COGITO ERGO SUM

MAGNA CARTA
MAINS 2023
PAPER II CRASH COURSE

POLITY & GOVERNANCE : LEC 8B

a
GOOD GOVERNANCE
THEMATIC + SECTORAL BODIES

ATISH MATHUR OFFICIAL

 OFFICIAL SYLLABUS GOVERNANCE LECTURE PLAN

Constitutional Bodies Appointment to various COMMON SYLLABUS

Constitutional posts, Powers, Functions and
responsibilities of various Constitutional Bodies
Probity in Governance: Concept of public Lecture 6 : Development Policy
Statutory, regulatory and various quasi-judicial
service; Philosophical basis of governance
bodies,
and probity; Information sharing and
Salient features of the Representation of People’s
transparency in government, Right to Lecture 7 : Non State Actors
Act. (Integrated with ECI + Elections sub-theme)
Information, Codes of Ethics, Codes of
Important aspects of governance, transparency and
Conduct, Citizen’s Charters, Work culture,
accountability, e-governance- applications, models,
Quality of service delivery, Utilisation of
successes, limitations, and potential; citizens Lecture 8 : Good Governance &
public funds, Challenges of corruption
charters, transparency & accountability and Thematic Bodies
institutional and other measures.
Role of civil services in a democracy.

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Transparency & Accountability

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NCPCR
CVC Lokpal & Lokayuktas
NCST, NCST, NCBC

CIC, SIC (RTI) Enforcement Directorate

Linguistic & Religious Minorities

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 India : The Regulatory State
Regulationsnotreadforpublicsector
Eg Railways insocialism
Related to 1991economicreforms

1. Context : With the economic liberalisation of the 1990s, the state has
gradually retreated from its functions making space for private
enterprise to deliver public services. As a result of this shift there
have also emerged bodies which are to provide a non partisan check
on the growth of such private players in the arena which was earlier
dominated by the public sector.
2. Meaning : “controlling human or societal behaviour by rules or
regulations or alternatively a rule or order issued by an executive
authority or regulatory agency of a government and having the force
of law” - OECD
3. Rationale for regulation

postisan
a. Neoliberalism
b. Issue of trust values
safety banks
RBI
c. Market failure: saving
d. To check anti competitive practices
e. To promote the public interest Regulation
4. Problems
a. Independence
Emastenureetc
b. Accountability through
c. Transparency
Parliament anzuetc
d. Absence of a uniform regulatory framework
e. Regulation and Social Objectives
f. Appellate Tribunals
g. Functions of the Regulator
h. Multi-Sectoral regulators
India : The Regulatory State
 India : The Regulatory State

Solutions

Problems

1. The challenge is to strike a balance

between the advantages of governance
through the regulator and the apparent
threat to democratic accountability.
This can be achieved, to some extent,
through parliamentary oversight of
regulators.
a. question hour
b. discussions in Parliament
c. parliamentary committees.
2. The Planning Commission in 2008 and
the Second Administrative Reforms
Commission (ARC) in 2009 have made
recommendations on strengthening
parliamentary oversight of regulators.
Both of them recommended that
regulators should be present before the
standing committees to explain their
actions and be subjected to legislative
questions. They have also suggested
that regulators submit annual reports
periodically which should include the
progress made on achieving their
objectives.
3. Direct accountability of regulatory
bodies to Parliament was
recommended by the Damodaran
Committee in 2013
 CAG

1. Context : CAG released more reports in 2023 than other year in the previous decade; CAG may use AI to conduct Audits
a. The CAG office has revealed many financial misdeeds, ranging from the bungling of the purchase of army jeeps, associated with V K Krishna Menon in the 1950s, and the Bofors gun
scandal in the 1980s, 2G telecom spectrum, Coalgate, and the Commonwealth Games scams.
2. Background :
a. Dates back to the British era :
i. 1753 when the Indian Audit and Accounts Department was created, the office of the Auditor-General made appearance in the year 1857.
ii. GOI Act, 1919 made the Auditor-General independent of the Government of India, GOI Act, 1935 further strengthened the office of the Auditor-General
iii. The Constitution of India continued this legacy and with its enactment in the year 1950, constitutional status was accorded to this office. The designation of the Auditor-General
was changed to the Comptroller and Auditor General of India
3. Appointment
a. The office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAGI) is the supreme audit institution of the country
b. Article 148 (1) states that there shall be a Comptroller and Auditor General of India who shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal.
c. Neither the salary of a Comptroller and Auditor General nor his rights in respect of leave of absence, pension or age of retirement shall be varied to his disadvantage after his
appointment (Article 148(3))
d. Comptroller and Auditor General shall not be eligible for further office either under the Government of India or under the Government of any State after he has ceased to hold his
office (Article 148(4))
e. The conditions of service of the CAGI have been determined by the Comptroller and Auditor General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971.
i. There shall be paid to the CAG a salary which is equal to the salary of the Judge of the Supreme Court.
ii. 6 years or 65 years of age; resignation to the President
iii. Can be reappointed, but cannot hold any other office post retirement
f. Unfortunately, most of the recent CAG appointees, with some exceptions, do not inspire confidence. They also lack the requisite professional knowledge to hold this office. They are
invariably from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and have held the post of secretary to the government and been given a post-retirement reward for “services rendered” while
working for the government.
i. Common Cause (a leading public advocacy organisation) and some other public-spirited persons and organisations have approached the Supreme Court several times by way of
public interest litigations (PILs); unfortunately, their attempts at affecting change have been unsuccessful.
ii. In the United Kingdom (UK), whose parliamentary traditions we follow, the 100-year-old Exchequer and Audit Departments Act (1866) was amended in 1983 to provide that the
CAG will be appointed only after an address is presented in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister, acting in agreement with the chairperson of the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC)
1. In Britain, under the amended law, the CAG is also considered a member of the House of Commons, which enhances his status. Similar provisions exist in other advanced
Commonwealth countries that have modified their auditor general acts in line with British practice
2. The president appoints the comptroller general on the advice and consent of the Senate. The president acts on recommendations made by a commission consisting of the
speaker of the House of Representatives, the president of the Senate, majority and minority leaders of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and certain other
nominated members of the House of Representative and Senate
3. It has been suggested that a Selection Committee be constituted through suitable legislation, consisting of the Prime Minister, the speaker of the Lok Sabha, the leader of the
Opposition of the Lok Sabha, the finance minister, and the chairperson of the PAC.
 CAG

1. Functions
a. The office of the CAG comprises the CAGI; Deputy CAGs in the areas of administration and staff, commercial, defence, communication and railways, central revenue audit, report
central and local bodies, government accounts; and Additional Deputy CAGs in the areas of inspection, professional practices group, northern region, southern region, western
region, central region and north eastern region.
b. There is an Audit Advisory Board which functions under the Chairmanship of the CAGI and comprises internal as well as external members. The board provides suggestions on
matters relating to audit
c. In the states, there are Accountant Generals who have the mandate to perform accounting and auditing functions.
d. There are broadly two types of duties
i. Compilation and keeping of accounts in selected states
1. With the implementation of the Scheme of Departmentalisation of Accounts from April 1976, the CAG has been relieved from the responsibility of compiling the accounts of
the union government.
ii. Audit of public entities of Union and State Governments
1. All receipts into and spending from the coffers (called the Consolidated Fund) of the Union and State Governments.
2. All transactions relating to the Emergency expenses (called Contingency Funds) and relating to the monies of the public held by the Government e.g. Postal savings, Vikas
Patras (called Public Accounts) at Central as well as State levels. All trading, manufacturing, profit and loss accounts, balance sheets and other subsidiary accounts kept in any
Government department.
3. All stores and stock accounts of all Government offices and departments.
4. Accounts of all Government companies and Corporations e.g. ONGC, SAIL etc
5. Accounts of all autonomous bodies and authorities receiving Government money e.g. municipal bodies, IIM's, IIT's, State Health societies
6. Accounts of any body or authority on request of the President/Governor or on his own initiative.
7. In the recent Regulation on Audit and Accounts issued by the CAG in 2007, NGOs have been included in the expression ‘body’ and ‘authority’ used in the sections of the DPC.
iii. Compliance Audit : transaction audit in which some selected transactions (for e.g. a purchase by a Medical Officer, a contract executed by a Public Works Division for building a
road or a tax assessment order by an Assessment Officer) of an entity for a particular financial year are chosen for examination.
iv. Financial Attest Audit : CAG certifies how far the accounts are “true and fair” i.e. whether the financial statements (accounts) are properly prepared, complete in all respects and
are presented with adequate disclosures
v. Performance Audit :
1. No ‘specific and separate’ provision exists in the CAG’s DPC Act for conducting performance audit.
2. Interestingly, the CAG’s DPC Act defines ‘accounts’, but does not define the word ‘audit’. The term ‘audit’ has been defined for the first time in the Audit Regulations issued in
2007, which clarifies that ‘audit’ includes performance audit or any other type of audit determined by the CAG. Thus, the authority of CAG of India to conduct performance
audit emanates from an administrative order and the Audit Regulations and not clearly from the Audit Act passed by the Parliament.
3. It seeks to establish at what cost and to what degree the policies, programmes and projects are working. Performance Audit, apart from asking whether things are being done
in the right way, goes a step further and analyses whether the right things are being done
 CAG

1. Critical Analysis
a. The Constitution (Article 151) prescribes that the reports of CAG relating to accounts of the Union/states shall be submitted to the President/Governor, and is then to be laid before
each House of Parliament/state legislature
i. Quite often, despite the reports being sent to the President/Governor/Central Government well in time before commencement of the Parliament/Assembly session, the reports
are not placed in Parliament/ state legislature immediately. Government takes considerable time in getting necessary approvals for tabling of Audit reports.
ii. In many cases, Government places the reports towards the end of the Parliament/Assembly sessions or on the last day of the session thus denying adequate opportunity to the
legislature to take cognisance of the CAG’s reports and raise relevant issues in the Parliament/Assembly.
iii. Once tabled in the House, the Reports stand permanently referred to the Central and State Standing Committees on Public Accounts (PAC)/ Committees on Public Undertakings
(COPU).
b. Every year, the CAG presents about 20–25 reports for the central government and 75–80 reports for the state governments (three for every state). Each report is 200–250 pages
long; all together, the CAG presents 25,000–30,000 pages of audit reports to Parliament and state legislatures. The CAG is expected to go through all this material personally, as he
must sign every report presented to Parliament and state legislature.
i. It is simply impossible for any individual to go through and do justice to such a large volume of material that is highly technical; it ranges from lapses in defence deals and tax
evasion to poor development scheme outcomes. He has to, therefore, necessarily depend on his deputies; this situation is unsatisfactory.
ii. As the CAG is technically solely responsible for the material in audit reports, he is sometimes accused of partisanship; this situation must be remedied.
iii. Continental countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Austria have audit courts vested with the power to order the recovery of money illegally spent from public
officials. In France, the Cour des Comptes (Court of Audit) always acts as a collegiate body. In Japan, there is an audit commission consisting of three commissioners. All major
decisions pertaining to audits are made by the audit commission, including finalising the audit report.
iv. There is a strong case at the apex level to convert the CAG into a multi-member body in India. Each member may be assigned a specific sphere of responsibility, such as auditing
civil departments, defence services, revenue, and commercial enterprises. The commission may have a minimum of five members (presided over by the CAG) who may enjoy the
same status and condition of service as the CAG, with the CAG acting as primus inter pares. The only time the office of the CAG was reviewed after independence was in 2002, by
the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), headed by Justice Venkatachaliah.. It may be mentioned that the Election Commission was
restructured in 1993, changing from a single-member body to a commission with three members. This has greatly enhanced its efficiency and credibility. In order to enhance the
effectiveness and credibility of the reports of an institution such as the CAG, there is an imperative need for it to be constituted as a multi-member audit commission or audit
board.
c. There is a need to transform the organisation from a babu-oriented culture, to a lean, thin, officer-oriented, professional outfit. Auditors should introduce modern techniques of
auditing and statistical sampling methods. The work of the CAG can be made more professional, if it recruits computer specialists, engineers, scientists, and economists in its senior
cadre, and if it hires domain experts and specialists for short-term consultancy assignments, to perform audit tasks—this is a practice popular in developed countries.
d. In India, the CAGs Act, 1971, does not even mention that the accountant general in states will function on behalf of the CAG. In the absence of a defined legal status, an accountant
general is seriously handicapped in effectively discharging duties, with the result that financial transactions are not effectively audited. There is need for a statutory provision that
the PrAG and accountant general in the state will function on behalf of the CAG. The status of the PrAG should be raised to the equivalent of at least state chief information
commissioner (under the Right to Information (RTI) Act), if not to that of a high court judge.
e. There is a need for the government and the CAG to work together and devise a suitable adjudication machinery, in cases where there is suspicion of deliberate default, negligence,
and unauthorised use of public money and loss to the government. Senior audit officers (at the level of accountant general and directors of audit) should be given adjudication
powers and the authority to summon public officials to appear as witnesses.
 MAINS MENTORSHIP PROGRAM
GS - 2
Important bodies and organizations

STATUTORY BODIES

● Statutory bodies are established by acts of Parliament or State Legislatures

concerned.
● Statutory bodies are non-constitutional bodies which make rules and regulations
and take the decision on behalf of the government.
● As these bodies are established by the act, it derives its powers, functions, duties
from the respective act.
● Statutory bodies are established to perform specific tasks. These are sector specific
and lessen the burden on the government.
● Government may grant certain level of independence in its functioning,
appointment of members. Though government may grant the independence and
autonomy to these bodies, government needs to ensure financial prudence in its
functioning.
● These bodies are subject to varying degrees of ministerial control which are identified
in the statutory bodyʼs enabling legislation. Ministers are accountable to Parliament
for the operation of all government agencies within their ministry and are necessary to
table their annual reports in Parliament.
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 ● The meaning of a ʻstatutory bodyʼ may change depending upon the legislation. For
example, a local council is not a statutory body for the purposes of the Financial
Accountability Act, but it is for the purposes of the Statutory Bodies Financial
Arrangements Act.
● All statutory bodies are established and operate under the provisions of their own
enabling legislation, which sets out the purpose and specific powers of the agency.
● Examples: National Human Rights Commission, National Green tribunal, Medical
Council of India, University Grants Commission etc.

REGULATORY BODIES

● The notion of the regulatory agency was initiated in the USA and it has been basically
an American establishment. The first agency was Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), established by Congress in 1887 to control the railroads.
● A regulatory body also called a regulatory agency is a public authority or a
government agency which is accountable for exercising autonomous authority over
some area of human activity in a regulatory or supervisory capacity.
● Regulatory agencies are generally a part of the executive branch of the government
or they have statutory authority to execute their functions with oversight from the
legislative branch.
● Their activities are generally scrutinized by the legislature. Regulatory authorities are
usually established to implement standards and safety, or to oversee use of public
goods and regulate business.

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 ● Regulatory body, independent governmental body established by legislative act in
order to set standards in a specific field of activity, or operations, in the private sector
of the economy and then to enforce those standards.
● Regulatory agencies function outside direct executive supervision. Because the
regulations that they adopt have the force of law, part of these agenciesʼ function is
essentially legislative; but because they may also conduct hearings and pass
judgments concerning adherence to their regulations, they also exercise a judicial
function – o en carried out before a quasi-judicial official called an administrative law
judge, who is not part of the court system.
● Regulatory agencies became popular means of promoting fair trade and consumer
protectionas problems of commerce and trade became more complex

Several risks are involved in the absence of a regulatory system. The main risks of not
regulating are:

● Excessive tariff
● Inadequate service level and quality
● Non-compliance of contractual obligations to users, government or other parties
● Low efficiency in production and in the provision of goods and services
● Inadequate level of investment in the sector
● Frequent discontent between the parties involved

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Functions of regulators include:

● Protection of public interest

● Monitoring compliance with contractual obligations to the government and users,
and other legal and regulatory requirements
● Establishing technical, safety and quality standards and monitoring their
compliance
● Imposing penalties for non-compliance
● Administering tariff adjustments and periodic reviews
● Establishing accounting standards and undertaking operatorʼs cost and
performance analysis
● Facilitating dispute resolution between parties
● Providing advice and counsel to government on policy matters and other related
matters to private sector involvement in the sector

Examples: Securities and Exchange Board of India, Reserve Bank of

India,IRDAI,PFRDA,Telecom and Regulatory Authority of India, etc.

Issues with Regulatory bodies:

● Regulatory sprawl: In India there are total 60 regulatory bodies at the Centre and
state level. In the name of specialization excessive regulatory bodies have been
created. This has created complexity in day to day operations.

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 ● Ineffective functioning: Regulatory bodies have failed to fulfill their basic duties. They
are continuously failing to meet the benchmarks. Example: Failure of RBI to curb the
menace of NPAs
● Overlapping of functions: Governmentʼs failure to demarcate functions of regulatory
bodies has created overlapping of functions. This creates not only confusion among
these bodies but also becomes reasons for conflict. It also hampers Ease of Doing
Business. Example: There is overlapping of functions in CVC and CBI, RBI and SEBI.
● Issue of autonomy: Regulatory bodies lack autonomy as the members of the
regulatory bodies are appointed by government. Thus, nepotism or favoritism cannot
be ruled out.
● No regular audit: Audit of regulatory bodies have never been prioritized by the
government. As these bodies do not face regular audit, they have involved into
corruption. Example: Medical Council of India.
● Failure to protect environment: There are many regulatory bodies in the field of
environment, but these are little achievements to count on. Example: CPCB is failed to
curb air pollution, river pollution. NGT is also failing to deliver judgments on time.
● Financial problems: All the regulatory bodies are dependent on budgetary resources
for their day to day functioning. Government through the budgetary provisions
interferes in the functioning of these bodies.
● Vacancies and lack of expertise: Regulatory bodies are generally under-staffed and
they also lack expertise. Most of the time, IAS officers are appointed to these bodies.
These officers are not specialist and lack even basic skillset to deal with the matters of
these bodies.

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Solution:

● Uniform appointment procedure, term of office, tenure across all regulatory bodies.
● Budgets of these bodies should be charged upon the Consolidated Funds of India.
● Establish Regulator of Regulators as recommended by Punchhi Commission.
● Parliament should review the functioning of the regulatory bodies
● At least to start with, central government can create single regulatory body for
financial sector by keeping RBI as a separate body looking at the nature of its work.
● Many countries have adopted techniques like “Regulatory Impact Assessments”. India
can also mandate such techniques through legislation and thereby preserve economic
value.
● Genuine functional autonomy would also have to be reinforced with financial
autonomy by putting in place a system where regulatory organisations are not
dependent on government departments for financial support.
● The appointment of persons to head regulatory organisations should be attempted in
a far more transparent manner.

QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY

● A Quasi-Judicial Body is an entity such as an arbitrator or a tribunal, generally of a

Public Administrative Agency, which has powers and procedures resembling that of a
Court of Law or Judge, and which is obliged to objectively determine facts and draw
conclusions from them so as to provide the basis of an official action.

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 Judgement
KJ B
Rules

● A Quasi-Judicial Body has also been defined as “an organ of Government other than
a Court or Legislature, which affects the rights of private parties either through
adjudication or rulemaking”.
● It is not necessary that a Quasi-Judicial Body has to be a Court of Law, such as
National Green Tribunal.
● For example, the Election Commission of India is also a Quasi-Judicial Body but
does not have its core functions as a Court of Law. Finance Commission is also a
quasi-judicial body but do not perform functions of court of law.
● Awards and judgements of quasi-judicial bodies o en depend on a predetermined
set of rules or punishment depending on the nature and gravity of the offence
committed. Such punishment may be legally enforceable under the law of a country, it
can be challenged in a court of law which is the final vital authority.
● Examples: Election Commission of India,Finance Commission.Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal,Intellectual Property Appellate Tribunal, etc.

Reasons for Emergence of Quasi-Judicial Bodies in India

1. Normal courts of law have become costly over the years. Where quasi-judicial bodies
offer cost effective solutions.
2. In quasi-judicial bodies, principle of natural justice is followed. This ensures speedy
justice.

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 3. As the State grew in size and functions, the burden on its functions, especially those of
the judicial system increased manifold. Therefore, the need for an alternative judicial
system arose.
4. As the technological advances have outpaced all sectors, it requires expertise to deal
with the matters. Normal courts lack such expertise and such courts may commit error
while giving final verdicts.
5. Quick, hassle free and cost-effective delivery of justice.
6. Need of domain and subject expertise, such as taxation.

Types of quasi-judicial bodies:

● Administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions, whether as part of their

respective departments or otherwise.
● Administrative adjudicatory bodies which are outside the control of the department
involved in the disputes and hence decide disputes like a Judge, free from bias. For
example: Intellectual Property Appellate Tribunal.
● Tribunals constituted under Article 323A and 323B of the Indian Constitution, enjoy
the powers and status of a High Court.
● Departmental bodies exercising inherent judicial powers of the State, wherein they
perform functions pertaining to control, composition and procedure, constituted
under Article 136, can also be classified as tribunals.

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Advantages of Quasi-Judicial Bodies:

● Lessen the burden of judiciary: Tribunals while taking up specific matters, majorly
help by sharing the massive workload of the Judiciary. In a country which has 3 crore
pending cases, it is important to take steps to decrease the burden of the Judiciary.
● Simplicity: Tribunals and other such bodies do not follow any lengthy or complex
procedure for submitting application or evidence etc. These bodies follow principle of
natural justice.
● Low Cost: In the conventional judicial process, a large section of the populace for the
fear of expenditure, may hesitate from approaching the Courts, thus defeating the
purpose of justice. Tribunals on the other hand, have an overall low cost which
encourages people to seek redressal for their grievances.
● Expert Knowledge: A tribunal comprises of experts, who can easily understand the
technicalities of a case, the necessary actions involved and their consequences.
● Accessibility: These are easily accessible to common people and offer very cost
effective solutions.
● Suo-Moto powers: Some of these bodies have suo-moto powers to initiate the
proceedings. Example-NHRC can initiate actions based on reports from media or
otherwise.

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Disadvantages:

● Pseudo independence: These bodies lack real independence from the executive as
they are dependent on government for finances, man power, investigating agencies,
infrastructure etc.
● Lack of human resource: Many quasi-judicial bodies are either under-staffed or lack
expertise.
● Lack of enforcement: The verdicts of these bodies can be challenged in high courts
and supreme court. Thus, such cases again pass through hierarchy of courts. This
delays the justice.

IMPORTANT BODIES

1. NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL

● The National Green Tribunal has been established on 18.10.2010 under the National
Green Tribunal Act 2010 for effective and expeditious disposal of cases relating to
environmental protection and conservation of forests and other natural resources
including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment and giving relief and
compensation for damages to persons and property and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto.
● The NGT has the power to hear all civil cases relating to environmental issues and
questions that are linked to the implementation of laws listed in Schedule I of the
NGT Act.

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 ● These include the following:
o The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974;
o The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977;
o The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980;
o The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981;
o The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986;
o The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991;
o The Biological Diversity Act, 2002.

Challenges:

● The NGT does not have jurisdiction under Wildlife Protection Act (1972), Indian Forest
Act 1927, Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of Forest Rights Act) and various other state
legislations.
● NGT Act specifies that the compensation amount as ordered by the tribunal
should be deposited to Environmental Relief Fund within a period of 30 days. But
the parties involved donʼt abide by this rule.
● Technical members are generally appointed from generalist cadre. They lack
expertise knowledge and issues of favoritism can not be ruled out.
● Given the current state of the NGT, it is reasonable to claim that the multiple
objectives of access to justice, efficiency, cost-efficiency, and protection of the
environment through the NGT Act, have been defeated.

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 ● The NGT orders are more o en challenged in the Supreme Court, where a heavy
penalty has been imposed by the tribunal. Such cases defeat the very purpose of
NGT. There is no institutional mechanism to ensure that the environmental
regulatory authorities comply with the orders of the tribunal.
● The NGT has very few regional benches considering the expanse of the country.
● The Act is silent on provision that who is liable to pay compensation or cost of
damage to public health or environment.

Suggestions:

● Appointment of Experts: It should be ensured that only expert members are

appointed to the NGT.
● Implementation of Decisions: The decisions of the Tribunal should be respected and
implemented by all stakeholders.
● Providing Proper Support: In order to be able to entertain petitions and prevent
frivolous environmental litigations, the National Green Tribunal should be equipped
with all the resources required for scrutinizing and reviewing petitions and
investigating the intentions of petitioners.
● Synergy with the Supreme Court: Its function should be more transparent than the
Supreme Courtʼs in environmental cases. More importantly, the procedures of PIL
should be institutionalized with guidelines in place for emphasizing the conditions
under which the tribunal can entertain or reject a petition seeking its attention.

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 ● The National Green Tribunal could play a particularly significant role in the context of
proposed reforms regarding the structure of environmental governance and the
emergence of active environmental groups in the country.
● Proper Legal Framework: The legal framework also needs to be comprehensive and
suitably designed for objective interpretation of environmental laws and policies.

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

● The CBI owes its origin to the Delhi Special Police Establishment, established in
1941, to enquire into cases of corruption in the procurement during the Second World
War.
● Later, based on the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention
of Corruption, CBI was established by a resolution of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Later, it was transferred to the Ministry of Personnel and now it enjoys the status of
an attached office.
● The CBI is not a statutory body. It derives its powers from the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946.The CBI is the main investigating agency of the Central
Government.

Issues with CBI:

● Constitutional conflict: Since police is a State subject under the Constitution, and
the CBI acts as per the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC),

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 which makes it a police agency, the CBI needs the consent of the State government
in question before it can make its presence in that State. This is a cumbersome
procedure and has led to some ridiculous situations.
● Political interference: due to it being under the control of central government with
latter having immense control over its functioning, o en allegations of political misuse
of CBI have been there.
● Constitutional status: CBI enjoys great power over the investigative machinery of
the country, yet it derives its origin from DPSE Act, 1946 and the MHA resolution of
1963 which puts its constitutional status on shaky ground. Guwahati High Court in
2013 termed CBI unconstitutional which was later stayed by the Supreme Court.
● Dependence on Various Ministries: The agency is dependent on the home ministry
for staffing, since many of its investigators come from the Indian Police Service. The
agency depends on the law ministry for lawyers and also lacks functional autonomy to
some extent.
● Dependence on State: Generally, CBI needs consent of states to start any
investigation, and recently many states like West Bengal, Maharashtra have withdrawn
their general consent to CBI. Thus, in such cases CBI needs consent of states on each
and every case.
● Credibility crisis due to recent happenings.

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Other Issues:

Problems

● Legislative loopholes:
○ Its functions are based merely on a government resolution that draws its powers
from the DPSE Act 1946.
○ Its dependence on State governmentsʼ approval for investigation in certain cases
also is a concern.
○ Measures
■ Committee suggestions:
● The Second ARC (2007) also suggested that “a new law should be
enacted to govern the working of the CBI”.
● The Parliamentary Standing Committees (2007 and 2008)
recommended that “the need of the hour is to strengthen the CBI in
terms of legal mandate, infrastructure and resources”.
● CBI should be vested with the required legal mandate and pan-India
jurisdiction and must have powers to investigate corruption cases
against officers of All India Services irrespective the state they are
serving.

● Administrative Hurdles:
○ The CBI does not have its own cadre and is run by officers on deputation which
makes them prone to manipulation by the government of the day.
○ Additionally, lack of sufficient manpower o en leads to delay in solving cases.
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 ○ Internal conflicts such as the recent one between Director and Special Director
and their public allegations against each other are a serious concern.
○ Measures
■ Manpower strengthening:
● The CBI should develop its own cadre of officers who are not
hindered by deputation issues and abrupt transfers.
● The manpower of CBI should be enhanced for effective and timely
investigation.
● The service conditions for direct recruitment to the CBI can be
improved to attract a wider talent pool.
● The process of direct recruitment through UPSC which was stopped
in 2000 can be restarted.
● Overlapping jurisdictions:
○ There is an overlap in jurisdictions of CVC, CBI and Lokpal in certain cases
leading to problems. In corruption cases the rates of conviction are just 3%.
○ Measures
■ The anti-corruption wings of CBI and CVC can be brought under Lokpal
which should utilize both the organisations for investigation and
prosecution. Such an integrated setup would lead to a more potent body.
● Political Pressure:
○ The CBI has o en been criticized as acting at the governmentʼs behest. In 2013,
the Supreme Court called it a “caged parrot speaking in its masterʼs voice”. ·
○ Measures:

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 ■ It should be granted more autonomy by making it accountable only to the
Parliament like the office of CAG.
● Lack of Transparency:
○ CBI is exempt from the provisions of the RTI Act of 2005 ·
○ Measures
■ There has been suggestion from an information commissioner that
agencies like NIA, CBI, IB and paramilitary forces should come under
the purview of RTI as there are adequate safeguards in the Act to keep
sensitive information outside the public domai
● Transparency issues
○ CBI is exempt from the provisions of the RTI Act of 2005. There has been
suggestion from an information commissioner that agencies like NIA, CBI, IB and
paramilitary forces should come under the purview of RTI as there are adequate
safeguards in the Act to keep sensitive information outside the public domain.

Provision of Prior Permission

● The CBI is required to obtain the prior approval of the Central Government before
conducting any inquiry or investigation into an offence committed by officers of
the rank of joint secretary and above in the Central Government and its authorities.
● However, on May 6, 2014, the Supreme Court held as invalid the legal provision
that makes prior sanction mandatory for the CBI to conduct a probe against senior
bureaucrats in corruption cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

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 ● A Constitution Bench held that Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment
Act, which granted protection to joint secretary and above officers from facing
even a preliminary inquiry by the CBI in corruption cases, was violative of Article
14 of the Indian Constitution.
● Article 14 states that, “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the
law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”

CBI vs State Police

● Primarily, State Police is responsible to maintain law and order in the state. CBI may
investigate:
○ Cases which are essentially against central govt employees or concerning
affairs of the Central govt.
○ Cases in which the financial interests of the central government are involved.
○ Cases relating to the breaches of central laws with the enforcement of which
the GoI is mainly concerned.
○ Big cases of fraud, cheating, embezzlement and similar other cases when
committed by organized gangs or professional criminals having ramifications in
several States.

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SC over CBIʼs autonomy

● The landmark judgment in Vineet Narain v. Union of India in 1997 laid out several
steps to secure the autonomy of CBI.
● The Court directed –
● the CBI director shall have a “minimum tenure of two years, regardless of the
date of his superannuation”.
● the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) “shall be responsible for the efficient
functioning of CBI”.
● the CVC chief shall be selected by a panel comprising the prime minister, home
minister and the leader of the opposition from a panel of “outstanding civil
servants”.
● Most importantly, the Vineet Narain judgement stated that the “transfer of an
incumbent Director, CBI in an extraordinary situation, including the need for him
to take up a more important assignment, should have the approval of the
selection committee”

CBI: A Caged Parrot?

● Politicization of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has been a work in

progress for years.
● Corruption and politically biased: This was highlighted in Supreme Court criticism
for being a caged parrot speaking in its masterʼs voice.

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 ● CBI has been accused of becoming ʻhandmaidenʼ to the party in power, as a result
high profile cases are not treated seriously.
● Since CBI is run by central police officials on deputation hence chances of getting
influenced by government was visible in the hope of better future postings.

Suggestions:

● New Central Law: A comprehensive new central law should govern the working of the
institutions.
● Special Public Prosecutor: The law should specifically provide for appointment of a
special public prosecutor who will have full independence to deal with the politically
and nationally sensitive cases and take a stand safeguarding public interest.
● A high-level governing board should be set up for the CBI in which, apart from the
prime minister and union home minister, four-five chief ministers of states may be
appointed, by turn, to give broad guidelines and keep a watch over the working of the
CBI.
● Right to Information: These organisations should be brought fully under the Right to
Information law and information related to all cases except ongoing cases and cases of
national security importance should be made available under RTI.
● Fixed Term and no reappointment: The directors should have a fixed term of three
years. A er retirement, the director of should be made ineligible for any appointment
by the Central and state governments.

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 ● Accountability to Parliament: Like Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG),
parliamentary oversight would ensure better accountability, reduce chances of
political misuse, and increase its credibility.
● Dedicated cadre: Dedicated officers of its own without depending upon deputations.
CVC provides for tenure stability of 2 years which must be respected for transparent
and independent investigations as well.

Committee Suggestions:

● The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2007) also suggested that “a new
law should be enacted to govern the working of the CBI”.
● The Parliamentary Standing Committees (2007 and 2008) recommended that “the
need of the hour is to strengthen the CBI in terms of legal mandate, infrastructure
and resources.
● CBI should be vested with the required legal mandate and pan-India jurisdiction and
must have powers to investigate corruption cases against officers of All India Services
irrespective the state they are serving.

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THE ELECTION COMMISSION

● Election Commission of India is an independent constitutional body responsible for

administering the free and fair election system and process of both the Union and
State elections of India, in order to uphold the true spirit of democracy.
● Part XV, Article 324 – 329 deals with the powers, function, tenure, eligibility, etc. of
the commission and the member.
● Article 324 of the Indian Constitution provides for an independent Election
Commission for the ʻsuperintendence, direction and control of the electoral roll and
conduct of the electionsʼ in India.
● Election Commission is an all India body that conducts the elections to:
✔ Parliament
✔ State Legislature
✔ Office of President
✔ Office of Vice President.

Issues and Suggestions

● Appointment and Removal of members of the EC: There is no ban on members of EC

to get further employment in the any government. Thus nowadays it is becoming
perception that EC is performing its functions independently. Also the chairman and
members are appointed by the executive instead of being constitutional body. In 2015,
the Law Commission recommended a collegium comprising the Prime Minister, the
Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India.
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 ● Discriminatory removal process: CEC is removed like judge of the Supreme Court
while other members are removed by the president on the recommendations of CEC.
● De-registration of political parties: Under the Representation of People Act, 1951, the
EC is the registering authority for all political parties, which have been expressly
provided under Section 29A of the said Act but the power to register does not carry
with it the ancillary power of de-registering a political party. ECI should be vested
with all powers to deregister the non performing parties or fake parties.
● Enforceability of Model Code of Conduct: Model Code of Conduct lacks statutory
backing and ECI expects that political parties should follow the MCC in letter and spirit.
But recently there are numerous cases of violation of MCC. ECI lacks enforceability
powers. In 2013, the Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and
Justice recommended making the MCC legally binding by adding it to the
Representation of People Act, 1951.
● Issue over EVM: Though EVM has proved its capabilities ECI failed to address the
concerns of political parties over the EVM. This has widened the gap between ECI and
political parties as well as ECI and people.
● It is imperative to restore trust in the Election Commission, for it is the guardian of
elections in India, the very foundation of Indian democracy.

ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS

● A tribunal is a statutory, quasi-judicial body established in India by an Act of

Parliament or State Legislature to resolve disputes in speedy, cost effective and in
efficient manner that are brought before it.
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 ● Tribunal performs a number of functions like adjudicating disputes, determining
rights between contesting parties, making an administrative decision, reviewing
an existing administrative decision and so forth.

Constitutional Basis:

● Tribunals were not part of the original constitution.

● Added by 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 with a new Part XIV-A to the Constitution on
recommendation of Swaran Singh Committee. (Committee also recommended
Fundamental Duties)
● 323-A – deals with Administrative Tribunals.
● 323-B– deals with tribunals for other matters.
● Works on principle of natural justice, not abide by civil procedure code.
● Members are drawn from Judicial and administrative streams.
● Chairpersons of tribunals accorded Status of judges of HC
● They enjoy some of the powers of a civil courte. issuing summons and allowing
witnesses to give evidence. Its decisions are legally binding on the parties, subject to
appeal.
● In pursuance of the provisions in Article 323A, Parliament passed the Administrative
Tribunal Act, 1985, providing for all the matters falling within the clause (1) of Article
323-A.
● According to this Act, there must be a Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) at the
centre and a State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) at the state level for every state.

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Utility of Tribunal

● Flexibility in procedures – They are not restrained by rigid rules of procedure.

● Less Expensive – Setup to be less formal, less expensive, and a faster way to resolve
disputes than by using the traditional court system.
● Relief to Courts – The system also gives the relief to ordinary courts of law, which are
already overburdened with numerous suits, tendencies and vacancies.
● Domain experts on a specialized subject – Reduces the time needed and thus costs.
● Diversity of subjects -They hear disputes related to the environment, armed forces, tax
and administrative issues.
● Providing speedy and inexpensive, effective justice to the aggrieved party.

Difference Between Court of Law and Tribunal

● Administrative Tribunals and Ordinary Courts both deal with the disputes between the
parties which affects the rights of the subjects. However, Administrative Tribunal is
not a court.
● Court of Law A court of law is a part of the traditional judicial system.
● Tribunal : An Administrative Tribunal is an agency created by the statute and invested
with judicial power.
● Court of Law The Civil Courts have judicial power to try all suits of a civil nature
unless the cognizance is expressly barred. Tribunal is also known as the Quasi-judicial
body.

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 ● Tribunal : Tribunals have the power to try cases of special matter which are conferred
on them by statutes
● Court of Law Judges of the ordinary courts of law are independent of the executive in
respect of their tenure, terms and conditions of service etc. Judiciary is independent of
Executive.
● Tribunal : Tenure, terms and conditions of the services of the members of
Administrative Tribunal are entirely in the hands of Executive.
● Court of Law A court of law can decide vires of a legislation
● Tribunal : Administrative Tribunal cannot do so
● Court of Law : A court of law is bound by all the rules of evidence and procedure.
● Tribunal : An Administrative Tribunal is not bound by rules but bound by the principles
of nature of Justice.
● Court of Law The presiding officer of the court of law is trained in law and legal
professional.
● Tribunal The president or a member of the Tribunal may not be trained as well in law.
He may be an expert in the field of Administrative matters.
● Court of Law Court must decide all questions objectively on the basis of evidence and
materials on record.
● Tribunal Decision of Administrative Tribunal may be subjective rather than objective.
Administrative Tribunal may decide questions by taking into account departmental
policy.

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Problems with Tribunals

● Violation of Doctrine of Separation of Powers – Tribunal is not a court of law and is

controlled and manned by the members of Judiciary and Executive which allows the
Executive to perform adjudication functions.
● Potential Conflict of interest – Executives adjudicating cases of executives. Executive
is also the largest litigant in the country.
● Inadequate constitutional protection – The tribunals do not enjoy the same
constitutional protection as HC.
● Increasing Pendency and inordinate delays – Average pendency across tribunals is
3.8 years with 25% increase in the size of unresolved cases.
● Undermining the Authority of Judiciary – Tribunals have largely replaced HC for
disputes under the various Acts.
● Overcrowding of tribunals leads to “Tribalization of justice” as observed by
Supreme Court.
● Huge vacancies in dozens of tribunals have defeated the very purpose for which
these specialized quasi- judicial forums were created.
● Unequal geographical presence – Tribunals are also not as accessible as HC. This
makes justice expensive and difficult to access.
● Overlapping Jurisdiction – Various tribunals are functioning under various ministries
and departments and also there are multiple tribunals performing functions of similar
nature.

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Way Forward

● Law Commission of India (LCI) in its report has laid out a detailed procedure for
improving the working of the tribunal system in the country-

● Qualification of judges – In case of transfer of jurisdiction of HC (or District Court) to a

Tribunal, the members of the newly constituted Tribunal should possess the
qualifications akin to the judges of the HC (or District Court).
● Common nodal agency – Under law ministry to monitor the working of tribunals as
well as ensure uniformity in the appointment, tenure and service conditions of all
members appointed in the tribunals.
● Filling Vacancy arising in the Tribunal – Preferably within six months prior to the
occurrence of vacancy.
● Selection should be impartial with minimal involvement of government agencies as
the government is a party in litigation.
● Formation of Separate Selection Committee – for both judicial and administrative
members.
● Equitable regional presence – Tribunals must have benches in different parts of the
country to ensure easy access to justice, ideally where the HC are situated.

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