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Can affirmative action be morally justified? A critical analysis of Anderson’s four

models of affirmative action
Introduction
For the purpose of this paper, the definition of affirmative action to which I refer to
for the entirety of my project is that which was put forward by Roberta Ann Johnson
and is as highlighted below:
“Affirmative action is a generic term for programmes which take some kind of
initiative either voluntarily or under the compulsion of law, to increase, maintain, or
rearrange the number or status of certain group members usually defined by race or
gender within a larger group” (Johnson, 1990, 77).
The reason I adopt such an open-ended definition of affirmative action is that there
are weak programmes that one might take in the name of affirmative action as well as
stronger, more controversial ones. For example, making sure that women are
encouraged to apply to vote is a kind of initiative that seeks to increase the status of
women in society but is a weak initiative. The definition above encompasses both the
weak and the strong affirmative action initiatives however, for the purpose of my
paper, I shall focus solely on strong affirmative action initiatives such as those set in
the work place as well as in educational institutions. This paper will be primarily
concerned with Elizabeth Anderson’s four models of affirmative action –
compensatory, diversity, discrimination blocking, and integrative (Anderson, 2010).
These models are the moral justifications of affirmative action usually put forward by
scholars in the literature. In the literature, the main argument against affirmative
action is that it is fundamentally unfair against non-historically marginalised groups-
primarily white males and as such; it cannot be morally justified (Walzer, 1983;
Newton, 1973; Posner, 1993). What follows from Anderson’s work in her book, “The
Imperative of Integration”, is an analysis of the aforementioned four justifications of
affirmative action in which she dismisses both the compensatory and diversity models
for not having strong normative bases for justifying affirmative action, and champions
the integrative model as the primary justification for affirmative action (Anderson,
2010).
The Integrative justification of affirmative action is the idea that the root cause of
systematic disadvantages is segregation and physical integration is a way of
addressing this problem (Anderson, 2010, 148). According to Anderson, physical
integration undermines certain latent biases that people have towards particular
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groups in the society as a whole, most notably racial minorities. These biases are
ones, which have been formed as a result of different groups living separately, being
ignorant of each other, and ultimately misjudging the other–with the minority groups
being seriously negatively impacted on. For Anderson, having these marginalised
groups intermingle with the rest of society– living and working together within the
same space, sharing various networks, and thus having access to the same important
social goods, will dismantle these latent biases. Anderson however, primarily
concentrates on the issue of affirmative action as it relates to race and as such, there is
a gap in her argument that becomes obvious in her defence of the integrative model.
She relies heavily on the role integration plays in dismantling latent biases
nonetheless; the continually strong presence of gender biases in current society
establishes that integration might not necessarily combat latent racial biases.
Arguably, marriage is the quintessential form of physical integration and has been
around for over centuries. Its existence though, has done next to nothing to combat
negative gender stereotypes. As such, an argument from physical integration alone as
opposed to being a point for the justification of affirmative action backfires against it.
Thus, the aim of my paper is to further the current literature on affirmative action, as
well as demonstrate that Anderson might be too pessimistic about the other moral
bases of affirmative action.
In this paper, I argue that there is a plurality of arguments for affirmative action, and
they are all important to justifying it. In other words, all the theories for the
justification of affirmative action are relevant, and with the appropriate underwriting
educational framework, they could all be valid. I emphasize on education and its role
because; thinking about affirmative action with an educational framing in mind, rather
than in the workplace, provides greater context as to why affirmative action can be
morally justified. In the literature, a general weary implicit in the various arguments
made against affirmative action is that (particularly in the workplace) affirmative
action is conducted in such a way that people do not really understand what its
purpose is. This is evident in empirical arguments such as, “affirmative action is
unjust as it places ‘unfair’ burdens on those who have not engaged in discrimination”
(Gross, 1994, 255-260). This weary could help explain why affirmative action does
not seem to be particularly productive at dismantling racist attitudes. However, an
educational setting is exactly the kind of setting where one can talk about affirmative
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action and really be introspective about why it is happening and what the rationales
are. I shall elaborate on this point further in later paragraphs.
In the sections below, I shall make an argument parallel to that which Anderson
makes. That is, I shall I) give a brief general outline of the compensatory model.
Following from that, I shall elaborate upon one of the arguments made by Anderson
against it and respond to the argument, addressing possible counter-responses along
the way. II) I shall give a brief general outline of the diversity model and also
elaborate on one of Anderson’s arguments against it, counter the argument, and
address possible counter-responses. III) I shall re-examine Anderson’s arguments on
the discrimination-blocking model and expand on it, addressing possible counter-
responses along the way. IV) I shall critically analyse Anderson’s take on the
integrative model, uphold its strong points, and highlight its flaws. Finally, V) I shall
proceed to discuss the point and purpose of higher education as it relates to
affirmative action in order to supplement the integrative model justification, thus
offering a unified theory of affirmative action.

The Compensatory Model

The compensatory model of affirmative action is a backward looking model that
operates on the moral principle of corrective justice. The corrective justice principle is
to the effect that; if a person (A) is responsible for harming a person (B) by way of
wrongful conduct, then A is morally liable and as such, has a responsibility to make
amends to B (Forde-Mazrui, 2004, 692). Thus the compensatory justification of
affirmative action starts from the position that someone, or a group of people have a
moral responsibility to remedy past discrimination, primarily against historically
marginalised groups. Since ethnic minorities and women have historically been the
victims of discrimination, the compensatory model dictates that they, as beneficiaries,
are entitled to the remedy of compensation. This model is captured clearly in the
illustration below:
All things being equal, the University of Mordor might choose to admit Miss Arwen
Williams, a less qualified Black-British Woman, over Mr Frodo Baggins, a more
qualified Caucasian Male because of the mere fact that Miss Arwen is a female and/or
comes from an ethnic minority group (Kershnar, 1997, 345).
Given the corrective justice principle, in an analysis of the compensatory model, two
prima facie conceptual questions that must be answered spring up. These are; what
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compensation is owed and by who (Kershnar, 1997, 350)? According to Anderson,

the type of compensation owed is the type, which comes in the form of access to
opportunities (Anderson, 2010, 135). By opportunities, Anderson refers to
socioeconomic opportunities such as educational and occupational opportunities. The
arguments made by proponents of the compensatory model is that the effect of past
discrimination is such that it is extensive and has persisted long after the events that
brought about it, manifesting into deprivation of socioeconomic opportunities from
these historically marginalised groups in present day (Raskin, 1995; Verdun, 1993).
They also argue that it is society as whole that ought to bear the cost of compensation
given that it is a collective responsibility, as opposed to a personal responsibility of
societal members that is owed to victims of historical discrimination. Both of these
arguments are often made as a pre-emptive response to those critics who would argue
that the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action, under the logic of the
compensatory model are dead, and the individuals being compensated are not the
same individuals burdened by historical injustice (Sher, 1979, 378-391). For example,
in the United States of America, discrimination against black people came about as a
result of slavery hundreds of years ago and understandably, those directly affected by
slave trade can be reasonably presumed dead. However, empirical evidence shows
that although there is a ratio of six whites to one black in America, more blacks are
dependent on welfare and twice as likely to be unemployed (Bureau of the Census,
1997; Forde-Mazrui, 2004, 695). As such, they are more likely to grow up in poverty,
have low life expectancy and experience a higher rate of crime victimisation
(Aleinikoff, 1991, 1060). The reason for this is still traceable to past discrimination,
whose effects pack a massive amount of force, oppressive and debilitating in nature
on black people such that them resorting to crime or other unproductive behaviours
cannot be fairly blamed on them (Butler, 1995,715-16).
Nonetheless, some of these critics still maintain their stance that society can no longer
be held responsible for the plight of ethnic minorities and women. Using empirical
evidence to support their conclusions, they argue that affirmative action based on the
compensatory model fosters resentment, and unfairly discriminates against innocent
white males especially, facilitating further racial and gender discord (Sowell, 1996).
An obvious counter to this is that it is an argument that holds little weight because in
the first instance, pervasive racial discrimination and gender bias already exist in
current society and as such, there is bound to be resentment stemming from latent
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racial or gender biases when say, a black female gets a good job over a white male.
This aside, it is a particularly bad argument to make because for every policy that has
a compensatory angle to it, there must always be some sort of burden placed on
innocent victims (Anderson, 2010, 139). For example, imagine to compensate for the
wrongful bombing of Iraq, the US decides to grant ‘indefinite leave to stay’ to tens of
thousands of displaced Iraqi nationals, at the expense of other innocent foreign non-
nationals who have painstakingly followed through all the procedural requirements
for a grant but yet have placed on a waiting list. There would hardly be any objections
considering the widespread nature of the injustice. “That one, for example, has neither
committed nor benefitted from any crime constitutes no claim against paying taxes
used to help victims of crime” (Anderson, 2010, 140).
Summarily, one of the strongest arguments that is generally used by defenders of the
compensatory model is the ‘rough justice’ argument (ibid; Vermuele, 2005).
Following the moral principle of corrective justice, society has a duty of justice to
compensate victims of historical injustice. Thus the rough justice argument goes; just
because compensation may come with the negative effect of placing burdens on
‘innocent’ individuals does not mean that the duty to compensate is automatically
wiped off. Due to the widespread nature of the injustice, and how costly individual
compensation would be, group compensation most adheres to the principle of
corrective justice as opposed to a refusal to compensate, absent individualised proof
of wrongdoing (Nickel, 1974). Having established that historically marginalised
groups are the beneficiaries, and why they are owed compensation in the form of
socioeconomic opportunities by the society, by virtue of a collective responsibility, I
shall now turn to one of Anderson’s primary arguments against the compensatory
model.
For Anderson, the compensatory model can be defended against obvious objections
such as the ones above, which focus on criticising the model for the common
drawbacks its non-individualistic approach to compensation brings. However,
Anderson maintains that to have a strong moral claim of entitlement, individuals, and
not groups, still remain the relevant unit (Anderson, 2010, 138). To this regards, she
argues that the compensatory model fails to give a compelling reason as to why
affirmative action is an appropriate form of compensation when in hindsight it only
benefits a small section of the population of the marginalised groups (Anderson, 2010,
140).
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For her, the reasoning becomes even less compelling as those who indeed benefit
from the affirmative action initiatives are those who are the best off among the group.
These include those individuals with enough education to prosper at the few select
higher educational institutions that do practice affirmative action; those with sufficient
experience and adequate qualifications to keep up with the demands of the large
corporations with affirmative action initiatives; and those who are already business
owners running businesses capable of executing government contracts (Anderson,
2010, 140). These individuals have the lowest standing to claim that the persisting
effects of past injustice directly affect them. For example, an ethnic minority child
from a middle-class familial background cannot reasonably expect that he or she be
given preferential treatment when trying to gain admission into a prestigious
university on the grounds that he or she has been adversely affected by past injustices.
In the same vein, a black entrepreneur cannot reasonably expect that he be given
guaranteed ‘set-asides’ for contractors on government-backed projects (Kennedy,
1985, 1333).
Nonetheless, this objection is hardly a damning objection against the compensatory
model. The underlying assumption present in this argument is that affirmative action
should primarily be targeted towards the least well off among the minority population
or to those who can best prove that they have been directly affected by past historical
injustice (Kennedy, 1985, 1333). Once again, the problem with this line of argument
is related to the widespread nature of historical injustice. As Anderson herself agrees,
an individualised conception of compensation could hardly be fruitful where there is
glaring evidence that there are victims of historical injustice but by virtue of the cost
and the impossible task of precisely identifying each one, compensation on a case-by
case basis makes little sense (Anderson, 2010, 139). Moreover, the concept of
affirmative action itself sprung out of the premise that a strategic leg up should be
given to the important sectors of the minority groups– for example, those with the
threshold ability to cope with the workload pressures of higher institutions (Kennedy,
1985, 1333). There are two major reasons for this. The first is that understanding
affirmative action in this way is effective as it undermines one major concern, that
affirmative action violates the principle of meritocracy i.e. that the best person for the
job gets the job. The illustration below highlights this point further.
Imagine two people, a person (A) and a person (B) were competing for the same
position at a major corporation– A is woman from a middle class ethnic minority and
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B is a white middle class male. At every step of the recruitment process, A and B had
similar qualifications; they both went to good universities, both graduated top of their
class, and both had relevant work experiences suited for the role they were both
competing for. However, during a written test in the final step of the recruitment
process, B scored slightly higher than A by 1%. The principle of meritocracy
presupposes equality of opportunity. Fair equality of opportunity is to the effect that
individuals with the same level of talent and ambition should have the same prospects
of success (Rawls, 1971, 63). If A got the job above B as a result of an affirmative
action initiative in place at the corporation, there will be no denying that she did merit
the role or was as competent as B. The second reason is based on the “multiplier-
effect” rationale (Brest and Oshige, 1995, 867). The multiplier-effect rationale as it
relates to affirmative action is the idea that by giving a strategic leg up to a small
group within the broader disadvantaged population, those smaller groups will in turn
confer external benefits to the rest of the population. Consider this thought experiment
below:
Imagine two people– Victor and Trey, both white and black males respectively, with
the same middle class, socioeconomic status, but both originally previously stuck on
the lowest level of the socioeconomic chain (Brest and Oshige, 1995, 868). Victor is a
reclusive and as such, is not fully integrated with the rest of his community. In
contrast to Victor, Trey is loved by his community and has strong cultural ties and
support networks within it and as such, is fully integrated. Another obvious major
difference between them is that Trey belongs to an ethnic group that is negatively
stereotyped by non-members. As people like Victor are not fully integrated with
members of their communities, a rise in their middle class status will have no impact
on members of their community beyond its normal role in the economic market (ibid,
865). Conversely, a rise in Trey’s status may benefit members of his community and
potentially undermine the stereotypes non-members have of the group. This is likely
to be the case seeing as Trey will now have at his disposal; wealth, power and
connections (Brest and Oshige, 1995, 868).
With his newly acquired wealth and connections, Trey could support his community
by, for example, investing in start-up enterprises of businesses that have a reputation
for overlooking black people. This way, he is there to oversee that members of his
group get employed and are able to upgrade their socioeconomic status. He could also
boost the status of his group members by being their link to accessing important social
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goods that could potentially alleviate their economic hardship. In the same vein, with
his power, Trey could serve as a representative outside his community for his group,
shielding his group members from discrimination; for instance, say Trey is a senior
partner at a reputable law firm, when hiring new partners, Trey’s presence and
involvement in the recruitment process brings to the table, a heightened sense of
awareness that could undermine latent biases and positively impact the decision of his
fellow partners. Hence, Anderson’s assertion that rough compensatory justice would
be better served if cash reparations were given only to the least well off in a
marginalised group is misguided (Anderson, 2010, 140).

The Diversity Model

The diversity model of affirmative action is rooted in the importance of “promoting a
robust exchange of ideas” (Bakke, 1978, 313). It is an argument from social utility as
it focuses on the benefits having a diverse array of opinion bring to mainstream
institutions that make up society. Under this model, the justice for marginalised
groups rationale is side lined, in favour of the future oriented reasoning that the point
of affirmative action should be to further the development of societal institutions
(Anderson, 2010,141). Once again, in order to analyse this model, three points need to
be established. These are: Who are the beneficiaries under this model, who owes
them, and why are they owed?
As the point of affirmative action is to develop the institutions that practice it for the
benefit of society, the beneficiaries are the underrepresented members of the society,
i.e. those who would be able to contribute to the epistemic diversity of these
institutions (Anderson, 2010, 141). Thus, under the diversity model, what is necessary
for the practice of affirmative action are beneficiaries, who again are, the best
qualified; with enough education to prosper at the educational institutions that do
practice affirmative action; or those who have sufficient experience and adequate
qualifications to keep up with the demands of the large corporations with affirmative
action initiatives; or those who are already business owners running businesses
capable of executing government contracts– in other words, the best off among the
marginalised group (Anderson, 2010, 140). The diversity model is therefore, a more
clear-cut justification of affirmative action based off on the idea of meritocracy than
the compensatory model. As such, it defeats the initial criticisms that face the
compensatory model. Its forward looking approach eliminates the prospects of it
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being criticised for fostering stigmatising notions both internally, within the minds of
the marginalised groups themselves and externally, in the eyes of the broader society.
Furthermore, this model fits in perfectly with higher educational institutions such as
universities and colleges, as well as certain workplaces such as advertising and
marketing firms, which thrives and grow on the exchange of ideas.
The benefactors under the diversity model are members of the institutions in society
whose views are already well represented (Anderson, 2010, 141). The reasoning is
self-explanatory; they are properly represented. Race and gender under this model are
used as proxies for relevant variables such as having a diversity of perspectives and
ideas, because the understanding is that people from various races and of different
genders have different life experiences, which shape their perspectives and make
whatever ideas that they come up with, dissimilar to one another. For Anderson
though, the diversity model’s divorce from justice-related concerns has left it
susceptible to various criticisms, one of which is that there is no point in using either
race or gender as a proxy for relevant features (Anderson, 2010, 143). She argues that
the model has no response to the question of why the institutions that practice
affirmative action cannot just as easily carry out tests capable of discerning those
individuals with a plethora of perspectives and a diversity of ideas. That is, if the
whole aim of wanting to include the underrepresented population of society, e.g.
ethnic minorities and females, is so as to further the development of the institutions in
the society, rather than make these features a proxy for achieving that aim, a
straightforward way of doing this is to “select directly for diverse ideas” (Anderson,
2010, 144).
As exchange of ideas that can develop the institutions in society is at the heart of the
diversity model, the racial identity of its originators should not matter. For example,
in admitting new students into its law programme, UCL could conduct interviews
asking strategic open and closed ended questions targeted towards establishing
whether the prospective students are capable of viewing things from different
perspectives and coming up with rich and diverse ideas. As Anderson further argues,
besides selecting directly for diverse ideas, in an institution like an educational
institution, the instructors and study materials can imbibe all the diversity of
information and opinion necessary to allow a student develop the ability to come up
with new and diverse ideas by themselves (Anderson, 2010, 144). For example, a law
student could be given a fictional case as part of his or her assignment to go research
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on the arguments that could be made in say, America, Saudi Arabia, Lithuania, and
Russia. From researching these four countries, he or she could come up with several
ideas on how to argue both for and against the parties involved, potentially developing
the ability to further the law pertaining to such a case should similar facts from it
come up later in real life.
However, as already established earlier, under the diversity model, affirmative action
is a forward-looking initiative that aims at furthering the development of the society
(Anderson, 2010, 141). And of course, as society is made up of several institutions,
affirmative action initiatives directly target these institutions. For as long as the aim of
affirmative action is to allow people share their diverse ideas so as to enhance
whatever particular institution they are in; for example, the workplace or educational
institutions, then Anderson has a point is arguing that this can be achieved without
using race (or even gender) as a proxy. Nevertheless, the diversity argument is much
bigger than this. The background thought behind the diversity model is the question of
what can contribute to the development of society and not what can enhance
institutions in society individually. These are two different things; what may enhance
an educational institution may not necessarily enhance a workplace institution. An
example of this is with pink-collar jobs such as secretary roles or dental assisting jobs
(Anderson, 2010, 142). Exchange of ideas can serve a university’s surface mission of
impacting knowledge on its students, enhancing the university. Being a secretary or a
dental assistant however, does not involve any exchange of ideas.
The diversity model rationalises that furthering the development of the society can be
done through the exchange of varied ideas and uses features such as race primarily as
a proxy because it is “a powerful factor that influences a person’s experiences and
perception” (Chemerinsky, 1996, 1163). For example, an African American in a
discussion about say, activism is bound to have a different insight than a white
American as a result of their very different experiences on that front. Nonetheless,
there is still far more to such features than just being a factor that shapes experiences
and perspectives. Vital to responding to Anderson’s argument that the “actual
presence of racially diverse persons are not needed”, is the concept of democracy
(Anderson, 2010, 144).
I shall explain the importance of democracy consequently but first, some definitions
are in order. Democracy refers to “the practice of collective self-determination” (Post,
1996, 8). It is a process in which members of a society exercise their autonomy to
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choose what laws and policies they want to be subjected to. Democracy is essential to
societal growth and development because it advances the common good (Freeman,
2000, 375). Common good in this instance refers to laws and policies that allow
citizens to realise their social freedom and equality. When citizens realise their social
freedom and equality, social capital is strengthened. Social capital refers to “networks,
norms and trust that allow members of a society band together to achieve their
objectives” (Putnam, 1996, 24; Estlund, 1999, 2). The process of democracy occurs
through a public deliberation medium, which is made possible through public culture
(Post, 1996, 8). Public culture is defined as a space where members of a society, with
distinctly separate identities and assumptions unique to their communities, interact
and communicate with each other (Post, 1996, 8).
In pursuit of social capital, cultural capital must be sought after first, as it is cultural
capital that guarantees successful participation in public culture. Cultural capital is the
ability to interact in such a manner that dismantles local certitudes and bridges the
divide between racially distinct groups (Post, 1996, 8).
The reason why the diversity model’s justification of affirmative action fits in more
with higher educational institutions, than with other societal institutions becomes
clearer when on second look, we realise that higher educational institutions are a
primary source of cultural capital–not just that they foster exchange of ideas. They are
so in the sense that their mission is to help members of the society gain the skill of
being able to view themselves through the eyes of others (Post, 1996, 9). The reason
for this is to ensure the participation in public culture by members of marginalised
groups, the absence of whom, in the democratic process, will undermine democratic
legitimacy. Imagine, for example, that all universities in America decided not to
implement any affirmative action initiative, and subsequently, racially homogenous
groups–white males –dominated the population of the universities because the
admission standards indirectly exclude politically salient groups such as, ethnic
minority males and women. What will follow is the development of a myopic
perspective of the way the society functions and the continuous deepening of racial
and ethnic rifts, fostering the creation of a democratic state that is legitimate to only
one side.
Moreover, we should not underestimate the power of unintended consequences. An
unintended consequence of the diversity model emphasis on the promotion of a robust
exchange of ideas is that a kind of critical interaction inevitably starts to occur among
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members of the different groups. This allows them to regard themselves from the
perspective of each other, bridging the gap in the differing ideologies of the groups –
ingredients of a strong social capital. There is an obligation owed by educational
institutions, particularly public universities, to ensure that the cultural capital at their
disposal is distributed within society in such a way that strengthens public culture
(Post, 1996, 9). In other words, if the current admission standards have the effect of
excluding certain groups in society, the universities have a duty to rectify the problem
by changing their admission standards to ensure the inclusion of these groups. Of
course, the actual individuals that represent the group still need to be able to
contribute to the epistemic diversity of the society for any real progress in
development to be made. And once again, this would include a small section of the
group. With this response, the diversity model still retains its original forward-looking
approach, not dependent on any group entitlement or compensation for historical
injustice committed against certain groups in society.
Besides, this diversity rationale is not just limited to educational institutions. It can
also be applied to workplace institutions. Perhaps not in an obvious manner, but the
workplace is also an equally good source of cultural capital. It is where most of the
employed population of society develop close interpersonal relationships among
themselves, discussing social, personal and political matters amongst themselves
(Estlund, 1999,4). The connections formed educate members of society about one
another and also allows them to view themselves from the perspective of each other,
again, building up norms, networks and trust. In a society plagued by continuous
segregation, where even in racially heterogeneous metropolitan areas, the
neighbourhoods are populated by people of their own race, the one place where one
can exploit cultural capital, is in the workplace (Massey and Denton, 1993, 64;
Hayden, 2005, 34).
Empirical data suggests that the workplace is the one place where people are willing
and most able to associate with people from different racial backgrounds (Hayden,
2005, 35). In the same way educational institutions have an obligation to ensure that
the cultural capital at their disposal is distributed within society in such a way that
strengthens public culture, so also do workplace institutions. Thus, given as there is
evidence that certain groups in the society are, either consciously or unconsciously,
discriminated against in terms of hiring or promotion, it is up to these institutions to
ensure the inclusion of these groups through affirmative action initiatives (Aleinikoff,
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1987). The chosen representatives will again have to be able to contribute to the
epistemic diversity of the society.

The Discrimination-Blocking Model

The discrimination-blocking model justification of affirmative action is a rationale of
affirmative action, which arises as a response to the unaccomplished goals of
antidiscrimination laws. It sees affirmative action as a practical tool to correct for
unjustified and biased stereotypes, putting the unfairly stereotyped groups into the
position they would have been in had these stereotypes not been in place (Anderson,
2010, 146). For example, say a Tina Knowles submitted her CV for consideration of
the role of a software designer at the Royal Software Design Institute. Say also, she
was suitably qualified for the role, but when going through the pile of applications
made, the recruiting head, who happens to be a white male, passes over Tina’s
application by virtue of the fact that she is female– as he subconsciously associates
the role as fit only for men. If an affirmative action initiative were to be put in place at
the company, Tina would get the job. The reason for this would not be because she is
being compensated for historical injustice, or because she is needed for a strong social
capital, but because she might have gotten the job in the first place had the recruiting
head not been sexist.
In the discrimination-blocking model, neither race nor gender are not viewed as
proxies. They are viewed as the cause of the current injustices faced by marginalised
groups and as such; they are used to identify those who would otherwise have been
recruited but for their ethnicity or gender. Thus, the beneficiaries under this model are
members of marginalised groups who would, under normal circumstances, meet the
criteria to gain access to opportunities, but for entrenched biases (Anderson, 2010,
144). These beneficiaries are owed by any institution that still practice
discrimination, as could be evident from the composition of the institution. To really
analyse the discrimination-blocking model, the question of why discrimination exists
despite the passing of antidiscrimination laws is pertinent. What goals did these laws
fail to achieve? The focus of the following analysis will be with regards to
employment discrimination.
Before the passage of antidiscrimination laws, discrimination hugely reduced the
types of roles women (of all races) and ethnic minority men could gain access to.
When they did gain access to some roles, the jobs were mostly dead-end; low paying
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jobs (Reskin, 1998, 24). Stereotypes for women, such as that, ‘they would only prefer
part-time roles or temporary roles’, resulted in them being excluded from a vast array
of job opportunities (Stephanopoulos and Edley, 1995). Likewise with ethnic minority
males, stereotypes that they are generally lazy, unintelligent and unfit to handle
skilled roles shut down access to entire industries and occupations for them (Smith
1990; Bobo 1996). With the passage of antidiscrimination laws, discrimination in the
work place, while not as covert and blatant as before, still persists; nothing really
changed. This is because, for the most part, discrimination, especially in present day,
is not always intentional or deliberate (Reskin, 1998, 24). When established,
workplace institutions tended to model their business on what they perceived to be the
standard that the broader society expected of them about how they should look and be
run (Baron, 1991, 115). Historically, the standard that broader society expected of
how businesses should be run and look like was based off on prejudice and bias.
Thus, current discrimination in these institutions simply reflects entrenched habits
cultivated when the norm was overt racial segregation and sexist bias. As human
beings are creatures of habits, this standard remains (Reskin, 1998,24). Evidence of
such engrained habits of discrimination in workplaces can be seen from statistical
studies gathered by researchers over the years. For example in America alone, the
studies show that since 1965, nearly two million discrimination complaints have been
filed (Blumrosen, 1996, 4). While not all discrimination complaints are necessarily
true examples of discrimination, where there is smoke, there is often always fire.
Furthermore, in spite the advent of antidiscrimination laws, the individual victims of
discrimination find it hard to identify themselves and prove that they have been
discriminated against (Anderson, 2010, 145). A reason for this can be attributable to
the informal methods that employers use in their recruitment endeavours. These
methods curtail who learns about job openings and applies for them (Reskin, 1998,
32). A popular method employed by most workplace institutions is the word-of-mouth
approach, due to its cost effective nature. Using this method, potential employees are
identified through referrals by current employees (Miller and Rosenbaum, 1997, 513).
However, this method of recruitment only serves to maintain the original composition
of a company (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, 188). In other words, say the company
is filled with predominantly white males, their friends are also bound to be white
males. The reason for this is because people’s acquaintances generally tend to be of
the same race and sex (Reskin, 1998, 32).
 15

When these available employment positions are filled up through these informal
networks, the chances of women and ethnic minority males hearing about their
availability in the first place are very slim –even if these jobs are located within their
own neighbourhoods (Reskin, 1998, 32; Kasintz and Rosenberg, 1996, 189). How can
they possibly file a discrimination suit against these workplace institutions when they
themselves have a hard time identifying the discrimination itself much less, proving
it? Such practices, on the surface, appear race and gender neutral, yet, in reality, they
have an adverse impact on racial minorities and women.
Having established that antidiscrimination laws are ineffective as a tool for
eliminating discrimination, I shall now evaluate the discrimination-blocking model on
the basis of whether or not it is able to accomplish the goal that the antidiscrimination
laws have failed to accomplish. From the analysis of antidiscrimination laws above,
one clear observation is that discrimination continued after its passage as a result of
entrenched habits in people’s unconscious, as well as long-standing employment
practices. Thus, for the discrimination-blocking model to be satisfying, it has to give
an account of affirmative action that challenges these entrenched habits of racial and
sexist stereotypes in societal institutions. The discrimination-blocking model’s
framing of affirmative action is very different from that of the compensatory and
diversity models in the sense that it is neither backward looking nor forward looking.
It has a ‘presentist’ framing i.e. it shifts people’s attention to current evidence of
widespread implicit bias (Kang and Banaji, 2006, 1075). This places it in a unique
position to give a compelling account of affirmative action because it successfully
avoids the general problems associated with a backward looking framing, e.g. the
weakened chain of causality, as well as those associated with a forward looking
framing, e.g. the option it presents to not include marginalised members of the
society. It does these while simultaneously accepting that injustice requires
compensation and diversity does bring about certain benefits. As it is operates along
the lines of the principles of merit, it has an appropriate response for those critics who
would argue that it may lead to reverse-discrimination or a divisive society defined by
group segregation, in which the groups are entitled to a proportional share of
opportunities (Anderson, 2010, 146; Newton, 1973). Entrenched stereotypical habits
or norms are inevitable and will not cease to persist unless checked by a
countervailing force. By focusing on the present, the discrimination-blocking model is
able to push back against recalcitrant actors who refuse to stop discriminating
 16

regardless of the presence of antidiscrimination laws. The model can offset

entrenched discriminatory habits and unconscious bias for example, by making sure
employers advertise their jobs in such a manner that excluded groups would be able to
learn about them (Kang and Banaji, 2006, 1092-1096). It can also do this by
discarding subjective criteria, which encourages evaluative bias and covert
discrimination (Anderson, 2010, 146).
For Anderson though, the discrimination-blocking model’s account of affirmative
action is incomplete. She responds that race may be inferred by several other factors
for example, recommendation letters, the applicants’ address, schools attended, etc.
(Anderson, 2010, 146). One response to this would be for the institutions to take
formal measures sensitive to the marginalised group, such as conducting regular
monitoring to see to it that discrimination has truly ended. Nonetheless, she reasons
that such measures will not be able to hold up long-term. Thus, she views the
discrimination-blocking model as a half measure, which merely halts discrimination
temporarily as opposed to actually undermining people’s racist and sexist bias. By
simply approaching discrimination with a countervailing force, the model only masks
latent, unconscious bias as opposed to representing affirmative action as dismantling
the continuing causes of discrimination (Anderson, 2010, 148).
I argue however, that the discrimination-blocking model provides a compelling case
for affirmative action because it does help dismantle continuing causes of
discrimination. It achieves this in two ways; 1) it promotes self-awareness in the
discriminating actors, motivating them to correct their bias; and 2) it breaks the norm
by stopping the spread of implicit bias (Kang and Banaji, 2006, 1090-1098). In many
instances, some actors engaged in discriminatory practices genuinely believe
themselves to be bias-free and as such, they deem claims of implicit bias as
inapplicable to them (Krawiec, 2003, 515). Thus, an easy way to undermine these
biases is to make such individuals self-aware. The discrimination-blocking model
does just this. As this model relies on the fact that discrimination occurs in the
present, hard evidence of discrimination is a possible powerful trigger for
discriminating agents that lack awareness that they are. Audit studies and statistical
studies are examples of how such evidence can be obtained. However, there are more
cost effective and efficient tests that could give such evidence. An example would be
the implicit association test (Greenwald, 2006, 56-61). Upon realisation that they are
 17

in fact carrying out discriminatory practices, these institutions could restructure in

such a way that is greatly beneficial for marginalised groups.
With regards to breaking the norm, once individuals are no longer associated with
debasing stereotypes, then implicit bias can no longer influence evaluation, be it in the
workplace or in educational institutions. The discrimination-blocking model
contributes to this by adopting policies, such as cloaking social categories (Kang and
Banaji, 2006, 1092). By doing this, biased perceptions aren’t a factor stopping the
stereotyped groups from climbing up the socio-economic ladder. When these
individuals are in positions where they can be seen doing things contrary to their
stereotypes, then formerly held perceptions of them would begin crumble. For
example, say KPMG adopts a group-blind recruitment policy whereby, when they
scan through applications, those factors which can easily result in an evaluative bias,
e.g. names and genders, in CVs are shielded. Imagine that the result of this is the
recruitment of a significant number of ethnic minorities and women. Once these
individuals are seen performing really well in roles that they have generally been
associated as not being able to do, then perspectives would change.

The Integrative Model and the Role of Democratic Education

Anderson’s Integrative justification of affirmative action, as mentioned above, stems
from the idea that the root cause of systematic disadvantages is segregation and
physical integration is the way of addressing this problem (Anderson, 2010). By
segregation, Anderson refers primarily to racial segregation. Her argument is that
racial segregation is a commanding feature in society that has; caused ethnic minority
groups to have limited access to socioeconomic opportunities, left them open to
stigmatization and discrimination, and worst of all, left society largely undemocratic
(Anderson, 2010, 148). She reasons that promoting integration will serve to break
racial barriers and stereotypes as it undermines segregation. Once again, to critically
analyse this justification of affirmative action the following preliminary questions
have to be answered: 1) who are the beneficiaries under this model and why? 2) Who
owes them?
Under this model, the beneficiaries are those individuals that are in the best position
to promote racial integration, i.e. those who are generally left out of the democratic
process (Anderson, 2010, 148). These people, for Anderson, are generally the ethnic
minority groups i.e. blacks. Targeting beneficiaries of affirmative action on the basis
 18

of race is justifiable not because they can be used as a proxy for relevant features, but
because race itself is the culprit of the biases and stereotypes that has led directly to
their segregation and discrimination (Yelnosky, 2003, 1415). In the pursuit of
meaningful integration, focus must be shifted to the associations, which count as sites
for public discourse. This is due to the fact that, at the heart of a fully socially
integrated society is public discourse, without which effective citizenship and
legitimate democratic self-governance would be unattainable (Habermas, 1996, 307-
308; Estlund, 2000, 2). Such associations for the most part are workplace associations,
e.g. labour unions and professional associations, as well as educational associations,
e.g. universities (Estlund, 2000, 3). These associations generally tend to exclude
ethnic minority groups (and women) in critical mass. The inclusion of such groups
into these associations would serve to facilitate racial integration, as these groups
would be able to feed into the public discourse and dismantle stereotypes that only
serve to further strengthen segregation. These beneficiaries are thus, for the same
reason, owed by those associations in society that count as sites for public discourse
i.e. institutions capable of facilitating racial integration.
Because the beneficiaries of affirmative action are excluded in critical mass, for
integration to be meaningful, that is, to have any positive effect, they have to be
admitted to the institutions, in which they are generally excluded, in critical mass
regardless of whether those institutions actually carry out discriminatory practices
(Anderson, 2010, 148). Thus, the cost of this is borne by all members of the society.
This is justifiable, seeing as all members of the society “have a duty to promote the
justice of social arrangement, and integration is instrumental to justice” (Anderson,
2010, 148-149). Having answered these preliminary questions, the next important
question to examine is what Anderson means exactly when she says that we have to
practice racial integration. Anderson’s integrative argument, unlike the diversity
argument, is not based just primarily on the epistemic advantages having an integrated
society brings to the society, but on the value of contact and working together
(Anderson, 2010, 151). There are general features of societal institutions that could
promote racial integration which, are worth considering when making an analysis of
the value of contact.
Institutions such as the workplace and schools tend to be where most adults spend
majority of their time (Robinson and Godbey, 1997, 95). Furthermore, it is safe to
assume that majority of the time they spend at these institutions are spent interacting
 19

with one another. For example, in the workplace, opportunities for interaction do not
just present themselves during the actual work itself but, prior to, in between, and
after work. These sort of constant and repeated interactions lead to the cultivation of
social ties among the members of such institutions in which; they learn about each
other, and develop a deep meaningful bond driven by “affection, mutual
understanding, empathy, sympathy, and loyalty” (Estlund, 2000, 9). In the same vein
that contact promotes social relationships, so also does the process of working
together. Working together requires at least, some form of cooperation and implies the
presence of some sort of civility norms, without which no institution could function
effectively (Estlund, 2000, 9-10). This cooperation eventually leads to the formation
of some degree of mutual trust and solidarity among the members of the institutions
(Akerlof, 1982, 546-550).
In other words, as the general features of mainstream institutions highlighted above
show, an important part of achieving integration is to promote regular physical
contact. As Anderson puts it, “institutionally supported cooperative interaction with
members of stigmatised groups on terms of equality reduces stigmatization of and
discrimination against them” (Anderson, 2010, 151). When the people we constantly
interact with come not only from homogeneous racial and ethnic backgrounds, but
also from different cultural, racial and ethnic backgrounds, comparative integration– a
site where regular interaction occurs among adult members of society, of different
racial and ethnic identity– is achieved (Estlund, 2000, 13). The integrative model
further points out the need for the inclusion of these ethnic minority groups in such
institutions by highlighting that their presence as equal members of the society
increases responsible deliberation by decision makers (Anderson, 2010, 151). People
who live in stigmatized and disadvantaged communities have a special kind of insight
and knowledge of what it is like to be unfairly stereotypes on the basis of race, unlike
racially privileged groups, who have grown up sheltered from such experiences. As a
result, when they are brought into the public sphere and given the opportunity to
interact with broader society, experiences and knowledge are exchanged, and the
ability for the other group to put themselves in the shoes of the stigmatised minority is
developed. This enables the decision makers to engage in a just and legitimate
democratic decision-making process (Anderson, 2010, 151-152).
The integrative model also stresses the importance of implementing affirmative action
initiatives that would result in raising a critical mass of the disadvantaged groups to be
 20

engaged in this meaningful interaction process that yields to integration (Anderson,

2010, 151). It increases the probability of the privileged white groups having more
contact with the disadvantaged minority groups, thus increasing the chances of
successful integration. Empirical research in workplaces for example, shows that
where minorities constitute only a small number of the entire workforce population,
they are given a ‘token status’ (Yelnosky, 2003, 1387). In other words, the presence
of only a limited number of ethnic minorities at these institutions would trigger the
same kind of stereotypes and bias that the compensatory model is often criticised for
triggering, making successful integration less likely. A main aspect of the integrative
model is that beneficiaries are not brought into mainstream societal institutions as
merely tokens; they are there by virtue of what they can contribute to the institutional
goals. Incidentally, all institutions in a civil society share one similar mission, justice
and thus, ushering in a more than token number of ethnic minorities furthers this
institutional goal (Anderson, 2010, 150).
The integrative model offers up a strong rationale for justifying affirmative action as
it identifies the underlying cause of current discrimination and bias-segregation. It
aptly proceeds to demonstrate the role integration could play in dismantling these
latent biases and stereotypes. However, the integrative model cannot be the full story
as to why affirmative action should be justified because it cannot explain why sexism
is pervasive despite the most intimate kind of integration one can have between men
and women– marriage. Anderson tries to emphasize the value of everyday contact but
despite that, women are amongst the pool of disadvantaged groups in society. That
integration cannot explain why affirmative action should be justified in one of the
most important cases; serious doubt is cast about whether it is even a plausible theory
for race.
A possible reason that an argument from integration cannot explain away persisting
sexism in society is evident in workplace institutions. The integrative argument is
more compelling for government employers than it is for private employers
(Yelnosky, 2003, 1415-1416). This is so in the sense that the qualm of the integrative
model with segregation is primarily how inconsistent it is with a fully democratic
society (Anderson, 2010, 148). Integration is therefore heralded as the antithesis of
segregation because of the benefits society gains as a whole from it. However, this
reasoning is still not enough to private employers because these aforementioned
benefits to the society as a whole are difficult to demonstrate (Yelnosky, 2003, 1415).
 21

An ‘Integration plus’ justification model of affirmative seems to be thus, an effective

solution to this problem. The plus aspect of integration comes in the form of
education. Here, one can imagine the point of affirmative action to be to educate
people out of their biases and sexism, allowing them to see how oppressed people
represented in mainstream institutions will increase their intelligence. In other words,
affirmative action under my integration plus rationale can be viewed as one element
of a larger educative endeavour on the part of the state to educate people out of their
biases and pernicious attitudes. In this version of affirmative action, the importance of
a diversity of gender and ethnic groups being represented is independent of the notion
that one’s way of thinking about things is defined by their race or gender. Rather, its
importance is weighed on the reality that people of different genders and from
different ethnic backgrounds go through different life experiences, which influences
their interaction with others, as well as shapes and influences their way of thinking
about things (Brest and Oshige, 1995, 862). For example in the workplace arena,
policies that may seem neutral to white males may be perceived differently by women
or ethnic minority males (Bell, 1992; Mackinnon, 1989). The implications of
affirmative action on the educative rationale are twofold: on an interpersonal level,
the opportunity to interact with individuals from distinct backgrounds and culture will
allow members of both the dominant and the disadvantaged groups to gain awareness
of their differences and learn to bridge the gap that divides them through
communication (Piore, 1995, 131-132). This first implication can be likened to an
English man learning the French language when in France, so as to understand better
the people and culture of the country he is visiting. There is valuable knowledge that
comes in the form of sharing different cultural experiences. For example,
understanding that people from different backgrounds have different views on what
constitutes public and private divide (Brest and Oshige, 1995, 862). Higher
educational institutions such as universities, give a better insight into this educative
rationale. The set-up of universities is in such a way that students are given the
opportunity to really gain an insight into different cultures, learning and exploring
their boundaries and the way of life of people from such diverse backgrounds. This
kind of special insight is particularly important for certain members of the society
who command respect and holds important leadership roles in political, civic and
private organisations (Brest and Oshige, 1995, 863). For example white privileged
male law or political students like any privileged group in society, harbour negative
 22

misconceptions about certain other groups in society. The encounters that such groups
have among themselves within an educational setting will facilitate intergroup
relations. Upon graduation, and taking their places in society, these members of
society would have been educated out of their biases and as such, latent biases and
prejudice that have so far, kept ethnic minority males and women alienated would be
slowly dismantled, given them access to the socioeconomic opportunities that they
have been denied from.
The second implication of viewing affirmative action from an educative standpoint is
intellectual. From an intellectual perspective, one is able to observe that policy issues
express themselves in every facet of education one can think of, from the law and
legal studies, to engineering and medicine (Brest and Oshige, 1995, 863). The
complex nature and dynamics of these policies reflect the difficulty of reconciling
diverse interests and culture. For example, if say, the government was thinking about
carrying out a mining project on a land belonging to an indigenous group, considered
sacred by the group, the legal sphere would be involved as this will include legal
issues regarding group rights. Public policy will also be involved seeing as a mining
project is something that is in the interest of the public. Hence the decision making
process in creating laws or policies will benefit from having an understanding of the
different interests and cultural perspective of the various groups in society, including
the marginalised groups. Such understanding can be easily gotten within a university
campus. Thus, at the end of the day, what is important to an institution’s intellectual
mission is not group membership, but a “multiplicity of intellectual perspectives”
(Brest and Oshige, 1995, 863). One counter response against my educative rationale
could be that it disregards the principle of meritocracy. However, this is hardly
enough to take away from the fact that different life experiences increases knowledge,
opening the doors for growth and access to equality of opportunity, a premise from
which the principle of meritocracy is based on (Harding, 1991).

Conclusion
Affirmative action has a pluralist bases. It cannot be justified on just one moral
ground, as that would constitute an incomplete account of the reason it should be
justified in the first place. This is because an adequate theory of affirmative action is
one that ought to be able to justify all the different kinds of affirmative action
initiatives practiced. A theory of affirmative action that only justifies some its
 23

initiatives but not others is an inadequate theory of affirmative action. That Anderson
side-lines the other three moral justifications of affirmative action, while over selling
the integrative justification of affirmative action only highlights this inadequacy. The
integrative model cannot explain gender based affirmative action. However, when all
the moral justifications are viewed as a whole, then they can each survive the various
charges brought against them. Thus for the compensatory model, Anderson’s
argument against it; that it fails to explain why only a small section of the
marginalised groups benefit from affirmative action when the claim is that affirmative
action is justified because it compensates the whole group, does not prove fatal. The
model survives because when viewed as a part of a whole, its rough justice rationale
is a good enough response. The compensatory model while focused on group-based
compensation, retains its individualist rationale, justifying such compensation on the
grounds of administrative necessity. That the drawback of a group-based
compensation approach is that the best off among the group reaps the benefits of
affirmative action is no damning blow to the compensatory model either. Such
individuals, by virtue of the multiplier-effect still advance the main aims of the
compensatory model.
Likewise, with regards to the diversity model, the charge that Anderson brings against
it, that race is an imperfect proxy for morally relevant variables survives when the
model is viewed holistically. Under the diversity model, the point of affirmative
action is to develop the institutions that practice it for the benefit of society. The way
that this can be done is to facilitate a “robust exchange of ideas” (Bakke, 1978, 313).
Under this model, exchange of ideas can be gotten from including a diversity of
cultural and ethnic groups into mainstream societal institutions. Viewing the diversity
model one-dimensionally, it appears to be reductive and insulting, suggesting that
people’s contributions simply lie in the fact that they are members of some group as
though their identity is just reducible to that. This, however is not the case when race
is viewed a powerful factor that shapes a person’s experiences and perceptions.
As for the discrimination-blocking model, Anderson’s criticism that it is not a long-
term solution to current discrimination is not a compelling reason to discard it as a
justificatory basis for affirmative action. While it is by no means the one fix to
discrimination, it does assist in dismantling the continuing causes of discrimination by
promoting self-awareness and breaking the norm that sees certain groups in society as
inferior.
 24

Finally, the integrative argument is only compelling when it is complemented with an

educative rationale. The value of integration would thus lie in the idea that an
integrated society serves as an avenue to educate people out of their biases and
prejudice, creating a unified, solid and stable society. Hence the need especially, to
promote affirmative action initiatives in higher educational institutions. In summary
then, affirmative action can be morally justified, but not on one basis as Anderson
believes, but on a plurality of bases. Moreover, affirmative action is but one policy
among many that is targeted towards ending discrimination. It is by no means the full
story.