THE RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE IN EMPLOYMENT MATTERS

In the case of Zinka v The Attorney-General (1991) ZR 73 (SC), the Supreme Court stated the
following: "the principles of natural justice are implicit in the concept of fair adjudication,
that an adjudicator shall be disinterested, and unbiased (nemo judex in causa sua); and
that, no person shall be condemned unheard. That is, parties shall be given adequate notice
and opportunity to be heard (audi alteram partem)". The learned authors Halsbury’s Laws of
England, 4th Edition Vol.1 para. 84, cited by the Complainant, state that, “implicit in the
concept off fair adjudication are two cardinal principles, namely that no man shall be a
judge in his own cause (nemo judex in causa sua), and that no man shall be condemned
unheard (audi alteram partem). These two principles, the rules of natural justice, must be
observed by courts, tribunals, arbitrators and all persons and bodies having the duty to act
judicially, save where their application is excluded expressly or by necessary implication.

The repealed Section 26 A of the Employment Act which was applicable before the Employment
Code Act provided as fiollows:
“An employer shall not terminate the service of an employee on grounds
related to the conduct or performance of an employee without affording
the employee an opportunity to be heard on the charges laid against
him”.

In the Supreme Court ruling of Rabson Sinkombe v Access Bank Appeal No. 240 of 2013 on
the Right to be heard, the Supreme Court held as follows:

“We wish to note that Section 26A as formulated did not prescribe the
procedure in which the employee is to be afforded the opportunity to be
heard on a charge laid against him. In these circumstances, the
provisions of that section are sufficiently complied with if an employee
has had an opportunity in whatever way, to ventilate his views on an
issue touching on his conduct or performance prior to the termination of
his services”.
In the case of CAMFED Zambia v Yvonne Matebele Sichingabula SCZ/8/44/2016 where it
was stated that, “Clearly, a reasonable fear of bias arises when a member of a disciplinary
panel sits in judgment over matters concerning him or herself or a person with whom he or
she associates or in matters of which he or she has prior personal knowledge or experience
or has an interest in the outcome. The perception of the employee is important but
suspicion only will not be sufficient. Allegations of bias must be seen in the sense of
impeding justice (underlining emphasis ours only).”