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Introduction
In every criminal justice system, the aim of the justice system is to
punish the convicts of the crime for their wrongful act and rehabilitate
with the purpose of their recovery. The system does not intent to harm
the convicts by unnecessarily punishing them and making their living
difficult. But there are some instances where the convicts of the crimes
maybe repeat offenders are convicted for their acts multiple times even
for the same offence.
This act of granting multiple punishments for same offences violates
offenders one of the Fundamental rights granted under constitution of
India. Part III of the Indian Constitution provides certain fundamental
rights available to citizens of India. Under these fundamental rights,
article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution provides that No person Shall be
prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.
This article of the constitution provides for the basis of double jeopardy
laws in India. The principle of autrefois convict or double jeopardy
means that no person can be punished twice for the same offence.
‘Double Jeopardy’ is the act of putting a person on second trial for an
offence of which he or she was already been tried and prosecuted or
convicted. The doctrine lays that if a person is charged for an offence
and tried in the court of law of which he has been declared innocent or
guilty cannot be tried again for the similar offence.
History
The concept of double jeopardy marks its existence from the Latin
maxim Nemo Debet bis Vexari. This doctrine states that a man should
not be present in court of law twice for the same offence. This maxim
however also exist in S. 26 of the General Clause Act and S. 403(1) of
CrPC 1898. S. 26 states that where an or omission constitutes an
offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be
liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those
enactments but shall not be liable twice for the same offence.
The doctrine of double jeopardy is now defined under S 300 of CrPC
which will be discussed in detail later in the paper. The concept
however evolved more and took various changes in its form and
definition leading to the current position under Indian laws on criminal
procedure code and the Constitution of India.
Clause (2)
Clause (2) of this section provides that if a person has committed
several offences but he was not tried for all such offences in the first
trial then he cannot be prosecuted for other charges in the second trial.
This means that when a person is acquitted or convicted for any offence
and then he is charged with another offence separately then he cannot
be charged for another offence under second trial as it is an abuse in
itself. A person cannot be always made under prosecution for different
charges separately. So to provide a check against this abuse, section
300(2) make it obligatory to obtain consent of state government before
a new prosecution is launched against any person for any distinct
offence for which a separate charge might have been made against the
person at the former trial.
The clause therefore provides that this section does not bar the
prosecution under second trial for distinct offence but it should be
initiated only after the consent of state government.
Clause (3)
Clause (3) of the section permits for the second trial of the convict only
in the cases where some new facts came into existence as a
consequence of already existing offence. Firstly, this section is only
applicable to the convicts of the offence and not to the acquits of the
offence. The second element of this clause is that a person can only be
re-tried in the cases where some facts relating to the offence were not
came into the notice of the courts.
This means that a convict can be taken for re-trial if some new facts
were noticed in the case and these new facts were not known to the
courts in the first trial. It mandates that the new facts or consequences
must have occurred since the conviction or acquittal of first trail was
going and these were not brought in the notice of the court. It
therefore says that if some new offence took place in the course of first
trial, as a result of already known offence, but not known to the courts
in the first trial, then the convict can be re-tried in the second trial only
for the newly observed offence which was not known in the first trial.
Second trial would be barred if the consequences and offences of the
second trial were already known to the courts in the first trial.
Clause (4)
Clause (4) of this section is in continuance with clause (3) and act as an
exception to the rule of double jeopardy. This clauses states that if any
court is incompetent to try the accused of any offence which is actually
the consequence of the offence which the court is taking trial, the first
acquittal or conviction will not bar the competent court to take
cognizance of consequential offence. This basically means that if the
court under which first trial was made was not competent enough to
try the second offence which was the consequence of the first offence
can be tried in other competent court and the first trial will not act as a
bar on second trial.
Clause (5)
Clause (5) of the section says that if a person is discharged under S. 258
of CrPC which talks about the courts power to stop the proceedings of
the case at any stage without pronouncing the judgment. The stoppage
can however be made after recording the evidence of principle witness,
pronouncement of acquittal or release of the accused have the effect of
discharge. This clause (5) therefore states that no such accused person
under S 258 shall be tried again for the same offense unless the consent
of the court from which such discharge was made is obtained. This
provision is made to protect the person against the abuse of power of
fresh prosecution in such cases.
Clause (6)
This is the last clause of S. 300 which provides that nothing in this S 300
of CrPC shall affect the provisions of S 26 of General Clause ACT, 1897.
S.26 provides for an acts or omission constituting an offence under two
or more enactments. This means that if the offence which is committed
by the accused falls under two or more enactments then that accused
shall be charged with either of the two enactments. The emphasis is
made on the ingredients of the two offences with which the accused is
charged. It is also provided that the accused shall not be made liable
and punished for the same offence twice, but if there exist two distinct
offence that the ban imposed by S.26 cannot be imposed.
Landmark Judgment
MAQBOOL HUSSAIN V. STATE OF BOMBAY
In this case, the appellant Maqbool Hussain, a citizen of India arrived at
an airport of Santa Cruz from a place from abroad. Upon his landing, he
did not declare that he has brought gold from abroad. However on
search it was discovered that he brought 107.2 tolas of gold which was
in contravention to government notification dates August 25, 1948.
Action was taken against the appellant by the custom authorities and
the gold was thereafter confiscated. Later the appellant was prosecuted
by the criminal court under the Foreign exchange Regulation Act. The
question was whether the plea of autrefois acquit be raised under Art
20(2) of the Indian Constitution or not.
The Supreme Court in this case concluded that the proceedings made
before any custom authorities does not constitute ‘prosecution’ of
appellant and the penalty imposed by such authorities does fall within
the category of ‘punishment’ as under Art 20(2) of Constitution of India.
It was therefore said that in this case where the case was first
presented under custom authorities and then before the criminal court
does not constitute as second trial and Art 20(2) does not act as a bar
on second trial.
The Supreme Court therefore pronounced that It is clear that in order
that the protection of Art. 20 (2) be invoked by a citizen there must
have been a prosecution and punishment in respect of the same
offence before a court of law or a tribunal, required by law to decide
the matters in controversy judicially on oath which it must be
authorized by law to administer and not before a tribunal which
entertains a department or an administrative enquiry even though set
up by a statute but not required to proceed on legal evidence given on
oath. The very wording of Art 20 and the words used therein would
indicate that the proceedings therein contemplated are of the nature of
criminal proceedings before a court of law or a judicial tribunal and the
prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or starting of
proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a judicial
tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute
which creates the offence and regulated the procedure.
The court therefore excludes departmental and administrative
authorities from this provision of double jeopardy and only considers
proceedings which are made before judicial courts and judicial
tribunals.