SPC - Guidelines & Circular

INDEX
Sr. Category Circular No. Date Subject Page

No. No.
1. SPC_10.04.2007 10.04.2007 Guidelines for taking remedial
measures to avoid non –operation of
bus -bar protection at EHV sub-
station.
2. SPC_25.02.2009 25.02.2009 Guidelines to avoid operation of bus-
bar protection due to dislocation of
IPS tube at 400kV sub-station.
3. SPC_28.07.2010 28.07.2010 Modifications in Bus-bar protection
scheme type RADSS of M/s ABB.
4. SPC_02.08.2013 02.08.2013 Guidelines for avoiding operation of
BUS BAR bus-bar protection & precaution to
AND be taken during feeders under
LBB outage/breakdown.
5. GUIDELINES MSETCL/CO/ 02.02.2018 Mal-operation of ABB make REB
CE (PAC)/ 670/REB500 bus-bar protection
MO/74 scheme at 220kV OLD GCR Parli &
220kV Boisar sub-station _
recommendation thereof.
6. MSETCL/CO/ 21.03.2018 Revised guidelines for Local Breaker
CE (PAC)/GTC/ Backup (LBB) Scheme EHV
213 (765/400/220/132 kV) Lines
&ICTs/TFs in MSETCL system.
7. LOGIC/ SPC_10.10.2007 10.10.2007 Logic/scheme to generate an alarm
SCHEME in the event of wrong NT switch
MODIFI- position.
8. CATION SPC_05.03.2014 05.03.2014 Removal/bypassing of tripping of CB
GUIDELINES on lockout condition.
9. SPC_14.12.2007 14.12.2007 Standardisation of Tripping &
Closing coils for 220kV Circuit
Breakers.
10. SPC_14.12.2007 14.12.2007 Implementation of the committee
recommendations pertaining to Main
– I and Main-II protections for
400kV lines.
11. SPC_28.07.2010 28.07.2010 Utilization of auto-reclosing feature
on 400kV & EHV lines in MSETCL.
12. SYSTEM SPC_20.06.2012 20.06.2012 Provision of protection trip to
IMPROVE- Second trip coil of breaker with
MENT provision of trip circuit supervision
GUIDELINES arrangement at EHV sub-station
under MSETCL.
13. SPC_30.07.2015 30.07.2015 Retrofitting of 220kV line back-up relays
by state of the art Numerical relays.
14. SPC_27.10.2015 27.10.2015 Implementation of Under Voltage
Load Shedding Scheme (UVLS).
15. MSETCL/CO/ 22.09.2016 Guidelines for implementation of
TR. O&M/ Load Trimming Scheme (LTS) for
CIR/10279 ICTs/PTRs in MSETCL.
16. MSETCL/CO/ 28.04.2016 Guidelines for avoidance of load
TR. O&M/SE-I/ shedding due to transmission
SYSTEM CIR/4459 constraints.
17. IMPROVE- MSETCL/CO/ 12.07.2017 Application of Numerical Distance
MENT CE (PAC)/GTC/ Protection Relays as a back-up to
GUIDELINES 547 Busbar protection.
18. MSETCL/CO/ 12.07.2017 Provision of OC & EF protection relay
CE (PAC)/GTC/ as backup to bus-bar protection.
547
19. SPC_15.03.2008 15.03.2008 Analog triggering of disturbance
recorders and adoption of settings
thereof.
20. SPC_15.03.2008 15.03.2008 Revision of overvoltage stage –II
time delay setting.
21. SPC_24.06.2008 24.06.2008 Provision of Over-fluxing Relay for
400kV ICTs in MSETCL & adoption of
setting thereof.
22. SPC_18.10.2008 18.10.2008 Guidelines for revision of relay
setting & remedial measures to be
taken to minimize the incidents of
RELAY power transformer
SETTING trippings/failures due to fault on
GUIDELINES DISCOM feeder.
23. SPC_29.06.2009 29.06.2009 Pole discrepancies relay (PDR) time
setting for EHV feeders.
24. SPC_17.09.2009 17.09.2009 Disabling of instantaneous high set
E/F Relays provided on ICTs.
25. MSETCL/CO/Tr 27.06.2012 Undesirable trippings of 400/220kV
(O&M)/Tech. ICTs on Neutral Displacement Relay
CIR/ 8934 (NDR) protection at various 400kV
S/s.
26. MSETCL/CO/Tr 19.09.2015 Revision in Power Swing blocking
(O&M)/SE- (PSB) philosophy as per the
I/SPC/12282 recommendations of Ramakrishna
committee.
27. SPC_02.02.2007 02.02.2007 Guidelines for taking remedial
action/measures in case of CB `Trip
circuit fault’.
28. GENERAL MSETCL/CO/ 07.04.2007 Capacitance & Tan-Delta
GUIDELINES O&M/GTC/ Measurement of Transformer
3631 Bushings.
29. MSETCL/CO/ 25.04.2007 Monitoring of Healthiness of
O&M/GTC/ Lightning Arresters and use of LCM
4420 kit.
OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER (PAC) CO AIROLI 2

30. SPC_14.12.2007 14.12.2007 Submission of monthly status on
healthiness of Disturbance
Recorders (DRs) and sequential
event logging / recording devices to
WRPC.
31. MSETCL/CO/ 08.06.2009 Guidelines for occurrence at EHV
TR. (O&M)/ sub-station.
GTC/ 7780
32. Dir (Ops)/ 26.10.2010 Sub-station Maintenance Practices.
Maint/ 16662
33. MSETCL/CO/Tr 12.01.2011 Ensuring healthiness and reliability
(O&M)/ 00649 of EHV Transmission lines and
Transformers/ICTs.
34. MSETCL/CO/ 14.02.2013 Guidelines regarding Leakage
DIR (Ops)/ Current Measurement of Lightning
GTC/2317 Arresters.
35. MSETCL/CO/Tr 06.05.2014 Guidelines for test frequency of

GENERAL (O&M)/SE-I/ various protection schemes &
GUIDELINES GTC/5157 diagnostic testing of EHV
equipments.
36. MSETCL/CO/ 20.04.2015 Periodic Calibration of Diagnostic
DIR (Ops)/ Testing Equipment in MSETCL.
GTC/5319
37. MSETCL/CO/ 15.09.2015 Ensuring healthiness of spare
DIR (Ops)/ Tr. Transformers & ICTs before putting
(O&M)/SE-I/ EE- it into service.
III/12137
38. MSETCL/CO/ 09.03.2016 Norms for procurement &
Tr.(O&M)/SE-I/ availability of various Testing &
TE/2697 Measuring Equipments in MSETCL.
39. MSETCL/CO/ 28.04.2017 Guidelines to Balance the Load
TR. (O&M)/ Sharing by ICT’s
4442
40. MSETCL/CO/CE 01.11.2017 Reporting of disturbance and allied
(PAC)/MO/732 information to SLDC / WRLDC.
41. SPC_10.04.2007 10.04.2007 Guidelines for precaution to be
taken during outage to avoid bus-
bar operation at EHV sub-station.
42. MSETCL/CO/ Tr. 07.10.2009 Incidence of tripping of 400kV lines
(O&M)/ & ICTs/TFs on account of human
HUMAN Occur/13842 error, lapses, lack of adequate care
ERROR while working in C&R panels etc.
43. SPC_09.02.2011 09.02.2011 Guidelines for occurrence at EHV
sub-station.
44. MSETCL/CO/CE 15.07.2017 Non operation of 400kV bus-bar
(PAC)/MO/552 protection scheme at 400kV Jejuri
s/s _ necessary precaution to be
taken thereof.

BUS BAR AND
LBB GUIDELINES
SPC_10.04.2007
Sub: Guidelines for taking remedial measures to avoid non –operation of bus
bar protection at EHV sub-station.
An occurrence took place at 220kV Trombay sub-station on dtd. 29.03.2007 &

30.03.2007. During both occurrences, flashover occurred on R-ph string of Bus section-I at
220kV Trombay s/s. The string was observed to be hanging in air. The busbar protection
scheme did not operate resulting in tripping of all other lines connected to this substation
from remote ends. The busbar protection scheme type RADSS, ASEA make was tested on 29-
03-2007 and 30-03-2007 & the same was found functioning correctly. The services of M/s.
ABB were also availed for checking the busbar protection scheme on 02-04-2007. Certain
discrepancies noticed during thorough checking up of busbar protection such as multiple
earthing of CT secondary etc. have been attended. The location of Trombay S/S is peculiar in
the sense that lot of pollution and deposition is observed on the insulators being located
close to coastal and chemically prone area. All these factors provide low creepage path
across the insulator strings resulting into partial discharge and ultimately bus faults.
Similar non operation of bus-bar protection at 220kV Apta sub-station observed on

09.07.2007 due to multiple earthing in CT circuitry.
In view of above occurrences, following guidelines are issued which need to be

ensured / followed up scrupulously henceforth.
1.0. The periodic hot line washing of insulators in the switchyard and on the lines
near the coastal /chemically prone area needs to be arranged on regular basis.
2.0. Multiple earthing in CT circuit if any should be checked up in all the bays and
should be removed immediately.
3.0. The spark gap arrestor provided in respect of 220kV CT secondary circuit of
busbar protection needs to be bypassed.
4.0. The auxiliary CTs used in the busbar protection scheme should be mounted in
the relay panel located in control room & rewired.

SPC_25.02.2009
Sub: Guidelines to avoid operation of bus-bar protection due to dislocation of IPS
tube at 400kV sub-station.
An occurrence took place at 400kV Girawali sub-station on 07.10.2008, wherein the
IPS tube connecting breaker of 400 kV Lonikand - II bay to 29B pantograph isolator base got
dislocated from isolator side. The IPS tube fell down from one side & touched the post
insulator metallic structure on breaker side. The busbar protection for 400kV Main Bus-I has
operated correctly for this fault. Due to continuous rains & storm, no manual yard inspection
could be carried till 40-50 minutes after the occurrence. After detailed study & analysis of the
occurrence, it was concluded that the occurrence took place due to dislocation of IPS
tube resulting into a bus fault and the dislocation of IPS tube can be attributed to
failure of bolts in shear. It was also pointed out that the last thermo vision scanning of
400kV switchyard was carried out in the month of August 2008 & no hot spot was observed
at the location of the fault at that time.
After detailed discussion, the committee has decided to check up & adopt the
following at all 400KV s/s.
1.0. The Nut-Bolts used for IPS tube clamp must be of good quality i.e. stainless
steel.
2.0. Periodical thermo vision inspection of Nut-Bolts, joints should be done.
1.0. The span of IPS tube may reduced by providing additional BPI.
The above remedial measures should be implemented invariably for all 400kV sub-
station in MSETCL.

SPC_28.07.2010
Sub: Modifications in Bus-bar protection scheme type RADSS of M/s ABB.
An occurrence took place at 400kV Padghe sub-station on 21.04.2010, wherein all the
220kV Lines, ICTs, Transformers connected to 220kV Main Bus-II along with B/C tripped due
to operation of 220kV Busbar protection. The Busbar protection of Main Bus-II operated
without any fault on primary side. Only ‘U’ flag indication appeared without any phase
indication (i.e., R, S, T flag) which confirms the mal-operation of Busbar protection. After
detailed investigations, during joint testing with M/s ABB representative, no abnormality
was noticed in the scheme & as such reasons for mal-operation, Busbar protection could not
be arrived at. However, in order to avoid such incidents of mal-operation of Busbar
protection scheme type RADSS, certain modifications in the RADSS scheme ( i. e. separation
of incoming positive & trip output terminals) were carried out as a part of corrective
measure.
Modification in ABB RADSS Busbar Trip Scheme.
Before Modification

After Modification
All S. E., TCCs were directed to implement the modified scheme

immediately wherever RADSS Busbar panels are available & pass on necessary
instructions to the field offices in view of above recommendations.

SPC_02.08.2013
Sub: Guidelines for avoiding operation of bus-bar protection & precaution to be

taken during feeders under outage/breakdown.
An occurrence took place at 220kV Boisar sub-station on 17.06.2013, wherein 132kV

bus bar protection operated along with 132kV Jindal-IOL line fault. During tripping the
132kV Boisar - Viraj line was under outage for maintenance work and permanently grounded
at both ends which is before line CT. Further, CT switching relay of 132kV Viraj line was in
operated condition, which should have been reset after operating the isolator. The single
phase fault on 132kV Jindal – IOL line caused the flow of zero sequence current through
under outage 132kV Boisar – Viraj line due to closed loop formed by permanent grounding at
both ends of line. This additional zero sequence current created unbalance in Busbar
protection & operated the same.
Similarly on 02.04.2011 at both 400kV Talandage & 220kV Mudshingi s/s, the bus bar
protection operated while test charging 220kV Mudshingi-Chikodi line which was tripped
along with tripping of 220kV Talandage-Mudshingi –I. During tripping 220kV Talandage-
Mudshingi line was under breakdown. The said line was earthed through earth isolator at
both ends. However bus isolators at both ends are kept closed as such bus bar CT switching
relays are in operated condition. The tripping of line caused the flow of zero sequence
current through breakdown line which was earthed at both ends with CT switching relays
operated, causes the operation of bus bar protection at both ends.
In view of above after detailed discussion & deliberation, the committee suggested
that,
I) 2 Main + 1 Transfer bus arrangement
1.0. It is necessary that while availing outage on EHV lines & wherever bus-bar
protection is provided with CT switching relay & having line side CT, the
earthing needs to be provided after CT towards line.
2.0. The operating staff should invariably confirm that the CT switching relay in
Busbar protection having line side CT is in reset condition for the line /
transformer which is under outage.
II) Single bus arrangement
1.0. It is necessary that while availing the outage on EHV lines & when ever bus bar
protection is not provided with CT switching relay & having line side CT, the
secured temporary earthing needs to be provided after CT toward line side.
2.0. However if bay maintenance is to be carried out & earthing is provided to both
side of CT, then bus – bar protection is to be taken out of service for that period.
3.0. The earthing on both side of CT to be avoided in any case to avoid the operation
of bus bar protection.

MSETCL/CO/CE (PAC)/MO/74 Date:02.02.2018
Sub: Mal-operation of ABB make REB 670/REB500 bus-bar protection scheme

at 220kV OLD GCR Parli & 220kV Boisar sub-station _ recommendation thereof.
This is in connection with the above subject. The 220kV Parli-Harangul-I line trip on
distance protection due to opening of Wave trap jumper at 220kV Old GCR Parli s/s on
17.08.17 & subsequently recloses at both end. Simultaneously the 220kV bus-bar protection
ABB make type REB 670 operated during the auto reclosing of 220kV Parli-Harangul-I at
220kV Old GCR Parli s/s. Similarly on 15.10.2017 at 220kV Boisar sub-station, the 220kV
Boisar-PGCIL-I line tripped & subsequently CB charged on fault from Boisar end by shorting
closing wires at terminal block instead of through TNC control switch. Simultaneously the
ABB make REB670 bus-bar protection operated during charging of 220kV Boisar – PGCIL-I
line. As seen from DR of Bus Bar (ABB REB670) and Line DPR (Siemens 7SA522) while
charging 220kV PGCIL Line on persisted fault, it was observed that CB status to the BB and
Manual Closure command found missing which resulted into CT current forced to zero logic
operation. The BB relay didn’t measure 220 kV PGCIL Line -I fault current in calculation due
to which the other bays contributed current considered as differential current, and Busbar
initiated tripping to all bays of 220 kV B bus and Bus coupler.
In past also similar operation of ABB make REB670 bus bar protection was observed
at 400kV Kalwa sub-station on 30.12.2015. The single phase (R phase) fault was observed in
220 kV Borivali Line which was cleared by the line protection relay in Zone – 1. The Auto –
reclose (AR) in the protection was initiated and after a dead time of 1 second, AR close
command was issued. The fault was a persisting fault and the protection relay sensed the
fault zone – 1 and issued trip command. However, soon after the inception of fault in zone – 1
during reclaim time, bus bar protection operated and tripped all the feeders connected to
zone – A (Bus – 1). M/s ABB Engineer has visited to investigate the reason of operation of
bus-bar protection & after detailed investigation; a report was submitted.

In view of the above & after detailed discussion with M/s ABB, following setting &
modification are recommended for existing & new ABB make REB670/REB500 bus bar
protection,
1. The CB Open Status (NC contact) shall be connected in series such that only when all
the three phases of the circuit breaker open, does the current of any feeder is forced to
zero.
2. Connect the AR close command in parallel with the CB manual close command for all
line feeders.
3. The CB should be charged through TNC control switch when line tripped on fault. The
CB should not be charged through Local control switch or by passing TNC control
switch.
4. The End zone fault protection (ENFP) shall be kept OFF/disable.
5. The bay parameter setting shall be modified as under,
Sr. No. Bay Name Group/Parameter PC Value

Name
Existing Revised to
Setting Group 1
1 CT Connection Connected _
2 ZoneSel Fixed TO ZA & ZB _
3 ZoneSwitching Conditionally Force out
4 CheckZoneSel Connected Not Connected
5 tTripPulse 0.200 _
6 Bus-coupler bay tZeroCurrent 0.200 _
7 tInvertCurrent 0.200 _
9 ZoneSel Fixed TO ZA & ZB _
10 ZoneSwitching Conditionally _
11 Line/ICT/TF CheckZoneSel Connected _

bay
12 tTripPulse 0.200 _
13 tZeroCurrent 0.200 _

16 ZoneSel CtrlIncludes _
17 ZoneSwitching Conditionally _
18 CheckZoneSel Connected _
19 TBC bay tTripPulse 0.200 _
20 tZeroCurrent 0.200 _
The snapshot of parameter setting is attached as Annexure.
6. The link between Block `ENFP’ & Block `Force to Zero’ in CB open status logic used in
relay configuration shall be disconnected/opened. The snapshot of CB open status
logic is attached as Annexure.
It is requested to verify the above recommended setting in existing bus-bar schemes &
rectify the same in order so as to avoid the mal operation of ABB make REB 670/500 bus bar
protection in future. Also due care in this respect shall be taken while commissioning/setting
configuration of future scheme. The compliance report shall be submitted to this office.
(Shashank S. Jewalikar)
Chief Engineer (PAC)
Copy s. w. rs. to:
The Director (Proj. / Ops), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai
Copy f. w. cs. to:
1. The Chief Engineer, EHV PC (O&M) zone, MSETCL, Amravati/ Aurangabad / Karad
/ Nagpur/ Nasik / Pune / Vashi.
2. The Chief Engineer, (Tr. O&M) CO Mumbai.
Copy to:
The Executive Engineer, EHV Testing Division, Akola/ Yavatmal/ Aurangabad

/Latur /Nanded /Karad /Kolhapur /Ratnagiri /Nagpur/ HVDC T&T, Nagpur
/Ballarshah /Nashik /Dhule/Pune/Solapur /Kalwa/Panvel/ HVDC T&T, Padghe.

ANNEXURE:
CB open status logic used in relay configuration to force current to zero in IED
Disconnect /open this link
Bay Name: - Feeder/IC/TF bay

Bay Name: - Bus Coupler
Force out
Not Connected
Bay Name: - TBC bay

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/CE (PAC)/GTC/213 Dated: 21.03.2018
Sub: Revised guidelines for Local Breaker Backup (LBB) Scheme EHV
(765/400/220/132 kV) Lines & ICTs/TFs in MSETCL system.
Ref: 1. Ramakrishna committee report
2. Maloperation of LBB protection during recent occurrences.
In view of the recent occurrences of maloperation of LBB scheme at 400kV Padghe,

400kV Lonikand and 220kV Chinchwad substation the issue of setting of Current detectors of
the existing LBB relay setting and methodology adopted for LBB initiation is highlighted
again.
It has been observed that in view of different perceptions of the setting philosophy,
varied settings have been adopted at different locations.
In view of the above occurrence, this office has taken a review of the existing LBB
relay setting adopted as per decisions taken during the various SPC meetings. As per the
present guidelines the existing LBB relays in MSETCL are to be set to 3 Over-current (3OC)
configurations with current set to 0.8A & time delay of 200msec for Lines/ICT &
Transformers.
To avoid the mal-operation/mal functioning & non operation of LBB protection in
future, following guidelines are prepared based on existing MSETCL philosophy &
Ramakrishna guidelines so as to bring uniformity of practice throughout MSETCL.
Guidelines for Settings:

1. Current setting:
1.1. 3 Over-current (3OC) configurations to be used.
1.2. Current level detectors current setting should be less than the minimum
fault current (If) of the corresponding feeder (approx. 80%) i.e.0.8 x CTR
for lines and in case of ICTs/ transformers it should be 1.2 x full load
capacity in case of 220kV & below.
For 765 & 400kV lines & ICTs/TFs, the LBB current detector shall be set as
per Ramakrishna committee recommendations i.e. 0.2A (for 1A CT
secondary) along with implementation of retrip function.
1.3. TBC & BC LBB current detectors shall be set to 0.2A (for 1A CT secondary)
for 400kV & above and for 220kV & below, it shall be set to 0.8A (for 1A CT
secondary).

1.4. Breaker failure protection shall be of two steps/stages tripping. This shall
reduce the risk for unwanted isolation of all the connected CBs to the Bus in
case of maloperation of the breaker failure protection.
2. Time setting:
2.1. In stage-I (Retrip), time delay is to be set to 100 msec. In this stage the trip
command from the LBB relay shall initiate the tripping of the Own CB
though both the trip coils.
2.2. In stage-II, additional time delay of 100msec i.e. it is to be set to 200 msec.
In this stage the trip command from the LBB relay shall initiate the tripping
of the all the CBs connected to the bus.
The LBB trip Matrix shall be as follows:
Sr. Bus arrangement Stage-I trip Stage-II trip Remark

No.
1 1. Single bus arrangement
2. Two bus arrangement
Trip Own CB Trip all CBs 1. In case of bus
(1M+1A)
of respective connected to coupler LBB
3. Main with bus sectionalizer operation, in
bay. stuck up
CB & aux. bus arrangement stage-I, trip own
breaker bus.
4. Two Main + 1 Aux. bus CB & in stage-II
arrangement trip both bus.
2. In case of TBC
LBB operation,
in stage-I, trip
TBC CB & in
stage-II trip
connected bus.
2 One & half breaker bus arrangement
Trip Main
CB of dia. &
all CBs of
Tie CB LBB operation_ Half Trip Tie CB bus which
dia arrangement directly
connected to
tie bay.
Trip both Ensure that direct

CBs trip (DT) command
Tie CB LBB operation_ Full Trip Tie CB
connected should send to

dia arrangement to tie bay. remote end.
Trip all CBs

connected to
Main CB LBB operation Trip Main
respective
CB
bus.
3. General application aspects:

3.1 The separate relay for each breaker shall be provided and is to be
connected in the secondary circuit of the CTs associated with that
particular breaker. This CT secondary may be a separate core, if
available. Otherwise it shall be clubbed with Main-II protection core for
765/400kV & Backup protection for 220kV & below.
3.2 In order to reduce the incidents of Local Breaker Backup protection,it is
essential to wire up both the Trip coils (TCI & II) for Protection trip.
Specific Guidelines have been issued in this regard vide SPC guidelines
dated 20.06.2012. This should be followed scrupulously.
3.3 Separate DC circuits for Gr. A & Gr. B master trip relay and LBB DC circuit
shall be provided through separately fused supply.
3.4 For all ICT/TF Circuit Breaker, Inter tripping of respective HV/LVCB
shall be carried out on operation of LBB protection.
3.5 The Substation where Busbar protection scheme is not provided, a
separate trip bus along with necessary Trip extension logics as per Bus
Configuration shall be utilized for commissioning of LBB protections
scheme so as to achieve minimum fault clearance time in case of CB
failure.
3.5.1 In the existing schemes inbuilt Circuit breaker failure protection shall
be provided through a protective relay other than the main
protection for line, transformer, reactor etc. In case where LBB
inbuilt to main protection relay is used, it is to be shifted from Main
to Backup protection.
3.5.2 In future schemes a stand-alone relay (other than Backup and Busbar
protection relay) shall be provided for the Circuit breaker failure
protection.

3.6 The Direct Trip command shall be initiated through single channel for
all 220kV Lines, on operation of both LBB/BB Protection. In first phase
of implementation all 220kV lines at all 400kV sub-station will be
considered for provision of direct trip scheme for remote end CB tripping.
Rest of 220kV lines will be taken in next phase of implementation.
3.7 Isolation link shall be invariably provided for LBB to BB trip Bus
command and for LBB initiation from Busbar protection to LBB relay
for ease of isolation during testing.
4. Initiation Philosophy
4.1 The LBB initiation contact shall be only of the trip relay utilized for CB
tripping and not from any other separate Contact multiplier relay.
4.2 765kV/400kV/220kV Lines employing single phase auto-reclosing, the
LBB relays should be initiated on a single phase basis from the trip relays
as well as the AR LO relay. This is to achieve phase segregation of the
phases on single phase tripping.
4.3 LBB relay shall initiated by Bus bar protection trip relay(96 T), since failure
of CB to clear a bus fault would result in the loss of entire station if LBB
relay is not initiated. Whenever used in combination with bus bar protection
scheme, tripping logic of the same shall be used for LBB protection also.
4.4 The LBB protection shall not be initiated through non-fault /Alarm Internal
functions of the relay used for LBB protection as well viz LTS Alarm,
LTS Trip, Line overload Alarm, Line overload operated etc. Such Non
Fault/Alarm functions shall be implemented through a separate relay
preferably if the same cannot be achieved in the single relay
4.5 The LBB initiation Matrix shall be as follows:

Single Master
Sr. LBB
Element Protection phase Trip Trip
no initiation
Operation Operation
Distance Prot
√ √ √
(M1 & M2)
Transmission Backup OC +EF Prot X √ √

1
Lines Overvoltage Trip X √ √
Overload
X X X
LTS/SPS/UVLS
Differential Protection X √ √
REF Protection X √ √
Backup OC +EF Prot X √ √
ICT/TF BU Impedance Prot X √ √

2
/Reactor NDR Protection X √ √
Overflux Protection X X X
TF Auxiliary Prot Trip X √ √
ICT/TF LTS/SPS X X X
3 Bus Bar Busbar Protection X X √
4 Remote end Direct Trip receive/

X √ √
Protection Intertrip
5. Mandatory Testing procedure to be followed:
5.1. During the commissioning of the LBB protection relay the test for phase
segregation initiation & operation confirmation should be carried out to
avoid unwarranted trippings.
5.2. For the Inbuilt Local Breaker Backup protection the LBB initiation shall
be for internal/External protection operation and shall be checked for both
the conditions during commissioning/ Annual Protection testing cycle.

5.3. Non initiation of the LBB protection for Non Fault /Alarm functions should
be confirmed during the commissioning
The above guidelines shall come into force with immediate effect &
should be followed scrupulously henceforth.
Also, immediate necessary action for adopting revised
guidelines/philosophy should be taken & compliance thereof be reported
to this office.

Copy s. w. r. to:
1. The Director (Operations), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai.

2. The Director (Projects), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai.
Copy w. cs. to:
1. The Chief Engineer (LD), SLDC, Kalwa.

2. The Chief Engineer (Design, C&M)/(Tr. O&M), MSETCL, C. O., Mumbai
3. The Chief Engineer, EHV CC O&M zone, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad/ Karad/
Nagpur/Nasik/Pune/Vashi
Copy to:
1. The Superintending Engineer, T & C Circle, MSETCL, Akola/Aurangabad/Karad/

Nasik/ Nagpur/Pune/Vashi
2. The Superintending Engineer, Tr. (O&M) Circle, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad/
Bhusawal/Chandrapur/HVDC Chandrapur/HVDC Padghe/ Kalwa/Karad/ Kolhapur/
Nagpur/Nasik/Panvel/Parli/Pune/Solapur.

LOGIC/SCHEME
MODIFICATION
GUIDELINES
SPC_10.10.2007
Sub: Logic/scheme to generate an alarm in the event of wrong NT switch position.
An occurrence took place at 400kV Kolhapur (Talandage) sub-station on 23.01.2007,

wherein the 220kV Mudshingi –II line CB did not trip on line fault. Subsequently the fault was
cleared by back up protection of ICT-I & II, resulted into 220kV power failure at 400kV
Kolhapur s/s. The 220kV Mudshingi feeder was on Main bus –II through own breaker;
however NT switch was not changed to `N’ position. The occurrence took place due to non
observance of proper operational procedures while shifting line from one bus to other
through TBC.
The issue of implementation of suitable logic/scheme to generate an alarm in the
event of wrong NT switch position was prepared as below for implementation at all EHV S/S.
LOGIC FOR NT SWITCH DISCRIPANCY
This logic/scheme needs to be implemented at all EHV S/S in a time bound

manner. The priority should be given to all 400/220kV s/s and 220 kV & 132 kV s/s
attached to power stations and important/critical 220 kV S/s.

SPC_05.03.2014
Sub: Removal/bypassing of tripping of CB on lockout condition.
An occurrence took place at 220 KV Akola (Apatapa) sub-station on

21.12.2013, where in the work of SF6 gas filling in CB of 132 KV Akola-Paras - II was
in progress. Due to sudden loss of SF6 gas, SF6 lockout relay operated. As per the
existing scheme, this lockout relay was connected for tripping and hence, the line
tripped. Due to this tripping, 132 KV Akola-Paras -I tripped due to over-loading which
further resulted in over loading of other grid lines & leading to cascade tripping &
failure of supply at EHV S/s under Amravati zone.
The issue was discussed in detail & it was pointed out that tripping of CB was
due to tripping extended through Lockout relay as per scheme. As such it was decided
to bypass the tripping of CB on Lockout condition.

SYSTEM
IMPROVEMENT
GUIDELINES
SPC_14.12.2007
Sub: Standardisation of Tripping & Closing coils for 220kV Circuit Breakers.
Presently, the 220KV Circuit Breakers are being provided / supplied with 110V DC
tripping and closing coils with resistance in series. As the station DC supply at majority of
220KV Sub-station is of 220V DC only, these closing and tripping coils should also be rated
for 220V DC thereby eliminating the need for series resistance. The replacement of faulty
resistors creates problem at later stage, due to non- availability of similar resistor readily at
site.
Members also shared their views in this regard and explained the problems
experiences at site due to utilization of 110V DC closing and tripping coils in 220 KV circuit
breakers.
After detailed discussions on the issue it has been decided that 220 KV class CBs
should be provided with closing and tripping coils rated for 220 V DC only (i. e without
any resistor etc.)
In some specific cases, where 220 KV sub-station are having 110 V DC control supply,
closing and tripping coils rated for 110 V DC would be required.
CE (Tr. PR) to take necessary action accordingly in this regard in future procurement
of 220 KV class CBs.

SPC_14.12.2007
Sub: Implementation of the committee recommendations pertaining to Main – I and

Main - II protections for 400kV lines.
In line with the CBIP guidelines ( Section 2 of CBIP Publication 274 of Nov 1999),
the enquiry committee into the Grid Disturbance in Western Region of dates 25th & 28th
Feb. 2007 has recommended in its report under item 9-2 (V) that the Main - I and Main - II
protection should be of different make. Further the said issue was came up for discussions
during 98th WRPC PCM held at Raipur on 24-25th Oct. 2007 and the constitutes were
directed to take necessary measures in this regard. This issue was discussed in detail and it
was informed that MSETCL has decided to provide Main - I and Main - II protections
from the same manufacture but operating on different hardware and software
platforms on forthcoming 400KV lines. This has been implemented at 400KV Akola S/s.
Also, if the protection with different principle (i. e. other than Distance principle) is available
with proven performance, then the same can be considered for Main - II protection on future
400KV lines. However, nothing can be done for existing 400KV line protections as the
numerical relays have been installed recently and the same cannot be phased out at this
stage.

SPC_28.07.2010
Sub: Utilization of auto-reclosing feature on 400kV & EHV lines in MSTCL.
The issue of Utilization of auto-reclosing feature on EHV Lines was discussed during
SPC meeting dtd. 28.07.2010. It is informed that in Nagpur zone few 220kV & 132kV Lines,
auto-reclose scheme was taken into service due to which the transient trippings of Lines are
reduced considerably. Further it was observed that most of 400kV/220kV/132kV/100kV
lines tripped on transient fault. To avoid the delay in restoration & to understood the
healthiness of line and to maintain the availability of line, it is necessary to take A/R in
service.
The issue was discussed further and after detailed discussions & deliberations on
various issues, committee recommended that:
1.0. Single phase Auto-reclose scheme should be commissioned on all 220kV Lines
& 132kV/100kV Lines wherever feasible.
2.0. The settings should be adopted same as that of 400kV Lines.
i. e. Dead time= 1 Sec. and Reclaim time = 25 Sec.
3.0. In case of 132kV/100kV double circuit lines, three phase auto reclose scheme
should be commissioned as 132/100KV CB are gang operated.
4.0. In case of 132kV/100kV single redial line / feeders, the 3 phase A/R is to be
taken into service at source end only. At remote end, the under voltage relay is
to be provided to trip the LV side of transformer to avoid the sudden loading
after reclosing the lines at source end so that the transformer get charge after
reclosing at source end.
5.0. The A/R is not to be taken into service for cable feeders or mixed cable plus
overhead feeders / lines where fault are likely to be permanent.
6.0. The AR ON / OFF switch is to be provided.
All S. Es., TCC to take review in their respective jurisdiction and identify the
220kV & 132kV/100kV Lines on which Auto-reclose scheme can be commissioned
and take up commissioning activities immediately.

SPC_20.06.2012
Sub: Provision of protection trip to Second trip coil of breaker with provision of trip
circuit supervision arrangement at EHV sub-station under MSETCL.
An occurrence took place at 220kV Uran sub-station on 26.03.2012, wherein all the
220kV Lines, ICTs, Transformers connected to 220kV Main Bus-II along with B/C tripped due
to operation of LBB protection. On detailed investigation, it was observed that Y & B pole of
220kV JNPT CB tripped instantly and the R pole did not trip through trip relay but tripped
through PDR subsequently. Further R Pole trip coil used for protection trip found weakened
drawing a heavy current resulting in burning of trip relay contacts, as such fault was cleared
delayed, resulted into operation of LBB protection at GTPS Uran. In this case protection trip
was extended only to trip coil-I.
After detailed discussion on the issue, the committee observed that in most of the
cases the protection trip is not given to both the trip coils available in the breaker. Therefore
in case of failure of this trip coil (due to any elect/mech. Problem) the LBB protection
operates resulting into tripping of complete bus. This happens, however in this case second
trip coil doesn’t get chance to pick up and trip the breaker to avoid LBB operation. The LBB
operation in the above case is unwarranted and can be avoided if the second trip coil is
healthy. As such committee has recommended `extending the protection trip to trip
coil-II (TC-II) also wherever possible with provision of trip circuit supervision
arrangement’.

SPC_30.07.2015
Sub: Retrofitting of 220kV line back-up relays by state of the art Numerical relays.
The issue of retrofitting of 220kV Line Back-up relays by state of the art Numerical
Relays was discussed by S. E., TCC, Vashi. It was informed that, as per MSETCL connection
agreement and Gazette of India, it is mentioned that “Two main Numerical Distance
Protection shall be provided on transmission line of 220kV & above for all new substation.
For existing substation, it may be implemented in reasonable time frame”.
The issue was discussed in detail. The members opined that, as only one DC source is
available at 220kV substations providing Numerical Distance relay instead of line back up
relay will not make duel redundant scheme. Further, panel replacement may also be required
hence will not be feasible at all the places. Moreover, the work of retrofit of old back-up
relays on EHV Lines by fully numerical back-up relays has been taken-up recently & as such
immediate retrofit may not be required & possible also. Further, this retrofit may not be
economical also.
After detailed discussion and deliberation on the issue committee recommended that:
1.0. In view of recommendations of CEA guidelines and MSETCL connection
agreement, retrofitting of 220kV Line Back-up relays by state of the art
Numerical Relays can be done in Mumbai region and ring main systems in
MSETCL, if required & feasible.
2.0. For new substations decision in this regard can be taken on case to case basis
by projects (Design) Dept.
3.0. For existing substations, all S. E., TCCs to take review in their respective
jurisdictions and if required submit the requirement of Numerical distance
relays for retrofitting of 220kV Line Back-up relays by state of the art
Numerical Relays considering various factors as mentioned above.

SPC_27.10.2015
Sub: Implementation of Under Voltage Load Shedding Scheme (UVLS).
S. E. (LD) SLDC, Kalwa informed that the issue of implementation of Under Voltage
Load Shedding Scheme (UVLS) was discussed in the OCCM of WRPC & it was directed to
explore the possibility of implementation of the same in Western Region. This issue was also
discussed in WRPC Protection Committee meeting. It was informed that each SLDC should
identify the areas where UVLS can be envisaged. It was further informed that as per CEA
recommendation the under voltage setting should be 372kV. Further, the quantum of load
should be managed in such a way that, the voltage should boost upto 380kV.
S. E., SLDC, Kalwa informed that the UVLS scheme can be implemented at 400kV
Padghe, Lonikand, Parli, Babhaleshwar & Jejuri Substations. It was informed that the load
trimming schemes for 400/220kV ICTs are already implemented at above-mentioned 400kV
Substations & as such the UVLS can be implemented easily following the same logic by using
under-voltage relays.
After detailed discussion and deliberation on the issue committee recommended that,
the UVLS scheme can be implemented at above mentioned 400kV substations as follows:
1.0. Settings for stage - I UVLS scheme should be 370kV with 5 sec delay.
2.0. Settings for stage – II (if available) UVLS scheme should be 370kV with 10 sec
delay.
3.0. Separate discrete Under Voltage Relays should be provided for implementation
of this scheme.
4.0. Resetting feature should be used as per available setting of Under Voltage
Relay.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/TR. O&M/CIR/10279 Dated: 22.09.2016
Sub: Guidelines for implementation of Load Trimming Scheme (LTS) for ICTs/PTRs in
MSETCL.
Ref: Meeting regarding Review of Load Trimming Schemes held at C.0. on 20.09.2016
1. The Load Trimming Schemes are implemented on various ICTs and Power
Transformers in MSETCL system to avoid the unwarranted tripping in the system
due to sustained/transient overloading of ICTs/Transformers. The data of existing
settings adopted for various ICTs and transformers is collected and studied at
corporate office and it is observed that there is no uniformity in the settings of LTS at
various substations in MSETCL system. For same capacity ICT/Transformers settings
of the LTS scheme implemented varies from substation to substation. Therefore, in
order to use the installed capacity of ICTs & PTRs optimally & to avoid load shedding,
it was decided to have uniformity in the settings of LTS being implemented in
MSETCL. Accordingly, a meeting was held at C.O. on 20.09.2016 for deciding the
policy to be adopted for implementation of LTS schemes in MSETCL. The
following guidelines are finalized for implementation and monitoring of load
trimmings schemes for ICTs/PTRs.
2 Applicability of LTS:-
Load trimming schemes shall be implemented for
1. All ICTs in MSETCL system
2. Power Transformers operating in parallel & carrying load more than 50% of its
rated capacity.
3. All independently run Power Transformer where season’s peak load last was
around 80% of full load capacity.
4. The scheme wiring & logic should be kept in ready condition in respect of all
ICTs & PTRs and scheme shall be taken in service after approval only.
1. Settings to be adopted:
A. Following settings are to be adopted for ICTs:
1. Alarm setting: At 100% loading of ICT's rated Capacity (i.e. Full load current)
with time delay of 1.0 sec,
When load on ICT increases to 100% of its rated capacity, after a time delay of
1 sec, an alarm should be generated.

2. LTS initiation setting (stage-I): At 110% loading of ICT's rated Capacity with
time delay of 1.3 sec & to be co-ordinated with Backup O/C protection relays of
ICTs such that LTS should operate well before over current relay operation.
When load on ICT reaches to 110% of its rated capacity, after a time delay of
1.3 sec, LTS should be operated in stage 1.
3. Two or multiple stages of LTS for ICTs can be proposed by respective SE TCC in
co-ordination with respective SE EHV (O&M) Circle.
B. Following settings are to be adopted for PT (operating in parallel and
carrying load more than 50% of its rated capacity):
1. Alarm setting: At 100% loading of PTR's rated Capacity with time delay of
1 sec, when load on PTR increases to 100% of its rated capacity, after a time
delay of 1 sec, an alarm should be generated.
2. LTS initiation setting (Stage-1): At 110% loading of PTR's rated Capacity
with time delay of 1.3 sec., when load on PTR reaches to 110% of its rated
capacity, after time delay of 1.3 sec, LTS should be operated in Stage-I.
3. LTS Initiation setting (Stage-II): At 110% loading of PTR's rated Capacity
with time delay of 2.5 sec. When load on PTR reaches to 110% of its rated
capacity, after time delay of 2.5 sec, LTS should be operated in Stage-II.
This time settings should be co-ordinated with Backup O/C
protection relays of PTRs such that LTS should operate well before O/C
relay operation to avoid tripping of PTRs.
C. Type & Quantum of load shedding:
In case of LTS for sustained overloading conditions, the quantum should be
decided in such a way that the ICTs/PTRs operate with 90% loading after
operation of LTS. The Radial/ Local load should be trimmed & as far as
possible the grid lines are not to be tripped on operation of LTS. Also, due
consideration must be given for Exclusion of feeders from the scheme which
are catering the Emergency loads such as Hospitals, Water Works, MIDC, VIP
areas, etc. Use of PLCC Carrier for load trimming may be considered whenever
required.
After operation of LTS, the load should be restored step by step considering the
safety margin in consultation with LD or higher authorities to keep the
downtime to minimum.

2. Monitoring strategy:-
In the event of Stage-I alarm, following monitoring protocol should be followed-
2.1. When load reaches to 100% of the ICT/Power Transformer rated Capacity,
Overloading alarm will appear. From this instant, continuous and closed
monitoring of ICT/Power Transformer and its Oil/Winding temperature
should be carried out & ensure that temperature should be less than set limit
of winding temperature.
It is expected that no load shedding is to be carried out at this stage as
ICT/ Power Transformer is designed to sustain overloads if temperature rise is
kept within limit. Thus, alarm is for alertness only.
2.2. Ensure that complete cooling control system is in operation.
2.3. As per the load patterns prevailing, time of the day, trend of load rise at
location of LTS, if small quantum of load shedding can avoid load trimming
operation and maintain T/F loading in the range af @ 105-109% then in such
cases manual load shedding is to be carried out, Selection of HV feeders and
their prioritization for manual load shedding in this case will be essential.
Identification of such feeders for each load trimming scheme will be done by
respective SE, TCC & SE, EHV (O&M)
2.4. In the event of any other kind of abnormalities such as abnormal
temperature rise, winding & oil temperature alarm conditions, sudden
problems with cooling system which cannot be immediately attended etc,
necessary manual load shedding should be carried out.
2.5. Respective higher authorities shall be informed about the situation prior to
manual trimming of identified feeders.
3. General Preparedness:-
For optimum utilization of rated capacity of PTRs & ICTs, it is essential that 100%
cooling system is operational. The respective substation in charge should ensure this.
For all the locations where the load has reached 80% of full load in the last season,
review of complete availability of cooling system should be taken by concerned SE
EHV (O&M) well in advance.

6. LTS approving authority:-
a) For implementation of LTS for ICTs with Single/multiple stage, scheme will be
proposed by SE, TCC in co-ordination with respective SE, EHV O&M circle. If
proposed radial loads to be trimmed are within the area of respective zone,
Chief Engineer of the zone will approve the scheme. In all other cases & when
grid line opening is a part of scheme the scheme will be approved by Dir.
(Operations)
b) Proposals of Load trimming scheme for Power Transformer should be initiated
by concerned SE TCC in coordination with SE EHV (O&M) & should be
approved locally by Zonal CE.
c) In ease where 100-110% loading of ICTs/PTRs is not possible on account of
any abnormalities; LTS with necessary modified settings will be proposed by
Zonal C.E. in consultation with SE TCC & will be approved by Dir.(Operations)
The event of operation of load trimming scheme should be reported to the concerned Load
Dispatch Centre and the higher authorities at Circle, Zonal and Corporate level by the
concerned field officials.
The above guidelines shall come into force with immediate effect & settings of the existing
LTS may be revised accordingly at the earliest.
Sd/-
Director (Operations)
Copy s. w. rs. to:
The CMD, MSETCL, CO, Mumbai
Copy f. w. cs. to:
The Director (Projects), MSETCL, CO, Mumba

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/TR. O&M/SE-I/CIR/4459 Dated: 28.04.2016
Sub: Guidelines for avoidance of load shedding due to transmission constraints.
a) Incidents of forced load shedding due to transmission constraints have been observed.
Even load shedding of the order of 2-5 MW is being carried out for short durations
which is not desirable.
The force load shedding could be due to:
l) Transmission constraints such as overloading of Transmission tines & T/Fs/ ICTs.
2) Occurrence based
3) Low voltage
b) In order to avoid forced load shedding due to transmission constraints, following
measures can be taken and these can be classified /grouped as:
1) Immediate (l to 2 days)
2) Short term (6 months)
3) Long term (2 years)
Immediate Measures:
1. In case of load shedding due to overloading of transmission lines, explore the
possibility of loading lines upto its thermal limit with proper monitoring of critical sag
points and thermo-vision scanning of the bays at both ends and at cut points of
transmission lines.
2. Avoid self imposed limits on the line. Margin of safety if required, should be
reasonable and scientific and be annually validated by SE (TCC) & CE by February end.
The conductor can be loaded upto 110% of capacity as indicated in the attached
Annexure for a short duration (upto two hours).
3. In case of load shedding due to overloading of transformers, check the following:
l) Whether T/Fs are operating in parallel or independently and load can be managed
with parallel operation.
2) Explore possibility of loading Power T/Fs upto 105-110% for short duration (upto
2 hours) with proper arrangement of cooling system and monitoring OTI /WTI,
Thermo-scanning of CT, CB and Isolator jumpers of the concerned T/F bay.
3) Explore possibility of shifting of load on 33kV/ 22kV side to nearby/ adjacent EHV
substation in co-ordination with MSEDCL authorities.
4. In case of load shedding due to low voltage, check the following:
l) Whether capacitor banks are in service, if provided.

2) Maintaining proper voltage at EHV and HV level by use of OLTC.
3) Number of HV substations on the 33kV/ 22kV feeders and redistribution thereof in
co-ordination with MSEDCL authorities.
5. Minor reorientation in the transmission network.
Short Term Measures:
1. Second circuit stringing.
2. Use of high ampacity Conductors.
3. Providing Additional ICT/ Transformers.
4. Ensure adequate reactive power compensation.
5. Reorientation in the network for tapping alternate sources.
Long Term Measures:
1. Additional link lines
2. New Substation
The long term and short term measures should be more of preventive nature. It
should be identified immediately after the peak load of the current year and keeping
in mind 10% load rise for the next year. CEs are responsible for identifying and
implementing such works.
c) The probable areas in the system for which load shedding/ immediate measures
including validation of loading limits and margin of safety, to avoid load shedding may
be needed in the ensuing peak load season should be identified and planned in
advance i.e.
- By February end for the period 15th April to 15th June and
- By May end for the period 15th September to 15th November
d) The load shedding due to transmission constraints should be a measure of last resort"
The decision on load shedding due to transmission constraints by Substation Incharge
and Concerned EE should be taken in due consultation with concerned SE/CE.
Further, every event of load shedding due to transmission constraints should be
supported by certificate of inevitability by concerned CE.
e) All transmission constraint based load shedding should be directly reported to Dir
(Ops) and Dir (Proj) by concerned CE through SMS/ telephonically.
f) In order to have uniformity in deciding the thermal loading limits of EHV lines across
MSETCL, the limits indicated in the attached Annexure should be observed in all the
zones. These limits should be observed for operation purpose only and shall
supersede the earlier specified limits in this regard. A chart indicating these limits

should be available at each & every substation so that the operators are well aware of
these limits and there should not be any ambiguity in taking decision regarding
carrying out load shedding.
The above-mentioned guidelines should be followed with immediate effect and should
be circulated to concerned offices under zone,
Above circular is available on the employee portal namely ep.mahatransco.in on
Company’s website.
Sd/-
C. s. w. rs to:
The CMD, MSETCL, C.O, Mumbai
Copy f. w. cs to:
The Director (Projects), MSETCL, CO, Mumbai
Copy to:
1) The C.E. (LD), MSLDC, Kalwa
2) The C.E. (STU), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai
3) The C.E. (Trans. O&M), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai
4) The C.E., EHV CC O&M Zone, MSETCL, Amravati/ Aurangabad/ Karad/ Nagpur/
Nashik/ Pune/ Vashi
5) The S.E.(LD) Ambazari, Nagpur
6) The S.E.EHV (O&M) Circle, MSETCL, Amravati/ Aurangabad/ Parali/ Karad/
Kolhapur/ Nashik/ Bhusawal/ Nagpur/ Chandrapur/ HVDC Chandrapur/ Pune/
Solapur/ Kalwa/ Panvel/ HVDC Padhge
7) The S.E., T&C Circle, MSETCL Akola/ Aurangabad/ Karad/ Nagpur/ Nashik /
Pune/Vashi.
ACSR Code Nominal Aluminium Area Current carrying capacity in Amps
Dog 100 291
Wolf 150 405
Panther 200 487
Zebra 420 737
Deer 420 756
Moose 520 836
Morculla 560 862

Sub: Application of Numerical Distance Protection Relays as a back-up to Busbar

protection.
The issue of application of numerical distance protection relays as a back-up to

busbar protection at EHV S/S was discussed at length in SPC dtd. 25.02.2009. It was decided
to implement the proposed scheme (Stage-I) at 400kV Girawali sub-station & after observing
the performance of pilot scheme, it can be considered for implementation at other EHV
substations. Subsequently the said scheme was also commissioned at 220kV Apta sub-
station.
Recently in view of non operation of bus-bar protection at 400kV Waluj &
Babhaleshwar sub-station, CE (PAC) vides above Circular issued the guidelines for
application of distance relay reverse zone. The guidelines for revision of reverse zone setting
are based on MSETCL & Ramakrishna committee guidelines. Hence to bring in uniformity in
implementation of reverse zone setting of distance protection relay, guidelines are detailed
here.
1.0. Function:
To use the Numerical distance protection relay reverse zone feature as back
up to bus-bar protection in case of failure or non operation of bus bar protection
relay.
2.0. Impedance setting:

2.1. Zone-4 reverse reach is set to 50% of shortest line connected to local
bus or limited to 2kM reach, whichever is minimum.
2.2. Zone-4 reverse zone reach set in reverse direction to cover expected
levels of apparent bus bar fault resistance, when allowing for multiple
in feeds from other circuits, for this reason, its resistive reach setting is
to be kept identical to Zone-3 resistive reach setting.
3.0. Time setting:

3.1. In stage-I, time delay is to be set to 200 msec.
3.2. In stage-II, additional time delay of 150msec i.e. it is to be set to 350
msec.

4.0. Output Action & Configuration:
4.1. In stage-I to trip the bus-coupler or bus-sectionalizer (for three bus
arrangements (2 main + 1 transfer bus) with bus coupler or in case of
single bus with bus sectionalizer circuit breaker). However in case of
single bus arrangement, all the CBs at local end to be tripped.
4.2. In stage-II to trip all CB at faulty bus (for three bus arrangements (2
main + 1 transfer bus) with bus coupler or in case of single bus with bus
sectionalizer circuit breaker).
5.0. Precaution:
5.1. In case of both numerical distance protections on line/feeder (For
400kV sub-station) _
1. Both Main 1 & 2 relays shall be utilized for two stage reverse zone.
2. The reverse zone stage 1 and stage 2 tripping shall be obtained through
separate contacts from each of the Distance protection relay.
3. It is essential in this case that the reverse zone stage 1 trip should not
initiate the LBB protection for own line breaker.
4. The reverse zone stage-2 tripping shall be extended to LBB trip bus,
through proper isolation links so that faulty bus feeders & ICTs/TFs
isolated simultaneously.
5.2. In case of numerical distance protections & back up IDMT O/C &
E/F on line/feeder (For 220kV & below sub-station) _
1. The reverse zone stage 1 and stage 2 tripping shall be obtained through
separate contacts of Distance protection relay.
2. It is essential in this case that the reverse zone stage 1 trip should not
initiate the LBB protection for own line breaker.
3. The reverse zone stage-2 tripping shall be extended to LBB trip bus,
through proper isolation links so that faulty bus feeders & ICTs/TFs
isolated simultaneously.
The above guidelines shall come into force with immediate effect & should be
followed scrupulously henceforth till further instructions. Also, immediate necessary action
for adopting revised guidelines/philosophy should be taken & compliance thereof be
reported to this office.

Copy s. w. r. to:

Copy w. cs. to:

2. The Chief Engineer (Design, C&M), MSETCL, C. O., Mumbai
Copy to:

Bhusawal/Chandrapur/HVDC Chandrapur/HVDC Padghe/Kalwa/Karad/Kolhapur/
Nagpur/Nasik/Panvel/Parli/Pune/ Solapur.

Sub: Provision of OC & EF protection relay as backup to bus-bar protection.
In view of occurrence at 400/220kV Karad substation on 19.05.2009, the issue of

providing numerical OC & EF relay for Bus-coupler bay in EHV substation was discussed in
detail. Various aspects such as adoption/utilization of characteristics, time & current setting
etc. were discussed & deliberated in detail. After detailed discussions on the issue, it has
been decided to provide numerical non-directional high set over-current relay on bus
coupler/bus sectionalizer panel at all EHV substations. It was also decided to adopt time
setting/delay of 250 ms for this protection, however, the current setting is to be decided
on case to case basis at local level, considering the fault level etc. It was also informed
that the practice of providing OC & EF relay on bus-coupler panel is being followed in
new procurement of C&R panels.
Recently the non operation of bus-bar protection at 400kV Waluj & Babhaleshwar
sub-station was observed. Wherein at 400kV Waluj s/s, the backup OC relay provided for
400kV Bus-coupler as back up to bus-bar operated correctly & at 400kV Babhaleshwar s/s,
the backup OC relay is not provided for 400kV Bus-coupler as back up to bus-bar, resulted
into tripping of lines from remote end, causing the total failure of power supply. As such CE
(PAC) vides above Circular issued the guidelines for usage of backup relay for bus coupler &
setting to be adopted are based on MSETCL & Ramakrishna committee guidelines. Hence to
bring in uniformity in implementation of backup relay for bus coupler, guidelines are
detailed here.
1.0. PROVISION OF B/U RELAY AS BUS BAR BACK UP PROTECTION TO TRIP

BUS-COUPLER:
1.0. Function:
To use back up OC relay as bus bar back up protection to trip bus coupler in
case of failure or non operation of bus bar protection relay.
2.0. Relay setting:

2.1. Pick up of OC element is set 80% of half of total bus fault.
2.2. Non directional OC element is used.
3.0. Time setting:
3.1. Definite time delay is set to 200 msec.

4.1. To trip only bus coupler, in case three bus arrangements (2 main + 1
transfer bus) with bus coupler or in case of single bus with bus coupler
circuit breaker.
5.0. Precaution:
5.1. In case of ICTs running in parallel, co-ordination between ICT LV
backup & bus coupler relay shall be cross checked.
5.2. For Close in faults (in case of 220kV and below) cross check of ROT of
connected Line BU relay for OC with Bus Coupler DT OC relay should be
carried out.
5.3. In case of Imbalance Bus loading where Bus coupler carries 30-40%
Load of Connected CTR, the Definite Time delay shall be set to 250
msec.
2.0. PROVISION OF B/U RELAY AS BUS BAR BACK UP PROTECTION TO TRIP

BUS-COUPLER FOR LILO LINE ARRANGEMENT SUB-STATION WITH BUS-
COUPLER CB _
1.0. Function:
To use back OC relay as bus bar back up protection to trip bus coupler in case
of failure or non operation of bus bar protection relay.
2.0. Relay setting:
2.1. Pick up of High set element is set to 80% of fault contribution by line
for bus fault.
2.2. Directional OC 2-elements are to be used with direction set towards
each bus.
3.0. Time setting:
1.1. Definite time delay is set to 200 msec.
4.1. To trip only bus coupler, in case of LILO line arrangement Sub-station
with bus coupler CB.
5.0. Precaution:
5.1 For Close in faults (in case of 220kV and below) cross check of ROT of
connected Line BU relay for OC with Bus Coupler DT OC relay should be
carried out.

followed scrupulously henceforth till further instructions. Also, immediate necessary action
for adopting revised guidelines/philosophy should be taken & compliance thereof be
reported to this office.
Sd/-
Copy s. w. r. to:

Copy w. cs. to:

4. The Chief Engineer (Design, C&M), MSETCL, C. O., Mumbai
Copy to:

Bhusawal/Chandrapur/HVDC Chandrapur/HVDC
Padghe/Kalwa/Karad/Kolhapur/Nagpur/Nasik/Panvel/Parli/Pune/ Solapur.

RELAY SETTING
GUIDELINES
SPC_15.03.2008
Sub: Analog triggering of disturbance recorders and adoption of settings thereof.
The issue of analog triggering of Disturbance Recorders (DRs) as per the enquiry
committee into the Grid Disturbance in Western Region of dated 25th & 28th Feb. 2007 &
adoption of suitable settings thereof was taken up for discussions and obtaining guidelines in
this regard in the WRPC meeting by SE, TCCs. Accordingly the issue was discussed in the SPC
meeting dtd. 15.03.2008 & following decisions have been taken as per discussion in the
WRPC meeting which needs to be implemented.
1.0. It has been decided to provide a setting of 150% of rated voltage for analog
triggering of DRs on over voltage.
2.0. It has been decided to provide a setting of 70% of rated voltage for analog
triggering of DRs on under voltage without any intentional time delay.
3.0. A setting of 150% of rated secondary current is recommended for analog
triggering of DRs on over current feature.
However in light of occurrence at 400kV Chandrapur S/S wherein the genuine DR

data was lost during tripping on 400kV Chandrapur - Parli - II on13.02.2008 & it was decided
to take up this issue with WRPC for obtaining necessary guidelines in this regard. However
WRPC did not agree to for providing the time delay for under-voltage triggering. After
detailed deliberations on the issue in SPC meeting 24.06.2008, it was decided to adopt
the setting as below:
1. Under Voltage : 70% with time delay 100msec.
2. Over Voltage : 110% Inst.
3. Current : 150% of rated secondary current with

time Delay of 1 sec.
4. Under frequency : 48.0 HZ

SPC_15.03.2008
Sub: Revision of overvoltage stage –II time delay setting.
The issue of adopting the overvoltage relay setting as per WRPC guidelines was
discussed in SPC dtd. 15.03.2008. As per WRPC guidelines, the overvoltage stage-II time
delay was set to instantaneous. However SPC members are of opinion that stage-II time delay
to be set to 100msec instead of instantaneous. Further this issue was discussed in WRPC
meeting & agreed to set time delay 100msec. in line with the CBIP guidelines (Section 2 of
CBIP Publication 274 of Nov 1999). Accordingly it was decided to adopt the over-voltage
stage-I time delay setting as per WRPC guidelines & stage –II time delay 100msec instead of
instantaneous.
The settings are to be adopted as:
1.0. Ph -Ph voltage measurement is selected.
2.0. 1st stage = 110% Voltage setting
Time Delay = 5 sec, Single line

7 sec, 2nd Parallel line
7 sec, 3rd Parallel line
3.0. 2nd stage = 150% Voltage setting
Time delay = 0.100 sec.
The above-settings should be implemented invariably for all 400kV lines in

MSETCL.

SPC_24.06.2008
Sub: Provision of Over-fluxing Relay for 400kV ICTs in MSETCL & adoption of setting
thereof.
The issue of providing the over-fluxing relays for all 400kV ICTs in MSETCL was
discussed in detailed in the SPC dtd. 24.06.2008. Director (Operations) pointed out that the
over fluxing relays are provided for ICTs in PGCIL sub-station & is of opinion that over fluxing
relay shall be provided in MSETCL. Further it was observed that these relays are not
provided for 400kV ICTs (barring few substations) in MSETCL. After detailed discussions on
the issue, it has been decided to provide over-fluxing relay on HV side of all 400kV ICTs
(existing as well as new) with two stage alarm mode in MSETCL system. The settings are to
be adopted as:
2.0. Alarm I - 110% with 30 sec.
3.0. Alarm II - 110% with 60 sec.
The above-settings should be implemented invariably for all ICTs in MSETCL.

Further the operation of Over fluxing relays need to be monitored after installation &
proper record of alarms received should be kept at respective S/S.

SPC_18.10.2008
Sub: Guidelines for revision of relay setting & remedial measures to be taken to
minimize the incidents of power transformer trippings/failures due to fault on
DISCOM feeder.
The issue of tripping & failure of EHV transformers feeding the distribution network
was discussed during SPC dtd. 18.10.2008. It was pointed out that the incidents of
tripping/failure of power transformers feeding the distribution network are more in spite of
provision of high set relays for distribution feeders. Though the relays are operating
correctly, the CBs are not tripping thereby reflecting the fault on transformer. It was also
informed that this issue is taken-up regularly with DISCOM authorities but no action is taken
by them. It was pointed out that the CBs require more frequent maintenance/replacement as
their operations are unreliable. The issue was discussed at length & following actions
are proposed to minimize the incidents of power transformer trippings/failures due
to fault on DISCOM feeder.
1.0. The issue of tripping/failure of power transformer due to fault on

11kV/22kV/33kV feeders emanating from EHV substations should be
immediately referred to concerned DISCOM authorities & be followed up
rigorously for action at their end.
2.0. The sectionalized busbar arrangement should be provided in new EHV
substations with CB for sectionalizer i.e. bus sections should be coupled
through C.B.
Also, while implementing the scheme for additional transformers at EHV S/S, it
should be invariably ensured to provide sectionalizer.
3.0. It was also decided to explore the possibility of providing/making
sectionalized busbar arrangement in the existing EHV substations wherever
the same does not exist. If the bus sectionalizer cannot be accommodated in
between due to space constraints then the same can be kept at the end and
connection shall be established by using cables so that the electrical
position/connectivity is achieved as desired.
4.0. As far as possible, the transformers directly feeding the DISCOM feeders should
be run independently (i.e. parallel operation of such transformers should
be avoided).
The time gradation in such cases of independent operation of T/Fs shall
be as under:
4.1. HV outgoing feeder relay: ROT = 110 ms with high-set

instaneous setting of 2T-3T of CTR connected.
4.2. Transformer LV Back up Relay: ROT = 350 ms
4.3. Transformer HV Back up Relay: ROT = 450 ms
If the transformers are already operating independently at some of the

EHV substations then this provision is not necessary.
5.0. In case, the site & system conditions do not permit to run the T/Fs
independently, and the transformers are necessarily required to be run in
parallel, it should be ensured that the directional & non-directional protection
of T/F LV back-up, both are active with the setting criteria mentioned below:
5.1. Directional element: Direction towards T/F & ROT:110 ms
5.2. Non-directional element: ROT = 350 ms
The non-directional back-up (i.e. O/C-E/F) relay with high set feature will
have to be provided in addition to existing back-up protections.
6.0. If programmable numerical relay is available for LV back-up multiple setting
feature of relay should be adopted to achieve the setting for directional as well
as non-directional elements.
7.0. The maintenance cycle of the CBs at EHV S/S controlling the DISCOM feeders
(i.e.11kV/22kV/33kV) should be increased & at least yearly maintenance
should be carried out regularly.
The above measures & settings should be implemented invariably for all Power
Transformers feeding the distribution network in MSETCL.

SPC_29.06.2009
Sub: Pole discrepancy relay (PDR) time setting for EHV feeders.
The 103rd PCM meeting of WRPC held on 12-13 Dec. 2008, has recommended that the
Pole Discrepancy Relay (PDR) timer in respect of CBs controlling EHV lines, Generator,
Transformer/ ICTs where auto reclosure is not provided, should be set to 100 msec. i.e.
less than LBB time setting.
The issue of adoption of this PDR setting in MSETCL was discussed in detail in SPC
meeting dtd. 29.06.2009. After detailed discussions on the issue, it was decided to adopt PDR
timer setting of 100 msec. for CBS controlling Generators, Transformers/ICTs & EHV lines
where A/R is not provided. Whereas the EHV lines with A/R in service, the PDR time
shall be set to 1.5sec.
However during SPC meeting dtd. 17.09.2009, it was informed that at many of the
places, the minimum timer setting available is 500ms & as such, either the timer is required
to be changed or to adopt available minimum setting. After detailed discussions &
deliberations on various issues, the committee recommended that, wherever provision of
100ms is not available, minimum timer setting should be adopted & 2nd trip coil
which is normally used for PDR, should be energized through master trip relay.
Accordingly Scheme to trip C.B. through second trip coil using PDR Aux. relay was
prepared for implementation as under:
1.0. In most of the cases the protection trip is not given to both the trip coils
available in the breaker. Therefore in case of failure of this trip coil (due to any
elect/mech. Problem) the LBB protection operates resulting into tripping of
complete bus. This happens, however in this case second trip coil doesn’t get
chance to pick up and trip the breaker to avoid LBB operation. The LBB
operation in the above case is unwarranted and can be avoided if the second
trip coil is healthy.
2.0. The arrangement of extending trip to second trip coil by using pole
discrepancy Aux. relay is shown in the schematic below. In this arrangement
one ‘NO’ contact is used in series to avoid continuous pick up of P.D aux relay.
3.0. As decided in SPC meeting to adopt PDR timing as 100 msec but this cannot be
achieved in the existing timers of some CB’s. So this scheme can be
implemented to achieve the objective of reducing time to 100 msec.

4.0. Recently the new panels are having provision of giving trip command to both
trip coils in that case the above is not required.
5.0. The above arrangement can be applicable to
5.1. Where both trip coils are not actuated through protection trip.
5.2. Where A/R scheme is not in service.
5.3. Where two trip coils are available to C.B. and one is used for PDR only.
Schematic for tripping of CB through PDR Relay

SPC_17.09.2009
Sub: Disabling of instantaneous high set E/F Relays provided on ICTs.
In view of occurrence at 400kV Kalwa substation on 23.06.2009, the issue of disabling

of instantaneous high set E/F relays provided on ICTs was discussed in detail. All S.E., TCCs
briefed the details about existing provision and settings of instantaneous high set E/F relays
provided on ICTs in their respective jurisdiction. It was informed that the instantaneous high
set E/F protection is enabled only at Dhule, Kalwa & Kharghar substations.
After detailed discussions on the issue, it has been decided to immediately disable
the instantaneous high set E/F relays provided on ICTS at above mentioned substations.
However, the high set O/C protection/relays on HV/LV side should be kept in service
after deciding the proper setting on case to case basis.
The instantaneous high set E/F relays provided on ICTs shall be disabling
immediately.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/Tr (O&M)/Tech. CIR/ 8934 Dated: 27.06.2012
Sub: Undesirable trippings of 400/220kV ICTs on Neutral Displacement Relay (NDR)

protection at various 400kV S/s.
Recently large no. of incidents of unwarranted trippings of 400/220 kV ICTs on NDR

protection during pre-monsoon rains have been reported at various 400 kV substations in
our system. This is really a matter of serious concern & needs to be addressed immediately
by suggesting suitable remedial measures/corrective actions. A detailed review of existing
NDR protection, its setting & other related aspect was taken in the Standing Protection
Committee (SPC) meeting held at C.O. on 20.06.2012. Various issues were discussed and
deliberated at length & following guidelines are issued to resolve this problem of undesirable
operation of NDR protection.
1.0. The following settings are to be adopted for NDR with immediate effect:
Alarm setting: 12.5V, 1sec.
Trip setting: 30V, 4.5sec.
The above settings are to be adopted wherever possible. In case of static
(IDMT) relays, maximum possible voltage setting with TMS of 0.1 may be
adopted. Else, the above setting can be provided by providing external timer.
"In case of NDR alarm, the on duty In-charge / operator should immediately
carry out the yard inspection particularly that of tertiary delta arrangement of
ICTs & report abnormality Observed, if any, to the concerned authorities.
The Capacitance & Tan Delta measurement of Tertiary bushings to be
done invariably in the month of April every year & later before on-set of
monsoon every year.
*Note: Do not change the NDR setting & PTs at 400kV S/s where no
unwarranted operation of NDR has been reported last year & this year during
the pre monsoon rains.
2.0. Thorough cleaning of 33 KV or 20 kV bus support insulators, PTs, LAs &
Tertiary bushing of ICTs need to be ensured from time to time i.e. whenever an
outage is availed on the ICT, this activity should invariably be carried out. It is
to be ensured that the dust is not accumulated on equipments in delta system
at all, which otherwise may create the problem during subsequent rain.

3.0. The Capacitance & Tan Delta measurement of Tertiary bushings to be done
invariably in the month of April and also prior the on-set of monsoon every
year.
4.0. The insulating taping / coating of proper insulation level to be done to the IPS
tube used for delta connection. Further, insulating coating to be applied on Bus
Post Insulators, LAs, Tertiary Bushing to achieve enhancement/ increase in
creepage distance of external insulating part. This activity is to be carried out
only after cleaning is done as above.
5.0. Standardization-of NDR protection:
5.1 Numerical protection having DR facility to be used.
5.2 Relay should have two independent functions:
5.2.1 Working on direct open delta voltage with selectable definite &
inverse time characteristic.
5.2.2 Working on derived open delta voltage from three phase voltage
input with selectable definite and inverse time characteristic.
5.2.3 Relay should respond to only fundamental frequency voltage with
blocking for other harmonic voltages.
5.2.4 It is to be checked, if both the functions are available in the same
relay or separate relays are to be used. Further, the possibility of
meeting above functions in the existing numerical protection, in
service, need to be explored so as to avoid requirement of separate new
relay.
5.3 The relay working directly on open delta voltage should be used for DR/
Alarm purpose only and no trip to be extended.
5.4 The relay working on derived open delta voltage should be used for Trip
purpose.
5.5 The annunciation should be provided for "NDR protection Alarm" and
"NDR protection Trip" from both the functions.
6.0 Suitable series connected Damping Resistor needs to be provided in the delta
secondary winding. The VT-guards (ABB-make) to be provided in the NDR
circuitry for ICTs at 400 kV Akola & Khaparkheda S/Ss on experimental basis &
to be kept under Observation.

7.0 The possibility of using tertiary bus post insulators with higher creepage
distance should be explored for new projects. It has been decided to adopt this
arrangement for new (4th) ICT bay at Padghe.
The above guidelines shall come into force with immediate Effect &
should be followed scrupulously henceforth.
Sd/-
Chief Engineer (Tr. O&M)
Copy s. w. r. to:
1. The Director (Operations/ Projects), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai.
2. The Executive Director (Operations/Projects), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai.
Copy w. cs. to:
1. The Chief Engineer, EHV CC O&M zone, MSETCL, Amravati /Aurangabad/ Karad/
Nagpur /Nasik/Pune/Vashi
2. The Chief Engineer (Tr. Project & Design), MSETCL, C. O., Mumbai
- The guidelines at Sr. No. 5.0 & 7.0 above needs to be considered for all future
project works.
Copy to:
Bhusawal/Chandrapur/HVDC Chandrapur/HVDC Padghe / Kalwa/ Karad/ Kolhapur
/Nagpur /Nasik/ Panvel/Parli/Pune/ Solapur.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/Tr (O&M)/SE-I/SPC/12282 Dated: 19.09.2015
Sub: Revision in Power Swing blocking (PSB) philosophy as per the

recommendations of Ramakrishna committee.
1.0. Ramakrishna Committee had been constituted by CEA for analyzing the causes and
suggesting remedial measures in respect of Grid disturbance dtd. 30th and 31st July
2012 in WR. Ramakrishna committee has recommended for tripping of lines on
detection of power swing in Z – I instantaneously and block the tripping for Z –
II & Z – III permanently. Further, it is stated that, power swings entering Z – I are
generally non-recoverable and power swings entering Zone – II & III are generally
recoverable and hence allow tripping of line if power swing enters in zone-I.
2.0. WRPC has requested all utilities that the recommendations of Ramakrishna
Committee for revision in Power Swing blocking protection philosophy may be
implemented. The issue was discussed in detail in recent SPC meeting held at CO on
30.07.2015. After detailed discussion and deliberation on the issue, members opined
that, the recommendations of Ramakrishna Committee should be followed and
implemented in MSETCL.
3.0. Accordingly a proposal for adopting the guidelines of Ramakrishna committee

regarding PSB protection philosophy was initiated for approval of the Director (Ops).
The Director (Ops) has accorded approval for the same.
4.0. Thus, as per recommendations of Ramakrishna Committee & as per discussions

in SPC, it is decided to revise power swing blocking setting on all the 400kV &
EHV lines in MSETCL as “if power swing is detected allow tripping of lines on
power swing in Z – I instantaneously and block the tripping for Z – II & Z – III
permanently”.
followed scrupulously henceforth till further instructions. Also immediate necessary action
for adopting revised philosophy should be taken & Compliance thereof be reported to this
office.
Sd/-
Chief Engineer (Tr. O&M)

Copy s. w. r. to:
Copy w. cs. to:
2. The Chief Engineer (Design, C&M), MSETCL, C. O., Mumbai.
3. The Chief Engineer, EHV CC O&M zone, MSETCL, Amravati/ Aurangabad/ Karad
/Nagpur /Nashik/Pune/Vashi.
Copy to:
1. The Superintending Engineer, T & C Circle, MSETCL, Akola / Aurangabad / Karad/
Nashik/ Nagpur/Pune/ Vashi.
2. The Superintending Engineer, Tr.(O&M) Circle, MSETCL, Amravati / Aurangabad /
Bhusawal / Chandrapur / HVDC Chandrapur / HVDC Padghe/ Kalwa / Karad
/Kolhapur / Nagpur /Nashik /Panvel/Parli/ Pune / Solapur.

GENERAL
GUIDELINES
SPC_02.02.2007
Sub: Guidelines for taking remedial action/measures in case of CB `Trip circuit fault’.
An occurrence took place at 220kV Miraj sub-station on 10.12.2006, due to non

clearance of line fault due to persisting of `trip circuit faulty’ indication. This has resulted
into operation of LBB relay, causes the tripping of all 220kV feeders connected to 220kV bus.
Also an occurrence took place at 100kV Taloja s/s on 24.12.2006, where 22kV fault
was cleared by tripping of 200MVA, 220/100kV ICTs at 220kV Taloja s/s. The fault was not
cleared by any of the intermittent lines and transformers, which is highly undesirable
situation. After detailed investigation, the `trip circuit faulty’ indication was persisting
resulted into tripping of ICTs at 220kV Taloja s/s.

1.0. The ‘Trip circuit Faulty’ indication should never be ignored and to be
considered very serious.
2.0. Faulty Annunciator to be replaced on top priority, at local level.
3.0. If `Trip circuit Faulty’ indication appears on any of the feeder then the use of
TBC should be made immediately to isolate the unhealthy breaker.
4.0. If TBC is not available, then use the emergency trip facilities of the Main
unhealthy breaker, provided the SF6/Air/N2 pressure of circuit breaker shall
be is order (as specified by manufacturer or in manual).
5.0. If `Trip circuit Faulty/Lockout’ is due to low SF6/Air/N2 pressure then the
CB should not be tripped through emergency trip facility. In that case the
faulty CB is to be opened /tripped in off peak hrs or night time after isolating
the same from all sources.
6.0. Specific instructions must be made available in all substations to handle the
“Trip circuit Faulty” situations.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/O&M/GTC/3631 Dated: 07.04.2007
Sub: Capacitance & Tan-Delta Measurement of Transformer Bushings.
Recently during an occurrence at 220kV Padghe substation on 14-03-07, 220/100 KV,

200 MVA transformer caught fire and burnt completely. R-ph, HV bushing reported to have
failed and burst. Similar incidences of bursting of transformer bushings have been reported
in past also. Thus, it is very clear that the incident of bursting/damaging of bushing is very
dangerous and could be detrimental to the transformer itself. The incidents of bursting of
bushings can be avoided if the healthiness of bushings is monitored periodically. The
periodic measurement of capacitance and Tan-delta values of bushings is certainly helpful in
monitoring the health of the bushings.
It is needless to mention the importance of capacitance and Tan Delta measurements
for various EHV equipments like Bushings, CTs, and Transformers etc. It is, therefore,
directed that the C & Tan Delta measurements of bushings of all 400KV / 220 KV class ICTs/
transformers be taken periodically on regular basis and proper record thereof be maintained
at Division/Circle level. If any abnormal deviation/increase in these values is noticed,( i.e.
above 0.70% or so) the matter should be immediately referred to the transformer
manufacturer for obtaining his views/ comments. All SEs. EHV (O&M) to act as nodal officer
for this purpose and to follow up matter with transformer manufacturers for further
necessary action in the matter.
In order to facilitate the replacement of bushing in case the C & Tan-delta results
warrant such replacement necessary in consultation with transformer manufacturer, every
zone should have at least one spare bushing of each type available at nodal substations.
All the S.Es EHV (O&M) and SE, TCCs are directed to note the contents of this circular
and take necessary action accordingly in this regard. They are requested to inform how many
220kV Class & above transformer bushings Tan delta measurements records are not
available as on date, to this office by 30 April 07 positively. The contents of this circular
should be brought to the notice of all E.E.s. EHV (O&M) Division & Testing Division in their
respective jurisdiction.
Sd/-
Executive Director (Operations)

Copy s. w. r. to:
1. The M. D. MSETCL, Mumbai.
2. The Director (Operation) MSETCL, Mumbai.
Copy to:
1. The CE EHV CC O & M Zone, MSETCL, Amravati / A'bad / Karad / Nasik / Nagpur /
Pune / Vashi.
2. The SE T & C Circle, MSETCL, A'bad / Nagpur / Nashik / Pune / Vashi. They are
directed to bring the details available in this regard for 400KV & 220KV class
transformers in their respective jurisdiction during SPC meeting to be held in May
2007.
3. The S.E. EHV (O&M) Circle, MSETCL/ Amravati/ A'bad/ Chandrapur/Karad / Khadka
(Bhusawal) / Kalwa / Nagpur / Nashik / Pune / Parli / Panvel.
4. The S.E. HVDC RS (O&M) Circle, MSETCL, Chandrapur / Padghe.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/O&M/GTC/4420 Dated: 25.04.2007
To,
The Chief Engineer,
EHV CC O&M Zone, MSETCL,
Amravati/Aurangabad/Karad/Nasik/Pune/Vashi
Sub: Monitoring of Healthiness of Lightning Arresters and use of LCM kit.
You may be aware that we have recently procured five nos. of state-of-the-art Leakage
Current Monitoring (LCM) test kits from M/s. DOBLE, USA. These kits are available with the
office of respective S.E. T&C Circle under your zone.
These LCM kits are very useful for monitoring and ensuring the healthiness of
Lightning Arrester (LAs.) installed in our EHV substations. This measurement does not
require outage on any feeder and can he performed in live conditions. The LAs are very
critical elements in the switchyard and their healthiness is very important as the
bursting/failure of LAs lead to damage to other adjacent important elements like
transformer bushing. etc. in the switchyard resulting in forced outage of the line or
transformer feeder and thereby reducing availability also.
As such, keeping in view the forthcoming monsoon, it is hereby directed that the
extensive use of LCM kit may be made to ensure the healthiness of LAs installed in various
EHV substations under the control of your Zone. Further, this work needs to be taken up
immediately and completed preferably before the onset of forthcoming monsoon. This will
certainly help us to reduce trippings / occurrences on account of failure of LAs. The work
may be taken up on priority basis at all 400KV S/S and 220/132KV S/S attached to power
stations and certain critical EHV S/S.
It may also be noted that very old LAs (of gap type) or LAs having doubt about the
healthiness should invariably be replaced. A weak, LA is like a live bomb in the switchyard.
Normally healthy (new) LAs have 10 to 150 micro amp leakage current (third harmonic
resistive current.) While of 10 years old LAs have leakage current of 500 micro amp. LAs of
10 years or having 500 micro amp leakages current shall be replaced.

You are therefore, requested to instruct the concerned field offices suitably to take up
above said works immediately and monitor the progress of the same. For any queries /
difficulties related to measurement and use of LCM the field offices may directly contact M/s.
ELPE Engineers, Vadodara, authorized representative of M/s. DOBLE, USA.
Sd/-
Copy s.w.rs.to:
1. The M.D., MSETCL, Mumbai.
2. The Director (Operations), MSETCL, Mumbai.
Copy to:
1. The S.E., T&C, Circle. MSETCL, A’bad/Nasik/Nagpur/ Pune/Vashi.
2. The S.E., EHV (O&M) Circle, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad/ Bhusawal
(Khadka)/Chandrapur/Karad/Kalwa/Nasik/Nagpur/Parli / Pune/ Panvel.

SPC_14.12.2007
Sub: Submission of monthly status on healthiness of Disturbance Recorders (DRs)

and sequential event logging / recording devices to WRPC.
The issue of submission of monthly status on healthiness of DRs and SERs to SLDC
Kalwa for onward submission to WRPC were discussed in detail during SPC dtd. 14.12.2007.
The CE Tr. (O&M) vide letter no. MSETCL/CO/Tr (O&M)/ WRPC/11431 dt.5.11.2007 have
already issued clear cut guidelines in this regard which are to be scrupulously followed by
the concerned authorities. The information is to be submitted on monthly basis by
concerned as per format below:
FORMAT FOR MONTHLY STATUS OF HEALTHINESS OF DRs
1. Name of organisation/utility:
2. Name of 400kV sub-station/Generating station:
3. Name & designation of sub-station/generating station In-charge:
4. Address of sub-station:
5. Phone:
6. E-mail ID:
Sr. Name DR Details Whether Whether Whether Time Remark

No. of Make Sr. No. Of DR was in separate any tripping stamping: Any
Lines No. Analog service for DR is took place whether info.
/Digital current installed during the provided & You
inputs month? If or current GPS may
used for NO, reason Numerical month. If so synchronis like to
DR Relay DR was DR ed mentio
facility printout n.
used generated?
I certify that the above data /information are correct to the best of my knowledge & belief.
Executive Engineer

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/TR. (O&M)/GTC/7780 Dated: 08.06.2009
Sub: Guidelines for occurrence at EHV sub-station.
An occurrence took place at 220kV (400/220kV) Karad S/S on 19/5/09 due to

snapping of jumper between isolator & circuit breaker from isolator end in 220kV bus
coupler bay creating a bus fault. The busbar protection did not operate for this fault and the
fault got reflected on 400kV system & was finally cleared by tripping of 220kV & 400kV lines
from remote end leading to major interruption in the system.
Also, an occurrence took place at 132kV Deepnagar S/s on 01/06/2009 leading to
tripping of 210 MW Gen. Unit-2 immediately after its synchronization due to operational
lapses. Thus, in short, two major occurrences took place in recent past due to some
lacunas/lapses in protection system as well as in the operational procedures.
1. Ensure that all the ICTs are provided with directional back-up O/C-E/F
protection both on HV & LV side. If not in existence/provided, the same shall
be provided immediately.
2. Ensure that all the feeders (i e. Lines, Generators, Transformers etc) in the
substation should be connected to the Main bus I & II in such a fashion that
normally the current through the bus coupler is minimum.
3. Ensure that while synchronizing of Generator units in the power station
attached substations, a testing engineer is invariably available at that
substation for smooth synchronization of the unit.
The above guidelines should be brought to the notice of the concerned for strict
observance upto the substation level. These guidelines should be followed up with
immediate effect & non-observance of these will be viewed seriously.
Sd/-
Copy s. w. rs to:
The Director (Operations), MSETCL, C.O.
Copy to:
1. The C.E., EHV CCO&M Zone, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad/Karad/Nashik /Nagpur/
Pune/ Vashi.
2. The S.E., T&C Circle, MSETCL Amravati/Aurangabad/Karad/Nashik/Nagpur/ Pune/ Vashi.
3. The S.E. Tr. (O&M) Circle, MSETCL, Amravati /Aurangabad /Chandrapur/Karad/ Kolhapur
/Kalwa /Khadka /Nasik/Nagpur/Pune/Parli/Panvel.
4. The S.E., HVDC R/S (O&M) Circle, MSETCL, Chandrapur/Padghe.

Circular No. Dir (Ops)/Maint/16662 Dated: 26.10.2010
Sub: Sub-station Maintenance Practices.
While taking the stock of substations on maintenance count, it is noticed that a very
Little attention is being paid by the substation staff, concerned EEs and SEs. Due to which key
equipments like Transformers CTs, PTs in substations are failing frequently, affecting the
supply in the regions being supplied by this substation at large. In fact the entire State
barring few places, is reeling under huge load shedding due to power shortage. Such
breakdowns in our system aggravate the situation further.
Failure of 600 MVA, BHEL make, ICT at Kalwa is the recent example of such
negligence. In fact the equipment manufacturers have recommended maintenance schedule
through manuals, but the concerned are not even bothering to go through this. In addition to
this, some latest technology tools in the market are also available which when adopted in the
maintenance practices, give some clues about predictive maintenance. e.g. analysis of results
of online DGA, C and Tan-delta measurement, thermo-vision camera, circuit breaker analyzer
etc.
It has been therefore felt essential once again to lay emphasis on the maintenance
practices which should be followed scrupulously.
The EE EHV (O&M) of each Division shall conduct immediate meeting of all Sub-
station In-charge and critically discuss the following issues in detail so that suggested
measures are taken on war footing basis, in order to ensure the reliable operation of our
system.
1 .Cooling system:-
You are quite aware that, this season huge Ag load is likely to come on our system
because of very good rainfall, thereby our power transformers will be running to its full
capacity giving rise to increased oil and winding temperatures. In order to control oil and
winding temperatures within safe Limits, entire cooling system must be in service
completely i.e. all cooling fans and oil pumps. If you neglect this important aspect then it will
pose danger to the life of power transformer in a way shortening the life. So the substation
In-charge, concerned EE and SE shall ensure the complete functioning of cooling system
during their visit personally.

2. Online DGA:-
This is a pathological test of the transformer i.e. gives the presence of percentage of
dissolved gases, helping in getting the clues about the health. Accordingly one can decide the
further course of action, to improve the health of it. But unfortunately people are not
critically analyzing the results of online DGA and thus breakdown occurs. This can't be
tolerated since a stitch in time saves nine. Therefore it is once again reiterated that the
concerned should ensure the analysis of such results daily and accordingly the remedial
measures shall be taken. If you don’t practice it and neglect to do so then it will be viewed
very seriously. The senior officers during their visit should verify this aspect without fail. A
record to this effect shall be properly maintained and verified too where such system is
installed. Also in other cases where online system is not installed, values must be verified
from renowned laboratory having good credentials or by using portable DGA kits available
with us.
3. Thermo vision Camera:-
It is needless to lay emphasis on the use of thermo-vision camera in electrical
maintenance. Worldwide use of this has shown that the opening of jumpers, joints due to red
hot can be avoided and thus further breakdowns. Especially the temperature of bushing, its
turret, clamps, connectors, isolators and other joints leading to opening and causing to shut
down be monitored for preventive action. A register shall be maintained showing the details
of the equipments, date & time.
4. Nitrogen injection system meant for fire protection:-
Past experiences show that if the fault inside the transformer is not cleared in the
predetermined time then it catches fire leading to huge damages to itself but the adjoining
equipments also are damaged leading to multiple loss. This is very serious and thus recently
Nitrogen injection based fire protection system has been deployed with most of power
transformers. The function of it is very simple whenever a fault occurs inside the transformer
then the Nitrogen injection based fire protection system is activated and nitrogen, a neutral
gas, forms the layer in the top portion of transformer thus the fire if caught, is prevented in
getting in contact with oxygen thus damages are limited. But the experience of Kalwa showed
that Nitrogen injection based fire protection system did not come to rescue and led to
irreparable loss. On close analysis it is revealed that the M.C.B. meant for D.C. supply to
Nitrogen injection based fire protection system was tripped meant for oil drain and nitrogen
release. This test is recommended for every six months. In fact the Nitrogen injection based
fire protection system is supposed to perform the very duty under such circumstances only.

Please call the Nitrogen injection based fire protection system suppliers and ensure its
correct operation.
5. PRV:-
Whenever a tremendous pressure is created inside the transformer on account of
internal fault then this PRV gives way to release this pressure to atmosphere so that the
transformer tank is avoided from bursting, damages and sometimes from fire. It has been
observed that the PRV in the occurrence of Kalwa has also failed to operate which led to fire
and subsequent damages.
6. PID Testing:-
Number of incidents of insulator string flash over, decapping, bursting of insulator
strings in substation as well as of line are reported leading to increased number of
interruptions. PID testing is vital technique to identify defective insulators. The PID testing
should be carried out regularly and record thereof be maintained properly.
7. Use of Circuit Breaker Analyser test kits:-
It has been brought to my notice that at 54 locations this system has been provided
which when used gives the ECG of CB meaning thereby it gives clues about the preventive
maintenance, unfortunately staff are not critically analyzing the results and do the necessary
repairs. Due to this reports of CB stuck up, bursting of it during occurrence are informed.
This unnecessarily leads to operation of either LBB or Bus-Bar. This shows that high
technology equipments are lying as a show case piece which can’t be tolerated.
8. OiI Pumps:-
The efficient functioning of oil pump gives additional support in expediting the oil
circulation in the tank of transformer and efficient cooling is achieved, reducing the burden
on cooling fans, in turn keeping the winding temperature and oil temperature within safe
limit. This permits to load transformers to its rated capacity and safe service life is also
guaranteed.
9. Battery Maintenance:-
It is needless to lay emphasis on the importance of use of DC supply in the functioning
of substation. Entire protection system depends on healthy DC supply. But it also requires
attention to be paid for its regular maintenance such as specific gravity, per cell voltage,
cleaning of contacts etc. Further in order to ensure the healthiness of battery set its efficiency
test shall be taken on weekly basis i.e. the AC supply can be put off and let the battery set take
load. This test certainly gives the clues of the healthiness of it. The substation staffs are
requested to please pay timely attention towards this vital aspect. Also, the extensive use of

DC earth fault locator should be made to detect and eliminate the DC earth leakages in the
system which results in spurious trippings many times.
10. Earthing:-
The earth resistance shall be maintained to its safe values in order to ensure the
operation of protection system. For this regular watering and its measurements shall be done
meticulously to ensure the correct and timely operation of protective system. This also helps
to ensure the safety of equipments and operating staff.
11. General Maintenance:-
Whenever an opportunity or planned outage is availed then the testing staff or
substation staff should take the measurement of Capacitance and tan-delta of bushings, IR
values of transformer and bushings etc, CB timings, contact resistance, the all possible test of
the oil be taken.
12. Mock drill of the fighting and Nitrogen injection based fire protection system
operation:-
It has been felt that unless and until we undertake mock drill, the confidence of
substation staff who is supposed to respond/act quickly in the emergency will not boost up.
They become panic in emergency and thus fail to help to take all precautionary measures. For
that at the beginning, such mock drill for firefighting shall be held on fortnight basis and that
too in the presence of concerned substation in charge and for 220kV concerned EE, and for
400kv substation SE. Later the frequency of mock drill in respect of fire fighting is taken on
the regular intervals as may be decided by concerned EE in his region please. Secondly the
non operation of Nitrogen injection based fire protection system is very dangerous and
crucial in occurrence, when the transformer may catch fire. In fact, it is expected that it
should automatically switch on and act to avoid the fire, but sometimes it fails to operate
automatically, may be because of tripping of MCB meant for DC supply to Nitrogen injection
based fire protection system. Then it can be brought in to service manually. This manual
operation of Nitrogen injection based fire protection system be understood very clearly and
should learn properly from representative of Nitrogen injection based fire protection system.
The substation staff should well understand this, since they are the real soldier who are
subjected to such unprecedented emergency situations. The mock drill of it can be taken on
monthly basis wherever those are installed. The record of mock drills for both, be kept for
office purpose with name of the participants, date, time etc.
These are few vital measures and the concerned may add to this in order to avoid the
shutdown in our system please.

To,
1. All CEs, (Construction Cum O&M), MSETCL - as per mailing list.
2. All SEs, (O&M) MSETCL -as per mailing list.
3. All SEs, (TCC) MSETCL -as per mailing list.
4. All EEs, (O&M) &Testing Divisions, MSETCL -as per mailing list.
Copy s.w.rs.to:
The Chairman and Managing Director, MSETCL. C.O., Mumbai.
Copy f. w. c. s.:
Director (Projects), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai
Copy to:
1. Executive Director (STU), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai.
2. Executive Director (Operations), MSETCL. C.O., Mumbai.
He is directed to please check the above aspects of maintenance during his visit in
the field.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/Tr (O&M)/ 00649 Dated: 12.01.2011
Sub: Ensuring healthiness and reliability of EHV Transmission lines and

Transformers/ICTs.
This year Maharashtra has received adequate rainfall which has resulted in
withdrawing of load shedding in many parts of the state. In this context, it is observed that
many of our EHV transmission lines and transformers/ICTs are loaded substantially. The
tripping/breakdown of any single element is worsening the situation, thus jeopardizing the
system reliability, availability and stability also. The load shedding in some of the groups has
been withdrawn recently. Due to withdrawal of load shedding from some of the groups, the
EHV line/transformer loading will eventually increase considerably and EHV network will be
subjected to maximum loading. This substantial increased loading may result into hot spots
where joints are not intact and subsequently may result in tripping/breakdowns etc. due to
snapping/breakage of conductor, opening of jumper, damage / melting of clamp/connectors
etc.
To avoid such kind of incidents, following actions need to be taken immediately.
1) Identify and list out the overloaded elements i.e. lines, transformers/ICTs and
switchyard equipments in respective jurisdiction. Also, identify critical
lines/transformers. The details of overloaded elements should be sent to C.O.
2) Thermo vision scanning of the switchyard and important/critical and over loaded
lines should be done and appropriate action be taken immediately to attend
identified hot spots.
3) Ensure proper tightening and fitting of all joints/clamp-connectors etc.
4) Ensure healthiness of lines by making use of 'TAURUS" Line Fault Analyzer Kit
whenever opportunity becomes available.
5) Identify and correct sag problems.
6) Ensure complete maintenance of line such as thorough patrolling, monkey
patrolling, tree cutting, replacement of faulty disc insulators etc.
7) In the event of overloading of transformers / ICT's, EHV transmission lines,
possibility of shifting of such load to adjacent substations, EHV lines in order to
give relief to above said scenario may be explored in consultation with DISCOM
and MSLDC, Kalwa.

8) As a permanent solution to relieve system from such problems appropriate
proposals may be submitted to Corporate Office for further needful action.
9) The progress of ongoing project works proposed for evacuation of power from
upcoming generation in coming years, for transfer of power, for system
strengthening should be monitored scrupulously to relieve the system from
overloading.
As such utmost care and precautions need to be taken to avoid any kind of
tripping/breakdown on account of increased loading conditions. All out efforts must
be put in to extend uninterrupted supply to DISCOM network.
Sd/-
Copy s. w. rs. to:
The CMD, MSETCL, C.O.
Copy to:
1. The E.D. (Operations), MSETCL, C.O.
2. The C.E. EHV CC O&M Zone, MSETCL, Amravati / A'bad / Karad / Nashik / Nagpur /
Pune / Vashi.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/DIR (Ops)/GTC/2317 Dated: 14.02.2013
Sub: Guidelines regarding Leakage Current Measurement of Lightning Arresters.
A review of EHV equipment failures reveals that the incidents of LA failures are more
in numbers. Lightning Arresters are subject to rigorous duty during monsoon due to
recurring lightning discharges of atmospheric origin. The matter was discussed during O & M
Review Meeting held at C.O. on 31.01.2013 and following guidelines are issued to the field
staff to ensure secure performance of Lightning Arresters during monsoon:
1. Take the LCM of the LAs preferably before the onset of monsoon (i.e. in the m/o May-
June).
2. The defective LAs so detected should be replaced prior to the monsoon.
3. For identifying the LAs that have become weak due to severe lightning strokes during
monsoon, LCM of the LAs should be re-confirmed immediately after the monsoon (i.e.
in the m/o October-November).
4. The defective LAs so detected should be replaced immediately after monsoon.
5. The dates of LCM measurement, the atmospheric / system condition etc should be
incorporated in the failure report of LAs apart from other information such as make,
type, date of commissioning, service life etc. for proper analysis of the LA failure.
Above practice should be followed strictly by all field offices. Necessary instructions
should be issued to the field offices accordingly.
Sd/-
To,
1. The C.E., EHV CC (O&M) Zone, MSETCL, Amravati/ Aurangabad / Karad / Nagpur /
Nashik/ Pune/ Vashi.
2. The S.E., EHV (O&M) Circle, MSETCL, Amravati / Aurangabad / Parli/ Karad/
Kolhapur/ Nagpur / Chandrapur/ HVDC Chandrapur/Nashik/Bhusawal/ Pune /
Solapur / Kalwa/ Panvel /HVDC Padghe.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/Tr (O&M)/SE-I/GTC/5157 Dated: 06.05.2014
Sub: Guidelines for test frequency of various protection schemes & diagnostic testing
of EHV equipments.
MSETCL has adopted the concept of predictive & proactive maintenance practices
instead of earlier periodic maintenance practices, to maintain the transmission lines & sub-
station equipments in healthy condition. To achieve this, MSETCL has procured & provided
various types of modern & state of the art testing and measuring equipments to our
engineers, so that functionality & healthiness of various EHV equipments & transmission
lines can be monitored from time to time and suitable remedial action can be taken before
any major occurrence takes place.
The issue of formulation of test frequency of various diagnostic testing activities &
protection schemes in respect of EHV equipments was under consideration at CO. The issue
was discussed in detail in SPC meeting held on 05.03.2014 at CO & guidelines for the same
have been circulated along with MOM to field offices. However, during meeting held on
29.04.2014 at CO all SE TCCs requested to make some amendment in guidelines & presented
proper justification for the same. After detailed discussions & deliberation on the various
issues, necessary modifications have been made & test frequency for various diagnostic
testing activities & protection schemes in respect of EHV equipment, their limiting values &
action to be taken has been finalized. A copy of the same is enclosed herewith for reference,
record & further needful action. All Zonal CE, SE, TCCs & SE (O&M) are directed to take
necessary actions accordingly & ensure that these guidelines are followed scrupulously
henceforth from the date of issue of this circular. Sd/-
Encl.: As above
Copy to:
1. Executive Director (Operations/Projects) MSETCL, CO, Mumbai
2. The Chief Engineer Tr. (P&D) MSETCL CO, Mumbai
3. The Chief Engineer, EHV O&M Zone, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad/Karad/Nagpur/
Nashik/Pune/Vashi
Bhusawal/Chandrapur/HVDC Chandrapur/HVDC Padghe/Kalwa/Karad/Kolhapur/
Nagpur/Nasik/Panvel/Parli/Pune/ Solapur.
6. The TA to CMD, MSETCL, CO, Mumbai.

Test frequency of various Protection schemes & Diagnostic testing of EHV equipment
Sr. Equipment Testing Activity Testing To be done by Limiting values & Actions
No. Frequency
1 ICT / Bushings - Yearly Testing Team 1. 1.
Capacitance: -5% to +10%
Transformers / C & tan-delta 2. 2.
Tan-delta: 0.7%
Shunt Reactors (400kV & 220kV) 3. 3.
Rate of rise of Tan-d is 0.1%per year (max).
4. 4.In case when Tan-delta or capacitance values
exceeds above limits, follow up measurement
should be carried out for next two quarters &
replacement decision to be taken on the basis
2 Bushings - Yearly O&M Team
of rate of change observed.
C & tan-delta
5. 5. However, if the Tan-delta value is more than 1%
(132kV & below)
at any time replacement of bushing to be done
immediately.
3 Winding - 2 Yearly Testing Team 6. 1. Measured values should be compared with
C & tan-delta factory test results or initial site commissioning
(400kV & 220kV) values.
7. 2. Any change in Capacitance of -5% to +10% or
Tan-delta more than 0.7%, further action to be
4 Winding - 2 Yearly O&M Team decided in relation with transformer test & oil
C & tan-delta test results. This analysis of data & further
(132kV & below) action to be decided by SE, TCC & SE O&M
jointly.
5 Winding Resistance 4 Yearly & As Testing Team ±5% difference between phases or from factory
and when tests. (Resistance converted to 75°C)
required

6 ICT / SFRA 5 Yearly & As Testing Team 8. 1. Signature should be compared with factory test
Transformers / and when results or initial site commissioning signature.
Shunt Reactors required 2. ±3dB or more change in the following frequency
range to be considered for further analysis:
1. 5Hz to 2KHz
2. 50Hz to 20KHz
3. 500Hz to 2MHz
4. 25Hz to 10MHz
7 IR & PI Yearly O&M Team 1. Min. desired IR at 1 min. @30°C = 500MΩ
measurement 2. PI:
1. Less than 1 : dangerous
2. 1.25 to 2 : fair
3. 2 to 4 : good
4. above 4 : Excellent
8 DGA __ ICT & Quarterly for O&M Team
Reactor first year on
commissioning
& then
subsequently
half yearly
9 DGA __ Power Quarterly for O&M Team
Transformer first year on
commissioning
& then
subsequently
half yearly
10 Oil parameter test Yearly O&M Team

11 ICT / Excitation current 2 Yearly 1. Testing Team
Transformers / measurement @ (for 220kV &
Shunt Reactors 10kV above)
2. O&M Team (for
132kV & below)
12 Cooling system trial Half Yearly O&M Team
13 Auxiliary Yearly O&M Team
Protection trial
14 Dielectric 2 Yearly Testing Team % moisture by dry weight in paper (wp):
Frequency 1. Dry : 0.5 to 1 %
Response (DFR) 2. Normal in operation : less than 2%
3. Wet : 2 to 4 %
4. Extremely wet : greater than 4.5%
15 Furan Analysis As & when O&M Team
required
16 Tap changer 2 yearly O&M Team
(OLTC) continuity
test
17 LA Leakage Current Half Yearly O&M Team Third Harmonic Resistive Current component:
(Third Harmonic (before & after 1. For new LA: Up to 30μA
Resistive Current) monsoon) 2. For LA in service
measurement a. Up to 150μA : normal
b. 150 – 350 μA : Take stack wise IR Values and
replace the faulty stack of LA.
c. Beyond 350 μA : Replace complete LA

18 CT Capacitance & tan- 2 Yearly O&M Team in 1. Capacitance: -5% to +10%
d of 400kV association with 2. Tan-delta: 0.7%
400kV Testing 3. Rate of rise of Tan-d is 0.1%per year (max).
Unit 4. In case when Tan-delta or capacitance
19 Capacitance & tan- Yearly 1. TF & ICT bays: values exceeds above limits, follow up
d of 220kV at major Testing Team measurement should be carried out for next
/ important s/s 2. All other bays: two quarters & replacement decision to be
O&M Team taken on the basis of rate of change
20 Capacitance & tan- 2 Yearly O&M Capacitance: -5% to +10%
d of all other EHV Team
CT (66kV to 220kV)
21 CVT Capacitance & tan- 2 Yearly O&M Team in 1. Capacitance: 2%
d association with 2. Tan-delta: 0.007 or +0.002 variation from
400kV Testing factory test result or commissioning value
team 3. In case when capacitance values exceeds
22 Measurement of Quarterly O&M Team in above limits, follow up measurement should
secondary voltage association with be carried out for yearly & replacement
at C & R Panels 400kV Testing decision to be taken if value varies by ±6%.
team 4. In case when Tan-delta values exceeds
above limits, follow up measurement should
be carried out for yearly & replacement
decision to be taken if value changes by +
0.003 along with change in capacitance &
drift in secondary voltage.
5. CVT Voltage Ratio Error:
±5% protection core
±0.5% metering core

23 PT IR Value, During bus Testing Team
Magnetizing outage
current & Primary
winding resistance
measurement
24 Circuit Breaker Contact Resistance 2 Yearly O&M 1. 400kV : 50μΩ
Measurement Team 2. 220kV : 100 μΩ
(CRM) for EHV CB 3. 132/100/66/33/22/11kV : 100 μΩ
25 Contact Resistance Yearly O&M

Measurement Team
(CRM) for HV CB
26 Timing for EHV CB 2 Yearly O&M 400kV 220kV 132kV & below
Team Close: 150 150 150 (ms)
Trip: 25 35 45 (ms)
27 Timing for HV CB Yearly O&M
Team
28 DCRM of 400kV During Testing Team
commissioning
& then 2 Yearly
29 DCRM of 220kV During Testing Team
major/important commissioning
s/s & then as &
when required
30 DCRM of all other During Testing Team
EHV s/s commissioning
& then as &
when required

31 Circuit Breaker Dew point in SF6 2 Yearly O&M
gas Team
32 IR Measurement 2 Yearly O&M
for EHV breaker Team
33 IR Measurement Yearly O&M
for HV breaker Team
34 Relays Bus-bar 1 Yearly after Testing Team 1. The test procedures should include through
commissioning functional scheme testing.
& subsequent 2. For electromechanical / static relays except
after 3 year bus bar, Yearly testing to be carried out.
35 LBB 1 Yearly after Testing Team
commissioning
& subsequent
after 3 year
36 Distance 2 Yearly Testing Team
37 Differential 2 Yearly Testing Team
38 Back up 2 Yearly Testing Team
39 Battery Capacity test Yearly O&M Team
40 Impedance Yearly O&M Team
measurement
41 EHV Line Line signature test Yearly & line Line
breakdown maintenance
Team
42 Fault locator Line break Line
down maintenance
Team
43 PID for critical line 3 Yearly Line
maintenance
Team

44 EHV Line PID for line facing immediately Line
insulator failure maintenance
problems Team
45 Thermo scanning of Yearly Line
critical lines maintenance
Team
46 Tower footing 3 Yearly during Line
resistance dry season maintenance
measurement Team
47 Monkey patrolling Yearly Line
of critical lines maintenance
Team
48 Monkey patrolling As & when Line
of other lines required maintenance
Team
49 Substation Thermo scanning of Monthly O&M Team
critical s/s
50 Thermo scanning of 2 Monthly O&M Team
non- critical s/s
51 Earth Resistance Yearly & as and O&M Team
Measurement when required
Note:
1) Where ever specific limiting values & actions are not suggested; same should be decided in consultation with S.E., TCC.
2) Identification of Major / Important substations should be done by respective zonal Chief Engineer in consultation with S.E., TCC & S.E. EHV
(O&M).
3) If required, separate teams out of existing Engineers & Staff be created for each EHV (O&M) Circle to carry out certain activities, Necessary
training to these teams to be Imparted by S.E., TCCs.
4) Diagnostic measurement activities except DGA, Oil parameter test & Furan to be carried out departmentally. While efforts should be made to
make extensive use of available Kelman kit for DGA measurement.
Chief Engineer (Trans. O&M)

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/DIR (Ops)/GTC/5319 Dated: 20.04.2015
To,
The Chief Engineer,
EHV CC O&M Zone, MSETCL,
Amravati/Aurangabad/Karad/Nagpur/Nasik/Pune/Vashi
Sub: Periodic Calibration of Diagnostic Testing Equipment in MSETCL.
MSETCL has a wide range of advance Diagnostic Testing Equipments used to

periodically carry out breakdown & routine testing for the high value EHV equipments and
EHV lines. Major decisions regarding the healthiness of the EHV equipment are taken based
on these test results. Periodically calibrating these diagnostic testing equipment as per
manufacturer’s recommendation is of utmost importance to ensure accurate readings from
these test equipment and in turn to support correct decision making process based on these
test results.
The need of formulation of standard policy is therefore felt so as to carry out Periodic
Calibration of Diagnostic Testing Equipment throughout MSETCL as per recommendations of
respective manufacturer. Recording the Calibration results so obtained in SAP system will
also help the organization to track the status of these diagnostic testing equipments. In view
of the above, Calibration in respect of following critical measuring instruments should be
carried out at intervals recommended by the manufacturer:
1. Capacitance and Tan delta Kit.

2. CB Timing kit.
3. SFRA.
4. Portable DGA Kit.
5. Digital insulation Tester
6. LCM Kit
7. PID Test Kit
Automated Calibration Inspection Process will be introduced in SAP system shortly.
Sd/-
Copy s. w. r. to:
The Director (Operations), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai.
Copy to:
Chief Engineer (HRD)/Trans. O&M, MSETCL, Mumbai.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/DIR (Ops)/Tr. (O&M)/SE-I/EE-III/12137 Dated: 15.09.2015
Sub: Ensuring healthiness of spare Transformers & ICTs before putting it into
service.
Ref: L. No MSETCL/CO/CE/SE-I/EE-III/10708 Dated 03.09.2014 from C.E., TR. (O&M),
C.O. Mumbai.
In connection with above subject, vide letter cited under reference, it was directed to
ensure availability of two numbers of 25MVA. 132/11 kV OR 25MVA, 132/33 kV Power
Transformers in each zone to meet the emergency situation arising in the event of failure/
problem in the existing in-service Transformers. Moreover, filed offices are keeping Power
Transformers / ICTs as spare on need based basis to meet the emergency situation at any
time. Such Transformers are kept spare either after suitable conversions, repairs or major
overhauling in ready condition so that the same can be utilized as and when required. OFF
late, it is observed that such spare Transformers / ICTs are not getting utilized within
guarantee period & in many cases the guarantee after conversion/repair/overhauling works
gets expired.
As such, when such Transformers / ICTs are put into service after expiry of guarantee
period, the guarantee from repairers cannot be claimed also. Moreover as the Transformers
/ICTs remains unutilized for a prolonged period, its healthiness also becomes
doubtful/suspicious. Hence, whenever such Transformers / ICTs are to be used/put into
service after prolonged period, their healthiness need to be ensured/confirmed, If
required, filtration / testing may be required to be carried out & expenditure incurred
thereon shall be borne by MSETCL as R&M expenditure.
Further, it is directed to explore the possibility of utilization of spare
Transformers/ICTs within guarantee period wherever & whenever possible to avail the
benefit of guarantee period.
Sd/-
Copy to:
1. The Chief Engineer, EHV CC O&M Zone, MSETCL, Amravati / Aurangabad /
Karad / Nagpur / Nashik / Pune / Vashi.
2. The S.E. EHV O&M Circle, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad /Parli-Vaijanath /
Karad / Kolhapur / Nagpur / HVDC Chandrapur/Chandrapur / Nashik /
Bhusawal / Pune / Solapur / HVDC Padghe / Kalwa / Panvel.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/Tr. (O&M)/SE-I/TE/2697 Dated: 09.03.2016
Sub.: Norms for procurement & availability of various Testing & Measuring
Equipments in MSETCL.
In context to the above subject, it is to mention that C.O. is procuring various Testing
& Measuring equipment required for diagnostic testing as well as periodical
checking/monitoring of healthiness of various sub-stations equipments. No policy/standard
norms were available for procurement & availability of various types of Testing & Measuring
equipment. The equipments are being procured based on requirement received from various
filed offices. Hon. CMD has directed to finalize these norms so as to have uniformity in
availability & placement of such kits in MSETCL. Accordingly, the issue of formation of norms
for procurement & availability of various Testing & Measuring equipments was discussed in
the Standing Protection Committee (SPC) meeting held on dtd. 15/01./201.6 at C.O. After
detailed discussions & deliberations, the norms for the same have been finalized in such
manner that adequate number of Testing & Measuring equipments will be available at
proper location for carrying out regular testing & diagnostic testing works in an efficient
manner. These norms have been approved by Hon" CMD & copy of approved norms is
enclosed herewith for ready reference & further needful action. It is directed to take a note
of this & henceforth ensure availability & placement of this equipment as per norms.
Sd/-
Encl: As above
Copy s. w. r. to:
The CMD, MSETCL, CO, Mumbai.
Copy to:
1. The Chief Engineer, EHV O&M Zone, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad/Karad/Nagpur/
Nashik/Pune/Vashi
2. The Chief Engineer Tr. (P&D) MSETCL CO, Mumbai
3. The Chief Engineer, (procurement) Prakeshgad Bandra (E) Mumbai.
5. The TA to CMD, MSETCL, CO, Mumbai.

Sr. Existing Norms Norms Recommended and Finalized by
Name of the Testing Equipment
No. SPC Committee
One kit for each Testing Division

One kit for each Testing &
1 Sweep Frequency Response Analyzer +
Communication Circle
One kit for each Testing & Communication Circle
One camera for each 400kV S/s

+
One camera for each Transmission Line
One camera for each 400kV
Maintenance Sub-Division/Unit
S/s &
+
2 Thermo Vision Scanning Camera 3 cameras for each EHV
For EHV (O&M) circles –
(O&M) & Transmission line
One camera for 10 EHV S/s.
maintenance Division
(If number of substations are more than 10 then
Two cameras. Further, if number of substations
are more than 20 then Three cameras and so on.)
One kit for each EHV(O&M)
3 Dissolved Gas Analyzer (Portable) Circle & each EHV (O&M) One kit for each EHV(O&M) Division
Division
One kit for each 400kV S/s
+
Fully Automatic Capacitance & Tan Delta Communication Circle & each
4 +
test kit EHV (O&M) Dn. Two kits for
Two kits for each Testing Division
each Testing Dn.
+
Two kits for each EHV(O&M) Division

+
In Testing Division - One kit per Unit/Team/Batch
5 Fully Automatic Relay test kit -
+
In Testing & Communication Circle - One kit per
Mobile Testing Unit
Circuit Breaker Analyzer
6 - +
(DCRM)
7 CRM - +
8 CB Timer - +
No Change i. e. -
One kit for each 400/220kV One kit for each 400kV S/s
S/s & One kit for each Testing +
9 DC Earth Fault Locator Dn. Further, One kit for One kit for each Testing Dn.
critical EHV S/s attached to +
power station One kit for critical EHV S/s attached to power
station

10 LCM - +

No Change i. e. -
11 Battery Health Analyzer Two kits for each zone
Two kits for each zone
12 Line Signature Analyzer - One kit for each EHV(O&M) Circle
Tower footing Impedance Measurement One kit for each Transmission Line Maintenance
13 -
kit Sub-Division/Unit
For EHV (O&M) circles –

14 Puncture Insulator Detector -
One kit for each PID Team
15 CT/PT Analyzer - Two kits for each Testing Division

16 Dielectric Frequency Response Analyzer -
Communication Circle
Transformer Winding Resistance

17 - Two kits for each Testing Division
Measurement kit
Not Required.
PD Locator with Hot line probe may be beneficial.
18 Partial Discharge Surveyor -
However, demo of the same will be required
before finalization.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/TR. (O&M)/4442 Dated: 28.04.2017
Sub: Guidelines to Balance the Load Sharing by ICT’s
It is observed that at a time ICT’s are in Parallel but load sharing by ICT’s is Not
Proportional to their capacities. This is due to the Unequal Impedances of the different make
and Capacities of these ICT’s. This unequal sharing of the load results in underutilization
of ICT’s having more impedances and Overloading of other ICT’s. Sometimes this leads to
Marginal Load Sharing of the same amount which is available in the Underutilized
Transformer.
During s/s max load condition, it is noted that the ICT having low capacity
in comparison reaches full load condition & ICT having highest capacity is under loaded
which may trigger LTS or Overload protection operation although capacity margin is
available. This is not desirable as full load capacities of the highest MVA ICTs are not fully
utilized. To avert the above situation, it is suggested to adjust the OLTC of highest capacity
ICT such that its load sharing is increased thereby reducing the load on other ICT of low
capacity.
Such exercise is successfully carried out at 400 kV BBLR s/s. as detailed in
Annexure-A All SE TCC are directed to check / study in detail & implement the above load
sharing exercise at 400 kV s/s in coordination with O&M and SLDC so that the s/s full load
capacity is effectively utilized & avoid undesirable operation of Overload tripping / LTS
operation.
All field officers are hereby directed to scrupulously follow these guidelines
henceforth. Above circular is available on the employee portal namely ep.mahatransco.in
on company’s website. Sd/-
Copy s.w.rs.to:
The CMD, MSETCL, C.O. Mumbai.
Copy f. w. cs to:
The Director (Projects), MSETCL, CO, Mumbai.
Copy to:
1. The CE (PAC) MSETCL, Kalwa
2. The CE (STU) MSETCL, CO, Mumbai
3. The CE (LD) SLDC, Kalwa
4. The CE (Tr. O&M) CO, Mumbai
5. The Chief Engineer, EHV O&M Zone, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad/Karad
/Nagpur/ Nashik/Pune/Vashi
6. The S.E. EHV O&M Circle, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad /Parli-Vaijanath /
Karad / Kolhapur / Nagpur / HVDC Chandrapur/Chandrapur / Nashik /
Bhusawal / Pune / Solapur / HVDC Padghe / Kalwa / Panvel.
7. The SE (LD) ALDC, Ambazari, Nagpur.

Annexure-A
At 400 KV Babhaleshwar S/s, there were 3 (Three) ICT’s of 2x315 MVA & 1x500 MVA. Before
commissioning of 4th ICT the Percentage Impedances of these ICT’s were mismatching
and that was resulting in Unequal Sharing of Load. Among the Three ICTs, ICT no. 1 was
reaching to its threshold (Full Load Capacity) early and the operation staff was resorting to
load shedding of 50 MW. However, 50 MW margin was available in the Third ICT of 500 MVA.
As the ICTs were in Parallel it was not possible to extract that 50 MW from Third
Underutilized ICT. With the help of Tap Changers this mismatching impedances of ICTs can
be corrected to certain extent and Load sharing can be adjusted to best Utilize the Optimum
Capacity of the ICT’s or T/f’s.
1. Case – 1: Before Matching T/F Loading:

T1 = 448 A
T2 = 422 A Total = 1475A
T3 = 605 A
No further Load possible since T/F 1 (T1) reached to threshold
2. Case – 2: After Matching T/F Loading with Changing Tap of ICT-3 by 3 taps :
T1 = 421 A
T2 = 397 A Total = 1494 A
T3 = 676 A
Load balancing with OLTC Created Margin of 105 A
3. Case – 3: T/F loaded to full load capacity

T1 = 454 A
T2 = 454 A Total = 1629 A
T3 = 721 A
The same exercise can be done at 220 & 132 kV s/s where such mismatching in
Capacity & % Z of ICT/ Power transformers exists to avert undesirable tripping/load
shedding.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/CE (PAC)/MO/732 Dated: 01.11.2017
Sub: Reporting of disturbance and allied information to SLDC / WRLDC.
Ref: 1. CE (Tr. O&M) C.O. Mumbai L. No. MSETCL/CO/Tr. (O&M)/Occurrence/ 6786

dtd.21.05.15.
2. CE (Tr. O&M) C.O. Mumbai L. No. MSETCL/CO/Tr. (O&M)/ Occur/Rev.1/ 7232
dtd.30.06.2017.
This is with reference to above subject. The CE (Tr. O&M), C.O., Mumbai vide above
informed that the disturbance are to be reported to SLDC / WRLDC in time. However
substantial time delay has been noticed while reporting of events, interruption or
disturbance to SLDC/WRLDC, which is not desirable. As such the mechanism for reporting
the disturbance events has been setup by CE (LD), so that each and every occurrence /
tripping can be reported to SLDC/WRLDC & CE PAC, as per sequence & schedule as
mentioned below:
1. Preliminary /Flash report along with DR/SEL.
1.1. Any event of tripping of EHV elements to be reported to SLDC/ALDC in oral

immediately followed by flash report by e-mail (cesldc@mahasldc.in) or fax
within one hours as per format. This information is to be submitted by sub-
station in-charge / shift In-charge.
1.2. As per circular under reference (2), the reporting of occurrences/incidences is
to be carried out immediately to SE (Protection) & EE (Protection) PAC.
This should be followed spuriously.
1.3. The Preliminary report along with DR/SEL for any tripping event has to be
sent to SLDC / WRLDC / CE PAC (e-mail id cesldc@mahasldc.in /
protectionwrldc@posoco.com / cepacmsetcl@gmail.com /
seprotectionmsetcl@gmail.com) within 24hrs of the event / tripping took
place. The Superintending Engineer (TCC) has to submit the DR/SEL to SLDC /
WRLDC under intimation to this office as per preliminary report format
circulated by this office.
The non – submission of DR/SEL is non compliance of IEGC Section –
5.2(r) and CEA grid standard 15.3 regulations.

2. Detailed Analysis Report:
As per the State Grid Code, Section 29.2.3, it is the responsibility of transmission
utility to provide the written report within two (2) weeks of the occurrence of the
event to SLDC / RLDC. The Superintending Engineer Testing & Communication Circle
has to submit the detailed report to SLDC / WRLDC / CE PAC (e-mail id:
cesldc@mahasldc.in / protectionwrldc@posoco.com / cepacmsetcl@gmail.com /
seprotectionmsetcl@gmail.com) within one week as per Standard major occurrence
analysis Report format.
You are therefore requested to submit the detailed tripping / event / occurrence
report invariably as per above to the SLDC / WRLDC & CE PAC on regular basis. The
Preliminary & Standard major occurrence analysis report format is enclosed herewith.
To,
1. The Superintending Engineer,
T&C, Circle, Akola/Aurangabad/Karad/Nagpur/Nashik/ Pune/ Vashi.
2. The Superintending Engineer, HVDC, R. S. (O&M) Circle, Chandrapur/Padghe.
Copy s. w. rs. to:

1. The Director (Project), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai
2. The Director (Ops), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai
Copy f. w. cs. to:
1. The Chief Engineer, EHV PC (O&M) zone, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad/
Karad/Nagpur/Nashik/Pune/Vashi.
2. The Chief Engineer, (Tr. O&M) CO, MSETCL, Mumbai.
3. The Chief Engineer, SLDC MSETCL, Kalwa.

PROTECTION, AUTOMATION & COMMUNICATION (PAC) UNIT, C.O. – AIROLI.
OCCURRENCE ANALYSIS REPORT FORMAT
1. Date & Time of Occurrence :

2. Name of Sub-station :
3. SAP Notification No. :
4. Name of Feeder (bays) / Equipments involved :
5. Date & Time of Restoration :
6. Detailed of SLD & sub-station interconnection :
7. Brief Summary of occurrence :
8. Conditions prior to Occurrence :
9. Conditions after Occurrence :
10. Bus Configuration & load Prior to occurrence :
Sr. No. ------- KV Main Bus – I ------- KV Main Bus – II

Name of bays Loads (MW) Name of bays Loads (MW)
(Feeder/ ICTs/TFs) (Feeder/ ICTs/TFs)
11. Load/Power loss and / or generation (In MW)

Interrupted and duration of interruption :
12. Load/Power loss due to operation of Load Trimming Scheme (LTS)/Special Protection
Scheme (SPS)/Under Voltage Load Trimming Scheme (UVLS).
a) Please specify whether existing Load trimming /SPS/ UVLS schemes if any, are serving
intended purpose.
b) Please specify whether load trimming scheme or special protection scheme operated as
desired or Nonoperation/maloperation, any modifications in LTS/SPS required.
c) Please specify Settings adopted for LTS/SPS/UVLS & revision required, if any.

Sr. No. Name of Feeder/bays Load Relief obtained
FROM TO Duration MW
13. Relay/Flag Indications :
Sr. No. Name of Local End Indication Remote End Indication

Feeder/bays
WI RI WI RI
14. Performance & Indication of PLCC :
Sr. Name Local End Remote End

No of Permissi Permissi Direct Direct Permiss Permiss Direct Direct
. Feed ve trip - ve trip - trip-I trip-II ive trip ive trip trip-I trip-II
er/ I II -I - II
bays
Tx Rx Tx Rx Tx Rx Tx Rx Tx Rx Tx Rx Tx Rx Tx R
x
(Please specify whether advancement of counter after operation during occurrence

observed)

15. Restoration :
Sr. No. Name of Date & Time Duration Remark

Feeder/bays (hrs)
From To
16. System data including soft copies of DRs (in Comtrade format _ cfg & dat file, of both end in
case of line), Event Logger (EL) log and relevant data related to occurrence of SMS, SAS &
SCADA. :
17. Observations & Analysis of occurrence :
18. Sequence of Events :

a) Line trippings & Restoration
b) ICT/TF trippings & Restoration
c) Relay Operations observed
19. Diagnostic test records of Equipments/lines including recent ones in soft. Past trends of
diagnostic testing results if results are alarming along with action taken or proposed.
20. Protection related issue if any :

a) Non operation of protection system & reason for the same
b) Maloperation of protection system & reason for the same
c) Protection system Non operation/Maloperation due to human error
21. Operational issues leading to Nonoperation/Maloperation of protection system, if any
22. Remedial Measures suggested & action taken in order to avoid recurrence.

PROTECTION, AUTOMATION & COMMUNICATION (PAC) UNIT, C.O. – AIROLI.
MAJOR OCCURRENCE PRELIMINARY REPORT FORMAT

Note: This report is to be submitted within 24hrs of occurrence to ce (pac) e-mail id: cepac@mahatransco.in &
cepac_msetcl@gmail.com
Indications Indications Equipm Wheth
Name of Occurrence Restoration
at Local end at remote Nature of Discrepan ent er
Feeder/ICT date/ time date/time
Name S/S end S/S Fault cy if any involve Tech DR/SL
/TF
Sr. of the Name (BB/LBB (Malopera d nical D
(765/400/
No. Zone/ of S/S Operation/ tion/Non (for Anal enclose
220/132/1
Circle Date Time Date Time W.I. R.I W.I. R.I multicircuit Operation causing ysis d
10/100
tripping) ) fault in (Yes/N
/66kV)
system) o)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

HUMAN ERROR
SPC_10.04.2007
Sub: Guidelines for precaution to be taken during outage to avoid bus-bar

operation at EHV sub-station.
An occurrence took place at 400kV Kolhapur (Talandage) sub-station on 30.10.2006,

the 220 KV Busbar protection of Main Bus -I operated while closing Earth Isolator of 220 KV
Mumewadi line, which was in charged condition from Halkarni end. The Busbar protection
has operated correctly and the occurrence took place due to wrong operation.
Similar occurrence took place at 220kV Chalisgaon sub-station on 27.01.2007;
wherein operator on duty closed the Earth Isolator of 132kV Dhule line which was in charged
condition instead of opening of Earth Isolator of 132kV Chalisgaon line which was under
outage for CT replacement work. In this case the 132kV Bus bar protection did not operate at
220kV Chalisgaon sub-station. The occurrence took place due to gross negligence of
operating staff and wrong operation. After investigation of non operation of bus bar
protection (EE makes type CAG), it was observed that auxiliary CTs were used for ICTs
(whose CTR was 800/1A) to match the CT ratio of 400/1A used for bus bar protection. The
auxiliary CT’s might have saturated during the incidence leading to non-operation of Bus-bar
protection scheme.
1.0. Instruction regarding Network / Circuit changes to be displayed clearly on the
control panel at both the ends.
2.0. Major changes and proper instructions should be recorded in instruction
register/manual or log book kept in the substation and these are to be carried
forward in next shift so that the operating staffs are aware of the situation.
3.0. Auxiliary CT’s should not be used in high impedance schemes particularly EE
make CAG type bus bar protection schemes & should be removed immediately
wherever it was used.
4.0. For EE make CAG type bus bar protection, CTR of all feeders/ICTs/ TFs shall be
same.
5.0. Proper functioning of mechanical interlock of isolator and earth switch should
be ensured and checked periodically.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/Tr. (O&M)/Occur/13842 Dated: 07.10.2009
Sub: Incidence of tripping of 400kV lines & ICTs/TFs on account of human error,
lapses, lack of adequate care while working in C&R panels etc.
It is noticed that the incidents of tripping of 400KV lines and ICTs / Transformer on
account of human error, lapses, lack of adequate care while working in C & R panels etc., have
increased considerably in recent time. During this month, following three such occurrences
took place, which could have been avoided, had proper precaution and care been taken while
working.
(i) Tripping of 400KV Aurangabad - Bhusawal Circuit while attending PLCC
Problems at Aurangabad end.
(ii) Tripping of 400KV Kalwa - Padghe Circuit while carrying out cable dressing
work in the RP at Kalwa end.
(iii) Tripping of 400KV Kolhapur-Karad Circuit - Il while assigning relay setting at
Kolhapur end.
Such incidents are highly undesirable as it leads to unnecessary interruptions which
could be dangerous sometimes as it hampers system stability, security and reliability.
Also, tripping of heavily loaded lines on account of such mistakes may invite a major
disturbance / occurrence. It is; therefore, felt that due care and proper precautions should be
taken particularly while working in C & R panels, PLCC panels etc. Such important and
sensitive works should always be carried out under strict supervision of expert testing /
telecom engineers.
It is, therefore, requested to instruct concerned Testing & Telecom Divisions,
Testing/Telecom/Sub-Divisions/Units under your jurisdiction to avoid casual approach
while working in live panels and take extreme care and precautions to avoid inadvertent
trippings of lines / ICTs, Transformers etc.
These instructions should be followed scrupulously with immediate effect.
Sd/-
To:
The Chief Engineer, EHV CC (O&M) Zone, MSETCL, Amravati/Aurangabad / Karad /
Nashik / Nagpur/Pune /Vashi.
Copy s. w. rs. to:
The Director (Operations), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai.
Copy to:
The S.E., T&C, Circle. MSETCL, Akola/Aurangabad/Karad/Nashik/Nagpur/
Pune/Vashi.
SPC_09.02.2011
Sub: Guidelines for occurrence at EHV sub-station.
At 220kV Dondaicha substation, on 30/11/2010, at 11:04 Hrs., Busbar protection

operated with ‘U’ flag indication without any phase indication and tripped all the feeders
connected to 220kV Bus except 220/132kV ICT II connected to 220kV Bus. On detailed
inspection, a rat was found in the Busbar panel and that might have caused the shorting
which resulted in operation of Busbar Protection. Further, the insulation of some wires was
found damaged. The 220/132kV, 100 MVA ICT-II did not trip due to the cutting of the trip
wire by rat. After replacing the damaged wires, normalcy of all the 220kV bays was restored.
It was also informed that Vermin proofing of the said panel was done after the occurrence.
The occurrence took place due to poor maintenance & negligence of O&M staff.
After detailed discussions on the issue, to avoid such type of occurrence in future, the
committee recommended that
1.0. Proper Vermin proofing of all C & R panels should be ensured at all EHV S/S to
avoid such occurrences in future.
2.0. O&M staff should ensure that the doors/covers etc. of all C & R panels are
intact & properly closed.
3.0. Regular check should be done to ensure compliance of above
recommendations.

Circular No. MSETCL/CO/CE (PAC)/MO/552 Dated: 15.07.2017
Sub: Non operation of 400kV bus-bar protection scheme at 400kV Jejuri s/s _
necessary precaution to be taken thereof.
Ref: T. O. L. No. MSETCL/CO/CE (PAC)/MO/510 dtd. 21.06.2017
This is with reference to above subject. On 01.06.2017, B-ph string insulator of 400kV
Main bus-I flashover at 400kV Jejuri sub-station, creating bus fault in the system. However
the 400kV bus-bar protection scheme RADSS, ABB make failed to operate resulted into
failure of total power supply. The one & half CB bus arrangement is provided at 400kV Jejuri
sub-station. After detailed checking & testing of non operation of bus bar, it was observed the
shorting of the CT terminals of the under construction bay at the terminal blocks with
disconnecting type of terminal through, resulted in the shorting of primary of the aux. CT of
all three phases with the ground which in turn provided an alternate low impedance path to
the fault current therefore resulting in non operation of the relay. In view of this non
operation of bus bar, it is imperative to take necessary precautions viz. shorting of CT
terminal blocks towards the yard side & dropping of disconnecting type link for the single
bus & one and half breaker arrangement with no CT switching arrangement for any
spare/under construction bay in bus bar panels to avoid the non operation of bus bar
protection schemes in future.
In view of the above, it is requested to pass on or circulate the necessary instruction to
field in order so as to avoid the non operation of bus bar protection in future.
To,
T&C, Circle, Akola/Aurangabad/Karad/Nagpur/Nashik/ Pune/ Vashi.

HVDC, R. S. (O&M) Circle, Chandrapur/Padghe.
Copy s. w. rs. to:

The Director (Op), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai
Copy f. w. cs. to:
1. The Chief Engineer, EHV PC (O&M) zone, MSETCL, Amravati / Aurangabad / Karad
/ Nagpur/ Nasik / Pune / Vashi.
2. The Chief Engineer, (LD) MSEDCL, Airoli/ (Tr. O&M) CO Mumbai.

Copy to:
1. The Executive Engineer, EHV Testing Division, Akola/Yavatmal/

Aurangabad/Latur/Nanded/Karad/Kolhapur/Ratnagiri/Nagpur/HVDC T&T,
Nagpur/Ballarshah/ Nashik/Dhule/Pune/Solapur/Kalwa/Panvel/ HVDC T&T,
Padghe.
2. The Addl. Executive Engineer, 400kV Testing Unit, Akola/Waluj/ Tapthitanda/

Girwali/ Kumbhargaon/765kV Ektuni/ Karad/ Talandage/ New Koyna/ Koradi
GCR/Khaparkheda/Koradi-II/ Warora/ HVDC Chandrapur/GCR Chandrapur/
Chandrapur-II / Chandrapur switching/ Khadka/ Babhaleshwar/ Dhule
/Deepnagar / Lonikand-I/ Lonikand-II/ Lamboti/ Chakan /Jejuri/ Kalwa/
Padghe/ Kharghar /Nagothane.

Maharashtra State Electricity Transmission Co.. Ltd.
“Prakashganga”, Plot no. C-19, E’-Block, Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra (East), Mumbai- 400051

SPC - Guidelines & Circular

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INDEX

Sr. Category Circular No. Date Subject Page

OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER (PAC) CO AIROLI 2

35. MSETCL/CO/Tr 06.05.2014 Guidelines for test frequency of

OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER (PAC) CO AIROLI 3

An occurrence took place at 220kV Trombay sub-station on dtd. 29.03.2007 &

Similar non operation of bus-bar protection at 220kV Apta sub-station observed on

In view of above occurrences, following guidelines are issued which need to be

OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER (PAC) CO AIROLI 5

Sub: Guidelines to avoid operation of bus-bar protection due to dislocation of IPS

tube at 400kV sub-station.

An occurrence took place at 400kV Girawali sub-station on 07.10.2008, wherein the

at the location of the fault at that time.

following at all 400KV s/s.

2.0. Periodical thermo vision inspection of Nut-Bolts, joints should be done.

OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER (PAC) CO AIROLI 6

Sub: Modifications in Bus-bar protection scheme type RADSS of M/s ABB.

Modification in ABB RADSS Busbar Trip Scheme.

OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER (PAC) CO AIROLI 7

All S. E., TCCs were directed to implement the modified scheme

OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER (PAC) CO AIROLI 8

Sub: Guidelines for avoiding operation of bus-bar protection & precaution to be

An occurrence took place at 220kV Boisar sub-station on 17.06.2013, wherein 132kV

I) 2 Main + 1 Transfer bus arrangement

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Sub: Mal-operation of ABB make REB 670/REB500 bus-bar protection scheme

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Sr. No. Bay Name Group/Parameter PC Value

2 ZoneSel Fixed TO ZA & ZB _

3 ZoneSwitching Conditionally Force out

4 CheckZoneSel Connected Not Connected

6 Bus-coupler bay tZeroCurrent 0.200 _

9 ZoneSel Fixed TO ZA & ZB _

11 Line/ICT/TF CheckZoneSel Connected _

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19 TBC bay tTripPulse 0.200 _

The snapshot of parameter setting is attached as Annexure.

The Director (Proj. / Ops), MSETCL, C.O., Mumbai

Copy f. w. cs. to:

The Executive Engineer, EHV Testing Division, Akola/ Yavatmal/ Aurangabad

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Disconnect /open this link

Bay Name: - Feeder/IC/TF bay

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Bay Name: - TBC bay

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In view of the recent occurrences of maloperation of LBB scheme at 400kV Padghe,

Guidelines for Settings:

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Sr. Bus arrangement Stage-I trip Stage-II trip Remark

Trip both Ensure that direct

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Trip all CBs

3. General application aspects:

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4.2 765kV/400kV/220kV Lines employing single phase auto-reclosing, the

4.5 The LBB initiation Matrix shall be as follows:

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Transmission Backup OC +EF Prot X √ √

Backup OC +EF Prot X √ √

ICT/TF BU Impedance Prot X √ √

TF Auxiliary Prot Trip X √ √