Journal of Risk Research

ISSN: 1366-9877 (Print) 1466-4461 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjrr20

Risk as Value: Combining Affect and Analysis in

Risk Judgments

Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup

To cite this article: Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup (2006) Risk as Value: Combining
Affect and Analysis in Risk Judgments, Journal of Risk Research, 9:2, 141-164, DOI:
10.1080/13669870500166930

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13669870500166930

Published online: 20 Aug 2006.

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Journal of Risk Research
Vol. 9, No. 2, 141–164, March 2006

ARTICLE

Risk as Value: Combining Affect and

Analysis in Risk Judgments

MELISSA L. FINUCANE & JOAN L. HOLUP

Center for Health Research, Hawai‘i, Kaiser Permanente Hawai‘i, Honolulu, Hawai‘i, USA

ABSTRACT Studies of public perceptions of hazardous activities and technologies

include a wide range of approaches. One approach—‘‘risk-as-analysis’’—emphasizes
the human capacity for analytic deliberation. A second approach—‘‘risk-as-feelings’’—
emphasizes the tendency for people to rely on affective reactions. In this paper we
expand and link these approaches by adopting a ‘‘risk-as-value’’ model, emphasizing
that responses to risk result from a combination of analysis and affect that motivates
individuals and groups to achieve a particular way of life. Derived from dual-process
theories, the risk-as-value model implies that differences in perceived risk may arise
from differences in the analytic evaluation of a risk, differences in the affective
evaluation of a risk, or the way these evaluations are combined. We discuss the goals of
dual processes in comprehensively governing the valuation of risk information in order
to achieve desirable outcomes. We highlight the importance of model-based research
and the need for researchers to look for converging evidence using multiple dependent
measures and methods. Implications for risk communication are discussed.

KEY WORDS: Perceived risk, affect, analysis, value, judgment, decision making, dual process
models

Traditional models of judgment and decision making under conditions of

risk and uncertainty have focused mainly on cognitive aspects of information
processing (e.g., Busemeyer et al., 1995; Savage, 1954; Shafir et al., 1993;
von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). New models of how people judge
risky options emphasize the important role of affect,1 positing that affect is
essential for navigating our way through a complex and uncertain
environment (Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Finucane, Slovic,
and colleagues (Finucane et al., 2000, 2003; Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic et al.,

Correspondence Address: Melissa L. Finucane, Center for Health Research, Hawai‘i, Kaiser
Permanente Hawai‘i, 501 Alakawa Street, Suite 201, Honolulu, Hawai‘i, USA 96817. Fax:
+1-808-432-4785; Tel.: +1-808-432-4754; Email: Melissa.L.Finucane@kp.org
1366-9877 Print/1466-4461 Online/06/020141–24 # 2006 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13669870500166930
142 Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup

2002b) describe how people rely on affect through strategies such as the
‘‘affect heuristic’’ to judge the risk of diverse hazardous activities and
technologies. Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman writes that the idea of an
affect heuristic is one of the most important developments in the study of
judgment heuristics in the past few decades (Kahneman, 2003).
However, much theoretical development and empirical work is still
needed to fully understand how affect and analysis work together in
judgments of risk. In this paper, we draw on recommendations by Weber
and Hsee (1999) regarding how to proceed with studies examining perceived
risk. The first recommendation is that research should be model based.
An appropriate model should explicitly specify possible causal constructs
or variables that influence reactions to risk, allow for individual and
group differences in these variables or in the relationships between them,
and generalize across risk domains and contexts. Furthermore, researchers
should look for converging evidence using multiple dependent measures
and methodological approaches. The most conclusive evidence about
factors (affective or analytic) that contribute to risk perceptions will come
only from a systemic examination at multiple levels of this complex
phenomenon.
The aim of this article is to offer preliminary steps toward a more
comprehensive understanding of risk perceptions by positing a ‘‘risk-as-
value’’ model that derives from dual-process theories of judgment and
decision making. Our model emphasizes the constructed nature of risk
judgments and decisions through a combination of affective and analytic
evaluations of risky options. We describe critical elements of our ‘‘risk-as-
value’’ model and review evidence for (and some goals of) the partnership of
affective and analytic processes in risk judgments and decisions. Since this
theoretical framework is in its formative stages, we highlight aspects of the
model that need development and critical examination in future research. In
particular, we emphasize the need for research that uses multiple measures
and methods to provide converging evidence for the interplay of affect and
analysis in decisions under uncertainty. Finally, we discuss the implications
of our framework for risk communication and policymaking challenges. Our
goal in this article is to facilitate discussion of and empirical work on the role
of both affect and analysis in reactions to hazardous activities and
technologies.

1
Although researchers in the field of emotion have not yet agreed on a precise definition of
‘‘affect,’’ we conceptualize this term as meaning ‘‘goodness’’ or ‘‘badness’’ (i) experienced as a
feeling state (with or without consciousness), and (ii) demarcating a positive or negative
quality of a specific stimulus. The strength and speed of positive and negative affective
reactions differs across individuals; stimuli also vary in the strength and speed with which
they elicit positive and negative affect. An affective reaction can be an enduring disposition
strongly related to a stimulus (e.g., your child), but can also be a fleeting reaction or weakly
related response (e.g., to a chair) (Finucane et al., 2003).
 Risk as Value 143

Risk as Value
Studies of public perceptions of hazardous activities and technologies
include a wide range of approaches to understanding behavioral responses
to risks and their acceptability. One approach—‘‘risk-as-analysis’’—has
emphasized the human capacity to approach risk judgments using analytic
deliberation. The analytic approach is intentional and effortful; it requires
justifications for decisions via logic and evidence, thus mediating behavior
by conscious appraisals of the situation. Reflecting rationalistic origins, the
analytic approach is encapsulated in models such as subjective expected
utility theory (SEU, Savage, 1954), which posits that risky choices are made
by assessing the probabilities (likelihood) and utilities (desirability) of
various available options, computing the subjective expected utility (by
multiplying the probability and utility) for each option, and then choosing
the option with the highest subjective expected utility. The use of SEU theory
as a standard for evaluating the quality of decisions has been critiqued
previously (Frisch and Clemen, 1994; Hastie, 1991; Lopes, 1981).
Importantly, considerable empirical research has shown that SEU theory
does not accurately describe how people make decisions. For instance,
situations in which individuals deliberate over all the information available
are not distinguished from situations in which they act out of habit or
impulsiveness. Even if the theory accurately described decision processes,
many authors note that it focuses on only a very small part of the process. In
particular, SEU ignores how a decision maker generates options and
determines the importance of consequences (Baron, 2000; Hastie, 1991).
A second approach—‘‘risk-as-feelings’’—has emphasized the tendency to
rely on affective experiences when assessing risk. Several authors have
proposed a direct and sometimes dominant role for feelings (Clore et al.,
1994; Damasio, 1994; Finucane et al., 2003; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic
et al., 2002b, 2004). In contrast to the maximal rationality view that ‘‘more
is better’’ with respect to processing relevant information, models
incorporating affect show how feelings can efficiently and effortlessly guide
our deliberations of the relative desirability of alternative options. Feelings
help us to anticipate the consequences of various actions, simplify complex
scenarios, and resolve ambiguity. The affective system operates according to
heuristic principles. Affect-based heuristics suggest that images (representa-
tions of objects and events in people’s minds), marked by positive and
negative feelings, guide people’s judgment and decision making. Images are
tagged to varying degrees with affect and people refer to this ‘‘pool of affect’’
in the process of making evaluations and choices. Using an affect heuristic
can improve judgmental efficiency as it allows for deriving both risk and
benefit evaluations from affective reactions to the stimulus item.
Perhaps the greatest insight into public risk perceptions will come,
however, from thorough examination of how affect and analysis are
combined in human judgment and decision making about the acceptability
of hazardous activities and technologies. In this article we adopt the view of
144 Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup

‘‘risk-as-value’’—a combination of analysis and feelings that motivates

individuals and groups to achieve a particular way of life. Values are
important because they are people’s best judgments, based on their logical
deliberation and experiences of processes and events, of the overall goodness
of outcomes (Baron and Leshner, 2000). Our use of the term ‘‘value’’ is
similar to Baron’s (2000) use of ‘‘utility’’ as the measure of desirability that
decisions are meant to increase. From an economic perspective, values can
be measured in terms of money (e.g., willingness to pay, WTP, to protect a
way of life) (Calfee and Winston, 1998; Jones-Lee, 1989; Keeney, 1992;
Mitchell and Carson, 1989; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; von
Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). However, our understanding of ‘‘value’’
also incorporates non-quantitative measures of desirability. From a
psychological perspective, values can be measured in terms of affective
qualities (e.g., satisfaction or happiness derived from a way of life, the
goodness of an outcome for society at large, and so on). By incorporating
both analytic and affective aspects, our conceptualization of values reflects
the interplay of deliberative and affective judgment and decision processes.
Thus, unlike Baron and Leshner (2000), we view values as the result of both
deliberation and desires.
Formalizing the risk-as-value model of perceived risk is difficult given
the lack of research on the affective components of risk judgments and on
how affective and analytic components are integrated. Generally speaking,
the model should reflect that the perceived risk of a hazardous activity or
technology (X) is a function of the analytic evaluation (EAn) and the affective
evaluation (EAff) of the activity or technology:

Perceived Risk ðXÞ~fðEAn ðXÞ, EAff ðXÞÞ ð1Þ

Equation 1 implies that differences in perceived risk may arise in at least

the following ways. They may result from differences in the analytic
evaluation of X, differences in the affective evaluation of X, or differences in
the way these evaluations are combined. As research moves from simply
describing differences in risk perceptions to predicting (and possibly
modifying) them, it is useful to have multiple potential loci for such
differences with different substantive interpretations.
Importantly, we do not posit a specific rule for combining affective and
analytic evaluations, although traditional information integration rules
(such as adding, averaging, or multiplying) may be applicable in some
contexts. For instance, when the implications of both affective and analytic
evaluations are congruent, the processes may be more likely to combine
additively to influence judgments. Conditions of incongruence may result in
greater analytic or affective processing depending on various factors related
to the task, decision maker, or context (e.g., analysis may be increased if it is
viewed as more reliable, but may be attenuated under time pressure). Under
conditions of ambiguous information, affect may set up an expectancy and
 Risk as Value 145

analysis may then interpret the information in line with this expectancy (cf.,
Zuckerman and Chaiken, 1998).
We also posit, however, that recent research makes a good case for
leaving open the possibility that we need to develop new (e.g., qualitative)
understandings of how affective and analytic components (and their
interplay) are best represented. Although economic values figure heavily in
many important risk decisions, a growing body of ethicists and social
scientists have criticized quantitative procedures as ill-equipped to reflect
public conceptions of the complex, multidimensional, and often non-
monetary quality of goods extant in or produced by nonmarket goods such
as nature and good health (Prior, 1998; Stern and Dietz, 1994). Many argue
that we cannot think about or easily offer a price for nonmarket goods
(Payne et al., 1999; Ritov and Kahneman, 1997). Mitchell and Carson
(1989) describe ‘‘protest responses’’ to questions asking for a dollar value to
be placed on natural resources, exemplifying what Baron and Spranca
(1997) call ‘‘protected values’’. In some instances, people think that some of
the things they value (e.g., a pristine ecosystem) cannot be traded off for any
compensating benefit. Consequently, analytic cost-benefit calculations and
negotiations break down. Alternative models of perceived risk that permit
affective evaluations to be incorporated in non-quantitative ways will help
to address the neglect of affective components of risk decision making
(Finucane and Satterfield, in press).
In short, we introduce the risk-as-value model to expand and link the risk-
as-analysis and risk-as-feelings models. We envision that the model posited
in Equation 1 will be elaborated as research identifies various factors that
influence the equation’s component variables. Just as the constructed nature
of judgment and decision making (Slovic, 1995) has been established through
in-depth investigation of an array of influential contextual variables (e.g.,
information framing), we anticipate that the risk-as-value model will be
enhanced with increasing knowledge about the role of hazard and decision
maker characteristics that influence the interplay of affective and analytic
processes in risk judgments. Such model-based research can broaden our
understanding of basic psychological phenomena (Weber and Hsee, 1999).

Dual Processes: A Partnership Approach to Valuing Risk

Why do we anticipate that the key to understanding risk will be found in
understanding both analytic and affective processes and how they combine
in judgment and decision making? The answer comes from recent
developments in psychological theories of cognition and emotion, collec-
tively referred to as dual-process models. In short, research suggests that
analytic and affective processes work in partnership to identify and prioritize
experiences that are valued positively (and thus pursued) and experiences
that are valued negatively (and thus avoided). Together, dual processes
comprehensively govern the valuation of risk information in order to
maintain a particular way of life.
146 Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup

Dual-process models can be traced to Aristotle’s ‘‘Nicomachaean

Ethics’’ but are best expressed contemporarily by the work of Bruner
(1986), Epstein (1991, 1994, 2003), Finucane et al. (2003), Loewenstein
et al. (2001), Reyna and Brainerd (1995), Sloman (1996), and Zajonc
(1984). Bruner proposed that human cognition relies upon two modes of
thought: ‘‘a paradigmatic or logico-scientific’’ mode and ‘‘a narrative mode
that deals instead with good and believable stories’’ (pp. 12–13). More
importantly, Bruner claims that ‘‘efforts to reduce one mode to the other or
to ignore one at the expense of the other inevitably fail to capture the rich
diversity of thought’’ (p. 11).
Epstein (1994) similarly argues that all behavior is assumed to be the
product of a joint operation of two systems that work in parallel and interact
with one another. Epstein describes ‘‘an experiential system that is
intimately associated with affect…, that encodes experience in the form of
concrete exemplars and narratives and that operates according to a set of
inferential rules that differ from those of a relatively affect-free system’’
(p. 713). This experiential system influences and is influenced by an analytic
system, which directs behavior on the basis of learning from past experience.
The analytic system is capable of very high levels of abstraction and long-
term delay of gratification, operating through a person’s understanding of
logical rules of inference (Epstein and Pacini, 1999).
Although Epstein (1994) distinguishes two systems, it is important to note
that the processing of experiences may be involved in both affective and
analytic approaches. Johnson and Lakoff (2002; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999)
point out that even our most abstract thinking (mathematics, for example) is
based on our ‘‘embodied’’ experiences. They describe how the locus of
experience, meaning, and thought is the ongoing series of physical interactions
with our changing environment. Our embodied acts and experiences are an
important part of our conceptual system; in making sense of what we
experience, there is no ultimate separation of mind and body.
Also arguing against Descartes’ separation of mind and body, Damasio
(1994) describes how dual processes are important partners. In proposing
the somatic-marker hypothesis, Damasio states ‘‘The partnership between
so-called cognitive processes and processes usually called ‘emotional’ should
be apparent’’ (p. 175). Damasio posits that before individuals reason toward
a solution for problems, they experience pleasant or unpleasant gut feelings
connected with given response options that function as automated incentive
or alarm signals. An incentive signal encourages further consideration of the
favorable options; an alarm signal protects against future losses, allowing for
choices among fewer alternatives. Subsequent reasoning and final selection
may take place, meaning somatic markers are not necessarily sufficient for
deciding all outcomes. In short, somatic markers do not deliberate for us, but
they assist deliberations by highlighting (and narrowing) options, thereby
increasing the accuracy and efficiency of the decision process.
Consistent with Damasio’s hypothesis, Finucane, Slovic, and colleagues
(Finucane et al., 2000, 2003; Slovic et al., 2002b) proposed that mental
 Risk as Value 147

representations of decision stimuli evoke on-line affective experiences that

influence people’s perceptions and consequently their judgments and
decisions—a process called the ‘‘affect heuristic’’. The salient qualities of
real or imagined stimuli evoke images (perceptual and symbolic interpreta-
tions) that may be made up of both affective and instrumental dimensions.
The mapping of affective information determines the contribution that
stimulus images make to an individual’s ‘‘affective pool’’, which contains all
the positive and negative markers associated (consciously or unconsciously)
with the images. According to the affect heuristic, people consult or refer to
the affective pool in the process of making judgments. Using an overall,
readily available affective impression can be easier and more efficient than
weighing the pros and cons of various reasons or retrieving from memory
many relevant examples, especially when the required judgment or decision
is complex or mental resources are limited. Similarly, Loewenstein et al.
(2001) present a ‘‘risk-as-feelings’’ hypothesis which postulates that
responses to risky situations result in part from direct emotional influences,
including feelings such as worry, fear, dread, or anxiety. This hypothesis
explains how emotions arise in large part as a reaction to mental images of a
decision’s outcome, highlighting the importance of vividness in forming
images and determining what individuals view as the best course of action.
Drawing on modern concepts of memory representation, retrieval, and
processing, Reyna and colleagues (Reyna and Brainerd, 1995; Reyna et al.,
2003) have proposed a dual-process model called fuzzy-trace theory (FTT)
to understand reasoning about risk. FTT posits that people form two kinds
of mental representations—verbatim and gist representations, but rely
mainly on gist. Less precise than verbatim representations, gist is a fuzzy
trace of experience in memory. Gist captures the meaning of experience,
including the emotional meaning. The basic idea of FTT is that gist-based
reasoning increasingly supplants analytic verbatim-based reasoning as
novices become experts. FTT differs from other dual-process models by
placing intuition at the highest level of development, viewing fuzzy intuitive
processes as more advanced than precise analytic processes (Reyna, 2004).
For instance, in a study of medical expertise, Reyna et al. (2003) reported
that compared with non-expert physicians, expert cardiologists processed
fewer dimensions of information and also processed those dimensions in a
cruder all-or-none fashion (patients were either at risk or not at risk of an
imminent heart attack). More generally, a person’s representation of gist
(reflecting his/her education, emotion, culture, and worldview), rather than
verbatim information, governs the perceptions of risk (Reyna and Hamilton,
2001).
Other work also highlights that both affective and analytic elements
comprise mental representations of risk. Psychometric research has shown
that in contrast to expert models of risk, which are typically based on
technical estimates of frequency or probability and the magnitude of
exposure, lay mental models tend to incorporate more qualitative and
affective dimensions. Seminal work by Slovic and colleagues (see Slovic,
148 Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup

1987) suggested that two main dimensions underlying lay models are:
‘‘dread risk’’ (the extent to which a hazard is perceived as dreaded,
uncontrollable, not equitable, involuntary, potentially catastrophic) and
‘‘unknown risk’’ (the extent to which a hazard is perceived as unknown,
unobservable, unfamiliar, or has delayed consequences).2 The extent to
which a hazard evokes feelings of dread tends to be most highly correlated
with perceptions of risk (Fischhoff et al., 1978), suggesting that affect plays a
central role in risk representations for both lay people and risk experts
(Slovic et al., 1995, 1997). Furthermore, interview techniques have been
used recently to provide a deeper understanding of mental models about
specific risk issues. For instance, researchers have constructed influence
diagrams depicting people’s knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, values, percep-
tions and inferences about specific hazards (e.g., radon, global climate
change, genetic engineering) and their consequences (Atman et al., 1994;
Bostrom et al., 1994a, 1994b; Roberts et al., 2004).
In sum, dual-process theories imply that multiple dimensions of risk
scenarios can be successfully responded to with a toolkit of qualitatively
different modes of information processing. A combination of analytic and
affective processes helps individuals to judge the overall goodness of
alternative outcomes. The best results occur when the judgment or decision
strategy selected meets the demands of the task and the goal of the decision
maker. Sometimes, more emphasis on non-analytic processes and the use of
affective processes is appropriate; other times, more analytic processing and
thorough deliberation are required. Consequently, decision makers given the
same information can engage in different kinds of processing, potentially
resulting in higher or lower perceptions of risk and different behavioral
responses. A particular way of life can be maintained through this
partnership approach to valuing risky courses of action.

The Interaction of Affective and Analytic Processes: The Role of Task and
Decision-Maker Characteristics
To help explicate the interaction of affective and analytic processes in
judgments of risk, we turn to theories of appraisal, memory, heuristic-
systematic processing, and motivation. These theories provide a rich
resource of empirically tested concepts that can help us understand how
various task and decision-maker characteristics may influence the interplay
of affect and analysis.
Research by Lerner and Keltner (2000) and their colleagues suggests that
emotions arise from but also elicit specific cognitive appraisals. According to
their appraisal-tendency theory, cognitive appraisals are tailored to help an
individual respond to events that evoke emotions and may persist beyond the

2
Note that the exact nature of the multidimensional representation revealed may vary
according to the type of task and modeling approach used (Johnson and Tversky, 1984).
 Risk as Value 149

eliciting situation so that subsequent situations can be interpreted. For

example, fear arises from and evokes appraisals of uncertainty and
situational control, whereas anger is associated with appraisals of certainty
and individual control (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Smith and Ellsworth,
1985). Lerner et al. (2003) have shown that more optimistic beliefs about
risks such as terrorism are evoked when anger is experienced, whereas
greater pessimism about risks is evoked when fear is experienced.
The interaction of affective and analytic processes can also be under-
stood by examining the structure of memory. Information that is consistent
with basic or core emotions is more available in memory (Forgas, 1995;
Johnson and Tversky, 1983), but affect may also be recalled from memory
through explicit or implicit retrieval processes (Weber and Johnson, in
press). Invoking a preferences-as-memory framework, Weber and Johnson
(in press) highlight how judgments and decisions are made by retrieving
relevant (cognitive and affective) knowledge from memory in order to
determine the best outcome. Framing normatively equivalent information
positively or negatively (e.g., 90% lives saved vs. 10% lives lost) influences
preferences because the different descriptions prime different representations
in memory (predominantly positively valenced or negatively valenced).
Importantly, concepts in memory vary in their degree of interconnectedness,
which reflects, at least in part, our daily experience of the co-occurrence
of concepts in the natural world (Sherman et al., 1992). The fact that
some concepts (e.g., ‘‘buying a car’’) are represented more richly (affectively
or cognitively) in memory than others (e.g., ‘‘money’’) explains why people
fail to attend to some risks (e.g., opportunity costs). For instance, it may be
easy to generate a large number of reasons for buying a car, but it may be
hard to generate alternative uses for the money needed to make the
purchase.
More generally, memory research provides a rich repertoire of
empirically tested concepts that help explain the psychology of risk: the
dual encoding of verbatim and gist representations of information and the
reliance on gist whenever possible; the dependence of judgment and decision
making on retrieval cues that elicit values and principles stored in long-term
memory; and the potential of interference from overlapping classes of
events, resulting in denominator neglect in risk or probability judgments
(Reyna, 2004). These principles can be used to explain why, for instance,
people overestimate small risks but ignore very small risks (Stone et al.,
1994). Weber et al. (1995) have shown how the formation of overall
impressions may be the relatively effortless by-product of memory
representations and storage operations (i.e., the superposition of distributed
item representations).
In a heuristic-systematic model of persuasion, Chaiken (1980, 1987;
Chaiken et al., 1989) suggests that simplified, heuristic thinking and
comprehensive, analytic thinking may co-occur when available, accessible
heuristics exist in combination with adequate levels of cognitive capacity
and motivation for systematic processing. Specifically, the nature of risk
150 Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup

information and the demands of the judgment or decision task may impact
how the information is processed. Early persuasion work suggested that
individuals process non-threatening messages more comprehensively or
systematically when the message is personally relevant (Chaiken, 1987;
Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). For threatening messages, however, increased
personal relevance may evoke defensive goals that increase motivation to
bias information processing to arrive at a preferred conclusion or reject
an undesirable one (Liberman and Chaiken, 2003; see also Eagly et al.,
2001).
Tordesillas and Chaiken (1999) showed that systematic processing may
be disrupted by instructing individuals to consider how each piece of
available information in a judgment task affects their evaluation.
Introspection instructions resulted in a decreased ability to focus on relevant
information because attention was divided relatively evenly between
important and unimportant attributes. Under introspection conditions,
participants based their judgments primarily on cue valence, suggesting an
increased reliance on heuristic processing. Systematic processing seemed to
increase when the consensus information available was negative and when
individuals believed that their task was very important. In an examination of
compliance with risk messages (product warning labels), Zuckerman and
Chaiken (1998) explain how time constraints, knowledge constraints, or the
presence of simultaneous processing tasks may result in decreased systematic
processing (and low compliance). They recommend that when employers or
product users cannot easily eliminate factors reducing cognitive capacity,
warnings may be best designed by including only the most critical
information required to use the product safely.
In addition to the cognitive and motivational factors mentioned above,
the affective state of an individual has been shown to influence the type of
information processing most likely to occur. However, research findings so
far have been inconsistent. Positive moods have been related to both
increased and decreased systematic processing (Isen, 1997; Isen and Geva,
1987; Mackie and Worth, 1989; Wegener and Petty, 1994). Similarly, fear
has been shown to increase systematic processing in some cases and decrease
systematic processing in others (Baron et al., 1992; Gleicher and Petty, 1992;
Schwarz, 1990). More research is necessary to thoroughly understand the
impact of affective states on dual processes.

Responding to Risk: Some Goals of Dual Processes

Dual processes evolved to provide a comprehensive approach to responding
to a risky environment. In this section we discuss some of the goals of
governing the valuation of risk information with both affective and analytic
processes. In short, determining the overall value of alternative outcomes via
more than one process improves survival and regulation, allows for efficient
yet sound decision making, and enhances our ability to think and
communicate about abstract concepts such as risk.
 Risk as Value 151

Survival and Regulation

The question of what arouses and energizes behavior has been of central
interest to theorists in diverse fields such as motivation, emotion, learning,
cognition, ethnology, biology, and evolution. The risk-as-value model posits
that the combination of affective and analytic evaluations of risk
information is critical for human survival and regulation. Significant risk
events are responded to automatically by the affective system, which rapidly
searches its memory banks for related events, including their emotional
accompaniments. If the activated feelings are pleasant, they motivate actions
and thoughts anticipated to reproduce the feelings. If the feelings are
unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts anticipated to avoid the
feelings (Epstein, 1994). Akin to instinct, the affective system enhances our
chance of survival by protecting us against immediate threats and attuning
us to opportunities by automatically highlighting the relative desirability of
different goods and actions and motivating a behavioral response. In
addition to predisposing individuals to behavioral responses, affect
predisposes individuals to appraise their environment in specific ways
toward similar ends (Lerner et al., 2003; Lerner and Keltner, 2001). The
analytic system then deliberates more slowly and exhaustively, carefully
weighing the pros and cons of alternative responses, to ensure a
comprehensive consideration of possible actions so that the best action for
maintaining and enhancing a desirable way of life is selected. With a briefer
evolutionary history than the affective system, the analytic system uses
logical rules of inference to offer individuals extra protection against threats
or additional incentive signals to pursue valuable opportunities.
In a test of the somatic-marker hypothesis, Bechara et al. (1997) showed
how survival and regulation depend critically on dual modes of information
processing. Participants in their study gambled by selecting cards from any
of four decks; turning each card resulted in the gain or loss of a sum of
money. Whereas normal subjects and patients with brain lesions outside the
prefrontal sectors quickly learned to avoid decks with attractive large
payoffs but occasional catastrophic losses, patients with frontal lobe damage
did not, thus losing a great deal of money. Although these patients
responded normally to gains and losses when they occurred (as indicated by
skin-conductance responses immediately after an outcome was experienced)
they did not seem to learn to anticipate future outcomes (e.g., they did not
produce normal skin-conductance responses when contemplating a future
choice from a dangerous deck). In other words, they failed to show proper
anticipatory responses, even after numerous opportunities to learn them.
Positive and negative affective experiences need to be linked with potential
outcomes to function adequately as a motivating force. Without affect
identifying significant events and motivating a behavioral response, the
power of analytic deliberations is compromised.
However, too much influence from affective experiences on the relative
desirability of different goods and actions can also be a problem.
152 Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup

Loewenstein et al. (1999) describe how immediately experienced visceral

factors can have a disproportionate effect on behavior, crowding out goals
other than mitigating the visceral factors. These authors claim that there is
nothing inherently irrational about taking visceral factors into account since
they do affect well being and generally serve important survival and
regulatory functions. On the other hand, at sufficient levels of intensity,
individuals may make highly skewed tradeoffs between goods and activities
that alleviate the visceral factor and those that do not. In the case of
addiction, the visceral factors increase the value of the craved substance
relative to other forms of consumption, narrow one’s time perspective to the
present, and reduce concern for other people. Affective processes may guide
subsequent responses (behaviors or cognitions) to objects or events that are
unrelated to the original cause of the affect (e.g., Gasper and Clore, 1998;
Lerner et al., 1998, 2004). Hertwig et al. (2004) have shown how limited
experience can result in overweighting of low probabilities. In short, checks
and balances on the affective mode of information processing are needed to
ensure proper regulation of any organism; in humans, the analytic system is
one mechanism that provides such feedback. Clearly, a partnership between
affect and analysis has evolved to maintain and enhance survival.

Efficient Yet Sound Decision Making

A second goal of combining affective and analytic evaluations of risk
information is to assure efficient yet sound responses to risk. Because overall
capacity for mental effort is limited, effortful analytic processes tend to
disrupt each other. Effortless affective processes, however, neither cause nor
suffer much interference when combined with other tasks (Kahneman,
2003). A partnership between affect and analysis allows the overall value of
alternative outcomes to be determined in different ways, depending on the
demands of the context and the resources available.
The automatic evaluation of stimuli as good or bad is an important
natural assessment: attributes that are registered by the perceptual system
without intention or effort allow risk evaluations to be carried out quickly
and efficiently. The sensory response(s) evoked by a hazardous activity or
technology activate neural systems that hold nondeclarative dispositional
knowledge related to the individual’s previous emotional experience of
similar situations. The ensuing nonconscious signals then act as covert biases
on the circuits that support processes of cognitive evaluation and reasoning.
This preserves the organism at least initially and buys time for the analytic
system to deliberate more thoroughly, correcting the initial reaction if
necessary. However, being purely driven by affect, as Loewenstein (1999)
describes, may lead us astray because short-term gains may be pursued at the
expense of more important, longer term gains. Furthermore, a study by Hsee
and Rottenstreich (2004) has shown that encouraging people to make
evaluations predominantly by feelings (versus analytic calculations) may
result in an insensitivity to scope. Although the analytic system is relatively
 Risk as Value 153

inefficient, it is capable of long-term delay of gratification and is responsive

to scope. A slower, but more thorough deliberation enhances the likelihood
of sound risk responses.
Empirical work (e.g., Hammond et al., 1987) suggests that judgment is
most accurate when task properties correspond to the mode of processing
applied to the task. The task of developing policies related to complex new
risks like biotechnology, for instance, is likely to contain both intuition-
inducing properties (i.e., qualitatively measured values), such as perceived
threat to the natural order of things, and analysis-inducing properties (i.e.,
quantitatively measured values), such as crop growth rate or micronutrient
composition. The key to optimal judgment under conditions of uncertainty
is to apply the appropriate evaluation process or combination of processes,
so that both affective and analytic features of risk information govern risk
responses. The covert biases from the affective system do not decide per se,
but rather facilitate the processing of knowledge and logic necessary for
conscious decisions (Bechara et al., 1997). The analytic system generates an
overt recall of pertinent facts and options and applies reasoning strategies to
these facts and options. The combination of these systems results in an
efficient yet sound decision process.

Thinking Abstractly
Another goal of the partnership between affective and analytic processes in
responding to risk is to facilitate abstract thought and communication.
Without affect, abstract risk representations cannot be evaluated. Affect
allows people to think abstractly because it links abstract concepts (e.g.,
good, bad) to the physical or sensory world. Without such links, people are
slower and less accurate in their judgments. One subtle demonstration of the
link between affect and analytic thought is research showing that positive
words are evaluated faster and more accurately when presented in white
font, whereas negative words are evaluated faster and more accurately when
presented in black font, despite the brightness manipulation being
orthogonal to the valence of the words (Meier et al., 2004). Similarly,
Meier and Robinson (2004) have shown that when making evaluations,
people assign ‘‘goodness’’ to objects high in visual space and ‘‘badness’’ to
objects low in visual space. Linking abstract concepts to physical or sensory
experiences helps the analytic system to interpret the meaning of stimuli so
that they can be incorporated in (sometimes complex) cognitive calculus.
Additional evidence of the importance of the affect–analysis partnership
comes from studies of the value of numeric information. Typically, it is
assumed that numeric expressions (e.g., 50%) are more precise than verbal
expressions (e.g., ‘‘a good amount’’). However, there are many instances in
which the reverse is true (Sanford and Moxey, 2003). For example, given the
statement ‘‘50% of this community have advanced math qualifications’’, one
might ask, ‘‘Is that a good amount?’’ Knowing a number does not necessarily
tell you about its importance; affective evaluations are needed to clarify and
154 Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup

guide us through this ambiguity. Without this link, people are unable to
communicate effectively about their valuations of risk information and the
associated implications for responding to risky options.

Directions for Future Research

Converging Evidence
Research needs to provide converging evidence for hypothesized effects of
the interplay of affect and analysis on risk perceptions. Converging evidence
will be obtained by looking at multiple dependent variables and by using
multiple methodological approaches. Focusing on only a few measures or
methods may provide only partial answers and may not permit a test of
alternative explanations of results (Weber and Hsee, 1999). In combination,
however, multiple measures and methods can provide more conclusive
evidence about both affective and analytic factors that contribute to risk
responses. Given the predominantly cognitive focus of research on risk
judgment and decision making, the weakest aspect of our knowledge at this
point concerns the role of affective processes. Although methods and
measures for studying affect may be unfamiliar to many risk researchers, a
wealth of tools exist in diverse disciplines studying the form and function of
affect. Physiological, neurological, psychological, sociological, and other
approaches can be used to examine the interplay of affective and analytic
processes in risk judgments, to yield the fullest picture of how reactions to
risk form.
A good example of how converging evidence can be used to examine the
nature of the partnership between affective and analytic evaluation processes
in risk judgments is provided in Bechara et al.’s (1997) gambling study
described earlier. While the participants performed the gambling task,
parallel assessments were made to obtain: (i) behavioral measures (i.e., the
number of cards selected from good decks vs. bad decks), (ii) psychophy-
siological measures (i.e., skin conductance responses), and (iii) self-account
measures (i.e., how the participants conceptualized the game and strategy
they were using). Together, these measures were used by Bechara and
colleagues to describe the parallel but interacting chain of events wherein
nonconscious signals are combined with overt knowledge to ensure
advantageous responses to risky options.
Another way to study the partnership between affect and analysis is
demonstrated in research using event-related functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), which permits examination of specific parts of the central
nervous system (e.g., amygdala) that are involved in affective responses to
specific stimuli. Using this technology, Mather et al. (2004) have shown that
older adults experience less negative affect than younger adults because of
age-related decreases in amygdala reactivity to negative information. The
use of fMRI can show how shifts in processing style (perhaps as a result of
changing goals or priorities) are related to changes in the neural substrates of
 Risk as Value 155

affect and may offer one point of intervention for improving the optimality
of judgment and decision processes about risky activities and technologies.
Psychological measures of affect include subtle imagery techniques, such
as the association task used by Finucane et al. (2000), in which respondents
were asked to free associate to the phrase ‘‘blood transfusions’’. Associations
included ‘‘HIV/AIDS’’, ‘‘hemophilia’’, ‘‘gift giving’’, and ‘‘life saving’’.
Respondents were then asked to rate each of their associations on a scale
from bad (23) to good (+3); these ratings were correlated with a number of
other measures, such as acceptability of having a transfusion and sensitivity
to stigmatization in other risk settings. Finucane et al. (2003) suggested that
the association technique might be used to ask subjects to free associate to a
stimulus about other hazardous activities such as ‘‘eating beef’’. We would
expect this to produce a variety of positive and negative associations, such as
‘‘tastes good’’ (+), ‘‘hamburgers’’ (+), ‘‘cholesterol’’ (2), ‘‘expensive’’ (2),
and so on. Based upon previous imagery research, we would expect that
subjects’ attitudes toward consuming beef would be linearly related to the
sum or average rated valence of the associations produced. Suppose that a
percentage of subjects included a stigmatizing association, such as ‘‘mad
cows’’, or ‘‘brain disease’’, as part of their set of positive and negative
thoughts. Through parallelism tests of regression lines it should be possible
to determine whether the stigmatizing associations merely acted like other
negative valences or whether they changed the integration rules governing
the other affective information. At the extreme, we might find that the
presence of a stigmatizing negative rendered all positive associations
impotent, similar to the extreme weights Baron and Spranca (1997)
observed in their studies of ‘‘protected values’’. Identification of negative
thoughts as stigmatizing could be done by raters evaluating each negative on
stigmatizing qualities such as (a) the risk or negative quality is abnormal or
unnatural for the stimulus object; (b) the risk is new; (c) contact with the
negative feature is involuntary or uncontrollable; and (d) the quality is
immoral.
Finally, a more qualitative approach may be beneficial, as demonstrated
by sociological researchers. For instance, through interviews, focus groups,
and content analyses of mass media, Macintyre et al. (1998) have described
affective and analytic aspects of different contexts and experiences that
impact decision making about food risks. Weber et al. (1998) reported a
content analysis of national proverbs to gain insight into the sources of
cross-cultural differences in financial and social risk taking. These
approaches can help to improve our insight into the impact of affective
and analytic elements of social stations such as the mass media or social
networks on risk judgments.
In sum, the risk-as-value model implies that differences in the perceived
risk of a hazardous activity or technology may arise from multiple sources
(the affective evaluation of the hazard, the analytic evaluation of the hazard,
or the way these evaluations are combined). Each of these sources is a
complex construct. Consequently, multiple measures and methods are
156 Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup

required to obtain a comprehensive understanding of how affective and

analytic processes govern the valuation of risk information and resultant risk
reactions.

Communication about Risk

A second direction for future research is to begin translating theory into
practice. Given what we know about the impact of affect, analysis, and their
interplay on risk responses, how can we design risk communications to
effectively evoke appropriate perceptions of and reactions to hazardous
technologies and activities?
We propose that risk communicators consider using diverse forms of
numeric and graphic representation designed to make stimulus attributes
more evaluable (meaningful). Determining the appropriate mix of affective
and analytic processing for any given context will facilitate information
integration and help individuals to better employ their knowledge and
desired judgment policies. For instance, safety data may have little influence
on buyers’ choices when expressed as ranges (see Hsee, 1996), but may carry
considerable weight when expressed in more precise and affectively
meaningful formats, such as letter grades (A, B, C, D, etc.) or stars (Slovic
et al., 2002a). Similarly, the weight given to member satisfaction and other
quality measures of health plans may be enhanced with affectively salient
features to improve choices by health-care consumers (Hibbard et al., 2001,
2002).
Importantly, however, the power of images may be too strong in some
instances and lead people astray. The affective responses to the dread risk
elements of hazardous activities may be responsible for people making sub-
optimal choices. For instance, analyses by Gigerenzer (2004) suggest that
following September 11, 2001, people tended to avoid flying, instead driving
some of the unflown miles and causing an increase in fatal traffic accidents.3
Gigerenzer concludes that ‘‘informing the public about psychological
research concerning dread risk could possibly save lives’’ (p. 286).
However, his analysis fails to demonstrate that such information would
change behavior. Indeed, the automatic nature of affective reactions suggests
that an analytic intervention will have little effect. What is needed is a way to
interrupt or enhance affective responses and their impact on transportation
choices so that risks are perceived accurately and behavioral responses are
appropriate.
Direct affective experiences, such as interaction with computer-
generated environments, may be an effective way of changing behavior so
that it is more congruent with technical risk assessments. For instance,

3
As an anonymous reviewer commented, an important qualification is that Gigerenzer’s
analysis does not recognize the uncertainty surrounding air safety immediately after
September 11, 2001, nor that the traffic safety data may be skewed toward the young and
drunk, rather than those contemplating driving.
 Risk as Value 157

virtual reality, one of a class of interactive cyberspaces, allows us to create

and interact directly with objects not available in the everyday world.
Despite successes in the entertainment and aviation industries, this
technology has yet to be applied to problems such as community inertia
regarding hazard mitigation. Direct experience with a hazard (such as fire or
floods) has been demonstrated as a powerful incentive to adopt mitigation
measures (Mitchell, 1997). In the real world we cannot summon hazard
events at will in order to gain experience, but a virtual world could provide a
controlled environment in which people could be exposed to a hazard’s
effects.
Consistent with the work by Loewenstein and colleagues (Loewenstein
and Adler, 1995; Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999;
Loewenstein et al., 2001; Sieff et al., 1999; Van Boven and Loewenstein,
2003), interactive technologies may provide a mechanism for reducing the
gap between anticipated and experienced affect. For instance, several studies
have shown discrepancies between patient and non-patient ratings of health
states. In particular, people mis-estimate the quality of life associated with
unfamiliar conditions and predict that various events will affect their future
well-being more than is reported by people actually experiencing those
events (Loewenstein and Frederick, 1997). Such mis-estimates may lead to
sub-optimal decisions, especially given that current standards for economic
analyses recommend that health state utilities (or quality of life) estimates
should be derived from the general public rather than from patients (Gold
et al., 1996). This practice potentially invalidates cost-effectiveness analyses.
In sum, judgments of events and their likelihoods may differ as the affective
experiences vary with differing contexts and individuals. Interactive cyber-
space may provide a means for generating a better match between one’s own
or others’ anticipated and experienced affect.
One drawback of interventions based on interactive cyberspaces, such as
virtual reality, is the expense of developing and distributing the technology.
Other existing technologies may lead to a sufficiently similar effect,
however. Recent research suggests that risk representations in popular
culture (e.g., mass media) may have a powerful role in generating and
amplifying public risk perceptions (Kasperson et al., 2003). Although little
experimental research has been done thus far, the vivid imagery in widely
distributed movies such as ‘‘The Day After Tomorrow’’ (a disaster movie
about climate change) may strongly influence mental models of risk,
behavioral intentions, and policy priorities (Leiserowitz, 2004).
An alternative tool for experiential immersion that could be applied to
risk behavior change problems is the technology of narrative. We have
proposed narrative as a tool for eliciting and integrating non-quantitative
values in debates about risks (Finucane and Satterfield, in press; Satterfield
et al., 2000). Research suggests that information presented in narrative form
improves respondents’ ability to read about a subject, consider its content,
and then link that content to a specific judgment. Sanfey and Hastie (1998)
found that respondents given narrative information produced more accurate
158 Melissa L. Finucane & Joan L. Holup

performance estimates for a set of marathon runners than did those using the
same information presented via either bar graphs or data tables. A growing
number of scholars are developing evidence for the efficacy of narrative in
aiding memory (Price and Czilli, 1996) and explaining data (Pennington and
Hastie, 1993). A coherent and interesting story, paraphrasing Kearney
(1994), may help participants comprehend the text’s main ideas, allowing
them to answer complex questions about content and apply the information
to new situations. This ability is fundamental to the decision analyst’s
concern for respondents’ capacity to work with the dimensions of a problem
and to link those dimensions to a judgment or decision about alternative
response options.
Embedding social and technical detail about a risk issue within a
narrative may also be optimal because it triggers dual modes of information
processing (an analytic mode and an affective mode). Perhaps one of the
most important features of narrative is its ability to facilitate task
engagement and to operationalize a language that is consistent with lay
talk of risk issues. Participants can be engaged by employing emotion to add
meaning to otherwise abstract information (Finucane et al., 2000; Kida and
Smith, 1995) and by concretizing information through the use of imagery
and anecdote. Oatley (1994) has developed a taxonomy of emotional
response to literature with the aim of demonstrating that it is through
affectively engaging devices that we enter into the world of narrative. By
seeing the problem through the narrator’s point of view, we take the
problem on as our own and endeavor to solve it from a less distanced
perspective than might be typical of cost-benefit methods. Anecdote serves
(in turn) the need for discursive frames that mimic the scene-dependent
stories behind conversations about the basis of behavior (Earle and
Cvetkovich, 1995; Lutz, 1988). Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Strange
and Leung (1999), and Hendrickx et al. (1989) have demonstrated the
influence of anecdotal narrative on causal judgments.
In sum, the multiple potential loci highlighted by the risk-as-value model
for differences in risk perceptions suggest alternative approaches to
communicating about risk and possibly modifying risk responses. Tools
that successfully enhance survival and regulation, permit efficient yet sound
decision making, and facilitate our ability to think and communicate
abstractly, will optimize our valuation of risk information and our ability to
maintain a desired way of life.

Conclusions
In sum, the risk-as-value model enables researchers to pinpoint more
accurately where and how decision making differs across individuals and
contexts. Derived from dual-process theories of risk judgment and decision
making, this model provides empirical (rather then rhetorical) grounds for
predicting individual differences in risk perceptions. The model is explicit,
but the question of how two putative processes jointly govern risk
 Risk as Value 159

perception and determine the overall value or goodness of an outcome is one

that has received little attention. Empirical research is needed to determine
how affect and analysis work in partnership so that risk theorists and
practitioners have a sound basis for explaining and predicting points at
which decision-making processes may result in different risk responses. In
particular, researchers need to identify the nature of the interaction between
affective and analytic processes, how conflict between affective and analytic
evaluations is resolved, and what features of decision makers and risk events
influence valuation processes and risk responses. As critical elements of the
risk-as-value model are identified, the generalizability of the model across
individuals and risk contexts needs to be tested.

Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Dr. Paul Slovic for his comments during the
drafting of the paper and to Ms. Jeanette Murray for assistance with
manuscript preparation.

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