EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL FEELING IN

GERMANY UPTO 1871

Priyanka Kumar

The terms ‘nation’, ‘nationalism’ and the like are open-ended concepts. Walter Bagehot, who
presented the history of the 19th century as that of ‘nation-building’ observed “We know what it is
when you do not ask us, but we cannot very quickly explain or define it.” Hobsbawm points out that
attempts to establish objective criteria for nationhood, or to explain why certain groups have
become ‘nations’ and others have not, are often made based on a single criteria such as language,
common territory, common history, cultural traits etc. All such objective definitions have however,
failed, for exceptions can always be found. Moreover, the criteria used for this purpose – language,
ethnicity etc. – are themselves vague and ambiguous. Yet it is with these concepts that the history of
the modern times is inextricably linked. This must be kept in mind while attempting a study of the
evolution of national feeling in Germany.

The modern sense of the word ‘nation’ can be dated to the late 18th century. Before the French
Revolution, Montesquieu defined the nation as comprising of the aristocracy and the clergy, which,
at the time of the Revolution, constituted only 4% of the total population of France. In Germany too,
one could speak of an aristocracy (Reichsadel) and the Imperial Church (Reichskirche), who were
represented in the Parliament (Reichstag), leaving out the masses. However, in the late 18th century,
a transformation occurred and elite nationalism paved the way for modern mass nationalism.

Nationalism emerged from two main sources - the Romantic exaltation of “feeling” and “identity”
and the Liberal requirement that a legitimate state be based on a “people” rather than a dynasty or
God. Over time, different concepts of nationalism emerged. One was the political notion, drawing on
the French Revolution, which declared that people who swore allegiance to the universal ideals of
liberty, equality and fraternity were ‘citizens’ comprising the French nation. Thus nationality was a
matter of the subjective will of the individual. In practice however, this gradually became the
ideological basis for French imperialist expansion. But on the other side of the Rhine, where multi-
racial and multi-lingual states were common, nationality came to be determined by such objective
factors as language, folkways and ethnic origin. This was cultural nationalism, the origins of which
can be seen in the views of a German thinker, J. Herder. He used the term ‘volk’ (people) to describe
the totality of the people of all ‘nations’ living within the same province or state, who were linked
together by language. After the appearance of social Darwinism in the late 19th century, it also
became a matter of ‘blood’ and racial stock.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the awareness of nationality preceded and even helped in the
creation of the nation-state. The study of the evolution of national feeling in Germany is thus linked
to ‘the German question’ or the problem of unification of Germany, which was achieved for the first
time in 1871. This was in itself a long-drawn process, which was shaped by both the internal
politico-economic and social scenario of the German states, especially Prussia and Austria, and the
international concerns of the Great Powers in keeping Germany divided to maintain the balance of
power in Central Europe. This essay will attempt to trace the historical evolution of national feeling
in Germany beginning in the late 18th century, while following the process of unification as well as
analyzing the role played by Bismarck.

Certain obstacles to this process of unification had always existed. Germany had a unique
geographical position - it is located in the heartland of Europe and has no natural frontiers that
define its boundaries. Hence the frontiers of Germany remained a source of debate. The problem was
further intensified due to the political developments that gave rise to a dual German identity. Areas
to the west of the river Elbe, because it had been a part of the Roman Empire, were a mixture of
German and Latin cultures and had patterns of development that were closer to the Mediterranean.
By the 18th century, the region became the seat of French ‘high’ culture. But the regions east of the
Elbe developed a unique anti-Roman and anti-Catholic identity. The contempt of the west soon
turned into an aggressive anti-German identity. With industrialization, this divide deepened. This
gave rise to a prolonged debate about who, among the two, is German.

The territorial division was arched over by a religious one, beginning in 1517 with the Reformation.
Luther rejected the political hegemony of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church and
obtained the support of the princes. But after Luther’s death, frequent wars between the princes and
the Holy Roman Emperor divided the Germans. The period of Counter-Reformation served to
further decentralize Germany. The Diet of Augsburg (1555) laid down that a German province
would follow the religion of her prince. So north Germany remained largely Protestant, while the
south and west became predominantly Catholic.

There was, thus, no one answer to who the Germans were. In 1766, Friedrich Carl von Moser said,
“For centuries we have been a puzzle with respect to our political constitution…an object of ridicule,
disunited and weak”. This accurately reflects the situation in the late 18th century. At that time,
Germany meant the ‘Holy Roman Empire of the German nation’, which was split up into 314 larger
and smaller states and free cities. The Empire was on the decline and the Emperor ruled in the name
alone. The people were loyal to their respective ruler. This lent no uniformity to the land in terms of
political unification and hindered attempts at national integration.

Germany, like most of Europe, also faced a cultural division occurred along class lines. The
aristocracy was cosmopolitan in nature and pledged allegiance to the French culture. They were
separate from and often looked down upon the masses, who spoke different dialects. For the
common people, the test of nationality was still religion. Thus there existed a parochial culture at
the local level.

The fate of Germany was also dependent upon the relationship between the two most important
German states – Austria and Prussia. The Habsburg Empire in Austria, with its capital at Vienna,
was composed of 3 main racial and linguistic groups - the Germans, who predominated in the west
and comprised one-sixth of the population; the Magyars, who predominated in Hungary; and
various Slav peoples. It was staunchly Catholic and German in a very cosmopolitan sense. On the
other hand, the non-German Slav people dominated Prussia, with its capital at Berlin. The ruling
dynasty was Hohenzollern, which by the 17th century had become Protestant. By the 18th century,
the subordination of one power to the other was an impossibility, since neither Prussia nor Austria
would accept the leadership of the other. Neither was ready to see the other in a unified Germany

German unification was also hampered by the interest of the other Great Powers of Europe –
Britain, France and Russia. They saw every concentration of power in Germany as a threat to their
own power and the European equilibrium. Also the region acted as a shock absorber for the frequent
wars that broke out among them.

In the late 18th century thus, there was no clear German identity, given the absence of a single
German nation-state and the wide distribution across Europe of communities speaking German
dialects. Yet, at the same time, the nation also grew precisely because of its fragmented identity and
the practical requirements of the small states. The demands of administration required highly
trained officials of ability and qualification; aristocratic birth alone could not suffice. This resulted in
the rise of an educated middle class in Germany, including civil servants, lawyers, journalists,
professors etc. They tried to move away from the dominant French culture of the elite and foster
German values through a common German language. For them, language was not merely an
administrative convenience or a vehicle of universal intellectual expression or even a revolutionary
device for spreading liberty and progress to all. It was the only thing that made them Germans. The
first step in this direction had been the translation of the Bible into German by Luther, which gave
German the status of a literary language, though it was actually the dialect of Saxony. Even later
such efforts to cultivate a purely German language were largely restricted to the Protestant areas.
But in the first half of the 19th century, it provided a central argument for the creation of a unified
national state.
The period 1770-1830 was one of tremendous intellectual activity in Germany. This was the age of
Romanticism, as opposed to the Reason of the Enlightenment. Dissatisfied with the limits of
rationalism, it emphasized emotion and sentiment, and a belief in the diversity and individuality of
human beings. It resulted in an attack on French culture, since Enlightenment was the hallmark of
French culture. The revival of classicism also popularized patriotism and civic virtue. Certain
writers and poets like Lessing, Klopstock, Hamaan and Herder provided the solid foundation for a
nationalist literature, arguing that that the German culture must be asserted more strongly. Herder
spoke of nations as organic units that evolved through history and not as a result of a social
contract, which could be broken. Civilization was seen many-sided and the encouragement of all
national cultures could but enrich the whole. Nevertheless, these German intellectuals were not the
spokesmen of the middle-class. The ‘German nation’ was born in the minds of a few small
intellectual circles as a cultural entity based on language, without any direct link to politics. They
did not want the creation of a nation-state but an increase in solidarity among the princes and more
committed support for the Emperor. Thus, the problem was seen not in territorial fragmentation
but in the egotism of its rulers.

German national identity first emerged in response to the challenge of Napoleonic aggression, in a
definite anti-French form. Napoleon, in fact, unwittingly paved the way for unification by reducing
the number of the states from 314 to 39. He did it, however, mainly for strategic as well as
administrative convenience. The Holy Roman Empire was formally dissolved in 1806 when the last
Emperor, Francis II, resigned. Rhineland was annexed to France, under the direct control of Paris.
The rest of Germany, outside Prussia and Austria, was organized into the Confederation of the
Rhine under the protection of Napoleon and, like the rest of his empire, had imposed upon it a
common social and political pattern, helping to modernize it. This was the first time that these
states had been brought together and French interference stirred up a natural resentment. A.J.P.
Taylor has also argued that since these areas were subjected to liberal reforms, which were
nevertheless seen as French, German nationalism took on an “anti-liberal character”.

Austria and Prussia both suffered defeat at the hands of Napoleon. But unlike Austria, the defeat of
Prussia was complete and Prussian resentment was beyond all bounds. Neither, however, thought in
terms of ‘liberating’ Germany - their only object was their own preservation and recovery. In order
to match up to Napoleon, they began now to modernize themselves. Once again, in Austria, these
reforms were never taken up in a big way. On the other hand, Prussian reforms (1806-12) under
Stein and Hardenberg affected every area of national life. They were carried out by the Prussian
bureaucracy and their fundamental aim was to strengthen the power of the state, not to establish the
basic human rights. Serfdom was abolished (1807); the bureaucracy was made more efficient; the
system of municipal government was reorganized (1808); a modern education system was
introduced and the University of Berlin was set up in 1810. The army was modernized under
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, universal military service was introduced and social reforms like the
emancipation of Jews were carried out. By the end of the period, Prussia was more advanced and
modern than Austria.

More importantly, Napoleon forced the people to define what it meant to be German, and whether
this had political or larger cultural connotations. For most ordinary Germans, it amounted to little
more than resentment of French rule. But among the German intellectual circles a great debate
began and soon, two distinct attitudes emerged. The first group saw Germany as a part of the
Western world and so wished to retain French culture. Its ardent supporter was Goethe (1749–
1832). He never rejected the Enlightenment and emphasized his admiration for Napoleon. He
compared Germans and the Jews and pointed out that though the Jews had no state of their own,
they had made an immense contribution to the cultural world. He also showed little interest in the
unification of Germany; instead he argued that the division of Germany would help maintain her
cultural diversity.

The second group contended that German nationalism was equivalent to an attack on the elite, yet
corrupt and decadent, French culture. New value was attached to local institutions, native customs,
traditional culture and national language. French rationalism and enlightenment were cosmopolitan;
in reaction, nationalism was romantic, particularist, exclusive in character. This is seen in the views
of E.M. Arndt (a patriotic writer) and Friedrich Jahn, who founded the Berlin Gymnastic
Association in 1811, which attempted to combine physical fitness and character building. An ardent
romanticist, Jahn accepted the doctrine of the national spirit (Volksgeist). But he said that the
German volk were culturally and spiritually superior to the artificial society of the French. Fichte
agreed with him - in a lecture he argued that not only should the Germans fight off French rule but
that this was a battle of civilizations.

At a more popular level, German nationalism was further aroused by the Prussian victory at Leipzig
in 1813, when Napoleon was defeated. But its role has been greatly exaggerated. It was in fact an
allied victory, and it was made possible in part by Napoleon’s disastrous campaign in Russia the year
before. There was no popular movement - the rural mass, almost 80% of the population, was not
involved in the struggle against the French at all. However, it gave an indirect boost to the German
national myth. This myth of a patriotic war blended with the common cultural heritage to which
Romanticism had given a powerful boost. The result was that ‘Germany’ exerted, for the first time, a
strong emotional and intellectual appeal among liberals, students and a large part of the middle
classes. It also hinted at the changing balance between Prussia and Austria, where the former took
the lead in the War of Liberation.

The Congress of Vienna was held in 1815, after Napoleon's defeat. The political principles agreed
upon included the restoration and solidarity of rulers for the repression of revolutionary and
nationalist ideas. It also included safeguards to maintain the balance of power and prevent a
resurgence of France. This can be seen in the territorial settlement - the Austrian Netherlands and
Luxembourg were combined with Holland to make a buffer state in the north; Prussia was given the
Rhineland.

A German Confederation (Deutscher Bund) was set up, under the presidency of Austria, which was a
loose conglomeration of the 39 states to which Germany had now been reduced. Its main body was
the Federal Diet (Bundestag) – a permanent congress of envoys chosen by the rulers of the member
states. However, the hope in progressive circles that the Diet might pursue policies conducive to
national unification was quickly dispelled at its first meeting in 1816. The Congress of Vienna had
stipulated that all member states should have constitutions of their own. But apart from a few rulers,
none bothered to even make empty promises about it and the Diet proved powerless to do anything.
In effect, for its defense, it continued to depend upon cooperation between Austria and Prussia. All
this shows that the Diet was a redundant organization and was incapable of giving Germany any
real bond of unity. Also, it linked the political order with that in Europe in a determined rejection of
the principle of nationalism. This can be seen in the fact that while Prussia and Austria were partial
members as only part of their territories which were German were covered by the organization,
certain non-German powers like England and Denmark were also its members.

In the following period, a conservative reactionary system emerged all over Europe under the
influence of the Austrian Chancellor, Metternich. Almost everywhere, the old rulers repressed the
nationalist movement, now mainly alive among students and professors. The German princes
recognized that nationalism was a revolutionary force that required reform or even destruction of
the traditional monarchic states and a redrawing of the existing territorial boundaries. That the
nationalists often voiced liberal demands, such as the granting of constitutions and parliaments,
further alarmed the princes and their aristocratic supporters. There was, therefore, considerable
cooperation between Prussia and Austria to suppress nationalism. Thus there began in 1820 the
period of ‘peaceful dualism’, what German historians call the ‘quiet years’, which lasted until the
1840s.

After 1815, the war-time enthusiasm for nationalism was kept alive in the universities by professors
and students, who formed the student organization Burschenschaften. It was devoted to the moral and
political regeneration of Germany and the cause of national unity. A number of other secret societies
were also formed but their role was limited. A.J.P. Taylor, in fact, regards these as student
disturbances, not evidence of a nationalist movement in Germany. Public festivals were also
organized on a large scale with the intention of boosting national fervour among people. In 1817,
student organizations gathered for the ‘Wartburg festival’, and reactionary books were burnt. This
was, however, suppressed. On a much larger scale was the festival in Hambach in May 1832.

Metternich wasn’t worried about these societies until 1819, when a student called Karl Sand
assassinated a reactionary writer. Metternich used this as a pretext to make the Confederation issue
the Karlsbad Decrees. Press censorship was rigidly introduced and universities were put under
supervision; the Burschenschaften was dissolved. The Karlsbad Decrees have been blamed for the
disappearance of the radical movement which followed at once; in fact they merely gave a halo of
martyrdom to a movement which was already practically extinct. However, a whole generation of
young men, who later occupied leading positions in German society, had experienced, for the first
time, an idealistic nationalism which transcended local loyalties.

Between 1830 and 1833, influenced by events in Greece, France and Belgium, local revolts occurred
in Germany, but only to a very limited extent. These were liberal revolts led by the wealthy middle
classes, students and journalists. They were primarily protests against the rigidities and
shortcomings of the conservative policies adopted since 1815. In 1832, Austria and Prussia got the
Diet at Frankfurt to pass the Six Acts, which re-established repressive measures throughout
Germany. By 1835, the forces of conservatism crushed the revolutions. There were no serious
constitutional changes and little hint of any new national feeling. After this, however, a radical
movement of the “young Germans” emerged. It had a burning desire to translate abstract ideals of
human freedom into practical action. But it was composed of isolated intellectuals on the fringe of
German society. Many, like Heinrich Heine and Karl Marx, were abroad in exile.

At the same time, Prussia began to rise in importance. It had ceded most of its Polish possessions to
Russia and received compensation in Saxony and Rhineland, as a result of which its population
became overwhelmingly German. It also came to posses the rich mineral resources and coal deposits
of the Ruhr valley and Saar, which became the foundations of Prussian industrialization in the
coming years. And although Austria was dominant until 1848, two developments worked in favour
of Prussia's advance - the philosophy of Hegel, which made of the advance of Prussia something
inevitable, and the Zollverein in 1834, which made Prussia appear essential to Germany.

Hegel argued that true freedom was to be found in working in line with the trend of history; that the
Prussian state was the culmination of the historic process and that therefore submission to the
Prussian state should be the choice of every free man. This was welcomed by all those who had
found it hard to reconcile their German pride to the circumstances of everyday subjection; now they
felt that in accepting subjection they were really free.

The Zollverein fitted in well with the doctrine of Hegel. In the early 19th century, Germany was a
pre-dominantly agrarian society. Industrial activity was scattered and small-scale in nature; and
suffered from a shortage of capital. However certain economic changes now began taking place. In
1818, the Prussian government introduced a new tariff law that abolished all internal tolls, while
imposing a uniform moderate tariff on goods coming in from outside. By 1826, several of the smaller
German states enclosed by Prussia’s sprawling territories joined the system and a large North
German area of internal free trade grew up. Similar unions were set up in 1828 between Bavaria and
Württemberg in the south (South German Zollverein) and between Hanover, Saxony, Brunswick and
others in the north (Central German Trade Union). In 1834, the three unions merged into the
Zollverein, or German Customs Union, comprising 17 states, excluding Austria and Bohemia.
Customs barriers of member states were leveled, and a uniform tariff was instituted against non-
members. The Zollverein economically hurt the Austrians since it became cheaper for German
countries to trade within the Confederation. It also made the member states increasingly dependent
on Prussia, giving her a new role of economic leadership and domination in German territory.

After 1835, there was a modest but perceptible increase in industrial activity as well. The leading
industry, textiles, grew steadily in importance in Saxony and an iron and steel industry began to
flourish in West Germany. This general economic revival was due partly improved communications.
Roads improved steadily and canal networks were built by 1845 on all major rivers. But the real
revolution came with the railways. The first railway line was laid in 1835. It opened up the interiors
of Germany, creating a single unified market and bringing a new stimulus to trade and offering new
opportunities in every sphere of business. Thus, just as the Zollverein removed the artificial
impediments, so the railways removed the natural impediments to German integration and
prosperity. They made possible the rapid expansion of the German economy after 1850.

The Rhine Crisis of 1840 evoked an upsurge of national feeling in Germany and gave it an
opportunity to appear in its full form. There was a war scare that France, having failed in her effort
to secure control over Syria and Palestine, might seek compensation in Europe by acquiring
Rhineland. National sentiments were articulated strongly through patriotic songs, plays and poems.
But the alarm blew over, with no practical results. The full failure of the Confederation was now
obvious - Austria had her hands full in Italy and only the Prussian army garrisoned the Rhine.
Nationalist enthusiasm had centered on Prussia for the first time since 1813 and unwittingly, it
became the defender of Germany.

Hagen Schulze notes that the great surges of nationalistic feeling in this period coincided with crises
in the economy and foreign affairs. However, up to this point, cultural and linguistic unity still
dominated intellectual thought. Although there were increasing references to the ‘German people’
and the ‘German fatherland’, these terms occurred in vague and poetic contexts, used only to
heighten the contrast with the enemy, the French. The years following 1840 saw a rebirth of
German nationalism and strong growth in the organizations promoting it. The gymnastics
movement (Turnbewegung) was revived and linked the goal of physical fitness with ideas of
patriotism and national defense. Another important role was that of the Gesangverein, or choral
society. Local groups formed umbrella organizations that sponsored the first national music festivals
and fanned nationalistic sentiment; members not only promoted patriotic songs at these gatherings,
but they also made inflammatory speeches. The first pan-German academic congresses took place in
this era, where participants stressed the links between scholarship and the idea of nationhood. The
1840s was also the age of the political lyric. Poets like Fallersleben, Prutz and Herwegh did much to
keep the spirit of patriotism alive. The decade was also the heyday of national monuments, e.g. the
Hall of Liberation near Kelheim on the Rhine. Popular enthusiasm for the Schleswig-Holstein
question, a source of dispute between Germany and Denmark, kept the issues of unification firmly in
the forefront in the late 1840s. But the ‘German fatherland’ had yet no fixed shape.

1848 was the year which saw revolutions throughout the continent of Europe. It was preceded in
1846-47 by the last European crisis of the old type, when poor harvests resulted in famine and
migration to cities, which was followed in 1847-48 by the first “modern” crisis, precipitated by the
collapse of prices for consumer goods. In Germany, there was social discontent in the countryside
(among the landless peasantry) as well as towns (mainly among the Handwerker, craftsmen fighting
for protection of small-scale industry against growing modernization). Following the events in
Paris, disturbances and revolts broke out all over Germany in March. Most of these were liberal and
nationalist insurrections directed against the political order which had prevailed since 1815. The
revolution achieved initial success as the frightened princes capitulated without resistance, granted
constitutions and appointed liberal ministries. On 31 March, a Vorparlement, or provisional general
assembly, met in the Paulskirche at Frankfurt. It consisted of 500 members drawn from the
parliamentary assemblies of the different German states, including Prussia and Austria. However, it
achieved no results save to arrange for the election of an all-German assembly.

A new phase in the unification process now began. In May, the German National Assembly met at
Frankfurt to draw up a national German constitution. It wanted Germany to be federal, liberal,
constitutional and united. Its delegates were mostly professors, lawyers, businessmen, civil servants
and the clergy. It provided for a federal structure with a monarchical head and a parliament elected
by universal male suffrage. However it was deeply divided over the question of the frontiers of the
new German state. Neither the existing Confederation nor the test of language offered any clear
guide. A few members, notably Arndt and Jahn, demanded the inclusion all German-speaking areas,
irrespective of the number of Germans there. However, this posed a problem for the multi-racial
Austria. Two conflicting programmes for unification soon emerged. The first was the idea of a
‘Greater Germany’ (Grossdeutsch), led by Schmerling. It argued that the new state should include
Austria, including Bohemia and Moravia where Germans were an upper-class minority, but leave
out Hungary. They were impatient at any separatist Slav nationalisms, such as the Polish and Czech,
which obstructed their project. Here the chauvinism inherent in the national idea became evident -
German was seen as the master race and other “un-historic” races were inferior races, with no right
to self-determination. The other alternative was the idea of a ‘Little Germany’ (Kleindeutsch), which
excluded Austria completely and looked at Prussia for leadership. One of its main supporters was
Heinrich von Gagern. The dispute dragged on inconclusively. Religion also influenced it - Catholics
looked to Austria; Protestants to Prussia. Eventually the majority voted for the Kleindeutsch solution
and they offered the crown of the new state to the Prussian monarch Frederick William IV. But he
refused on the grounds that he would accept the crown only from the princes and not from an
elected body. This was a deathblow to the Parliament and it was disbanded in 1849.

By the end of May 1848, the revolutionary movement had spent its main force. The liberals, under
threat from the radicals, turned back to the crown and the army in order to maintain law and order.
At the same time, the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses began to ebb away. By the beginning
of 1849, the revolution was over. It failed, among other reasons, due to the lack of central leadership,
lack of unity of purpose and the threat of the big powers. Also, it was led by intellectuals, not “men
of action”. Its failure resulted in a return of monarchical order all over Germany in a more absolutist
form. Military force was used to suppress the risings and the German Bund was re-established.

The failure of 1848 thus discredited liberal ideas. It pointed out that unification could not achieved
from below, since the princes were not ready to surrender their power to a popularly elected
government. National liberalism also changed in character; Romantic idealism was replaced by a
more materialistic and realistic spirit. The intellectual content for this in the 1860s was supplied by
writers such as Sybel, Droysen and Treitschke, who helped mobilize public opinion in Prussia. Some
nationalists now came to believe that what liberalism and democracy failed to give them might be
got from more authoritarian sources and by more militaristic means. This increased respect for
power found its philosopher in Ludwig von Rochau, who distinguished sharply between
philosophical speculation and practical politics (Realpolitik). The Schleswig-Holstein affair of 1848
also made it clear that changes in Central Europe could not be achieved against the will of the Great
Powers. However, the debates of the Frankfurt Assembly brought into focus for the first time some
of the major problems of German nationalism. The question of what was the German fatherland was
clarified – either Kleindeutsch or Grossdeutsch.

The years after 1848 saw Prussia take a gradual and definite advantage over Austria. In 1849, the
Austrian army was engaged in war to protect its dominions in Italy (Piedmont) as well as Hungary.
Thus Austria had neither force nor policy to spare for the affairs of Germany. The international
situation also became more favourable. Napoleon III, who came to power in France, wanted to undo
the Vienna settlement and redraw the map of Europe in order to reclaim the lost French pride. For
this purpose, he was willing to foster limited nationalism in Italy and Germany. The Crimean War
(1854-56) shattered beyond repair the fragile structure of the Holy Alliance. Also, Austria had
adopted an official policy of armed neutrality instead of aiding Russia against England and France,
but had actually sided with the western powers. This left her virtually isolated at the end of the war.
The onus now lay in Prussia to manipulate the situation to her advantage.

The conservative Junkers (landed class) merely wished to defeat the nationalist movement while
maintaining the traditional disunion of Germany. But William IV held the romantic vision of a
united Germany under the Hohenzollern dynasty. Though he had rejected the crown earlier, he now
devised a scheme calling on the German princes to join their territories in a union that would be led
by Prussia and would exclude Austria. The Erfurt Union was formed. But before the plan could
materialize, the Austrians intervened and through the Treaty of Olmütz (1850) pressurized Prussia
to agree on the re-establishment of the German Confederation. Prussia was left completely
humiliated.

There was little scope for a national movement during the 1850s. Counter-revolutions made open
politics impossible and governments restricted the scope for cultural activity which might have
promoted a sense of national identity. However, in the late 1850s, a relaxation of controls allowed
more communication across state boundaries. Associations such as choral societies, shooting clubs
etc. had a larger membership and geographical spread than ever before. There was also a revival of
popular festivals of the lower middle-classes like Turnerfeste and Schützenfeste. The demand for
unification revived also as a consequence of economic development. Germany’s output of coal and
iron and steel increased rapidly. Heavy industries developed. The railways made it possible to travel
quickly from any part of Europe to another. Military strategy, guided by Moltke, took full
advantage of the new speed with which troops and supplies could be moved. The manufacture of
heavy artillery now made possible transformed field warfare. The Zollverein knitted German trade
more closely together, while still excluding Austria.

Industrialization was also accompanied by the expansion of the middle classes, which began to
constitute independent organizations. German lawyers founded an association in 1860 to work for a
unified legal code. In 1861, a national Chamber on Commerce (Deutscher Handelstag) was formed. At
a political level, the Nationalverein of 1859 drew liberal aristocrats, professionals, intellectuals and a
few industrialists as its members. It reflected the economic and intellectual basis that the German
national movement had acquired. It sought to unite liberals and democrats into a national movement
behind Prussian leadership. But its membership never exceeded 25,000, it lacked official support and
was politically divided.

In the summer of 1859, there was a further resurgence of German nationalism, once again over the
Rhineland. Napoleon’s annexation of Savoy and Nice in 1860 confirmed the growing fears of French
imperialism. A wave of anti-French feeling swept through Germany and by 1861, the German
people were united in their hatred of France.

Thus the rapid expansion of the economy united Germany economically, and partially culturally,
before 1871. John M. Keynes commented, with some justification, “The German Empire was created
more by coal and iron than by blood and iron”. The favourable economic situation made it easier for
Bismarck to separate nationalism from liberalism. German nationalism lost its connection with
Romanticism and became conservative; it no longer recognized any supranational bonds. However
this alone was not sufficient. By the early 1860s, it had become apparent that the political framework
of the German Confederation was acting as an obstacle to any further progress towards political
unity. German unity was now brought about by a sequence of diplomatic maneuvers and wars, in
which Bismarck played a major role. Here arises the question of the role of Bismarck in the process
of Germany – was it a product of the larger historical processes of the time or the result of an
individual's genius? This cannot be understood without a look at the events 1860-71 that led to
Germany’s eventual unification.

Bismarck came from the Junker class, who were deeply conservative. But his mother was of an upper
middle-class origin, by which he developed a certain cosmopolitanism. He had a quick, sensitive,
restless mind, great personal charm, acute intelligence and indomitable will power. He occupied a
number of official posts before he became the President of the Prussian Ministry in 1862. In 1847 he
became a member of the Prussian Diet and made a name for himself as a determined reactionary. He
came into the limelight in 1862 when the Prussian King William I, facing liberal opposition to the
army reforms proposed by him, turned to Bismarck for help.

He was in many ways a typical Junker, but 1848 marked a change in his thinking and he began to
modify his ideas in tune with the rise of realism. Thereafter he became isolated from his class, which
could no longer understand his actions. For Bismarck was, above all, an exponent of Realpolitik - the
view that government and state policy are matters divorced from moral considerations, to be
dictated only by the necessities of power. This comes out in his famous speech to the Prussian Diet
(Landtag) in 1862 – “The position of Prussia in Germany will be decided not by its liberalism but by
its power…the great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and the resolutions of
majorities - that was the blunder of 1848 and 1849 - but by blood and iron”.

Bismarck remained a conservative from the beginning to the end. But with 1848 he realized that the
age of mass politics had arrived and thus he tried to preserve the existing monarchy, yet base it on
some kind of popular vote by introducing universal suffrage in Germany. He also opposed socialism.
But in order to avoid a revolution, he attempted a compromise and even introduced social welfare
legislation like food insurance, accident insurance etc. His pragmatism comes out most clearly in his
foreign policy. Junkers looked up to Austria as the bulwark of conservatism in Central Europe after
1815. Bismarck was different - from 1850s he laid out a new foreign policy that was not ideologically
but politically motivated. He attacked the idea of ideological solidarity with Austria and pointed out
that since new opportunities were opening in Europe, Prussia must take advantage of them and be
open to new alliances. His flexible approach and diplomatic skills were amply displayed during the 3
wars that resulted in the unification of Germany in 1871. However, it must be added that a large
part of his success was due to favourable international situation that emerged after the crisis after
the Crimean War.

In 1863 Austria made a last bid to seize the initiative in Germany and unite her by consent. Austria
summoned the German princes to meet in Frankfurt and discuss a new reform plan, by which she
proposed the establishment of a federal assembly and the voluntary surrender by the princes of part
of their sovereignty. Bismarck however persuaded William I not to accept this proposal, which in
effect led to its failure. This ended all chance of a Germany achieved by negotiation.

The first war was fought with when Denmark formally annexed the duchies of Schleswig and
Holstein in 1863. Germany was again seized with a patriotic fervour, since it was seen as a region
which had historical and cultural ties to the ‘mother country’. Prussia and Austria decided to
cooperate in liberating them, which they achieved quite easily. However, they did not integrate the
two duchies into the German Confederation, marginalizing German nationalism. Instead, under the
Gastein Convention (1865), Austria took over Holstein and Prussia Schleswig. Two years later,
however, conflicts between them over occupation rights escalated. There is a debate among
historians about whether Bismarck deliberately used this to provoke a war with Austria. Either way,
the result was a political division, with Austria and Prussia now fighting for dominance of the
Germanic states. Bismarck might have preferred to gain his ends without war, but he came to regard
war as indispensable.

Simultaneously, Bismarck began to use international diplomacy to secure the neutrality of the big
powers. His negotiations with France in 1865 and vague hints of territorial gain kept Napoleon III
favourably disposed towards Prussia; while Bismarck’s support for Russia over the Polish Revolt
(1863) won the gratitude of Alexander II. Britain was committed to non-intervention on the
continent. Bismarck’s masterstroke was the Italian alliance of 1866. This left Austria diplomatically
isolated. He also secured alliances with the Magyars, still subject to Vienna, and German radicalism,
with whom the alliance was political as Bismarck proposed a German parliament elected by direct
universal suffrage.

In June 1866, when the dispute between Prussia and Austria broke out into war, most German
states joined Austria. Yet, within 7 weeks, the Prussians emerged victorious due to their superior
military organization and equipment. Bismarck imposed mild peace treaties on Austria and the
South German states, to keep them as future allies. Prussia, however, annexed all of the states north
of the Main River to form the North German Confederation (Norddeutscher Bund) in 1867. Bismarck
drafted a constitution for it that granted universal male suffrage to the parliament of the
Confederation. The parliament also got the right to vote the budget, but the government remained
responsible only to the Prussian king, who headed the North German Confederation. This
represented an enormous expansion of Prussian power. Austria was now expelled from the
organization of Germany. However, the liberals welcomed it as a step toward national unification.

The next step for unification was to include Southern Germany in the North German Confederation,
which traditionally looked to France for leadership. However, once again there is a controversy
about whether Bismarck had planned the war with France or whether he was pushed into it by a
rising national sentiment against a traditional enemy. The ‘doctored’ Ems telegram provides some
evidence in favour of the former. In August 1870, Prussia went to war with France over the question
of succession to the Spanish throne. The French armies were defeated and the southern states were
united with the North German Confederation. They also had to cede Alsace and Lorraine. The
German princes were induced by Bismarck to offer the crown to William I and on January 18, 1871,
the German Empire was proclaimed in the Palace of Versailles.

All the wars were regarded as a proof of the strength of German nationalism. However, German
nationalism had as little to do with the victories of 1866 and 1870 as in 1813. Bismarck used the
national movement as and when it suited his purpose. Hagen Schulze, however, says that public
opinion was powerful enough for to influence the course of events. It is doubtful that his real aim
was to achieve a unified Germany; it was imposed on him by the national movement. His only
interest was to increase the power of Prussia, and within Prussia his own power; and this he did by
presenting himself, on one hand to the nationalists as one who had the diplomatic expertise to
manipulate the international scene to achieve unification, and on the other hand to the Great Powers
as the only one could defend Germany against the national movement in the interest of the old
order.

Also, it can be said that the development of German nationalism was an inevitable consequence of
trend of European history. Bismarck himself said, “Man cannot create the current of events. He can
only float with it and steer.” However there is nothing inevitable in the particular form that it took;
Bismarck’s role must be recognized. But once again, the sequence of events was not one coherent
plan, conceived in the mastermind of Bismarck. Instead, in an age of uncertainty, Bismarck was
merely a political realist – a brilliant opportunist who remained undecided and flexible until the last
moment; his policy looks more clear-cut only in retrospect. Moreover, his success must also be seen
in context of the favourable international situation in Europe during the 1860s. Thus it can be seen
as a consequence of the interplay of an individual’s personality and well-devised policy within the
course of events.

Lastly, it can also be said that Bismarck’s state was not a ‘historical necessity’ as has been presented
by his contemporaries and admirers; several other possible alternatives to it had existed, such as the
idea of a Greater Germany or a ‘Third Germany’ consisting of the German states to the exclusion of
Austria and Prussia. Post unification, many felt that what had been created was not a unified
Germany but a Greater Prussia. In cultural terms, this ‘Prussianization’ meant that the stock image
of the Prussian militarist now became symbolic of the German stereotype. Also, the question of
‘German identity’ continued to be debated beyond 1871, and found its worst and most fatal
extension in Hitler.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. David Thomson – Europe Since Napoleon
2. A. J. P. Taylor – The Course Of German History
3. William Carr – A History Of Germany, 1815-1945
4. Hagen Schulze – Germany: A New History (Translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider)
5. Hagen Schulze (ed.) – Nation-Building In Central Europe
a. The Revolution Of The European Order And The Rise Of German Nationalism –
Hagen Schulze
b. The Nineteenth-Century German Nationalist Movement As A Movement Of Societies –
Dieter Düding
c. Europe And The German Question In Historical Perspective – Hagen Schulze
6. Theodore S. Hamerow (ed.) – Otto Von Bismarck: A Historical Assessment
7. Otto Pflanze (ed.) – The Unification Of Germany (1848-1871)
8. Otto Pflanze – Bismarck And The Development Of Germany, The Period Of Unification (!815-
1871)
9. Stephen J. Lee - Aspects of European History, 1789-1980
10. E. J. Hobsbawm – Nations And Nationalism Since 1780 (Programme, Myth, Reality)
11. E. J. Hobsbawm – The Age Of Revolution (Europe, 1789-1848)
12. E. J. Hobsbawm – The Age Of Capital (Europe, 1848-1875)
13. John Breuilly (ed.) – Nineteenth-Century Germany: Politics, Culture, And Society, 1780-1918
a. Revolution To Unification – John Breuilly
14. A. J. P. Taylor – Bismarck: The Man And The Statesman