Sandberg 2005 How Do We Justify Knowledge Produced Within Interpretive Approaches

ORGANIZA
10.1177/1094428104272000
Sandberg / KNOWLEDGE
TIONAL RESEARCH
PRODUCED
METHODS
WITHIN INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES
How Do We Justify Knowledge Produced

Within Interpretive Approaches?
JÖRGEN SANDBERG
University of Queensland
The use of interpretive approaches within management and organizational sci-

ences has increased substantially. However, appropriate criteria for justifying re-
search results from interpretive approaches have not developed so rapidly along-
side their adaptation. This article examines the potential of common criteria for
justifying knowledge produced within interpretive approaches. Based on this in-
vestigation, appropriate criteria are identified and a strategy for achieving them is
proposed. Finally, an interpretive study of competence in organizations is used to
demonstrate how the proposed criteria and strategy can be applied to justify
knowledge produced within interpretive approaches.
Keywords: validity; reliability; truth; interpretive approach; qualitative

research
A central focus for researchers within management and organizational sciences is pro-
ducing knowledge about human action and activities in organizations. Traditionally,
knowledge has been produced from quantitative or qualitative approaches within the
positivistic research tradition. However, during the past three decades, interest in qual-
itative approaches based on the interpretive research tradition has steadily increased in
management and organizational sciences (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1999; Prasad &
Prasad, 2002; Zald, 1996), as well as within social sciences more generally (Atkinson,
Coffey, & Delamont, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; 2000; Flick, 2002; Lincoln &
Denzin, 2003; Schwandt, 1994). The strong growth of interpretive approaches mainly
stems from a dissatisfaction with the methods and procedures for producing scientific
knowledge within positivistic research. Advocates of interpretive approaches claim
that those methodological procedures and claims for objective knowledge have signif-
icant theoretical limitations for advancing our understanding of human and organiza-
tional phenomena (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1999; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2000;
Lincoln & Denzin, 2003; Prasad & Prasad, 2002; Sandberg, 2001a).
Author’s Note: I would like to express my gratitude to Gloria Dall’Alba, Amedeo Giorgi, Ashly
Pinnington, Ron Weber, and the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of, and valuable comments
on, an earlier version of this article.
Organizational Research Methods, Vol. 8 No. 1, January 2005 41-68
DOI: 10.1177/1094428104272000
© 2005 Sage Publications
41
42 ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH METHODS
To overcome the shortcomings of positivism, advocates of interpretive approaches

have followed ideas from philosophical phenomenology,1 most notably, its emphasis
on lived experience as the basis of human action and activities. In an overview, Hol-
stein and Gubrium (1994) found that the analytic paths of qualitative approaches
within the interpretive research tradition have been varied and “diverge into a rich vari-
ety of constructionist, ethnomethodological, conversation-analytic, and interpretive
strains” (p. 262). Prasad and Prasad (2002) identified a similar pattern in management
and organizational research. Interpretive approaches have provided new means of
investigating previously unexplored questions, thus enabling management research-
ers to conduct research that has led to new forms of knowledge about management and
organization. Although the increased use of interpretive approaches has produced new
knowledge, it has also contributed to methodological and epistemological confusion
in management and within the social sciences more generally (Denzin & Lincoln,
1994, 2000; Lincoln & Denzin, 2003; Prasad & Prasad, 2002; Seale, 2003; Smith &
Deemer, 2000). One of the most significant confusions accompanied by the interpre-
tive rejection of so-called objective methodological procedures for producing knowl-
edge is how, and to what extent, knowledge produced within interpretive approaches
can be justified. In other words, what criteria can be used, if any, to justify interpretive
knowledge claims?
The aim of this article is to explore the potential of common criteria for justifying
knowledge produced within interpretive approaches with a view to proposing appro-
priate criteria. Criteria from the positivistic research tradition are rejected as inappro-
priate by propagating a mixed discourse (Giorgi, 1994) of theoretical and method-
ological principles from different philosophies of science. Not only is it contended that
these criteria are unsuitable, but advocates from different intellectual orientations
within the interpretive research tradition such as hermeneutics, critical theory, and
deconstructionism claim that objective knowledge is unattainable. Nevertheless, even
though objective knowledge may be untenable, most advocates of interpretive
approaches want to reject going as far as taking a complete relativistic stance. Based
on philosophical phenomenology, it will be argued in this article that truth claims are
possible using criteria consistent with the basic assumptions underlying a research
approach.
Problem of Mixed Discourse Within Interpretive Approaches
As argued previously, there is evidence for a theoretical shift from positivistic to

interpretive approaches occurring in the social sciences as well as in the management
and organizational sciences. However, overall, this shift has not been accompanied by
a corresponding methodological shift. More specifically, appropriate criteria for justi-
fying research results from interpretive approaches have not been well developed. As a
consequence, many researchers such as Giorgi (1992, 1994) and Jones (1998) have
questioned the extent to which knowledge produced within interpretive approaches
has been justified as adequate. For example, Giorgi (1994) criticized the qualitative
methods within many of the interpretive approaches, such as those used by Morgan
(1983), Van Maanen (1983), Miles and Huberman (1984), and Lincoln and Guba
(1985). He argued that these methods combine theoretical and methodological princi-
ples from fundamentally different philosophical traditions. For instance, in legitimat-
Sandberg / KNOWLEDGE PRODUCED WITHIN INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES 43
ing research approaches as interpretive and qualitative, Giorgi (1994) found that prin-
ciples and concepts from phenomenological philosophy were often employed. On the
other hand, when justifying the results, methodological criteria from the positivistic
research tradition were most frequently used.
The problem with embracing positivistic criteria when justifying the results of
interpretive approaches is that they are not in accordance with the underlying ontology
and epistemology. In particular, validity and reliability are the criteria used for justify-
ing knowledge produced within the positivistic tradition. These criteria are based on
an objectivist epistemology that refers to an objective, knowable reality beyond the
human mind and that stipulates a correspondence criterion of truth (Kvale, 1989;
Salner, 1989). As Salner (1989) observed, the correspondence criterion of truth
implies that “facts are out there to which our ideas and constructs, measuring tools, and
theories must correspond” (p. 47). Common forms of validity in positivistic research
approaches, such as internal and external validity (Kvale, 1989, 1995), are used to
measure the extent to which our theories and instruments correspond to objective real-
ity. Similarly, a common criterion for establishing reliability within the positivistic
research tradition is whether scientific results can be duplicated under identical condi-
tions (Enerstvedt, 1989). If somewhat different results are achieved, the variation is
typically attributed to measurement error, such as influence from the context in which
the measurements were taken. In cases in which the results differ significantly from
one occasion to the next, they are considered to be unreliable. Reliability is said to be
established when repeated measurements of objective reality give similar results.
The ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the interpretive
research tradition are distinctive from those of the positivistic tradition. The develop-
ment of the interpretive research tradition is often traced back to ideas from Weber
(1947/1964) that subsequently have been developed further by phenomenological
sociologists such as Schutz (1945, 1953), Berger and Luckmann (1966), Giddens
(1984, 1993), and Bourdieu (1990). However, the roots of the interpretive research tra-
dition are many, and it is not a single unified approach. The more influential
approaches are various forms of social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966;
Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1984, 1993), critical theory (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000;
Habermas, 1972), ethnomethodology (Atkinson, 1988; Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage,
1984; Silverman, 1998), interpretive ethnography (Denzin, 1997; Geertz, 1973; Van
Maanen, 1995) symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1934; Prasad, 1993),
discourse analysis (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Foucault, 1972; Potter & Wetherell,
1987), deconstructionism (Derrida, 1972/1981; Kilduff, 1993), gender approaches
(Calas & Smircich, 1996; Harding, 1986; Keller, 1985; Martin, 1994), institutional
approaches (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995), and
sense-making approaches (Weick, 1995).
Despite the great variety of approaches, what unifies them is their phenom-
enological base, which stipulates that person and world are inextricably related
through lived experience of the world (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Gadamer, 1960/
1994; Heidegger, 1927/1981; Husserl, 1900-1901/1970; Schutz, 1945, 1953).2
Hence, within interpretive approaches, the human world is never a world in itself; it is
always an experienced world, that is, a world that is always related to a conscious sub-
ject. Thus, the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the interpre-
tive research tradition reject the existence of an objective knowable reality beyond the
human mind. Instead, they stipulate that knowledge is constituted through lived expe-
rience of reality. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to justify knowledge produced
within this tradition using criteria based on an objectivist ontology and epistemology.
Interpretive Challenge to Knowledge and Truth
Many advocates of interpretive approaches have questioned not only the use of
positivistic criteria but also the research goal of achieving objective knowledge and
truth. The major challenge comes from rejection of positivists’ assumptions, namely,
the rejection of dualist ontology, objectivist epistemology, and language as an accurate
representation of objective reality (language as a mirror). I will first describe the gen-
eral meaning of these assumptions and then discuss why most advocates within the
interpretive research tradition reject them.
To assume a dualist ontology is to treat subject and object as two separate, inde-
pendent entities. A dualist ontology implies a division of research objects into two
main entities: a subject in itself and an object in itself (cf. Giorgi, 1994). For example,
corporate strategy is typically defined and described by seeing organization and envi-
ronment as two separate entities. First, the inherent qualities of the organization such
as its strengths and weaknesses are described, and then the inherent qualities of the
environment such as threats and opportunities that it offers are described (Smircich &
Stubbart, 1985).
To expound an objectivist epistemology is to stipulate that beyond human con-
sciousness, there is an objective reality. The qualities and the meaning we experience
are assumed to be inherent to reality itself. Objective reality is thus seen as given and
the ultimate foundation for all knowledge. Through systematic scientific observations
and careful monitoring of the extent to which our theories correspond to the particular
aspect of objective reality we are investigating, it is assumed that we will come closer
to this true picture of reality.
The assumption that language is a mirror of objective reality stipulates that lan-
guage can represent or, as Rorty (1979) argued, “mirror” reality in an objective fash-
ion. The relationship between language and reality is thus seen as a relationship of cor-
respondence. As it is assumed that language has the capacity to represent reality, it is
treated as a representational system available to the researchers in their endeavor to
describe reality objectively.
Advocates of interpretive approaches reject all three of the above assumptions for
several reasons. First, and most important, instead of assuming a dualist ontology that
implies a division of subject and object, advocates of interpretive approaches regard
subject and object as constituting an inseparable relation. As Giorgi (1992) noted,
There are not two independent entities, object and subjects existing in themselves
which later get to relate to each other, but the very meaning of subject implies a rela-
tionship to an object and to be an object intrinsically implies being related to subjec-
tivity. (p. 7)
As indicated previously, the problem of separating subject and object was origi-
nally pointed out by phenomenologists such as Husserl (1900-1901/1970), Heidegger
(1927/1981), Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), and Gadamer (1960/1994) and then later
by a series of other researchers such as Schutz (1945, 1953), Berger and Luckmann
(1966), Foucault (1972), Derrida (1967/1978), Bourdieu (1990), Giddens (1984,

1993), and Searle (1995). Husserl argued that, as subjects, we are always related to re-
ality through our lived experience of that reality. Heidegger developed Husserl’s argu-
ment further by suggesting that not only is reality mediated through our lived experi-
ence, it is also mediated through the specific culture, historical time, and language in
which we are situated. Derrida radicalized Husserl and Heidegger’s arguments even
more by claiming that the meaning of reality can never be fixed but is fundamentally
indeterminate.
A number of other researchers in areas such as critical theory, literature theory,
social theory, and gender theories have reached similar conclusions to Heidegger and
Derrida on the problematic nature of objectivist conceptualizations of reality. Critical
theorists such as Habermas have suggested that our descriptions of reality are often
colored by taken-for-granted ideologies. Advocates of literature theory have argued
that our descriptions of reality are furnished by established cultural conventions con-
cerning specific genres and speech codes (Bruner, 1996). Gender studies have sug-
gested that the dominating theoretical framework for producing knowledge is molded
by and saturated with male imagery (Richardson, 1995).
Based on these assumptions and empirical findings, advocates of interpretive
approaches claim that it is not possible to produce an objective description of reality.
Instead, their basic argument is that our descriptions are always colored by our specific
historical, cultural, ideological, gender-based, and linguistic understanding of reality.
Thus, instead of assuming an objectivist epistemology for the existence of objective
reality, advocates of interpretive approaches typically claim that reality is socially con-
structed by continuous negotiation between people about the very nature of that real-
ity. Finally, the assumption that reality is socially constructed means language is not
seen as a representational system that can be used to classify and name objective real-
ity. Instead, language does not achieve its meaning primarily through a correspon-
dence with objective reality but through the way we socially define and use it in our
different social practices.
The rejection of a dualist ontology, an objectivist epistemology, and the assumption
of language as a mirror of reality have given rise to many promising interpretive
research approaches that have opened up new possible spaces of inquiry. However, as
Altheide and Johnson (1994) pointed out, it also has led to a crisis among qualitative
researchers using interpretive approaches about which criteria, if any, are suitable for
justifying the knowledge produced. Denzin (1994) and Lincoln and Denzin (2003)
argued in a similar vein. With reference to Guba (1990) and Rosaldo (1989), Denzin
(1994) argued that “social sciences today face a crisis of interpretation, for previously
agreed-upon criteria from the positivist and postpositivist tradition are now being
challenged” (p. 501). More recently, in an overview, Smith and Deemer (2000)
summarized this crisis in the following way:
With the end of the possibility that we could think of ourselves as neutral spectators at
the game of knowledge, the central problem that has preoccupied the thought of
numerous researchers for the past few decades is that of “Now what are we going to do
with us.” (p. 878)
The dilemma interpretive researchers face can be stated in the following way: At
the same time as advocates of interpretive research deny the possibility of producing
objective knowledge, they want to claim that the knowledge they generate is true in
some way or another. But how can they justify their knowledge as true if they deny the
idea of objective truth? Does not the rejection of objective truth mean that advocates of
interpretive research approaches are forever condemned to produce arbitrary and rela-
tivist knowledge? This is unlikely because it does not follow from the rejection of ob-
jective truth that we cannot produce valid and reliable knowledge about reality. De-
spite the rejection of objective truth, as Wachterhouser (2002) proposed, we can still
“develop, apply, and retest criteria of knowledge that give us enough reliable evidence
or rational assurance to claim in multiple cases that we in fact know something and do
not just surmise or opine that it is the case” (p. 71).
Rejecting the idea of objective truth while claiming the possibility of producing
valid and reliable knowledge gives rise to two central questions: What criteria could be
used for justifying knowledge produced by interpretive approaches and, more funda-
mentally, on what basis can such criteria be developed?
One of the most common responses to the above challenge is what Smith and
Deemer (2000) called the quasi-foundationalist response. Advocates of this response
such as Hammersley (1990), Manicas and Secord (1983), Maxwell (1992), and Seale
(2003) accept the interpretive idea that knowledge claims are dependent on the person
who makes them. But to avoid relativism, they adopt a realist ontology, which regards
reality as independent. As Hammersley (1990) argued, just because we accept that
observation of reality is theory laden, “we do not need to abandon the concept of truth
as correspondence to an independent reality” (p. 62).
Accepting a contructionist epistemology and simultaneously adopting a realist
ontology give rise to a major challenge. This is so because as Smith and Deemer
(2000) argued, “any elaboration of criteria must take place within their commitment to
ontological realism on the one side and, on the other, their realization that they are obli-
gated to accept a constructivist epistemology” (p. 880). In other words, their truth cri-
teria need to take into account that knowledge claims are dependent on the perspective
of the person making the claims and that knowledge claims should correspond to
objective reality. According to Smith and Deemer, criteria such as plausibility and
credibility validity (Hammersely, 1990) and descriptive validity (Maxwell, 1992) are
successful in the first instance but fail in the second. They fail to demonstrate how they
reach an independent reality that would attain their criteria of validity “the kind of
force that will allow it to stand over and against or beyond a process of socially and
historically constrained judgements” (p. 883).
As Smith and Deemer (2000) noted, the quasi-foundationalist’s problem is similar
to that of their intellectual precursor, Popper (1959, 1972). Although Popper convinc-
ingly argued that observation of reality is theory laden, he retained the idea of an inde-
pendent reality as against knowledge claims that could be tested through falsification.
However, as several researchers have noted, it cannot be possible to carry out such a
validity check if observations are theory laden. “It is impossible to think of the com-
parison of a hypothesis with theory-mediated facts as the same as testing a hypothesis
against an independently existing reality” (Smith & Deemer, 2000, p. 883).
The quasi-foundationalists’assumption that observations are theory laden and their
assumption of an independent reality create a major inconsistency. This means that
they fall into the same problem of mixed discourse, which faces traditional positivism,
albeit in a more sophisticated form. It is consistent to justify knowledge produced
within interpretive approaches using quasi-foundationalist criteria within the bound-
aries of their underlying constructionist epistemology, but there is a lingering incon-

sistency arising from their grounding in realist ontology.
Truth as Relative to Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions
Based on phenomenological philosophy, it is argued here that although objective

truth cannot be achieved, truth claims are feasible using criteria consistent with the
basic assumptions underlying a research approach. More specifically, when establish-
ing knowledge about an aspect of reality, every research approach also makes specific
assumptions about the nature of reality under investigation (ontology) and about the
nature of knowledge (epistemology). Seeing knowledge and truth as relative to onto-
logical and epistemological assumptions is one way of overcoming both the problem
of mixed discourse and the problem of extreme relativism that can arise from the inter-
pretive rejection of objective truth claims. Although researchers such as Giorgi
(1988), Guba and Lincoln (1989), Lincoln and Guba (2003), Altheide and Johnson
(1994), and Smith and Deemer (2000) have argued in a similar vein, few studies have
sought to identify the criteria that could be used for justifying results produced within
interpretive approaches in a systematic way. In particular, what is lacking is an elabo-
ration of a nonfoundationalist platform and theories of truth and their ground for truth
claims on which interpretive truth criteria can be developed.
As truth is seen as relative to the ontological and epistemological assumptions
underlying the interpretive research tradition, these assumptions are elaborated below
as a first step in exploring appropriate criteria. Second, theories of truth that accord
with these assumptions are elaborated. Third, based on the elaboration of ontological
and epistemological assumptions and theories of truth, appropriate criteria are pro-
posed. Finally, a strategy for achieving the proposed criteria is suggested.
Basic Assumptions Underlying the Interpretive Research Tradition

As argued above, the primary research object within the interpretive research tradi-
tion is individuals’ and groups’ lived experience of their reality. The notion of lived
experience as the primary research object can be traced back to the phenomenological
idea of life-world. It was first developed by Husserl (1936/1970) but has been further
developed by other phenomenologists, such as Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), Schutz
(1967), Heidegger (1927/1981), and Gadamer (1960/1994, 1977). The idea of life-
world expresses that person and world are inextricably related through the person’s
lived experience of the world. As Bengtsson (1989) argued,
Even if the life-world is objective both in the sense that it is a shared world and in the
sense that it transcends (exceeds) the subject, that is, its qualities are not qualities
within the subject, it is likewise inseparable from a subject, namely, the subject who
experiences it, lives and acts in it. The world is always there in the first person from the
perspective of my space and time here and now. (p. 72)
As Bengtsson points out, the life-world is the subjects’ experience of reality, at the
same time as it is objective in the sense that it is an intersubjective world. We share it
with other subjects through our experience of it, and we are constantly involved in ne-
gotiations with other subjects about reality in terms of our intersubjective sense mak-
ing of it. Consequently, the agreed meaning constitutes the objective, intersubjective
reality. Furthermore, the life-world is objective in the sense that it transcends the sub-
ject. This is because its qualities are not solely tied to the subjects’ lived experience of
it. At the same time, however, it is inseparable from the subjects through their experi-
ence of it. For example, most European countries have agreed to have daylight saving
and move the clock 1 hour ahead for the period from March to October. Daylight sav-
ing thus becomes an objective fact through this intersubjective agreement. Even if
some of us try to ignore the agreed daylight saving time, we encounter difficulty in do-
ing so because its consequences extend beyond our subjective experience of clock
time.
The phenomenological notion of consciousness as intentional (Husserl, 1900-
1901/1970) provides further specification of life-world as the basis of human action
and activities. At the same time, it has fundamental epistemological implications for
the interpretive research tradition. Epistemology—the theory of knowledge—refers
primarily to three central questions for the researcher. First, how can individuals
achieve meaning and thereby knowledge about the reality in which they live? Second,
how is this knowledge constituted? Third, under what conditions can the knowledge
achieved be claimed as true? (For further elaboration see, for instance, Chisholm,
1977.)
In general, intentionality means that individuals’ consciousness is not closed but
open and always directed toward something other than itself. More precisely, Husserl
(1900-1901/1970) argued that individuals’ various modes of consciousness such as
perceiving or imagining are always related to something, which is not consciousness
itself but intentionally constituted in a particular act of consciousness.3 For example,
“in perception something is perceived, in imagination something is imagined, in a
statement something is stated, in love something is loved, in hate something is hated, in
desire something is desired etc” (Husserl, 1900-1901/1970, p. 554). Figure 1 portrays
the intentional character of consciousness in more detail.
What appears when we experience the object in Figure 1? The object may present
itself as an umbrella. However, if we look at the object a little longer, the picture may
become something else. Perhaps a three-dimensional cube appears from the same
object as the umbrella. As foreshadowed in the discussion about Figure 1, it is not the
object itself, which is the content of the experience, but the meaning, which results
from the way we experience the object. The meaning, such as umbrella or cube, is thus
inseparable from both the object and we who experience it.
In our daily reality, we often ascribe the entire meaning of an experienced object to
the object itself; the object and the meaning, “umbrella” or “cube,” become the same
object. However, if all of the meaning relating to an object is placed outside ourselves,
we overlook the role of the subject in the process of constituting meaning. Achieving
meaning about the world demands that a subject be involved such that without an
experiencing subject, the meaning “umbrella” or “cube” would not appear from the
object. On the other hand, the meaning cannot be ascribed solely to the subject. As the
example in Figure 1 demonstrates, the qualities of the object transcend the subject, as
the meaning changes from umbrella to cube when a subject experiences the object.
Although the object transcends the subject, its appearance is dependent on a subject;
that is, it is intentionally constituted in a perceiving act as an umbrella or a cube. Thus,
the intentional character of consciousness has a constitutive power. It constitutes the
meaning of reality, that is, the meaning of reality that appears to us in our experience. If
intentionality is seen as the basic epistemological assumption underlying the interpre-
Figure 1: The Experienced Object
tive research tradition, what appropriate criteria could be used for justifying the
knowledge produced as true? Before addressing this question, possible theories of
truth that stipulate what truth is and when it is achieved within the interpretive research
tradition need to be explored.
Theories of Truth
The purpose of this section is not to discuss theories of truth in general (for such a
discussion, see, for instance, Allen, 1995). Instead, the aim is to explore theories of
truth that accord with the phenomenological assumptions of life-world and
intentionality. As pointed out in the introduction, the positivistic research tradition
makes use of the correspondence theory of truth. This theory is based on a dualist
ontology and objectivist epistemology treating reality as objective and knowable
beyond the human mind. Given a dualist ontology and an objectivist epistemology, the
correspondence theory of truth refers to the extent to which a statement made by a
researcher corresponds with the specific aspect of objective reality under investiga-
tion. Truth is achieved if the statement is a representation of objective reality. Based on
the assumption of life-world and the epistemological assumption of intentionality,
both Husserl (1931/1962) and Heidegger (1927/1981) rejected the idea of truth as a
relationship between the researcher’s statement and an objective reality. This is
because it overlooks the phenomenological insight about intentionality, that is, the
researcher’s intentional relation to the research object. Moreover, as the researcher is
intentionally related to the research object, the truth claim does not refer to an objec-
tive reality as such but to the specific meaning of the research object as it appears to the
researcher.
Within the interpretive research tradition, therefore, truth can only be defined, as
Lyotard (1991) claimed, “as lived experience of truth—this is evidence” (p. 61). But if
truth is confined to the researcher’s lived experience of truth, how can the researcher
claim that the knowledge produced is true? One possible way to attain or rather
achieve truth is in terms of intentional fulfillment. Intentional fulfillment is established
when there is an agreement between the researcher’s initial interpretation of the object
being studied and the meaning given in lived experience. The following example from
Heidegger (1992) can be used to illustrate truth as intentional fulfillment:
I can in an empty way now think of my desk at home simply in order to talk about it. I
can fulfil this empty intention in a way by envisaging it to myself, and finally by going
home and seeing it itself in an authentic and final experience. In such a demonstrative
fulfillment the emptily intended and the originally intuited come into coincidence.
This bringing-into-coincidence—the intended being experienced in the intuited as
itself and selfsame—is an act of identification. The intended identifies itself in the
intuited; selfsameness is experienced. (p. 49)
Following the idea of truth as intentional fulfillment, the general principle of truth in
the interpretive research tradition could be stated in the following way: Is the initial in-
terpretation of an object fulfilled in experience of it; that is, does the initial interpreta-
tion demonstrate itself to be based on the way the meaning of an object under investi-
gation presents itself to consciousness? If this fulfillment is experienced, then truth is
achieved. For instance, assume that the research object is socialization. Individuals
participating in a study may have been interviewed about their lived experience of be-
ing socialized into the organizations in which they work. As Heidegger (1927/1981)
showed, to be able to interpret lived experience at all, the researcher must have some
understanding of what socialization means. This understanding is the researcher’s ini-
tial interpretation of what socialization means to the individuals interviewed. While
reading through the transcripts, the researcher may experience a discrepancy between
his or her initial interpretation and the way socialization shows itself to consciousness.
In such a case, truth is not evident. Based on the first reading, the researcher formulates
a new interpretation and reads the transcripts a second time. This iterative process con-
tinues until the researcher experiences an agreement between his or her presumed in-
terpretation of socialization and the way the individuals’ lived experience of socializa-
tion shows itself to consciousness. Only then can truth be said to be achieved.
Truth as intentional fulfillment may appear to be identical to the correspondence
theory of truth through the analogous process of matching between the initial interpre-
tation of an object and the meaning given in experience of it. However, a fundamental
difference exists between these theories of truth. Within the correspondence theory,
the matching process takes place between two separate entities, that is, between the
researcher’s statements and an independent research object. By contrast, within truth
understood as intentional fulfillment, there is no separation between the initial inter-
pretation and the meaning given in lived experience, for this matching process does
not take place separate from the researcher. Instead, the matching process takes place
within the researcher’s lived experience of the research object.
Although Husserl and Heidegger agree on the general principle of truth as inten-
tional fulfillment, their views differ concerning when truth is achieved. In Husserl’s
view, it is achieved through perceived fulfillment, and in Heidegger’s view, through
fulfillment in practice (Lübcke, 1987). These different views can be illustrated by
Heidegger’s (1927/1981) example of investigating what a hammer is. From a
Husserlian perspective, the researcher would observe the hammer, for example, in all
its various modes, ranging from perceiving it on a table to perceiving somebody ham-
mering with it and to asking people about their lived experience of hammers and ham-
mering. If the researcher studies the hammer and allows it to appear on its own condi-
tions, then truth is achieved through perceived fulfillment. Following Heidegger, the
researcher would not only observe the hammer but also actively use it, hammering
with it in practice. Hence, from a Heideggerian perspective, it is first in the researcher’s
lived experience of using the hammer in practice that he or she can achieve true knowl-
edge of what a hammer is. In other words, truth is achieved through fulfillment in
practice.
A third form of truth that complements but at the same time challenges Husserl’s
idea of truth and also Heidegger’s to some extent is the idea of truth within deconstruc-
tion developed by Derrida. Deconstruction can be described as a radicalization of
philosophical phenomenology (Moran, 2000). Derrida questions that the meaning of
reality, what he calls text,4 can be experienced or interpreted in a coherent and
nonambiguous way. As Bernstein (2002) argued, Derrida has through his numerous
deconstructive studies successfully demonstrated that the meaning of reality is not pri-
marily coherent and unambiguous but, rather, is fundamentally indeterminate and
irresolvable.
Derrida is thus deeply skeptical toward the idea that we can reconcile the internal
conflicts and contradictions in texts and turn them into a coherent meaning system,
which to a large extent is presumed within many interpretive approaches (Derrida,
1989). Given the focus on and a belief in irresolvable contradictions and tensions in
texts, deconstruction can be seen to express a theory of truth as indeterminate fulfill-
ment. This requires that the researcher deconstructing a text must experience an inde-
terminate fulfillment of its meaning; otherwise, it will not have been properly decons-
tructed. As Derrida (1984) explained, “To deconstruct a text is to disclose how it
functions as desire, as a search for presence and fulfillment which is indeterminably
deferred” (p. 126).
Taken together, Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Derrida’s theories of truth can be seen
as complementing each other as a “truth constellation” within the interpretive research
tradition. How each theory of truth can complement each other will be further elabo-
rated when discussing possible truth criteria for justifying interpretive knowledge
claims.
Perspectival Nature of Interpretive Truth Claims
A central implication of truth as intentional fulfillment is that truth claims are

dependent on the researcher’s understanding of the research object. This does not
mean that truth becomes purely subjective. As argued earlier, everyone is situated in a
specific historical, cultural, and linguistic understanding of reality, which is internal-
ized through upbringing, education, and work. The internalized understanding
becomes to a large extent our framework for making sense of reality.
The basis for understanding reality for researchers is often the disciplinary field,
such as sociological, psychological, educational, organizational, and anthropological
perspectives. This perspective itself is evolving, for instance, Giorgi (1992) argued
that in taking a psychological perspective on a research object, “the presupposition
here is that psychological reality is not ‘ready made’but rather must be constituted” (p.
69). Every research approach also contains a specific methodological perspective on
the phenomenon under examination. For instance, an ethnomethodological perspec-

tive may give rise to a different interpretation of an event than an ethnographic per-
spective (Silverman, 2001). This means that from the point of view of an interpretive
approach, it is only meaningful to talk about truth with reference to the perspective
taken by the researcher.
The perspectival nature of truth gives rise to the question of relativism. However, as
Schrag (1992) argued, the problem with perspectival truth claims is not relativism but
rather “that there appears to be an unmanageable surplus of truths” (p. 75). Schrag pro-
posed one way of dealing with pluralistic truth claims by assessing one specific truth
claim in conjunction with others dealing with the same issue. This strategy, according
to Schrag, allows us to speak about justification or “correctness” of a knowledge
claim. Here, “correctness” does not mean representation of objective reality but rather
a process of justification “that proceeds by ‘correcting’ the limitations and misunder-
standings of other particular interpretations.” Other researchers such as Guba and Lin-
coln (1989), Polkinghorne (1983), and Smith and Deemer (2000) have argued in a
similar vein.
The idea of “correcting” by comparing alternative knowledge claims has been fre-
quently proposed and can be found in Hirsch’s (1967) claim that the requirement of
certainty should be replaced by a probability judgment, Ricoeur’s (1971) discussion
on validation as an argumentative discipline comparable to the juridical procedures of
legal interpretation, Habermas’s (1990) discussion on achieving trustworthiness and
knowledge through communicative action, House’s (1980) discussion of validity in
evaluation seen as an argumentative discourse, Karlsson’s (1993) concept of argumen-
tative reasoning, and Norén’s (1995) trustworthy knowledge.
To summarize this section, assessing truth claims is an iterative process of correct-
ing by comparing alternative knowledge claims within a certain research perspective
as well as between specific research perspectives. It can lead to a deeper understanding
of the aspect of human activity under investigation, and limitations in specific knowl-
edge claims can be disclosed and replaced by more inclusive knowledge claims. This
means that truth achieved within interpretive approaches will never be one final and
unambiguous truth but rather is an ongoing and open process of knowledge claims
correcting each other.
Criteria for Justifying Knowledge

Produced Within Interpretive Approaches
If we assume that truth as intentional fulfillment can be achieved when the
researcher’s interpretation allows the research object to appear on its own conditions
within the perspective taken, it still prompts the question as to what kind of criteria
might be applied in justifying such truth claims. To check researchers’ interpretations,
criteria recommended by several researchers such as Kvale (1989, 1995), Lather
(1993, 1995), Richardson (1995), and Sandberg (1995) are proposed in this section.
These criteria are elaborated consistent with the assumptions of life-world and
intentionality, following the concept of truth as intentional fulfillment. In particular,
the criteria are elaborated in line with the proposed truth constellation consisting of
truth as perceived fulfillment, fulfillment in practice, and indeterminate fulfillment. A
study on human competence at work (Sandberg, 2000) will be used to elaborate and
illustrate how the proposed criteria can be used to justify knowledge produced within
interpretive approaches.
Understanding Human Competence

at Work: An Interpretive Approach
In a study of what constitutes competence at work (Sandberg, 2000), an interpretive

approach was proposed as an alternative to the prevalent rationalistic approaches. The
most central feature of the rationalistic approaches is that they all regard competence
as an attribute-based phenomenon. More specifically, competence is described as con-
stituted by a specific set of attributes such as knowledge and skills, which workers use
to accomplish their work. This view originates from a dualist ontology and objectivist
epistemology such that competence is seen as consisting of two separate entities: a set
of attributes possessed by the worker and a separate set of work activities.
The view of competence as an attribute-based phenomenon has, however, been
subject of increasing criticism. The most basic one comes from a growing body of
studies using interpretive approaches to competence. Their main objection is that
advocates of rationalistic approaches overlook the ways people experience or interpret
their work. From an interpretive standpoint, competence is not seen as consisting of
two separate entities. Instead, worker and work form one entity through the lived expe-
rience of work. Competence is thus seen as constituted by the meaning the work takes
for the worker in his or her experience of it (Dall’Alba & Sandberg 1996; Sandberg
1994). Hence, a shift in the point of departure—from worker and work as two separate
entities, to the workers’ lived experience of work—gives rise to an alternative way of
understanding what constitutes competence at work.
Drawing on previous interpretive research on competence, phenomenography was
adopted to further our understanding of what constitutes competence at work.
Phenomenography is an interpretive approach that was originally developed within
education to describe qualitatively different ways in which people understand or make
sense of their world (Marton, 1981; Marton & Booth, 1997). More specifically, a
phenomenographic approach to competence was adopted during an empirical study of
engineers, namely, engine optimizers in the department of engine optimization at the
Volvo Car Corporation in Sweden. Their task was to develop engines for new car
models.
In exploring what constituted competence in engine optimization, the point of
departure was the engineer’s understanding of their work. Interviews and observation
were used to identify the ways in which the optimizers understood and made sense of
their work.
Three different ways of understanding engine optimization emerged from the
study: namely, engine optimization as (a) optimizing separate qualities, (b) optimizing
interacting qualities, and (c) optimizing from the customers’ perspective. Within each
way of understanding, it was possible to distinguish a number of essential attributes
and a specific structure of attributes, which characteristically appear as the optimizers
accomplish the optimization.
The most central findings were that human competence is not primarily constituted
by a specific set of attributes. Instead, workers’ knowledge, skills, and other attributes
used in accomplishing the work are preceded by and based on the workers’ under-
standing of their work, which constitutes human competence. It is the workers’ ways
of understanding work that form and organize their knowledge and skills into a dis-
tinctive competence in performing the work. But how can these knowledge claims be
justified as true within the theoretical and methodological interpretive perspective? In
particular, what criteria can be used to justify the knowledge claims as true according
to the proposed truth constellation? Below communicative, pragmatic, and trans-
gressive validity together with reliability as interpretative awareness are proposed and
elaborated as suitable criteria for justifying knowledge produced within interpretive
approaches. First, communicative validity is proposed as a criterion for establishing
truth as perceived fulfillment. Second, pragmatic validity is elaborated as the criterion
for establishing truth as fulfillment in practice. Finally, transgressive validity is
suggested as an appropriate criterion for establishing truth as indeterminate
fulfillment.
Truth Constellation of Criteria
Communicative validity. Communicative validity can be seen as one criterion for

achieving truth according to the Husserlian notion of perceived fulfillment. The extent
to which the researcher has achieved a truth claim can be justified in at least three
phases in the research process. In the initial phase of generating empirical material,
communicative validity can be achieved by establishing what Apel (1972) called a
community of interpretation. According to Apel, the production of valid knowledge
claims presupposes an understanding between researcher and research participants
about what they are doing. In the Volvo study, a community of interpretation was
established by initially arranging a seminar with the optimizers in which I explained
that my aim was to understand their lived experience of engine optimization. I also
spent about 1 week in their department observing and talking with them about their
work and took part in an induction program for new employees. Moreover, at the
beginning of each interview, I reminded them that my purpose was to discuss their
experience of engine optimization. Such clarification from both sides contributed to
establishing a fruitful community of interpretation for the subsequent interviews.
The interviews were conducted in the form of a dialogue because generating verbal
descriptions of lived experience becomes a one-sided activity when the researcher
merely poses questions and the subject answers, and it is unlikely to achieve high com-
municative validity. Instead, it is preferable that verbal descriptions be generated
through a dialogue, which conveys an openness toward the research object. As
Gadamer (1960/1994) pointed out, genuine dialogue involves the process of question
and answer, with the priority of the question over the answer. We develop our under-
standing through posing questions: “Recognizing that an object is different, and not as
we first thought, obviously presupposes a question whether it was this or that” (p.
362). In the interviews at Volvo, only two principal open-ended interview questions
were used to encourage the optimizers to identify and describe what they themselves
understood as central in engine optimization. These questions were elaborated and
substantiated with follow-up questions such as “What do you mean by that?” “Can
you explain that further?” and “Can you give an example?” Using only two questions
in combination with follow-up questions enabled me to constantly focus on their lived
experience of engine optimization throughout the interviews and thus achieve high
communicative validity. The following discussion between the interviewer (I) and the
optimizer (O) provides one example of how the interviews in the Volvo study were
conducted as a dialogue with the intention of achieving communicative validity. It
illustrates how the interviewer, by getting involved in a genuine dialogue with the
optimizer, gradually arrives at a clearer understanding of what the optimizer means by
“tricks” and how they are used to avoid extra loops in the optimization process.
I: Yeah, but are you a competent optimizer then?

O: Well then you have other knowledge as well.
I: Such as what?
O: That you have been working here for a long time, you know, those tricks, as I said. As
usual it’s the error you make but shouldn’t, so you don’t fall into these traps yourself.
I: Yeah, well what are you thinking about when you say “tricks”?
O: There are a lot of things you do automatically which someone newly employed misses.
I: Can you give an example?
O: We know, for instance, that if they [the new employees] optimize Kennfeld [the ignition]
in the FP [function testing room]. For example . . . we have an ignition curve here . . . then
the curve goes up, something like this, and sure when you drive in FP then you want to
continue with this curve but we know that it will landing here depending on the emis-
sions. Such tricks, they save enormously much time for us. We can avoid an extra loop
between FP and EP [emission testing room] and FP.
I: Yeah, yeah, because the optimum seems to be here, but you mean that it must be here some-
where instead?
O: Yes, the optimum seems to be here but we end up down here.
Second, when analyzing empirical material such as interview transcripts, commu-

nicative validity can be achieved by striving for coherent interpretations (e.g., Eisner,
1985; Karlsson, 1993). The principle of coherence is based on the notion of the herme-
neutic circle (Palmer, 1972), which stipulates that interpretation is constituted by a cir-
cular relation between parts and whole. For example, a text can be understood only in
relation to its parts and, conversely, the parts can be understood only in relation to the
text as a whole. Hence, striving for coherence means that the parts of a text must fit the
whole and the whole must fit the parts.
Using this strategy, conflicting interpretations can be judged with respect to how
coherent they are with the empirical material. The greater the number of parts of the
empirical material that accord with a specific interpretation, the more coherent it is. In
the Volvo study, I strived for coherence by making interpretations of the optimizers’
statements about their work that were consistent with both the immediate context of
surrounding statements and the transcript as a whole. When I had analyzed how each
optimizer understood engine optimization, I shifted the analysis from single
optimizers and compared the different ways of understanding engine optimization
across optimizers. First, I grouped the optimizers who had understood engine optimi-
zation in a similar way. Second, I compared them both within and between groups.
This process enabled me to refine the coherence of my interpretations and thus to
achieve high communicative validity.
A third way of establishing communicative validity is to discuss our findings with
other researchers and professionals in the practice being investigated. Although single
researchers may be the main producers of knowledge claims, it is ultimately
intersubjective judgment that determines whether the original researcher’s knowledge
claim is true. As Gadamer (1960/1994) argued, truth is to a large extent achieved

through dialogue between people. Seeing truth as intersubjective can be traced back to
the phenomenological idea of life-world. As discussed, the life-world is not only sub-
jectively but also intersubjectively constituted through ongoing negotiations with oth-
ers about its meaning. Hence, by discussing with different communities of interpret-
ers, knowledge claims can be refined or challenged as limited. For example, the
identified ways of understanding engine optimization were presented to the
optimizers on two occasions, initially to the 20 study participants and then to all 50
optimizers in the department. On both occasions, the optimizers confirmed that the
understandings identified were valid. My research results were also further refined in
the communication with the reviewers and the editor during the review process.
However, it is important to note that intersubjective judgment can be influenced by
factors other than achieving defensible knowledge claims, such as the social control of
what is published. As Astely (1985) expressed it,
Producing quality work is not enough; it must be certified as being of high quality by
the right people. This privilege falls to the gatekeepers who control the discipline’s
formal evaluation system. These gatekeepers define what will count as important or
unimportant work and, in effect, determine what constitutes valid knowledge. (p. 509)
Thus, according to Astely, even if the gatekeepers realize a certain knowledge

claim is of high quality, they may not accept it as true for other reasons. In initial at-
tempts to publish the Volvo study, one of the reviewers claimed that although the find-
ings were interesting and intriguing, they could not be accepted without an interjudge
reliability check. Without such a check, the reviewer claimed that the readers of the
journal would not accept the knowledge claims as true.
Pragmatic validity. Although communicative validity enables us to check the
coherence of our interpretation, it does not provide enough attention to possible dis-
crepancies between what people say they do and what they actually do. Research par-
ticipants usually do not describe their lived experience in an undistorted way. As
Alvesson (2003) has indicated, their accounts are mediated via impression manage-
ment, political action, moral storytelling, social codes, and cultural scripts. Such medi-
ators may produce discrepancies between interview accounts and lived experience.
Pragmatic validity can reduce this weakness in communicative validity. Pragmatic
validity involves testing knowledge produced in action (Kvale, 1989). It can be an
appropriate criterion for judging the extent to which truth has been achieved according
to a Heideggerian fulfillment in practice. Using pragmatic validation as part of the
research process may increase the likelihood of capturing knowledge in action, which
contrasts with what Argyris and Schön (1978) called “espoused theories.” One way to
achieve pragmatic validity when generating descriptions of lived experience is to ask
follow-up questions that constantly embed the statements in concrete situations, as
outlined previously in the Volvo study. Another way to ascertain whether a statement
refers to knowledge in action is to use a form of pragmatic validation indirectly. With
reference to Freud (1963), Kvale (1989) argued that a statement could be checked by
observing the subject’s reaction to a particular interpretation of it. In the Volvo study, I
occasionally misrepresented the optimizers’ statements deliberately as a way to check
their pragmatic validity. Most of the time they reacted quite strongly. To make sure I
had understood them correctly, they went back and elaborated the specific statements I
had misinterpreted. The quote below illustrates how pragmatic validity is checked by
the interviewer appearing to misunderstand the optimizers’ statements about “tricks,”
suggesting there may be many more tricks. The optimizer then clarifies that it is also
about knowledge as well as tricks, which is consistent with what he said previously in
the interview.
O: You have to have those rules of thumb to be able to judge where to make the thrust (direct
your efforts) because we are always under time pressure, and it’s those small tricks [that
enable you to see links between the qualities of the engine].
I: But how have you acquired those small tricks?
O: You have to listen, and XY [colleague with competence 3] is that type of person, because
he is an old hand . . . you discuss with him.
I: Does he have more tricks then?
O: Yes, he has great many tricks, it’s obvious, well tricks, he has knowledge, he knows how it
works.
I: But tricks, does it mean that you know what to do?
O: Yes, yes, it isn’t really anything strange.
A further way to validate researchers’ interpretations pragmatically is through par-

ticipant observation. For instance, in many anthropological studies on foreign cul-
tures, the anthropologists not only carry out interviews and collect various documents
but also live and actively participate in the culture. In the Volvo study, I pragmatically
validated my interpretations by observing the optimizers optimizing new car engines
and compared that with my interpretations of what they had said they did in the
interviews.
The most extensive way to pragmatically validate our interpretations is to use them
in practice. However, this way of validating often requires a separate study in which
the findings are recontextualized into the practice investigated. Such a pragmatic vali-
dation was to a large extent carried out in relation to my Volvo study. The study
resulted in a request from Volvo for a model of competence to be developed based on
my findings. To elaborate such a model, another researcher replicated my study using
7 additional optimizers from the group of 50, selected according to the criteria of the
original study. The independent research confirmed the three ways of understanding
engine optimization reported in my study.
Transgressive validity. It has been argued that communicative and pragmatic valid-
ity are two appropriate criteria for justifying the extent to which truth has been
achieved according to perceived fulfillment and fulfillment in practice. However,
those criteria tend to encourage the researcher to search primarily for consistent and
unequivocal interpretations of lived experience. For instance, to achieve them, it was
argued that the researcher should strive for coherent interpretations. This means that
the criteria of communicative and pragmatic validity may encourage the researcher to
overlook various forms of ambiguity, complexity, and multiplicity in the lived
experience investigated.
Truth as indeterminate fulfillment can help the researcher to pay more attention to
irresolvable contradictions and tensions. Lather’s (1993, 1995) and Richardson’s
(1995) transgressive validity could be seen as one appropriate criterion for judging the
extent to which truth as indeterminate fulfillment has been achieved. Its primary aim is
to help researchers to become aware of their taken-for-granted frameworks.
Lather (1993) suggested three main ways to achieve transgressive validity. One
way is to use irony to interrupt and disturb our present interpretations in such a way
that we become aware of the codes that have guided us in producing them. A second
way is to search for differences and contradictions rather than for coherence in lived
experience. For example, in the Volvo study, I deliberately searched for differences
and contradictions by cross-checking my interpretation of each understanding of
engine optimization. I did so by reading through the transcript expressing a particular
interpretation and assessing it against the sense of an alternative perspective. I per-
formed this cross-checking until I believed I had found the most truthful interpretation
of each optimizer’s way of understanding engine optimization. This cross-checking
also led to clearer and more precise formulations of my interpretations. I eventually
reached a point at which, despite further cross-checking, each understanding of engine
optimization remained stable.
A third way to establish transgressive validity is related to the fact that the scientific
framework for producing knowledge within Western culture is often molded by and
saturated within a male imaginary. As a consequence, the female imaginary in terms of
specific lived experience and ways of being is to a large extent excluded. However, by
systematically recognizing not only male but also female lived experience, trans-
gressive validity can be achieved. This form of transgressive validity was not estab-
lished in the Volvo study because all of the 50 optimizers in the department of engine
optimization were men. The inclusion of women may have resulted in some additional
ways of understanding engine optimization. However, this result is unlikely to have
changed the main knowledge claim, namely, that our understanding of work provides
the basis for competence at work, as evident in subsequent studies that included
women (Dall’Alba, 2002; Sandberg, 2001b, Stålsby Lundborg, Wahlström, &
Dall’Alba, 1999).
To sum up, the proposed criteria of validity can be seen as a specification and elabo-
ration of how each theory of truth within the proposed truth constellation correct each
other. The main strength of communicative validity is its focus on meaning coherence,
stipulating that interpretations should be coherent with the empirical material investi-
gated. Although communicative validity enables researchers to achieve coherent
interpretations, it does not adequately check discrepancies between what the research
participants say they do and what they actually do. Pragmatic validity corrects that
weakness. A weakness in both communicative and pragmatic validity is that they do
not pay enough attention to possible contradictions, but this is corrected by trans-
gressive validity. On the other hand, the strong focus on contradictions, and tensions
make transgressive validity ill-suited to check for coherent interpretations: a weakness
that is corrected by communicative and pragmatic validity.
Reliability as interpretive awareness. The principal question of validity has been

how we, as researchers, can justify that our interpretations are truthful to lived experi-
ence within the theoretical and methodological perspectives taken. Although the main
question of validity relates to the truthfulness of interpretations, the principal question
of reliability concerns the procedure for achieving truthful interpretations.
Given truth as intentional fulfillment, criteria of reliability, such as replicability and

interjudge reliability of results relating to objective reality, fall outside the domain of
interest in achieving reliability within interpretive approaches (Sandberg, 1995).
Instead, the proposed truth constellation implies first and foremost that researchers
must demonstrate how they have dealt with their intentional relation to the lived expe-
rience studied. That is, researchers must demonstrate how they have controlled and
checked their interpretations throughout the research process: from formulating the
research question, selecting individuals to be studied, obtaining data from those indi-
viduals, analyzing the data obtained, and reporting the results.
Because researchers cannot escape their interpretations, one appropriate criterion
of reliability in researching lived experience is the researcher’s interpretive awareness
(Sandberg, 1994, 1995). To maintain an interpretive awareness means to acknowledge
and explicitly deal with our subjectivity throughout the research process instead of
overlooking it. This form of reliability can be discussed in terms of Kvale’s (1996)
notion of “biased subjectivity” and “perspectival subjectivity.” Biased subjectivity
simply results in unprofessional work. As Kvale argued, biased researchers princi-
pally take note of statements that support their own opinions, selectively interpret
statements so they can justify their own conclusions, and tend to ignore counter-
evidence. In contrast, researchers exercising perspectival subjectivity are more aware
of how their own interpretations are influenced by the particular disciplinary, theoreti-
cal, and methodological perspectives taken in the study. Thus, interpretation then
becomes a strength rather than a threat to reliable results. The means by which the
researcher can achieve interpretive awareness will be further elaborated in the next
section.
Using Phenomenological Epoché as a Strategy for

Achieving Validity and Reliability in Interpretive Studies
The communicative, pragmatic, and transgressive validity and reliability as inter-
pretive awareness have been proposed as appropriate criteria for justifying knowledge
produced within interpretive approaches. But what research strategy could be used for
achieving these criteria? Based on an overview of qualitative literature, Miles and
Huberman (1994) confirmed the importance of justifying the production of knowl-
edge throughout the research process. They suggested a strategy consisting of the fol-
lowing tactics: checking for representativeness, checking for researcher effects, trian-
gulation, weighting the evidence, checking the meaning of outliers, using extreme
cases, following up surprises, looking for negative evidence, making if-then tests, rep-
licating a finding, and checking out rival explanations. It is important to note that these
tactics have been primarily developed within the positivistic research tradition, and as
Guba and Lincoln (1989) noticed, even if adjustments are made to fit the assump-
tions underlying interpretive approaches, “there remains a feeling of constraint, a feel-
ing of continuing to play ‘in the friendly confines’ of the opposition’s home court”
(p. 245). Hence, instead of adjusting the above tactics to interpretive research, there is
a need for a customized strategy originating from the assumptions of life-world and
intentionality.
One available strategy is the phenomenological epoché (Sandberg, 1994), which
underlies most forms of phenomenology and also includes more radical phenomenol-
ogy, such as Derrida’s deconstruction.5 The aim of epoché is to ensure that the
researcher withholds his or her theories and prejudices when interpreting lived experi-
ence. The epoché does not mean, however, that the researcher must or can bracket all
previous experience (Giorgi, 1990; Ihde, 1977). To reiterate, as researchers, we inter-
pret the research object within particular disciplinary, theoretical, and methodological
perspectives. Rather, the point behind the epoché, as Giorgi (1990) expressed it, is “to
bracket that knowledge which is relevant to the issue at hand” (p. 71). That is, research-
ers should strive to retain themselves from routinely applying their known theories and
prejudices to be maximally open to the lived experience under investigation. Accord-
ing to Ihde (1977), phenomenological epoché requires “that looking precede judge-
ment and that judgement of what is ‘real’ or ‘most real’ should be suspended until all
the evidence (or at least sufficient evidence) is in” (p. 36). More specifically, epoché
consists of steps that can work as concrete guidelines for achieving the proposed truth
criteria throughout the research process. As phenomenology has been under continu-
ous development (Spiegelberg, 1976), there are a number of variations of phenomen-
ological epoché (Giorgi, 1990). In my use of the epoché, I will principally follow Ihde
(1977).
The first step suggests that the researcher should be oriented to how the research
object appears throughout the research process. Such an orientation enables the
researcher to be attentive and open to possible variations and complexities of lived
experience. For instance, in the Volvo interviews, I tried to achieve communicative
validity by constantly being oriented toward the ways in which engine optimization
appeared to the optimizers. Similarly, I tried to achieve pragmatic validity by asking
follow-up questions that encouraged them to elaborate on their experience of engine
optimization in practical situations.
The second step of epoché suggests that the researcher is oriented toward describ-
ing what constitutes the experience under investigation, rather than attempting to
explain why it appears as it does. One way to adopt a describing orientation is to ask
“what” and “how” questions rather than “why” questions (Gubrium & Holstein, 2000;
Sandberg, 1994). “Why” questions tend to encourage individuals to explain why they
experience the research object the way they do. “What” and “how” questions, on the
other hand, direct the individuals to the research object and what it means to them. In
the Volvo interviews, I used this strategy to encourage the optimizers to focus on
describing what engine optimization meant for them.
A describing orientation also helps the researcher to avoid generating interpreta-
tions that surpass the lived experience investigated. As soon as researchers surpass
what is given in their experience, they begin to explain and use their arsenal of theories
and models, which essentially are outside what is lived experience. In the Volvo analy-
sis, I tried to achieve the truth criteria by focusing on the ways the optimizers under-
stood engine optimization. I tried to maintain focus by holding back my own prior
understanding of competence and continually checking if my interpretations were
grounded in the optimizers’ description of their work.
Step 3 involves horizontalization, initially treating all aspects of the lived experi-
ence under investigation as equally important. Ordering some aspects into being more
important than others is likely to distract the researcher away from a truthful inter-
pretation of their experience. Horizontalization is critical in both collection and data
analysis. In the Volvo interviews, I initially strived to treat all interview statements as
equally important in combination with asking follow-up questions that required
the optimizers to elaborate on and be more specific about what they meant by their
statements. Similarly, in the analysis, I initially treated all statements as equally impor-
tant, which enabled me to be more truthful to the optimizers’ understanding of engine
optimization.
The fourth step implies a search for structural features, or the basic meaning struc-
ture, of the experience under investigation. This step is particularly important for
achieving communicative validity in analyzing data. Within philosophical phenomen-
ology, this step is carried out through the method of free imaginative variation. In
empirical interpretive approaches, free imaginative variation would mean that when a
first tentative interpretation of individuals’lived experience is achieved, the stability of
that interpretation must be checked. This is done by adopting different interpretations
when subsequently reading through the data. The variation in interpretations of the
data continues until the basic meaning structure of the lived experience being studied
has been stabilized.
This step is also central in achieving transgressive validity in the analysis. In the
Volvo study, I searched for structural features of the optimizers’ understanding of
engine optimization by cross-checking my interpretation of each optimizer’s under-
standing. As described previously, this cross-checking enabled me to formulate more
precise and clear interpretations of the optimizers’ ways of understanding engine
optimization.
Step 5, using intentionality as a correlational rule, consists of three separate, but
internally related, phases. The first phase involves identifying what the individuals
experience as their reality. The second phase is to identify how the individuals experi-
ence that reality. Finally, the constitution of the lived experience is fulfilled by integrat-
ing the individuals’ ways of experiencing with what they experience as their reality.
Using intentionality as a correlational rule was adopted throughout the analysis in the
Volvo study. I initially tried to acquire a general grasp of the optimizers’understanding
of engine optimization by reading each transcript several times. Second, I read all the
transcripts again, to systematically search for what each optimizer understood as
engine optimization. Third, I analyzed all the transcripts again, but now in terms of
how each optimizer understood engine optimization. The primary focus here was how
the optimizers delimited and organized what they understood as engine optimization.
Finally, I analyzed all the transcripts again, simultaneously focusing on what each
optimizer understood as engine optimization in relation to how they understood
engine optimization.
Taken together, each step in the epoché, from the most overarching principle of
holding back known theories and prejudices to the most specific principle of using
intentionality as a correlational rule, may increase the researcher’s chances of achiev-
ing the proposed criteria for justifying knowledge produced within interpretive
approaches. More specifically, each step in the epoché can be seen as a gradual specifi-
cation of how communicative, pragmatic, transgressive validity and reliability as
interpretive awareness can be achieved.
However, even if researchers enter into the phenomenological epoché and experi-
ence truth as intentional fulfillment satisfying the proposed criteria, errors may still
occur. There is no complete guarantee that the research object will show itself on its
own conditions to researchers’ consciousness. As Giorgi (1988) claimed, there are
“only checks and balances, and primarily the checks and balances come through the
use of demonstrative procedure” (p. 173). A thorough demonstrative procedure is,
however, of crucial importance as a way to defend our knowledge claims in ongoing

argumentative discourses such as presenting papers at conferences and seminars and
in review processes for scientific journals in which our knowledge claims are justified.
Concluding Remark
The central aim of this article has been to provide a platform from which research-
ers can develop appropriate and shared criteria for justifying knowledge produced
within interpretive approaches. Based on phenomenological philosophy, it is argued
that although objective knowledge is untenable, it is still possible to make truth claims
consistent with the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the
approach to interpretative research. More specifically, the principal argument has been
that knowledge produced from interpretive approaches can be justified as true in rela-
tion to the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying this research tradi-
tion. This was demonstrated first by explicating life-world and intentionality as the
basic assumptions underlying the interpretive research tradition. Second, based on
those assumptions, truth as intentional fulfillment, consisting of perceived fulfillment,
fulfillment in practice, and indeterminate fulfillment, was proposed. Third, based on
the proposed truth constellation, communicative, pragmatic, and transgressive valid-
ity and reliability as interpretive awareness were presented as the most appropriate cri-
teria for justifying knowledge produced within interpretive approaches. Finally, the
phenomenological epoché was suggested as a strategy for achieving these criteria.
It should be noted that because truth is always something unfinished within the
interpretive tradition, the criteria proposed do not enable researchers to generate abso-
lute truth claims. Instead, they give researchers the opportunity to produce more
informed and thorough knowledge claims in relation to their ontological and
epistemological assumptions. However, although the criteria proposed are generally
applicable for justifying knowledge produced from interpretive approaches, more
specific criteria need to be developed for justifying knowledge produced within the
diverse range of interpretive approaches. This will have to take into account other
aspects of justifying knowledge, such as the perspective taken, the research object, and
the researcher’s purpose in carrying out the research. Finally, the core assumptions of
life-world and intentionality together with the proposed truth constellation, it has been
argued, provide a coherent philosophical foundation for developing more specific
criteria.
Notes
1. When referring to philosophical phenomenology, I do not primarily mean Husserl’s
(1931/1962) descriptive phenomenology and his idea about a transcendental subject as the
foundation of all knowledge but rather the interpretive phenomenology developed after Husserl.
More specifically, if we look at how the various forms of modern phenomenology have been de-
veloped since Husserl, not even his closest colleagues accepted a pure and transcendental ego as
the foundation of all knowledge (Spiegelberg, 1976). It was primarily through Heidegger’s
(1927/1981) work Being and Time that Husserl’s transcendental subject was rejected by most
advocates of phenomenology. Heidegger’s work demonstrated above all that (a) a pure tran-
scendental subject standing above reality cannot exist because subjects are always situated in a
specific culture, historical time, and language that mediate reality and that (b) it is not possible to
produce objective descriptions of reality because the descriptions are always constituted by the
researcher’s preunderstanding of the particular aspect of reality under investigation. In other
words, researchers’ descriptions of reality are always based on their interpretation of the reality
described. Moreover, because both Gadamer and Derrida are profoundly influenced by
Heidegger’s thinking (Bernstein, 2002, p. 276), it can also be appropriate to see hermeneutics
and deconstruction as part of the ongoing development of philosophical phenomenology
(Moran, 2000, p. 436). Although Husserl’s transcendental philosophy has been heavily criti-
cized, modern philosophers such as Mohanty (1989) and social scientists such as Giorgi (1992)
have established a descriptive phenomenology closely based on Husserl’s work.
2. Given the great variety of research approaches related to the interpretive research tradi-
tion, there are naturally not only unifying themes but also significant differences and tensions
between the different approaches. See, for instance, Sandberg (2001a) and Schwandt (2003).
3. Husserl’s theory of consciousness may sound as far removed from a social constructionist
epistemology underlying most interpretive approaches. This is, however, not the case. As
Gubrium and Holstein (2000) argued, “Although the term construction came into fashion much
later, we might say that consciousness constructs as much as it perceives the world. Husserl’s
project is to investigate the structure of consciousness that make it possible to apprehend an
empirical world” (p. 488).
4. Derrida does regard not only written material such as books and journal articles as texts but
our entire social reality such as social practices and events in the sense that they are socially
constructed.
5. For example, Derrida (1999) said, “It is true that for me Husserl’s work and precisely the
notion of epoché, has been and still is implied. I would say that I constantly try to practice that
whatever I am speaking or writing” (p. 81).
References
Allen, B. (1995). Truth in philosophy. London: Harvard University Press.
Altheide, D. L., & Johnson, J. M. (1994). Criteria for assessing interpretive validity in qualita-
tive research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp.
500-515). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Alvesson, M. (2003). Beyond neopositivists, romantics and localists: A reflexive approach to
interviews in organizational research. Academy of Management Review, 28, 1-13.
Alvesson, M., & Deetz, S. (2000). Doing critical management research. London: Sage.
Alvesson, M., & Kärreman, D. (2000). Varieties of discourse: On the study of organizations
through discourse analysis. Human Relations, 9, 1125-1149.
Alvesson, M., & Sköldberg, K. (1999). Toward reflexive methodology. London: Sage.
Apel, K.-O. (1972). The a priori of communication and the foundation of the humanities. Man
and World, 51, 3-37.
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (1978). Organizational learning. Readings, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Astely, W. G. (1985). Administrative science as socially constructed truth. Administrative Sci-
ence Quarterly, 30, 497-513.
Atkinson, P. (1988). Ethnomethodology: A critical review. Annual Review of Sociology, 44,
441-465.
Atkinson, P., Coffey, A., & Delamont, S. (2003). Key themes in qualitative research: Continui-
ties and change. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
Bengtsson, J. (1989). Fenomenologi: Vardagsforskning, existensfilosofi, hermeneutik [Phe-
nomenology: Everyday research, existential philosophy, hermeneutics]. In P. Månson
(Ed.), Moderna samhällsteorier: Traditioner riktningar teoretiker (pp. 67-108). Stock-
holm: Prisma.
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality. Harmondsworth, UK:
Penguin.
Bernstein, R. J. (2002). The constellation of hermeneutics, critical theory and deconstruction. In

R. J. Dostal (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Gadamer. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Bruner, J. (1996). The culture of education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Calas, M., & Smircich, L. (1996). From the “woman’s” point of view: Feminist approaches in
organization studies. In S. Clegg, C. Hardy, & W. Nord (Eds.), Handbook of organization
studies (pp. 218-258). London: Sage.
Chisholm, R. (1977). Theory of knowledge. New York: Prentice Hall.
Dall’Alba, G. (2002). Understanding medical practice: Different outcome of pre-medical pro-
gram. Advances in Health Sciences Education, 7, 163-177.
Dall’Alba, G., & Sandberg, J. (1996). Educating for competence in professional practice. In-
structional Science, 24, 411-437.
Denzin, N. K. (1994). The art and politics of interpretation. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln
(Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research. (pp. 500-515). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Denzin, N. K. (1997). Interpretive ethnography. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (1994). Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (2000). Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed.).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Derrida, J. (1978). Edmund Husserl’s origin of geometry: An introduction. New York: Harvester
Press. (Original work published 1967)
Derrida, J. (1981). Positions (A. Bass, Trans.). London: Athlone Press. (Original work pub-
lished 1972)
Derrida, J. (1984). Deconstruction and the other: Interview with Richard Kearney. In R. Kearney
(Ed.), Dialogues with contemporary continental thinkers (pp. 107-125). Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Press.
Derrida, J. (1989). Three questions to Hans-George Gadamer. In D. P. Michelfelder & R. E.
Palmer (Eds.), Dialogue & deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida encounter (pp. 52-55).
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Derrida, J. (1999). Hospitality, justice and responsibility. In R. Kearney & M. Dooley (Eds.),
Questioning ethics: Contemporary debates in philosophy (pp. 65-83). London: Routledge.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147-160.
Eisner, E. W. (1985). The art of educational evaluation: A personal view. London: Falmer.
Enerstvedt, R. (1989). The problem of validity in social science. In S. Kvale (Ed.), Issues of va-
lidity in qualitative research (pp. 135-173). Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur.
Flick, U. (2002). An introduction to qualitative research. London: Sage.
Foucault, M. (1972). The archeology of knowledge. London: Routledge.
Freud, S. (1963). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. New York. Norton.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1994). Truth and method (Sheed and Ward Ltd, Trans.). New York: Contin-
uum. (Original work published 1960)
Gadamer, H.-G. (1977). Philosophical hermeneutics (D. E. Linge, Trans.). Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. New York: Prentice Hall.
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. London: Fontana Press.
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure and contradiction in
social analysis. London: Macmillan.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline a theory of structuration. Cambridge,
UK: Polity.
Giddens, A. (1993). New rules of sociological methods: A positive critique of interpretive

sociologies. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Giorgi, A. (1988). Validity and reliability from a phenomenological perspective. In W. J. Baker,
L. P. Mos, H. V. Rappard, & H. J. Stam (Eds.), Recent trends in theoretical psychology (pp.
167-176). New York: Springer-Verlag.
Giorgi, A. (1990). Phenomenology, psychological science and common sense. In G. R. Semin &
K. J. Gergen (Eds.), Everyday understanding: Social and scientific implications (pp. 64-
82). London: Sage.
Giorgi, A. (1992). The theory, practice and evaluation of the phenomenological method as a
qualitative research procedure for the human sciences. Quebec, Canada: Université du
Québec à Montréal.
Giorgi, A. (1994). A phenomenological perspective on certain qualitative research methods.
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 25, 191-220.
Guba, E. G. (1990). Carrying on the dialog. In E. G. Guba (Ed.), The paradigm dialog (pp. 368-
378). Newbury Park, CA. Sage.
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). Fourth generation evaluation. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Gubrium, J. F., & Holstein, J. A. (2000). Analyzing interpretive practice. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S.
Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed., pp. 487-508). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Habermas, J. (1972). Knowledge and human interest. London: Heinemann.
Habermas, J. (1990). Kommunicativt handlande: Texter om språk, rationalitet och samhälle
[Communicative action: Texts about language, rationality and society]. Göteborg, Sweden:
Daidalos.
Hammersley, M. (1990). Reading ethnographic research: A critical guide. London: Longman.
Harding, S. (1986). The science question in feminism. London: Cornell University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1981). Varat och tiden [Being and time] (Vol. 1-2, R. Matz, Trans.). Lund, Swe-
den: Doxa. (Original work published 1927)
Heidegger, M. (1992). History of the concept of time. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heritage, J. (1984). Garfinkel and ethnomethodology. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Hirsch, E. D. 1967. Validity in interpretation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Holstein, J. A., & Gubrium, J. F. (1994). Phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and interpretive
practice. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp.
262-272). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
House, E. R. (1980). Evaluating with validity. London: Sage.
Husserl, E. (1962). Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson,
Trans.). London: Collier Macmillan. (Original work published 1931)
Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology (D.
Carr, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published
1936)
Husserl, E. (1970). Logical investigations (Vol. 2, J. N. Findlay, Trans.). London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1900-1901)
Ihde, D. (1977). Experimental phenomenology. White Plains, NY: Longman.
Jones, T. (1998). Interpretive social science and the “native’s point of view”: A closer look. Phi-
losophy of the Social Sciences, 1, 32-68.
Karlsson, G. (1993). Psychological qualitative research from a phenomenological perspective.
Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Keller, E. F. (1985). Reflections on gender and science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Kilduff, M. (1993). Deconstructing organizations. Academy of Management Review, 18, 13-31.
Kvale, S. (1989). To validate is to question. In S. Kvale (Ed.), Issues of validity in qualitative re-
search (pp. 73-91). Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur.
Kvale, S. (1995). The social construction of validity. Qualitative Inquiry, 1, 19-40.
Kvale, S. (1996). InterViews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Thousand

Oaks, CA: Sage.
Lather, P. (1993). Fertile obsession: Validity after poststructuralism. Sociological Quarterly, 4,
673-693.
Lather, P. (1995). The validity of angels: Interpretive and textual strategies in researching the
lives of women with HIV/AIDS. Qualitative Inquiry, 1, 41-61.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Denzin, N. K. (2003). The seventh moment: Out of the past. In N. K Denzin &
Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The landscape of qualitative research: Theories and issues (pp. 611-
640). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (2003). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging
confluences. In N. K Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The landscape of qualitative research:
Theories and issues (pp. 253-291). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Lübcke, P. (1987). Fenomenologin och hermenuetiken i Tyskland [Phenomenology and herme-
neutics in Germany]. In P. Lübcke (Ed.), Vår tids filosofi (pp. 30-90) Köpenhamn, Ger-
many: Politikens forlag.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1991). Phenomenology (B. Beakley, Trans.). New York: State University of New
York Press.
Manicas, P., & Secord, P. (1983). Implications for psychology of the new philosophy of science.
American Psychologist, 38, 399-413.
Martin, J. (1994). The organization of exclusion: Institutionalization of sex inequality, gendered
faculty jobs, and gendered knowledge in organizational theory and research. Organization,
1, 401-431.
Marton, F. (1981). Phenomenography: Describing conceptions of the world around us. Instruc-
tional Science, 10, 177-200.
Marton, F., & Booth, S. (1997). Learning and awareness. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Maxwell, J. (1992). Understanding and validity in qualitative research. Harvard Educational
Review, 62, 279-300.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self and society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. Chicago:
Chicago University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.). London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1945)
Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutional organizations: Formal structure as myth and cere-
mony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363.
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1984). Qualitative data analysis: A sourcebook of new meth-
ods. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Mohanty, J. N. (1989). Transcendental phenomenology: An analytic account. Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology. London: Routledge.
Morgan, G. (Ed.). (1983). Beyond method. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Norén, L. (1995). Tolkande företagsekonomisk forskning [Interpretive business research]. Lund,
Sweden: Studentlitteratur.
Palmer, R. (1972). Hermeneutics: Interpretation theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger
and Gadamer. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Polkinghorne, D. (1983). Methodology for the human sciences. Albany: State University of
New York Press.
Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.
Popper, K. (1972). Objective knowledge. Oxford, UK: Clarendon.
Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and be-
haviour. London: Sage.
Prasad, P. (1993). Symbolic processes in the implementation of technological change: A sym-

bolic interactionist study of work computerization. Academy of Management Journal, 36,
1400-1429.
Prasad, A., & Prasad, P. (2002). The coming age of interpretive organizational research. Organi-
zational Research Methods, 5, 4-11.
Richardson, L. (1995). Poetics, dramatics, and transgressive validity: The case of the skipped
line. Sociological Quarterly, 4, 695-710.
Ricoeur, P. (1971). The model of the text: Meaningful action considered as a text. Social Re-
search, 38, 529-562.
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Rosaldo, R. (1989). Culture and truth: The remaking of social analysis. Boston. Beacon.
Salner, M. (1989). Validity in human science research. In S. Kvale (Ed.), Issues of validity in
qualitative research (pp. 47-72). Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur.
Sandberg, J. (1994). Human competence at work: An interpretive perspective. Göteborg, Swe-
den: Bas.
Sandberg, J. (1995). Are phenomenographic results reliable? Journal of Nordic Educational
Research, 15, 156-164.
Sandberg, J. (2000). Understanding human competence at work: An interpretive approach,
Academy of Management Journal, 43, 9-25.
Sandberg, J. (2001a). The constructions of social constructionism. In S.-E. Sjöstrand, J.
Sandberg, & M. Tyrstrup (Eds.), Invisible management: The social construction of leader-
ship. London: Thomson.
Sandberg, J. (2001b). Leadership rhetoric or leadership practice? In S.-E. Sjöstrand, J.
Sandberg, & M. Tyrstrup (Eds.), Invisible management: The social construction of leader-
ship (pp. 167-187). London: Thomson.
Schrag, C. O. (1992). The resources of rationality: A response to the postmodern challenge.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Schutz, A. (1945). On multiple realities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A Quar-
terly Journal, 5, 533-575.
Schutz, A. (1953). Common-sense and scientific interpretation of human action. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research: A Quarterly Journal, 14, 1-37.
Schutz, A. (1967). The phenomenology of the social world. Vienna: North Western University
Press.
Schwandt, T. A. (1994). Constructivist, interpretivist approaches to human inquiry. In N. K.
Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 118-137). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Schwandt, T. A. (2003). Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry: Interpretativism,
hermeneutics and social constructionism. In N. K Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The land-
scape of qualitative research: Theories and issues (pp. 292-331). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Scott, R. W. (1995). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Seale, C. (2003). Quality in qualitative research. In Y. Lincoln & N. K. Denzin (Eds.), Turning
points in qualitative research: Tying the knots in a handkerchief. Walnut Creek, CA:
AltaMira Press.
Searle, J. R. (1995). The construction of social reality. New York: Free Press.
Silverman, D. (1998). Harvey Sacks: Social science and conversation analysis. Cambridge,
UK: Polity.
Silverman, D. (2001). Interpreting qualitative data. Methods for analyzing talk, text and inter-
action. London: Sage.
Smircich, L., & Stubbart, C. (1985). Strategic management in an enacted world. Academy of
Management Review, 4, 724-736.
Smith, J. K., & Deemer, D. (2000). The problem of criteria in the age of relativism. In N. K.
Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 877-896). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Spiegelberg, H. (1976). The phenomenological movement: A historical introduction (Vols. 1-2).
The Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
Stålsby Lundborg, C., Wahlström, R., & Dall’Alba, G. (1999). Ways of experiencing asthma
management: Variations among practitioners in Sweden. Scandinavian Journal of Primary
Health Care, 17, 226-231.
Van Maanen, J. (Ed.). (1983). Qualitative methodology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Van Maanen, J. (1995). Representation in ethnography. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Weber, M. (1964). The theory of social and economic organisation. New York: Free Press.
(Original work published 1947)
Wachterhauser, B. (2002). Getting it right: Relativism, realism and truth. In R. J. Dostal (Ed.),
The Cambridge companion to Gadamer. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Zald, M. N. (1996). More fragmentation? Unfinished business in linking the social sciences and
the humanities. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 251-262.
Jörgen Sandberg is a reader in management and director of research at the University of Queensland Busi-
ness School, Australia. His research interests include competence and learning in organizations, leadership,
and qualitative research methods, including their philosophical assumptions. His work has appeared in sev-
eral journals and books including Academy of Management Journal and Harvard Business Review. He is
currently writing a book for Sage about managing understanding in organizations.

Sandberg 2005 How Do We Justify Knowledge Produced Within Interpretive Approaches

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sandberg 2005 How Do We Justify Knowledge Produced Within Interpretive Approaches

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ORGANIZA

How Do We Justify Knowledge Produced

The use of interpretive approaches within management and organizational sci-

Keywords: validity; reliability; truth; interpretive approach; qualitative

To overcome the shortcomings of positivism, advocates of interpretive approaches

Problem of Mixed Discourse Within Interpretive Approaches

As argued previously, there is evidence for a theoretical shift from positivistic to

Interpretive Challenge to Knowledge and Truth

(1966), Foucault (1972), Derrida (1967/1978), Bourdieu (1990), Giddens (1984,

aries of their underlying constructionist epistemology, but there is a lingering incon-

Truth as Relative to Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions

Based on phenomenological philosophy, it is argued here that although objective

Basic Assumptions Underlying the Interpretive Research Tradition

Figure 1: The Experienced Object

Perspectival Nature of Interpretive Truth Claims

A central implication of truth as intentional fulfillment is that truth claims are

the phenomenon under examination. For instance, an ethnomethodological perspec-

Criteria for Justifying Knowledge

Understanding Human Competence

In a study of what constitutes competence at work (Sandberg, 2000), an interpretive

Truth Constellation of Criteria

Communicative validity. Communicative validity can be seen as one criterion for

I: Yeah, but are you a competent optimizer then?

Second, when analyzing empirical material such as interview transcripts, commu-

claim is true. As Gadamer (1960/1994) argued, truth is to a large extent achieved

Thus, according to Astely, even if the gatekeepers realize a certain knowledge

A further way to validate researchers’ interpretations pragmatically is through par-

Reliability as interpretive awareness. The principal question of validity has been

Given truth as intentional fulfillment, criteria of reliability, such as replicability and

Using Phenomenological Epoché as a Strategy for

however, of crucial importance as a way to defend our knowledge claims in ongoing

Bernstein, R. J. (2002). The constellation of hermeneutics, critical theory and deconstruction. In

Giddens, A. (1993). New rules of sociological methods: A positive critique of interpretive

Kvale, S. (1996). InterViews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Thousand

Prasad, P. (1993). Symbolic processes in the implementation of technological change: A sym-

You might also like