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Alberti explicitly desi g nates, with the words principia, partes, rationes, only a subset
o f the operators he uses. However, by applying a functional analysis we can iden-
tify the whole set, which I will present synthetically in a formulation that is rel-
atively free compared to that o f the De re aedificatoria and employing, once again,
my own terminology.
Although this distinction was not made by Alberti, we can divide the op-
erators o f the De re aedificatoria into two categories: theoretical and practical. I
call the former, o f which there are five (along with their corollaries), axioms, and
the latter, which are three in number, prindples.
I have chosen to call the theoretical operators axioms because they are
presented as propositions which are indisputable, fundamental, and possessed o f
generative power. This axiomatic foundation is, moreover, free o f any depen-
dence upon visual media. It is striking that, alone among Occidental trattatisti,
Alberti deliberately declined to illustrate his treatise or to rely on the use o f
geometric fi g ures. In a passage o f book 3 whose importance seems to have been
overlooked, Alberti explains this decision, which has also been ignored by
his editors from the sixteenth century (with the Italian translation o f Bartoli
and the French translation o f Martin) up to our own time (where Orlandi as
well as Rykwert have retained their illustrations) in opposition to the spirit o f
the text. If, in a period dedicated to the hegemony o f vision and its relationship
to truth (and given his own profound contribution to the theory o f perspective
and cartography), Alberti asserted that illustration was "forei g n" to his project
(" ab instituto aliena"), 153 yet freely admitted the difficulties it would cause him to
explicate his points "using words alone (verbis solis)," 154 his decision must in-
deed be seen as one charged with meaning. I will return to this point some-
what later.
The first axiom ofAlberti's triad can be formulated in this way:'edification
consists in three parts involving respectively necessity, commodity, and pleasure'.
This axiom establishes the three levels (each one simultaneously logical, chrono-
logical, and axiological) o f architectural activity, and determines three types o f
rules. It also serves to establish the tripartite division o f the De re aedificatoria and
it is deployed throughout the treatise by intercrossing with the other operators.
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THE DE RE AEDIFICATORIA: ALBERTI, OR DESIRE AND TIME
the other axioms, the whole set o f rules o f edification. They also determine the
consecutive order o f the chapters o f books 1 and 3, and help to structure and
order the treatment o f the contents o f books 4 through 9.
T h e fifth axiom, the axiom o f concinnitas concerning aesthetic pleasure, is
rendered the homologue o f the preceding one by its introduction somewhere
other than in the prologue and its division into operations. It can be formulated
thus: 'the beauty o f an edifice results from the intercrossing o f three operations
dealing with the number o f its parts, its proportions, and its arrangement'. It is
formulated i n b o o k 9, chapter 5, and it retrospectively clarifies the aesthetic
books (6, 7, 8, 9, chapters 1 to 5) which precede it; b u t i n fact, it only actually
generates the plan o f chapters 5 through 8, and the rules contained therein.
As for the three practical principles, which Alberti is content to use under
various formulations w i t h o u t designating t h e m as abstract entities for the
reader, they first appear in the prologue and are at work all throughout the De
re aedificatoria.
Thus the principle e f economy o r frugality stipulates that the optimal solution
at the least cost should always be sought: and the edifice must consist only o f
that which cannot be eliminated, whether it is a matter o f materials o n the level
o f construction, o r ornament o n the level o f the aesthetic as well as cost. Only
intellectual expenditure, i n the form o f the work o f conception and auto-cri-
tique, is encouraged unconditionally.As we have seen, this principle plays a par-
ticularly important role i n what I have called the negative aesthetic o f Alberti.
As for the construction o f the text itself, application o f the principle o f frugal-
ity is manifested first with a remarkable economy o f theoretical and concep-
tual means. 155 N e x t , arising from the same motivation, w e find a set o f
structural equivalencies which also contribute to reducing the theoretical and
textual expenditure: doors, windows, conduits for the evacuation o f smoke and
water are all subsumed under the denomination of'openings',just as ceilings
and floors are b o t h subsumed under that o f 'coverings'. Similarly, as we have
seen, the city is assimilated to a large house and, inversely, the house is c o n -
strued as a city i n small, a move that renders both subject to the same rules o f
compartition.
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THE DE RE AEDIFICATORIA: ALBERTI, OR DESIRE AND TIME
must obey the laws o f mechanics and physics 15 7 as well as a logic imposed by
the human mind: a two-fold dependence, which for the modern reader recalls
that o f phonic substance, the foundation for the construction o f all discourse,
which is subject to the rules o f phonetics as well as those o f phonology. While
the physics o f materials indeed occupies the whole o f book 2, Alberti devotes
an original part o f his work, one which owes nothing to any predecessor, to the
delineation o f the six basic operations o f conception in the domain o f building.
It treats an innate power o f formalization which, being specific to the human
brain, partakes o f the same necessity as the laws o f nature. It both allows the ar-
ticulation o f materials (book 1) and the formulation o f the rules o f this articula-
tion (book 3). These six irreducible operations thus inform a pliant matter, which
is subject to its own specific laws not susceptible to any human intentionality.
They ensure its integration into the primary system, which constitutes the pre-
condition and in its turn the 'matter' from which the built world can be devel-
oped o r expressed. For the system o f construction is a necessary, but not
exclusive, condition o f edification. It opens the way to meaning, but it no more
permits meaningful structures to be articulated than the phonological system
alone allows meaningful propositions to be constructed. That is why the rules o f
the first part o f the D e re aedificatoria do not deal with the varied world o f edifices.
This world is only inscribable at a second level o f articulation (books 4
and 5). It depends on a second system o f rules which transfers the built from the
semiotic to the semantic domain. But this second articulation is not comparable
to that which characterizes verbal lang u age. It appeals to the external semiotic
system o f lang u age. The first system, that o f construction, can only be deployed
in space o n the condition that it is integrated into the hierarchically superior
system o f verbally expressed demand or desire. Whereas current attempts to the-
orize an 'architectural semiotics' are polarized by the ambi g u ous and elusive no-
tion o f function, 15 8 Alberti masterfully asserts the consubstantial link between
the activity o f building and desire, and the unlimited potential o f the latter.1 5 9
Moreover, he avoids falling into the trap o f dogmatism, and from the start as-
sumes that demand and desire for built space are only conceivable by means o f
arbitrary taxonomic categories. The system o f programmatic rules he develops in
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book 4 is presented as one possible solution among others. Its value lies in its
functionality and it draws upon the work o f rationalization which precedes it.
Thus, throughout books 4 and 5, far from being a mere interpreter, 160 language
is primary, and verbal discourse, at the very origin o f the built text, constitutes
above all a transcription before it can become a foundation. Alberti's rejection
o f drawing and illustration si g nalled above confirmed this regal status o f verbal
language. One could also interpret it as a means o f defending the generative
value o f the rules and o f the Albertian method against the reductive power o f
the image. 161
In its turn, the second level is assimilated to the rules o f a third system,
that o f beauty, the source o f pleasure (books 6, 7, 8, 9). For us today, this third
level is that o f poetics, 162 wherein architecture is subordinated to and ordered
by the system oflanguage and the semantics o f verbal discourse, and is thereby
equipped to si g nify with its own specific means. Thus, lacking access to the fal-
lacious analogies fashion has sometimes suggested to our contemporaries, yet re-
membering Horace,Alberti posits for the first time in history the conditions o f
what we would call a semiology o f built space. 163
The conception o f these three interconnected strata thus represents a
major contribution to the theory o f edification. Its importance has never been
fully reco g nized. This misunderstanding is explained in part by the fact that the
D e re aedificatoria has traditionally been read as a new D e architectura, rather than as
an original theoretical work. It is also clear that the repercussions o f modern lin-
guistics on other branches o f anthropological research allow a different reading o f
the text today. This reading, deliberately anachronistic, is nonetheless rendered
possible and legitimated by the intrinsic qualities o f Alberti's oeuvre. Thus, the D e
re aedificatoria indeed appears to lay down the prolegomena-not yet superseded
and thus still r e l e v a n t - o f a theory to come which would have access to new
conceptual instruments for treating the specificity and the hierarchy o f the three
levels o f edification: Alberti was able to demonstrate in general terms their means
o f integration and indissociability at the same time as he si g naled the privileged
status o f the third.
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THE DE RE AEDIFICATORIA: A L B E R T I , OR D E S I R E AND TIME
We have seen, however, that the level o f beauty does not evince the same ho-
mogeneity as the others and disturbs the unity which otherwise characterizes
Alberti's scheme. This is because in spite o f his knowledge o f the culture o f
Antiquity and its archaeological remains as well as his grasp o f contemporary art
and its leading ideas (remarkable in the Quattrocento),Alberti did not have access
to the conceptual instruments (developed only much later) which would have
allowed him, if not to resolve, at least to pose in clearer terms the problem o f
aesthetics. A synthetic summary o f the difficulties which, as my analysis o f book
9 has shown, prevented Alberti from maintaining the perfect coherence o f his
treatise, will allow us to specify precisely his original contribution to a 'theory o f
art' and to reveal the origin o f the misunderstandings that are habitually perpe-
trated regarding the relations o f the De re aedificatoria to ancient thought in gen-
eral and Neoplatonism in particular. I will employ my own terminology, on the
one hand, in those cases w h e r e - a s with the operators-it helps to desi g n ate
ideas Alberti appropriated without giving them specific denomination (such as
organic beauty), and on the other hand, when it can furnish interpretive con-
cepts (such as the negative aesthetic).
We have seen that Alberti subsumes beauty under four categories which
are opposed in pairs. O n the one hand, he opposes intrinsic beauty to supple-
mental beauty or ornament (his terminology); on the other hand, natural or
organic beauty is opposed to cultural or dogmatic beauty (my terminology).
Organic beauty first appears, in fact, at the level o f commoditas, where it results
from the successful adaptation o f an edifice to its purpose. It then comes from a
particular concinnitas, analogous to that o f the animal, the harmony o f whose parts
is achieved by nature coextensivly with the adaptation to its functions. In either
case, that o f the edifice or that o f the animal, its beauty is universally perceptible
to all: in modern terms, we could say that it is a matter o f good form (Gestalt).
This is Alberti's first discovery and it is integral to the logic o f his treatise.
But i f Alberti had stopped with this, there would have been no third part
to the De re aedificatoria. The third part is entirely based on the hypothesis o f a
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supplementary articulation, possessing its own laws, which belongs to the world
o f culture and constitutes a poetics o f edification by virtue o f which architecture
is, in the strict sense, an 'artistic language', 1 6 4 in contrast to banal construction or
'natural language'. Thus, the poetics o f the temple, for example, is governed by
two sets o f rules. The rules o f the first set deal with the exterior and allow it to
express divine transcendence and the majestic gravity o f relig1on by means ofits
installation in a natural site or urban context and by the treatment o f its walls. 16 5
The others apply to the interior space o f the temple, the goal being to arouse
religious terror, l 6 6 contemplation, 1 6 7 or a sense o f mystery 16 8 through the dis-
position o f plan, and the articulation o f roof and openings.
However, this poetics which the De re aedificatoria so clearly identifies as
the domain o f man, is dramatically split between two tendencies. O n the one
hand Alberti remains obsessed with the principle o f economy, which has inspired
his negative aesthetic and which, by extension, would move him to consider good
form an adequate ideal. H e more or less unconsciously relates cultural beauty to
ornament. Ornament (experienced as a threat) is consubstantial with poetics.
O n the other hand, Alberti attempts to establish two homologous pillars o f ra-
tional laws on either side o f the intermediate level on which the aleatory rules o f
commodity apply: to the necessity o f the laws o f nature on the first level o f ed-
ification correspond the equally rigorous constraints o f the mathematical laws
on the third level. This is how he is led to elaborate surreptitiously two competing
aesthetics which are formulated in parallel in the course o f book 9.
One aesthetic, still natural but not reducible to that o f good form despite
the fact o f its universality, is based not on the body o f the animal but rather on
the human body, which functions simultaneously as actor and model. The plea-
sure engendered by architectural beauty brings into play the whole body o f the
person who experiences enjoyment in the perception o f the beautiful edifice as
another body governed by the same proportions (demonstrated in the example
o f the architectural promenade). 16 9 T his aesthetic role attributed to the body and
the sexual resonances o f its interpretation, suggest, especially in light o f the texts
ofFilarete treated below in Chapter Four, a comparison with certain o f Freud's
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THE DE RE AEDIFICATORIA: ALBERTI, OR DESIRE AND TIME
ideas 17 0 which give them new perspective and development. However, this 'po-
etics o f the body' is more speculative than normative.
O n the other hand, the second aesthetic, a 'mathematical' one, does indeed
propose a system o f stylistic norms. But, as the dogmatic form o f its exposition
shows clearly, this system is borrowed from Greco-Roman Antiquity in its nu-
merical expression, which assumes the force o f law, and from the Pythagorean
connotations it evokes. It is precisely this mathematical aesthetic which is re-
sponsible for the interpretation not only o f the third part, but o f the entire trea-
tise as a work o f Neoplatonist inspiration. Most historians o f architecture, and
Wittkower in particular, neglecting the naturalistic concinnitas inherited from
Aristotle's 'physiologism', 1 7 1 have focused on the mathematical concinnitas and
the dogmatic system it supports; they have too readily taken Alberti to be the
promoter o f an exclusively mathematical and Neoplatonic theory o f architec-
ture. For us, on the contrary, the dogmatic aesthetic appears to be a momentary
drift away from the spirit and logic o f the D e re aedificatoria. Certain formal
anomalies seem to dawn in this hypothesis: the verb tenses utilized to express
the laws o f the dogmatic aesthetic, and the locus o f the origin narrative which
follows instead o f precedes them. But the thesis I am defending is supported
above all by the role and the unexpected authority granted to the Ancients, in
contradiction with the whole o f the rest o f the book, as well as by the limited
space given in book 9 to the theory o f the orders, which furthermore is sub-
sumed under the category o f ornament. Finally, it is supported by the blocking
o f poetic creativity which imposes on a theory o f creative time the adoption o f
the Greco-Roman stylistic system.
If, then, as my analysis has shown, Alberti postulates that beauty presents
two visages, one universal, the other contingent, and i f this second face is for
him a function o f time and history, how are w e to explain the partial drift o f
book 9? Alberti is confronted here with an insurmountable difficulty stemming
from the fact that he grants autonomy to the level o f poetics, and confers on this
dissociation not a heuristic value, but rather a normative function. He wants to
attribute necessity, to give the status o f universal laws 17 2 to those rules which are
not what w e would call cultural universals but rather stylistic rules bound to
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contingent values. B y definition, then, he must look for them in the history o f
architecture. But history can provide them only i f it has already produced a ra-
tional system. That this absolute reference exists follows from the schematic his-
tory o f architecture (book 6, chapter 3) which Alberti bases on the brief origin
narrative o f the arts (artes) (book 6, chapter 2): "the arts were born o f Chance
and Observation, fostered by Use and Experiment, and matured by Knowledge
and Reason."173Thus, the work o f the Romans marks the end o f a long devel-
opment and the poetics o f architecture is realized in truth.
Alberti's argument must be sought beneath the surface, behind the words
that contradict and collaborate in its masking: the invasive presence o f the natural
aesthetic that infiltrates all the chapters concerning ornament; the gaps and ex-
ceptions Alberti forcefully maintains with a dogmatism that contradicts his sense
o f becoming.
It is all the more important to situate the precise point where the drift o f
the De re aedi.ficatoria manifests itself, because it should be seen as a decisive turn-
ing point for the aesthetic theory o f architecture, as the origin o f positions whose
ramifications are felt even today, and which for centuries were adopted by
Western architects: the privilege o f the truth accorded to ancient architecture,
its consecutive bracketing in historical styles, the prerogative that devolved on a
small group o f clerics to enforce the rules o f this poetics henceforth as dissoci-
ated from building itself as from a natural aesthetic.
M y thesis finds supplementary confirmation in Paul Frankl's analyses o f
"post-medieval" architecture, 174 which he characterizes as having that self-con-
sciousness which seems to me to be at the basis o f Albertian instauration.
According to Frankl, the inventiveness manifested by the architecture o f the
Quattrocento and marked in particular by its "corporeality"175 depends from the
gaps in the archeological knowledge o f its promoters. Archaeology would steril-
ize architecture at the moment o f its constitution as a scientific discipline, as is
witnessed by the synchronic advent o f Neoclassicism. However, in the case o f
Alberti, we must invoke with equal emphasis the determinate role o f his natural
aesthetic, partial as it is, which is founded precisely on the axiom o f the building
as a body.
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THE DE RE AEDIFICATORIA: ALBERTI, OR DESIRE AND TIME
The manner in which the dogmatic aesthetic and the law o f the orders
disturb and warp Alberti's project thus calls into question his relation to the past
and to history in general. It opens the question of his relation to Vitruvius, the
Roman architect who virtually embodies the authority of the Ancients and from
whom Alberti borrowed not only archaeological information but also a number
of his narratives concerning the past. This is why, before attempting to elucidate
the role of history and of narrative in the De re aedificatoria, the time has come to
confront Alberti's treatise with the De architectura. In this context, I shall be able to
respond to the question posed in Chapter One of whether Alberti's book is ef-
fectively inaugural, or does that status in fact belong to the De architectura.
IV. A L B E R T I AND V I T R U V I U S : 1 7 6
OF SUPRA-STRUCTURAL BORROWING
Did the De architectura serve as Alberti's model or his springboard? Are the nu-
merous commonalities between the two texts superficial or structural? On the
level of form, is the identity of procedures and expressive modes actual or merely
apparent? Is there room for difference between two books, both written in the
first person singular, both written by architects sharing the goal of defining their
art and establishing all of its rules (" omnes disciplinae rationes," writes Vitruvius), 17 7
both articulating these rules using gerundives, subjunctives, verbal adjectives, or
verbs of equal appropriateness, and both supplementing them with explanations
in the present indicative and narratives or anecdotes in the past tense? On the
level of content, what use does Alberti make of the borrowings that his succes-
sors-as well as present-day historians 1 7 8- consider important?
Alberti not only drew fr m Vitruvius, or the authors likewise used by
Vitruvius, most o f his historical information and the anecdotes concerning ar-
chitecture, construction techniques, the typology o f ancient edifices, the orders,
and even climate, meteorology, and the relations o f living things to their envi-
ronment, 17 9 but he also familiarized himself with Vitruvius' advice on the edu-
cation o f the architect. 18 0 Alberti owes some o f his fundamental operators to
the Roman architect, like, for example, the triadic structure 18 1 and the binary
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THE DE RE AEDIFICATORIA: ALBERTI, OR DESIRE AND TIME
At no time does Vitruvius offer his reader such a global view o f the un-
folding text o f his treatise. The reader is condemned to a succession o f fragmen-
tary glimpses. O n e after another, the proemia and the excurses recite goals
accomplished and announce new intentions, but never give an overview o f the
whole.Vitruvius m a n a g e s - i f only on two occasions-to articulate links among
the four books: retrospectively, in the proemium o f book 4, and prospectively, in
the conclusion o f book 5, but from then on he speaks only oflocal and consec-
utive relations from book to book. The Roman architect does indeed, from ex-
cursus to excursus, affirm the deployment o f an organizational logic and claim that
there are essential links that tie one book to the preceding and/ or following one,
but in the end, the order in which the books succeed one another has never
been explained. 197 It is not explicable because there is no dynamic relation to
forge an organic whole out o f the ten individual parts. Book 2 can only be in-
terpreted as a parenthesis, and book 7, dealing with water, can only be inter-
preted as a supplement. The positions o f books 9 and 10 could be reversed, and
these two books might just as well have preceded those devoted to aedif,catio.
N o explanation justifies either the preeminence ofreligious edifices over all oth-
ers, or the priority accorded to beauty in relation to solidity and utility, or, cor-
relatively, the inordinate amount o f space given in the text to the harmonious
construction o f temples. It is impossible to represent the organization o f the De
architectura with a diagram analogous to the one I have proposed for the De re
aedif,catoria. O n e must rely on the conventional tables which outline the con-
tents o f the treatise.
M y diagram represents the functioning o f the operators as well as the
function o f time, which, in Alberti's treatise, permits the deployment o f the
whole and brings into accord the Bildung o f the author, his book, and the built
domain. The chronological axis is on the other hand utilized by Vitruvius only in
an incidental manner, for the (realistic) presentation o f certain sequences o f
rules. 198
The difference between the textual organization o f the De re aedif,catoria
and that o f the De architectura overtly manifests the difference-equally irre-
ducible, i f less evident-between Alberti's motivations and those o f Vitruvius.
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Both claim to present the reader with a set o f rules. But the th·eoretical I of
Alberti, who addresses and challenges an anonymous and universal you, 199 has
decided to begin with a tabula rasa and to progressively discover and formulate
the rules o f edification with the help of operators for which his own jud g m ent
will be the evaluative criterion. O n the contrary, for the social I ofVitruvius,
who addresses Augustus, whose you dates and locates the te.xt, the problem o f
discovering and determining these rules does not arise. It suffices to borrow
them from an already given corpus, to which it is only necessary to bring order
and light. Vitruvius does not proceed from a radical interrogation, but rather a
tacit acceptance o f tradition; 2 0 0 this pertains to the rules themselves as well as
the principles 2 0 1 he uses to clarify them. This attitude is particularly explicit
when he describes the different categories o f temples 2 0 2 or the typology o f
Greek edifices. 2 0 3 At the time he was writing, it was not possible for Vitruvius to
speak as an autonomous theorist o f an autonomous discipline o f building. 2 04
The moment had not yet arrived to question tradition, to imagine a spatial order
never before seen. Ritual and custom were still the basis o f architectural practice.
The issue for the Roman architect was neither to promote reason as an instru-
ment for the organization o f space nor to liberate-and thereby to discipline-
the architect's creative spontaneity; it was rather to assemble, order, and
sometimes comment on a set o f building practices. Vitruvius occasionally rec-
ognizes this himself when he assumes the task o f explaining the traditional
rules. 2 0 5 In this sense, as Krautheimer correctly observes, the De architectura is still
a manual. Pierre Gros convincingly argues that it is instead a popularization of
traditional knowledge without any practical purpose.
Our acknowled g m ent o f the limitations o f the Vitruvian enterprise need
not be interpreted as a depreciation o f its value. My goal is to situate Alberti in
his proper place, not to minimize the originality o f an author whose book was
unique in its genre in the ancient world.Vitruvius has the sig n al honor o f being
the first to gather together a mass o f material which had until then been widely
scattered, and to attempt to make an organized whole o f it. In this sense, Andre
Chaste! is justified in seeing him as a 'hero'. 2 0 6 But only in this sense, for the
Roman architect is not a creator in the Albertian or Renaissance sense o f the
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THE DE RE AEDIFlCATORlA: ALBERTI, OR DESIRE AND TIME
term. If he did not manage to liberate the demi urge sleeping within him, 207 if
his attempt at synthesis fails with his postulation o f an order and a logic that are
in fact lacking, that is because his epoch did not provide the conceptual means
which would have allowed him to realize-much less to define-his project as
such. Three interconnected elements are lacking: the objective of a foundation,
the hypothesis o f the autonomy o f the act of building, and the concept o f creative
time. The space o f these absences defines two historical moments, two mentali-
ties, two relations to knowledge and expertise. Moses Finley has projected this
gap onto the economic plane, showing that Vitruvius the technician, whose prac-
tical knowledge he admires, finds his practice limited by the horizon o f a con-
sumer society which ignores the notions o f productivity and profit. 208 This
analysis can be adopted metaphorically on the level o f the book and its textual
economy.Alberti's treatise becomes, then, the machine which the Roman archi-
tect could not even imagine constucting, the machine in which no gear is inert
and which is desi g n ed for perfect functionality.
In writing the De re aedificatoria, Alberti is doing something other than
Vitruvius. Whatever the importance o f his borrowings, he transforms their
meaning by changing their order, their fi g u re, their functioning. The similarity of
content and the haunting presence o f the ancient urban landscape in the De re
aedificatoria are in effect o f little importance, since Alberti has banished tradition,
imposed his own order derived exclusively from reason, and proposed a general
and universal method. This is why, even i f his initial intention was different, even
i f his treatise had its origin in a commentary on Vitruvius suggested by Leonello
d'Este, it is impossible to define Alberti's work only in relation to the De archi-
tectura and not see it as an authentic beginning. Krautheimer, even though he
was unable to decipher the mutation to which Alberti submitted the text o f
Vitruvius, continues nonetheless to envisage the De re aedificatoria only through
the optic o f humanist erudition, as the work o f a "counsellor-at-antiquity." 209
For him, the De architectura is an edifice ravaged by time which must be recon-
structed anew by the interpretation o f its remains. Alberti is an archeologist o f
genius, whose work is that o f reconstructive restoration. But why refuse to see
that this restorer, even i f his most ardent desire had been to reconstruct the actual
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approach o f Antiquity, never fails to oppose to it his own theory, °from which a
new practice can be developed. Moreover, Alberti himself defined his position
with respect to Vitruvius when, in book 2 o f his De pictura, 210 he indicates that
the Roman architect transmits practical instructions concerning, for example, the
place where one can procure the best pi g m ents for making colors, but on the
other hand is incapable o f enunciating the method and the rules for combining
these colors. Why not then admit that, in the De re aedificatoria, Alberti poses the
problem o f edification with the same assurance, the same systematicity, and in
terms just as revolutionar y as those employed in his treatise on painting when he
theorizes about matters in which Antiquity had been no more successful.
My comparison o f the two treaties does indeed demonstrate the inaugural
role o f the De re aedificatoria. It also confirms the interpretation I have given it,
and further emphasizes by contrast the singularity o f a text whose parts cohere
into a whole and are functionally articulated. Finally, it will help to clarify the in-
vestigation I will now undertake after having deferred it: the inquir y into the
function exercised by the past in the historical narratives and anecdotes o f the De
re aedificatoria.
IN THE DE RE AEDIFICATORIA
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THE DE RE AEDIFJCATORIA: A L B E R T I , OR D E S I R E AND TIME
are absent altogether in the first o f the three books. How, then, can we justify all
the references to ancient sources, all the narratives and anecdotes in the second
treatise? Why are there so many perfects, pluperfects, and even imperfects, when
the present indicative o f observation and the various modes o f rule-giving-the
future, the imperative, the subjunctive, the gerundive, and the verbal adjective-
would have sufficed?
One explanation would consist in interpreting all this material as non-
structural, as superfluous and ornamental. With his narratives o f mythical or an-
cient events, with his borrowings from classical literature, Alberti might have
wanted to make a dull journey more pleasant, to display his humanist learning, or
to give the appearance o f conforming to the Vitruvian m o d e l - a s when he bor-
rows from the Roman architect the division o f his work into ten books.
However, I have already asserted that this is not the case, and that no part o f
the De re aedificatoria is superfluous or self-contained. This assertion must now be
proven, and the proof will involve a systematic comparison o f narratives and their
role in the texts o f the two authors. Such a comparison will show that, unlike the
narratives ofVitruvius, those o f Alberti are not dissociable from his treatise.
In order to define precisely the status o f these fragments within the two
treatises, I have borrowed a certain number o f concepts from the linguistic study
o f meaning. In particular, I have taken up the distinction drawn by Emile
Benveniste between discours (discourse) and histoire (historical narrative or
story).212 In his prolegomena to a linguistics o f utterance (or semantics), Benveniste
notes that "the tenses o f a French verb are not employed as members o f a single
system," but "are distributed in two systems which are distinct and complemen-
tary,"213 and which correspond to two different levels in the use o f language:
one being desi g n ated as the level o f discourse, and the other, that o f history or
narrative.
Discourse (discours) is characterized by the presence o f the speaker, in other
words, by the use o f the first person, by the relation o f the subject, and by the use
o f all the tenses except for the preterit, with the present playing a dominant role.
Historical narrative (histoire), on the other hand, excludes the first and its correlative
second person, in favor o f a third person who, as Benveniste has convincingly
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shown, is really the absence o f any person; 2 14 it eschews the use o f the present in
favor o f the preterit (supported by the imperfect, the pluperfect, and the
prospective future), which situates the narrative outside o f the discourse, in an-
other space-time. In later studies, 2 1 5 Benveniste was led to define 'discourse' as
any text containing shifters, that is, elements which relate the text to the situation
d'enonciation, 2 1 6 and 'history' o r narrative as any text without shifters. However,
these criteria are n o t relevant in certain cases where theoretically contradictory
combinations o f elements appear, such as the basic present and the third person
and the preterit and the first person, and also where shifters do in fact occur in
historical texts.
This is why, in the context o f developments in linguistics and given the
emphasis placed o n the notion o f enonciation, o r enunciation, and on its relation
to the enonce, o r utterance, Jenny Simonin-Grumbach 2 17 has reformulated
Benveniste's hypothesis in different terms, allowing the concept o f the 'theoret-
ical text' to be defined and a n e w typology 2 1 8 o f utterance to be d e v e l o p e d -
thus resolving the difficulties raised by the use o f the criteria o f tenses and
persons associated with Benveniste's shifters. 2 1 9 Simonin-Grumbach proposes to
call discours (discourse) those texts in which the author establishes context o r lo-
cation in relation to the situation d'enonciation (= Sit £), and histoire (history o r
narrative), those texts where n o such context is effected in relation to S i t £ , but
rather in relation to the text itself, 2 2 0 that is, the situation d'enonce (= Sit E). We
will refer to these definitions in the following discussion.
W i t h respect to its location in the typology o f semantic systems, the De
architectura exhibits a resistance to categorization characteristic o f the hybrid. It is
alternately discourse and theoretical text, and furthermore, it is punctuated by a
series o f autonomous fragments that exhibit the characteristics o f historical nar-
ratives. These fragments can be classed in three categories: origin narratives for ar-
chitecture, illustrative narratives whose purpose is to support the theorist's
argument, and edifying narratives typically situated in the proemia and having n o
direct link with the objectives o f the treatise.
This last type, illustrated in particular by the story o f the shipwreck o f
Aristippus 2 2 1 and by that o f Aristophanes, one o f the learned judges appointed
12 4