
http://www.senato.it/leg/18/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/53197.htm, accessed on 21 December 2020. A
role in the fight against fake news is also played by the AGCOM ("Autorita per le garanzie nelle
comunicazioni"). On the role played by the latter, see in particular: F. Sciacchitano, A. Panza, Fake
News e disinformazione online: misure internazionali,in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2020, p. 102 ff.
See also the task force set up by the Prime minister's office to counter the spread of fake news on
Covid-19 on the web and social networks ("Unity di monitoraggio per il contrasto della diffusione
delle fake news relative al Covid-19 sul web e sui social network"), https://informazioneeditoria.gov.it/
it/notizie/unita-di-monitoraggio-p er-il-contras to-dell a-diffusione-di-fake-news-relative-al-covid-19-
sul-web -e-sui-social-network-adottato-il-4-aprile-il-decreto-di-istituzione-presso-il-dipartimento/, accessed
on 21 December 2020.
62 Pointing out the inadequacy of our legal system to face the technological evolution and the
phenomenon under examination: T. Guerini, La tutela penale della liberta di manfestazione del pensiero
nell'epoca delle fake news e delle infodemie, in discrimen.it, 15 June 2020, p. 50; S. De Flammineis, Diritto
penale, beni giuridici collettivi nella sfida delle fake news: principio di offensivita ed emergenze, in Sistema
penale, 6/2020, p. 137. In a broader perspective: L. Picotti, Diritto penale e tecnologie informatiche: una
visioned'insieme, in A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime, Utet, Milano, 2019, p. 42;
L Picotti, La tutela penale della persona e le nuove tecnologie dell'informazione, in L Picotti (ed.), Tutela
penale dellapersona e nuove tecnologie, Cedam, Padova, 2013, p. 2 9 ff.
63 A similar provision is contained also in art. 440 of the Romanian Penal Code.
64 For a more detailed analysis of art. 656 c.p.: S. De Flammineis, Diritto penale, beni giuridici
collettivi nella sfida dellefake news: principio di offensivita ed emergenze, in Sistema penale, 6/2020, p.
134 ff (according to the author, art. 656 c.p. represents the main criminal law instrument against this
phenomenon in the protection of collective legal goods, p. 136).
65 For an analysis of the different bills on the topic: T. Guerini, Fake news e diritto penale. La
manipolazione digitale del consenso nelle democrazie liberali, Giappichelli, Torino, 2020, p. 168 ff.;
P. Guercia, I progetti di legge sulle fake news e la disciplina tedesca a confronto, in A. Cadoppi,
S. Canestrari, A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime, Utet, Milano, 2019, pp. 1253-1271; A. Costantini,
Istanze di criminalizzazionedelle fake news al confine tra tutela penale della verita e repressionedel
dissenso: verso un nuovo simbolismo penale?, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto penale contemporaneo,
2/2019, p. 60 ff.; F. De Simone, 'Fake news', 'posttruth, 'hatespeech': nuovifenomeni sociali alla prova
del dirittopenale, inArchivio penale, 1/2018, p.1 ff.
GIULIA LANZA
for Internet Rights and Duties and published in 2015. It reads that the Declaration "is
founded on the full recognition of the liberty, equality, dignity and unique diversity of
each individual. Preserving these rights is crucial to ensuring the democratic
functioning of institutions and avoiding the domination of public and private powers
that may lead to a society of surveillance, control and social selection. The Internet is
an increasingly important space for the self-organization of individuals and groups,
and it is a vital tool for promoting individual and collective participation in democratic
processes as well as substantive equality"66 . Such a Declaration is particularly
important also with regards to the topic under examination as, whatever the means
used to counter the fake news phenomenon - including criminal law - it is not
possible to limit the right of the individual to freedom of expression, which constitutes
a cornerstone of our democratic system.
V.3.1. The Gambaro bill

The Gambaro bill ("ddl Gambaro"), sponsored by senator Adele Gambaro, at the
time a member of the Five Star Movement (MSS), was presented on 7 December 2017
("Provisions to prevent the manipulation of online information, to ensure
transparency on the web and to encourage media literacy") 67 . It represents the first
attempt aimed at countering fake news and followed the Resolution 2143 (2017)
"Online media and journalism: challenges and accountability", adopted by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 25 January 201768. The bill stems
from the need to face the challenges presented by the technological developments and
to regulate the individual's online life with the same guarantees ensured in the offline
life 69. Its aim was to make online platforms liable for the dissemination of news which
is false, exaggerated, biased or which has a propensity to disrupt public order, as well as to
introduce specific offenses for the authors of such news and for the dissemination of hate
campaigns 70
.
The bill under examination included three new offences in the Penal Code. More
precisely, art. 1 of the ddl Gambaro provided for the introduction - after art. 656 c.p.
-
of art. 656 bis c.p. "Publication or dissemination of false, exaggerated or biased news
likely to disrupt public order through IT platforms", ("Pubblicazione o diffusione di
66 The text in English of the Declaration of Internet Rights is available at the following link:
http s: //www.camera.it/application/xmanager/proj ects/legi7/commissioneinternet/testo_definitiv

oinglese.pdf, accessed on 21 December 2020. The Declaration is particularly important as it contains
a number of provisions recognizing several rights to the users, such as the right to Internet access
(art. 2), the right to online knowledge and education (art. 3), the right to one's identity (art. 9), the
right to be forgotten (art. 11), the rights and safeguards of people on platforms (art. 12).
67 Atto Senato n. 2688, XVII legislature (ddl Gambaro) "Disposizioni per prevenire la manipolazione
dell'informazione online, garantire la trasparenza sul web ed incentivare l'alfabetizzazione mediatica". The
text is available at the following link: http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/17/DDLPRES/0/1006504/
index.html?part=ddlpresddlpresl-articolato_articolatol, accessed on 21 December 2020. The bill
remained a "dead letter" as it was never discussed and it did not proceed in the parliamentary procedure.
68 The text of the Resolution is available at the following link: https://assembly.coe.int/nw/
xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=23455&lang=en, accessed on 21 December 2020.

69 T. Guerini, Fake news e diritto penale. La manipolazione digitale del consenso nelle democrazie
liberali, Giappichelli, Torino, 2020, p. 169. More in general: L. Picotti, Diritto penale e tecnologie
informatiche: una visione d'insieme, in A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime,
Utet, Milano, 2019, p. 42.
70 M. Bassini, G.E. Vigevani, Primi appunti su fake news e dintorni, in Rivista di diritto dei media,
1/2017, p. 13.
notizie false, esagerate o tendenziose, atte a turbare l'ordine pubblico, attraverso

piattaforme informatiche"), punishable with a fine of up to 5.000 euros7t . This provision
would not have been applied to professional journalism.
Art. 2 of the ddl Gambaro provided for the introduction respectively of art. 265
bis c.p. "Dissemination of false news that can raise public alarm or mislead sectors of
public opinion", ("Diffusione di notizie false che possono destare pubblico allarme o
fuorviare settori dell'opinione pubblica"), punishable with at least twelve months of
imprisonment or a fine of up to 5.000 euros, and art. 265 ter c.p. "Dissemination of
hate campaigns or campaigns aimed at undermining the democratic process",
("Diffusione di campagne d'odio o volte a minare it processo democratico"), punishable
with at least two years of imprisonment or a fine of up to 10.000 euros 72 . However, the
second part of art. 2 is more related to hate speech.
The bill further imposed a series of measures on IT platforms, such as
registration requirements (art. 3), the obligation to rectify detrimental or fake content
(art. 4) and the obligation to monitor online activity, determining the liability of the
providers in the event that they did not remove unreliable and fake news (art. 7).
Finally, but equally importantly, the bill highlighted the importance of media
literacy and the role played by schools within their functions of education and of
encouraging public awareness (art. 6).
The bill faced fierce criticism for several reasons. It was criticized for violating the
"principle of legality" (principio di legalita) and the "principle of offensivity" (principio
di offensivita) 73 . It jeopardized the right to freedom of expression as, for fear of
punishment, the private individual would, firstly, have been discouraged from sharing
his or her opinion and, furthermore, the platform would have further increased the
controlling power7 4. This would have resulted in forms of private censorship. Such a
71 With regard to the conduct, the offense endorsed in art. 656 his c.p. seems to be very similar
to the one contained in art. 656 c.p. with the exception of the means (IT platforms) required to carry
out the conduct.
72 These criminal offenses would have been introduced among the crimes against the
personality of the State.

73 T. Guerini, Fake news e diritto penale. La manipolazione digitaledel consenso nelle democrazie
liberali, Giappichelli, Torino, 2020, p. 172; E. Lehner, Fake news e democrazia, in Rivista di diritto dei
media, 1/2019, p. 100; M. Fumo, Bufale elettroniche, repressione penale e democrazia, in Rivista di
diritto dei media, 1/2018, p. 89; Cuniberti M., Il contrasto alla disinformazione in rete tra logiche del
mercato e (vecchie e nuove) velleita di controllo, in Rivista di dirittodei media, 1/2017, p. 31. The bill
lacks of a clear definition of "fake news".
74 The "interventionist" spirit of the bill is highlighted by Guercia, in particular where he
highlights the use of the term "control", adopted already in the bill's presentation report: P. Guercia,
I progetti di legge sulle fake news e la disciplina tedesca a confronto, in A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari,
A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime, Utet, Milan, 2019, p. 1258. Moreover, on p. 1259, the author
points out the significance of the "chilling effect" according to which the ISP, for fear of incurring
sanctions, could implement private censorship strategies and thus limit the circulation of
information). More specifically on the "chilling effect": J. Townend, Freedom of Expression and the
Chilling Effect, in H. Tumber, S. Waisbord (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Media and Human
Rights, Routledge, 2017, pp. 73 ff. In the same vein: M. Bassini, G.E. Vigevani, Primi appunti su fake
news e dintorni, in Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2017, p. 20, the authors refer to the "collateral
censorship" effect. More generally, on the "collateral censorship" effect: J. Balkin, Free Speech and
Hostile Environment, in Columbia Law Review, 99/1999, p. 2295 ff In the case law, inter alia:
dissenting opinion of judge Saj6 and judge Tsotsoria appended to the judgment of the Grand Chamber
of the European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Delfi v. Estonia case, App. 64569/09, 16 June
2015. According to the judges, if the ISPs were obliged to remove content or were considered
- GIULIA LANZA
strong duty of control would have been in contrast with the law provided at European
Union level and, more particularly, with the E-Commerce directive 75 . The bill was
further criticized for being a selective and partial legislation (e.g., it was not applicable
to the journalists)7 6 and for mixing problems related to the spreading of fake news
and to hate speech77
.
V.3.2. The Zanda and Filippinbill
The Zanda and Filippin bill ("ddl Zanda and Filippin"), sponsored by senator Luigi
Zanda and Rossana Filippin, members of the Democratic Party 78 "General rules on
social networks and combatting the dissemination of illegal content and fake news on
the Internet" ("Norme generali in materia di social network e per il contrasto della
diffusione su internet di contenuti illeciti e delle fake news") was presented on 14
December 2017.
The bill was inspired by the model adopted in Germany ("NetzDG") 79 . It targeted
only social networks with an elevated number of users, more than one million (art.
1(2)). In contrast to the ddl Gambaro, it did not introduce new criminal offenses, but
relied on the existing provisions contained in the Penal Code. As pointed out in the
bill's presentation, the aim of the law was to limit the publication and spread of
content that constitutes crimes against the individual and crimes against the republic.
Alongside the authors' criminal liability for the illicit content constituting one of the
criminal offenses listed in art. 1 (e.g., stalking, defamation), the bill provided for the
administrative liability (of an omissive nature) of the social network providers for not
fulfilling the obligations endorsed in the bill's provisions. More precisely, art. 2
required the social network providers to adopt a very complex procedure with the
responsible for the content, for conditioned reflex they could implement strategies of private
censorship for fear of penalties, which would probably have a negative effect on the circulation of
information on the web.
7s C. Magnani, Libert6 d'informazione online efake news: vera emergenza?Appuntisul contrasto
alla disinformazione tra legislatori statali e politiche europee, in Forum di quaderni costituzionali,
4 April 2019, p. 4; F. Donati F., Fake News e libert6 d'informazione, in Rivista di diritto dei media,
2/2018, p. 443 (the author goes even further stating that the bill constitutes a "surreptitious form of
censorship"). In particular, art. 15 of the E-Commerce Directive 2001/31/EC does not impose a
general obligation to monitor on ISPs. At domestic level, the legislative decree 70/2003 of 9 April 2003,
implementing the EU E-Commerce Directive 2001/31/EC, establishes that the ISP does not have a
general obligation to monitor information which is transmitted or stored, nor a general obligation to
actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity (art. 16).
76 C. Melzi D'Eril, Fake news e responsabilitd: paradigmi classici e tendenze incriminatrici,in
Rivista di diritto dei media, 1/2017, p. 62 (according to the author, if the aim of the bill is that of
punishing the manipulation of the public opinion, the fact that the provision does not apply in the
field of professional journalists seems inconsistent with the premise); M. Cuniberti M., Il contrasto
alla disinformazione in rete tra logiche del mercato e (vecchie e nuove) velleit6 di controllo, in Rivista di
dirittodei media, 1/2017, pp. 30-31.
77 M. Bassini, G.E. Vigevani, Primi appunti su fake news e dintorni, in Rivista di diritto dei media,
1/2017, fn. 20.
78 Atto Senato n. 3001, XVII legislature (ddl Zanda-Fillipin) "Norme generali in materia di social
network e per il contrasto della diffusione su internet di contenuti illeciti e delle fake news". The text
is available at the following link: http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/48538.htm,
accessed on 21 December 2020. For an analysis in academic literature: P. Guercia, I progetti di legge
sulle fake news e la disciplina tedesca a confronto, in A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.),
Cybercrime, Utet, Milan, 2019, p. 1263 ff.
79 Supra, para. 5.2.
aim of handling complaints and removing illicit content within a certain amount of
time8 0. In case of violation of the obligations required by the bill, social network
providers would have been sanctioned with a fine of up to five millions euros (art. 7).
This bill has also been the subject of criticism. More particularly, the quantitative
requirement was criticized for at least two reasons: firstly, it is difficult to determine
the exact number of users; secondly, the number of users does not seem to constitute
a fundamental requirement as content could be shared and relaunched, and could
jump from one platform to another, thus obtaining a level of dissemination with the
potential to influence public opinion8 1 . The bill was further criticized for leaving
private subjects to determine whether a specific piece of content may constitute a
crime8 2. This could have led to the implementation of private censorship strategies,
which may have resulted in the limitation of the circulation of information 3. This also
holds true in light of the sanctions set out in the bill. It is notable how criticism that
emerged against this bill is similar to the criticism of the Facebook act8 4
.
V.3.3. The De Girolamo bill
Although it does not strictly refer to fake news, it is important to at least mention
bill n. 4692, "Introduction of the ban on the anonymous use of the Internet and
provisions on the right to be forgotten" ("Introduzione del divieto dell'uso anonimo
della rete internet e disposizioni in materia di tutela del diritto all'oblio")85 presented by
Nunzia De Girolamo and other parliamentarians of Forza Italia on 10 October 2017.
The bill was aimed at adopting measures to combat online anonymity. It was
composed of only two articles. The first article prohibited the uploading of online
content of any kind anonymously and obliged all IT platforms to register users via
username, password and e-mail address. The second was strictly related to the right
to be forgotten, to its exercise and to the obligations imposed on the operators of
search engines and websites related to the removal of certain content.
V.3.4. The red button

In 2018, around the time of the elections, the Italian Government launched an
online service (named "redbutton") aimed at repressing and combatting the spread of
80 The social network provider, which received more than 100 complaints in a calendar year,
should have reported it on a bi-annual basis. Moreover, such a report should have been published in
the official gazette and in the social network's homepage. See art. 4.
81 F. De Simone, 'Fake news, 'post truth', 'hatespeech': nuovifenomeni sociali alla prova del diritto
penale, inArchivio penale, 1/2018, p. 18.
82 T. Guerini, Fake news e diritto penale. La manipolazione digitale del consenso nelle democrazie
liberali, Giappichelli, Torino, 2020, p. 175.
83 P. Guercia, I progetti di legge sulle fake news e la disciplina tedesca a confronto, in A. Cadoppi,
S. Canestrari, A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime, Utet, Milano, 2019, p. 1263 ff In this vein, see also:
M. Monti, La proposta del ddl Zanda-Filippin sul contrasto alle fake news sui social network: profili
problematici, in diritticomparati.it, 7 December 2017, https://www.diritticomparati.it/la-proposta-
del-ddl-zanda-filippin-sul-contrasto-alle-fake-news-sui-social-network-profili-problematici/, accessed on 10
January 2021.
84 Supra, para. 5.2.
85 Camera dei deputati n. 4692, XVII legislature (ddl De Girolamo et al.) "Introduzione del divieto
dell'uso anonimo della rete internet e disposizioni in materia di tutela del diritto all'oblio", the text of
the bill is available at the following link: https://www.camera.it/leg17/126?tab=2&leg=17&idDocumento
=4692&sede=&tipo= For a deep analysis: F. De Simone F., 'Fake news, 'post truth', 'hatespeech': nuovi
fenomeni sociali alla prova del diritto penale, inArchivio penale,1/2018, pp. 35 ff.
GIULIA LANZA
fake news 86. This initiative was aimed at countering the proliferation of fake news,
particularly during the electoral period. Indeed, as mentioned above, the spread of
fake news is particularly common in periods such as this one.
This service allowed people to report the alleged fake news through the use of a
red button on the website of the Postal and Communication Police. The task of
verifying the warnings received through the reporting mechanism was assigned to a
team of experts from the National Anti-Computer Crime Centre for Critical Infrastructure
Protection" ("Centro nazionale anticrimine informaticoper la protezione delle infrastrutture
critiche", Cnaipic), within the Postal and Communications Police. In order to verify the
information, the experts made use of specific fact-checking software and techniques 87
.
If the information was found to be fake, the Postal and Communications Police would
have had to demand that the platform withheld such content and give prominence to
the denial on the website of the Postal and Communications Police, as well as on other
institutional channels.
The criticism raised against the red button mechanism led to the closure of the
page on the portal shortly after it had been activated. One point of criticism made
against this mechanism related to the power attributed to the police and the adoption
of such a simplistic solution to face a very thorny issue, which requires the balancing
of different protected rights, one of which is the right to freedom of expression 88
.
Criminal law has a subsidiary character. It should be invoked as a last resort and
thus when non-criminal measures have proven inadequate in tackling a specific
phenomenon. The same holds true with regard to the fake news phenomenon.
The role of criminal law in the context under examination would not be that of
safeguarding the truth of information itself, since false information and its spread per
se are not relevant under criminal law8 9 . In contrast, it would intervene to prevent the
potential harm that false information and its diffusion may cause to protected legal
goods of paramount importance, such as public order, safety and health 90
.
86 More information is available on the Government's website: https://www.interno.gov.it/it/

notizie/progetto-red-button-contro-fake-news, accessed on 15 January 2021.
87 Belonging in particular to the "Centro nazionale anticrimine informatico per la protezione
delle infrastrutture critiche" (Cnaipic). For further details: P. Guercia, I progettidi legge sullefake news
e la disciplina tedesca a confronto, in A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime, Utet,
Milano, 2019, p. 1268 ff.
88 P. Guercia, I progetti di legge sulle fake news e la disciplina tedesca a confronto, in A. Cadoppi,
S. Canestrari, A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime, Utet, Milan, 2019, pp. 1269-1270; Magnani C.,
Liberta d'informazione online efake news: vera emergenza?Appunti sul contrasto alla disinformazione
tra legislatori statali e politiche europee, in Forum di quaderni costituzionali, 4 April 2019, p. 6. See
also the Communication of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression on the red button protocol, Mr. David Kaye, of 20 March 2018.
89 Supra, para. 2.
90 In this vein: P. Guercia, I progetti di legge sulle fake news e la disciplinatedesca a confronto, in
A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, A. Manna, M. Papa (eds.), Cybercrime, Utet, Milano, 2019, p. 1256. Similarly:
Melzi D'Eril C., Fake news e responsabilitd:paradigmi classici e tendenze incriminatrici,in Rivista di
dirittodei media, 1/2017, p. 64.
Criminal regulation should not be used widely. A regulation that is too strict
would determine the chilling effect 9 1 and thus excessively limit the free flow of
information. Moreover, the reliance on criminal law to counter the diffusion of fake
news can be used neither as an excuse nor as a tool to violate the right to freedom of
expression 92 . The choice to criminalize conduct inevitably requires a balance between
fundamental rights and protected legal goods. However, when the spread of false
information jeopardizes protected legal goods such as public order or public health, it
seems likely that freedom of expression may (proportionately) be limited 93
.
In the fight against the phenomenon of fake news, it is important to avoid using
criminal law in a way that is merely symbolic 94 and that may weaken the specific function
of this branch of law. This risk is particularly high in light of the fact that the fake news
phenomenon is among the most widespread problems faced by the entire world, further
increased by the spread of fake news about Covid-19 and, more recently, on vaccination
campaigns. Criminal law could, therefore, be used inappropriately 9 s, as a tool to placate
the widespread concerns of the majority, flowing into the so-called "penal populism" 96
.
Another risk is that of anticipating excessively the intervention of criminal law 9 7
.
This approach, for example, would have the effect of determining a merely symbolic
intervention of criminal law9 8
.
What is of fundamental importance is to establish whether the spread of false or

misleading information has a negative impact on the aforementioned legal goods. This
91 Supra, fn. 74.

92 This aspect is highlighted in: A. Costantini, Istanze di criminalizzazione delle fake news al
confine tra tutela penale della verita e repressionedel dissenso: verso un nuovo simbolismo penale?, in
Rivista trimestraledi dirittopenale contemporaneo,2/2 019, p. 76.
93 This is particularly manifest with regard to the criminal offense provided in art. 656 of the
Italian penal code. The prevalence of the protection of public order respect to the exercise of the right
to freedom of expression has been highlighted also by the Italian Constitutional Court: Corte Cost., n.
19/1962, in Giurisprudenza costituzionale, 1962, p. 189 ff, annotated by Esposito, La liberta di
manfestazione del pensiero e l'ordinepubblico. See also Corte Cost. n. 199/1972 and n. 210/1976. For
a further analysis: S. De Flammineis, Diritto penale, beni giuridici collettivi nella sfida delle fake news:
principio di offensivita ed emergenze, in Sistema penale, 6/2020, p. 135 ff.
94 On the symbolic use of criminal law: A. Manna, Alcuni recenti esempi di legislazione penale
compulsiva e di ricorrenti tentazioni circa l'utilizzazione di un diritto penale simbolico, in archiviodpc.
dirittopenaleuomo.it,21 December 2016, pp. 7-13; S. Bonini, Funzione "strumentale"efunzione "simbolica"
del diritto penale, fra discorsivita "critica"e discorsivita "dialogica",in archiviodpc. dirittopenaleuomo.it,21
December 2016, pp. 2 7 - 3 1
.
95 On the use of criminal law during the emergency period: S. De Flammineis, Dirittopenale, beni
giuridici collettivi nella sfida delle fake news: principio di offensivita ed emergenze, in Sistema penale,
6/2020, pp. 138-139; R. Bartoli, II diritto penale dell'emergenza "a contrasto del coronavirus":
problematiche e prospettive, in sistemapenale.it,24 April 2020, p. 1 ff.
96 On this concept, ex multis: N. Selvaggi, Populism and CriminalJustice in Italy, in G. Delledonne,
G. Martinico, M. Monti, F. Pacini (eds.), Italian Populism and Constitutional Law. Challenges to
Democracy in the 21th Century, Palgrave, Macmillan, London, 2020, p. 291 ff.; M. Donini, Populismo
penale e ruolo del giurista, in sistemapenale.it, 7 September 2020, p. 1 ff.; M. Donini, Populismo e
ragionepubblica. Il post-illuminismo penale tra lex e ius, Mucchi, Modena, 2019; E. Amati, Insorgenze
populiste e diritto penale, in discrimen.it, 3 June 2019, p. 1 ff.; G. Fiandaca, Populismo politico e
populismo giudiziario, in Criminalia, 2013, p. 95 ff.; D. Pulitan6, Populismi e penale. Sull'attuale
situazione spirituale della giustizia penale, in Criminalia, 2013, pp. 123-148; J. Pratt, Penal populism,
1st ed., Routledge, London, 2006.
97 De Flammineis S., Diritto penale, beni giuridici collettivi nella sfida delle fake news: principio di
offensivita ed emergenze, in Sistema penale, 6/2020, p. 132 ff., p. 138.
98 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
GIULIA LANZA
approach would contribute to further determining which fake news warrants

intervention by means of criminal law and which does not. Particular attention must
be paid to the threshold of harm and to the proportionality of the reaction. Indeed, the
high level of interference determined by criminal law must be proportionate to the
levels of threat and harm to the protected legal good 99 . Only in this case is the
intervention of criminal law justifiable. For example, it appears reasonable to
criminally punish an individual who intentionally or knowingly creates and spreads
fake news that results in a public health crisis or in the incitement of violence that
disrupts the legal order'00 . In this case, it is manifest how the diffusion of such
information could provoke collective reactions, as well as distorted or even violent
behavior. Furthermore, particular attention must be paid to the subjective element, as
it is less plausible to assume that the unconscious spreading or sharing of false
information should fall within criminal law.
In conclusion, in limited cases and circumstances, it would be possible to rely on
criminal law. However, it cannot be ignored that this approach may pose some
difficulties with regards to particular aspects, some of which are specifically related to
the domestic legal system in which a criminal offense related to the creation and
diffusion of fake news online has to be introduced. Firstly, it has to be coherent with
the legal system in which the proposition is introduced. Moreover, the criminal
offense should be determined with specific precision and, as mentioned above, the
criminal sanction should be proportionate to both the legitimate aims pursued and the
legal goods protected by the provision.
Criminal law is one of the instruments that could help to fight against the
diffusion of fake news, but alone it is not sufficient to counter the phenomenon.
Prevention plays a fundamental role in this battle. As was recently demonstrated in
Finland, the educational aspect is fundamental to countering the spread of fake news.
This aspect was emphasized at both supranational and national levels (e.g., Finland,
ddl Gambaro). The promotion of critical media literacy is a key factor. It is a tool to
empower citizens, to help them to critically understand and assess information
divulgated by all types of media. This holds true in particular in an era characterized
by the predominance of social media and the crisis of traditional media. Furthermore,
it cannot be ignored that, in spite of being the principle means by which fake news is
spread, social media plays a central role in both the prevention and repression of fake
news. In light of this, given that the harmful consequences of fake news warrant multi-
level action with the objective of limiting or reducing its negative impact on society
-
99 R.K. Helm, H. Nasu, Regulatory Responses to 'Fake News' and Freedom of Expression:Normative
and EmpiricalEvaluation, in Human Rights Law Review, 2021, p. 23.
100 In this vein: R.K. Helm, H. Nasu, Regulatory Responses to 'Fake News' and Freedom of
Expression:Normative and EmpiricalEvaluation, in Human Rights Law Review, 2021, p. 23 ff Similarly,
but more specifically related to medical fake news: Mamak K., Do we need the criminalization of
medicalfake news?, in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2021, pp. 1-11. More specifically related
to the Italian system: M. Fumo, Bufale elettroniche, repressionepenale e democrazia, in Rivista dei
Media, 1/2018, p. 90. Open to the possibility of relying on criminal law: De Flammineis S., Diritto
penale, beni giuridici collettivi nella sfida delle fake news: principio di offensivita ed emergenze, in
Sistema penale, 6/2020, p. 144. Contra:A. Costantini, Istanze di criminalizzazione delle fake news al
confine tra tutela penale della verita e repressionedel dissenso: verso un nuovo simbolismo penale?, in
Rivista trimestrale di diritto penale contemporaneo, 2/2019, pp. 76-77 (the author rejects the
possibility of relying on criminal law mainly for two reasons: the potential limitation of the right to
freedom of expression and the lack of effect of the reliance on criminal law in the limitation of the
diffusion of fake news online).
including democratic political processes and values - social media is one of the
indispensable players involved in such a fight.
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Bluebook 21st ed.

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APA 7th ed.

Chicago 17th ed.

McGill Guide 9th ed.

AGLC 4th ed.

MLA 9th ed.

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* Postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Law, University of Verona. This is an elaborated

2 P. Guercia, I progetti di legge sulle fake news e la disciplina tedesca a confronto,

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In 2018, the European Commission established a High-Level Expert Group

The Commission particularly recalled the importance of combatting disinformation

Measures aimed at countering the phenomenon under examination are widely

The Network Enforcement Act (in German Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz,

inadequacy of the self-regulatory mechanisms adopted by social media to counter

SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDGengl.pdf;j sessionid=E54C7EC36D9B 604A

In Italy, the debate related to the introduction of measures aimed at countering

un project de loi liberticide: https://www.snj.fr/article/«-fake-news-»-un-projet-de-loi-liberticide-60222644,

During the XVII Legislature, a number of legislative proposals were presented in

61 A bill (ddl n. 1900) on the establishment of a parliamentary committee of inquiry on the

V.3.1. The Gambaro bill

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V.3.4. The red button

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91 Supra, fn. 74.

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55. Spindler G., Der Regierungsentwurf zum Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz -

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