Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Agenda
International Trade Policy
– Free trade vs. Protectionism : overview
– The Case for Protection
– Trade Instruments:
Tariffs
Subsidies
Imported Quotas
Voluntary Export Restraints (VER)
Other tools: Non-
Tariff Barriers | Measures
Analyze the Welfare of these tools
Case study:
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Free Trade Versus Protectionism
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Free Trade Versus Protectionism
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Contents
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Free Trade Versus Protectionism
Freer trade cuts the cost of living
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Free Trade Versus Protectionism
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Free trade makes the world more
efficient
Scarce resources are used most efficiently when
governments do not interfere with the way free
markets work.
– National welfare of a small country is highest under
free trade.
– Under restricted trade, consumers pay higher prices.
– Under restricted trade, prices for domestic
producers are artificially high. This causes
overproduction either by existing firms producing
more or by more firms entering the industry.
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Free trade reduces rent seeking
Quotas can lead to rent seeking behavior that is
economically wasteful
– In India in the 1950s and 1960s, the amount of resources that a
business was allowed to import was tied to how big the
business was. This gave businesses an artificial incentive to
over-invest and be big
– Tuna importers to the United States were allowed to bring in a
limited amount of tuna on a first-come-first-served basis. Tuna
importers spent a lot of money to stockpile tuna in December,
in order to be first in line in January
– Such wasteful activities that are provoked by quirks in the
laws are called rent seeking
Tariff Man
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Tariff Man
Tariff Man
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Free Trade Versus Protectionism
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ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST
FREE TRADE
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Free Trade Versus Protectionism
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Arguments for and against
Protectionism
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How special-interest groups that are
against free trade can capture political
power and the special-interest groups
that favor free trade are sidelined
ANTI-TRADE POLITICS
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Protectionism: Agriculture in
Japan
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Instrument of Trade Policy
...But this does not mean that everyone will be better off.
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Instrument of Trade Policy
new tools
TikTok giữa 'sóng thần
trừng phạt' của Mỹ
Vi Trân 08/12/
Một số tiểu bang tại Mỹ đã công bố
lệnh cấm cục bộ hoặc toàn phần đối
với ứng dụng TikTok trong khi nhiều
tiểu bang khác cũng đang cân nhắc
hành động tương tự.
Trong vài năm qua, các nghị sĩ Mỹ đã
kêu gọi cấm nhân viên chính quyền
cài đặt và sử dụng ứng dụng chia sẻ
video ngắn TikTok. Cuộc vận động
diễn ra khi cơ quan chức năng Mỹ
ngày càng giám sát kỹ TikTok vì
nguy cơ an ninh quốc gia dù nền tảng
này phản bác.
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Instrument of Trade Policy
new tools
Muốn xuất khẩu mạnh, doanh nghiệp phải
'xanh'
18/11/2022 16:22 GMT+7
TTO - Hơn 300 doanh nghiệp hàng đầu đến từ các ngành cà
phê, gỗ, thuỷ sản… đã tham gia hội thảo 'Xuất khẩu vào các
thị trường FTA - Giải bài toán phát triển bền vững' do Báo
Công Thương tổ chức tại TP.HCM ngày 18-11.
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Instrument of Trade Policy
new tools
Bangladesh làm không đủ bán, vì sao dệt may
Việt Nam than thở thiếu đơn hàng?
Trả lời tờ Daily Star, giám đốc điều hành SM
Khaled của Công ty hàng may mặc Snowtex cho
biết giá cả cạnh tranh, chất lượng, cũng như
những thành tựu gần đây về an toàn và tuân thủ
tiêu chuẩn đã nâng tầm ngành may mặc nước
này.
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Instrument of Trade Policy
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Instrument of Trade Policy: TARIFF
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Who Uses Tariffs?
Sample US tariffs
– Cars: 2.5%
– Trucks: 25%
– Men’s cotton shirts 19.7%
– Women’s blouses 26.9%
– Tariffs facing exports of developing countries:
Nepal 13.2%
Bangladesh 13.6%
Example:
Lecture 5: Tariffs 45
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Government uses to protect industry
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Revised concept: Consumer & Producer
Surplus
FIGURE 8-1 (2 of 2)
In panel (b), the producer surplus from supplying the quantity S1 at the price
P1 is the area above the supply curve and below that price.
Economic of Tariffs:
Tariffs are the most common type of trade
restriction
A tariff requires the importer of a good to
pay a
specified fraction of the world price to the
government
By raising the domestic price of imports, a tariff
helps domestic producers but hurts domestic
consumers
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Instrument of Trade Policy: Tariffs
Economic of Tariffs:
We can summarize the effects of tariffs to
Consumption effect
– Domestic consumers reduce their
consumption.
Production effect
– Higher prices make it profitable for domestic
producers to increase their output.
– Thus the tariff attracts resources into the
protected industry from other sectors of the
economy.
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Economic of Tariffs:
We can summarize the effects of tariffs to
Trade effect
imports to fall.
– The tariff causes
Revenue effect
– After the imposition of the tariff, the
government
collects a certain amount of money.
Redistribution effect
– The tariff redistributes income from consumers to
producers.
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The Effect of a Tariff
4 International Trade Policy - 4.2 Trade Barriers: Tariffs, Subsidies and Quotas 55
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Effects of a Tariff on Prices and Quantities
Price
of Steel
Domestic
supply
Equilibrium
without trade
Price
after tariff Tariff
Price World
before tariff Imports price
Domestic
with tariff
demand
S S D D
0 Q Q Q Q Quantity
of Steel
Imports
under free trade
Price
of Steel
Consumer surplus
before tariff Domestic
supply
Producer
surplus Equilibrium
before without trade
tariff
Price World
before tariff price
Domestic
demand
S D
0 Q Q Quantity
of Steel
Imports
under free trade
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Consumer Surplus after Tariff
Price
of Steel
Consumer surplus
after tariff Domestic
supply
A
Equilibrium
without trade
B
Price
after tariff Tariff
Price World
before tariff Imports price
Domestic
with tariff
demand
S S D D
0 Q Q Q Q Quantity
of Steel
Imports
under free trade
Price
of Steel
Domestic
supply
Producer
surplus Equilibrium
after tariff without trade
Price
after tariff C Tariff
Price World
before tariff G Imports price
Domestic
after tariff
demand
S S D D
0 Q Q Q Q Quantity
of Steel
Imports
under free trade
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Government’s Revenue from Tariff
Price
of Steel
Domestic
supply
Tariff Revenue
Price
after tariff Tariff
E
Price World
before tariff Imports price
Domestic
after tariff
demand
S S D D
0 Q Q Q Q Quantity
of Steel
Imports
under free trade
Price
of Steel
Domestic
supply
A
Deadweight Loss
B
Price
with tariff C Tariff
D E F
Price World
without tariff G Imports price
Domestic
after tariff
demand
S S D D
0 Q Q Q Q Quantity
of Steel
Imports
without tariff
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The Welfare Analysis of a Tariff
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Effects of Tariff on
Social Welfare
Price
of Steel
Domestic
supply
A
Deadweight Loss:
Production distortion loss
B Consumption distortion loss
Price
with tariff C Tariff
D E F
Price World
without tariff G Imports price
Domestic
after tariff
demand
S S D D
0 Q Q Q Q Quantity
of Steel
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Imports
without tariff
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Instrument of Trade Policy: Tariffs
Economic of Tariffs:
Summing up, in addition to deadweight loss (triangle ( d+ f)),
there are other losses:
The area of triangle D equals the increase in marginal costs for the
extra units produced and can be interpreted as the production loss
(or the efficiency loss) for the economy due to producing at
marginal cost above the world price.
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Instrument of Trade Policy: Tariffs
Economic of Tariffs:
The deadweight burden of a tariff suggests that
society suffers from restricting trade.
This is the case for free trade.
Tariffs have fallen substantially under the
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) and WTO (World Trade Organization).
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Welfare Effects of a Tariff
Infant industries
– An attempt to nurture new activities via learning by
doing.
A temporary production subsidy probably
better.
Revenue
– Tariffs raise government revenue.
But there are better ways to do that.
Cheap foreign labour
– A non-argument – denies benefits of comparative
advantage
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Protectionist Policies: Tariff
Justification
Infant industry argument
– Protection for young domestic Cost of Tariffs
industry
Interfere with comparative
Employment argument advantage
– Protect domestic jobs
Reduced economic efficiency
Terms of Trade argument (case (generate 2 deadweight
for Big Country)
– Tariffs improve terms of trade losses for Economy)
Diversification and
Industrialization argument
Collect revenue to help!
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Protectionist Policies: Tariff Example 2
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Instrument of Trade Policy: Quotas
Other commercial policies: Types of Quotas
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US Import Quotas:
• Sugar
• Tobacco
• Peanuts & peanut butter
• Specific dairy products (e.g. powdered milk, baby
formula)
• Cotton
• Beef
• Animal feed
• Anchovies
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Instrument of Trade Policy: Quotas
4 International Trade Policy - 4.2 Trade Barriers: Tariffs, Subsidies and Quotas 78
Domestic
supply
Equilibrium
without trade
Domestic
Quota
supply
+
Import supply
Isolandian
price with
Equilibrium
quota
with quota
Price
World World
without =
price Imports price
quota Domestic
with quota
demand
S S D D
0 Q Q Q Q Quantity
of Steel
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Imports
without quota
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The Effects of an Import Quota
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Protectionist
Policies:
Quotas
Example 1
AFTER
QUOTA
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Protectionist Policies: Quotas
Winners, Losers, and Social Loss from an Import Quota
◦ When the Canadian government imposes an import tariff on
imported T-shirts:
◦ Canadian consumers of T-shirts lose.
◦ Canadian producers of T-shirts gain.
◦ Importers of T-shirts gain.
◦ Society loses: A deadweight loss arises.
◦ Figure 7.8 illustrates the winners and losers with an import
quota.
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The Effects of an Import Quota
Because the quota raises the domestic price above the
world price,
– domestic buyers of the good are worse off, and
– domestic sellers of the good are better off.
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The Effects of
an Import
Quota
Price
of Steel
Domestic
supply
Equilibrium
without trade
Domestic
Quota
supply
A
+
Import supply
Isolandian
price with B
Equilibrium
quota
with quota
C D E'
Price E" F
World World
without =
price G Imports price
quota Domestic
with quota
demand
S S D D
0 Q Q Q Q Quantity
of Steel
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Imports
without quota
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The Effects of an Import Quota
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Tariffs v. Quotas
If government sells import licenses for full value,
– the revenue would equal that from an equivalent tariff
and
– tariffs and quotas would have identical results.
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The Lessons for Trade Policy
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Instrument of Trade Policy
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Instrument of Trade Policy
Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs)
Restriction of exports
– At request of importing country
– Usually specified as maximum quantity
This was the major form of protection for the
US auto industry in the 1980s: US persuaded
Japan to limit exports of cars to US
Illegal since 1995 under WTO rules
– But how to enforce
– Examples in 2012 that look like VERs
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A Voluntary Export Restraint in
Practice: Japanese Cars
Japanese producers moved in to fill the new demand.
As the Japanese market share soared and US output fell,
strong political forces in the US demanded protection
Rather than act unilaterally and risk creating a trade war,
the US government asked the Japanese government to
limit its exports
The Japanese, fearing unilateral US protectionist
measures, agreed to limit their sales
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Instrument of Trade Policy: Subsidy
Most Common Trade Barriers:
2. Export and Production Subsidies:
Government payments made to domestic firm to
encourage exports or production in general.
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Trade Policy Tools
WTO rules against Boeing in US subsidies case Boeing
added that it was confident the ruling would be overturned on appeal and
insisted its tax breaks were not nearly as high as the $22 billion Airbus
had received in subsidized loans by European governments.
War over subsidies
The ruling is WTO's third in the two aerospace giants' disputes over
illegal state aid. Mutual accusations involve tens of billions of
dollars allegedly received by the other.
European Union Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström welcomed the
ruling on Monday, calling for the prohibited tax break to be scrapped
immediately.
"We expect the US to respect the rules, uphold fair competition and
withdraw these subsidies without any delay," she said.
Meanwhile, Boeing's rival Airbus called for a fundamental solution to
the subsidies dispute. On Monday, Airbus Chief Executive Tom Enders
said in an emailed statement that the rivalry should no longer set the
"framework of reference in future," noting recent support by the Quebec
government for Canada's Bombardier.
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Subsidies
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Instrument of Trade Policy: Subsidies
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Export Subsidies
Export subsidies are paid to companies for exporting a given
product Such subsidies expands production and exports
– This increases profits in the favoured industries
– Lowers the price paid by foreigners
– Raises the price paid by domestic consumers of the
good The national well-being of the exporting country is
worse off
– This is an example of a policy that expands trade
beyond what is optimal: the country becomes more
engaged in international trade than is really warranted by
the data of the market
– Capital is misallocated as a result – toward the exporting industries and
away from industries producing for the domestic market
– Since imports and exports must balance, import-competing 10
4
industries are hurt Kristoffer J. M. Hansen, Institute for Economic Policy
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Subsidies: Are They Used?
YES!!
US, EU, Japan all have large subsidies on many
agricultural products
These reduce world prices and hurt producers of
these products in developing countries
Examples of US subsidies and whom they hurt:
– Corn: Mexico
– Sugar: Caribbean countries
– Cotton: Certain African countries
Export subsidies
Commercial policy to boost exports.
Consumption Production
loss Exports loss
Price
Sdom
A B Sw +
P’ subsidy
G E
P Sw
C F
Ddom
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Instrument of Trade Policy:
Export subsidies
(cont.)
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Export Subsidies
Export Subsidies
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Export Subsidy
Competitive playing fields
Domestic Employment National Security
Because foreign imports are produced in Subsidizing the exports of domestic Export subsidies can also encourage
other countries by foreign workers, production "levels the competitive domestic production of goods that are
subsidizing exports and increasing playing field" compared to imports
deemed critical to the security of the
domestic production also increases produced by foreign workers who
receive lower wages. national economy.
domestic employment
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loss total international
6% market share
48%
the Middle East
market share $50,000,000,000
7% subsidy
42% transatlantic
market share
34%
Salvatore: International Economics, 11th Edition © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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Europe’s Common Agricultural
Program
The EU has a massive export subsidy program
The CAP began not as an export subsidy, but as an effort
to guarantee high prices to farmers by having the EU buy
products when prices fell below support levels
To prevent this policy from drawing in imports, it was
initially backed by tariffs that offset the difference
between European and world prices ➔ to make imports
more expensive
Since the 1970s, however, the support prices set by the EU have turned out
to be so high that Europe—which, under free trade, would be an importer
of most agricultural products—was producing more than consumers were
willing to buy
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Question: Bonus point
Actually, temporary production
subsidies rather than import tariffs are
some times suggested by economists.
WHY? What are the economic
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Test Concept
1) Specific tariffs are
A) import taxes stated in specific legal statutes.
B) import taxes calculated as a fixed charge for each unit
of imported goods.
C) import taxes calculated as a fraction of the value of the
imported goods.
D) the same as import quotas.
E) import taxes calculated based solely on the origin
country.
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Dumping
Dumping happens when goods are sold in export
markets for less than their “normal value”.
Generally this is taken to mean as less than their
price in domestic or third-country markets
Price-based dumping is when a firm sells a product in a
foreign market at a price below that for which the firm
sells in the domestic market
Cost-based dumping is when a firm sells a good in a foreign
market below its average total cost
Both are really examples of price discrimination – in favour
of the buyers of exports!
Kristoffer J. M. Hansen, Institute for Economic Policy 12
2
123
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Trade Policy Tools
Solar tariffs on China are ‘counter-productive’ say experts
Stopping Chinese solar ‘dumping'
The move comes after complaints by European producers to the EU Commission,
that China is flooding Europe with cheap solar panels sold at below
the cost of production. Fast growth, rude awakening
The current trade war has been a long time coming. In the early 2000s, the solar
market grew exceptionally fast in places like Spain, Germany and Italy,
encouraged by government subsidies. That led to the emergence of new solar
manufacturers in Europe, the US and China, drastically increasing the number of
solar products being produced. But, as subsidies were cut, many manufacturers
found they were unable to make a profit in a market saturated with solar goods.
German-based company, SolarWorld claimed Chinese manufacturers were
getting unfair support from their governments and that they were selling panels
below cost. Many European competitors — led by SolarWorld – have charged that
Chinese competitors are underpricing them in order to keep their grip on the
lucrative European market.
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Trade Policy Tools
China retaliates despite calls to end trade row with EU China had informed
the European Commission that European chemicals companies, notably Belgian
group Solvay, were the focus of an anti-dumping investigation, France's daily
newspaper Les Echo reported Monday.
The move follows a complaint made by China two weeks ago against EU
companies that produce unwelded pipes, including French group Vallourec.
China accuses firms from the two sectors of selling their products below cost to
win market share and eliminate competitors. Trade experts see the Chinese
complaints as coming in retaliation to European Union anti-dumping
procedures.
Earlier this month, the EU Commission imposed a higher customs duty of
about 47 percent on Chinese solar panels, accusing Beijing of undercutting
market prices with hefty state subsidies. In addition, EU authorities announced a
probe into Chinese manufacturers of mobile network equipment amid claims they
sell their products at a loss.
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Instrument of Trade Policy
Dumping:
– International price discrimination
– Foreign producers charge lower prices than
domestic producers for an identical product
After allowing for transportation costs and tariff
duties
– Selling in foreign markets at a price below
the cost of production
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Instrument of Trade Policy
Antidumping Regulations
Antidumping duty
– U.S. Department of Commerce
Foreign merchandise is being sold at less than fair
value (LTFV)
– U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
Determines that LTFV imports are
causing/threatening material injury
– Imposed in addition to the normal tariff
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Thực tiễn điều tra phòng vệ
thương mại của EU
(1995-2019)
Số vụ việc điều tra phòng vệ thương mại do EU tiến hành
1995-2019
70
66
60
50
40
40
35
33
31
29
30 27
25 24 24
20 20
20 18 17
15 15 14 14
13 12 11
9 9 8
10 7
5 5 6 6 6
3 3 4 45 5
12 22 2 2 2 2 23
00 00 0 0 0 00 0 1 01 10 00 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Anti-Dumping Anti-Subsidy Safeguard
Nguồn: European Commission – https://trade.ec.europa.eu/ |4
|
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5
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Part II : Non- Tariff Barriers
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Nontariff Barriers to
Imports
Nontariff barriers to imports are any policies used by the
• government to reduce imports other than tariffs
An NTB reduces imports through one or more of the
• following direct effects:
Types of NTBs
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NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
TO T R A D E
Import bans
Determination of eligibility
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Inspection density is too Strict quality standards
high
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Instrument of Trade Policy
Nhiều doanh nghiệp, nông dân trồng
thanh long ruột đỏ xuất khẩu đi Nhật
đang "ngồi trên lửa" với quy định mới
về mã số vùng trồng.
Cái khó là chỉ có giống thanh long ruột đỏ LD1
mới được Nhật chấp nhận nhập khẩu, mà giống này
lại thuộc sở hữu của một công ty tư nhân tại Long
An. Do yêu cầu quá gấp và phức tạp nên không ít
doanh nghiệp phải đem thanh long xuất khẩu ra bán
tại các chợ đầu mối, thiệt hại đơn hàng xuất khẩu
không nhỏ. Như... trên trời rơi xuốngGiữa tháng
1 vừa qua, Công ty TNHH chế biến trái cây Yasaka
(chuyên xuất khẩu trái cây đi Nhật Bản) gặp vấn đề
khi 5 container (khoảng 70 tấn) thanh long ruột đỏ
trị giá 190.000 USD xuất đi Nhật... bị vướng rào
cản bất ngờ. Đó là thông báo từ Trung tâm Kiểm
dịch thực vật sau nhập khẩu II (thuộc Cục Bảo vệ
thực vật) về việc áp dụng mã số vùng trồng cho trái
thanh long ruột trắng và thanh long ruột đỏ khi xuất
khẩu qua thị trường Nhật Bản.
© AD at UEF 144
Challenged sectors
Wooden
o Woodchip products have a preferential export tax rate of 0%.
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Challenged sectors
Fishery
o Many big competitors.
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Other NTBs:
Unfair Trade Laws
The (legal) threat and use of
– Anti-Dumping Duties
– Countervailing Duties
We’ll say more about this later, in lecture about U.S.
Trade Policies
These are NTBs if
– “Unfair trade” is actually normal trade (it usually is)
– The threat of action discourages trade, even when duties are
not levied (the “chilling effect”)
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Occupational safety and health regulation
Employment law
Import licenses
Export subsidies
TECHNICAL BARRIERS
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TECHNICAL BARRIERS
TECHNICAL BARRIERS
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Các biện pháp phi
thuế
Non tariff measures
Thủ tục hợp pháp hóa lãnh sự giấy tờ thương mại: Bỏ ngay
Consular legalization requirement is to be immediately removed
▪ Thúc đẩy đơn giản hóa thủ tục hải quan, hải quan điện tử/
Promote simplification of custom procedures and e-customs
TBT, SPS
▪ Minh bạch/ Transparency
▪ Công nhận tương đương/ Mutual recognition
▪ Căn cứ trên các tiêu chuẩn quốc tế/ Based on international
standards
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➢Ứng phó với các rào cản, quy định mới
là không dễ... / Coping with new regulations and barriers is no
easy task...
o Khó phát triển nếu không chủ động nâng cao nhận thức, thói quen tìm hiểu
thị hiếu và quy định của thị trường Trung Quốc / Improving awareness and
skills is imperative to penetrate Chinese market
• Đặc biệt là nếu chỉ duy trì cách làm tiểu ngạch, thiếu gắn kết, ... / Adaptation to
formal
channels and business linkages, etc.
o Khó phát triển nếu không điều chỉnh chiến lược kinh doanh phù hợp, gắn
với đề xuất hỗ trợ (không trái cam kết) từ các Bộ, ngành và cơ quan địa
phương; /
Adjustment of business strategies, together with proposal for legitimate supports from
Ministries, line
authorities and local governments;
o Khó phát triển nếu doanh nghiệp không chủ động kiến nghị, tháo gỡ những
bất cập chính sách (bởi cơ quan nhà nước khó tự rà soát hết được). / Active
proposals to address regulatory constraints (as self-review by government agencies hardly
suffice).
EXAMPLE
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Administrative and bureaucratic delays at the entrance
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Local Content Requirement
A local content requirement is a regulation that requires a
specified fraction of a final good to be produced domestically.
It may be specified in value terms, by requiring that some
minimum share of the value of a good represent home value
added, or in physical units.
AD @ UEF 2018
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American buses, made in Hungary
THE REASON
Governments offer barriers to encourage
domestic production, encourage import
and export and stabilize their economies.
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Other Trade Policies
Sanctions, bans, and the politics of trade policies
Summary:
Choose 1 trade tool that benefit the Economy
In the long run ? ( Social welfare, Job Creation,
Social Stability, Local Economy, Production
© AD at UEF
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